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FOREWORD 
The 13th ESARDA Symposium, held in the magnificent setting of the 
Palace of the Popes in Avignon, France is characterized by two main 
features. 
One is the very high number of papers in total and more specifically in 
the field of measurements. This means that there is great interest in this 
field again, both in Nondestructive Assay and in Destructive Analysis. 
The total number of papers accepted in the Symposium was: 60 included 
in oral sessions and 66 presented as posters. 
The second important fact is the considerable participation of Eastern 
European Countries. There were several papers and 6 participants from 
the USSR, with appreciated contributions. We also had papers and parti-
cipants from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, countries which are 
candidates to join an important European initiative i.e. COST (Scientific 
and Technical Co-operation) which has the aim of promoting research in 
Europe on a transnational basis. 
I wish to thank all the authors who, in the era of word processors, were 
obliged to use scissors and glue to arrange their papers in a two column 
format. Nevertheless several authors will discover that their papers are a 
little modified in their making-up. 
Finally I am very pleased to note that some authors presented results 
obtained the week before the conference. The ESARDA Symposium is 
in this respect very alive and the proceedings, which will appear promp-
tly, are therefore well updated. The presentation of the manuscripts only 
at the conference time meant that photocopies could not be made befo-
rehand, which would have been useful, especially for the interpreters, 
but I am convinced that the game is worth the candle. 
L. Stanchi 
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Opening address by the Chairman of ESARDA 
B H Patrick (UKAEA, Harwell) 
Ladies and gentlemen 
It is my privilege and pleasure, on behalf of the ESARDA organisation, to 
welcome you to the 13th Annual Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Materials 
Management. In recent years, the pattern of the annual ESARDA meetings has 
been alternate internal meetings with a specific theme, restricted to ESARDA 
members and Working Group observers, and open symposia, such as the present 
one. The latter type provides an opportunity for many representatives from 
countries around the world to interact with ESARDA participants and thereby 
increase the international dimension which is such an important part of 
safeguards. I shall say more on this point later. 
Our hosts this year are The Comissariat a l'Energie Atomique of France. We 
are very much indebted to our French colleagues for arranging for the 
meeting to be held in this superb location, Le Palais des Papes, so full of 
historical significance. I hope you all have an opportunity during the week 
to visit other parts of the Palace and to absorb the atmosphere. I am sure 
we shall all let our minds drift back several centuries at times during the 
next few days, imagining what it was like when this Palace was a powerful 
influence in the land. Princes, ambassadors, cardinals arriving with their 
entourages to have an audience with the Pope; luxurious furnishings, 
extravagant decorations, beautiful paintings must have contributed to the 
magnificence of it all. I shall resist trying to make any comparison with 
our meeting this week, in order not to get into deep water. But I hope 
that, in letting your minds wander, you will not do it during the sessions 
as there is much of interest in the programme! 
It is very encouraging to see such a good turnout. ESARDA itself is 
nothing; it is the people who contribute to its activities who give it its 
strength. Without them there would be no harmonisation of R&D in safeguards 
in Europe and no useful forum for discussion between developers and plant 
operators. Your input is a vital ingredient in ensuring the success of the 
Association. This year, as in the past, we shall have presentations from 
all the ESARDA Partners and from further afield. But it is particularly 
gratifying to see the interest from a number of countries in Eastern Europe. 
I should like to extend a particular welcome to the representatives from 
those areas and say that we look forward greatly to their contributions and 
to interacting with them. 
The Symposium is organised along the usual lines, with sessions devoted to 
the topics which we all recognise as categories of prime importance in 
safeguards. Presentations take two forms, oral and poster. In the latter 
case, specific times are set aside when authors should be available 
alongside their boards and I commend these times to you as I know from 
experience that a great deal can be gained from one-to-one discussions. 
Posters, once set up, will be on display for a whole day to give maximum 
viewing time and I am sure authors will be delighted if you seek them out 
with specific questions, if they are not there when you look at their 
presentations. 
There is one new feature in this year's Symposium - a review talk. For some 
time, I have been concerned at the lack of reviews of important aspects of 
safeguards. In most scientific disciplines that I am aware of, reviews 
appear in journals and at major conferences but this does not seem to be the 
case for safeguards. It is true that some review-type articles appear in 
the ESARDA Bulletin, the Journal of the INMM and occasionally in the IAEA 
Bulletin, but there has been a noticeable lack of review presentations at 
the ESARDA Symposia. This makes it very difficult for a newcomer or someone 
wanting to know the state of the art and practice in a particular area 
without having to plough through individual contributions to a topic 
contained in the proceedings of past conferences. In an attempt to begin to 
bridge this gap, the UK commissioned a review of passive neutron coincidence 
counting by Dr B W Hooton, a former Chairman of ESARDA. He will give a talk 
on this subject in Session 58. As time will not allow him to cover the 
topic in depth, we intend to publish a detailed report in a few months' 
time. We hope this will be a useful contribution to the safeguards 
community and that this initiative will stimulate others to follow suit by 
tackling other important safeguards areas. 
I look forward to an interesting meeting. The programme looks to be an 
exciting and interesting one, and I am sure that, in addition to the 
knowledge gained from the presentations, many useful contacts will be made 
outside the formal sessions. Safeguards, although now a fairly mature 
subject, is nevertheless facing many challenges and problems. The ESARDA 
analysis in 1988 of the nuclear fuel cycle up to the year 2000 highlighted 
the increasing use of MOX in thermal reactor systems and the problems which 
that would bring. The financial pressures on the industry focus attention 
on the need to increase the efficiency of inspection activities to reduce 
the unit cost of safeguards. Several large scale reprocessing plants are 
expected to be commissioned in this decade and it is important to show that 
credible and effective safeguards can be applied. During this meeting, we 
can expect to find the issues arising from these and other current topics 
being addressed and I believe we shall find that practical solutions can be 
found which will enable the nuclear industry to advance in the confident 
knowledge that safeguards measures will be found to give the necessary 
assurance. 
I hope you all have a very enjoyable stay in Avignon. 
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LE CONTROLE DES MATIERES NUCLEAIRES 
EN FRANCE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS EN 
FRANCE 
~P. DEVILLIERS, 
Haut Fonctionnaire de Défense 
Ministère de l'Industrie et de 
l'Aménagement du Territoire 
présenté par M. LAUREANA 
ABSTRACT 
As one of the most important industrial 
electronuclear states ~n the world, 
with a comprehensive national fuel 
cycle (from mines to reprocessing 
plants) on the one hand, and as a 
nuclear supplier as well as a nuclear 
weapon state on the other hand, France 
deemed it necessary to establish its 
own domestic safeguards system, in 
order to struggle against hazards of 
malevolence at the national level and 
to contribute efficiently to nuclear 
non-proloferation at the international 
level. The french legal regulations are 
based on the main following 
principes : 1) Licensing of activities 
related to import-export, to the 
possession or to the transportation of 
nuclear material i 2) Control performed 
by the operator, including NMCA, C/S an 
physical protection i 3} Inspection by 
the domestic Safeguards Authority i 
4) Penalties. Specifities of domestic 
and international Safeguards (Euratom, 
IAEA) concerning objectives and scopes, 
information required, accounting, 
inspection types, R & D are illustrated 
and possible interactions are 
considered. 
1 - INTRODUCTION 
Second pays après les Etats-Unis, avec 
un parc électronucléaire de 56 tranches 
installées représentant 56 GWe nets, la 
France se classe au premier rang 
mondial en ce qui concerne la part du 
nucléaire (75 %) dans le bilan 
électrique national. Elle a été ainsi 
amenée à se doter d'un cycle du 
combustible complet allant de la mine 
au retraitement des combustibles 
irradiés, utilisé à la fois pour ses 
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besoins nationaux et pour la 
de services aux autres pays. 
gouvernemental, la sécurité 
relève de chacun des 
compétents. 
fourniture 
Au niveau 
nucléaire 
ministres 
Pour assurer la cohérence des actions 
entreprise, il a été mis en place, sous 
l'autorité du Premier Ministre, le 
Comité Interministériel de la Sécurité 
Nucléaire, (CISN) présidé par le 
Premier Ministre. Ce comité se réunit 
de façon périodique i le su~v~ 
permanent des affaires est assuré par 
le Secrétariat général du Comité de la 
Sécurité Nucléaire (SGCISN). La France 
dispose par ailleurs d'installations 
nucléaires d'une part pour ses 
programmes de recherche et de 
développement et d'autre part en tant 
qu'Etat doté de 1 'arme nucléaire pour 
les programmes relatifs aux 
applications militaires. Elle est enfin 
l'un des principaux pays industrialisés 
fournisseurs de matières, 
d'équipements, de technologie et de 
services nucléaires. 
Compte tenu de cette situation et 
conscient de ses responsabilités 
particulières, tant au plan national 
pour la sécurité du public qu'au plan 
international dans le domaine de la 
non-prolifération nucléaire, le 
gouvernement français a mis en place un 
dispositif de contrôle national placé 
sous 1' autorité du Haut Fonctionnaire 
de Défense du ministère chargé de 
l'industrie pour : 
- assurer la protection et le contrôle 
des matières nucléaires (vol ou 
détournement). 
- assurer 
installations 
malveillance. 
la protection 
contre des actes 
des 
de 
Si d'autres pays au monde (Etats-Unis, 
Japon, Suède par exemple) ont un 
système national de contrôle, il 
convient de mentionner la situation 
originale de la France au sein de la 
Communauté européenne, puisque aucun 
autre Etat membre n'a instauré un 
système national de comptabilité et de 
contrôle des matières nucléaires 
indépendant, de telle sorte qu'une 
partie des prérogatives est déléguée à 
EURATOM. Ces Etats membres conservent 
par contre, comme la France, leurs 
compétences nationales exclusives pour 
toutes les questions relatives à la 
protection physique et au transport des 
matières nucléaires. 
Seul est abordé dans cet exposé le 
contrôle des matières nucléaires. C'est 
en effet 1 'unique domaine dans lequel 
d'éventuelles interactions peuvent être 
envisagées entre le contrôle national 
et l'application des contrôles de la 
Direction du Contrôle de Sécurité 
d'EURATOM (DCS) et de l'Agence 
Internationale de l'Energie Atomique 
(AIEA) en France, pour la vérification 
du respect des engagements pris par le 
gouvernement français en matière de 
non-prolifération des armes nucléaires 
et autres engagements d'utilisation à 
des fins pacifiques. 
Cependant, comme précisé plus loin, le 
domaine de la protection physique des 
matières ne sera pas totalement exclu 
de cette communication. 
2 - LE CONTROLE FRANCAIS DES MATIERES 
NUCLEAIRES 
La loi du 25 juillet 1980, relative à 
la protection et au contrôle des 
matières nucléaires, et les textes 
d'application définissent les principes 
et les dispositions générales devant 
être mises en oeuvre pour prévenir et 
le cas échéant détecter sans délai 
toutes disparitions, pertes, vols ou 
détournements de matières nucléaires. 
Ces principes et dispositions générales 
s'appliquent à 1' ensemble des matières 
nucléaires, qu'elles soient utilisées 
dans des activités entièrement civiles 
ou destinées aux besoins de la défense 
nationale. 
Selon la nature et la quantité de 
matières, les détenteurs sont soumis à 
un régime d'autorisation, de 
déclaration annuelle ou d'exemption 
(voir tableau annexé). 
La volonté du législateur apparaît dans 
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les maîtres mots "autorisation", 
"contrôle", "sanctions". 
a) Autorisation : 
Une autorisation préalable, délivrée 
par le ministre chargé de l'industrie, 
est requise pour quiconque veut exercer 
des activités d'importation, 
d'exportation, de détention, de 
transfert, d'utilisation ou de 
transport de matières nucléaires. Les 
matières concernées sont le plutonium, 
l'uranium, le thorium, le deutérium, le 
tritium et le lithium enrichi en 
isotope 6, ou les composants contenant 
ces éléments, quelle que soit leur 
forme physique ou chimique, à 
l'exception des minerais. 
A 1 'appui de sa demande, 1 'exp loi tant 
ou le transporteur fournit un dossier 
décrivant les mesures qu'il compte 
mettre en oeuvre pour assurer la 
protection et le contrôle des matières. 
Ce dossier peut éventuellement faire 
référence à des documents internes 
(procédures, consignes, etc ... ) 
Les pouvoirs publics, avec l'aide de 
leur appui technique, procèdent à 
l'analyse de ce dossier afin de 
déterminer si les mesures présentées 
correspondent bien aux exigences 
réglementaires, en particulier pour ce 
qui concerne les niveaux de protection. 
b) Contrôle 
Il s'exerce à deux niveaux 
- En premier lieu par l'exploitant qui 
doit assurer le contrôle des matières 
nucléaires par des mesures appropriées 
et complémentaires de suivi et de 
comptabilité, de confinement, de 
surveillance et de protection physique. 
Les dispositions de suivi et de 
comptabilité ont pour objectif de 
connaître en permanence les quantités, 
la localisation et les mouvements et de 
détecter, puis d'infirmer ou de 
confirmer, toute anomalie concernant 
les quantité, qualité, localisation ou 
emploi des matières nucléaires, en 
utilisant toutes les mesures 
disponibles, y compris les données 
d'exploitation. 
Les mesures de confinement doivent 
prévenir les mouvements de matières non 
autorisés ou non justifiés. Les mesures 
de surveillance doivent garantir 
l'intégrité du confinement, vérifier 
l'absence de sortie de matière par des 
voies anormales, ainsi que l'absence de 
fraude sur les appareils ou équipements 
utilisés pour le suivi, la 
comptabilité, le confinement et la 
surveillance, y compris pour la 
transmission et le traitement des 
données. 
Enfin, les mesures de protection 
physique des matières, des locaux et 
des installations ont pour but de les 
protéger contre les actes de 
malveillance à 1' aide de systèmes de 
protection en profondeur, un contrôle 
des personnes et une intervention 
éventuelle des forces de 1' ordre. Les 
matières nucléaires en cours de 
transport font l'objet de mesures de 
protection destinées à prévenir tout 
vol ou détournement. Les principes de 
la protection physique, bien que plus 
rigoureux en ce qui concerne les seuils 
et certaines matières (uranium naturel 
et appauvri, tritium, lithium 6), sont 
conformes à ceux énoncés par les 
directives de Londres auxquelles la 
France est partie ( INCIRC/254) et par 
la convention internationale sur la 
protection physique des matières 
nucléaires (INFCIRC/274) que la France 
a signé en 1980 et dont le parlement 
français a autorisé l'approbation en 
juin 1989. S'agissant des mesures 
spécifiques de chaque installation ou 
des transports, la confidentialité 
étant la condition essentielle de leur 
efficacité, elles ne doivent être 
connues que des personnes autorisées 
par l'exploitant ou le transporteur, en 
accord avec les pouvoirs publics. 
En second lieu, le contrôle est exercé 
par le Service de Protection et de 
Contrôle des Matières Nucléaires 
(SPCMN) placé sous l'autorité du Haut 
Fonctionnaire de Défense du ministère 
chargé de l'industrie. L'autorité 
nationale fait appel en appui 
technique, aux moyens appartenant à 
1' Institut de Protection et de Sûreté 
Nucléaire du CEA (Département de 
Sécurité des Matières Radioactives). Ce 
contrôle de l'application de la 
réglementation et de la doctrine 
comporte en particulier : 
- l'analyse de la protection et du 
contrôle des matières nucléaires 
(dossier d'autorisation, modifications 
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des installations, respect des 
engagements pris par l'exploitant et 
des prescriptions de l'administration), 
- 1' instruction approfondie des études 
de sécurité demandées à certains 
exploitants pour évaluer leur système 
de protection des matières nucléaires 
et déterminer les actions possibles sur 
la base d'analyses à caractère 
technique, 
- les inspections effectuées par des 
agents habilités par les autorités de 
l'Etat et assermentés. Ces inspections 
tiennent compte notamment de la 
sensibilité des matières nucléaires et 
des conclusions des inspections 
précédentes. Elles sont en principe 
notifiées aux exploitants ; toutefois 
des contrôles inopinés peuvent être 
effectués pour vérifier la mise en 
oeuvre courante des dispositions 
particulières demandées par les 
pouvoirs publics à certains 
exploitants, ou décidées sur le champ à 
la suite d'incidents ou d'événements 
exigeant que des mesures, même 
transitoires, soient mises en oeuvre et 
que des actions correctives soient 
engagées sans délai. 
Aussi bien pour le contrôle effectué 
par 1 'exploitant que pour le contrôle 
par les pouvoirs publics, un accent 
particulier est mis sur l'importance de 
la mise en place des principes de 
l'assurance et de l'organisation de la 
qualité, ou de principes équivalents. 
c) Sanctions 
Certains agissements portant sur les 
matières nucléaires cons ti tuent des 
délits assortis de sanctions pénales 
parfois très lourdes (pouvant atteindre 
10 ans d'emprisonnement). Parmi les 
infractions figurent en particulier 
l'appropriation indue de matières 
nucléaires, l'exercice sans 
autorisation des activités visées par 
la loi, l'obstacle à l'exercice du 
contrôle par les pouvoirs publics, le 
défaut de déclaration de perte, vol, 
disparition ou détournement, la 
détention, le transfert, 1 'utilisation 
ou le transport hors du territoire de 
la République Française de matières 
visées par la convention internationale 
sur la protection physique des matières 
nucléaires, sans autorisation des 
autorités étrangères compétentes. 
3 - COMPARAISON DU CONTROLE NATIONAL 
FRANCAIS ET DES CONTROLES 
INTERNATIONAUX ET INTERACTIONS 
EVENTUELLES 
3.1. - Aspects juridiques 
Sur le plan juridique, le principe 
selon lequel les accords internationaux 
priment les règlements nationaux ; 
aussi le contrôle national tient compte 
des engagements internationaux du 
gouvernement français en matière 
d'utilisation pacifique et non 
explosive des matières nucléaires. 
Ainsi, si la loi de 1980 et les textes 
d'application tenaient compte en 
particulier de notre adhésion au Traité 
d'EURATOM et aux directives de Londres, 
ainsi que de notre offre volontaire de 
soumission aux garanties de l'AIEA 
(INFCIRC/290), la ratification par le 
Parlement de la convention 
internationale sur la protection 
physique des matières nucléaires a 
conduit à la modification de cette loi 
et du code de procédure pénale. 
3.2. - Objectifs et champ 
d'application: 
Une différence politique fondamentale 
existe sur le plan des objectifs. 
Alors que le contrôle national vise le 
terrorisme national ou international 
mettant principalement 1' accent sur le 
vol de matières nucléaires par une 
personne ou un groupe de personnes 
habilitées à travailler normalement 
dans une installation ou un groupe 
d'agresseurs externes, les contrôles 
internationaux ont pour objectif 
d'assurer la communauté internationale 
que les Etats honorent les engagements 
qu'ils ont pris en matière de non-
prolifération et d'utilisation 
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pacifique. Il en résulte une différence 
essentielle sur le plan de la 
responsabilité. Pour le contrôle 
national, celle-ci repose en premier 
lieu sur 1' exploitant considéré comme 
un acteur important de la sécurité 
nationale ; elle est complémentaire du 
contrôle exercé par les pouvoirs 
publics qui vise à vérifier les 
conditions dans lesquelles il applique 
la réglementation. Au contraire pour 
les contrôles internationaux la 
responsabilité est assumée par l'Etat 
qui doit pouvoir rendre compte lui-même 
du respect de ses engagements. 
Par ailleurs le champ d'application du 
contrôle national est plus large que 
celui des contrôles internationaux : 
- pour les matières nucléaires, 
puisqu'il concerne en plus des matières 
brutes et des matières fissiles 
spéciales, le deutérium sous toutes ses 
formes (alors que les accords conclus 
par la Communauté avec le Canada et les 
Etats-Unis sont restreints à l'eau 
lourde), le tritium et le lithium 
enrichi en lithium 6, principalement 
utilisés dans les programmes de 
production d'armes nucléaires, 
- pour les installations concernées, 
puisque le contrôle national vise non 
seulement les matières nucléaires 
civiles, mais aussi les matières 
nucléaires utilisées ou susceptibles de 
1 'être pour les besoins de la défense 
nationale, 
- pour ce qui concerne l'étape du cycle 
du combustible, à partir de laquelle 
commencent ou cessent les 
contrôles : les minerais sont exclus du 
champ d'application de la loi, mais 
sont soumis aux contrôles d'EURATOM, 
alors que les contrôles de l'AlEA 
commencent seulement au stade de la 
matière nucléaire propre à la 
fabrication du combustible ou à 
l'enrichissement, (métal, oxyde ou 
fluorure) . 
- pour ce qui concerne le contrôle des 
matières nucléaires contenues dans les 
déchets, le contrôle national ne 
nécessite plus de dispositions 
spécifiques à l'égard des actes de 
malveillance à partir du moment où les 
déchets ont été conditionnés et stockés 
sur un site de stockage de 1 'ANDRA ; 
les règles de sûreté sont alors 
considérées comme satisfaisantes pour 
les objectifs de la sécurité. Pour 
l'AlEA, il est prévu que les contrôles 
cessent lorsque l'Agence a constaté que 
les matières nucléaires contenues dans 
les déchets ne sont plus utilisables 
pour aucune activité nucléaire ou sont 
pratiquement irrécupérables. Les 
contrôles internationaux cessent en 
principe de s'appliquer après que les 
vérifications aient eu lieu 
préalablement au conditionnement. Il 
paraîtrait déraisonnable en tout état 
de cause que pour des motifs de non-
prolifération de tels contrôles 
s'appliquent aux sites de stockage 
définitif de déchets non utilisables ou 
irrécupérables. 
3.3. - Dossier à fournir par 
l'exploitant et dispositions 
appliquées : 
Sur le plan national, l'exploitant 
adresse au ministère chargé de 
1' industrie un dossier de demande 
d'autorisation et de contrôle de 
1' installation, avec en particulier un 
chapitre suivi et comptabilité rédigé 
selon un plan type. Pour EURATOM, les 
"déclarations des caractéristiques 
techniques fondamentales" et pour 
l'AlEA le "questionnaire sur les 
renseignements descriptifs", bien que 
différents dans la forme et le détail 
du contenu, présentent certains points 
communs pour le chapitre décrivant les 
dispositions et mesures de suivi et de 
comptabilité mises en oeuvre par 
l'exploitant. 
Pour ce qui concerne les dispos! ti ons 
nationales, une autorisation de 
détention, de transport, d'utilisation, 
d'élaboration ou d'import-export, est 
délivrée par le ministère de 
l'industrie sous forme d'un arrêté 
fixant les conditions et les limites 
d'exploitation. A cet arrêté est joint 
un état récapitulatif dressé par le 
SPCMN, qui recense 1' ensemble des 
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correspondances et des dossiers qui lui 
sont adressés par le titulaire de 
l'autorisation. Ainsi ce document 
témoigne-t-il des engagements de ce 
titulaire envers les pouvoirs publics 
et acceptés par eux pour assurer la 
protection et le contrôle des matières 
nucléaires. Cette autorisation ne 
dispense évidemment pas des obligations 
du chapitre VII du Traité d'EURATOM. 
3.4. - Comptabilité : 
Des différences entre le système 
national et les systèmes internationaux 
existent pour : 
- les matières nucléaires, plus 
nombreuses dans le système national, 
comme déjà indiqué, 
- les découpages en ensembles 
techniques au plan national et les 
zones de bilan matières pour EURATOM et 
1 'AlEA qui, répondant à des objectifs 
différents, ne sont pas nécessairement 
identiques, bien qu'il y ait toujours 
une cohérence parfaite entre un ou 
plusieurs ensembles et une zone de 
bilan matières, 
- les délais de transmission des 
données comptables, le jour même pour 
le contrôle national, le mois pour les 
contrôles internationaux, 
- les renseignements à transmettre, les 
descriptions détaillées des matières, 
tels que ceux fournis au contrôle 
national, ne concernent pas les 
contrôles internationaux, alors qu'au 
contraire les codes d'engagement 
particulier demandés par EURATOM ne 
sont pas de la responsabilité directe 
du contrôle national. 
Dans le domaine de la comptabilité, 
l'impératif est de ne pas obliger 
1' exploitant à faire des déclarations 
distinctes, en élaborant un modèle de 
rapport comptable satisfaisant aux 
obligations des deux systèmes. Le 
système national de comptabilité 
centralisée permet d'adresser à EURATOM 
des rapports comptables dans le format 
voulu (1) (2). 
A côté de cet impératif il y a le voeu 
constant de rapprocher autant que 
possible les deux systèmes. 
3.5. Confinement, surveillance et 
protection physique : 
Bien que la protection physique soit de 
la compétence exclusive des Etats, des 
interférences paraissent possibles 
entre les deux systèmes de contrôle. En 
efffet dans les opérations qu'ils 
conçoivent, les contrôleurs 
internationaux doivent se conformer aux 
restrictions d'accès motivées pour des 
raisons de sécurité nationale. Ceci 
milite en faveur d'un système de 
confinement et de surveillance de 
l'organisme international, indépendant 
de celui de l'exploitant et de son 
système de protection physique, et sur 
lequel ce dernier n'aura aucun retour 
d'information à moins de détection 
d'anomalie. La présence d'un tel 
système indépendant renforce malgré 
tout les dispositions mises en place 
dans le cadre du contrôle national. 
Un autre exemple d'interférence 
possible entre les deux systèmes 
concerne la protection physique des 
transports qui repose en particulier 
sur des règles strictes de 
confidentialité quant aux 
renseignements relatifs aux matières 
nucléaires et à la date du transport. 
Or une certaine information doit être 
notifiée à la Direction du Contrôle de 
Sécurité d'EURATOM et éventuellement à 
1 'AlEA pour que les inspecteurs aient 
la possibilité de vérifier sur site 
certaines réceptions ou certaines 
expéditions et poser ou ôter des 
scellés. Afin d'éviter tout risque de 
fuite d'informations sensibles du point 
de vue de la protection contre la 
malveillance en cours de transport, 
l'emploi d'un système codé de 
transmission et la plus grande 
discrétion de la part des inspecteurs 
internationaux sont nécessaires. La 
même remarque est d'ailleurs applicable 
en ce qui concerne les données sur le 
suivi et la comptabilité (localisation 
et quantités de matières sensibles) ou 
sur la surveillance des matières 
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nucléaires dans les installations. Ceci 
devra d'autant plus être pris en 
considération à l'avenir que des moyens 
modernes de transmission (en 
particulier par satellites) seront 
utilisés entre les installations et les 
sièges des organismes de contrôle. 
3.6. - Inspections 
a) C'est dans ce domaine 
qu'apparaissent les distinctions les 
plus importantes au niveau des 
procédures et des moyens mis en oeuvre. 
Ceci est la conséquence des différences 
entre le contrôle national et les 
contrôles internationaux qui conduisent 
à des objectifs d'inspections 
spécifiques. Contrairement au contrôle 
national, les contrôles internationaux 
se fixent pour objectif de détecter des 
détournements de matières nucléaires 
effectués par un Etat en une seule fois 
(abrupt diversion) ou en plusieurs fois 
sur une année (protracted diversion) 
d'une quantité significative de 
matières nucléaires. 
La notion de détournement en une seule 
fois conduit à la prise en compte du 
facteur temps lié au délai de 
détection. Il en résulte pour la 
fréquence, la nature et la portée, deux 
types d'inspection : celles qui visent 
le contrôle de 1' inventaire annuel et 
celles dites "intérimaires" relatives 
aux flux et à l'objectif d'inspection 
lié au facteur temps. 
Dans le cas du contrôle national, les 
inspections peuvent être de portée 
générale (examen de la protection d'un 
site par exemple), ou viser un thème 
précis (suivi et comptabilité ou 
confinement, surveillance et protection 
physique d'une installation ou d'une 
partie d'installation) ou porter sur 
1' analyse des procédures établies par 
l'exploitant, des résultats obtenus et 
des moyens utilisés pour les obtenir. 
A l'occasion des contrôles d'inventaire 
ou des mouvements de matière, les 
inspecteurs français effectuent, comme 
les inspecteurs internationaux, des 
vérifications indépendantes par analyse 
non destructive ou prélèvement 
d'échantillons pour analyse 
destructive. Mais ils vérifient 
surtout l'efficacité des procédures et 
la rigueur de leur application par 
l'exploitant, en particulier pour 
l'inventaire, les mouvements de 
matières (réception, expédition, 
transferts) , les écarts expéditeur-
destinataire, les différences 
d'inventaire ou les écarts de bilan de 
campagne. 
Au contraire, les vérifications 
effectuées par les contrôles 
internationaux pour le su1v1 et la 
comptabilité portent systématiquement 
sur des mesures indépendantes utilisant 
des analyses non destructives ou des 
échantillonnages pour analyse 
destructive par un laboratoire 
extérieur. ces mesures basées sur des 
plans d'échantillonnage statistiques 
ont pour objectif de détecter le 
détournement d'une quantité 
significative de matière nucléaire avec 
une probabilité déterminée (souvent de 
95 %) • 
On constate d'ailleurs que 
l'utilisation de critères différents 
aboutit en France à une activité 
d'inspection de la part d'EURATOM 
supérieure à celle du contrôle 
national, avec en particulier une 
inspection continue des installations 
de retraitement de la COGEMA à La Hague 
et d'enrichissement d'EURODIF et une 
inspection trimestrielle des réacteurs 
à eau sous pression d'EDF. Le nombre 
d'inspecteurs internationaux habilités 
à opérer en France est beaucoup plus 
élevé que celui du contrôle national. 
b) En ce qui concerne le droit d'accès, 
l'autorité nationale compétente peut 
faire effectuer à tout moment et en 
tout lieu toute inspection qu'elle juge 
nécessaire. Dans le cas des contrôles 
internationaux, un droit d'accès, à 
tout moment et en tout lieu, est 
reconnu par le Traité d'EURATOM et le 
Statut de l'AlEA. Cependant en pratique 
les dispositions particulières de 
contrôle pour EURATOM et les 
arrangements subsidiaires pour l'AlEA 
précisent les modalités d'exercice de 
ce droit d'accès et le limitent dans 
les faits à des points stratégiques, en 
particulier les points de mesure 
principaux. 
4 - LE PROGRAMME FRANCAIS DE R & D DANS LE 
DOMAINE DE LA SECURITE DES MATIERES 
NUCLEAIRES 
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Depuis plusieurs années la FRANCE a un 
programme important de recherche et 
développement dans le domaine de la 
sécurité des matières nucléaires. 
L'effort le plus important est celui 
consacré à la protection physique qui 
n'est pas traitée ici d'une part parce 
que ce sujet n'entre pas dans le cadre 
ESARDA, d'autre part parce que nous 
tenons à lui conserver une certaine 
confidentialité pour mieux assurer 
l'efficacité des mesures adoptées. Nous 
nous limiterons donc à ce qui concerne 
le suivi, la comptabilité et le 
confinement surveillance. 
4.1. -Motivations : 
La priorité de ce programme est 
évidemment de faciliter l'exercice du 
"contrôle national". Un autre but vise 
à l'amélioration des contrôles 
internationaux, en contribuant à la 
mise au point de méthodes et 
d'appareils de contrôle dont la mise en 
oeuvre gêne le moins possible les 
exploitants tout en assurant 
l'efficacité des contrôles. 
Si certaines recherches sont au départ 
effectuées pour résoudre un problème 
spécifique du contrôle national ou des 
contrôles internationaux, d'autres ont 
des objectifs communs. 
4.2. - R & Den confinement 
surveillance : 
Les développements les plus importants 
actuellement en cours dans le domaine 
du confinement surveillance sont les 
suivants 
4. 2. 1. - Scellés 
La Direction des Applications 
Militaires du CEA participe au 
développement des scellés à ultra-sons 
VALSEUR et TITUS en collaboration avec 
le CCR d'ISPRA (4). 
Le Département de Sécurité des Matières 
Radioactives de l'IPSN améliore un 
scellé à fibre optique "SAFO" associé à 
un système portable de lecture et de 
vérification automatique. Le logiciel 
d'analyse et comparaison des images 
développé à cette occasion donne déjà 
des résultats très intéressants. Les 
efforts actuels portent sur la 
miniaturisation du dispositif de 
lecture et d'enregistrement des images, 
ainsi que sur l'augmentation de la 
résistance à la fraude des scellés. 
4. 2. 2. - Surveillance d'un stockage de 
Plutonium en temps réel : 
Le plutonium et le tritium dégageant en 
permanence une énergie calorifique 
appréciable , cette propriété est mise 
à profit pour vérifier la continuité de 
la présence de ces matières dans leur 
stokage, par simple lecture continue 
des températures données par des 
thermistances judicieusement placées. 
Les efforts actuels portent sur la 
transmission par radio de ces 
températures et sur leur tri 
informatique, de manière à bien 
distinguer les ouvertures des 
conteneurs, des mises en route des 
ventilations (5). 
4.2.3. - Dénombrement, 
et transfert : 
identification 
Dans le cadre du programme français de 
soutien des garanties de l'AlEA, le CEA 
et la COGEMA ont développé un système 
intégré de dénombrement et 
d'identification des transfert des 
assemblages combustibles irradiés 
entrant dans les piscines de stockage 
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de l'usine de LA HAGUE. Ce système de 
surveillance appelé CONSULHA est basé 
sur une détection gamma et neutron, 
ainsi que sur des prises de vues par 
caméra-vidéo. Ce dispositif fonctionne 
maintenant depuis environ un an, et ses 
premiers résultats font l'objet d'une 
communication pendant ce congrès (6). 
4. 3. - R & D concernant des appareils 
de mesure : 
4.3.1. -Mesure de densité des liquides 
Les développements les plus importants 
actuellement en cours concernent la 
mesure in situ des densités et des 
niveaux de liquides dans des cuves par 
bullage lent de gaz en condition quasi-
statique et mesures de pression du gaz. 
Ce dispositif qui n'utilise aucune 
source électrique pour la prise 
d'information est bien adapté aux 
liquides agressifs, radioactifs et 
ionisants créant un milieu hostile soit 
pour le matériel, soit pour 
l'opérateur. Il a déjà été utilisé avec 
succès dans diverses usines françaises 
du cycle du combustible (MALVES!, LA 
HAGUE) , notamment pour des mesures de 
densité du nitrate d'uranyle. Les 
efforts actuels portent sur 
l'automatisation du cycle de mesure et 
sur la diminution du temps de mesure à 
moins de 4 minutes (7). 
4.3.2. Contrôleur 
destructif (CINO) : 
isotopique non-
L'appareil en cours de développement 
est une amélioration du dispositif 
utilisé par COGEMA pour mesurer 
1' enrichissement de 1 'uranium dans les 
conteneurs d'UF5 de type 30B ou 48 Y. 
Ce dispositif utilise une méthode 
d'interrogation neutronique active à 
l'aide d'une source d'Am/Li qui 
présente l'avantage d'être peu sensible 
aux variations d'épaisseur des parois 
des conteneurs résultant de la 
corrosion, ainsi qu'à 1' épaisseur des 
dépôts internes d'UF6 souvent collés 
aux parois. 
Les efforts actuels portent sur 
l'allègement du dispositif initial, 
l'amélioration du rapport signal/bruit 
et de la stabilité des signaux émis 
(nouveaux détecteurs), ainsi que sur la 
facilité de mise en oeuvre (mesure en 
bout des conteneurs avec un 
positionnement plus reproductible de 
l'appareil par rapport au conteneur). 
4. 3. 3. - Amélioration du traitement du 
signal dans les mesures neutroniques 
passives 
Ce dispositif en cours de développement 
est une amélioration du traitement 
classique des mesures neutroniques 
passives par les sy.stèmes de 
coincidence à registre à décalage, qui 
est particulièrement intéressant pour 
les échantillons de masse importante 
dans lesquels les effets de 
multiplication neutronique ne sont pas 
négligeables (8). 
5 - CONCLUSION 
La comparaison entre le système 
français de contrôle et les contrôles 
d'EURATOM et de l'AIEA peut conduire à 
se poser la question des rapports entre 
ces deux systèmes. 
Après dix ans d'expérience la 
comparaison effectuée montre que, 
malgré des objectifs différents, ils ne 
peuvent pas s'ignorer, et qu'ils sont 
complémentaires. 
L'existence d'un système national de 
comptabilité et de contrôle des 
matières nucléaires, fiable et 
efficace, est considérée par l'AIEA 
comme un élément fondamental pour 
l'efficacité de ses propres contrôles. 
De même une partie de la R & D 
effectuée pour les besoins du contrôle 
national peut, au prix d'une adaptation 
tenant compte des objectifs spécifiques 
des contrôles, apporter une aide dans 
l'application des contrôles 
internationaux en France, mais aussi 
dans d'autres pays. 
L'application des contrôles 
internationaux en France devrait 
permettre de renforcer les dispositions 
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mises en place par l'exploitant dans le 
cadre du contrôle national dans la 
mesure où les autorités nationales 
pourraient bénéficier d'un retour 
d'expérience de la part des organismes 
internationaux. D'une manière générale, 
les anomalies constatées par les 
contrôles internationaux, fournissent 
des indicateurs susceptibles de 
conduire l'autorité nationale 
compétente à infléchir ses 
prescriptions. Une certaine 
concertation pourrait être utile en 
certain cas pour éviter une duplication 
ou certaines difficultés. 
En conclusion, il parait intéressant de 
rechercher les avantages qui peuvent 
résulter d'un échange mutuel 
d'informations et d'une concertation 
bien organisée. 
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Abstract 
The overal I objective of the energy 
polIcy of the European Community Is to achieve 
a secure supply of energy at reasonable cost 
and low environmental Impact. 
This overall objective is embedded In the 
ste~s taken by the European Community towards 
the Single European Market. This subject will 
be addressed brIef I y, as we 11 as the 
developments In eastern Europe Including the 
European Energy Charter. 
With regard to nuclear energy In the 
community, facts and Issues related to 
electricity production, the front end and back 
end of the nuclear fuel cycle ·and current 
environmental and safety Issues will be 
presented. A common Industrial strategy is 
required In the Community Including safety 
regulations, technical specifications and 
products for international markets. 
Concerning Safeguards, the Commission Is 
fully committed to the obligations from 
chapter VI I of the Treaty and to any relevant 
International agreements concluded by the 
community. This Is reflected In the close 
cooperation of the Commission with the IAEA 
and in the increase of resources, both In 
staff and budget, which the Commission has 
allocated to the Safeguards Directorate to 
cope with the Increasing requirements, for 
example for bulk hand! lng facilities. 
Based on a request from the European 
Parliament, the Commission has issued In 1989 
a f 1 rst Report on the Ope rat Ion of Euratom 
Safeguards. The Commission services are 
currently preparing the second report of this 
type. 
Finally, some remarks with regard to the 
future of nuclear energy and challenges of 
safeguards in the Community will be made. 
1. Introduction 
lt is reported that Albert Einstein 
surmised that the fate of nuclear power would 
be decided In the market squares. For European 
democracies, both new and old, the abl lity to 
use nuclear energy depends more on social and 
political factors than on economic and 
technical ones. 
In the area of nuclear energy, as in some 
other high technology industry there exists a 
large gap between what Is known and understood 
by the experts and what the public perceives 
to be true. This public perception, even If it 
1 s wrong, has enormous consequences, because 
public opinion can have a significant effect 
on how funds are spent. 
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The public associates immediately "Three 
Mile Island" and "Chernobyl" with nuclear 
energy but who associates "Chelyabinsk" with 
the use of natural gas 7 
it is Important, therefore, that 
adequate information on the risks of nuclear 
energy be made access I b I e and understandab I e 
to the public. The public has the right to 
know that al 1 areas In the nuclear fuel cycle 
are fu I 1 y deve I oped and are we I I mastered by 
scientists and engineers. 
One important step amongst others In this 
regard, was the publication of the 
International Nuclear Event Scale for prompt 
communication of the safety significance of 
Incidents and accidents. This scale was 
designed by an International group of experts 
convened by the IAEA and the OECD Nuclear 
Energy Agency and wl 11 permit a more objective 
judgment and classification of the 
significance of events both to the experts and 
to the public. 
2. Current Energy Issues In the 
European Community 
The overal I objective of the energy polIcy 
of the European Community is to achieve a 
secure supply to satisfy demand at reasonable 
cost and low environmental impact. 
2.1. The Internal Energy Market 
This overal I objective Is embedded in the 
steps taken by the European Community towards 
the Single Energy Market. 
In the past, the Community approached 
energy matters largely In playing the role of 
a coordinator of national energy policies of 
the Individual Member States. The European 
community has developed a joint energy policy 
only In particular sectors, namely the 
European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and 
a specific nuclear fusion programme. Since the 
first ol 1 crisis, the Commission and the 
counci 1 have agreed on recommendations and 
guidelines, e.g. for using oil and natural 
gas, for saving energy, for energy Import 
policy and for energy supply reliabl llty. 
Euratom has essentially concentrated on 
research and development activities, health 
and safety, supply and external relations 
Issues. Consequently the introduction of 
commercial nuclear power was, and sti I I is, a 
national decision within each Member State. 
Since 1985 (Commission white paper for a 
single market) and more specifically since 
1988 (publ lcation of white paper for an 
Internal energy market) the Commission has 
initiated a strategy for a common energy 
po I icy wh i eh cou Id eventua I I y be embodied 1 n 
the EEC Treaty. 
it Is important here to emphasize that 
the Community's role Is to set the conditions 
for a Single Energy Market, I.e. to create a 
framework for a I iberal, barrier-free, secure 
and competitive trading environment In which 
Industry can operate effectively. 
1992 Is approaching fast, but good 
progress can be reported In some areas wh I eh 
are fundamental for the establishment of an 
Internal energy market: 
-The Counci I adopted a directive on 
transparency of prices, a basic pre-
requisite for the operation of an open 
energy market. Twice per year, prIces paid 
by consumers for energy from the various 
suppliers wi 11 be published. 
-The Councl I also adopted a directive on 
Community trade In electricity, dealing with 
the use of the different electricity 
d I st r i but I on networks In the Member States 
across national frontiers. 
-This year the Councl I wi I I adopt a directive 
on natural gas, which should lead, through 
better Implementation of transit across 
national frontiers, to Increasing trade 
between existing suppliers and more 
competition. 
- Further proposa Is in other energy sectors 
are In preparation, the main focus being the 
introduction of greater competItIon by the 
removal of restrictive national barriers. As 
a direct consequence of this, the large 
single market should lead to reduced energy 
costs to the benefit of al I consumers. 
-Some open questions sti 11 exist In the area 
of access of third parties to electricity 
and gas networks of the Community. The 
Commission undertook during the last 12 
months extensive consultations on this topic 
with the industry as we I I as with the Member 
States. The Commission wi 11 formulate Its 
proposals In this area later this year. 
- Anotfier area of Commission Initiative will 
be the establishment of environmental 
standards in the energy sector and a certain 
harmonisation with regard to Indirect taxes. 
-The Community also adopted a directive to 
deal with public procurement: certain works 
or supp I I es in the energy sector must 
therefore go out to tender Community - wide 
and not be subject to pressure to award 
contracts to local or national suppl lers. 
Supply is only one side of the coin. The 
Community has not forgotten the demand side of 
the equation. Substantial amounts of money and 
effort have been spent on developments to save 
energy and to Increase energy effIcIency. 1 n 
the area of new energy technology, the 
Community has spent since 1974 about 1.5 
billion ECU supporting some 2.500 projects. 
The new Community technology programme THERMIE 
wi 11 continue this I ine of development. 
2.2. The International dimension 
The CommunIty is not an is I and nor an 
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isolated "fortress" as some believe. The 
Community stilI depends for nearly 50% of Its 
energy supply on resources from outside the 
Community. 
Long before the recent Gu If er Is Is, the 
Community has recognised the necessity of 
strengthening the energy relations with the 
neighbouring countries of EFTA, the near east 
and far east, and, of course, the countries of 
eastern Europe. 
The sincere desire to express our 
solidarity with the populatlons of the USSR 
and the countries of eastern Europe, the need 
to support their energy infrastructure 
development and I iberalization and our concern 
with the serious deterioration of the energy 
situation has lead to a number of Initiatives 
and Increased cooperation with those states: 
-The EC-USSR agreement of 1990 Includes 
provisions for co-operation on nuclear 
energy, nuclear safety, environmental 
protection and indeed the energy sector as a 
whole. 
-The Commission coordinates the work of the 
24 group, Which decided in October 1990 that 
energy was a priority for cooperation with 
eastern Europe. 
-The Community programme PHARE, originally 
considered for Poland and Hungary, has been 
extended to Bulgaria, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. An amount of 
6 Mlo ECUS per country could be used during 
1991 In the energy field. 
2.3. The European Energy Charter 
As a follow up of Prime Minister Lubbers 
initiative for a European Energy Community at 
the summit In Dub I in in June 1990, the 
Commission proposed a European Energy Charter 
at the Paris summit In November 1990. 
In its substance, the European Energy 
Charter envisages a scheme for ensurIng 
security and diversification of supply on a 
pan-European basis, I Inking the massive energy 
resources (suppl les) of the Soviet Union with 
the markets (demands) In Western Europe. 
Amongst others, two major political 
Issues wl I I have to be considered: 
-The geographical scope of the Charter. 
Presently it Is considered that the 
Community countries, the countries of 
eastern Europe, the USSR and the EFTA 
countries should at least be signatories. 
-The management and monitoring of compl lance 
with the Charter and Its sectoral 
agreements. 
The definition of principles and 
objectives for such a cooperation and the 
measures necessary for Its Implementation will 
be the subject of an International conference 
later this year. The Charter wi 11 be a two-
tier system: the Charter itself, as the code 
of conduct on broad economic, energy and 
environmental principles, and then the 
specific agreements associated with it. 
3. Nuclear Energy In the Community, 
Facts and Issues 
Nuclear energy, especially in the context 
with the European Energy Charter, will be a 
priority issue for transeuropean cooperation. 
This source of energy, which is at 
present a key source of electricity production 
not only in the Community, but also In eastern 
Europe and in the USSR, should be evaluated on 
Its own merits and compared objectively with 
other energy sources for electricity 
production in terms of safety, respect of the 
environment and direct and indirect costs. 
3.1. Electricity 
energy 
production from nuclear 
The net total electricity production in 
the European Community was about 1700 TWh 
during 1990 (EUROSTAT/1991). About 56% of this 
total production was generated by conventional 
thermal power stations, 35% by nuclear power 
stations and 9% by hydro-electric and 
geothermal plants. 
The five largest countries of the 
Community, namely (In order of production) 
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy and 
Spain account for 86% of the total electricity 
production. 
In the six of 
Community, which 
nuclear energy the 
follows: 
the twelve countries of the 
produce electricity from 
proportions In 1990 were as 
-the 55 reactors In operation in France have 
accounted for 75% of the electricity 
production. 13% of the French electricity 
product Ion was exported to other CommunIty 
Member States; 
- in Belgium~ the 7 reactors In operation 
del lvered 60% of the electricity production; 
- the 9 Spanish reactors accounted for about 
36% of the electricity production; 
- the 22 (west) German reactors accounted for 
33% of the country's total electricity 
production; 
- the 34 reactors In the United Kingdom 
accounted for about 20% of the electricity 
production and 
-the 2 reactors in the Netherlands accounted 
for 5% of the electricity production. 
What are the future perspectives? 
In its "I I lustratlve Nuclear Programme 
for the Community" of 1985 the Commission set 
out as one objective that the electricity 
production In the Community based on nuclear 
energy should reach a share of 35% by 1990. 
While this objective has been met lt Is 
Inconceivable that the target of 40% envisaged 
for 1995 wl I I be reached. 
The nuclear reactor programmes in the 
Member States have changed in the aftermath 
of Chernobyl. After the accession of the GDR 
to the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
construction of 6 reactors there was stopped. 
France and the United Kingdom have 5 plants 
under construction and projects for 4 further 
reactors exist. Germany Is considering the 
construction of new reactors to cope with the 
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expected electricity demands in the eastern 
part of Germany and to reduce the pollution 
caused by the extensIve use of I IgnIte for 
electricity production In old technology 
plants. 
lt Is projected that the electricity 
demand In the European Community wl I I Increase 
by about 20% over the next decade from 1700 
TWh to about 2000 TWh. 
The decision on which Individual energy 
source sha I I be used to meet the IncreasIng 
demand wl 11 not only depend on costs but also 
on environmental considerations. 
Energy costs have a substantial Impact on 
the competitiveness of the economy within and 
outside the European Community. 
The governments of France, the United 
K 1 ngdom, Be I g I um and Germany have Issued In 
Apr 11 1991 a "Common declaratIon about the use 
of nuc I ear energy for peacefu I purposes" In 
which they agree, Inter alia, to stabilise the 
co2 emissions In the Community until the 
year 2000 on the level of 1990. 
This agreement, which Is in line with 
other conclusions/recommendations made 
previously, for example at the World Energy 
Conference In Montreal (1989), could Imply an 
increased use of natural gas and nuclear 
energy to replace existing plants burning coal 
and oil and to meet additional future energy 
demands. 
3.2. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Developments 
While the number of power reactors in the 
CommunIty may not Increase substantIa 11 Y, 
there are and will be major developments and 
1 nvestments 1 n the so-ea I I ed back end of the 
fuel cycle In the Community. For the front end 
of the fuel cycle, there stl I I exists surplus 
mining and Industrial capacity and large 
stockpiles. Rational lsation of this sector 
will take several years owing to the presence 
of a secondary market for sales of surplus 
uranium and enrichment services. 
With the respect to the back end of the 
fuel cycle, France and the United Kingdom are 
constructing and commissioning three large 
reprocessing plants at Cap La Hague and 
Sellafield to process the Irradiated fuel 
from Inside and outside the Community. 
The 1 ncreased recyc I I ng of PIu ton I um In 
MOX fuel for I ight water reactors has lead to 
3 projects for new MOX fabrication facl I I ties 
in Germany (Siemens MOX plant), France (MELOX 
plant) and the United Kingdom (MDF plant). 
Enr 1 chment techno I ogy Is beIng Improved 
and new enrichment processes using laser 
technologies are being developed. 
Further construction and commissioning of 
interim fuel storage Installations, waste 
conditioning plants and final waste storage 
faci I I ties is planned in France, Germany and 
in the United Kingdom. 
Experience in the decomissioning of 
nuclear facilities will increase considerably. 
In addition to the 29 completed 
decommlssioning projects in the Community, 
there are at present a further 22 projects in 
progress and 14 projects planned. 
With regard to power reactors, lt can be 
expected that Industry will stay with light 
water reactors for about a further 20 years. 
Improvements will focus on safety features and 
to a more efficient use of fuel, by Improved 
fue I desIgn, core management. hIgher burn up 
and the extended use of recycled plutonium and 
uranium. 
European research centres and the 
manufacturing Industry have agreed to work 
together In the design of a European Fast 
Breeder Reactor (EFR), which would be 
licensable In all European countries Involved. 
3.3. Nuclear energy and environment 
While the choice of the energy options Is 
with the Member States, lt Is the duty of the 
Commission to ensure at Its highest levels the 
respect of the Euratom Treaty, for the well 
being of al I Europeans and for a better 
assimilation of this energy source Into 
society as a whole. 
Related to safety and environment, the 
Commission Is supporting directly or 
Indirectly a number of projects. 
Authorities In the Soviet Union 
recognised that the accident of Chernobyl was 
a tragedy which reached well beyond the 
boundaries of the USSR. For the first time 
they broke a tradition of silence. 
The European Community took Immediate 
steps to reinforce Its activities to Improve 
nuc I ea·r safety. L I kewl se, I nternat Iona I 
organisations specialising In nuclear safety, 
both publiC (IAEA and OECD) and private (WANO) 
started programmes to perfect or update older 
or less sophisticated reactors. 
The CommIssIon has promoted a twinnIng 
operation amongst nuclear power stations In 
western and eastern Europe. The exchange of 
plant experience accumulated by more than 200 
nuclear plants will represent a benefit to all 
Involved to optlmlse plant operations and as a 
consequence, enhance safety. 
With the financial support of the 
Community, programmes to evaluate the safety 
of the the Soviet VVER reactors, to Increase 
their safety levels and to Intensify the 
training of staff are being carried out. 
The concept of an open sIng I e European 
energy market requires that, power be 
generated on an economically competitive basis 
subject to comparable environmental protection 
regulations and the necessity of a joint 
energy policy. Today there are substantial 
differences between the Member States on 
environmental standards and safety 
regu I at Ions wh I eh I nf I uence Investment, 
operating and maintenance costs, and even 
production capacity. 
Against this background, nuclear energy 
Is, In fact, beginning a new phase In Its 
evolution. Nuclear power should become the 
subject of a common Industrial strategy, 
developed by the Interested partIes working 
together. The declaratIon of the four Member 
States on the use of nuclear energy referred 
to previously, Is a step In the right 
direct Ion. 
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This common Industrial strategy should 
combine the fol lowlng elements to achieve Its 
objective: 
- the European states, within 
soverelgnlty, should adopt 
regulations In relation to the 
nuclear power stations; 
theIr own 
the same 
safety of 
- the producers of electricity by nuclear 
plants should reach an understanding and 
define together the technical specifications 
of future reactors; 
- the main nuclear contractors should get 
together to out I lne any proposal for a 
common product to offer to the International 
market. French and German companies have 
already started down this road. 
Summing up, lt would mean conceiving and 
bu Id I ng a common European reference reactor. 
Drawing from plans already In use In France 
and Germany, this European project could be a 
common enterprise with the Community producers 
of nuclear electricity, and should they wish, 
the Member States of EFTA, eastern European 
countries as wel I as the USSR, could take 
part. 
In this way, all Interested European 
countr les would have taken part in the 
conception of the reactor with the possibility 
of adoptIng I dent I ea I regu I at Ions of nuc I ear 
safety and observing the same codes of 
construction. 
Europe would then have standards assuring 
irreprochable levels of safety and of quality 
control. The European economic area, then 
beIng homogeneous, w I I I Increase free 
competition amongst all the suppliers of 
nuclear equipment or systems services. 
In this way, the objectives of safety and 
economic vlabl I lty wl I I be attained In a free 
market way rather than by Community 
regulation. For the rest of the century, the 
nuclear option wl I I remain one option 
Impossible to do without. The lndlspenslble 
condition Is that this energy source receives 
public acceptance and credlbll lty. 
4. Safeguards In the European Community 
One of the means to a eh I eve cred I bIll ty 
and public acceptance of the nuclear energy Is 
to continue to perform credible safeguards In 
Europe. To this end and to fulfil I the mandate 
of Article 77 of the Euratom Treaty, the 
comm 1 ss ion has, sI nee 1958. dep I oyed a corps 
of Euratom Inspectors. 
The Commission has since that time not 
on 1 y supported the IncreasIng use of nuc I ear 
energy In the Community, but has assured In a 
complementary way that ad91tlonal resources 
were made aval lable for safeguards of the 
civil nuclear fuel cycle as would be the case 
for safety considerations In other Industries 
involving high technology. 
The Commission Is fully committed to the 
obligations from chapter VII of the Treaty and 
to any relevant International agreements 
concluded by the Community. This Is reflected 
1 n the c I ose cooper at Ion of the Comll) I ss I on 
with the IAEA and In the increase of 
resources, both In staff and budget, which the 
Commission has allocated to the Safeguards 
Directorate following approval by the 
Community's budgetary authorities to cope with 
the Increasing requirements at bulk hand I ing 
facilities. 
At the end of 1990, Euratom safeguards 
applied to 795 Installations of the European 
Community. The total stock of civi I nuclear 
mater I a I under Euratom safeguards at the end 
of 1990 was about .83.000t depleted uranium, 
44.000t natural uranium, 32.000t low enriched 
uranium, 13t high enriched uranium, 203t 
plutonium and 2.600t of thorium. 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate had at 
the end of 1990 227 staff members of which 165 
were operational Inspectors. During 1990 more 
than 7.500 mandays of inspections were carried 
out. The operational costs (excluding staff 
costs and main frame computer) were about 6 
Mio Ecu. 
The Commission provided In early 1990 for 
the first time, a comprehensive survey on the 
operation of Euratom safeguards in the civi.l 
nuclear fuel cycle to the Councl I and the 
European Pari lament. 
The Commission continues to. support the 
worldwide role and responslbl I ltles of the 
IAEA safeguards department. This Is In line 
with the commitments undertaken by Member 
states in the area of non prol lferatlon 
policy. 
The close cooperation with the IAEA Is 
reflected In a high effectiveness of 
safeguards In the Community Member States and 
a high level of verification technology 
applied In the nuclear Installations of the 
Community. 
The Commission has noted with Interest 
the statement made In February 1991 by 
Dr. Bllx about possibilities to strengthen the 
non prol iteration regime. 
The Commission is continuing to reflect 
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on the contents of this statement, which will 
clearly have to be examined closely by all 
concerned both inside and outside the European 
Community. 
These examinations wi 11 Include, but wl I I 
not be limited to the Issues set out below. 
Should the IAEA be provided with more 
comprehensive safeguards Information notlbly 
in the area of reporting of International 
transfers and of ye I low cake. 
Advanced access of the IAEA to 
installations not yet having nuclear material 
and further Improvements of IAEA Inspectors 
designation should also be addressed. 
With regards to early provision of 
details of nuclear facilities operators and 
Member States of the Community have already 
been cooperative. 
The Idea to extend the scope of non 
prol iteration safeguards In Nuclear Weapon 
States has been noted. Yet another possibility 
could be to consider a demonstration approach, 
for example, the selection of a plant of each 
type In the fuel cycle could be a more 
appropriate and efficient way rather than a 
full IAEA safeguards coverage of the civil 
installations in Nuclear Weapon States. 
The effectiveness of Euratom safeguards 
depends on the manner in which the Inspection 
service is organised and motivated, on the 
promptness and the extent to wh i eh operators 
and state authorities fulfi I I their 
respons I b I I It I es and on the • resources 
available to safeguards. 
The Commission has establIshed a medium-
term pI ann i ng wh I eh, If adopted and 
Implemented, will make a decisive contribution 
to discharge effectively Its responsibilities 
under the Euratom Treaty and to enable the 
implementation of non prol iferatlon safeguards 
In the Community to remain at its present high 
level. 

Member State Support Programmes: 
Invaluable Assets to !AEA Safeguards 
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Abstract 
In order to improve the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of its safeguards programme as 
well as to meet the new challenges which 
constantly arise, the !AEA is required to 
develop new safeguards instruments, procedures 
and techniques. The majority of the Agency's 
development needs is addressed by the 
development activities conducted through 
Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs). In 
order to maximize the use of these 
extra-budgetary resources, the Agency 
undertook an initiative in 1988 to review the 
modus operandi of the MSSPs which resulted in 
a number of changes in its organizational 
structure and administrative procedures. A 
thorough review and restructuring of the 
existing programmes was completed during 
1989/90 via Agency/MSSP bilateral meetings. 
Some of the results of this review as well as 
some examples of invaluable contributions made 
by MSSPs will be presented. 
I. Introduction 
Since the very beginning when the scheme 
of international safeguards was conceived and 
materialized through conclusion of relevant 
international legal instruments, the 
importance of safeguards R&D efforts was 
recognized in order to establish a credible 
safeguards system. For example, INFCIRC/153 
refers to the technological developments in 
the field of safeguards, stipulating that "the 
Agency shall take full account of 
technological developments in the field of 
safeguards and shall make every efforts to 
ensure optimum cost-effectiveness ••• " 
(paragraph 6). "Technical developments" is 
also referred to in INFCIRC/153 as one of "the 
criteria to be used for determining the actual 
number, intensity, duration, timing and mode 
of routine inspections of any facility" 
(paragraph 81). Safeguards could not be 
efficiently and effectively implemented 
without extensive use of various types of 
equipment and instrumentation both for nuclear 
material accountancy, a safeguards measure of 
fundamental importance, and for its important 
complementary measures containment and 
surveillance. 
The main responsibility for developing, 
acquiring and testing the necessary equipment 
and instrumentation lies with the Division of 
Development and Technical Support (SGDE) 
within the Department of Safeguards. However, 
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the International Atomic Energy Agency (!AEA) 
does not possess enough human and financial 
resources to operate a special research and 
development laboratory for conducting required 
safeguards R&D activities and is therefore 
very much dependent on the support of its 
Member States. The Agency's role is expected 
to be more on the identification of R&D needs 
and their priorities, communicating these to 
the Member States and coordinating the 
resultant R&D activities carried out by the 
Member States. 
II. Member State Support Programmes 
Evolution of MSSPs 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Agency's safeguards implementation programme 
expanded rapidly due to substantial increases 
not only in the total amounts of nuclear 
materials under safeguards but also in the 
diversification of their chemical and physical 
forms as used in a wide variety of facility 
types. This necessitated a substantial 
increase in the scope and scale of 
corresponding safeguards R&D work. 
Fortunately, this increase was accompanied by 
the growth of a scheme that greatly assisted 
the Agency in developing the tools it needed 
to meet ita challenges - the establishment of 
Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs) for 
Agency Safeguards. 
The scheme of MSSPs was initiated by the 
USA in 1976 and followed later by other 
countries such as Canada (1977), the Federal 
Republic of Germany (1978), United Kingdom 
(1980), Australia (1980), Euratom (1981), 
Japan (1981), Belgium (1982), USSR (1982), 
France (1983), Italy (1985), Sweden (1987), 
Finland (1988), the German Democratic Republic 
(1988) and Indonesia (1990). 
Table 1 summarizes the historical trend of 
how MSSPs have expanded. Due to financial 
problems, the Australian Support Programme was 
temporarily terminated in 1988 but established 
again in 1989. The change of its national 
nuclear policy forced Italy to announce the 
termination of its formal support programme in 
1989. However, arrangements have been made to 
allow some carried over tasks to be conducted 
while its funds left with the Agency last. 
The unification of Germany in 1990 made the 
GDR Support Programme to discontinue, while 
some of its tasks being incorporated into the 
FRG Support Programme. Talks are currently 
under way to identify areas of support by 
Hungary and to define tasks under its support 
programme. 
Table 1 
Historical Trend of 
Member States Support Programmes (MSSPs) 
Country Year 
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 
USA ~-r~==r=~~~~~~l!llllllll~lllllllll Canada FRG ~ A Aus VaJia Euratom Jopan Belgium USSR France 
Italy 
Sweden 
Finland 
GOA 
Indonesia 
Hungary 
Total Number 
oiMSSPs 2 3 3 5 7 
.... 
r--
-
10 10 11 11 12 13 14 14 14 
Thus, since the start of the scheme, there 
has been considerable expansion. Currently 
there are 14 MSSPs with approximately 150 
active tasks and a total budget estimate of 
not less than US $ 22 million. It is clear 
from these figures that the original concept 
of a joint co-operative effort has proved to 
be successful. The MSSP is mutually 
beneficial, both to the Agency and the Member 
States. 
For the IAEA, especially under the current 
zero growth budget situation, there are many 
benefits to be expected from the MSSPs. These 
include: the existence of a flexible source of 
funding and project management; access to the 
varied resources of some of the world's 
leading nuclear facilities, the availability 
of realistic environments for testing and 
evaluating safeguards equipment and training 
Agency personnel; and access to valuable 
sources of information on trends in the 
n~clear industry and facility construction 
schedules. 
For the Member States involved in the 
MSSPs, on the other hand, their benefits 
include: assistance in preparing their 
facilities to deal with the actual safeguards 
measures to be deployed; assurance that the 
equipment and techniques used will meet their 
safety requirements; provision of a forum 
through which they can ensure that the IAEA is 
made aware of practical constraints imposed by 
particular facility environments and operating 
procedures; and information on the latest 
techniques and instrumentation. 
The main requirement in early years when 
the idea of MSSPs was conceived was for the 
development of safeguards instrumentation, 
since the equipment needed for inspection 
purposes was often not available commercially 
and the IAEA did not have the resources to 
develop, test and produce its own. Another 
major need was for training of safeguards 
inspectors. The Member States ·not only 
generously provided training materials, 
equipment, facilities and lecturers but also 
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organized and funded entire courses on a 
continual basis. A certain number of other 
activities, such as the development of new 
safeguards approaches, information treatment, 
data evaluation, quality assurance and 
management and administrative support were 
also included in the MSSPs. 
Current Status of MSSPs 
Table 2 shows the distribution of 
currently active MSSP tasks by task category 
as follows: 
A. Measurement Methods and Techni ques 
B. Training and Management 
C. System Studies 
D. Information Processing 
E. Containment and Surveillance 
F. Safeguards Evaluation and Adm i ni-
strative Support 
Table 2 
DISTRIBUTION 
OF RESOURCES 
BY TASK CATEGORY 
155 Tasks 
0 c Syo1omSOd"' 
0 0 .. otmaion Procooling 
Oeeoo•"""*"' &S..Vo~.v><o 
Tasks 
0 F SOEv i!Lia110n & MTwl. Guppor1 10 
1ss-
As can be seen from the table, nearly half 
of the active tasks are related to safeguards 
equipment for nuclear material accountancy 
measurements (category A) and containment and 
surveillance (CIS, category E). Two thirds of 
the category A tasks are devoted in the area 
of NDA techniques development of both 
portable equipment, such as CVD (Cerenkov 
Viewing Device) and SFAT (Spent Fuel Attribute 
Tester), and installed equipment, such as 
upgraded CANDU bundle counters and CDM (Core 
Discharge Monitors), including preparation of 
measurement procedures and development of 
measurement software. The rest of the 
category A tasks are related to DA 
(destructive assay) technique, such as 
provision of reference materials, quality 
control at SAL (Safeguards Analytical 
Laboratory) and development of various 
measurement techniques including hybrid K-edge 
densitometery, coulometry and robotized sample 
preparation. 
Two thirds of C/S (category E) tasks cover 
surveillance devices, mostly in the area of 
video surveillance such as COSMOS (Compact 
~urveillance & Monitoring ~stem), MOS 
(Multi-camera Qptical ~urveillance System) and 
MUX-II (Multiple~ Surveillance System), 
including video-record reviewing techniques. 
The rest is in the area of containment such as 
development of ultrasonic seals (In-situ 
Readable Ultrasonic Seal System IRUSS 
project) and electronic seals (Variable Code 
~ealing ~stem- VACOSS). 
In the area of training (category B), 
nearly half of the active tasks is related to 
organizing and funding various basic inspector 
courses, training courses on specific types of 
facilities, such as CANDU reactors and 
enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities, 
and on specific types of safeguards technique 
such as CVD and GBUV (~amma Burn-up 
:l[erifier). Quite a few tasks are related to 
provision of CFE's (cost-free experts) 
assigned to the Training Section for managing 
various courses. 
Through system studies tasks (category C), 
facility-specific safeguards approaches are 
being developed for new types of facilities 
that are foreseen to come under the Agency's 
safeguards in the near future, such as a large 
scale commercial reprocessing plant, a MOX 
(mixed ~id e) fuel fabrication plant, a spent 
fuel disposal facility in geological 
repository and a pilot spent fuel conditioning 
facility. Substantial efforts are also 
devoted to formulation of "new safeguards 
approaches", such as a fuel-cycle oriented 
approach, a zone approach and a randomized 
inspection approach, and a safeguards 
effectiveness evaluation methodology. 
Examples of category D tasks in the area 
of information processing are those related to 
ISIS (Integrated Safeguards Information 
System), PC applications such as IFSS 
(Inspection Field Support System) and LAN 
(Local Area Network). 
Category F tasks are mostly devoted to the 
provision of CFE's or consultants services in 
the area of safeguards evaluation and 
administrative support as well as funding of 
travels to participate in meetings related to 
active tasks. 
Speaking of CFE's, nearly 20% of the total 
number of currently active tasks is devoted to 
this particular form of extra-budgetary 
support to the Agency by the Member States, 
covering almost equally each of the 
above-mentioned task categories - e.g. experts 
in the area of design, development, operation 
or maintenance of safeguards equipment and 
instrumentation for NDA, DA or C/S as well as 
specialists in training, system studies, 
computer science, programming, data 
evaluation, statistical analysis, quality 
assurance, occupational health and safety, and 
so on. The total number of CFE 's currently 
available in the Department of Safeguards is 
31, that amounts to 15% of the total number of 
regular professional staff in the support 
divisions. This demonstrates how 
substantially the MSSPs extend the Agency's 
human resource capabilities. CFE's are now 
found in any Division other than Operations 
Divisions that carry out actual safeguards 
inspections. 
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Another example of significant 
contributions made by the MSSPs is the fact 
that virtually all the safeguards equipment 
presently used by the Agency has been 
developed, tested, improved or documented 
through MSSPs. More specifically, 46 out of 
57 devices that have been authorized for 
routine inspection use are either direct 
products of MSSPs or made available in 
parallel with them while the others, being 
purchased commercially, have also been 
improved or documented as a result of various 
MSSP activities. 
Table 3 shows the principal programme 
areas where current MSSP efforts are 
concentrated. It is expected that this trend 
will remain also in the near future. 
Table 3 
Principle Programme Areas 
1 . Cost Free Experts 
2. CANDU Reactors 
Number 
~
31 
16 (+9)* 
3. Reprocessing and MOX Facilities 24 
4. New Facility Types and Approaches 16 
The number in the parenthesis indicates those in 
the "stand-by" status, pending finalization of 
workplans or "end-user" endorsement. 
III. The Support Programme Initiative[!] 
As stated above, MSSPs have grown 
substantially over the last decade or so, 
adding invaluable assistance to Agency 
Safeguards in achieving the levels of 
effectiveness and efficiency that currently 
characterize its activities. By 1988, it 
reached the stage where more than 300 tasks 
were covered by 13 MSSPs, at a cost estimated 
in excess of 14 million US dollars per year. 
Inevitably, the administrative, liaison and 
coordination functions performed by the IAEA 
in cooperating with the MSSPs had increased 
significantly. 
In view of these developments, a project 
called. "Support Programme Initiative" (SPI) 
was initiated in April 1988 for reviewing the 
modus operandi of the MSSPs with the objective 
to identify ways to improve the Department of 
Safeguards overall efficiency while 
maintaining or increasing the already high 
level of effectiveness. As a result of this 
review, a system has been designed which 
emphasizes a product-oriented, 
client-developer or client-supplier 
relationship between the Department of 
Safeguards and MSSPs with well defined task 
objectives, implementation schedules, and 
lines of responsibility. 
Some guiding principles for the approach 
taken are: 
Increase Agency control in 
establishing the !AEA R&D Programme 
and prioritization of MSSP tasks; 
Focus on the product what the 
Department needs and when and what 
the MSSPs are expected to provide and 
how it will be utilized; 
Take full account of the 
capabilities, facilities 
interests of different MSSPs 
allocation of tasks; 
special 
and 
in the 
Separate MSSP administrative 
activities from technical aspects; 
Increase the technical involvement of 
the Department end users, while 
streamlining the administration 
through centralization and increased 
use of modern communication methods; 
Utilize task results in the 
Department of Safeguards and feed 
back experience to Member States; and 
Increase interaction between MSSPs. 
The SPI resulted in the adoption of the 
Department's structure for managing and 
administering the MSSP tasks, establishment of 
the procedures to assure the effectiveness of 
these tasks and the new information and 
communications system (SPRIGS) to increase the 
Department's efficiency. 
The Department's Support Programme Organization 
The Department's organizational structure 
was adopted to make full use of line functions 
and to assure continuing input from end-users 
through the complete task cycle. In order to 
separate MSSP administrative activities from 
technical aspects, the Support Programme 
Administration (SPA) was established under 
the Director of SGDE, supported by a small 
group responsible for centralized 
administration of the Agency's interaction 
with MSSPs. The responsibility for monitoring 
and controlling specific tasks from technical 
points of view lies with the corresponding 
task officers assigned by a Division Director 
who is responsible for the technical 
management of particular tasks. 
Support Programme Procedures 
A set of procedures has been established 
defining the life-cycle of a task and the 
corresponding responsibilities for its 
successful completion. 
In the phase of task initiation, task 
proposals are made to one or more of the MSSPs 
using new task request formats, called 
SP-1 • s. R&D task proposals are derived from 
the Department's R&D programme*, while non-R&D 
tasks proposals from needs identified in 
Divisional work plans. 
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An SP-1 form is pr.epared by an end user 
and a Support Division jointly, with the 
respective Directors' signatures, indicating 
that each new task is expected to result in a 
needed product and is to be considered an 
investment for which the requestor (end user) 
will later be held accountable in 
implementing. An SP-1 clearly defines the 
Agency • s needs and identifies the safeguards 
impact and consequences when the task is 
successful. 
For those task proposals which a MSSP has 
accepted as a part of their programme, task 
officer assignments are made by both the 
Agency and the MSSP and corresponding task 
statements are formulated with clear 
definition of work plans indicating expected 
milestones for various "deliverable&" or 
end-products. 
Task progress is monitored primarily by a 
task officer and a respective work plan is 
revised as necessary in the course of its 
implementation. 
A bilateral (Agency/MSSP) review meeting 
with each MSSP is held annually to review the 
progress of each task, determine its future 
direction, evaluate the utilization of 
completed tasks and present a package of new 
task proposals in draft SP-1 forms. Prior to 
each bilateral meeting, a task status report 
is prepared by Agency task officers and 
reviewed at an in-house review meeting. These 
reports are also made available to the MSSP 
concerned as well as to other MSSPs through 
the SPRIGS. 
Support Programme Information and Communication 
System (SPRIGS) 
In arder to improve access to MSSP related 
information and enhance communication between 
MSSPs as well as between MSSP(s) and the 
Agency, the Support Programme Information and 
Communication System (SPRIGS) was developed as 
a MSSP related data base and became 
operational in mid-summer 1989 with the full 
support of the major MSSPs. It is available 
not only on all Wang word processing terminals 
in the Department but also available at remote 
stations such as MSSP offices through public 
telephone lines. The US Support Programme 
* In parallel to the SPI, the Department, in 
consultation with the SAGS! (Standing 
Advisory Group for Safeguards 
Implementation), has adopted a new 
systematic approach for the establishment 
of the Department's biennial (e.g. 
1991-92) R&D programme. The new method 
adopted provides the management with a 
tool for helping to make objective 
decisions on the basis of a set of 
prioritized needs[2]. 
Office is regularly using this facility, while 
tests are under way to extend this service to 
MSSP offices in Australia, Canada, France and 
Japan. The system has proven to be useful, 
improving the overall ease of communication 
among all parties involved, particularly by 
increasing the overall transparency of MSSP 
activities and assisting management decisions 
on questions of programme balance and 
priorities. 
Experience Gained in SPI Implementation 
The last one year and a half since the 
fall of 1989 can be seen as the transition 
period for the implementation of the SPI, 
during which a number of new procedures and 
organizational structures as mentioned above 
have been introduced and fully implemented in 
order to improve the overall management of 
MSSPs and enhance Agency/MSSP interactions. 
Presently there are 10 joint tasks where 
several MSSPs are working together on one task 
by integrating available MSSP resources. All 
the existing MSSP tasks have been carefully 
reviewed to identify their "end-users" and 
define workplans, resulting in a reduction of 
approximately 50% in the number of active 
tasks. 
The general reaction of the MSSPs to the 
Initiative has been extremely positive. 
Especially they favour the new SP-1 form which 
has proved useful in clearly defining the 
Agency's needs and communicating them to 
MSSPs. In dealing with their funding 
authority, some MSSPs have even started to use 
these SP-l's for justifying their requests for 
funding. 
Based on the actual experience gained, 
some minor modifications to the SP-1 have been 
made by incorporating comments received from 
the MSSPs. A standard list of "deliverables" 
has been prepared as an annex to the SP-1 for 
incorporation into workplans once task 
proposals are accepted by a MSSP. 
The SPRIGS has proved an invaluable 
resource for internal organization and 
managing of the programme. Upgrades, based on 
the initial years of experience are underway. 
It is anticipated that a number of Member 
States will connect to the system as its 
remote users in the coming year. 
IV. MSSP Coordinators Meeting 
In order to have a feedback from the MSSPs 
based on their experience gained through the 
implementation of the SPI, a meeting of MSSP 
coordinators was convened in Vienna in April 
1991[3]. The main objective of the meeting 
was to review the IAEA/MSSP management and 
administrative framework and associated 
procedures, with a view to further improving 
programmatic efficiency and effectiveness. 
The meeting agenda was arranged in such a way 
that it also provided excellent opportunities 
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for informal consultations among MSSP 
coordinators in order to increase interactions 
between MSSPs and identify areas for mutual 
cooperations. 
The meeting was attended by some 40 
representatives from 14 MSSPs and two observer 
countries, Italy and the Netherlands, and was 
successful to produce its final report with 
specific recommendations, inter alia, in the 
following areas: 
1. Programme Definition; 
the mechanism for the MSSPs to 
provide input to problem 
definition in the process of 
formulating the Agency's R&D 
programme, 
the importance of "special 
tasks" in addition to normal 
tasks, 
the means to provide the Agency 
with a profile of the MSSP 
resources, or a list of 
resources and capabilities that 
are readily available within the 
MSSPs both for R&D and non-R&D 
activities, 
the potential areas of joint 
tasks, 
the scheduling of a bilateral 
meeting in conjunction with a 
MSSP's budgetary cycle. 
2. Programme Management; 
the allocation of task activities 
between the Agency and the MSSPs, 
the procedures for milestone 
monitoring and status reporting, 
the incorporation of task 
implementation reports, 
the detailed arrangements for 
standardization of administrative 
procedures for Agency/ MSSP 
interactions, 
the need for further promoting 
interactions among MSSPs, 
including holding a technical 
meeting. 
Several actions have been identified both 
for MSSPs and the Agency for implementing 
these recommendations. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
As can be seen from the above description, 
the assistance provided by the MSSPs has 
contributed significantly to the Agency's 
ability to meet its safeguards 
responsibilities in an effective and efficient 
manner. 
The future directions 
expected to be as follows: 
of MSSPs are 
Increased focussing of MSSP tasks on 
problems defined in the Agency's 
biennial R&D progr~e; 
Achievement of increased efficiency 
through documentation and optimal 
standardization of administrative 
procedures for enhanced Agency/MSSP 
interactions; 
Further promotion of joint tasks that 
would result in products greater than 
those produced by a single MSSP by 
means of combining available 
financial, technical or experienced 
human resources to address a common 
problem; 
Increased focussing on MSSP resource 
profile for best utilization of 
available resoureces in the existing 
MSSPs; 
Addition of new MSSPs to expand 
available resources. 
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In view of the future growth in both the 
size and sophistication of the nuclear 
industry and the prevailing Agency's extremely 
tight budget constrains, the MSSP assistance 
will continue to be vi tal to the Agency in 
successfully executing its obligations. 
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ABSTRACT 
A particular feature of nuclear trade 
is the need to ensure a good 
equilibrium between technology transfer 
and the reguirements linked to non 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The 
recent dramatic changes that occurred 
on the international scene have 
particularly underlined the difficulty 
to reach this equilibrium, reminding us 
the fragility of the existing order and 
the responsibility of the nuclear 
community in the field of non-
proliferation. Consequently, there is a 
need for an international thorough 
review of the actual non proliferation 
tools developed until now. This review 
could lead to reconsider sorne of the 
"dogmas" upon wich the present 
safeguard system is based. 
Les transferts et échanges 
d'information, d'équipement et de 
matières nucléaires ont été au début du 
développement des technologies 
nucléaires considérés comme tabous y 
compris dans leurs applications 
pacifiques. 
Il a fallu la politique dite d'Atomes 
pour la Paix ("Atoms for Peace") lancée 
par le Président EISENHOWER et la 
première conférence de Genève pour que 
les informations à l'exception de 
celles concernant certaines 
technologies considérées comme 
particulièrement sensibles, commencent 
à être élaborée. 
Dès cette époque, cependant, il avait 
été clairement reconnu qu'une telle 
ouverture ne pourrait se faire sans 
contre-partie. Cette contre-partie 
était l'acceptation par le pays 
récipiendaire de contrôles 
internationaux. 
On peut donc dire que, dès l'origine, 
les contrôles internationaux ont été la 
condition sine qua non des échanges de 
technologies et matières nucléaires. 
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A cet égard, il est intéressant de 
s'interroger sur la situation telle 
qu'elle nous apparaît aujourd'hui. 
Dans un contexte national marqué par 
une forte progression démographique par 
l'augmentation des besoins énergétiques 
et par des préoccupations croissantes 
de protection de l'environnement, le 
marché nucléaire aujourd'hui déprimé, 
pourrait reprendre un nouvel essor pour 
participer à la satisfaction des 
besoins énergétiques de la planète. 
Les pays qui désirent s'équiper sur le 
plan électronucléaire devront pouvoir 
le faire, mais il faudra que soient 
apportées des garanties sérieuses 
contre le risque de dissémination des 
armes. C'est l'intérêt de tous d'aider 
à cette difficile conciliation entre la 
coopération dans le domaine nucléaire 
et les impératifs de non prolifération 
des armes nucléaires. Le conflit que 
nous avons connu durant les premiers 
mois de cette année a mis en évidence 
la fragilité de cet équilibre et a 
provoqué une accélération de la volonté 
de la Communauté Internationale de 
renforcer le dispositif actuel de la 
non prolifération en utilisant les 
instruments existants. 
I - UNE CONCILIATION DIFFICILE 
Le commerce nucléaire international a 
toujours été confronté à une 
conciliation difficile entre 
l'émergence de nouveaux utilisateurs et 
le souci de non prolifération des armes 
nucléaires. 
L'exportation d'équipements nucléaires 
recèle en elle-même un dilemme : alors 
que tous les Etats, qu'ils soient dotés 
d'armes nucléaires ou pas, sont 
d'accord pour éviter toute 
prolifération, comment faire pour que 
la vente d'une centrale nucléaire 
destinée à produire de l'électricité 
par exemple, dont la production 
permettrait de résoudre un handicap 
énergétique, ne puisse pas être 
utilisée par la suite à des fins 
nucléaires militaires. Ce dilemme de 
l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie 
nucléaire apparaît plus encore 
aujourd'hui comme l'enjeu majeur d'une 
poli~i~ue mondiale A de 1' énergie 
nuclea~re et ne peut etre résolu que 
grâce aux contrôles internationaux. 
Nous pouvons toujours en 1991 nous 
référer aux constats simples établis 
pour les travaux des experts sur 
l'évaluation Internationale du cycle du 
Combustible (ou INFCE) : 
Le recours à l'énergie nucléaire 
reste un nécessité pour faire face aux 
besoins énergétiques mondiaux; 
- Il n'y a pas de cycle nucléaire qui 
ne soit intrinsèquement non proliférant 
et aucun "verrou technologique" ne 
permet de développer l'électronucléaire 
en excluant tout risque de 
prolifération. 
- Les moyens les plus efficaces d'une 
politique de non prolifération sont les 
engagements de non prolifération et de 
contrôle. 
Les contrôles internationaux dont le 
but est de déceler le détournement de 
quantités significatives de matières 
nucléaires vers des activités 
militaires et de dissuader les Etats de 
tenter de tels détournements sont de 
fait l'outil essentiel de lutte contre 
la prolifération.L' AlEA est 
l'instrument des contrôles 
internationaux à l'échelle mondiale. 
Ainsi, 1' acceptation des contrôles 
est devenue une condition reconnue pour 
qu'un pays puisse être considéré comme 
un partenaire ser~eux en matière de 
commerce nucléaire international. 
Dans bon nombre d'échange nucléaires, 
notamment de matières, les garanties de 
l'AlEA sont aujourd'hui devenues une 
donnée essentielle. 
Le régime de non prolifération a 
efficacement rempli son rôle et en 
particulier, les contrôles 
internationaux ont répondu à nos 
attentes. Cela n'empêche que, comme 
pour toute autre institution, il faut 
régulièrement remettre en cause, 
émettre des doutes, voire des critiques 
pour améliorer l'ensemble de ces 
dispositifs. 
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II - LES ELEMENTS D'UN RENFORCEMENT 
NECESSAIRE DU DISPOSITIF DE NON 
PROLIFÉRATION. 
Les bouleversements que nous avons 
c~nnu depuis deux ans et les événements 
recents ont rappelé à l'ensemble de la 
Commu~auté Internationale que les 
9uest~ons de non prolifération devaient 
et:e au premier plan de ses 
preoccupations. 
Nous en avons 
confirmation 
eu en effet la 
Tout d'abord, le conflit du 
Golfe. a provoqué une prise de 
consc~ence plus aiguë du fait que les 
~rmes non conventionnelles pouvaient 
etre conçues dans certaines régions du 
monde comme des armes d'emploi et non 
de dissuasion. 
Ensuite, il a été confirmé que la 
solution la plus aisée pour acquérir 
des matières permettant de fabriquer 
des armes n'est pas le détournement 
délibéré d'installations civiles à des 
fins militaires. 
L'actualité a au contraire mis en 
évidence que la réalisation discrète 
d'installations spécifiques est la voie 
la plus probable pour acquérir 1 'arme 
nucléaire. 
Ceci nous donne d'ailleurs une 
nouvelle confirmation que les contrôles 
ont joué pleinement leur rôle de 
surveillance et de dissuasion. 
Jusqu'à présent certains avaient à 
l'esprit uniquement le risque constitué 
par le pays n'ayant pas signé le TNP et 
n'ayant pas soumis l'ensemble de leurs 
activités nucléaires aux garanties de 
l'AlEA. 
Pour l'avenir, nous avons la 
confirmation qu'un risque réel est 
aussi constitué par l'Etat qui souscrit 
tous les engagements conformes au TNP 
et achète une sorte de certificat de 
bonne 7~nduite en é~ant très coopératif 
en mat~ere de controles internationaux 
mais se livre à des activité~ 
clandestines en utilisant tous les 
points fragiles ou lacunes du système 
des garanties. 
Ce constat inquiétant a provoqué une 
accélération de la réflexion de 
l'ensemble de la Communauté 
I'!-t7rnationale pour un renforcement du 
reg~me actuel de non prolifération. 
III LES REFLEXIONS ET PROPOSITIONS 
ACTUELLES POUR UN RENFORCEMENT DU 
REGIME DE NON PROLIFERATION 
Il est utile de rappeler que les 
Aliments qui constituent ;~ régime 
actuel de non prolifération sont : 
- Le TNP et ses accords d'application 
des garanties de l'AIEA. 
- Les Directives de Londres qui sont 
un engagement unilatéral pris par 14 
pays lors de leur signature et dont le 
nombre est aujourd'hui de 26. 
Les engagements pris à l'occasion 
d'accords intergouvernementaux de 
coopération. 
- Des engagements d'exportation pris 
depuis 1974 et régulièrement révisés au 
cours des travaux du Comité dit ZANGGER 
chargé d'expliciter l'article III 2 du 
TNP et qui sont publiés par l'AlEA sous 
la référence INFCIRC.209. 
sous tous 
actuel de 
réflexion 
aujourd'hui 
jour. 
ces éléments du dispositif 
non prolifération une 
est largement engagée 
et des propositions se font 
- Les Directives de Londres 
A la suite de l'explosion indienne, 
les principaux pays industrialisés 
nucléaires se réunirent à l'instigation 
américaine au sein du "Club de Londres" 
pour envisager de renforcer .le 
dispositif du TNP. Certa~ns 
envisageaient, à 1' époque, de frapper 
d'embargo nucléaire les pays n'ayant 
pas toutes leurs activités nucléaires 
sous contrôle de l'AlEA (Full Scope 
Safeguards) et d'interdire 
l'exportation de certaines matières ou 
équipements particulièrement sensibles. 
Ces idées ne furent pas retenues pour 
les Directives de Londres publiées par 
l'AlEA EN 1978 sous la référence 
INFCIRC 254. 
Ces Directives prévoient que les 
fournisseurs ne doivent autoriser le 
transfert d'articles énumérés dans la 
liste dite de base, que contre 
l'assurance gouvernementale formelle 
des destinataires par laquelle ils 
excluent expressément des utilisations 
qui aboutiraient à l'obtention d'un 
dispositif explosif quelconque. 
Pour les Etats non dotés d'armes 
nucléaires parties au TNP, cet 
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engagement ré sul te de leur adhésion à 
ce traité pour toutes leurs activités 
nucléaires. 
Longtemps repoussée, mais considérée 
au jou rd' hui par tous comme in iv i table, 
une rev~s~on de la liste de base 
s'annonce déjà puisque nous sommes sur 
la voie d'une inclusion des listes du 
comité ZANGGER dans les Directives de 
Londres. 
Mais la liste de base des Directives 
de Londres, comme celle du Comité 
ZANGGER, concerne uniquement les 
produits fissile spéciaux, les matières 
nucléaires ou non, et les équipements, 
les installations et les technologies 
du cycle du combustible nécessaire à 
leur traitement, leur utilisation, et 
leur production. 
La liste publiée dans le document 
INFCIRC.254 n'ayant fait l'objet 
d'aucune consultation depuis sa 
parution en 1978, devrait faire l'objet 
de précisions afin de tenir compte des 
évolutions techniques qui ont vu le 
jour depuis cette date. 
Cela concerne notamment les 
installations d'enrichissement 
utilisant les procédés de séparation 
isotopique aérodynamique ou par échange 
chimique ou ionique ou encore de vapeur 
atomique ou moléculaire par laser ou à 
plasma, les équipements et 
installations spécialement conçus ou 
préparés pour la production d'UF6. Des 
précisions pourraient porter aussi sur 
les équipements et installations 
spécialement conçus ou préparés pour la 
fabrication de combustibles métalliques 
ou de combustible à base de plutonium. 
Par ailleurs, en ce moment même, les 
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ont entamé une réflexion afin 
d'instituer un nouveau régime 
international de contrôle à 
1 'exportation qui s'appliquerait à des 
équipements et matières à double usage. 
Des liste d'articles ont été élaborées 
dont certaines correspondent à des 
articles à ajouter aux Directives de 
Londres et seraient contrôlables par 
l'AIEA, et d'autres comprennent des 
articles à double usage qui devront 
faire l'objet de contrôle à 
1' exportation pour lesquels un reg~me 
spécifique devrait être trouvé. 
Cette êtude est d'ailleurs à l'ordre 
du jour de réunions du Groupe de non 
prolifération de la coopération 
Politique Européenne. 
- Les garanties de l'AlEA 
Comme 1' ont rappelé les Douze dans 
leur déclaration à l'occasion de la 
Conférence Générale de l'AlEA de 
septembre 1989, les garanties de 
l'Agence constituent la clé de voûte 
d'une politique d'utilisation pacifique 
de l'énergie nucléaire. Il est dès lors 
important de maintenir , voire de 
renforcer, sa crédibilité et son 
efficacité. 
J'ai évoqué au début de ma 
présentation des lacunes du système des 
garanties, il est plus juste de parler 
de limitations imposées par les textes 
et même d'auto-limitations de l'Agence. 
C'est en se référant à 
qu'un certain nombre de 
sont avancées actuellement. 
ce constat 
suggestions 
Il est à constater en effet que les 
textes imposent des limites de 
compétence à l'AlEA. 
On peut ainsi indiquer que seules 
sont contrôlables les matières définies 
à l'Article XX du Statut. Les 
équipements et les installations ne 
sont contrôlés que s'ils détiennent 
l'une de ces matières. 
C'est dans ce sens que beaucoup 
pensent qu'une clarification devrait 
être faite quant au rôle de 1 'Agence 
dans le cas de la fourniture de 
certains équipements visés par les 
Directives de Londres qui requièrent 
des garanties et qui ne sont pas 
contrôlés en pratique. 
Une autre limitation concerne le 
point de départ des garanties qui 
établit que les seules matières 
nucléaires ayant atteint un stade dans 
le cycle du combustible propre à la 
fabrication du combustible ou à 
l'enrichissement sont soumises aux 
garanties. 
Pour l'uranium, cela signifie 
aujourd'hui le dioxyde (U02), le métal 
ou l' hexafluorure (UF6). Des 
suggestions sont faites aujourd'hui 
pour une application des contrôles dès 
le stade du "yellow cake" 
Il faut cependant inciter l'Agence à 
faire des études approfondie pour 
vérifier si une telle extension 
contribuerait de façon significative au 
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régime de non prolifération, ce qui 
n'est pas à priori évident. 
L'AlEA s'impose par ailleurs des 
auto-limitations dans l'exercice de ses 
contrôles. 
Force est de constater que l'Agence a 
le droit d'effectuer une partie de ses 
inspections régulières sans 
notification tel qu'il est dit au 
paragraphe 84 de l'INFCIRC 153. 
L'exercice de ce droit aurait très 
certainement un important effet de 
dissuasion qui est reconnu comme 
faisant partie des garanties aux termes 
du paragraphe 28 de l'INFCIRC 153. 
Il faut 
fait que 
jamais eu 
spéciales. 
s'interroger 
l'Agence n' a 
recours aux 
aussi sur le 
pratiquement 
inspections 
L'Agence peut appliquer ce type 
d'inspection notamment lorsque les 
renseignements obtenus au moyen des 
inspections régulières ne lui suffisent 
pas pour s'acquitter de ses 
responsabilités. 
Il est indéniable qu'une réactivation 
de ces dispositions serait un facteur 
de crédibilité supplémentaire pour 
l'Agence. 
Il faut rappeler aussi que le 
Secrétariat de l' AIEA a le souci 
constant d'améliorer le système en 
recherchant de nouvelles approches de 
contrôles. Le Standing Advisory Group 
on Safeguard Implementation (SAGSI) 
mène des travaux qui s'éloignent de 
l'approche actuelle, installation par 
installation que l'on peut qualifier de 
philosophie "déterministe" des 
contrôles où les activités d'inspection 
découlent directement des stocks de 
matières présents dans l'installation. 
Les travaux s'orientent vers une 
approche davantage "probabiliste" 
prenant en compte tout ou partie du 
cycle du combustible. Cette approche 
devra pour être convaincante garantir 
au moins le même niveau de qualité que 
la précédente et aboutir au même 
résultat de dissuasion. L'Agence espère 
par ailleurs dans l'application de 
cette nouvelle approche obtenir une 
baisse sensible de l'effort 
d'inspection. 
Un certain nombre de programmes de 
soutien aux garanties, dont celui de la 
France, contribuent à l'analyse en 
cours. 
Nous avons de manière générale à 
soutenir 1 'Agence dans ses efforts de 
rationalisation des méthodes 
d'inspection et nous pensons que des 
suggestions pourraient être faites pour 
1' élaboration de nouveaux systèmes de 
programmation et d'évaluation des 
inspections. 
Une détermination des objectifs 
tenant compte de la sensibilité des 
matières nucléaires, de la complexité 
des installations, du cycle du 
combustible, en est un exemple. 
L'Agence devra peut-être aussi ne pas 
s'attacher de manière rigide aux 
valeurs quantifiées qu'elle s'est fixée 
pour interpréter les termes "temps de 
détection" et "quantités 
significatives" mais les pondérer en 
plus ou en moins en fonction d'une 
appréciation sur les installations 
replacées dans un cycle du combustible. 
Au terme de ces quelques réflexions 
dont la mise en oeuvre permettrait de 
renforcer encore la crédibilité des 
contrôles internationaux, j'en suis à 
ma conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
La question de non prolifération des 
armes nucléaires dans le monde va 
acquérir dans les années à venir une 
importance plus grande encore que par 
le passé. 
La satisfaction des besoins 
énergétiques pour laquelle le nucléaire 
devrait apporter une réponse majeure 
ira de pair avec des garanties 
rigoureuses contre le risque de 
dissémination des armes. 
Les réflexions engagées pour renforcer 
le régime actuel de non prolifération 
vont dans ce sens mais il ne faut pas 
sous estimer les difficultés. Il faut 
éviter : 
une déviation des contrôles à 
1' exportation telle que 1' on aboutisse 
à une politique d'embargo nucléair~ de 
facto, mais il faut des controles 
suffisamment précis pour éviter toute 
prolifération. 
Les solutions à ce dilemme sont 
partiellement poli tiques mais la 
techniques aussi a son rôle à jouer et 
je crois que notre rôle ici est d'une 
importance extrême à cet égard. Vos 
travaux cette semaine y contribueront 
sans aucun doute. 

CONTRIBUTING TO GOALS AND CONCEPTS 
FOR SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION 
W. Gmelin 
Commission of the European Communities 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate DG XVII-E 
Abstract 
Safeguards in the European Community 
in the 1990s can be characterized both through 
the way it will cope with the increased 
availability and use of Plutonium in the 
European commercial fuel cycle and through the 
aims and related efforts to continue to 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the safeguards operation in general. 
Based on the current operation of 
the industry and the construction schedules 
for fuel cycle facilities it is expected that 
the routine use of plutonium in LWR (MOX) will 
continue to increase significantly, that three 
to four MOX fabrication facilities with 
throughputs of up to 5 t Pufa and three 
reprocessing facilities with throughputs of up 
to 7 t Pufa will continue to operate or 
commence operation. In addition the 
safeguards of plants to condition irradiated 
fuel for direct final storage will have to be 
developed and implemented as such plants. will 
come on stream. 
To accomplish the requirements of 
European law under the constraints of limited 
if not less than sufficient resources the 
issue of safeguards goals needs to be re-
opened and this in view of the well-known 
expectations in the public domain. 
At the same time the related 
question of safeguards concepts or approaches 
needs to be addressed the resolution of which 
largely determines the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the safeguards operation. 
The contribution presents the main 
lines of the present thinking of Euratom 
safeguards relating to technical goals, i.e. 
the 'Tryptic' of characteristic amounts, times 
and probabilities, and considerations leading 
to criteria to attain such goals. 
Finally, concepts, efforts and 
implementations are outlined to continue to 
improve efficiency at large fuel cycle 
installations in line with the necessity to 
gradually replace manpower by machinepower in 
situations of difficult access or repetitive 
work. 
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1. Introduction 
Safeguards in the European Community 
is performed pursuant to the Euratom Treaty 
which sets out the well-known objectives and 
requirements whereby the tasks of the 
commission are, inter alia, to make certain, 
by appropriate supervision, that nuclear 
materials are not diverted to purpose other 
than those for which they are intended but 
also to establish with other countries and 
international organisations such relations as 
will foster progress in the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy. 
The implementing Chapter VII of the 
Treaty, notably article 77, specifies these 
objectives by giving the Commission clear 
responsibilities and wide powers in its 
safeguards implementation. 
As part of its basic tasks the 
Commission is required to fulfill the 
safeguarding obligations stemming from supply 
agreements with third countries, the most 
important of which are those concluded with 
the United States, Canada and Australia. The 
fulfillment of these safeguarding obligations 
require considerable resources from Euratom 
safeguards and put a considerable burden on 
the economic operators due to the need to 
track the relevant nuclear materials within 
the Community, to fullfil the various but not 
always congruent retransfer conditions and to 
provide, as appropriate and relevant, the 
inventories and balances to supplier States. 
Euratom has noted, when implementing such 
requirements, that they are differing, 
sometimes inconsistent but show, in any case, 
a marked absence of international consensus. 
Requirements leading to multi-labelling of the 
same portions of nuclear material are a case 
in point. The progress achieved in 
safeguards, in the wake of the NPT, by 
strongly coupling safeguards with verification 
should, in the view of Euratom, not be 
jeopardized by the pursuance of concepts such 
as "flag control" postulating the verification 
of indistinguishable atoms or by the re-
introduction into safeguards of objects whose 
uses are unverifiable. 
The Treaty also requires the 
Commission to satisfy itself that the 
safeguarding obligations under the agreements 
concluded with the !AEA are complied with. It 
may be recalled that the Community has 
concluded three safeguard agreements with the 
!AEA, i.e. the Verification Agreement 
INFCIRC/193 between the Community, its Non 
Nuclear Weapon States and the !AEA, the 
Voluntary Offer Agreement INFCIRC/263 between 
the Community, the United Kingdom and the !AEA 
and the Voluntary Offer Agreement INFCIRC/290 
between the Community, France and the !AEA. 
These agreements comprise protocols, 
subsidiary arrangements and installation 
attachments but also special understandings 
such as on Observation, Participation and 
Joint Teams. These regulate the day to day 
interaction between the !AEA and the Euratom 
inspectorate&. Against this background of 
agreements, arrangements and understandings 
any developments in !AEA safeguards continue 
to be , evaluated, in particular the 
implementation of the recently introduced 
internal !AEA safeguards criteria for 1991-
1995. 
As the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy in the Community is given high and 
critical attention in the public domain this 
attention has also been focused on the control 
activities ·of nuclear including safety, 
environment, physical protection and last, but 
not least, on safeguards. While this 
attention should be considered, in principle, 
as a good thing since it will contribute to -
at last - removing the shroud of mystery and 
secrecy in nuclear, more needs to be done to 
explain to a wider public the safeguards goals 
and concepts as well as their interaction with 
the safeguards resources. This appears 
necessary in order, inter alia, to promote 
the understanding that the control of complex 
technologies requires complex control concepts 
and implementations whose cost and resource 
requirements will increase as a function of 
the growth of the use of these complex 
technologies and of the expectations put on 
the effectiveness, completeness and coverage 
of these controls. Safeguards is no 
exception. 
This contribution to the 13th Annual 
ESARDA symposium of 1991 aims at providing 
some notes on the goals in safeguards and 
related concepts for the implementation of 
safeguards in the Community during the 1990s. 
2. Scope of Safeguards in the Community 
The challenge to safeguards in the 
European Community during the 1990s is 
characterized by the need to deal with the 
increased use of Plutonium in the nuclear fuel 
cycle. 
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Starting from the total stocks of 
the civil nuclear material under Euratom 
safeguards by the end of 1990 at some 790 
installations, i.e. 83,000 t of depleted 
Uranium, 44,000 t of natural Uranium, 32,000 t 
of LEU, 13 t of HEU, 2, 600 t of Thorium and 
203 t of Plutonium (still mostly contained in 
irradiated fuel) it is expected that these 
stocks of Plutonium will continue to increase 
by some 15-20 t annually. 
While the use of recycled Plutonium 
in LWR has now become routine and is expected 
to increase, three large reprocessing plants 
will be under safeguards by 1995 at La Hague 
and Sellafield to process the irradiated fuel 
thereby creating a shift in strategic value of 
the material which necessitate a corresponding 
strengthening of safeguards. Three projects 
for new MOX fabrication facilities are in the 
design and construction phase. It is, again, 
expected that these plants will be operational 
by 1995. 
The further construction and 
commissioning of interim fuel storages and 
waste conditioning plants which are presently 
planned in France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom will also increase the safeguards 
tasks and resource needs once these 
installations are operational. Major problems 
of concepts or approaches are not expected. 
Pilot projects are in the planning 
stage for the compacting and final storage of 
irradiated fuel. While it is not expected 
that major facilities of this type will become 
operational prior to the year 2000 it should 
be noted that, concepts for credible 
safeguards for such final storages need still 
to be developed. 
The resource requirements to 
effectively safeguard the above mentioned 
significant increase of the Euratom safeguards 
tasks have been estimated and, referring to 
the contribution of Mr. Maniatopoulos, the 
Commission has established a medium-term plan 
which needs to be adopted and implemented. 
3. Safeguards Goals, Criteria 
and Guidelines 
Relating to safeguards goals there 
appears to be a consensus that these goals 
comprise a so-called "tryptic", i.e. 
characteristic quantities to be detected, 
characteristic times describing the maximum 
response times of a safeguards system and 
characteristic probabilities describing both 
the risk of a false alarm and the risk of non-
detection of the amounts within the specified 
time. 
, 
Whereas both the Agency and Euratom 
safeguards implementation are based on a 
methodology using such safeguards goals, the 
numerical values of which are well-known, the 
thinking on the further development of these 
goals and their translation into safeguards 
criteria give rise to observations. 
No doubt, the establishment of 
quantified safeguards goals are required to 
allow the development of sampling plans, 
inspections schedules and resource planning or 
more generally, of safeguards logistics. But 
it continues to be doubtful that these goals 
would provide sufficient parameters to allow 
decisions in the safeguards reality. 
Euratom has found over and over 
again that these goals and related 
mathematical/statistical models, e.g. for the 
evaluation of material balances define and 
describe the majority of the aspects of the 
complex structure of the information declared 
to and obtained by the safeguards inspectors 
at best in a very macroscopic mode (e.g. at 
less complicated installations). 
Moreover, the contribution of un-
quantifiable safeguards methods (e.g. C & S) 
to the attainment of these quantified goals 
could, by definition, not be quantified. On 
the other hand, quantified goals allow the 
establishment of quantified attainment 
criteria. 
One of the particular difficulties 
in safeguards is constituted by the limitation 
of resources or, more precisely, by the time 
delays between the justification for, the 
recognition of and the actual disponibility of 
the necessary resources for the safeguards 
operation. The issue in need of further 
clarification is whether safeguards when faced 
with such (inevitable) time lags should adapt 
its goals, attainment criteria or inspection 
guidelines and, if yes, which of these. The 
answer is not obvious but it may be noted that 
the least adequate solution seems to be to 
create a vicious cycle between lack of 
resources and relaxation of goals, criteria or 
inspection guidelines since this would result 
in the deterioration of safeguards credibility 
with related consequences to nuclear. 
The !AEA has issued safeguards 
criteria for 1991-1995 and Euratom services 
are in the process of analyzing these with 
respect to methodology, compliance with the 
agreements and special understandings and 
compliance with facility attachments as well 
as with basic Community policy such as the 
unity of the European nuclear market. Once 
this analysis is completed it is intended to 
hold consultations with the Agency prior to 
the decision to which extent Euratom can 
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support the implementation of these internal 
IAEA criteria. 
As far as, however, the methodology 
of safeguards is concerned, Euratom believes 
that for its safeguards under the Treaty the 
establishment of safeguards criteria is less 
than useful or adequate. Apart from the 
points related to quantification referred to 
above, Euratom considers that safeguards 
criteria of the kind issued might be suitable 
for a formalized and centralized evaluation-
oriented safeguards system whereas 
(safeguards) inspection guidelines of the type 
under development appear suitable for 
decentralized and flexible decision-oriented 
systems, making, inter alia, full use of the 
experience of long-term safeguards inspectors. 
4. Concepts and Approaches 
The increased availability and use 
of Plutonium in the European commercial fuel 
cycle in the 1990s combined with the need to 
maintain the present high standards achieved 
in the safeguards development and operation 
necessitate the further improvement of 
safeguards efficiency and the related 
refinement of safeguards concepts and 
approaches. 
Improvements of the efficiency in 
safeguarding Uranium are expected to be 
achieved gradually through the introduction of 
improved instruments and equipment and through 
rationalization measures adapted specifically 
to the intermittent inspection regime which is 
exclusively applied at the installations in 
this part of the fuel cycle. 
Developments to be mentioned are the 
progressive introduction of new C&S equipment, 
e.g. using front end motion detection, the 
improved methods used for item verification, 
the shifting from DA to NDA and, last but not 
least, improved on-site data ,handling and 
evaluation. The implementation of "Random" 
inspections while mathematically quite 
elegant - is being tested by Euratom in an 
operational production plant but first results 
are less than encouraging. 
Thus, in the Uranium part of the 
fuel cycle including concentration, 
conversion, fabrication and enrichment 
facilities the latter require slightly 
different approaches due to the inherent 
commercial and non-proliferation sensitivity 
of the technology used - as well as for LWR-
LEU no significant changes are envisaged but 
gradual increases of efficiency. 
For LWR-MOX the safeguards concepts 
continue to be based on item verification 
techniques, i.e. based on the verification of 
the integrity and identity of distinguishable 
fuel elements and, notably, on the use of C&S 
and video surveillance techniques during all 
phases of reactor operations. These concepts 
have been implemented requ~r~ng, however, 
still considerable inspection effort. It is 
expected that this inspection effort can be 
reduced when either the time interval between 
fresh MOX arrival and core loading can be 
reduced to not more than a few weeks or, 
alternatively, the equipment allowing 
conclusive under water measurement will become 
fully operational. 
Safeguards of MOX fabrication plants 
and reprocessing plants will continue to 
require continual inspectors presence. 
Based on consultations with 
operators in the Community and, to some 
extend, with the Agency, modern safeguards 
systems were developed and are progressively 
being implemented. 
Under the aspect of safeguards 
concepts no dramatic new developments can be 
reported since the well-known concepts such 
as: 
are being 
plants. 
verification of BTC during the 
construction phases and later 
re-verification 
verification of all input and 
output streams; 
verification of, at least 
monthly, of the hold-ups using 
various techniques or FBOM 
maintenance of the continuity 
of knowledge in the product 
stores 
used or envisaged for the new 
As far as, however, the approaches 
are concerned the main features of the 
safeguards systems for the new plutonium 
plants are a significant shift from inspector 
attended to unattended measurement or 
surveillance operation. 
This is caused, inter alia, by 
a) the need to minimize radiation 
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exposure of plant personnel 
and inspectors 
b) the need to minimize stoppage 
for routine safeguards 
purposes of automated 
production and by 
c) the requirement to use 
identical or similar 
components in all plants so as 
to minimize development costs 
and to maximize 
standardization. 
The effect is a transition from 
operations costs to investment costs which, 
albeit expensive initially, are expected to 
"pay off" within a limited break even time. 
These systems are also expected to minimize 
repetitive inspectors work thereby further 
contributing to enhanced safeguards 
effectiveness. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Safeguards in the European Community 
in the 1990s can be characterized both through 
the way it will cope with the increased 
availability of and use of plutonium and 
through the approaches aimed at improving the 
efficiency of the safeguards operation. 
The discussion on safeguards goals, 
criteria or inspection guidelines needs to be 
re-opened and their interaction with the 
availability of resources needs to be 
clarified. 
For the new large plutonium plants, 
modern safeguards systems have been developed 
and are under impelementation which, while 
using known concepts, provide for a shift from 
operation costs to investment costs due to the 
introduction of unattended measurement and 
surveillance stations. 
Given these developments and their 
progressive implementation it is expected that 
the required rationalisation of Euratom 
safeguards will take place while maintaining 
its effectiveness. 
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A SCHEME FOR RANDOMIZED INSPECfiONS* 
Ming-Shih Lu and Theodor Teichmann, 
Technical Support Organization, 
Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
Upton, NY 11973 
We describe a general randomized inspection scheme that 
satisfies initially stipulated quantitative requirements on 
detection probabilities and timeliness for nuclear material 
safeguards verifications, and at the same time makes more 
efficient use of inspection resources. The scheme reduces 
intrusiveness into the operations of the inspected plant and 
strengthens the effectiveness of the inspection due to the 
unpredictability and the increased intensity of the 
inspections. 
The same formalism is applicable to sequential 
inspections, inspections by strata, and inspections of 
facilities over a large complex, such as a country. The 
methodology is applicable to a much wider class of 
inspections including arms control verification. 
Introduction 
The IAEA has been investigating the randomization of 
inspections as a means of optimizing their increasingly 
limited resources. Markin 1988 /1/ and 1989/2/ discussed 
the random allocation of inspection resources among 
facilities and the various strata of material. Fishbone and 
Nagele 1990 /3/ considered several practical aspects of 
randomized inspections, including confidentiality, detection 
probability, and the problems of associated logistics. The 
implementation of short-notice, random inspections (SNRI) 
is being tested at the General Electric (GE) Low-Enriched 
Uranium (LEU) fuel fabrication facility (Eberhard and 
Kessler 1990 /41). Canty, Stein and Avenhaus 1988 /5/ 
examined the relation between measurement error, false 
alarm rate and randomized inspections. Previously, Gordon 
and Sanborn 1984 /6/ examined some aspects of 
randomization of flow verifications for enrichment plants. 
In particular, they emphasized the importance of pre-
declaration of flow and inventory in randomized inspection 
schemes. 
In this paper, the Draft IAEA Safeguards Criteria for the 
Period 1991-1995 (the Criteria), which will govern the 
implementation and evaluation of the attainment of inspection 
goals by the IAEA, are used as the baseline to consider 
randomized inspections. We propose and examine a 
randornized scheme which can, at a minimum, satisfy the 
Criteria and reduce the required !AEA inspection resources. 
We note that the Criteria can be satisfied, even though flow 
verification is incomplete because of short material-
residence time. Incomplete flow verification reduces the 
effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards, since some of the 
material is not safeguarded. The proposed randornized 
inspection scheme can improve the completeness and 
timeliness of flow verifications. 
Our approach differs from others in that in our scheme 
the concept of randomization has been integrated into the 
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overall inspection design to achieve a certain set of 
inspection goals in terms of timeliness and detection 
probability. In most other approaches a randomization is 
considered in ad-hoc manner: each inspection procedure is 
designed without first considering its application in a regime 
of randomized inspections. Thus, it is necessary to assess 
the impact of randomization on inspection goal attainment, 
safeguards conclusions and evaluation criteria after the fact. 
In our scheme, on the other hand, the concept and practice of 
randomization is included in the inspection design .a..m:i,Qri. 
The central point of our paper is that the factors to be 
considered in the design of inspections include: times, 
facilities, material balance areas, material strata and items, 
and that all of these elements can be addressed on an equal 
footing. Our randomization approach can be applied to the 
entire complex of these elements, and the (interrelated) 
procedures applied to the individual elements are so chosen 
that the overall, initially stipulated (a priori) detection 
probability and timeliness criteria for the inspections as a 
whole are satisfied at each inspection opportunity. In 
contrast the current regular (non-randomized) IAEA 
inspection randomizes only over the items, but not over the 
other elements cited above. In this way, our approach can 
be viewed as an extension of the current IAEA regular 
inspection regime. 
In the proposed scheme, an inspection has two stages: 
(i) a randomized scheme for deciding whether an 
actual inspection is to be carried out, followed by 
(ii) an enhanced sampling program for the inspections 
which are conducted. 
This combination will achieve the same overall probability of 
detection as the conventional scheme. When the inspectors 
go to a facility, they will make more measurements than in 
the current scheme. On other occasions, they will remain at 
headquarters; nevertheless, the scheme will attain the same 
overall detection probability. The potential savings in 
resources come from the omitted inspections and their 
associated overhead, including travel, opening and closing 
meetings, health and safety procedures, and instrument 
preparations. On the other hand, there will be increased 
inspection when inspectors do go to the facilities. We 
believe that the decrease in effort from omitted trips will 
exceed the increase in effort during the inspections that are 
performed. (For example, about 30% of the trips to an LEU 
fabrication and conversion facility may be saved as against 
about a 20% increase in sample size to be measured when 
inspections are performed.) 
It is important to emphasize that in this scheme the onset 
of an actual inspection is determined randomly, before any 
requirement for timeliness or other interim scheduling. The 
overall inspection goal is attained because the onset of an 
inspection is randomly determined a priori, and the relevant 
sampling plan for that inspection is designed to satisfy the 
*This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy, under Contract No. DE-AC02-76CH00016. 
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Criteria in a timely manner. We also point out that the 
current IAEA verification scheme is a special case of the 
new, more general scheme proposed; it is one particular way 
of satisfying the Criteria, but it is not the only way. 
In addition, we will show that the proposed scheme not 
only achieves the detection probability goal at each 
inspection, but is also able to detect the diversion of a goal 
quantity of material distributed randomly throughout the 
year. 
Draft Safeguards Criteria 
In this section, we review the Draft IAEA Safeguards 
Criteria relevant to randomized inspections. Since the 
Criteria will be used to govern the implementation of 
safeguards activities in the field, and the evaluation of 
inspection goal attainment by the IAEA, the Criteria serve as 
necessary and sufficient conditions for satisfactory 
safeguards. Our discussion will concentrate on the Criteria 
for LEU conversion and fabrication facilities. Such LEU 
facilities are good candidates for considering randomized 
inspections because of the large material flows, the short 
residence time of the materials, and the relatively low goal 
for detection probability in the Criteria. However, the 
validity of the principles discussed in this note is not limited 
to LEU facilities. For example, power reactor facilities with 
fresh mixed oxide (MOX) or spent fuel also will be good 
candidates for such randomized inspections. Because of the 
short timeliness requirement when fresh MOX or spent fuel 
is present, many interim inspections are required (11 per 
year when fresh MOX fuel is present, 4 per year with only 
spent fuel). Although the decrease in inspection effort per 
reactor may be small, the total potential savings for the !AEA 
may be appreciable, since there are many power reactors 
operating under IAEA safeguards. 
The Criteria stipulate that for LEU conversion and 
fabrication facilities there is one physical inventory 
verification (PIV) per year and S interim inspections on a bi-
monthly basis to verify material transfers to and from the 
facility. (For some other types of facilities, interim 
inspections are performed to satisfy the timeliness 
requirements.) 
During an inspection, LEU is verified with medium 
detection probability (about SO%) for gross, partial, or bias 
defects (depending on the type of material) for the diversion 
of one significant quarterly (SQ) of the material. This 
inspection serves the IAEA safeguards objective for " ... the 
timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of 
nuclear material...and deterrence of such diversion by the 
risk of early detection." 
Operationally, the detection probability requirement is 
translated mathematically into a' sample size requirement via: 
(1) 
where N is the total number of items of interest at the 
inspection, m is the number of defective items making up an 
SQ, 1-~ is the detection probability as required in the 
Criteria, and n is the number of items that must be verified to 
satisfy the Criteria. Implicit in this formula is the assumption 
that if a defective item is included in the sample, it will be 
detected. It has been shown that for inspections in which 
sample sizes are calculated according to this formula, the 
scheme can also detect the diversion of 1 SQ distributed 
throughout the year with the same detection probability, 1-~. 
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The Basic Randomized Inspection Scheme 
First, the overall required detection probability, 1-P. 
remains the same (medium detection probability, about 
SO%). The timeliness requirement, or interim inspection 
schedule, is also preserved. A few days before the 
scheduled inspection, inspectors will decide if the actual 
inspection will be carried out, with probability p, O<p:S;l. 
(As shown below, p must lie between 1-P and 1, and a 
different value can be selected for each scheduled 
inspection.) After p is selected by the inspectors, they then 
use a random number generator which generates random 
numbers uniformly between 0 and 1. If the random number 
obtained is less than or equal top, the scheduled inspection 
will actually be carried out; if it is greater than p, the actual 
inspection will be omitted. 
Let n' be the number of random samples selected for 
verification during the inspections actually carried out, N the 
total number of items in the population and m the number of 
defective items making up 1 SQ. The total non-detection 
probability, B, for the randomized inspection scheme can 
then be expressed as : 
N-mCn• 
B= 1-p +p NCn• (2) 
where NCn is the number of combinations of N items taken 
n at a time. The non-detection probability, B, at this 
inspection is the sum of two terms: 
(i) the probability that the inspection is not carried out, 
1-p, and 
(ii) the product of the probability that the actual 
inspection is carried out and the probability that 
none of the defective items is included in the n' 
samples. 
For the IAEA inspections, B is required to be less than 
values of~ as specified in the Criteria. The exact sample 
size in this scheme can then be calculated from Eq. (2). 
After a variable transformation, 
• ~+p-1 1-~ ~=-=1--p p (3) 
one sees that, analogous to the derivation of the original 
sample size formula, Eq. (1), the sample size in the 
randomized inspection scheme can be approximated by: 
n'=N(l-~' 1/m) (4) 
Thus, in this scheme the sample size depends on the 
probability of actually carrying out an inspection, p. The 
higher the p, the smaller the sample size. When p = 1, the 
formula reduces to the original IAEA formula, Eq. (1), as it 
should when all the scheduled inspections are carried out. 
However, in the new, more general scheme, not all the 
scheduled inspections need be carried out. Instead, whether 
a scheduled inspection is to be actually carried out is 
determined randomly before the inspection, with a 
probability p for actually carrying out the inspection. The 
cost of this scheme is that when an inspection is actually 
carried out, more items than in the original approach must be 
sampled for verification. This will most likely be counter 
balanced by the benefits from carrying out fewer actual 
inspections. 
It can be seen from Eq. (2) that p must be greater than 
1-P. Thus, if one would like to have a 1-P detection 
probability, then p (the probability for carrying out an 
inspection) must be at least 1-P. Within this constraint, 
inspectors are free to choose a different p at each scheduled 
inspection. 
The basic randomized inspection scheme described 
above can be carried out easily and it will, on the average, 
reduce the resources required for IAEA inspections. A 
fraction, 1-p, of the scheduled inspections may not be 
carried out, at a cost of some additional sampling effort at the 
fraction p of the scheduled inspections which are carried out. 
This latter fractional increase of inspection effort will be (at 
most) pf, where f is the fractional increase in sampling 
effort. Under most circumstances, the net effect should save 
resources for the IAEA 1: the average fractional net savings 
become 
(1 - p)- pf = 1 - p(l +f). 
The definitions and relations contained in Eq. (3) above 
have a useful physical interpretation. Just as p and 1 - P = D 
represent the originally stipulated non-detection and detection 
probabilities, respectively, so do p' (giv·en by Eq. (3)) and 
' ' 1 - p D =1-P =--p 
represent the "effective" non-detection and detection 
probabilities, respectively, in the randomized inspection 
scheme described here. 
Distributed Diversions 
The randomized inspection scheme satisfies the Criteria 
at each inspection. A desirable feature of the current IAEA 
scheme is its ability to detect with the same probability, 1-P. 
a diversion of 1 SQ distributed throughout the year. We 
show below that the proposed randomized inspection 
scheme preserves this feature. 
In the case of the proposed randomized inspection 
scheme, the sample size, ni', at the i-th inspection with total 
population Ni is: 
, A • 1/m 
ni =Ni(1 - 1-'i ) (5) 
where, again, Pi' =(P+Pi-1)/pi, and Pi~1-P. It follows that: 
1 _ ni' A·' 1/m Ni = 1-'1 (6) 
When the sample size is determined as described, and 
when the total number of defective items is mi (instead of m) 
during this inspection period, the non-detection probability, 
Bi, for the i-th inspection can be expressed as: 
(7) 
mi n·' ~1-pi+Pi TI(1-N~) j=1 1 
1 Since 1 s; ~ in all practical cases. 
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= 1 - Pi + Pi Pi' mi/m 
~ (1- Pi+ Pi Pi') mi/m (Sanborn 1987 m. Lemma 3) 
=Pmi/m 
Summing over all the inspections with 
(where T is the total number of inspections), the total non-
detection probability is 
T T 
B = IT Bi ~ flpmi/m = P 
i=1 1=1 
Thus the proposed randomized inspection scheme could 
also detect the diversion of 1 SQ distributed randomly 
throughout the year, with the same probability, 1-p. 
Estimate of Savin~s 
We can estimate the savings in the following way. For 
each facility, the expected number of inspection trips not 
undertaken is the product of total number of inspections 
scheduled, T, times the probability of not conducting the 
inspection, 1-p. For now we assume that the application of 
the randomized scheme is limited to interim inspections 
only, while the PIV is still carried out as usual; this is a 
conservative approach. Let the inspection man-days (MDI) 
per interim inspection be d, and the fraction of time spent on 
measurements during an interim inspection be q. Then the 
expected savings per year for this scheme is at least: 
n' S=[1-p-pq(--1)]Td 
n 
(8) 
where n' and n are the samples sizes calculated according to 
Eqs. (4) and (1), respectively, for a total population N. The 
savings depend on the value of p. The limit on pis p;:::1-P. 
The estimates can be calculated for each type of facility and 
the savings for the IAEA as a whole then can be estimated by 
summing Eq. (8) over all facilities under safeguards. 
Any value ofp;:::1-P will do. However, ifp=1-p, then at 
least N-m+ 1 items need to be measured to ensure that at least 
one defect will be detected. This approach might not be 
desirable under some circumstances (e.g., many small 
items). To get a feeling of the estimated savings, the 
following estimates were calculated with 
p=N. (9) 
and 
(10) 
respectively; both equations satisfy the requirement that pis 
not less than 1-P. 
For LEU facilities or light water reactors (LWR) with 
spent fuels, about 30% of the scheduled inspection trips may 
be omitted when Eq. (9) is used to determine the probability 
of carrying out an inspection, while for each of the 
inspections actually carried out, the sampling fraction is 
increased from approximately 50% to 70%. When Eq. (10) 
is used, about 45% of the inspection trips may be omitted, 
while the sampling fraction is increased from about 50% to 
93%. 
Thus, the estimated savings in total inspection resources 
for large-scale LEU conversion and fabrication facilities are 
about 12% to 20%, and for LWRs with spent fuel but 
without fresh MOX, the savings are between 20% and 30%. 
Since there are about 100 LWRs and 8 LEU facilities, the 
total savings are about 250 man-days for LWRs, and 60 
man-days for LEU facilities. The savings would allow 
IAEA more opportunities for interim inspections, and thus, 
more complete coverage of flow verifications. 
Another possible formula for the selection of Pi is: 
(11) 
The model fits the criterion that Pi ~:1-p. Here, the more 
material available for inspection, the higher the probability 
for actually carrying out that inspection, and hence, the 
smaller the sample size required during that inspection. 
Selection of Strata or Facilities 
In some situations, it might be preferable to select a few 
strata for verification instead of verifying all of them. The 
methodology presented here can be readily extended to such 
applications. Consider first the current IAEA reg;ime where 
all inspections are actually carried out; this corresponds to 
p=1 in Eq. (2). 
However, instead of selecting n (Eq. (2) with p=l) 
samples from all strata for verification, each strata is 
assigned a probability q for verification. Then nq samples 
need to be chosen from the strata randomly selected for 
verification with probability q. The non-detection 
probability for each stratum can be expressed as: 
N-mCng 
Bq = 1- q + q C N nq 
Since Bq is required to be less than p, nq can be 
approximated by: 
1/m 
nq = N(1-Pq ) (12) 
where 
with q~ 1-P. 
The random selection of strata for verification is also 
applicable in the basic randomization scheme. The only 
modification required is to substitute P' for P in the 
definition of Pq. 
The basic randomization scheme also can be applied to 
the randomization over facilities (e.g., within a country), in 
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order to select facilities for actual inspections, in a manner 
similar to the randomization over material. The formalism is 
exactly the same as that described above. 
Summazy 
To summarize, our approach has the following features: 
it satisfies the stipulated quantitative criteria for 
detection probability and timeliness; 
it uses the inspection resources more efficiently by 
decreasing the indirect (overhead) costs, while 
intensifying the actual inspections; 
it reduces interference with plant operations because 
of the lower frequency of actual plant inspections; 
and 
it has an increased deterrence on potential diversions 
because the inspection times are unpredictable and 
enhanced actual inspection intensity. 
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ABSTRACT 
Game-theoretical models of randumized inspections 
for timely verification uf compliance arc investigated. Guar-
anteed average detection times comparable tu or shorter 
than those obtainable without randomization arc calcu-
lated. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we examine the following idealized model 
of interim inspections for timely verification of non-diver-
sion: A reference time period is subdivided into n equal 
intervals, at the end of each of which an interim inspection 
can take place. An inspection is assumed always tu take 
place after the nth interval, i.e. at the end of the reference 
period, and the total number of inspections, including the 
last, is defined tu be k ~ n. It is assumed, furthermore, 
that at mosl one diversion will occur, and if it occurs, it 
will be detected at the next. inspection. 
For the case k < n, we formulate a two-person zero-
sum game between plant operator and inspector with the 
payoff to the former, in case of illegal beh;n·ior, being the 
expected time tu detection as measured from the time of 
diversion. In case of legal behaviur, sim:e no diversion oc-
curs and since we exclude the possibility of false alarms, 
the time to detection is undefined. Formally, therefore, 
the operator's optimal strateg~· ma~· well be simply tu bc-
haYe legally. Rather than introducing subjectiYe utilities 
into the payoff function to deal explicitly with this option 
(and thereby complicating the analysis unnecessarily) we 
can give the following technical justification for consider-
ing the illegal game: \\'e se<'k 11 .~ub,qamc pcrfr:cl equilibrium 
of the overall two-person game (sec e.g. / 1/), i.e. a strat-
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egy for the inspector which is also optimal in the case in 
which the operator, perhaps against his better judgement, 
chooses to ad illegally within the reference period. 
Thus we consider only the illegal subgame. ln order 
to stress this we shall, in the sequel, refer to the operator 
as the 'diYerl.cr'. 
Two versions of the game arc considered. Ju the first, 
k is interpreted as the precise number of inspections to be 
carried out, so that an inspector's strategy is to choose a 
subset of k- 1 interim inspections out of n- 1 possibili-
ties. We also require that the diYersion strategy be chosen 
prior to the reference period, and that it be irrevocable. 
The resulting matr·ix game, by virtue of von Neumann's 
minimax tlteor·em /2/, possesses a saddlcpoint in the do-
main of mixed strategies, i.e. for randornizcd inspections. 
Numerical solutions may be calculated using the simplex 
algorithm. 
ln the second version, k is treated as an expectation 
value for the number of inspections, when the interim in-
spections are performed according to a probability distri-
bution over the n periods. That is, if Pi is the probabil-
ity that an inspection takes place after interval i, then 
k = Ei Pi· It is demunstatcd that, if both pla~·crs arc 
ignorant of their opponent's strategies, the game has no 
saddlcpuint. The related in$peclor· leaders/tip game, in 
which the inspector announces his strategy in advance 
. , 
does however have an equilibrium, "'hich is deriYed. 
The game theoretical results 11r1' presented in Section 
2. The solutions arc discussed in relation tu applicability 
tu interim inspection problems in Section 3. 
2. Game Theoretical Results 
Let the total number of inspections that arc to take 
place in the reference time n be k < n. As indicated 
'in the introduction, \VC suppose that inspections arc such 2 
that prior diversions will be detected with certainty at the 
first subsequent inspection and that an inspection always 
takes place at i = n. Suppose further that thP diverter is 
aware of this and of the number k of inspections that will 
be performed. 
Since detection is inevitable, the diverter can at best 
choose his diversion time in such a way as to maximize the 
time to detection. He has precisely n- I pure strategies 
at his disposal, narrl<'ly to violate jnst after tint<• i, i = 
0 ... n- 2. (Time n- 1 can be eli:cludcd, since this will 
always lead to the minimum detection time of one period.) 
2.1. TilE IVlATHIX GA~lE 
We treat the problem first as a finite game. The di-
verter chooses his strategy irrevocably prior to the start 
of play, i.e. at time l < 0. He cannot change his mind 
during the course of the game. (We shall return to this 
point later.) The value k is taken to be exact, that is pr·e-
cisely k inspections must take place within the reference 
time n. Thus the inspector has C~= D pure strategies, re-
calling that one inspection is always reserved for time n, 
and he will choose his strategy such as to minimize the 
time to detection. Each strategy corrtbination of divertcr 
and inspector leads to a unique detection time which is an 
integral number of inspection opportunity intervals. This 
suffices to define a two-person, zero-sum malr·ix _game be-
tween divcrtcr (player I) and inspector (player II) with 
the payoff to the diverter being the time to dt"tt"ction af-
ter diversion. The payoff matrix is a matrix whose rows 
and columns are labelled by the pure strategies of players 
I and U, respectively. The corresponding matrix t>lt>mt>nts 
are the detection times for each strategy combination. 
The payoff matrices construdt>d in this way do not 
possess saddlcpoints, that is, there is no pure strategy 
combination (i", r) for players I and 11, respectively, which 
satisfies 
Lv :::; L;· ,j· :::; L;· ,j Vi, j 
where L;,j is an element of the payoff matrix. However 
the minimax theorem of von Neumann /2/ guarantees 
the existence of a saddlcpoint solution in the domain of 
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1 
Player ll's Mixed 
Strategy 
~--------._-------+~ 
1/2 
Fi,g. 1: Gr·aphical solution of tlw matrix _game n = :l, k = 
2. 
mixed strategies, \\'here a mixed strategy for a player is 
a probability distribution o\'cr his set of pure strategies. 
A mixed strategy for player 11, the inspector, is thus an 
inspection randomizalion strategy. For small matrices, 
the optimal mixed strategies (solutions of the game) can 
generally be calculated by hand. A graphical solution 
for the simplest non-trivial case n = 3, k = 2 is shown 
in Figure 1. For many cases of interest, however, the 
matrix can be quite large and only numerical solutions 
arc possible. For example for n = 12, k = 6 the game 
matrix is of dimension 11 x .J.G2. 
The optimal inspection randotnization strategies and 
the associated guaranteed detection times for all \'alues 
3 :::; n :::; 12 with 2 :::; k :::; n- 1 have been calculated nu-
merically using the simplex algorithm and arc tabulated 
in /3/. The guaranteed detection times L are interesting 
from the point of view of inspect. ion efficiency since they 
satisfy 
L='!!:. 
k 
11 /, <-k 
k=n-1 
(2.1) 
I< k < 11.-1 
This means that, by performing k random inspections 
ov<~r the n opportunities, the inspector can obtain sltor·lcr 
detection times (at least fork< n- 1) than b~· splitting 
the reference period into k equal int.erYals and inspecting 
with certainly after each inler\·al. (This latter strategy 
gi\'es of course a detection time of exactly %·) For fixed 
inspection c~ort, a randomization strategy is thus supe-
rior to a deterministic: one. \\'e sha·ll discuss a practical 
application of this in Section :l. 
The disadvantage of the matrix game approach is that 
it requires, as we have already indicated abo\'e, that player 
I choose his strategy prior to the reference period with-
out taking into account any information about the in-
spector's strategy gained in the course of the game. One 
could imagine that, knowing both n and k, the diverter 
would wait for a few periods in order to obserYe how many 
inspections had heen 'used up', or identify the pure strat-
egy pattern chosen, and then act. Using such a behavioral 
strategy (which is of course also selected prior to the refer-
ence period) the diverter migh't, with some justifieation, 
hope to push the detection time beyond the saddlepoint 
value of the game considered here. This is not to say that 
the solution has no practical application. Depending on 
external circumstances the divertcr may have no choice 
in timing his action (e.g. he may have to plan well in 
ad\·ance). 
Alternatively, the di\'crtcr may be ignorant of the 
number k of inspections. This would be the case if, fur 
instance, not the precise value but only the expectation 
value of k is known to the operator. This situation is 
considered in the following section. 
2.2. THE INSPECTOR LEADERSHIP GAr-IE 
Suppose the inspector chooses to inspect at the ith 
opportunity with probability pj, whereby the p, arc in-
dependent. Then the expected value of the number of 
interim inspections carried out (i.e. excluding the last 
one ) is 
n-1 
L Pi= k -1. (2.2) 
i=l 
Thus a fixed k is to be interpreted now as an expectation 
value and need no longer be an integer. Again assuming 
that an inspection, if it takes place, will always detect 
a. prior diversion with certainty, we can write down the' 
following recursive expression for Li, the expected time 
to detection of a diversion at the beginning of the ith 
interval: 
L; = 1 + (1- Pi+!)· Li+l: 
Ln-! = 1. 
O~i<n-1 (2.3) 
It is convenient to consider first the special case n = 3. 
We will generalize to arbitrary n later. For this case, 
equa.tion (2.2) becomes 
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Pl + P2 = k -1, 
with the restriction 
max(O, k- 2) ~ flJ( 2) ~ min(l, k- 1). 
From equation (2.3) we obtain 
L0 = I + ( I - J1 J) /, 1 
L1 = 1 + (1 - P2)L2 
L2 = 1. 
Defining PI = p, and with (2.-!), P2 = k- p- 1, 
L0 = 1 + (1 - p) · (3- k + p) 
/,I= :1- k + ]J. 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
(2.fi) 
Let q = qo be the probability that the diversion occurs 
at time 0. Then the probability of di\·crsion at time 1 
is ql = 1 - q, since, as already noted, it would not be 
sensible for player I to time his diversion at i = n -1 = 2, 
this leading to the minimum detection time of one period. 
The average time to detection can therefore be written 
L(q, p; k) =q · L0 + (1 - q) · L 1 
=q. (1 + (1 - p). (3- k + p)) 
+ (l - q). (3- k + p). 
(2.7) 
We can now formulate the problem of determining the 
optimal inspection strategy as solving a two-person, zero-
sum infinite game< L, q, p > where the payoff fundion L 
is given by equation (2.7) and the strategy sets of players 1 
and Il satisfy, respectively, 0 ~ q ~ 1 and max(O, k- 2) ~ 
p ~ min(1, k-1). (The game is infinite since the inspector 
has a continuum of pure strategies p available to him.) We 
seek q* and p* such that the equilibrium or saddlepoint 
conditions 
L(q,p*;k) ~ L(q~,p*;k) ~ L(q*,p;k) (2.8) 
arc satisfied. 
Unlike the finite matrix game considered before, there 
is no guarantee that a saddlepoint exists. In fact a sad-
dlepoint exists if and only if 
min max L(q, p; k) = max rnin L(q, p; k) 
p q q p 
and we shall show that this is in general not the case. We 
begin hr stating 
Theorem 1: Define L(q*,p*;k) = minpmaxq L(q,p;k), 
where L(q, p; k) is gi1·en by (2. 7). Tllen for 3/2 < k $ 3 
* ) 2 L(q*,p ;k = . 
1.:- 3 + V(k- :1) 2 +·I 
q' = 0 or 1 
* 1 p =-L 
and for 1 $ k $ 3/2 
L(q*,p*;k) = 5- 2k 
q* = 1 
p* = k- 1. 
Proof: From (2.7) we can write L(q,p;k) as 
(2.!J) 
(2.10) 
L(q,p;k)=q(l-p(:l-k)-p2)+:1-k+p. (2.11) 
Since L is linear in q, it will be maximized for q = 1 
or q = 0 depending upon whether the coefficient of q in 
(2.11) is positive or negative, respectively. This in turn 
depends upon the ralue of 71. The coefficient of q in (2.11) 
changes sign for p = p* satisfying 
1- p(3- k)- p2 = 0 
or 
(2.12) 
being positive fur p < p* and negati\'!~ for p > p'. 
Thus we han~ 
L(r/=O,p;k)=3-k+p, p?,p• 
L(q*=1,p;k)=2+(2-k)(1-p)-p2, p$p*. 
(2.13) 
For 3/2 < k $ 3 this function takes its minimum wrt pat 
p = p*. (Sec Fig. 2.) Substituting fur p* in either of the 
expressions (2.1:1), we get 
2 1 
L(q*,p*;k) = =-. 
k - 3 + J(k - 3)2 + ·1 Jl 
which is (2.9) as required. 
Fork $ 3/2 the situation is as shown in Fig. 3 where, 
by virtue of (2.5), 0 $ p $ k -1 < 1/2. Now the riolator 
will always choose q* = 1 (upper curve) and the minimum 
wrt p occurs with p set to its maximum allowed 1·alue of 
p* = k- 1. Substituting this value into L(q* = 1, p; k) in 
equation (2.13), we get 
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L(q*,p;k) k-1 
p 
p* 1 
Fig. 2: Illustrating the situation of Theorem 1 for 3/2 < 
k $3. 
p 
p* 1 
Fig. 3: Illustrating the situation of Theorem 1 for· 1 < 
k $ 3/2. 
L(q* = l,p' = k- I; k) = 5- 2k 
which is (2.10), and the proof is complete. 
We note the following properties of Theorem 1: 
i) The condition for validity of solution (2.9) can be writ-
ten 
n/2 < k $ n/1 
where n = 3. Fur k satisfying this condition, the divcrtcr 
is indificrenl to strategies q = 1 and q = 0, i.e. to diver-
sion at times 0 or 1 = n- 2. 
ii) Similarly, the condition for solution (2.10) can be writ-
ten 
n/n $ k $ u/2 
and now the divcrtcr chooses q = 1, that is he dues not 
consider diversion at time n-2, knowing that k is so small 
that he can do better. than achieving a detection time of 
2 periods. We shall see shortly that these results can be 
generalized. 
That a saddlepoint need not exist can be easily seen 
by considering the special case n = 3, k = 2. From (2.7) 
L(q, p; 2) = q · (2- p2) + (1 -g)· (1 + p). 
Since this equation is quadratic in p with nonncgative 
slope at p = 0, 
[dL] =1-q~O, dp p=O 
it can take its minimum wrt p only at 'P = 0 or p = 1. At 
these points we have 
and it follows that 
L(q, 0; 2) = 1 + q 
L(q, 1;2) = 2- q_. 
{
1+q, forq$1/2 
minL(q,p;2) = 
P 2 - q, for q ~ 1/2 
The maximum of this function wrt q occurs for q satisfying 
1 +q = 2-q. Thus q = 1/2 and max9 minp L(q, p; 2) = 3/2, 
whereas from (2.9) we obtain 
minmaxL(q,p;2) = /F2 > 3/2 = maxminL(q,p;2) 
P q v5-1 q P 
and there is no saddlepoint. 
In non·cooperative games, equilibrium (or for a 2-
person zero sum game the saddlepoint) is the only avail-
able solution concept. In order to calculate the inspec-
tor's randomization strategy and his associated guMan-
teed detection time, we therefore need a new ga rnc the-
oretical model. This is provided by a change of rules. 
Rather than the players not informing one another of 
their strategies, we assume that the inspector announce.~ 
his strategy in advance, that is his inspection probabili-
ties Pi, i = 1 ... n. We call this the inspector leadership 
game and it is obviou~ly realizable iu an adual inspec-
tion regime. In this model, the equilibrium solution for 
both players is the minmax solution given by Theorem 
1. This can be seen by means of backward induction 
as follows: Player II (the inspector) announces his strat-
egy, p0 say, in advance. Player I (the diverter) will then 
choose his strategy q0 su as to maximize the dctedion 
time, q0 = arg max9 L(q, p0 ; k ). Knowing this, player 11 
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will choose his p0 so as tu minimize rnax9 L(q, p; k), i.e. 
he announces p0 = arg minp ma.x9 L(q, p; k). 
We see then that the inspector leadership game, which 
is solved in Theorem 1 for n = 3, provides a satisfactory 
solution to our problem. We clearly wish to generalize 
Theorem 1 to arbitrary n, leading us to 
Theorem 2: Given the function 
n-1 
L(g_,J!.; k) = L q;. Lj, 
i=O 
where Lj satisfies 
Li = 1 + (1 - Pi+I) · Li+I> 
Ln-1 = 1 
i<n-1 
and where 
n-1 
0 :5 gj :5 1, :L qj = 1 
i=O 
and 
1L 
0 :5 Pi :5 1, "'p·- k L.., z- ' Pn = 1 
i=1 
then for k in the range 
_n_ <k< '!!:. 
r+1 -r' r = 1,2, .. . n- 1 
the (/11/IIItity 
L(q*,p*;k) = rnin rnax L(q,p;k) 
-- ~ q_ --
is the positil'e solution of the quadratic equa.tion 
L2 + (kr- 2r- 1) · L- r · (n- r- 1) = 0 
wit/1 the 1·cctor l!.* = (pj ... p;,) gi1·cn by 
* 1 
Pi =L' 1:5i:5n-r-1 
* (r+1-L) 
Pn-r = r 
1ii = o, 
p;. = 1 
n-r+1:5i:5n-1 
and the l'ector g_* = (q0 ... q~_ 1 ) br 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
(1, 0, 0 ... 0) or (0, 1, 0 ... 0) or (0, 0, 1 ... 0) or ... 
(2.17) 
the last n - r components hcing all O's. 
Proof: Sec Ref. /3/. 
We note the following properties of the inspector lead-
ership solution: 
i) Fork= n/r, that is when n is an integer multiple of k, 
equation (2.15) has the solution L = nfk. The optimal 
inspection strategy for the inspector leadership game gives 
an average detection time equal to the detection time for 
the deterministic strategy of splitting the reference time n 
into k equal intervals and inspecting with certainty after 
each interval (compare with Section 2.1 above). If n is not 
an integer multiple of k, then L exceeds n/ k very slightly 
(sec the numerical example in Sec:tion 3 below). 
ii) Since according to (2.17), the diverter is indifferent as 
to which of the first n-r periods in which to act, he cannot 
improve his payoff by delaying his decision. This game 
thus avoids the objection to the matrix game solution at 
the expense of longer detection times. 
3. Discussion 
The inspector's guaranteed detection times for the two 
approaches discussed in Section 2 are compared in Table 
1 for the case n = 10 and all values of k = 1, 2 ... 10. In-
cluded in tile table are the a\'erage run lengths that would 
be obtained if, on the average, k - 1 interim inspections 
are distributed with equal and independent probabilities 
over the n - 1 opputunities. From equation (2.3) one can 
calculate that it is then optimal for the diverter to act 
TABLE 1 Comparison of solutions for n = 10. 
k Matrix Leadership Equal Prob. 
1 10.00 10.00 10.00 
2 3.987 5.000 6.228 
3 2.558 3.359 035 
4 1.9•Hi 2.5:11 2.9·18 
5 1.645 2.000 2.244 
6 1.444 1.702 1.799 
7 1.333 1.464 1.500 
8 1.222 1.275 1.286 
9 1.111 1.12:1 1.125 
10 1.000 1.000 1.000 
m the first interval. Equation (2.3) is also used to ob-
tain the figures in the last column. Except for the trivia.l 
cases k = 1 and k = 10 the matrix game solution always 
gives the best result. Both game theoretical solutions are 
better than for equally distributed probabilities. 
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In addition to the equilibrium solution5 in terms of 
average run lengths, the distributions of the run lengths 
about the average value arc of interest. Monte Carlo sim-
ulations of typical distributions arc shown in Figure 4. 
The matrix game solution is seen not only to have the 
lower mean detedion lime, but also tile narrower distri-
bution. Note also that in the inspector leadership game 
there is always a small but finite probabilit~· that detec-
tion will occur only after the nth period. In both cases, 
the probability that a detection occurs before the deter-
ministic detection time n/ k is greater than 50% (although 
the mean of the distribution is less than n/ k only for the 
matrix game solution.) 
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Fig. 4: Simulated probability distribution of run lengths 
' 
to detection for n = 10 and k = ·I for the two games. For 
the inspector leadership game, diversion was assumed to 
be at time i = 0. 
We conclude with an example of a real application. 
The detection time goal for diversion of irradiated fuel el-
ements at light water reactors is currently :1 months /4/. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency achieves this 
goal by sending inspectors to the reactor sites at 3 month 
intervals, with a major inspection (physical inventory ver-
ification) occurring about once per year during reactor re-
fuelling and maintenance. This corresponds to n = k = 4 
in our models and a period length of 3 months. The in-
terim inspection activities generally involve the checking 
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of seals and reviewing of surveillance films, with virtually 
100 % detection probability for diversion of a complete 
fuel assembly. 
Figure 5 shows a plot of detection time in months 
as a function of increasing n, as the reference time of one 
year is subdivided into smaller and smaller intervals, with 
the number of interim inspections held constant at k = 4 
and k = 3, respectively. The curves correspond to the 
matrix game saddlepoint solutions of Section 2.1. The 
guaranteed detection times are seen to decrease substan-
tially with n, so that for n = 12 the timeliness goal can 
be achieved with k = 3, that is with only two random 
interim inspections as opposed to the current practice of 
three deterministic interim inspections. The prerequisites 
for realization of such a scheme are that the reactor opera-
tor agree to an inspection opportunity ,once each calendar 
month, and that the simultaneity assumption (advance 
commitment to a diversion strategy) is valid. 
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ABSTRACT 
Assessing inspection strategies against diversion plans 
can be made easier by using knowledge-based 
software tools, which add flexibility and allow for 
qualitative reasoning and simulation (of strategies). 
Prior to developing a knowledge-based software system 
for inspection strategy, a feasibility study was performed 
on a simple diversion path analysis with a Prolog based 
software tool named SPIRAL developed by the CEA. 
The example chosen involves a spent fuel assembly 
diverted from a spent fuel pond. 
The next step covers diversion path analysis involving 
flows of nuclear material between facilities within a 
comprehensive fuel cycle, using the same tools, with 
temporal aspects in the reasoning. 
1 - INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this study is to develop a software 
system to help to improve nuclear material inspection 
strategies. 
lt is being carried out under the auspices of the French 
Support Programme to the IAEA. 
The purpose of all strategy is first and foremost to 
determine the frequency and scope of inspections 
which, as regards the IAEA, are of three types: 
• annual inventory verifications, 
• interim verifications (for timeliness}, 
• material flow verifications. 
All of the above should be represented in the software. 
The important word qualifying it is "assistance". There 
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is no question of this software finding the exact solution 
to the problem of inspection strategy optimization, but 
its use should make it possible to compare and improve 
different inspection strategies. 
Inspection strategies cannot be determined unless the 
expected effectiveness of the inspections is estimated. 
We consider that the only way of seriously doing this iis 
to determine diversion paths or scenarios which cannot 
be detected. Hence, we consider that a software 
system must have one fundamental objective: it must 
be capable of determining diversion paths which cannot 
be detected by the safeguards approach set up by the 
IAEA or which are poorly covered by inspection 
activities corresponding to a given inspection strategy. 
As a consequence, it~ use must assist in improving or 
optimizing the inspection strategy, i.e. determine the 
strategy for a minimum efficiency level at least equal to 
the current level. In addition, the proposed strategies 
should lead to a reduction in means. In order to fulfil 
this objective we use new techniques: object-centred 
representation and backward chaining logic-based, 
reasoning with backtrack. All of this is included in the 
knowledge-based system tool SPIRAL and is described 
in §2. 
In §3, in order to demonstrate SPIRAL's ability, we 
present the results of a study of the detection of 
diversion of a spent fuel assembly from a PWR spent 
fuel pond. 
In §4 we present the next stage in the development of 
the task, a software system called STRASSY 
(STRategy ASsistance SYstem}, in which diversion path 
analysis involving the flow of nuclear materials between 
facilities within a complete fuel cycle will be performed. 
Finally in the conclusions, we discuss various possible 
applications of STRASSY. 
2 - THE SOFTWARE TOOLS 
To show a facility in sufficient detail, and indeed a full 
nuclear· cycle, it is necessary to make a detailed 
description of the numerous parameters, such as the 
nature of the facility and of the transformation carried 
out, the plutonium and uranium-235 contents etc. 
The following summary of the principles of object-
oriented programming [1] shows how suitable it is for 
the problem in question: 
• an object is a discrete entity used in a computer-
based process of reasoning, 
• as a number of objects can have common structures 
and forms of behaviour, it is helpful to group them in 
classes, 
• for each class, there may be a number of sub-classes 
which inherit its properties, 
• a class can be thought of as an environment in which 
objects, referred to as instances of the cJass, can be 
generated, 
By using an object representation, one can generate a 
knowledge base. The next step is to use an inference 
engine in order to infer knowledge from the knowledge 
base and create a Knowledge Base System (KBS). If 
we limit our investigations to first order logic based on 
clauses - facts or rules - (with no more than one 
predicate), we have to select between logic with forward 
chaining and logic with backward chaining [2]. In the 
later case, the inference engine starts from an initial 
goal (for our problem of finding a diversion path) and 
examines the conditions that enable the goal to be 
reached. 
Among the various KBS tools available today, we have 
selected SPIRAL [3], which features object-centred 
representation associated with rules, Prolog language 
(first order logic and backward chaining) and the 
possibility of running under the UNIX operating system 
with powerful graphical interfaces. (SPIRAL was initially 
developed at the French Commissariat a I'Energie 
Atomique and is marketed by the company CRIL) [3]. 
3 -SIMULATION OF THE DIVERSION OF A SPENT 
FUEL ASSEMBL V 
We consider a fuel pond associated with a pressurized 
water reactor subject to international safeguards 
implying the following inspection activities: 
a) Video retrieval from one video camera, for follow-
up video reviewing (this camera is used for 
surveillance of the pond, i.e. enabling undeclared 
assembly movements to be detected). 
b) Counting of the spent fuel assemblies present in 
the pond. 
c) Spent fuel assembly serial number identification. 
d) Night Vision Device (NVD) measurements for 
verifying the irradiated state of spent fuel 
assemblies, which is done only in the case of 
knowledge loss through camera breakdown. 
In Figures 1 and 2, we give the classes and rules that 
allow us to formalize the problem. 
THE HIERARCHY OF THE CLASSES 
OBJECT 
1\ 7\ '"'''~~ Camera Inspection-Results 
A 7\' (Cam::::~~~"~~"' 
Real Declared Real Declared Counting Serial number 
identification 
Figure 1 
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NVD measurement 
THE MAIN RULES 
Operator strategy 
- Try to find an undetected means of diversion 
-· If the diversion is detected, refine the means 
of diversion 
• Inspector strategy 
- Periodic inspections 
- Detection of assembly movements by 
camera 
• Assembly displacement 
• Modification of assembly numbers 
• Camera switched on/off 
• Utilities for checking numbers of assemblies 
in real or apparent pond 
Figure 2 
The subject of diversion is a spent fuel assembly 
(containing about half a significant quantity of uranium, 
i.e. 4 kg). The questions asked of the system are "for a 
given inspection strategy, what are the diversion paths?" 
and "are there any which have not been detected?". 
For a given inspection strategy, the inference engine 
selects a number of the existing rules and arranges 
them to form action plans (diversion paths). In the event 
of failure, i.e. detection of the diversion path, the system 
backtracks and produces a more complicated action 
plan. 
The first inspection strategy used includes activities a), 
b) and c). The results obtained give four action plans of 
increasing complexity. The first three end in detection 
while the fourth escapes detection. 
• The first plan. The screendump in Figure 3 shows 
the end of this plan. The graphical windows give a 
true representation known to the operator (on the 
right-hand side) and a declared representation known 
to the inspector of the situation (on the left-hand 
side). The upper windows show these two situations 
in full. The middle windows correspond to 
observations made with the camera. The lower 
windows show other inspection activities b), c) or d). 
The plan features transfer of fuel assembly No. 1 to 
the hiding place and detection of the movement by 
the camera. 
• The second plan. The camera is made unserviceable 
before transfer of the fuel assembly and returned to 
service afterwards. This is detected on counting the 
fuel assemblies (activity b) during the interim inspec-
tion. 
• The third plan. This is identical to the second except 
that the missing fuel assembly is replaced by a fake 
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Figure 3 - Diversion detected by camera 
assembly. This is detected on checking the serial 
numbers (activity c). 
• The fourth plan. This is identical to the third except 
!hat the serial number of the deviated fuel assembly 
1s engraved on the fake assembly. In this case 
deviation is not detected. However, analysis of th~ 
results reveals a minor anomaly (failure of the 
camera), indicating that the inspection strategy needs 
to be altered. 
The new inspection strategy then includes activities a) 
b), c) and d). The final result of the fourth plan, a~ 
shown in the screendump in Figure 4, is detection of 
the diversion as measurement of the Cherenkov effect 
indicating that one of the fuel assemblies in the pond 
has not been irradiated and is therefore a fake. 
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Figure 4 • Diversion detected by NVD 
measurements 
Conversion 
plant 
_,.. LEUflux 
-o.. Depleted U flux 
..,.. Reprocessed U flux 
- Flux with plutonium 
LEU fuel 
fabrication 
plant 
PWR(9) 
FBR 
Depleted uranium 
Reprocessing 
plant 
PWRMOXfuel 
fabrication 
plant 
Pu 
conversion 
plant 
Reprocessed 
uranium 
FBR MOXfuel 
fabrication 
plant 
Figure 5 - Reference cycle 
4 - DESCRIPTION OF A SOFTWARE SYSTEM FOR 
DIVERSION PATH ANALYSIS IN A REFERENCE 
CYCLE 
After having demonstrated the ability of SPIRAL to help 
in the detection of diversion in a simple situation, we 
are preparing a demonstration prototype which should 
represent a complete reference cycle with the 
corresponding types of basic inspection activities and 
the frequency of these inspections. 
We have decided not to make a general description 
showing all the existing fuel cycles but to concentrate 
on one which is sufficiently representative of the cycle 
complexity. This we call the reference cycle. lt is 
designed to address a number of requirements: 
• using the experience acquired during earlier studies 
[4 and 5], 
• obtaining adequate cycle representation, particularly 
as concerns the recycling of plutonium, 
• simplifying as much as possible the description of 
the cycle facilities; in this phase of the study we are 
essentially concerned with material flows between 
facilities and with object-cantered representation, it is 
an easy matter to subsequently enhance the 
descriptions of the facilities. 
The entire cycle is schematically shown in Figure 5, in 
which it can be seen to consist of sixteen facilities: 
• nine pressurized water reactors with associated 
storage ponds, 
• one fast reactor with a storage pond, 
• one reprocessing plant, 
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• one plutonium conversion plant, 
• one low-enriched uranium conversion plant, 
• one low-enriched uranium fuel assembly fabrication 
plant, 
• one pressurized water reactor MOX fuel assembly 
fabrication plant, 
• one fast reactor MOX fuel assembly fabrication plant. 
The cycle is assumed to be well established and we do 
not consider the period in which an equilibrium is 
established but only the events during one year, using 
quantified time intervals of one day. The nuclear 
materials used during this cycle are: 
• the plutonium contained in the spent and MOX fuel 
assemblies, 
• the low-enriched uranium, 
• the uranium derived from reprocessing which is 
partially used in fabrication of the MOX fuel, 
• the depleted uranium used in the fertile fuels of the 
fast reactor and the natural uranium, which we 
assume will not be the subject of diversion. 
For each nuclear material, the significant quantities, the 
"detection times" and the residence times in the facilities 
are different. 
The inspections in this cycle are of three types: 
a) annual inventory verifications, 
b) interim verifications, for timeliness, 
c) flow verification, whenever material is shipped or 
received. 
The frequencies of these inspections are pre-
determined as regards types a) and b) and depend on 
material shipment and receipt for type c). We assume 
here that, in the case of reactors, that type a) 
inspections are carried out at the time of refuelling (if a 
zone approach was to be considered later, 
simultaneous annual inventory verifications would not 
require simultaneous refuellings). 
We are aiming to represent only those inspection 
activities which arise from the cycle aspect, i.e. we are 
not seeking to detail the activities inside the facilities. 
Therefore we consider each facility as just one single 
MBA. But the representation of these activities should 
be designed in such a way that it would be easy, at a 
later stage, to add or remove activities from the software 
package. 
The temporal aspect should be taken into account in 
these activities, with a timeliness goal of one month, 
associated with the MOX fuel. 
Time delays for arrival of declarations o~ shipments or 
receipts, at IAEA Headquarters are either set at a 
normal value (about 1 month) or, artificially at zero (in 
order to tighten the corresponding constraint). In the 
demonstration prototype, we take two months as the 
time limit for these shipments and receipts to appear in 
the IAEA accounting system. 
A diversion path or scenario is defined as being a 
series of operator actions leading to diversion, and their 
corresponding durations, of which arrangement and 
chronology constitute a diversion plan, under the 
constraints present, in particular the usual inspection 
activities. 
For the results of inspections, it is necessary to make a 
distinction between: 
• "minor" anomalies, which do not necessarily imply 
diversion (e.g. some delay in sending a shipment or 
receipt declaration). 
• "major" anomalies, where there is no doubt about 
diversion (e.g. a proven concealment or a very large 
unexplained MUF in a bulk facility). 
A diversion path will be considered successful if the 
various corresponding operator actions make it possible 
to avoid the detection of major anomalies which can be 
easily detected by the safeguards set up by the Agency 
for a length of time linked to the category of nuclear 
material (timeliness goal). 
The temporal evolution aspect should be well 
represented in the model since it is fundamental to the 
success (or failure) of diversion paths; it is therefore 
essential to adequately model the durations of the 
different actions or activities, as well as the times when 
they begin (or end). These are parameters which 
govern the sequence of activities. The te.mpor~l 
techniques needed for STRASSY are descnbed 1n 
greater detail in (6] and [7]. 
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5 - CONCLUSIONS 
Knowledge-based computer systems appear to be able 
to make a decisive contribution to solving the problem 
of improving international nuclear material safeguards. 
As proof of their effectiveness, we have applied the 
SPIRAL tool to the inspection of a spent fuel storage 
pond. 
Development work is currently being carried out on a 
prototype system containing descriptions of the 
inspection activities carried out in a fuel cycle. This 
protototype is capable of investigating all diversion 
paths for a given inspection strategy. 
This prototype may be developed further- depending 
on the results obtained with it - in order to produce a 
complete operational software package capable of: 
• incorporating the various inspection strategy 
techniques to allow comparisons, parametric studies 
and optimization, and eventually connections with 
other software programs which generate random or 
game-theory strategies, 
• tracking down anomalies (implying a tar more 
detailed representation inside the facilities). 
At the prototype manufacturing stage, allowance should 
therefore be made tor accommodating all the interfaces 
which will be required in the future, particularly for 
communicating with databases. 
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~UCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY FOR AND CONTROL OF IN CZECH 
AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
I.Hladik 
Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission Prague, Czechoslovakia 
Abstract 
The Czechoslovak State System of 
Accounting for and Control of (SSAC) is 
described. It is discussed the 
organizational chart and role of the 
Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission as 
the State Authority in the Safeguards as 
well as its functions in the related 
fields (nuclear safety, physical 
protection) are mentioned. The individual 
nuclear facilities from the nuclear 
material accountancy point of wiew are 
shortly described and the necessity of 
well functioned facility level 
accountancy system is expressed. The 
cooperation between the SSAC and !AEA is 
mentioned and experience gained is 
briefly summarized. 
1. Introduction 
Czechoslovakia is a non-nuclear 
weapons state. It signed the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. 
The Safeguards Agreement with the !AEA 
was signed in 1972. The state System of 
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials (SSAC) is based on INFCIRC/153 
-and full scope safeguards are applied in 
the CSFR. 
The "real" nuclear activity in 
Czechoslovakia has started in 1955 when 
the Nuclear Research Institute at Rez 
near Prague was founded. 
The first prototype nuclear power 
plant A-1, 150 MWe was in operation from 
1972 to 1978. It was an on-load reactor, 
moderated by heavy water, cooled by 
carbon dioxide and metallic natural 
uranium was used as fuel. Operation and 
experience have demonstrated the 
perspectives but also the performance 
limitation for this type of nuclear 
reactor. The construction of reactors 
with higher power would require a time 
consuming research and development 
programme and therefore it was decided to 
decommission the A-1 nuclear power 
plant. 
At present, our nuclear programme is 
undergoing rapid industrial development 
(see Fig. 1). Due to the negative 
balance, CSFR urgently needed a reliable 
source of energy. The construction of 
power plants using brown coal as a fuel 
was stopped due to the high pollution 
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Fig. 1 - Czechoslovak Nuclear Facilities 
effect and therefore it was decided to 
construct a number of industrially 
developed PWRs of the WWER type USSR 
design in the second stage of our nuclear 
power programme. It is estimated that the 
nuclear programme will include 12 nuclear 
reactors with an output of 440 MWe each. 
Eight units are already in operation in 
Jaslovske Bohunice and Dukovany, the 
rema~n~ng four units are scheduled to 
start operation gradually during the next 
five years. Construction has started on 
the first PWR (also WWER type) with an 
output of 1000 MWe. The site for 1000 MWe 
units is licensed for 4 units. 
Additionally two other sites have been 
selected and further sites are under 
consideration. 
At the present time all fresh fuel 
for nuclear power plants is imported from 
'the USSR. The away-from-the reactor 
storage is used l!ith enough capacity to 
store spent fuel from all our 440 MWe 
NPPs up to five years. 
Such an extensive nuclear programme 
cannot exist without nuclear research and 
industry. Fundamental research facilities 
include 4 research reactors, a small fuel 
fabrication plant and various 
laboratories. The industry is producing 
and exporting reactor components 
including reactor vessels, steam 
generators, piping, pumps, valves, etc. 
All regulatory activities related to 
the nuclear safety of the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy are performed by the 
Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission 
(CAEC) namely by the Nuclear Safety 
Inspectorate headed by the Inspector 
General (see Fig.2). According to the Act 
No. 28 of March 22, 1984 on State 
Supervision of the Nuclear · ·safety of 
Nuclear Facilities CAEC supervises the 
nuclear safety of nuclear facilities, 
physical protection measures, 
transportation of nuclear materials etc. 
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Drportm<nlof 
Hudt•r 81h-tr Att~t .. tmtnt 
D<plrtm<nl of 
Compontnlw •n• M1dtrl•b 
DIYitloaof 
Nnrlt•r M•frtft~lt 
orcanlzotlonlllr<tlon 
lrtornollt.lotiM 
deparTment 
l!c:onomle 
S<ttlon 
Fig. 2 - Organization scheme of the CAEC 
Apart from the other regulatory 
activities the CAEC authorizes the use of 
nuclear material at the facilities, its 
export from and import to the CSFR, and 
accounting for and control of the nuclear 
material in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, 
CAEC is responsible for the SSAC. 
Licensing procedures are established and 
the national inspection of nuclear 
materials is carried out by CAEC 
inspectors. 
The basic objectives of the SSAC ar~ 
to prevent the use of nuclear material 
for purposes other than for which it has 
been specifi~d, a timely detection of 
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loss, should it occur, and assistance in 
returning the retrieved material to its 
former purpose. The SSAC operates in the 
way which facilitates the goal attainment. 
Close linkage between the 
departments dealing with Nuclear Safety 
and Safeguards is very useful and 
important because exchange of information 
gained during inspections may lead to a 
timely detection of unauthorized use of 
nuclear facilities or installation or of 
misuse of nuclear materials. Even part of 
safeguards inspection activity may be 
carried out by the CAEC inspectors 
located at the nuclear power plants, 
whose ma1n task is to supervise the 
nuclear safety of the facility. 
2.SSAC- General Information 
As a basic legal tool the accounting 
for and control of nuclear material folow 
Regulations for the Nuclear Material 
Accounting and Control issued by CAEC in 
1977. The above mentioned regulations 
establish the CAEC as a regulatory body 
for nuclear material accounting and 
control. CAEC inspectors are authorized 
by the statute to enter any location 
where nuclear material is processed, used 
or stored, examine the accounting 
records, demand information essential for 
the performance of their duties, and to 
verify the physical state of all material 
present in the relevant location. If the 
CAEC inspector fin:ds that the use of the 
nuclear material is not consistent with 
its designation or that it is not 
correctly accounted for, he may ask the 
manager of the facility to correct their 
findings. In case of repeated 
shortcomings in the nuclear material 
accounting, CAEC chairman may withdraw 
the nuclear material license from the 
facility. 
During inspection the CAEC verifies 
the information reported by the facility 
and makes comparisons with the operation 
records. The inspector is authorized to 
carry out measurements, using CAEC's 
equipments, to verify the validity of the 
instruments and to order control 
measurements using facility equipment and 
to take samples and to apply seals as 
necessary. 
The CAEC' s inspections are divided 
into the following categories: 
Routine Inspections: The number and 
scope of routine inspections in the 
facility is not limited. The frequency 
depends on the nuclear material in the 
inventory and on the effectiveness of the 
accounting and contFol system at the 
facility. 
Physical Inventory Inspections: 
These inspections are usually carried out 
during a physical inventory taking. The 
inspector supervises the physical 
inventory taken by the operator. 
Special Inspections: The CAEC is 
authorized to carry out an inspection 
upon dispatch of a special report or if 
it has reason to believe that a situation 
has arisen which would require the 
facility to send a special report. The 
CAEC also makes a special inspection if 
the facility does not comply with the 
provisions of the regulations. The scope 
of the special inspection is limited to 
those inventory items which are related 
to the special report or to the 
shortcomings discovered in the facility. 
The CAEC is obliged to give advance 
notice to the facility, at least 24 hours 
in advance, about routine and physical 
inventory inspections. Special 
inspections do not require advance 
notification. 
The basic material balance covers 
organizations which use, produce or 
consume nuclear material. The 
organization also accounts for material 
which is owned by another organization 
but is stored or used within its 
premises. If the organization has several 
nuclear facilities, the CAEC may divide 
it into several MBAs. This is dependent 
on the agreement with the IAEA. Each MBA 
is considered as an independent 
organization in this instance. 
The manager of the facility is 
responsible for complying with the 
regulations concerning accounting for and 
control of nuclear material. The methods 
are prescribed in the instructions 
issued by the manager. The manager is 
obliged to prepare these instructions in 
consultation with the CAEC. The manager 
also appoints an expert (chief accountant 
for nuclear material) who assumes 
responsibility for the accounting for and 
control of nuclear material. For each MBA 
a deputy chief accountant is appointed as 
well. 
The facility is obliged to inform 
the CAEC prior to receiving nuclear 
material, and declare the use of the 
material. Based on evaluation of this 
information the CAEC may issue a license 
to use the material. The nuclear material 
license is usually restricted to certain 
periods of time, certain categories or 
quantities of nuclear material, and may 
be subject to other conditions. A 
facility not having the CAEC license is 
not allowed to receive nuclear material. 
Special attention is paid to waste 
disposal conditions. Before the nuclear 
material is disposed of as scrap, the 
facility must have approval from the 
CAEC. The CAEC can order control 
measurements and it has the right to take 
part in the disposal operations. After 
disposal, the material is in 
nonrecoverable form. Approval is also 
required in the case of termination or 
exemption of nuclear material. 
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Each MBA maintains the operating and 
accounting records in a form agreed with 
the CAEC. All movements of nuclear 
material have to be entered into the 
records and every record has to be signed 
by the responsible person. 
The information system of the SSAC 
contains a number of reports. Any 
inventory change of location inside a 
facility which uses nuclear material must 
be reported to the chief accountant and 
entered within two days after the 
inventory transfer occurs. This is valid 
not only for changes which represent 
"real" inventory change between two MBAs 
but also for "internal" inventory changes 
representing transfers of nuclear 
material inside the facility. The chief 
accountant must submit the "real" 
inventory changes in the form of reports 
(I CRs) to the CAEC not later than five 
days after each change has occurred. 
The communication between the 
facility and the CAEC is maintained by 
mail or by telex. Matters of urgency may 
be reported by telephone, and must be 
confirmed immediately in writing. 
Communication with the IAEA is 
maintained, in accordance with the 
Agreement, through the CAEC only. All 
reports, advance notifications and other 
information from the MBA is collected in 
the Nuclear Material Division of the 
CAEC. The information is validated, 
checked with the design information, 
corrected as necessary and transcribed in 
the form agreed upon with the IAEA. 
Standardization of the information and 
its correctness is thus ensured. 
Similarly, the information from the IAEA 
is communicated to the MBA through the 
CAEC. 
The increasing number of nuclear 
facilities in CSFR caused a similar high 
increase in the information flow from the 
MBAs to the CAEC and from the CAEC to the 
IAEA. During the period from 1972 to 1976 
about 500 entry lines in the forms of 
ICRs, PILs and MBRs, were reported to the 
IAEA annually. This number gradually 
increased to about 10,000 entry lines 
during the last two years. Such a large 
amount of information represented a large 
workload and created many problems in 
performing the necessary cross-checkings 
and design information verification. The 
number of mistakes during the typing of 
reports also increased and the amount of 
paper work exceeded the time originally 
allocated for nuclear material 
verification. The only way to maintain 
high standarts and efficiency in the SSAC 
was to introduce a computerized 
accounting system. This was accomplished 
in 1979. Now the computerized system is 
an intrinsic part of our SSAC and anyone 
who remembers the "old times" with 
reports being typed would not want to do 
anything without the computer now. Today 
there are more than 90,000 entry lines in 
the computarized data base. Our 
computer, is compatible with the 
computers of the nuclear power plants and 
the data are transferred on magnetic 
diskettes or tapes. A number of 
programmes can be run for data 
processing. Automatic cross-checking 
between MBAs and design information 
checks are carried out. The accounting 
office is promptly informed about all 
inconsistencies in the reports and is 
able to correct them easily and without 
delay. Reports to the IAEA are prepared 
on magnetic diskettes and are transmitted 
to the IAEA every month. Besides routine 
reports to the IAEA various printouts 
supporting the inspection activity for 
each MBA can be requested. The book 
inventory listing (BIL) is very useful. 
This list of batches is prepared by 
entering inventory changes to the last 
physical inventory list and includes more 
information than is requested for 
physical inventory listing.It provides 
good basis for performing a physical 
inventory and also helps during both 
CAEC's and IAEA's inspections. The 
general ledger is also a very important 
document as well as the list of sums 
stratified according to key measurement 
points, material description codes, etc. 
For small MBAs with low material 
flow, a simple accounting system using 
hard copy form is still used. Information 
from hard copies are checked at the CAEC 
and used as input data for the national 
computerized system. 
The regulatory activities of the 
CAEC are supported by a number of 
laboratories of the Nuclear Research 
Institute. Assistance in the field of 
nuclear material accounting and control 
is provided by the Central Control 
Laboratory. The main task of this 
laboratory is to analyse samples taken 
during inspections. The laboratory also 
arranges consultations with the MBAs to 
assist in establishing effective 
accounting and control systems, to 
develop measurement systems for nuclear 
material movements and for physical 
inventory takings, etc. The laboratory is 
also involved in the IAEA's laboratories 
network programme and has been performing 
successful chemical analyses of a number 
of IAEA's samples taken from various 
types and forms of nuclear material, 
especially of plutonium and uranium in 
spent fuel. 
As mentioned above, the Nuclear 
Material Division of the CAEC is 
responsible for accounting for and 
control of nuclear material. At the 
present time it accounts for 13 MBAs 
including 4 research reactors, five 
nuclear power plants and one 
away-from-reactor-storage. The Division 
is responsible to the Inspector General 
who is the head of the Nuclear Safety 
Inspectorate. All regulatory activities 
of the CAEC are concentrated in one 
department and a high efficiency in both 
inspection and licensing activities is 
achieved. 
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3.SSAC- Practial Information about 
Nuclear Material Accountancy at 
Different Types of Facilities 
Research Reactors: There is a very 
low mater1al flow. The accounting systems 
are very simple and easy to verify. The 
critical assembly LR-0 is an exception. 
This facility is loaded with dismountable 
fuel assemblies and fuel pins are often 
reshuffeled during testing. The basic 
accounting unit is one fuel pin instead 
of one fuel assembly and each fuel pin 
has its own identification number. A 
computerized accounting system was 
installed to track every single pin in 
the facility. 
Bulk Facilities: These are small 
facilities in CSFR. The most important is 
the Nuclear Fuel Institute. It has a very 
limited production of low enriched 
uranium fuel in the form of uranium 
dioxide pellets and shielding containers 
from depleted uranium are fabricated 
there. Additionally, there are also other 
locations such as laboratories, research 
institutes, glass works which use nuclear 
material in bulk form. Their throughput 
and inventory of nuclear material is very 
low. Therefore, the accounting 
application is very simple. In bulk 
facilities the MUF values are 
establishsed every year. They represent 
0.1 - 0. 5 % of the material inventory. 
This value is fully acceptable from the 
safeguards point of view. 
Nuclear Power Plants: This group of 
facilities consists of four MBAs with 
twin WWER 440 units, one MBA is away from 
reactor storage for WWER 440 spent fuel, 
and one MBA is spent fuel storage of the 
A-1 power plant. The WWER 440 unit is 
comprised of two reactors and two spent 
fuel stores in a common reactor hall. 
Easy access to the fresh and irradiated 
fuel and the application of seals and 
surveillance cameras is provided. Fuel 
assemblies maintain their identities 
after receipt from the USSR. The 
accounting system at the NPPs is 
computerized. The A-1 power p.lant is a 
complicated facility from the safeguards 
point of view. The facility design does 
not allow easy access to the spent fuel 
and it was necessary to install a 
surveillance system in order to verify 
that no fuel is shipped from the MBA 
without control. 
IAEA safeguards are applied at the 
individual facilities in accordance with 
the relevant Facility Attachment. Each 
facility attachment is carefully analyzed 
and the accounting system is tailored so 
that all requirements are fulfiled. 
In 1990 the IAEA carried out 49 
inspections in the CSFR. Most inspections 
were in NPPs (4-5 inspections per year 
per MBA). IAEA inspectors are always 
accompanied by CAEC inspectors and it 
provides for assurance that all 
safeguards requirements are fully 
understood and fulfilled. The number of 
person-days used is normally lower than 
stated in the Facility Attachment. This 
reflects the correctness and operational 
efficiency of our SSAC. 
Of course, from time to time, some 
kind of discrepancy is found during the 
IAEA or internal inspection. When it 
occurs the manager of the facility is 
informed and asked to clarify the 
situation. Follow-up inspections are 
carried out by the CAEC inspectors to 
confirm that all problems have been 
solved. 
The CAEC keeps on good term with 
Department of Safeguard of IAEA. Every 
year the working visit, where the 
operational problems are so:lved in very 
short way, is organised and every two or 
three years the visits on higher level 
are a.rranged, where the general views, 
opinions and evaluations related to 
performance of safeguards and nuclear 
programme of Czechoslovakia are 
discussed. 
The Czechoslovak experts participate 
in IAEA' s advisory groups and technical 
committees playing very active role. Very 
interesting is e.g. the proposal to 
implementation of so called "selective 
safeguards" which was raised by 
Czechoslovak member of SAGS!. 
The IAEA takes the advantage of very 
short distance among Vienna and the 
Czechoslovak nuclear facilities and 
according to the offer of CSFR the IAEA 
realises some field tests of new 
developed safeguards instruments there. 
At the Czechoslovak NPPs some TV 
surveilance systems, underwater telescope 
and spent fuel counter have been tested, 
some measurements on the fresh fuel have 
been performed and some research 
contracts are running. 
The Introductory Course of Agency 
Safeguards 1990 for new IAEA inspectors 
was organised by SSAC in cooperation with 
the Nuclear Research Institute and 
Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany in CSFR. 
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Another example of good cooperation 
among the SSAC's should be mentioned. 
Since about 1976 the meeting of 
safeguards experts from the CMEA 
countries dealing with the technical 
aspects of international safeguard is 
held every year. During that meeting 
various problems concerning the 
computerised and standardised safeguards 
systems at both SSAC and facility level, 
the export and import of nuclear 
materials, evaluation of safeguards goal. 
attainment in SIR etc. have been 
discussed and often solved. At present 
the organisation of these meetings is 
interrupted but we hope that on a new 
basis, with participation of all 
interested countries, similar meetings, 
which we consider very useful, would be 
organised again. 
4. Closing Remarks 
The Czechoslovak SSAC accounts for 
all nuclear material in the nuclear 
facilities and other locations using 
nuclear material and it complies with all 
IAEA's safeguards reguirements. Its 
approach to international safeguards 
reflects our international policy, to 
utilize nuclear energy solely for 
peaceful purposes. Also, in the future we 
will suport every effort to incerease the 
effectiveness of safeguards and to 
improve the reliability of the nuclear 
material verification. 
In our op~n~on, good cooperation 
between the operator and the CAEC will 
result in further progress in this field. 
We conduct regular meetings with the 
chief accountants at individual MBAs in 
order to explain the goals of the SSAC 
and the IAEA safeguards. These meetings 
are a very good basis for exchange of 
information and often result in new ideas 
for improvement to our SSAC. 
Also the close cooperation between 
the IAEA and SSAC increases the 
efficiency of safeguards inspections 
activity and the safeguards goal 
attainments without increasing the total 
inspection effort and is advantegeous for 
both the IAEA and CSFR. 

ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGES IN BANKING AREA WITH EDIFACT 
LANGUAGE AND ETEBAC 5 PROTOCOL£ 
Ph. Bachelier 
Chairman ofWestern Europe EDIFACT Board Finance Group 
Vice-President EDIFRANCE 
Directeur des Relations Telematiques Entreprises de la SOCIETE GENERALE 
Banking area was for many years, very involved in EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange): in 1990, the French banking system, quite as UK. banking system, cleared 
more than 1,700 x 106 electronif payment messages: the same year, 3,000 banks in 65 
countries exchanged 300 x 100 electronic payment messages throught SWIFT, the 
international banking network. 
All these electronic transactions need safeguards systems for information which 
have to be understood by specific people in the world as a Japanese buyer who has to pay 
invoices to a Spanish seller via their respective banks. 
Two challenges had to be solved. 
1. An international Language Understandable by any Partners: ED!F ACT 
(Electronic Data 1 nterchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport) 
This EDI language is already used for messages like: Orders, Invoices, Payments ... 
Five regional rapporteurs are report.ing twice a year in Geneva (United Nation 
Organisation)for common agreement on messages including segments, data elements and 
codes. These rapporteurs,from Eastern Europe, Western Europe, USA and Canada, New 
Zeland and Australia, Japan and Singapore with support of Message Development group 
are building, together, this new language which already contains about 50 messages, 
1,000 data elements and quite 10,000 codes. One main message in the banking area is 
called the "PAYORD" the fund transfer order initiated in EDI by the buyer to this bank for 
paying his seller. 
2. Security in the EDI Teletransmission 
French banks defined several ETEBAC protocols (stands for data communication 
between banks and their customers) in order to provide the French banking community 
with telecommunication standards. This standardization is important to favorize such 
exchanges, reducing the data processing costs and delays which is a valuable benefit for 
both customers and banks. 
Today, ETEBAC 5 standard introduces new and most significant improvements: 
ETEBAC 5 uses a reliable and efficient file transfer protocole PeSIT, close to 
international standard FT AM. 
ETEBAC 5 allows totally secure transfers, including a strong mutual authentication 
of communicating partners and a real digital signature. 
ETEBAC 5 complies with international standards for telecommunication (OS/ 
model) and security (ISO TC 68 standards). ETEBAC 5 standard also permits the 
transfer of EDI files. 
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Security services provided 
One of the main features of EFEBAC 5 standard is the availability of a wide range of 
security services: 
mutual partners authentication, 
~ file content integrity, 
file content confidentiality, 
mutual transfer non-repudiation. 
These services imply usage of symmetric algorithm DES (Data Encryption System) 
and of asymmetric algorithm RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman). 
Mutual authentication relies on each partner possessing an RSA secret key and a 
certificate issued by a Certification Authority. 
File content integrity is obtained by verification of a Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) computed using the Cypher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of DES algorithm. This 
MAC is appended to the transmitted file by the sender, the receiver checks that this 
received MAC is the same as the one he computes from the data he actually received. 
File content confidentiality is obtained by enscription of the file content using the 
CBC mode of DES algorithm. 
Mutual transfer non-repudiation is obtained by transmission of a digital signature of 
the file from the sender, and of an acknowledgment, including a digital signature, by the 
receiver. The sender signature and the receiver acknowledgment are based upon RSA 
encryption, using the owner secret key, of file caracteristic data including MAC file. 
Keys management 
ETEBAC 5 security has been designed in order to avoid the management of any 
kind of key directory: 
RSA public kej are dynamically exchanged during the hand-shakes related to the 
mutual authentication. 
DES encryption and MAC keys are generated when needed, and transmitted RSA 
crypted. 
Security usage 
Mutual authentication may be provided only with partners engaged in an ETEBAC 
connection. 
Usage of confidentiality is optional. 
File signature and acknolwedgment may be transmitted, as protocol parameters, 
during the file transfer, or may be recorded in a specific file, called "Execution Order" that 
may be transmitted indipendently from the main file. So, whatever the communication 
medium used to transmit the main file may be, its Execution Order may be sent using 
ETEBAC 5. 
Signature and acknowledgment must be performed by Customer and Bank entities. 
Bank and Customer Operators may use the same security mechanisms, but, thus, will not 
engage the Bank nor the Customer responsibility. Two different Customer entities may 
perform double signature of the same file. 
So, ETEBAC 5 standard may satisfy any organizational scheme on both partner 
sides. 
Before the end of this year, French banks are going to provide this new customer 
EDI service that we call EDI with EDIF ACT language and EFEBAC 5 protocole to secure 
all the electronic messages transmitted from the corporate to the bank. 
Thank you for your attention. 
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STATE SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL 
OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN POLAND 
A.Pietruszewski, R.Zarucki, G.Smaga~a 
Central Laboratory for Radiological Protect1on 
03-194 Warsaw , Konwaliowa 7 
Bbstract 
The paper presents the operat1on of the 
State System of Accaunt1ng far and 
Control of Nuclear Mater1als <SSAC NM> 1n 
Poland. The structure of the system, 
legislation, inspect1an act1v1t1es, data 
maintenance and camputer1zed system of 
data pracess1ng and repart1ng to IAEA are 
·. 
presented 1n the paper. The nuclear 
materials control 1n the f1eld by the NDA 
methods performed by state 1nspectors 1s 
also described. 
1. H1stary 
Poland, as the party member of the 
Treaty an the Nan-Prallferatlan of 
Nuclear Weapons (1970>, concluded the 
Agreement w1th the Internat1anal Atam1c 
Energy Agency far the appl1cat1an of 
Safeguards, basing an the IAEA INFCIRC/ 
153 document. lhis Agreement entered Into 
farce on the 11th of October 1972. S1nce 
then safeguards Is appl1ed an all source 
nuclear materials and special f1ssionable 
materials within the territory of Poland. 
2. National and International Sources 
of Regulations an Nuclear_Material 
Control 1n Poland 
The basis far the legal regulations an 
nuclear mater1al safeguards In Poland 1s 
the NPT Treaty, Agreement for Appl1catian 
of Safeguards signed w1th the !AEA and 
Subsid1ary Arrangements to this Agreement 
spec1fying all detailed requ1rements and 
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procedures on Internat1anal safeguards 
applicat1on 1n Poland. Each facil1ty is 
controlled by IAEA Inspectors according 
to the Fac1l1ty Attach~ments documents. 
Two ma1n legal documents regulate the 
aperat1an and the requ1rements of nuclear 
mater 1 al safeguards 1 n f'al and: 
"Atomic Law" - Act of Parl1ament a+ 
lOth A~ril, 1986 
"Principles a+ Accountancy and Control 
of Nuclear Materials" - Regulation is-
sued by Pres1dent of the National Ato-
mic Energy Agency (NA~A> an 2U October, 
1987 
President of NAEA in Poland is author1zed 
to enforce regulations an nuclear safety 
and radialag1cal pratect1on. 
3. Structure of the State System 
of Accounting far~nd Cansra~ 
of Nuclear Mater~als 1n Poland 
Nuclear materials accountancy and con-
trol as well as the phys1cal protection 
of nuclear materials 1s under superv1sian 
of the National Atam1c Energy Agency 
<NAEA>. 
Nuclear mater1als control 1s performed by 
nuclear safety 1nspectors from the 
National Inspectorate of Nuclear Safety 
and Radiological Pratect1an, wh1ch is one 
of the departments of the NAEA. The State 
Otf1ce for Nuclear Mater1als Accountancy 
and Control (80-NMAC> 1s situated in the 
Central Laboratory far Rad1alag1cal 
Protection, Warsaw wh1ch among 1t's other 
activ1t1es 1s respans1- ble for 
accountancy at rad1oact1ve mater1als. 
the 
Nuclear materials are accounted for in 
6 material balance areas: 
PL-A 
PL-B 
PL-C 
PL-O 
research reactor EWA (10 MW> 
cr1t1cal assemblies ANNA and 
AGATA 
research reactor MARIA (30 MW> 
research laboratories of the In-
stitute a+ Atom1c Energy and the 
Institute of Nuclear Problems 
(s~o!lerk> 
PL-E- miscellaneous locat1ons (small 
quantities of nuclear materials 
1n different research laborato-
rieS and 1nst1tutes eg. in 
medicine, Universities> In 51 
locat1ons over the whole country 
PL-F - research laboratories 1n the In-
stitute of the Nuclear Chemistry 
and Techniques <Warsaw). 
4. Sta~O+~~~tor N~clear Materials 
Accountancy and Control <SO-NMAC> 
The SO-NMAC IS responsible for collec-
ting and maintenance o+ all accountancy 
data and other 1nformat1ons relevant to 
nuclear materials balance and movements 
between MBA-s and +ram/to the country. 
This documentation is based on periOdi-
cal 1nformat1ons and reports from users 
of nuclear mater1als as well as on 
results of control act1vit1es of nuclear 
safety inspectors from NINS & RP. 
The SO-NMAC cooperates directly w1th the 
IAEA Department of Safeguards and prepa-
res all lCR, MBR, P!L and other standard 
reports to the !AEA. Each potent1al user 
of nuclear materials must fulflll spec1al 
requ1rements pr1or he 1s allowed to buy 
nuclear materials. He 1s obl1ged to orga-
nize Internal system of nuclear materials 
accountancy and control 
operation with spec1fy1ng 
descr1be 1ts 
all 
accountancy documentation and 
internal 
control 
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procedures. Th1s document 1s subject to 
the approval of the President of the NAEA 
after 1ts verif1cat1on by the SO-NMAC. 
Such documentation must be prepared 12 
months 1n advance before e>:pected date of 
rece1v1ng at nuclear mater1als in the 
case of nuclear fac1l1t1es and 3 months 
in advance in the case of the localiza-
tion outside nuclear fac1lit1es. Any 
change 1n the organ1zat1on of nuclear 
materials safeguards nuclear 
fac1l1ty must be announced to the SO-NMAC 
3 months 1n advance and IS subJect to be 
l1cenced by the Pres1dent of NAEA. 
Advance nat1+1cat1on on the foreseen 
1mport of nuclear mater1als should be 
sent to the SO-NMAC by 1mparter 30 days 
1n advance and the natif1cat1on on 
planned export 60 days 1n advance, 1f 1ts 
quantity exceeds 1 eff kg 1n total dur1ng 
3 months. If th1s quant1ty IS less than 1 
eff kg then the not1f1cat1on on foreseen 
shipment/rece1pt should be sent 7 
before the t1me of the transact1an. 
the case of International transfers 
documentation should contain: 
days 
In 
thiS 
name and address of shipper/rece1ver, 
quantity and type of nuclear materials, 
foreseen date of sh1pment/rece1pt, 
foreseen date and place of nuclear 
mater1als pack1ng/unpack1ng, 
foreseen date and place of tak1ng the 
respons1b1l1ty +or nuclear materials by 
Poland and an transfer of this respon-
siblillty to the other state 1n case of 
e>:port, 
formal cert1+1cate a+ competent author-
ities of fare1gn receiver that exported 
from Poland nuclear materials w1ll be 
subJect to the IAEA safeguards (with 
except1on of nuclear countries as 
specified by NP"f "treaty>. 
Each shipment on receipt o+ nuclear mate-
rlal is reported to the SO-NMAC not later 
than 5 days from the date at its ship-
ment/rece1pt an standard "Notif1cat1an an 
Change" document wh1ch 1s one of basic 
accountancy documents. 
There are 4 people 1nvolved 1n the work 
of the SO-NMAC: 
2 nuclear safety inspectors 
1 pragramm1st 
1 technic1an (book keeping) 
The respans1b111t1es of the SU-NMAC cover 
following act1v1t1es: 
maintenance of accountancy records an 
all nuclear mater1als w1thin the 
territory of country, 
1nspect1ons and control 
materials safeguards, 
of nuclear 
participation 1n the 1nspectians of 
IAEA inspectors. 
control measurements of nuclear 
mater1als, 
research and development 1n the f1eld 
of nuclear mater1als accountancy and 
control. 
Nuclear mater1als accountancy at +ac1I1ty 
level 1s performed by the fac1l1ty safe-
guards officer. 
5. Inspect1an Act1v1ties 
<state and IAEA> 
State Inspect1on act1v1t1es concentr-ate 
on the: 
control of the presence of nuclear ma-
terlal and ver1f1cation of the camplet-
ness and correctness at the nuclear 
materials safeguards accountancy docu-
ments at nuclear fac1l1t1es and other 
users of nuclear mater1als, 
control measurements of nuclear materi-
als enr1chment <NDA> and quant1ty <NDA, 
weighting>. 
control of the +ult1111ng by the nucle-
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ar material user the requirements and 
principles of nuclear materials safegu-
ards according to approved 
System Organ1zat1an" at the 
or at the other user. 
"Safeguards 
fac1lity 
There are 3 types of safeguards Inspec-
tions wh1ch are typically performed by 
the SO-NMAC: 
normal 1nspect1an rout1ne inspection 
to control nuclear materials balance 
and correctness of. safeguards account-
ancy data 1n compar1san with reports 
rece1ved by SD-1\lMAC: 
ad hac 1nspect1ons to control data 
which can not be ver1f1ed bas1ng on 
received reports and to control the 
from ful f i llment of requ1rement 
previous inspections; 
spec1al 1nspect1ans - performed 1n the 
case of unusual events, as eg. unau-
thorized movement of nuclear materials 
or 1 ts loss. 
The !AEA 1nspect1ans are performed 
routinely an monthly bas1s at research 
reactors. In total 26 mandays far each of 
2 reactors. Other MBA-s are controlled at 
least once per year after PIT far PIV. In 
addition to the Physical Verification of 
the nuclear mater1als and ver1f1cat1an of 
accountancy data, the following measures 
are be1ng appl1ed tor safeguard1ng at and 
control of nuclear mater1als: 
IAEA metallic and +1ber glass seals an 
fresh and spent fuel containers; 
State Office - paper seals an storage 
areas or containers with nuclear 
materials; 
Measurements w1th NDA-methods <state 
NDA spectrometry w1th portable germani-
um detector; IAEA - SAM 11, PMCN, PMCG, 
HM-4, ICVD • 
Few fuel elements of h1gh enrichment were 
measured by !AEA Inspectors with Neutron 
Collar and since then they are used as 
secondary standards tor the measurements 
w1th Nal or HPGe detectors by IAEA 
1nspectors. Measurements are be1ng done 
by IAEA inspectors - 4 t1mes a year 1n 
research reactor and 1n each of MBA-s 
during PIV. 
6. Nuclear Material Under Safegu~ds 
1n Poland 
Safeguards is being appl1ed 1n Poland 
accord1ng to the prov1sions 
Agreement w1th the IAEA on: 
special fiss1onable materials 
of the 
<Pu-239, 
U-233, enr1ched uran1um 1n U-235 and 
any mater1al contalninq one or more of 
these rad1onucl1des>• 
source nuclear mater1als natural, 
depleted uran1um and thor1um 
matall1c form, alloy, chem1cal compound 
or concentrate>; 
uran1um and thor1um ores - 1n the case 
and the amounts subJect to be processed 
for separat1on of uran1um and thorium. 
Nuclear materials 1n Poland are used 
ma1nly at research reactors wh1ch are 
operat1ng for research, and 
1sotope product1on purposes. The fuel 
cycle in Poland is not closed as there 
are not uranium enr1chment or proces-
Slng/reprocessing fac1l1t1es 1n Poland. 
The construct1on of the f1rst nuclear 
power station, wh1ch was supposed to be 
the WWR-440 reactor, was stopped 1n 
and is actually not supposed to 
continued. 
1990 
be 
Nuclear materials used at research 
reactors are highly enriched uran1um <80% 
and 36% at MARIA and 36i'. at EWA 
reactors). Fuel elements are accounted 
for bas1ng on sh1pper cert1t1cates <USSR> 
data. Each fuel element has 1ts own 
cert1f1cate and engraved 1dent1f1cat1on 
number. Spent fuel 1s stored at the place 
of reactors in water pools. 
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In local1sat1ons outside facillties 
PL-D,E,F small quantitles of uranium, 
thorium compounds and pluton1um <Pu-Be 
neutron sources) are used for research 
purposes In nuclear physics, chemistry 
and industry. Depleted uranium is used 
mainly as the sh1elding 
radioactive gamma sources. 
for highly 
7. Computerized Nuclear Mater1als 
Accountancy System 
Accountancy system at State Office was 
computerized In 1988/89. D'Base 111 Plus 
data base system operating at IBM PC/AT 
computer was used tor computerized system 
of nuclear materials accountancy data. 
For the processing to the IAEA - PIL, ICR 
and MBR documents are created with the 
programme and transmitted on 5 1/4" 
diskettes. The total number of reports 
submitted the IAEA per year 
usually 40. 
exceeds 
The system utillses one main data base 
which Is organized In sequential files. 
Addit1onally all reports which have been 
sent to the IAEA are kept as separate 
files. Following reports can be created 
With the system: 
ICR, PIL, MBR, Concise Note (for trans-
fer to the IAEA> 
General Ledger 
Book Inventory Listing 
Seals List (subtotals for sealed, 
sealed materials) 
Nuclear materials strat1ticat1on. 
un-
Quality control of data entr1es to the 
system 1s performed, what assures correc-
tness and consistency with requ1rements 
of Facility Attachments and Code 10. 
Actually fixed format of Code 10 is 
appl1ed for data transmission to the 
IAEA. Anyway parallelly, t-rom several 
months, the labelled code 10 format is 
used and tested in cooperation with the 
IAEA. In the nearest future after testing 
period we Intend to switch only for 
labelled code 10 format. Reports created 
with.our system are used also for support 
of Inspection activities of IAEA Inspec-
tors and the prepared hard copy form IS 
suitable to fill In IAEA 
logsheets. 
Inspection 
Accountancy at facility level Is based 
mainly on book keeping. For research 
reactors computerized 
performed. 
accountancy 1S 
8. Nuclear Materials Measurements~ 
Research and Development Acttvtties 
on Nuclear Materials Safeguards 
There are two types of control measure-
ments performed by nuclear safety 
Inspectors during their Inspection 
activities. Measurement procedures were 
elaborated by SO-NMAC In the framework of 
governmental research programme 1988/90 -
Nuclear Safety and Radtological Protec-
tion. NDA method of gamma spectrometry 
with HPGe portable detector 1s used for 
uranium enrichment control. In the case 
of nuclear fuel -because of its standard 
geometrical form enrichment 
total amount of uranium is being 
basing on reference calibration 
and the 
checked 
stand-
ards. Such measurements are based on the 
185.7 keV energy for U-235 and 1001 keV 
for U-238 <Pa-234Ml. 
There are 2 fuel elements which were 
measured in the past for total uranium by 
IAEA inspectors with AWCC. These elements 
we use as secondary standards for control 
of highly enriched fuel assembltes.These 
measurements are usually done parallely 
to IAEA measurements of fresh fuel for 
the same elements "from the other 
side". Portable HPGe detector and 
portable Canberra-10 (4096 Kl MCA IS used 
for measurements. Spectrum 1s elaborated 
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at the place with portable Toshiba 
personal computer. As MR-6 type fuel used 
for reactor MARIA Is of 2 different 
enrichments (80% and 36%) Its distinguish 
can be sometimes difficult because of the 
To same geometrical shape of the fuel. 
distingulsh these two types of fuel 
photopeak rat1o Pa-234M : U-235 <1001 keV 
: 185 keVl; 1s used for quick recognition 
of the enrichment.Such measurements of 
fuel can be done at any distance of fuel 
from the detector. 
The same "qualitttative" method for 
uranium enrichment control IS used tor 
control of materials In bulk or l1quid 
form, wh1ch are kept In dtfferent type of 
containers <steel, plastic, glass>. The 
principle of enrichment measurements 1n 
the fteld Is to measure with no opening 
of the container and never moving the 
material from its own container to the 
standard one at the place ot control. 
Typically several oatches of nuclear 
material in bulk form are measured at the 
place of control. 
estimated 
equations: 
E <'l.l 
t 
E <%> 
2 
basing 
a • 
t 
a • 
2 
The enrichment is 
on the following 
[ 
N(766keVl ]bt 
N < 185keVl 
[ 
N UOOlkeVl ]b2 
N < 185keVl 
where a 
1
•2, b 1 •2 factors are calculated 
as for the set of measurements of uranium 
compounds <U0
2 
powder) of d1fferent 
enrichments - from depleted up to 807. 
enriched uranium. 
As these measurements are used for the 
"estimation" of enrichment not its 
precise measurements, then no corrections 
are applted for the attenuation of gamma 
radiation In different uran1um compounds 
or container materials. This effects can 
be controlled and estimated basing on the 
automatic printout at the spectrum 
elaboration wh1ch calculates following 
photopeak rat1os and presents it in 
tables: 
Relations of photopeak rat1os of U-238 
daughters and U-235 calculated for the 
enrichment est1mat1on : 
keV 
keV 
63, 766, 1001 
185, 205 
Relations o+ U-235 and Pa-:234M 
photopeak rat1os used for the est1mation 
of autoabsorpt1on effect : 
keV 84, 143, 163, 194, 205 
keV 185 
keV 
keV 
63, 258, 766, 786, 883. 946 
1001 
Photopeak rat1os (766h85; 1001/185 
keV/keVl when presented 1n graphic form 
for the set of controlled materials Indi-
cate clearly possible uncorrect operators 
data on ur-an1um enr-Ichment • 
Such samples are later on sent to the 
SO-NMAC for- pr-ec1se measurements of 
U-enrichment With the 185.7 keV photopeak 
measurements and calibration of the 
german1um detector w1th EC-NRM-171/NBS-
SRM-969 set of standar-ds. Spec1al coll1-
mators and plastic containers for bulk 
for-m mater-1als nuclear- control are then 
applied 1n spectrometr1cal labor-atory of 
the SO-NMAC. All corr-ect1on factor-s are 
then appl1ed as spec1f1ed 1n the Instr-uc-
tion manual of these cal1br-at1on sources 
utilization. 
~- F1nal remarks 
Re+err-1ng the act1v1t1es of the SSAC NM 
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in Poland and the Implementation of IAEA 
safeguards +or- last 19 years the 
prov1s1ons of the Safeguards Agr-eement 
between Poland and the IAEA were always 
met. The cooperation between State Office 
and !AEA Inspector-s was always very 
constructive and correct. Poland accepts 
all designated by !AEA Inspectors w1th no 
restrictions. 
1. A.P1etruszewsk1 " Determination of 
the Influence o+ Measur-ement Geome-
try and Autoabsorpt1on 1n Spectrome-
trical Deter-m1nat1on o+ Nuclear Fuel 
Enr1chement " repor-t CLRP 10/84-
ZI I , 1984 
2. A.Pietr-uszewskl ,G.Smagala, K.Zar-no-
wiecki " Micr-ocomputer- Controlled 
System for Spectr-ometr-1cal Determ1-
nat1on of U-enr-lchement with Planar 
Coax1al Detector-s Us1ng Th-234:U-235 
and Pa-234M:U-235 Photopeak Rat1os " 
IAEA Sympos1um on Nuclear- Materials 
Safeguards Technology, V1enna 1986 
3. A.P1etruszewsk1 ,G.Smagala ,D.Walter 
R.Zaruck1," Repor-t1ng System to IAEA 
on Nuclear- Materials Movements 
Bewteen MBAs on Floppy D1scs " - re-
port CLRP 1/88/Z-li , 1988' 
4. A.P1etruszewsk1 ,G.Smagala ,R.Zaruc-
ki, D.Kolata. " Computer-Ised System 
of Nuclear Mater-1als Accountancy " 
r-epor-t CLRP 1/~0/Z-1! , 1~90 
NUCLEAR MATERIALS ACCOUNTANCY IN AN INDUSTRIAL MOX FUEL FABRICATION PLANT 
SAFEGUARDS VERSUS COMMERCIAL ASPECTS 
H. De Canck, R. Ingels, R. Lefevre 
BELGONUCLEAIRE-Dessel 
Abstract 
In a modern MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant, with 
a large throughput of nuclear materials, compu-
terized real-time accountancy systems are ap-
plied. Following regulations and prescriptions 
imposed by the Inspectorates EURATOM-IAEA, the 
State and also by internal plant safety rules, 
the accountancy is kept in plutonium element, 
uranium element and 235u for enriched uranium. 
In practice, Safeguards Authorities are con-
cerned with quantities of the element (Utot• 
Put0 t) and to some extent with its fissile con-
tent. Custom Authorities are for historical rea-
sons, interested in fissile quantities (Ufiss• 
Pufiss) whereas owners wish to recover the ener-
getic value of their material (Pu equivalent). 
Balancing the accountancy simultaneously in 
all these related but not proportional units is 
a new problem in a MOX-plant where pool accoun-
tancy is applied. This paper indicates possible 
ways to solve the balancing problem created by 
these different units used for expressing nu-
clear material quantities. 
l.Introduction 
In the last 30 years BELGONUCLEAIRE develo-
ped a "real time" nuclear materials accountancy 
system which was applied first in its research 
laboratories and later in the MOX Fuel Fabrica-
tion plant in Dessel. This computerized system 
fulfils the requirements put forward by the 
Inspectorates IAEA and EURATOM, and in particu-
lar those defined in the Commission RegulaLion 
EURATOM n• 3227/76 of 19 th. October 1976 con-
cerning the application of the provision on 
EURATOM Safeguards. 
In principle this accountancy is kept in 
plutonium element (Pur)A uranium element (Ur) 
and in enriched uranium (L35u). 
Although Safeguards authorities are directly 
concerned with quantities of PUr, Ur and 235u; 
the Inspectorates have an interest in the fissi-
le content, as verification measurements are 
made to determine the isotopic composition as 
well as the total content. 
When crossing of State borders occurs, the 
customs authorities verify and follow the fissi-
le content (Pufiss) of the material, as for his-
torical reasons, it is considered by them as a 
good unit for the financial value of the mate-
rial. To a certain extent the EURATOM Supply 
Agency wants to know the plutonium fissile con-
tent of nuclear material transfers when the bor-
ders of the Community are crossed. 
But last but not least, the customer of the 
MOX plant, who is using the plutonium in order 
to produce electricity is interested in recove-
ring the energetic value of the material he sup-
plied, value or quantity expressed in 
Puequivalent (Pueq). 
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In order not to keep separate accountancy 
systems running in parallel for Safeguards, for 
clients and for national and international 
authorities, BELGONUCLEAIRE tried to solve this 
problem by using the system of "current ac-
counts" in which all quantities are recorded in 
Pur. Pufiss and Pueq simultaneously. 
In this system the requirements of Safe-
guards and commercial nuclear material manage-
ment are met. 
The title of this presentation should in 
fact not be "Safeguards versus commercial 
aspect" but well "Combining Safeguards with com-
mercial aspects". 
2.Pool Accountancy 
2.1. The basis of the good functioning of a 
MOX-Fuel Fabrication Plant lies in the fact that 
there is a continuous flow of plutonium through 
the process without long hold-ups or storage 
during which 241Am builds up. This good flow is 
needed because all plutonium batches which are 
processed nowadays have a high 24lpu content, a 
situation which is different from the one occur-
ring 15 or 20 years ago when the basis rules of 
material fdllow up were laid down. 
Indeed in the past there was a relative low per-
centage of 24lpu eg. 2 to 4 %. In recent years 
however this 24lpu content went up to 12 %. 
Taking into account the relative short half-life 
of this isotope namely 14.4 years there is a 
rather high 241Am build up in a short time lap-
se. Higher 24lpu means faster 241Am build up 
and consequently higher radiation (gamma, alpha 
and thus neutron) which has to be minimized 
during material handling. 
2.2. An other important factor which has to 
be taken into account is the fact that the plu-
tonium batches (60 to 80 kg Pur) are sometimes 
very different from each other in isotopic com-
position. In other to obtain the uniform isoto-
pic composition in the MOX-product which is 
required by some customers it is necessary to 
perform cross-blending. This cross-blending 
between batches, not only of the same client, 
but also between batches supplied by different 
customers led to the need of instituting a pool 
accountancy system for the BELGONUCLEAIRE MOX-
Fuel Fabrication Plant. 
2.3. So, during the last 5 years, BELGONU-
CLEAIRE operates its Dessel plant as a pool of 
fissile materials; i.e. that when entering the 
plant the fissile material looses its ownership 
and its obligation (fungibility principle). 
However accurate balances are kept by BELGONU-
CLEAIRE in terms of 
- debt towards each customer; 
- liability towards Safeguards Authorities, 
Belgian Authorities, EURATOM and IAEA follo-
wing the Commission Regulation (EURATOM) 
n•3227/76 of 1976 in terms of nuclear material 
content per material categories as well as per 
obligation and also towards the EURATOM Supply 
Agency in term of total as well as fissile 
material component per campaign or sub-cam-
paign. 
When leaving the BELGONUCLEAIRE plant, normally 
after transformation from raw material into 
mixed oxide fuel, the fissile material regains 
ownership and obligation. Change of obligation 
can only with the agreement of both parties and 
by Euratom. It must however be well understood 
that a customer supplying fissile material for a 
fabrication (or a storage) campaign will get in 
return an equivalent amount of fissile material 
{decay taken into account), but must not expect 
to receive back the same material (quantity, 
isotopic vector, etc ... ). 
This pool accountancy system is beneficial for 
both customers and fabricator be~ause : 
- it avoids expensive segregation and traceabi-
lity between fabrication and recycle materials 
from different customers; 
- it allows for the utilization of material 
belonging to one customer for the supply to 
another customer so that overageing of mate-
rials awaiting utilization for the next cam-
paign for the same customer does not occur. 
Overageing would lead to products that have to 
be purified by the expensive liquid route 
because their Americium content has become 
excessive for fabrication; 
- it allows for a wider choice for cross-blen-
ding operations with as consequence a reduced 
spread of isotopic compositions within the 
product. 
- it avoids interruptions of fabrication in case 
of temporary technical or administrative pro-
blems regarding the timely supply of fissile 
material to the fabricator's plant, thus hel-
ping in obtaining a reliable mixed oxide fuel 
supply to the customers' reactors. 
In order to be sure that each customer receives 
back its due quantity and quality of material 
the system of current accounts for the fissile 
material accountancy is applied. 
3.Fissile material accountancy 
"Current account .. 
3.l.Units used 
3.1 1 For Uranium. The nuclear decay of 
uranium isotopes occurs with such a long period 
that this decay can be neglected. As enriched 
uranium is only used exceptionally for mixed 
oxide fabrication, it will not be considered 
here. 
The units used are : 
total uranium (Utotal) quantity of uranium 
element contained in the material, expressed 
in grams. 
68 
isotope 235uranium c235u) quantity of the 
235 isotope of uranium in the material, ex-
pressed in grams. 
It is evident that a simultaneous balance in 
both these units can only be achieved if the 
isotopic composition of the incoming and out-
going materials is exactly the same. The pool 
type management of nuclear materials in the 
BELGONUCLEAIRE plant makes this very unlikely. 
Three ranges of 235u content are thus defined 
-near natural uranium: 0.65 <% 235u < 0.75 
slightly depleted uranium : 0.35 < % 235u < 
0.65 
depleted uranium % 235u < 0.35 
Within each of these ranges, only the Utotal is 
taken into account for material balance. 
3.1.2.For Plutonium and Americium. All the 
isotopes of plutonium as well as americium, its 
daughter product, decay with periods that have 
to be taken into account for the material ac-
countancy. The loss of material due to radioac-
tive decay is always attributed to the customer 
who supplied the material. Summing and subtrac-
ting of quantities of plutonium andjor ameri-
cium, whatever the unit, can only be done when 
all parts have been calculated to the same 
date. 
The units used are 
- Io~al llytQnium iPYtot) : quantity of pluto-
nium element (excluding americium) contained 
in the material, expressed in grams. This 
unit is used for Safeguards purposes in the 
accounting for the EURATOM Supply Agency 
accountancy which is done on the basis of the 
contracts concluded for one or several cam-
paigns. 
- ii~sil~ llutQnium iPy~£is) : quantity of the 
isotopes 2J9pu and Pu contained in the 
material, expressed in grams. This unit is the 
one traditionally used for customs purposes, 
possibly for Safeguards purposes. 
- ~qgiyalent_Plu~onigm_(Pueq) : quantity of ele-
ment summing the content of each plutonium 
isotope and of americium, multiplied by the 
energetic equivalent coefficient of the cor-
responding isotope. The formula is of the 
form 
NB 
Pueq (a x 238Pu) + (b x 239Pu) + (c x 240pu) 
+ (d X 24lpu) + (e X 242pu) + (f X 241Am) 
where : - 238pu, 239pu, are the 
weights, of each isotope; 
expressed in grams; 
- a, b, ... f, are the energetic 
equivalence coefficients for 
each corresponding isotope. 
Pufiss is a particular case of Pueq 
where : [ a c e - f - 0 
b - d- 1 
In practice the energetic equivalence coeffi-
cients are more complex and can vary for various 
types of reactors. It is however proposed to use 
the following standardized average set of values 
for commercial accountancy purposes : 
a 1 
b 1 
c 0.4 
d 1.3 
e - - 1.4 
f 2.2 
As in the case of Uranium, a simultaneous balan-
ce in all units is impossible. 
NB This effect would be observed even without 
the pool type of fissile management. It 
would be due to : 
- the fact that all the by the customer 
supplied lots of Pu will not have been 
used in the same proportion; 
- analysis inaccuracies. 
Therefore one of these units must be used on a 
commercial basis for balancing inputs and out-
puts towards each customer. Pueq is the unit 
representing the energetic value of the fissile 
material and must thus be chosen for commercial 
accounts balancing purposes. 
3.2.Commercial in/out accountancy 
An example of balance for Plutonium is given 
in appendix 1. Inputs to the plant (material 
supplied by the customer) are positive, outputs 
from the plant are negative. Waste and archives 
are considered as outputs and are supposed to 
have the same isotopic vector as the product 
delivered by the BELGONUCLEAIRE plant. All data 
are recalculated at a same date (reference date 
of the current campaign), inputs and outputs in 
the three units are cumulated. The balance of 
the Pueq is the quantity that has to be trans-
ferred to the next campaign for the same custo-
mer, or returned to the customer (last 
campaign). 
3.3.Transfer from one campaign to the next one. 
for the same customer 
The balance of Pueq at the end of a campaign 
must be transferred to the next one which has 
usually a different reference date. Decay must 
thus be calculated from one reference date to 
the other and for this purpose the material to 
be transferred must be attributed an isotopic 
vector and a quantity of Putot which correspond 
to the to be transferred quantity of Pueq· 
It is supposed that the material transferred has 
the same isotopic composition as the product 
delivered by the BELGONUCLEAIRE plant for the 
completed fabrication campaign; the quantity of 
Putot is calculated to give the required Pueq 
quantity. 
The so defined transferred material is the first 
input in the Pu material balance of the next 
campaign. 
3.4.Balancing the other plutonium units 
Balancing the Pue unit settles all energe-
tic and thus financia1 accounts but for Safe-
guards and customs purposes the Pur and PuFiss 
must also be balanced, this is physically impos-
sible. The balance in those two units must thus 
be brought back to zero by the transfer, by 
mutual agreement of the parties, of fictitious 
material from the debtor to the creditor at zero 
cost. 
Remarks 
a) The settlement of the accounts must prefera-
bly occur at the end of each campaign, occa-
sionally the balances for the Putot and 
Pufiss of several campaigns can be cumulated 
in such an agreement. 
b) The ratio between the quantities of Putot and 
Pufiss can never correspond to a physically 
plausible Plutonium isotopic vector as they 
have a Pueq value of zero. 
4.Conclusion 
In order to harmonize different units in use in 
the nuclear material accountancy of BELGONU-
CLEAIRE the system of "current accounts" 
expressed in Putot• Pufiss as well as Pueq was 
applied during the last 5 years. The data are 
used for safeguards as well as for commercial 
purposes. 
During this period about 6 tons of plutonium 
were processed in the MOX-Fuel Fabrication plant 
in Dessel for different customers and for a dif-
ferent fabrication campaigns. This "current 
account" system proved to work successfully. 
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CAMP.! 
CII'IP.l 
CAMP .1 
CII'IP .1 
CAMP.! 
"CURRENT ACCOUNT• 
1) IH- RHO OUrPUr5 
APPENDIX. 1 
LOr AHAl V5E 500 
HUMBER HR. rRRHSPORI Pulot(g) Pufm(g) OAIE %238 X239 XZiO X211 X2i2 ppn AM 150TOPEI! 
M220-1 23-f eb-89 100000 .0 74880.0 21-Jan-87 0.200 70.330 23.950 1.550 0.970 360 100 
503-A 18-May-89 116000.0 77352 .3 02-0ct-87 1.330 56.837 26.722 9.816 5.265 229 lOO 
X-01 23-Mar-90 -200000.0 -113188.0 31-Jul-90 0.786 6i .766 21.103 6.828 3.217 7500 100 
ARCHIUE5 2H1ar-90 -67.1 -18.0 31-Jul-90 0.706 61.766 21.403 6.828 3.217 7500 100 
UA5r[ 2H1ar-90 -287.3 -205.7 3Hul-90 0 .'186 61.766 21.103 6.820 3.217 7500 100 
2) P.ECALCULAIIOH 10 REfERENCE OAIE 
CALCULAIIOH 
DArE Pulot(g) Pufm(g) X238 X239 Z210 %211 m2 ppn An 
_____ .., _______________________________________________________________________________ 
31-Jul-90 99268.6 7-1163.1 0.1959 '10.8110 21.1175 3.8685 0.9771 7190 
31-Jul-90 111197 .6 75893.2 1.3177 57.5781 27.0615 8.7056 5.3311 12698 
31-Jul-90 -200000 .0 -I i3188 ,(I 0 .'1860 0.6177 21.i030 6.8280 3.2170 7500 
31-Jul-90 -67 .I -18.0 0. 7860 0.6177 21.1030 6.8280 3.2170 7500 
31-Jul-90 -287.3 -205 0 7 0 0 7860 0.617'1 21.1030 6.8280 3.2170 7500 
3) CRLCULAIIOI! Of PU EQUIURLEHr 
UEIGHI COEff. Pu.eq. UEIGHI COEff. Pu.eq. UEIGHr CO[ff. Pu.eq. UEIGHr COEff. Pu .eq. UEIGHI COEff. Pu .eq. UEIGHI COEff. Pu .eq. 
Pu238 Pu238 Pu238 Pu239 Pu239 Pu239 Pu210 Pu210 PuZiO Pu211 Pu211 Pu211 Pu212 Pu21Z PuZ12 AMZ11 AM211 AM211 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·----------------------··----
191.17 
1509.73 
-1572.00 
-0.53 
-2.26 
-1 -191.17 70322.87 
-1 -1509.73 65925.51 
-1 1572.00 -129532.00 
-1 0.53 -13.16 
-1 2.26 -IB6.07 
CURREHI ACCOUHI "X' 
1 70322.87 23911.10 -8.1 -9576.41 3810.21 1.3 1992.27 969.95 -1.1 -1357.93 m.52 -2.2 -1635.71 
1 65925.51 30988.20 -0.1 -12395.20 9967.70 u 12958.01 6107.12 -1.1 -8550.38 m6.79 -2.2 -3248.98 
1 -129532.00 18806.00 -0.1 19522.10 -13656.00 u -17752.80 -6131.00 -1.1 9007.60 -15oo.oo -2.2 33oo.oo 
1 -13.16 -16.37 -0.1 6.55 -1.58 1.3 -5.95 -2.16 -1.1 3.02 -0.50 -2.2 1.11 
I -186.07 -70.11 -0.1 28.01 -19.62 1.3 -25.51 -9.21 -1.4 12.91 -2.15 -2.2 1.7'1 
31-Jul-90 
1) Pulo\, Pufiss, PuEq. 
I I 
I LOI !OrAL !OrAL !OrAL I 
I Hlt10[R Pulot Pufm Pu.eq. I 
I ----------------------------------------- I 
I Ill M220-1 99268.6 71163.1 62550.6 I 
1 Ill 503-R 111197.6 75893.2 53180.2 1 
1 our x-o1 -2ooooo.o -113188.0 -113882.8 1 
I OUr ARCHIUES -67 .I -18.0 -38.2 I 
I OUI URSIE -237.3 -205.7 -163.6 I 
I I 
S) CURREHr RCCOUHr CU51011ER "X' 
BRLRHCIHG CAMPRIGH I 
31-Jul-SO 
" CREDII 10 rHE CUSrOMER " OEOII ro rHE CUSIOMER <> 8ALRHCE or CREOII ID !HE CU510li[R 
LOJ u " o 
HR.IRAHSPORI HIN1UER •• Purot(g) PuflSS(g)PuEq(g) ., Purot(g) Pufm(g)PuEq(g) •• ORIE Pulot(g) Pufm(g)PuEq(g) 
CAMP .I I 23-t'eb-89 M220-l .. 99268.6 71163.1 62550.6 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ., 31-Jul-90 99268 .6 71163 .I 62550 .6 
CliiP .I 2 18-May-89 503-R .. 111197.6 75893 .2 53180.2 •• 0.0 0.0 0.0 •• 31-Jul-90 213766.2 150056.3 115730.8 
CAMP.! 23-Mar-90 K-01 .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 " 200000.0 113188.0 113882.8 •• 31-Jul-90 13766.2 6868.3 1848.0 
CAMP .I 2H1ar-90 ARCHIUES u 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 67 .I 18.0 38 .2 •• 31-Jul-90 13699 .I 6820.3 1809.8 
CAMP.! 23-Mar-90 UASJE •• 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 287.3 205.7 Jb3 .6 '" 31-Jul-90 13i11.6 6611.6 16%.2 
CAMP .I rRAIISrER u 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 2891.0 2069.8 IG%.2 •• 31-Jul-90 10520.8 1511.8 (0.0) 
CAMP .I REGULAR IS*' 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 10520 .B 1511.8 0.0 •• 31-Jul-90 (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
CAMP.2 rRR115f[R •• 2891.0 2069.8 16i6.2 •• 0.0 0.0 0.0 •• 31-Jul-90 2891.0 2069.8 16%.2 
CAMP .2 29-Hov-89 532(07.1R)u 6%8.2 5275.6 1113.8 ., 0.0 0.0 0.0 '* 31-Jul-90 9859.2 7315.1 6060.0 
70 
SAFEGUARDING LARGE PLUTONIUM STORES 
P.Chare, R.Schenkel, B.G.R.Smith, H.Wagner, S.Kaiser, J-C.Saglini 
Commission of the European Communities 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate 
L-2920 Luxembourg 
Abstract 
Within the European Communities there are presently 
under construction or commissioning several large 
plutonium stores. A generic Pu store design is 
described which takes into account typical features of 
importance to safeguards. The different safeguards 
measures used, or to be used in the near future, to 
safeguard such stores are reviewed. 
Different store designs are characterized according to a 
number of important parameters, i.e. storage location 
design, handling machines and routines, access routes 
for personnel, nuclear and non-nuclear material, etc. 
and each safeguards measure is presented and 
analysed in order to derive a classification of the 
aptness of each measure. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the role of "inter-
locking" safeguards measures which treat as a specific 
requirement the avoidance of unnecessary re-
verification through a judicious selection of 
complimentary techniques and instruments. 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
problems associated with the safeguarding of the large 
plutonium stores in the commercially operating 
plutonium handling plants that are presently under 
construction or have been recently commissioned. 
These stores have been designed to Incorporate the 
necessary radiation protection measures for the 
reduction of radiation doses to the plant operating staff 
and include remote handling techniques to reduce the 
need of human presence inside the stores to a 
minimum. As a consequence of the design and plant 
automation in the storage areas the classical approach 
of individual item or location sealing together with NDA 
measurement systems using mobile NDA equipment in 
the storage area had to be fundamentally re-examined. 
This together with the incorporation of the new 
instrument technology available led to the development 
of a safeguards system compatible with the new 
automated handling sequences and systems in the 
storage areas. 
The layout of the paper is based upon the 
sequence and iterative development processes in the 
approach to safeguarding these large plutonium stores 
(see Fig. 1). The following areas are discussed in some 
detail: 
a) Technical and accounting information 
about the plant 
b) Safeguards approach 
c) C & S measures 
d) NDA measures 
e) Project management 
f) Inspection activities 
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The results of the studies and work carried out 
by the Inspectorate, as described in this paper, wHI 
show the evolution of the safeguarding framework 
arising from the approach considerations utilising the 
available technology for both NDA and C & S aspects. 
Early Material Movements 
Technical Information Store Locations 
and Basle Technical Hend\lng Arrangements 
CharacteMsllcs Key Me...,rement Points 
A<:countancy System 
' 
I Consultation/ I Building Structure 
SlteV\slt 1 Penetratlons 
Ughting
Access Arrangements 
Power Suppl\eo I Sefeguards Strategy Space fOI" Sefeguards Equip. 
Inspection Scheme Authenllcstion Feall.lres 
I Technical Specifications J 
of Sefeguards 
Equipment 
Power SUppl\eo/Ughting 
~~nware I Sefeguards Equipment installation Order, Install (C&S, NDA. monitoring, etc.) 
Technical Reception I Operator Interface 
Maintenance/Repair Scheme 
Recovery from Failures 
I eaumtion 1 I Routine Inspection I Functional Checks 
Commissioning I 1 Implementation 
Fig. 1 Flow Diagram of Principal Decision Points In the 
Establishment of a System for Safeguarding Large Plutonium Stores 
2. Examination and Discussion of Technical and 
Accounting lntormation of the Plant 
A consultation/discussion with the plant operator 
at an early design and construction stage was 
considered vital and necessary for a satisfactory 
development and implementation of the safeguards 
approach . This consultation was essential in the 
identification of the material flow routes, key 
measurement and verification points, the possible 
locations for non-routine access, the understanding of 
the container handling and transfer, the stora!ile 
location layout, and the interaction of the matenal 
access routes in relation to the processing areas of the 
new plants. During these consultations the identification 
of possible locations for equipment to be installed was 
made, together with the expected location of the 
inspectors office, to ensure that in the subsequent 
deliberations as many options as possible were 
examined for the safeguards approach. 
During the first discussion and subsequent 
discussions more exact details concerning the 
quantities of material to be stored and configuration of 
the individual storage locations were confirmed 
together with the storage container design. These 
details were essential for the design of the C & s 
system and the measurement configuration for any 
proposed installed NDA system. 
In addition to the verification of the mechanical 
and physical details of the store, questions concerning 
the reliability of the electrical power available to the 
inspectors and linkage to the operators emergency 
back-up system were examined and discussed with the 
operator in some detail. This was deemed absolutely 
crucial to ensure that there was the necessary security 
of electrical power supply. In the absence of certainty 
of guarantee of electrical supply there was a need for 
the inspectors to design and incorporate a certain level 
of power back-up in their safeguards system. 
At this early stage of the discussions on the plant 
design the question of branching from the operators 
installed equipment, e.g. for NDA, merited examination 
for the inspectors use. The problems of authentication 
had to be studied and examined in detail before the 
construction and installation was completed. These 
discussions, defining the interface between 
operators/inspectors signals was considered the most 
important and the most useful by all the operators 
involved. 
Based upon this preliminary information derived 
from the consultations and the ensuing discussions 
with the operator an approach scheme for safeguarding 
the plant was drawn-up and discussed. 
3. Safeguards Approach 
The large plutonium stores recently 
commissioned or presently under construction differ in 
some distinct relevant safeguards features from 
previous fuel stores for the following reasons: 
1) The necessitY. for personnel access to the 
store has been significantly reduced for physical 
protection, health physics, and resource reasons 
2) As a consequence of (1) above, the new 
stores have multiple containment systems and 
complete remote operations of fuel transfers 
3) The classical apP.roach for (manual) 
verification of cans with mob1le equipment and the 
subsequent sealing of items in their individual storage 
positions has therefore become obsolete. 
4) The re-establishment of an inventory in such 
stores would be a very resource and cost intensive 
exercise for operators and inspectorates. Seals, which 
have proved to be very reliable cannot, in general, be 
used on the material locations inside the store. This 
places a new and highly significant emphasis on the 
design of very reliable alternative systems. 
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5) The increasing use of unattended safeguards 
systems in these stores necessitates more effort from 
technical services to maintain a high level of reliability, 
but it reduces, on the other hand, the need for 
continuous presence of inspectors in some facilities. 
The transmission of data to a central office significantly 
reduces the amount of time spent by the inspectors 
passing through controlled zone areas and following 
the necessary change of clothing routines. 
The general scheme designed by Euratom for 
these large stores is based upon the following basic 
principles: 
- 100% verification of flow into and out of the 
store by unattended Non .Qestructive Assay neutron 
and gamma measurements 
- 1 00% identification of flow into and out of store 
either by optical surveillance and/or number reading 
techniques 
- Highly reliable Containment and Surveillance 
measures to maintain continuity of knowledge for the 
material in the store and follow-up of any internal 
movements of cans/containers inside the store. The 
design goal with respect to reliability is to have a C & S 
system where the failure probability is at the maximum 
of 1 per life time of the plant. 
- The physical inventory verification consists 
essentially of examination of C & S results and the 
verification of some randomly selected items from the 
inventory and this activity can bee distributed over a 
material balance period. A schematic layout of such a 
store is shown in figure 2. 
The scheme for safeguarding these large 
plutonium stores was therefore based upon built-in 
redundancy, diversity, and separate interlinking 
systems to preserve the continuity of knowledge of the 
material inside the stores. Account was taken of the 
need for timeliness, with respect to the material 
residency time within the store and the frequency of 
shipment/exports from the storage area. From the 
inspectors point of view this was acknowledged by the 
requisite for the necessary regular review of the results 
of the surveillance equipment and diagnostic 
examination of the performance of the installed 
instrumentation. 
One of the most important features taken into 
consideration for detailed examination in the 
development of an approach was the difficulty of 
access to the material once inside the storage locations 
of the store. This aspect of the facility design and the 
logistics of handling arrangements inside the store had 
an impact on the costjtime penalty for the re-
estabUshment of inventory in the case of surveillance 
failure. 
The overall approach taken was that of an object 
cocooned by a number of protective shells, interlinked 
but at the same time independent for redundancy 
purposes. These shells of containment would be linked 
by monitored passageways from the outside to the 
inner sanctum of the store area and vice versa. The 
concept of the establishment of a number of 
containment barriers with sensors monitoring for 
penetration was therefore established and instituted. 
Nuclear Material Entry 
~~~~~~ 
[g§ Containment 
Material 
Maintenance 
Entry/Exit 
II Non-nuclear Material Flow 
• Nuclear Material Entry/Exit 
[] Nuclear Material Flow 
Ventilation Ducts 
Inspection Manholes 
Personnel Access 
Nuclear Material Exit 
Fig. 2 Physical Layout of Store 
The overall C & S system was designed to 
achieve at least a category B type C & S system. This 
was based upon the measurement of material entering 
the storage area and using several methods for C & S, 
including the installed NDA as a monitoring device 
outside the measurement activities, to ensure the 
continuity of knowledge. 
The proposed safeguards measures for a store 
are shown in Fig. 3. 
4. C&S Considerations 
One of the main considerations for the 
application of C & S in these large stores was the 
absence of the realistic opportunity due to operational 
limitations of placing classical seals on the individual 
storage locations. An alternative sealing method based 
upon different methods of containment were necessary 
for study under the umbrella of the safeguards 
approach as discussed in the previous section. Having 
established the overall safeguards approach, and 
identified/specified the equipment to be wtilised, the 
store was examined in detail by the safeguards 
inspectorate for the optimum siting of the equipment. 
The necessity for sealing, using conventional 
seals was not abandoned but the use of seals was 
restricted to accessible areas so that inspectors could 
readily verify them without undue intrusiveness to the 
operator. 
73 
The C & S system installed was designed to 
provide the necessary surveillance containment inside 
the store and to cover the different access routes injout 
of the store namely: 
a) nuclear material flow into and out of the 
store 
b) Personnel access 
c) Ventilation duct\ng 
d) maintenance hatch/doors 
e) inspection manholes 
as well as an overview of the store and storage 
locations. 
The C & S systems utilised were based upon the 
standard Euratom video system, together with front-end 
motion detection, active infra red for intrusion 
monitoring, and neutron and gamma counting for the 
installed NDA equipment. The systems were 
incorporated into an overall scheme so that any failure 
of the video system would be backed-up by techniques 
such as intrusion monitors and neutron detectors. 
Due to the problems associated with the spiking 
in the operator's power supply great importance was 
attached to the need for the inclusion of electrical 
filtering into the inspector's system. 
The camera system installed was based upon a 
standard commercially available ceo camera linked 
through a multiplexer and motion detection system to 
GYRR time lapse recorders. The cameras and 
recording systems were designed with an appropriate 
~ 
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Fig.3 Safeguards Measures for the Store 
redundancy based upon experience and historical data 
from similar installed video systems. 
The infra-red detection system utilised was the 
curtain type that was capable of detecting an object 
greater than Scm passing through the beam. 
As previously stated the inclusion of the installed 
NDA operating as a monitor outside the programmed 
measurement cycles was an important feature for the 
linkage into the overall C & S strategy. 
It was important that the interlinking of the 
different C & S systems into an overall scheme ensured 
that the likelihood of a total loss of continuity of 
knowledge was· reduced to an absolute minimum. As 
previouslY. mentioned ~ecovery. from a total or e~~n a 
partial failure of surveillance w1ll be extremely d1ff1cult 
and time consuming for both the inspectorate and the 
operator. 
The reliability of the electrical power supply, 
lighting, and adequate emergency power back-up were 
also important factors in the design ?f the ove~all C ~ S 
system. This aspect prompted considerable d1scuss1on 
throughout the realisation of the projects and sufficient 
back-up power or emergency supply through the 
operator had to be available to power an adequate C & 
S system during the periods of normal power outage. 
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5. Input and Output Measurements 
The decision on the installation location of the 
NDA instrumentation for the measurement of the 
material entering or leaving the store was dependent 
.upon the engineering layout of the ~tore, the 
operational sequences, and the space available. The 
location of the inspector's own equipment was 
established during the subsequent discussions to the 
early plant design visit The siting of the equipment was 
linked to the proposed C & S measures and would 
cover the material flow into and out of the store. The 
design of the neutron measurement system was based 
upon the HLNCC design of instrumentation with an 
accuracy of 1-2%' and the gamma measurement 
system on high resolution spectroscopy using the MGA 
code. 
The specification of the installed NDA system 
included the monitoring function step to dove-tail into 
the other C & S devices included in the overall 
safeguards scheme. As previously discussed this 
provided one of the protective containment shells to the 
inner store area. The measurement procedure was 
established on the cycle time of the material container 
transfer and the geometry of the container presented 
for the inspectors measurement. The signal transfer of 
the neutron and gamma signals was transmitted either 
to a local sited PC or the inspectors central computer 
system for recording and evaluation. The NDA 
measurement sequence would be triggered as part of 
the monitoring cycle to permit measurements both 
going in and out of the store. 
In the case of the branched option for the NDA 
measurement from the operator's equipment, 
appropriate authentication modifications had to be 
made to the branched signal to ensure that the 
equipment was triggered in the correct sequence and 
at the correct time. Internal monitoring of the NDA 
equipment through the inspectors software would alert 
the inspectors to unusual events or detector failure. 
Emphasis on the NDA measurement evaluation 
and data interpretation with reference to the operators 
declaration should be made towards the independence 
of the results rather than a comparison of two sets of 
derived figures, particularly in the case of the branched 
measurement system. 
6. Project Management 
Due to the complex nature Elf the proposed C & 
S and NDA installations associated with the 
safeguarding of the stores it was necessary t<;> estab!ish 
a proper project management scheme. Th1s enta1led 
the drafting of appropriate specifications for the 
different items for installation and the incorporated NDA 
equipment. With particular reference to the NDA 
installations this involved exploring new areas for 
unattended mode operation and data acquisition for 
both neutron and gamma measurements. 
After the establishment and agreement of the 
equipment specifications tenders. were sought for t~e 
installation of the safeguards equ1pment. The offers 1n 
comparison with similar projects enabled the 
inspectorate _to evaluate the reasona~leness. of the 
offers in relat1on to the overall costs of 1nstallat1on, the 
design and engineering component of the total cost 
figure, and the associated services installation. The 
capital costs presented about 30-40% of the ov~rall 
investment in safeguarding these large pluton1um 
handling plants. The remainder of the money invested 
being absorbed in the installation and des1gn costs. 
Based upon the capital and installation costs an 
estimate was made for the forecast running costs and 
maintenance of such equipment over the next 5/10 
year operating period. 
After detailed scrutiny and examination of the 
offers, together with further ~iscussi~ns . wit~ the 
suppliers and tenderers concern1ng the JUStification of 
the offer figures approval for the expenditure was 
sought from the' budget authority. After acceptance 
contracts were placed and t~e project for .i~stalling 
safeguards equipment was instituted to dovetall1nto the 
overall construction project of the new plants. 
7. Inspection Activities 
The routine inspection activities would include: 
- Check of internal consistency of 
operator records 
- Check of consistency of records with 
other MBAs 
Check of consistency between 
records/reports 
The internal consistency check would include the 
comparison of weightjidentity I content records of 
storage items against data gathered from the 
inspector's system. This would involve the frequent 
assessment of the C & S results together with the 
correlation of the NDA results and monitoring 
information to confirm and reconcile the declared 
movements into and out of the store. 
The inspector would compare the NDA results 
obtained from either from branched or independent 
measurement to the operators declared figures. The 
establishment of this comparison is essential for the 
judgement on the operator's materials accounting 
system. 
Where problems have been identified with 
respect to measurement results, these should be 
followed up, possibly implying repeat measurement. 
On the occasion of the Physical Inventory Taking 
( PIT), sufficient items should be remeasured ~o ~rovide 
confidence that the safeguards system 1s Indeed 
functioning as envisaged. 
8. Further Remarks and Future Developments 
The major new technical features for safeguards 
equipment in remotely operated fuel stores are the 
unattended operation mode and the integration of the 
equipment in the operators fuel handling, transfer, 
· measurement or surveillance equipment. 
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Due to the restrictions in the use of seals, system 
reliability is a fundamental requirement in remotely 
operated stores. The new generation of the twin 
recorder rnultiplexed video systems in operation _re~<?h 
reliability values between 96% and 98%. ( The reliability 
of the twin Minolta camera system has now reached a 
figure of 99.Z'A> ) 
A video system with a reliability of 95% would not 
be acceptable as the only C & S system in such a store, 
given that approximately each 1.5 years an equipment 
failure can be expected. If this video system was 
combined with an NDA/monitoring system, with a 95% 
reliability, covering the same safeguards objective the 
remaining total failure rate would be about 1 in 30 years, 
the operating lifetime of the plant. Careful attention is 
required in the design of such systems to avoid 
common mode failures, such as total power or light 
failures. The use of a properly electrically filtered 
Uniteruptable Power Supply unit would overcome the 
problems of total power failure. . 
Further development work is required in the 
following areas: 
1) Where sensors are used to trigger optical 
Sl..lrveillance or measurement equipment, means are 
required to check in an un-attended way the 
performance of the sensor in question (i.e. 
normalisation, calibration or diagnostic check ). In the 
case of an unattended neutron detector system, 3 very 
small et-sources were integrated and sealed into the 
d~tectors to provide an independent testjreference 
srgnal. 
2) A systematic fault tree analysis should be 
performed for the safeguards systems used in 
plutonium stores to optimise the reliability of systems 
and to determine the optimum combination of 
measures. 
3) A systematic performance evaluation needs 
to be carried out to monitor and maintain the reliability 
of the installed systems. 
· 4) The equipment status needs to be 
transferred to the inspectors office·· on or off-site to 
permit quick interaction in case of diagnostic messages 
or failures. 
5) Authentication techniques need to be further 
developed as proposed by the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate in the paper presented at the IN MM in 1990. 
9. Condusions 
The conclusions of this paper are that: 
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a) Early access for plant design 
information is required to ensure that the necessary 
equipment and cabling can be installed before the plant 
becomes active. 
b) In the case of branching operators 
NDA equipment early access is also required so that 
the necessary authentication can be made. 
c) The whole scheme must be properly 
project managed to ensure that the equipment and 
rnstallation is specified in detail. 
d) The equipment installed must be either 
capable of lasting the lifetime of the plant or the cabling 
accessible for equipment change/upgrading during the 
lifetime of the plant. 
e) The NDA system should be designed 
to act in a monitoring function and be interlinked into 
the overall C & S system to maintain continuity of 
knowledge. 
f) The overall safeguards system must be 
designed in such a way that the loss of continuity of 
knowledge for the whole srstem is reduced to an 
extremely low probability o once in the operating 
lifetime of the plant. 
g) The electrical power supply system 
must have either the necessary guarantees for non-
interruption or be backed-up by a sufficiently large 
power supply to cover interruptions to the electrical 
supply. 
h) The inspection activities will place a 
much greater reliance on the installed instrumentation 
than in previous similar locations du~ to large _number 
of individual items and the complexrty of movrng and 
individually identifying them. 
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Abstract 
A systematic review of the different 
nuclear material categories, physical 
and chemical forms, and container 
descriptions held by nuclear 
installations in the European 
Communities is presented along with 
the non-destructive instrumentation 
(NDA) currently used for their 
verification. Material categories will 
be identified where presently used NDA 
verification techniques are 
insufficiently accurate or where no 
adequate NDA technique y~t exists. 
Based on this analysis the future 
needs for NDA instrumentation are 
discussed, particularly with respect 
to the new large-scale nuclear 
facilities presently under 
construction or in commissioning. 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is primarily 
to outline the present and future 
needs for NDA instrumentation. This is 
done by comparing the types of nuclear 
material held in the European 
Community with the capabilities of 
existing NDA instrumentation. The aim 
of the paper is to present those areas 
where improvements are required in NDA 
instrumentation; it does not attempt 
to assess the needs in terms of, for 
example, detecto:r; numbers. The paper 
begins with a description of the 
nuclear installations in the Community 
and then gives the types and forms of 
nuclear material likely to be found in 
a set of generic installations which 
cover the most important types. This 
is followed by a very brief 
description of the NDA instruments in 
use by the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate Luxembourg. The paper 
concludes with a list of areas where 
new or improved NDA instrumentation is 
needed. 
2. European Community Nuclear 
Installations 
The number of each type of facility in 
the European Community is given in 
table 1. 
NDA measurements are carried out at 
all of the major types of installation 
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Type Number 
Research Laboratories 58 
Research Reactor and 
Critical Assemblies 68 
Mines and 
Concentration plants 26 
Enrichment plants 5 
Fuel Conversion/ 
Fabrication plants 27 
Reprocessing plants 11 
Power Reactors 128 
Storage Installations 52 
Others 420 
Total 795 
Table 1 European Community Nuclear Installations 
as part of the Euratom inspection 
activities. 
The various types of installation, 
representing the most important in 
terms of nuclear material usage, are 
now presented in more detail; The 
types of material expected to be 
present in seven different types of 
generic facilities are given. Material 
types are relevant to NDA requirements 
if they appear in the inventory of the 
plant or in transfers to and from the 
plant in non-negligible quantities. 
Each of the subsequent sections also 
gives the NDA measurement capability 
associated with each material type; 
the detector type and expected 
operator/inspector difference of the 
measurement are given. The detectors 
are identified in table 9. Unless 
otherwise stated, the quantity 
measured with the neutron equipment is 
the plutonium or U-235 mass. In the 
case of the gamma instruments the 
measured quantity is normally the 
enrichment in the case of uranium or 
the isotopic composition for 
plutonium. Only neutron and gamma 
techniques have been included in the 
tables, which means that weighing, for 
example, is excluded even though it 
may play a major part in the 
verification of some materials. 
(i) Research Reactors 
The description of the expected 
material in a research reactor is 
given in table 2. 
Material 
Fresh HEU fuel assemblies: 
NDA Method 
AWCC 3%, oavidson+Ge 0.5% 
Gamma scanner enrich. lt 
Irradiated HEU fuel assemblies: none 
Fresh scrap AWCC 20% oavidson+Ge lt 
Table 2 Research Reactor material types. 
The AWCC measures the bulk U-235 
content and the Davidson + Ge detector 
measures the uranium enrichment. The 
gamma scanner measures the enrichment 
and the U-235 content. In the case of 
scrap, it should be noted that the 
interpretation of the enrichment 
measurement will depend to a large 
extent on the nature of the sample. 
Similar techniques would be used at a 
HEU fabrication plant. 
(ii) Enrichment Plants 
The description 
material in an 
given in table 3. 
of the' 
enrichment 
expected 
plant is 
Material 
UF6 cylinders: 
Depleted u 
LEU 
Natural U 
In-process material 
UF6 waste 
NDA Method 
CIND 15-20% oavidson+Nai 10% 
CIND 8-10% Oavidson+Ge 3% 
CIND 15-20% oavidson+Nai 8% 
cascade meter GojNoGo for LEU 
none 
Table 3 Enrichment plant material types. 
The categories in this case are 
limited by the nature of the 
enrichment process to UF6 feed, 
product, tails and waste. out of the 
process, the UF6 is generally stored 
in cylinders. It should be noted that 
the CIND measures the enrichment in a 
small fraction of the volume of the 
cylinder. The Davidson MCA plus 
detector measures the uranium 
enrichment in each case. The cascade 
meter is used to confirm that the 
uranium enrichment is less than 20% 
(within 3 standard deviations of the 
measurement). 
(iii) Power Reactors 
The description of the expected 
material in a power reactor is given 
in table 4. 
Material 
Fresh LEU fuel assemblies 
Fresh MOX fuel assemblies 
" (underwater) 
Irradiated fuel assemblies 
Irradiated pins 
NDA Method 
NCC (active) 2-5%; 
Davidson+Nai Jt 
NCC (passive) 2% 
Davidson+Nai 3% 
Mod. Fork 5% 
Ion-fork attribute 
none 
Table 4 Power Reactor materiaJ types. 
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Power reactor material types are very 
limited. They are fresh fuel 
assemblies (LEU or MOX) and irradiated 
assemblies. Sometimes pins are removed 
from irradiated assemblies and stored 
in boxes on site. The NCC measures the 
U-235 content of a certain length of 
fuel, which is combined with an active 
length measurement to give the total 
U-235 content. 
(iv) LEU Fuel Fabrication plants 
The description of the expected 
material in an LEU fuel fabrication 
plant is given in table 5. (All the 
material is unirradiated). 
Material 
Powders: 
LEU and Natural u 
ceramic pellets: 
LEU and Natural 
Fuel rods: 
LEU and Natural 
Fuel assemblies: 
LEU 
Waste, scrap and 
small quantities 
NDA Method 
PHONID 2% Davidson+Nai 2% 
PHONID 2% 
Operator rod scanner; 
Davidson+Nai 2% 
NCC active J-5% 
oavidson+Nai 2% 
PHONID 20% 
Table 5 LEU Fuel Fabrication plant material types. 
PHONID measures the bulk U-235 content 
of the samples. 
(v) MOX Fuel Fabrication plants 
The description of the expected 
material in a MOX Fuel Fabrication 
plant is given in table 6. (All of the 
material is unirradiated). 
Material 
Powders: 
002 
PU02 
MOX 
Ceramic pellets: 
MOX 
Fuel rods: 
MOX single pins 
MOX pin trays 
Fuel assemblies: 
MOX LWR 
FBR 
Scrap and waste 
NDA Method 
PHONID 2% 
HLNCC 2% Cicero/Pu meter 1% 
HLNCC 2% Cicero/Pu meter 1% 
HLNCC 2% Cicero/Pu meter 1% 
Cerceuil <2%; 
HM4 for active length 
UFBC 2% CicerojPu meter 1% 
NCC passive 2% 
HM4 for active length 
UFBR 2% 
HLNCC Octagone 20% 
Table 6 MOX Fuel Fabrication plant material types. 
The cicero or the Pu meter are used 
with MGA (reference 1) which gives 
uncertainties of less than 1% on all 
plutonium isotopic abundances 
depending on the burn-up and the 
measurement time. For high burn-up 
material the errors increase to 2-3% 
if the Pu-242 is calculated from 
correlations. Improved correlations 
are presented at another paper in this 
conference (reference 2). 
(vi) Reprocessing Plants 
The description of the 
material in a reprocessing 
given in table 7. 
Material NDA Method 
Irradiated fuel elements: 
expected 
plant is 
LEU (Pu) 
Irradiated fuel rods 
Irradiated nitrate solutions 
Fresh nitrate solutions 
Ion-Fork attribute 
none 
Hybrid K-edge Pu 0.7% U 0.3% 
none Depleted u 
Pu HLNC INVS 2%; CicerojPu meter 1% 
K-edge 0.2-0.3% 
Fresh powders: 
Pu02 HLNC INVS 2%; Cicero/Pu meter 1% 
Table 7 Reprocessing plant material types. 
Due to the active nature of the 
material at such a plant, a large 
amount of material is difficult to 
access directly (e.g. large tanks of 
active solutions) therefore even when 
NDA techniques are available, sampling 
is required. The Hybrid K-edge 
measures the concentration of 
materials in solution arid has an 
accuracy of 0. 3% for uranium and 0. 7% 
for plutonium. The K-edge has an 
accuracy for plutonium of 0.2-0.3%. 
(vii) Research Laboratories 
The description of 
material in a research 
given in table 8. 
the expected 
laboratory is 
Material 
Fresh fuel rods: 
HEU 
LEU 
Irradiated fuel rods: 
LEU and Natural 
Fresh ceramic pellets: 
LEU and Natural 
Fresh metal: 
Depleted U 
HEU 
Natural U 
Fresh powders: 
U02 
Thorium 
Scrap and waste 
NDA Method 
AWCC 2-3%; Davidson+Ge 0.5% 
NCC active 2%; Davidson+Nai 3% 
none 
AWCC 2%; Davidson+Nal 3% 
none 
AWCC 3% 
AWCC 3% 
AWCC 5%; Davidson+Nai 3% 
Davidson+Nal attribute 
AWCC 30% 
Table 8 Research Laboratory material types. 
This list does not attempt to give all 
possibilities of material types which 
exist in research laboratories but 
gives an indication of the diversity 
of the material types. In general the 
more unusual forms exist in relatively 
small quantities. 
3. Euratom Safeguards NDA Equipment 
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of 
current usage of NDA equipment by 
installation type. Figure 2 shows how 
the usage of NDA equipment has 
increased over the past 7 years. 
Table 9 lists the types of NDA 
equipment which are currently in use 
in the Euratom Safequards Directorate. 
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Fig. 1 Usage of NDA by Installation 
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It is not possible in the space 
available to describe the method of 
operation and the applications of each 
of the pieces of equipment. Therefore 
only a brief description of each class 
of equipment will be given here. 
(a) Passive Neutron 
The bulk of the passive neutron 
measuring equipment consists of well-
known detectors developed at Los 
Alamos Laboratory: HLNC 1 UFBC 1 INVS 
and NCC (passive) . The performance of 
these systems is very good for well-
characterized material qivinq an 
Equipment fin use Typical usage ref 
Passive Neutron 
HLNC 13 
INVS 2 
NCC passive 4 
UFBC 4 
cerceuil 4 
Ion-fork 6 
Ion-fork (mod) 1 
Octagone 1 
Actiye Neutron 
AWCC 5 
NCC active 3 
CIND 3 
PHONID 3 
liDIIIA 
Cascade meter 1 
Cicero + HPGe 7 
Enrichment mete 2 
Gamma scanner 2 
HM4 7 
Davidson + Nai 20 
Pu meter 6 
Rod scanner 1 
K-edge 1 
Hybrid K-edge 2 
Fresh Pu and MOX, powders, 
pellets, solutions 
as HLNC for small samples 
Fresh MOX fuel assemblies 
as NCC + large MOX powders 
FBR assemblies 
MOX fuel rods 
Spent fuel assemblies 
Fresh MOX assemblies 
(under water) 
Pu waste 
Fresh MTR fuel, HEU 
Fresh LEU fuel assemblies 
UF6 cylinders 
U02 powders, pellets, meta 
U enrichment 
Pu isotopics 
U enrichment 
MTR fuel active length 
U, Pu, values 
U enrichment 
Pu isotopics 
Rod active length 
Fresh Pu and U solutions 
Irradiated Pu, U solutions 
Table 9 List of Euratom Safeguards NDA equipment 
overall accuracy of 1- 2%. -This-is as 
good a performance as is likely to be 
achieved in the medium term for such 
sample materials as clean Pu02 powder, 
pellets, clean MOX powder pellets, 
plutonium nitrate solutions, fuel rods 
and assemblies. One important feature 
of nuclear material which is not 
included in the description above and 
which is important in particular cases 
is the storage location. This can make 
access with certain instruments 
difficult or impossible. For example 
the usage of underwater storage for 
fresh MOX fuel elements at reactors 
has made the use of the standard 
neutron coincidence collar impossible 
and created the need for a new 
measurement method. The problem has 
been treated with good effect by the 
use of a modified ion-fork. (reference 
9). 
The standard ion-fork is used to 
verify the burn-up and cooling time of 
spent fuel assemblies in cooling 
ponds. The accuracy on the burn-up is 
about 5%. 
(b) Active Neutron 
The active neutron systems which are 
in use, comprise some Los Alamos 
systems: AWCC and NCC (active mode) 
which allow satisfactory measurements 
of fresh MTR fuel elements and fresh 
LWR elements. Other important active 
neutron instruments are CIND ( Cogema) 
for measuring UF6 cylinders and PHONID 
(Ispra) which is used for uranium 
samples. 
(c) Gamma Measurements 
These instruments supply information 
on plutonium isotopics and uranium 
enrichment. In some situations of 
fixed geometry, they can be used to 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
18 
22 
23 
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measure the nuclear material content 
of items. 
Further information on the status of 
these instruments as used by Euratom 
can be found in references 24 and 25. 
4. Non-destructive Assay Needs 
NDA capabilities ~~e been improved 
over a number of years and therefore 
have been able to play a wider role in 
the overall safeguards strategy. 
Further improvements such as greater 
accuracy or decreased measurement time 
could always be utilised to expand 
their role even more, giving the 
benefits of improved timeliness of the 
results and the reduced need for 
destructive analysis. Inspection of 
the tables 2-8 shows a number of areas 
where Euratom could benefit from 
improved NDA performance: 
- the measurement of the bulk fissile 
content of irradiated HEU assemblies. 
Irradiated LEU fuel assemblies can 
only be measured in 'attribute' mode; 
i.e. operator values of burn-up and 
cooling time can be verified but no 
measurement of the fissile content is 
made. A method to improve this 
situation (using complex fixed 
instrumentation) is mentioned below. 
the measurement of the bulk U-235 
content of UF6 cylinders. 
- the measurement of irradiated fuel 
rods or non-liquid samples of 
irradiated material. 
suitable techniques for the 
measurement of waste and, in 
particular, scrap are very limited. In 
new plants, however, the fraction of 
waste material is much reduced and 
tends to be better segregated making 
measurement less difficult. 
Other points which may be mentioned 
regarding the status of NDA 
instrumentation are as follows: 
There is a need for more sophisticated 
portable instrumentation such as a 
hand-held multi-channel analyser for 
rapid, simple, qualitative 
measurements of plutonium and uranium. 
The performance of the passive neutron 
measurement systems is not adequate 
for samples with unknown impurities 
(such as moisture or fluorine) . This 
makes the measurement of waste in 
particular difficult. Work is under 
way (references 26,27) to extract more 
information from the pulse train from 
the neutron detectors, and this may be 
one way to fulfil this requirement. 
There is a need for neutron 
coincidence detector systems having 
larger custom-designed measurement 
cavities. 
The ·calibration of the neutron collar 
when used in active mode for the 
measurement of LWR fuel assemblies is 
not readily transferable between 
different fuel assembly designs. This 
necessitates a calibration for many 
fuel element designs, consuming 
significant effort in each case. In 
addition for a single fuel assembly 
design the effect of different 
burnable poisons also requires 
individual assessment. It also means 
that the measurement of a 'scrap' fuel 
assembly (assuming some change in the 
configuration of the nuclear material) 
would not be possible by NI' A without 
dismantling it back to pins . This is 
an area where neutron transport 
calculations may enable the extension 
of existing calibrations to new 
situations. However it would be 
necessary to verify the input 
parameters (e.g. the number of 
burnable poison pins) for such a 
method to be usable. 
It should be borne in mind that there 
are requirements in terms of size and 
ease-of-use in order for non-installed 
equipment to be suitable for 
inspection use. 
The special requirements for large-
scale facilities are dealt with in the 
following section. 
5. Large-scale Facilities 
Large-scale bulk-handling facilities 
present special requirements in terms 
of NDA equipment. Large amounts of 
material are processed which makes a 
large number of measurements 
necessary. At the same time, the 
design of the facility is such that 
the material is not readily 
accessible. In the latest generation 
of bulk-handling facilities many of 
the operations are automated and 
Euratom has taken the opportunity, at 
the design stage, to include automated 
NDA stations. These have the advantage 
of being able to measure lOO% of the 
material flow at various parts of the 
plant. In addition, because they are 
no longer required to be 
transportable, it is possible for them 
to be much more sophisticated. For 
example, whereas at the output of a 
reactor the spent fuel can be 
monitored with an ion-fork, at the 
input to a modern reprocessing plant, 
the fuel can be measured with a high 
resolution gamma detector and an 
active neutron interrogation 
technique. 
The automated approach involves a 
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large amount of preparatory work 
before the equipment becomes 
operational. In general the design of 
each detector system is unique to the 
particular part of the plant to which 
it is applied which leads to a large 
collection of different detectors to 
commission and calibrate. In terms of 
the control software for these 
systems, it is an important 
consideration to ensure 
standardisation of the user interface 
and not to underestimate the 
developments required to ensure data 
security and performance monitoring. 
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THE "MAILBOX" FOR RANDOMISED SAFEGUARDS INSPECTIONS* 
Leslie G Fishbone, Geo~ges Moussalli, Michio Hosoya, Pantelis Ikonomou, La~s W~edbe~g 
Inte~national Atomic Ene~gy Agency, Vienna, Aust~ia 
Abst~act 
Enhancements in both the effectiveness 
and efficiency of inte~national safegua~ds 
ved.fications of inventory changes at natu~al 
o~ low-en~iched u~anium conve~sion and fuel 
fabdcation plants a~e possible by means of 
sho~t-notice ~andom inspections. Acco~dingly, 
a plant ope~ato~ would decla~e the contents of 
nuclea~ mate~ial itePts involved in t~ansfe~s 
befo~e knowing if a safegua~ds inspection 
would occu~ to ve~ify them. Such decla~ations 
would be deposited into a lite~al o~ figu~­
ative "mailbox", whose cha~acte~istics a~e 
impo~tant fo~ sustaining the validity of the 
~andomisation p~ocedu~e. An inspection pe~­
fo~med successfully in acco~dance with an 
app~oved ~andoroisation p~ocedu~e' should per.mi t 
the ext~apolation of ve~ification ~esults to 
unve~ified batches included in the ope~ato~' s 
decla~ations. 
1. Int~oduction 
The necessity fo~ statistical infe~ence 
p~ocedu~es in connection with safegua~ds 
inspection activities at a nuclea~ facility 
arises because of time and cost limitations 
imposed on these activities. Du~ing an 
inspection, the inspector ~ecords data con-
sisting of nume~ical values associated with 
~andomly selected items that he o~ she 
measures by non-destructive assay o~ obtains 
chemical samples fo~ later analysis. The set 
of all possible data is called the population, 
and inferential statistical theory is used to 
make statements about the population based on 
the data dedved f~om the ~andomly selected 
i terns, i.e. , the sample. The te~m "popula-
tion" is also used to refe~ to the group of 
items f~om which the sample is drawn. (This 
parag~aph is in part di~ectly quoted from /1/). 
Of cou~se the underlying goal of these 
p~ocedu~es is to ve~ify the plant ope~ato~' s 
declarations of values fo~ nuclea~ mate~ial 
contained in inventot·y o~ t~ansfe~ items, 
i.e., the state of cont~ol of the plant 
mate~ial accountancy system /2/. Random 
selection of items f~om a population permits 
this ve~ification to be done efficiently. 
In possible additional applications of 
~andomisation, the population can consist of 
possible dates of inspection and possible 
facilities to inspect. In most cases, it may 
be mo~e approp~iate to think of these ex-
tensions as more complicated ways to choose 
the sample of nuclea~-material items. Thus 
the p~oblem gene~ally becomes one of a two-
stage sampling p~ocedu~e. The fi~st stage is 
to choose, fo~ example, dates to ca~t·y out an 
inspection to ve~ify inventory changes, and 
the second stage is to sample items for actual 
vedfication. 
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As an example, verification of the plant 
matedal balance for a bulk-handling facility 
depends upon vedfication of the feed to the 
plant process (o~ ~eceipts aL the plant) and 
the plant production (o~ shipments from the· 
plant) as well as the beginning and ending 
inventodes. If the plant handles indi~ect­
use mate~ial (natural o~ low-en~iched u~anium) 
exclusively, then frcqucnL inspections fo~ 
inventory change ve~ification are not feasible 
in a situation of const~ained safegua~ds 
inspection ~esou~ces, including both inspec-
to~s and t~avel. 
Under such circumstances, a regime of 
short-notice random inspections (SNRis) for 
inventory change verifications can permit a 
valid conclusion about the state of control of 
the plant operator's material accountancy 
system based on ve~ifications of a limited 
numbe~ of items. The regime would be carried 
out by having sho~t-notice inspections occur 
at randomly selected times th~oughout the yea~ 
guided by the plant's ope~ational prog~amme. 
It is the purpose of this pape~ to ex-
plain the importance to SNRis of decla~ations 
of nuclear mate~ial p~io~ to the initiation or 
delibe~ate fo~egoing of an Agency safegua~ds 
inspection. 
2. Conditions fo~ the Application 
of Randomisation 
For the valid application of randomis-
ation to safegua~ds ve~ifications, th~ee 
conditions must be met /3/ (see also Annex F 
of /41). These apply both to simple sampling 
f~om a stratum as well as to the additional 
applications of ~andoroisation: 
a) Al 1 items in the population must have a 
non-ze~o (generally equal) likelihood to 
be chosen for ve~ification. 
b) The plant ope~ato~ must declare to the 
Agency values for the nuclea~-mate~ial 
content of i terns befo~e knowing if they 
are to be ve~ified. 
c) The operate~ must not alte~ item identity 
o~ content after lea~ning that an item is 
chosen for verification and befo~e the 
ve~ification actually occu~s. 
The second condition, a mate~ial account-
ancy decla~ation befo~e notice of inspection, 
is encompassed in the notion of a "mail box". 
The procedu~e for SNRis and the "mail-
box posting" must be such that the operate~ 
does not know, p~io~ to his posting of the 
material accountancy values to the mailbox, 
* 
This pape~ ~eflects the opinion 
autho~s. not necessa~ily those 
IAEA o~ its Member States 
of the 
of the 
whether the Agen~y inspectors will come to 
verify the material batches in question. If 
they do come, this would happen during some 
residence time - possibly very short - after 
receipt or production at the facility and 
after the posting of material accountancy 
values, when the batches are available for 
verification. 
For random inspections requiring a mall-
box, the mailbox information would ideally be 
"posted" as soon as the plant operator knows 
the content of items. This could mean immedi-
ately upon receipt, production or measurement, 
as appropriate. The "mail box" must be 
equipped with a time clock, enabling a 
verification after the operator declared the 
consignment but before the actual date of the 
shipment or feeding into the process. 
The information posted should be that 
necessary for verification purposes for those 
items newly available: dates, nuclear material 
content, and identification number. Inform-
ation which is of relevance only for the 
measurement method used for verification, 
e.g., zones of enrichment and the distribution 
of neutron poisons for fuel assemblies, can be 
supplied after the random selection of items 
for verification. 
Given the existence of a mailbox pro-
cedure, the first condition is satisfied if 
there is an agreed residence time for item 
verification after the mailbox posting about 
the item in question. Safeguards inspections 
can be planned in advance on the basis of an 
average residence time for verification with a 
realistic distribution of values for different 
items. However, satisfying this condition 
leads to the need for an absolute minimum 
value of this residence time to permit 
verification at an SNRI: one full day after 
the posting. 
Regarding the third condition, the time 
between notification of an inspection and the 
initiation of verifications would have to be 
established on the basis of practical imple-
mentation procedures, but it should not be 
longer than the time it would take the 
operator to carx·y out "credible" diversion 
activities. 
If the three randomization conditions are 
met, verification results can be extrapolated 
to unverified batches in the operator's 
declaration. 
3. Practical Realisation 
of a "Mailbox" 
Several possible realisations of the 
mailbox concept are possible. 
Existing methods include, first, the 
ordinary mail. This would involve either 
paper or computer disk declarations and trans-
mission to another location. Second would be 
data transmission by telefax. 
Methods requiring minor development 
include, first, a sealed box at the plant site 
that records the date and time of submission 
of records by the plant operator. Recording of 
the date and time could also be by means of a 
built-in surveillance system. Accordingly, 
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the plant operator would "post" declarations 
in, say, serially numbered envelopes. The 
surveillance system would periodically make 
images of the top of the stack of envelopes 
and include date and time information by means 
of a self-contained clock. 
Other methods requiring minor development 
include a remote Agency computer to which a 
plant computer or terminal communicates data, 
or a tamper-proof Agency computer at the plant 
site to which the plant computer or an opera-
tor directly inserts information. In these 
situations involving a computer, the inform-
ation, once in memory, must be unalterable; 
amending information can, however, be sub-
mitted. Because of their flexibility and 
compatibility with other needs, the computer 
solutions are the most desirable over the long 
term. 
4. Advantages of Randomisation 
of Inspections for Inventory 
Change Verification 
In contrast to the situation with 
verification of inventory changes when all 
available items in a stratum available at an 
inspection constitute the population for 
sampling /4/, inspection randomisation permits 
an efficiency of benefit Lo the Agency, the 
plant operators, and any accompanying per-
sonnel of the State System of Accounting for 
and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). 
Because the plant operator would be 
regularly submitting inventory change data to 
the mailbox and because each batch of invent-
ory change items would be available for 
verification for some agreed residence time, 
the population of items to be sampled for 
actual verification need only consist of the 
batches whose residence time overlaps with the 
beginning of the inspection. Items from 
earlier batches that happen still to be 
present at the facility need not be part of 
the population subject to random selection for 
verification. The reason is that the random-
ness in timing of inspections means that the 
earlier batches were subject to verification 
at an earlier date and data g1v1ng their 
nuclear material contents were submitted to 
the mailbox. Of course this batch distinction 
makes item identification particularly 
important. 
This point is mot"e graphically explained 
in the situation illustrated in Figure l for a 
fuel fabrication plant. After mailbox posting 
of their nuclear material content batches 11 
through 13 of fuel assemblies were in 
residence for possible verification at the 
time of the beginning of the second inspec-
tion. These three batches would constitute 
the population for random sampling during the 
second inspection. Any assemblies still 
present from earlier produced batches, however 
numerous, need not be part of the population 
for sampling, because they were either subject 
to verification at ear.lier times during 
randomly timed inspections (such as the first 
inspection), irrespective of the number of 
such inspect ions actually conducted, or they 
were available for verification even if an 
inspection did not occur. Batches 14 (a 
borderline case) and 15 were also in residence 
for verification during the second inspection, 
but randomization condition 2 (see Section 2) 
would not apply; the fabrication of these two 
batches and posting of their mailbox data did 
not precede the beginning of the inspection. 
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Figure I. Schematic diagram or the availability ror verification or rue I 
assembly batches al randomly timed safeguards Inspections 
In comparison to a situation where far 
from all inventory change items during a 
material balance period are available for 
verification, the inspection randomisation 
regime offers a dt'amatic increase in effect-
iveness by virtue of the complete (100%) 
coverage. (The quantitative defect detection 
probabilities for inventory change strata 
would depend on item and hypothesized defect 
sizes, inspection frequency and residence 
times for verification. Detailed quantitative 
considerations are not addressed here.) 
In comparison to a situation where all 
inventory change items are available for 
verification at regularly scheduled inspect-
ions, usually achieved only in facilities 
handling unirradiated direct-use material, the 
randomisation regime yields a decrease in 
inspection effort and a decrease in detection 
probability. 
5. Practical Problems of 
Randomisation of Inspections for 
Inventory Change Verification 
First and foremost, implementation of the 
inspect.ion randomisation scheme described here 
is not possible without the full cooperation 
of the plant operator, the SSAC, and the 
inspectors. This would be based on mutual 
understanding and agreement concerning the 
benefits to the three parties. 
Practical aspects associated with 
randomised inspections can mitigate their 
value, or, more precisely, can call into 
question the necessary conditions for the 
validity of the inspections. 
There would be the need to modify 
facility attachments to accommodate the 
additional aspects of randomisation. One key 
need would be advance notice of domestic 
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transfers to faci.l itate SNRis for inventory 
change verification. 
Implementat.ion of any randomisation 
scheme requires advance discussions and clear 
understandings of procedures by the SSAC and 
the facility operator, with detailed instruct-
ions and working papet's, and provision for 
certain notifications as required, in par-
ticular, by the mailbox. 
The inspection schedule for SNRis must be 
maintained secret. Given this secrecy, then 
the whereabouts of the inspectors must not be 
known to the facility or SSAC before any given 
inspection. This requires that inspectors not-
be required to go through extraordinary border 
formalities /5/. 
Within the facility, practical verific-
ation difficulties may occur if the plant 
operator is not prepared for the inspection. 
This could lead to much waiting time by 
inspectors. However, arrangements could be 
codified in advance based on the (announced) 
general programme of inspections. 
Some practical inspection problems are 
the same for both announced inspections and 
SNRis. One problem is that a fuel fabrication 
plant with one crane for moving finished fuel 
assemblies could probably not operate 
routinely if that same crane were required to 
move assemblies for safeguards verification. 
Another problem is that items are some-
times stored during their residence time in 
ways inconvenient for verification. Fuel 
assemblies may be in ct·ates and powder cans, 
in drums. Opening the containers for verific-
ation may be timeconsuming or may contravene 
quality-control regulations. 
The requirement for a minimum residence 
time may be in conflict with the effort by 
fabrication plant operators to shorten 
material residence time for cost-saving 
reasons. Shorter residence times would reduce 
the achievable defect detection probability 
for a given inspection frequency. In the 
1 i.mit of vet·y shorl residence times (one day), 
this could mean that cerlain batches might 
systematically be unavailable for verific-
ation: for example, those produced on Friday 
if inspections are not feasible on weekends. 
Systematic unavailability of items would 
violate the first condition for the applic-
ation of randomisation. 
f>, Pot•ntial for Field Trials 
Agency inspectors carried out SNRis for 
inventory change verification at the General 
Electric LEU Fuel Fabrication Plant in the USA 
for more than two years /6/. Though these 
inspections demonstrated the workability of 
the short notice feature, prior mail box 
declarations associated with agreed residence 
times were not part of this field trial. 
Field testing of the mailbox concept 
remains necessary, and it is expected that 
this will be done either in the framework of a 
Member State Support Progran~e or as a supple-
ment to actual Agency inspections of an appro-
priate facility. 
7. Acknowledgement 
One of the authot"s (LGF) is gt'ateful to 
Mt' Jonathan Sanbot'n fol' a discussion about 
cet't.ain points in the papet'. 
8. Refet'ences 
/1/ "TAEA Safeguat"ds: Statistical Concepts 
and Techniques", Fout'th Revised EdiLion, 
IA~A/SG/SCT/4, 1989. 
121 Hoopet', R. 1991, "Statistical Methods and 
Nucleat' Matet"ial Safeguat"ds to be 
published. 
/3/ Got'don, D.M. and Sanbot"n, J.B. 1984, "An 
Appt'oach to TAEA Matet"ial-Balance 
86 
Vet'ifications with Intet"mittent 
Inspection at the Pot'tsmouth Gas 
Centt'ifuge Knt'ichment Plant", BNL 51782, 
Bt'ookhaven National Labot"atot"y, Upton, 
New Yot'k, USA. 
/4/ "Safeguat'ds Cdteda 1991-1995", IAKA, 
1990. 
/5/ Tempus, P. and von Baeckmann, A., "Long 
Tet'm Planning and Reseat"ch and Develop-
ment fot' IAEA SAfeguat"ds", Pt"oceedings of 
the 9th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguat"ds 
and Nucleat' Matet'ia l Management, ESARDA 
21, p.l9. 1987. 
/6/ Ebet'hat'd, C. and Kesslet', J.C. 1990, 
"Shot't Notice Random Inspections: 
Resout"ce Constt"aints and Effective Safe-
guat"ds", Nucleat' Matet"ials Management, 
Vol. XIX (Pt"oceedings), p.23, 1990. 
Simulation of Inspection Randomization Models 
M. J. CANTY 
Forschungszentrum Jiilich GmbH, Jiilich, Germany 
ABSTRACT 
A computer simulation of a model light water reactor 
fuel cycle is described which allows a realistic estimate of 
the impact of alternative inspection,randomization mod-
els on inspectorate resources and safeguards effectiveness 
and efficiency. The program simulates the flows and in-
ventories of nuclear material through the fuel cycle dy-
namically, as well as basic safeguards activities carried 
out by the operators and the inspectorate. Results of 
simulation experiments involving current IAEA inspec-
tion procedures a.nd different randomization schemes are 
presented. 
1. Introduction 
A number of global, as opposed to facility-oriented, 
approaches to IAEA safeguards implementation have been 
proposed as a means to maintain effectiveness under man-
power and resource constraints. They include the super-
MBA concept (or zone appraoch, see e.g. /1/), random-
ization over interim inspections /2/, over inspection activ-
ities /3/ and randomization over entire fuel cycle facilities 
(the RFUV model /4,5/). In addition to the more formal 
problems of compatibility with safeguards agreements and 
IAEA effectiveness criteria, these 'fuel cycle a.pproaches' 
also raise practical problems with regard to efficient plan-
ning, coordination and implementation of inspections. 
Field experiments involving alternative global safe-
guards strategies would be very difficult to carry out, 
partly because of the IAEA 's own performance criteria, 
which tightly constrain the required inspection acth·ities, 
and also due to boundary conditions imposed by facility 
attachments. 
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In the present work, a computer simulation of a nu-
clear fuel cycle was de\·eloped to allow a more realistic es-
timate of the impact of alternati,·e inspection regimes on 
inspectorate resources and safeguards efficiency, without 
the cost and inconvenience of actually implementing such 
regimes. The program simulates the flows and inventories 
of nuclear material through the fuel cycle dynamically, as 
well as the basic safeguards activities of closing and re-
porting material balances, verification by routine on-site 
inspection, application of C/S, etc. The program is writ-
ten in a.n object-oriented style and can therefore be easily 
modified to accomodate new fuel cycles and safeguards 
strategies. 
The simulation program and the associated reference 
fuel cycle are described in Section 2. Section 3 illustrates 
the use of the simulator for investigation of some typical 
inspection strategies. Results are discussed in terms of 
inspector resources, travel costs, quantification of effec-
tiveness, consistency with existing safeguards agreements 
and practicability. 
2. The Simulation Model 
2.1. THE REFERENCE FUEL CYCLE 
Fishbone and Higinbotham, in their investigation of 
zone fuel cycle approaches /1/, presented a reference fuel 
cycle (referred to in their report as the 'second reference 
cycle') which proved to be very convenient as a basis for 
our simulation program. Their fuel cycle is based on 
an electrical power generating capacit~· of about 20 Gi-
gawatts with associated uranium-conversion and fuel fab-
rication facilities. A large away-from-reactor store and a 
Fig. 1: The reference light water reactor fuel cycle, as 
modified from /1/. 
single reprocessing facility feeding mixed oxide fuel pro-
duction plants constitute the ba.ck-end. As this reference 
cycle evolved from prior studies within the IAEA, rough 
estimates of required inspection efforts for verification ac-
tivities for the various facility types are also available /6/. 
In the original version of the fuel cycle /1/, reprocessed 
plutonium was merely stored for future use in an unspeci-
fied fast breeder system. In order to make the present in-
vestigation more contemporary, all reprocessed plutonium 
is thermally recycled to some of the light water reactors. 
Figure 1 shows an overview of the modified reference fuel 
cycle, including yearly throughput data. A portion of the 
input data file for the program is shown in Figure 2. 
2.2. TUE SIMULATION PROGRAM 
The fuel cycle simulator runs on an IBM PC and is 
programmed in Pascal. In order to allow for process-
oriented, discrete event simulation in the style of the clas-
sical simulation language SIMULA-67, a front end system 
was written, partly in machine language, to emulate the 
basic simulation class constructs of SIMULA /7/. The 
object-oriented facilities are provided by the Pascal com-
piler itself /8/. 
The process-oriented discrete event simulation para-
88 
digm used in the present work consists of the creation and 
scheduling of (pseudo)parallel processes which represent, 
for example, fuel cycle facilities, inspectors, transport ve-
hicles, etc. Control is always given to the currently active 
process. An active process will typically update its state 
variables, perhaps create, activate or reschedule other pro-
cesses, and then reschedule itself. The passage of time in 
the simulation corresponds tu control passing from the 
current process to the next one scheduled. Simulation 
terminates with the exhaustion of all actions of the last 
process on the time axis. The encapsulation and class 
inheritance offered by object-orientation and the parallel-
Hllll 
50 ai.a_time 
2 t_i . .Ddex 
wmtV 
10 sbip_til>e 
344 balanoe_period. 
20 invent()L"y_duratioo 
18 piv_effort 
0.11 piv...)!COb 
50 feed_cbarge 
50 feed_thresbold 
33.0 feed_ita 
200 prod_C2plcity 
50 prod_thresbold 
33.0 prod_item 
50.0 t:hruput 
0.0 proc_inventory 
8000 scale 
durati.al of silllll.ati.al (years) 
tiJaeliness index for interim randcadzatioo 
cluratioo of shiPDOilt to custaDers {days) 
time between PIT shu- (days) 
duratioo of PIT shutdown (days) 
inspec:tioo effort for piv {maalays) 
PIV inspec:tioo prd>ahili.ty f« RIVV IIOdel 
lize of order for - feed (11"6 cylirders) 
threshold for ordering more feed (UF6 cylinders) 
cxntent of ooe item in feed stoce (kg tr23Sl 
{U)2 cxntainers) 
threshold for filling custaoer orders (UJ2 cxnta 
cxntent of a>e itED in procluct stoce (llg tr23S) 
plaot procluctioo capacity (llg tr23S/day) 
in process inventory clurinq proclucti.al (llg tr2JS 
plot scale 
Fig. 2: An input data file for the simulation program. 
INSTANCES 
Fig. 3: The object class hierachy of the simulation pro-
gram. 
lism of the SIMULA constructs allow for programming of 
very complicated activities with relative ease. Program 
modification is also very simple. For example, a new nu-
clear facility of a given pre-defined class can be created, 
woven into the fuel cycle and activated with just a few 
lines of code. 
The class hierarchy stucture of the program is shown 
in Figure 3. The processes which take part in the simu-
lation are instances of the various object classes defined 
in the heirarchy. For example there are 14 instances of 
the class PWR, simulating the 14 pressure wa.ter reactors 
in the fuel cycle. They all descend ultimately from class 
PROCESS, meaning that they can run independently in 
parallel, and from class ELEMENT, from which they in-
herit the ability to display their status on the graphics 
screen. They communicate with other instances b~· send-
ing messages. The PWR instances, for example, place 
orders for more fresh fuel at the LEU and MOX fabri-
cation plants after refuelling, inform the relevant IAEA 
inspector when a. plant shutdown occurs, create transport 
vehicle instances to ship spent fuel to the reprocessing 
plant or away from reactor store, and so on. 
To illustrate some of the detail involved in the simu-
lation, Figure 4 shows a screen capture plot of the feed, 
process and product inventory as well as inspection pro-
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file for one of the LEU fabrication plants over a five year 
period. The other fuel cycle facilities are simulated at a 
similar level of detail. 
The simulator can be interrupted at any time and 
detailed status reports displayed for any process. An ex-
ample, again for the LEU fabrication plant, is shown in 
Figure 5. Simply clicking with the mouse on any facil-
ity displayed on the screen will, without interrupting the 
PFAB 
Fig. 4: Simulated key measurement inventories at a LEU 
fuel fabrication plant as a function of time. The histogram 
at the top indicated inspection visits. 
simulation, open a small window showing its status (e.g. 
on-line, shutdown, taking inventory) and the amount of 
material currently present at its various key measurement 
points. XY-plots of key measurement point inventories 
' (e.g. Figure 4) as a function of time can be displayed for 
any facility, again without interruption of the program. 
Aggregate statistics on inspection effort, tra.vel time, 
material under safeguards, etc. are collected by the in-
spector instances and written to an output file at the end 
of each calendar year. A typical record is shown in Figure 
6. These statistics, averaged over several years of simu-
lated fuel cycle activity, form the basic data for compari-
son and evaluation of alternative safeguards strategies. 
3. Safeguarding a Digital Fuel Cycle 
The application of the simulator will be illustrated 
with simulation experiments involving the following safe-
guards strategies: 
Base Case: The reference strategy consisting of an ideal 
facility-oriented safeguards regime. All physica.l invento-
ries are verified, all bulk facilities processing low enriched 
uranium are inspected for flow verification, and all item 
facilities containing plutonium are subjected to interim 
inspection for timeliness - every month if unirradia ted di-
rect use material is present and every 3 months otherwise. 
The sensitive facilities of the back-end, when in operation, 
arc subject to permanent inspection. 
Interim Randomization: Interim inspections at item 
facilities, carried out for reasons of timeliness of detection, 
are randomized according to a game theoretical analysis 
/9/. All other base case activities remain unchanged. 
Reduced Frequency Unannounced Verification: As 
described in /4,5/ the inspectorate's physical inventory 
verification activities are randomized according to the sad-
dlepoint solutions of a zero sum game. In calculating the 
randomization probabilities, the goal quantity for diver-
sion/detection is taken to be independent of material lo-
cation within the fuel cycle, and international standards 
of accountancy are assumed to be met or exceeded. 
The base case strateg~· is the limiting case as the ran-
domization probabilitico; in the other two strategies go to 
100 %. It will not be discussed in more detail here. 
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STATISTICS for pfab on 30.12.1990 
Inspectors present: 0 
Inspection effort in calendar year: 62 l'lal'ldays 
Material Balance ReDort <Bulk Facility> 
last PIT: 4081.00 COHPieted on 24.6.1990 
Material received: 4587.00 
~r of receipts: 4 
Material shipped: 5544.00 
NI.Mber of shiPtMIIlts: 7 
·On I"""ntory: 3124.00 
tiF (nultl!rical>: 0.00 
Signa HUF: 13.76 
Next PIT scheduled for 3.6.1991 
Fig. 5: A typical status report for a fuel cycle facility. 
STATISTICS for !AEA on 27.12.1994 
Current strategy is base case 
Inspectors In the field: :1 
Cunulative effort in this calendar year: 1493 nandays 
CuMulative travel in this calendar oyear: 203 ...,trips 
Facility !CAs received in this calendar year: 125 
Facility HBRs received in this calendar year: 27 verified: 27 
Hatarial Under Safeguards 
LEU 
IOU in reactor cores 
IOU outside reactor cores 
DU <S81larated Pu> 
25575.00 kg ll-235 
13305.60 kg Pu 
19334.40 kg Pu 
3443.40 kg Pu 
Current inspection randonization probabilities 
Facility P_piv P-int 
conv 1.00 1.00 
pfab 1.00 1.00 
bfab 1.00 1.00 
repr 1.00 na 
neon 1.00 na 
ltO)( 1.00 ""' 
afr 1.00 1.00 
p1 1.00 1.00 
b1 1.00 1.00 
341.0 SQ 
1663.2 SQ 
2416.8 SQ 
430.4 SQ 
Expected nunber of PlUs in this calendar year : 28,00 
PLARIE <Planned effort for PIUs in this calendar year> = 192.00 
ARIE <Effort actually expended to date>: 202.00 
Fig. 6: A report on accumulated inspection statistics within 
one calendar year, generated by an inspector instance. 
3.1. INTERIM RANDOMIZATION 
Assume that the detection probability for an abrupt 
diversion from an MBA is 1 for any inspection of that 
MBA, that n1 opportunities for an inspection are avail-
able within some reference period and that the inspector 
will take advantage of precisely k1 of them, deciding on 
a random, unannounced basis whether or not to inspect 
a.t any given opportunity. Then it can be shown to be 
optimal to inspect at opportunity i with probability 
kj -1 (3.1) 
where ni is the number of opportunities remaining and kj 
the number of inspections not yet used prior to the ith 
200 
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Fig. 7: Inspection effor·l as a function of timeliness for· 
item J.acilities. See text for details. 
opportunity /9/. (The ratio g is understood to be 1 so 
that the last opportunity is always used.) The guaranteed 
mean time to detection, at the beginning of the reference 
period, can then be shown to be 
nl 
kt 
measured in intervals between opportunities. 
(3.2) 
This strategy was simulated for the item facilities (re-
actors and AFR store) of the reference fuel cycle, with the 
reference period taken to be one material balance period 
for facilities with irradiated direct use material, or, for 
reactors with fresh MOX fuel, the fraction of a balance 
period for which such material was present at the site. 
The number of opportunities n1 was chosen such that the 
current timeliness goals would be met if every opportunity 
were used, for example at 3 month intervals for irradiated 
Pu. A range of k1 values was then chosen between 
a) full attainment of current timeliness goals, i.e, the 
base case strategy (this corresponds to k; = nj, or 
no randomization at all (base case), as can be seen 
from equation (3.1)), and 
b) timeliness of detection determined by the frequency 
of PIV inspections only. This corresponds to k1 = 1, 
or no interim inspections at all (equation (3.1)). 
A graph of inspection effort at the item facilities as 
a function of the degree of attainment of the timeliness 
goals is shown in Figure 7. A goal attainment of 0 % is 
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understood to mean that only PlY inspections are carried 
out. The item facilities a.t which fresh MOX fuel is present 
for at least some of the time (the PWRs) are distinguished 
from those having only irradiated Pu on inventory (BWRs 
and AFR store). 
The statistical error on the two curves m Figure 7 
is about 8 %, corresponding to a simulation time of 5 
calendar years. The greatest relative saving in effort by 
randomization is obtained for the direct use item facilities. 
IL is almost a factor of 5 for 0 % timeliness (nu interims 
whatsoever) as opposed to a factor of 2 for thG irradiated 
direct use facilities. 
The travel costs (measured by the simulator in in-
spector man-trips per year) exhibit analagous behavior, 
although results are far less realistic since the program 
does not (yet) simulate inspection itinerary optimization: 
each inspection generates one man-trip. 
The random unannounced inspections can be calcu-
lated, using equation (3.1), by the inspectorate in ad-
vance, a.llowing for efficient planning. (They would have of 
course to be kept secret.) Regarding consistency with ex-
isting safguards agreements, randomizations of this kind 
present no difficulties, since the opportunities are in any 
case- allowed for in the facility attnehmcnts. The present 
!AEA internal performance evaluation criteria set rather 
strict limits on the requirements for interim inspection 
frequency and these would have to be relaxed in any ac-
Qj' 
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Fig. 8: Inspection effort as a function of overall detection 
probability for diversion from the fuel cycle. See text for 
details. 
tual implementation of such a scheme. One might justify 
such a relaxation with the subjective argument that, from 
the operator's point of view, an inspection might occur at 
any opportunity so tha.t a considerable deterrence effect 
is present. Strictly (i.e. game theoretically) speaking, of 
course, the objective performance of the scheme is simply 
that given by equation (3.2). 
3.2. RANDOMIZATION OVER FACILITIES 
The Reduced Frequency Unannounced Verification mo-
del /4,5/ has to do with randomization over physical in-
ventory verifications (PIVs) at the facilities in the fuel 
cycle. Based on the a priori probabilities of detection 
for diversion of one significant quantity from any one fa-
cility, the optimal inspection randomization strategy for 
PIVs is determined as a function of the total number k 
of facilities to be inspected within one reference period 
(taken to be a calendar year), there being 11 facilities in 
all. The calculated strategies arc determined game theo-
retically and hence automatically focuss inspection effort 
on the most sensitive facilities, i.e. those most attractive 
to the diverter. (Of course all facilities receive finite PIV 
inspection probabilities in any given strategy.) See /4,5/ 
for more details. 
Figure 8 shows the total annual inspection effort for 
the fuel cycle as a function of the achievable overall detec-
tion probability for diversion of one significant quantity. 
Not included in the inspection effort is the effort asso-
ciated with permanent inspection at the back-end bulk 
facilities (dynamic accountancy, verification of internal 
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flows or whatever}, although the effort for verification of 
facility receipts and shipments is included for all facilities. 
The a priori detection probabilities for the bulk han-
dling facilities were calculated by assuming the significant 
quantities for low enriched uranium and plutonium given 
in the IAEA Glossary /10/, and furthermore that the in-
ternational standards of accountancy (also given in the 
Glossary) are bettered by a factor of two. Detection prob-
abilities associated with PIVs at the item facilities were 
taken to be 100 %. The false alarm rate indicated in the 
figure is for the fuel cycle itself, and corresponds to 5 % 
per year per facility for 6 bulk handling facilities, or 26 
%. 
The efforts were determined by simulating the RFUV 
model for several different k-values over a period of ten 
years of fuel cycle operation and averaging. Statistical 
errors are about 5 %. Frorn Figure 8 it can be seen that 
the inspection effort increases nonuniformly but monoton-
ically with k, and that the overall detection probability 
saturates at about 40 % at k = 8. Thus approximately 
100 man days of effort could be saved by applying the 
RFUV model, without sacrificing overall detection capa.-
bility. 
Implementation of the RFUV model would again en-
tail no modification of facility attachments: the inspectors 
would visit a given facility after the operator's physical 
inventory taking on an unannounced basis. Unverified 
inventory listings would be accepted at face value. Cur-
rent IAEA-internal performance criteria for PIV activities 
would have to be modified substantially. 
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F.VOLUTION DES TECHNIQUES DE VERIFICATION DANS 
LES USINES DE FABRICATION DE COMBUSTIBLE MOX 
A. Bonucci, F. Fernandez, S. Kaiser et Ph. Dossogne 
Direction Controle Sécurité d'Euratom, Luxembourg 
Abstract 
In the MOX fabrication plants the increase 
in throughput and the consequent changes in the 
conditioning of the nuclear material and in the 
fabrication process applied is requiring a 
constant tailoring of the verification methods 
and techniques to the operational constraints. 
This paper describes the evolution of the 
verification scheme as a response to the chang-
cd conditions and the experience gained on the 
technical means used (NDA, DA, C/S). it describes 
as vell the foreseeable evolution and the means 
which will be necessary to develop or to adapt. 
La progressive introduction de combustibles 
de type MOX dans le chargement des réacteurs de 
puissance à eau légère et le nombre réduit d'in-
stallations ayant, à ce jour, développé la techno-
logie nécessaire à leur fabrication, s'est tra-
duite par une rapide augmentation des deux gran-
deurs conditionnant le système de vérification, 
leur stock physique et le flux de matières. 
Cette évolution a été également qualitative 
dans ce sens qu'elle s'est traduite par la disper-
sion des matières nucléaires dans l'installation 
et par la diversification de leurs types et con-
ditionnement. La figure n° 1 illustre schématique-
ment la structure de flux et distribution de matières 
d'une telle installation. 
L'orientation générale des stratégies appli-
quées a ainsi évolué depuis la simple recherche 
d'une conclusion quantitative dans un délai 
couvrant le temps de détection ("Timeliness Veri-
fication") et visant essentiellement la détection 
d'une éventuelle "abrupt diversion" jusqu'à un 
régime d'inspection continue fondé sur le suivi des 
mouvements externes et internes à l'installation, 
leur vérification systématique et le recours au 
confinement/surveillance et ainsi diminuer l'effort 
d'inspecton au moment de l'action visant la 
"timeliness detection". 
La raison de ce changement d'orientation 
réside dans le fait aue la recherche d'une con-
clusion quantitative à chaque période correspondant 
au temps de détection exigerait un effort d'in-
spection considérable en cas de vérification pon-
ctuelle mais aussi, et surtout, imposerait des 
contraintes opérationnelles à l'exploitant pra-
tiquement inacceptables en raison de la nécessité 
d'arrêter la production pendant des périodes 
prolongées et qui se traduiraient par un accroisse-
ment sensible des coûts de production. 
Pour faire face à ces changements des équipe-
ments et instruments de mesure ont dû être ameliores 
ou parfois mis au point. Ils peuvent être con-
sidérés actuellement comme pleinement opérationnels. 
Les problèmes techniques résolus,le système doit 
être optimisé au moyen d'une gestion exhaustive 
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des informations recueillies durant les activités 
d'inspection et l'extension du confinement/sur-
veillance à la plus grande fraction envisageable 
de 1' inventaire dans 1' optique d'une projection des 
conclusions au niveau de la periode bilan 
matières. 
L'expérience montre que la projection des 
résultats partiels exige en préalable une stra-
tification aussi pousse que possible. Celle-ci 
doit être basée, non seulement sur les informations 
fournies par l'exploitant en application du 
Règlement 3227/76 D'Euratom, mais aussi sur une 
foule d'informations techniques ou opérationnelles 
recueillies sur le terrain. 
La gestion d'une telle masse d'information 
impose, "de facto", le recours à l'outil infor-
matique pour déplacer l'action des inspecteurs 
vers l'évaluation et la prise de décisions mo-
tivées. Nous avons développé un logiciel qui 
intègre l'ensemble des informations dérivées 
des actions de vérificatiar p:m- · en faire un outil 
de diagnostic, d'evaluation et d'assistance à la 
prise de décisions. 
La figure n° 2 décrit les grandes fonctions 
de ce logiciel dans le contexte de la mise 
en application des schemas décisionnels propres 
à une action de contrôle éontinu et ceux visant 
à la détection d'un détournement abrupte dans le 
temps de détection. Ces schémas sont illustrés 
dans les figures 3a et 3b. 
Les points les plus sensibles de ce logiciel 
résident dans la stratification et la gestion des 
discordances constatées au niveau d'un article, 
d'un stratumvu de la totalité de l'inventaire, ou 
respectivement dik, Dk et D (fig. 3). 
Nous avons choisi une stratification "à 
priori" sur les mouvements vers l'installation 
ou à l'intérieur de celle-ci. La stratification 
est interactive dans ce sens qu'elle peut être 
revue dès qu'un nouvel élément d'information se 
présente aux inspecteurs, ce changement pouvant 
être repercute au niveau de l'évaluation globale 
ou partielle. 
Un des bénéfices escomptés par la mise en 
place d'un tel logiciel est de pouvoir discerner, 
à terme et par l'accumulation d'informations, les 
composantes aléatoires et systématiques des 
erreurs de mesure NDA et DA et de pouvoir engager 
des actions correctives. 
Il deviendrait ainsi possible d'atteindre 
des conclusions quantitatives d'un niveau de 
précision comparable au O"MUF, ce qui permet 
d'envisager une évaluation de type MUF-D sur le 
bilan de matières. · 
En tout cas,il sera possible d'effectuer une 
évaluation de type "D-statistic" au niveau de, 
successivement, les flux de matières dans l'in-
stallation, l'ensemble de l'inventaire et le 
bilan de matières selon la relation bien établie 
DMB = DPE - DPB + DI - DO 
DMB: Difference estimée pour la période bilan (I 
matières 
) RECEIPTS 
-j LAB'S rrl WASTE 
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DPB: 11 11 11 11 initial 
!] ...... 
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mQ.tières 
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Fig. 3 
CONTINUOUS FOLLOW UP at time tl 
1 fig. 3a 1 
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ABSTRACT 
The independent analysis of samples of special fissile 
material is an important part of the overall effort of the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate to assure itself that 
the materials are not diverted from their intended uses 
as declar~d by ~he . users and that any particular 
saf~g~ardrng obhgat1ons are complied with. The 
maJonty of the safeguards verification samples are 
transp?rted to the European Commission's Safeguards 
Analytical Measurement (ECSAM) laboratories. In view 
of the large number of samples to be taken at the new 
thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) in 
Sellafield, the Euratom Safeguards Directorate has 
init.iated a desig~ study for ~n-site analytical facilities. 
Th1s paper descnbes the des1gn concept resulting from 
this study. 
1. Introduction 
The new large scale industrial reprocessing plants 
recently started up or approaching completion present 
a. new type of challenge to. the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate (DCS). The rndependent analysis of 
samples of special fissile material is an important part 
of the overall effort of the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate to assure itself that special fissile materials 
are not diverted from their intended uses as declared 
by the users and that any particular safeguarding 
obligations are complied with in these plants. Up to 
now almost all safeguards verification samples taken 
at reprocessing plants are sent off-site for chemical 
analysis at one of the European Commission's 
Safeguards Analytical Measurement (ECSAM) 
laboratories/1/. In view of the large number of samples 
to be taken at the new reprocessing plants the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate has initiated a design 
study for on-site analytical facilities. Although this 
studY. was primarily aimed at investigating the 
feas1bility of on-site facilities at BNFL Sellafield Works 
it is intended to apply the concept to other large 
reprocessing plants under Euratom Safeguards. 
2. User ( Safeguards ) Requirements 
The Euratom approach to reprocessing plant 
safeguards includes sampling each input and Pu 
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output batch for safeguards verification analysis. 
Additionally. sa.mples hav~ to be taken from process 
tanks to venfy In-process rnventory, from certain waste 
streams, from Uranyl-nitrate tanks and from drums 
containing Uranium oxide powder. The periodic wash-
out inventory presents a supplementary demand for 
sampling and verification analysis. Taking into account 
that both sites under consideration for the 
implementation of Safeguards on-site laboratories are 
multiple-facility sites, the annual number of samples to 
be analysed in an on-site laboratory (OSL) was 
estimated to be of the order of 1 000. The different 
~pes of samples expected are shown in Figure 1. In 
v1ew of the large throughput of nuclear materials in 
these facilities the analytical accuracy should be the 
best currently available for routine analysis for at least 
a subset of verification analyses. The laboratory must 
therefore routinely achieve ESARDA target values /2/ 
or better. Attention must be drawn, however, to the fact 
that the safeguards objective is the verification of the 
total quantity of nuclear materials in tanks or drums. 
This i~ determined by combining the results of volume 
or we1ght measurements of the material in the vessel 
or container with the nuclear materials concentrations 
obtained from chemical analysis or non-destructive 
analysis of samples drawn from these vessels or 
containers. The overall error variance of the 
determination of the quantity of nuclear materials is 
therefore given by the sum of the error variances of the 
chemical or non-destructive analysis and the volume 
or mass determination. Hence it would seem 
appropriate to aim for analytical accuracies equivalent 
to those achievable for volume or mass determination. 
lt should also be remembered that only systematic 
errors usually dominate campaign evaluation. 
In view of the expected operating life of the 
laboratories it must be ensured that full advantage can 
be taken of future improvements in techniques and 
procedures for the determination of volumes masses 
and concentration of nuclear materials. 'Table 1 
summarises the short term and medium term 
accuracies required for the principal types of samples. 
Analytical facilities must be available to the 
inspectors for 45 weeks of the year with back-up and 
fast repair/maintenance for the case of instrument 
failure. 
Pu-ni trate 
200 
Pu-ox ide 
350 
U-oxi de 
150 
Uranyl-nit rate 
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Figure 1: Expected annual sample throughput 
for on-site laboratories 
Values estimated for multiple facility site 
3. Boundary Conditions 
If possible, the on-site laboratory should ~e integrated 
into existing or new operator laboratones and r~n 
under the main site licence to avo1d problems w1th 
national licencing authorities and to make full use of 
supporting seNices. A green field on-site. !aboratory 
outside the perimeter fence of the fac1l1ty to be 
safeguarded would be prohibitively expensive, would 
pose some of the transport problems encountered for 
transfers to ECSAM laboratories and would have to go 
through the complete approval pr~cedures for a new 
nuclear facility. The space requ1rements must ~e 
reduced to a minimum because laboratory space 1s 
usually at a premium. The staff requiremen~s mu~t also 
be kept to the minimum figure still compatible w1th. the 
throughput envisage~ and with th~ safety regulations 
applicable in the fac11ity. All analytical _Procedures and 
working practices ~ust comply. w1th the safety, 
operating and secunty rules wh1ch apply for the 
operator's labora!ories. Sil}lil?-rlx, the laboratory 
concept, final des1gn, commiSSIOning schedules and 
operating procedures have to pass the same formal 
approval procedures as those required for the 
operator's laboratories. 
Staff for on-site laboratories will have to be trained 
and certified to the same standards as the operator's 
analytical staff. Th~y ~ill be s_ubject to ~he operato(s 
radiation dose momtonng serv1ce and will comply w1th 
all local rules regarding safety, security _and 
administrative arrangements. Interfaces and seN1ces 
will have to be provided by the operator. Ports for 
sample transport (bagged and bagless) must. _be 
compatible with the systems employed by the faci11ty. 
Whenever possible the analytical meth?ds employ~d 
and the instrumentation implemented 1n the on-s1te 
laboratories should be the same as those used at the 
European Commission's Joint Resee3:rch Cen~re 
Institute for Transuranium Elements s1nce on-s1te 
laboratory staff are expected to be based there. 
4. Analytical Options 
In ut sam les: The most accurate analytical technique 
current y ava1 able for the determination of Plutonium 
and Uranium concentrations in samples of LWR fuel 
reprocessing input liquor is isotope diluti~n m~ss 
spectroscopy (IDMS). Its overall accura~y (1~clud1ng 
random, systematic and samplmg errors) 1s. bellev~d to 
be better than 0. 7% and some laboratones cla1m < 
0.5% . There is scope for short to medium term 
improvement through the use of internal ratio 
standards and universally agreed spikes. A recent 
exercise at one reprocessing facility involving a 
complicated analysis tree with duplication and 
branching after almost every step of sample 
preparation and analytical procedures. demonstrated 
that IDMS inter-laboratory differences m the order of 
0.1% - 0.2% can be achieved for Uranium and 
Plutonium concentrations excluding sampling errors. 
The method is however complicated ·and time 
consuming. . 
The determination of Uranium and Pluton1um 
concentrations by K-edge absorption. densit?metry and 
XRF measurements in samples of tnput liquor ts an 
attractive alternative for routine analysis/3/. The 
accuracy for U-concentration is better than that 
routinely achieved with IDMS and the performance 
obseNed for Pu-concentration equals that found for 
the average of paired comparisons of 
inspector/operator results for this type of sample when 
both laboratories use IDMS. There 1s scope for some 
improvement in the accuracy of Pu-concentration 
through the use of fast pulse processing equipment 
and longer measurement times. The method has the 
enormous advantage of requiring no sample 
Method 1 Method 2 
shorllerm medium l. shorllerm medium l. long term 
Input Pu cone 0.6 <0.5 0.7 0.3 <0.1 
U cone 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.3 <0.1 
Pu nitrate Pu cone 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 <0.1 
Pu oxide Pu cone 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 <0.1 
UN nitrate u cone 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 <0.1 
U oxide U cone 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 <0. 1 
Table 1: Target performance values for the on-site laboratory in percent. 
Method 1 is the routine (NDA) method, Method 2 the (potentially) 
more accurate DA method 
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preparation whatsoever and of being a simple, non-
destructive method. Measurement results can be 
available as early as one to two hours after sampling. 
After completion and confirmation of measurement 
results the sample liquor could be recycled, thereby 
reducing analytical waste. 
The solution chosen for the OSL is the 
measurement of input samples by hybrid K-edge to the 
extent practically possible (undiluted samples must be 
available at the K-edge location). 
A subset of approximately 20 percent will be analysed 
by IDMS. 
Pu-nitrate samples: The analytical techniques used for 
th1s type of sample in the ECSAM laboratories is 
potentiometric titration and K-edge absorption 
densitometry. The accuracy currently achieved with 
titration in routine use is approximately 0.3% including 
the sampling error. There is scope for tmprovement. 
The same performance is obtained with K-edge 
absorption densitometry. Again the K-edge has the 
advantage that it is a non-destructive instrument 
requiring no sample preparation and leaving no waste 
as the liquor could be recycled to the process. 
Pu-isotopics in Pu-nitrate samples can be 
determined by mass spectrometry ..or by gamma 
spectroscopy. While mass spectroscopy offers higher 
accuracy for most Pu isotopes, gamma spectroscopy 
requires no sample preparation steps, its results are 
available one hour after sampling and the performance 
achieved with the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory Multiple Group Analysis (MGA) code /4,5/ 
is better than 1% for all isotopes if the operator's 
values for Pu-242 are accepted. 
In the OSL all Plutonium-nitrate samples will be by 
measured by K-edge absorption densitometry and high 
resolution gamma spectroscopy. Approximately 5% of 
the samples will be titrated and filaments prepared for 
mass spectroscopy. This figure will be increased if and 
when titration performance can be shown to reach the 
medium term target of 0.1 %. 
Pu-oxide ~owder samples: As for Pu-nitrate samples 
the metho routmely used by the ECSAM laboratories 
is potentiometric titration. The accuracy expected from 
ESARDA target values for these samples is 0.3% 
including the sampling error. In most cases this is not 
quite achieved in practice because samples frequently 
take up water and oxygen while awaiting transport. 
The IAEA analytical services have introduced a 
procedure for the correction of these effects. Since this 
method has been adopted by DCS the performance 
values have been consistent with the ESARDA target 
values. 
DCS have previously demonstrated that the 
Plutonium content in gramme size samples may be 
routinely determined to better than 1% accuracy with 
neutron coincidence counters/6/. A value of 0.5% can 
be achieved if detector design and calibration are 
optimised for small sample size. Additionally Pu 
isotopics can be determined to better than 1% using 
the MGA code. If Pu-242 is determined from isotopic 
correlations this may increase to 2-3% depending on 
burn-up. For first cycle reprocessed spent fuel 
however there are ways of improving the reliability of 
the correlation and thus for reducing the error on Pu-
isotopics to approximately 1% /71. 
All Pu-oxide powder samples arriving in the OSL 
will be measured by combined neutron coincidence 
counting/high resolution gamma spectroscopy. A 
subset of the order of 20% will also be dissolved, 
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titrated and filaments will be prepared fore mass 
spectroscopy. The proportion of samples analysed 
destructively in future will depend on the relative 
performance figures for both techniques. 
Uranyl-nitrate samples: ECSAM laboratories normally 
use modif1ed Dav1es and Gray potentiometric titration 
or K-edge absorption densitometry for these samples. 
The performance expected for titration from ESARDA 
target values {0.3%) 1s routinely achieved. Again the K-
edge instrument matches the performance of chemical 
analysis. 
The enrichment in U-235 is determined by mass 
spectroscopy {Thermoquad or Sector field) to 0.3-
0.5%. 
U-235 content may also be measured by gamma 
spectroscopy to approximately 1% but the counting 
rates observed for these samples would normally 
require excessive counting times to achieve this. If 
samples can be placed in a near 4' geometry (well 
detector) 1% accuracy can be achieved in 1-2 hour 
measurements. 
In the OSL the initial method will be the use of the 
non-destructive techniques described, with less than 
1 0% of samples also being titrated and prepared for 
mass spectroscopy. 
U-oxide powder samples: As for Uranyl-nitrate 
samples Oramum concentration and U-235 content are 
determined by potentiometric titration (modified Davies 
and Gray) and mass spectroscopy. For samples 
transported off-site there is a problem with sample 
stability similar to the one discussed 'tor Plutonium 
oxide powders. Again there exist procedures to correct 
for these weight changes but such changes are not 
expected to create problems at on-site laboratories. 
There is no established easy non-destructive 
method to determine Uranium concentration in these 
samples with reasonable accuracy. They can, 
however, be dissolved and measured as liquid 
samples in a k-edge absorption densitometer. The low 
Uranium concentration obtained in such liquid samples 
{-40g/l) limits the accuracy which can be achieved to 
approximately 1-2%. In spite of this limitation all such 
samples will be measured in this way, with 
approximately 20% of the samples also being titrated 
and about 10% prepared for mass spectroscopy. 
5. Laboratory Concept 
In view of the safeguards requirements, the boundary 
conditions and the analytical options discussed above 
the on-site laboratory design concept had to include 
the following key elements: 
- maximum degree of automation through the use of 
robots 
- where possible routine analysis of samples by non-
destructive methods to lim1t resource requirements 
and to reduce analytical waste 
- classical chemical analysis for a subset of samples 
only, to check for small biases. 
- shipment off-site of a small part of the samples 
chosen for destructive analysis for comparison of 
results and quality control. 
- very compact design 
- duplication and physical segregation of analytical 
proce~ses, to me~t the !arget throughputs while 
ensunng that localised fa1lures do not disable the 
entire operation. 
- compliance with national licencing requirements and 
the operator's site regulations 
The solution found by the design team from NNC Ltd 
(formerly . Nati<;>nal Nuclear Corporation) in close 
collaboration w1th DCS and TUI for the particular case 
of BNF~ Sellafield is shown in Figures 2 and 3. Glove 
boxes, Instruments and other items are being designed 
into two laboratories made available to DCS by British 
Nuclear Fuels plc. One laboratory (lab 2) will contain a 
small office area which will also house computer 
equipme~t . for data. evaluation, data storage, 
commumcatJons, quality control, nuclear materials 
accountancy and expert system advice. 
Under routine conditions all diluted input samples 
will be analysed in laboratory 2. lt is expected that 
approx!mately 250 diluted input samples per year will 
arnve 1n the laboratory through a pneumatic transfer 
connection from the operator's shielded cell facilities. 
They will be aliquoted, spiked and separated in the 
IDMS robot glove box /8/. The robot also deposits 
small droplets on the filaments for mass spectroscopy 
already placed on the turret and prepares planchets for 
alpha . spectroscopx which are subsequently 
autom_at1cally placed m the measurement cavity. The 
robot IS controlled by a special unit which receives its 
instruction from the central laboratory computer. 
All _analyses. of product samples will normally be 
earned out 1n laboratory 1. Samples of Plutonium 
oxide and nitrate will arrive either at a dedicated 
receipt station directly from the sampling stations or 
will be manually transferred in bags or containers for 
bagless tran?port. All Plutonium nitrate samples ( -
200 p.a.) Will be measured by K-edge absorption 
densitometer, a subset will be analysed for Pu-
isotopics in the robot box for mass spectrometry. The 
samples will be lowered into a special cavity protruding 
from the bottom of the box for K-edge measurements. 
Every Pu02 powder sample will be weighed (the 
samples will be taken in pre-weighed vials) and then 
measured by neutron coincidence counting and high 
resolutiOn gamma spectroscopy in a finger protruding 
from the bottom of the glove box into the body of the 
neutron detectors. A subset will be dissolved -
probably microwave enhanced - and titrated. The 
design shown in Figure 2 still uses a suite of glove 
boxes for manual sample manipulation. lt is very likely 
that this will be replaced by a single robot glove box /8/ 
currently being designed by TUI, Canberra and the 
Karlsruhe nuclear research centre (KfK). Filaments for 
mass spectroscopy will be prepared in the MS robot 
box. 
The Uranyl-nitrate samples and the dissolved 
Uranl.um oxide samples will be measured in a 
~ombmed new compact K-edge/ enrichment meter 
Instrument /9/ developed at KfK which will be attached 
to a small glove box not shown in Figure 2. 
The use of robots for filament preparation and 
dissolution/titration will enhance sample throughput 
abov~ that <;~~~ievable by manual operation alone, by 
enabling actiVItieS to proceed during silent hours. lt will 
also reduce dose uptake of OSL staff. In addition 
electronic logging of analysis results will reduce th~ 
scope for data transmission errors. 
102 
6. On-site vs off-site analysis 
The front end design prepared by NNC demonstrated 
the feasibility of on-site analytical facilities for Euratom 
Safeguards. lt also gave DCS reliable estimates for 
investments and running costs for the on-site 
laboratory. There are seven principal reasons why 
DCS is following a policy of implementation of on-site 
laboratories as the preferred solution for safeguarding 
large reprocessing plants: 
1. lt is the only solution which guarantees that 
analytical results are available to the inspector in 
time for follow-up. 
2. lt is the only solution which guarantees timely 
verification of operator's declarations. 
3. The analytical results will most likely be of higher 
accuracy than those obtained off-site because 
error sources related to transport preparation and 
transport delays are avoided. 
4. lt increases the inspector's confidence in the 
authenticity of some types of samples. 
5. lt significantly reduces operator and inspector 
human resource requirements and dose uptake. 
6. lt almost completely eliminates the need for 
transports of samples of nuclear material from the 
sites where on-site analytical facilities are 
implemented. 
7. lt is the cheaper solution. 
These statements require some additional comments. 
Ad 1 &2) The efforts made by the IAEA and DCS to 
expedite transport of safeguards samples /10/ have 
been largely successful. Nevertheless recent 
developments in some Member states have shown 
that events beyond the control of the Safeguards 
Authorities can virtually block transport of safeguards 
sample~ for long periods. Strict interpretation and 
application of the terms of global transport licences is 
likely to lead to increasing delays. 
Ad 3) lt is believed that the expertise and experience 
available at ECSAM laboratories can not be matched 
by the small team _on duty _at the on-site laboratory. 
Therefore the bas1c analytical accuracy at on-site 
analytical facilities can at best be the same as that off-
site as long as the same analytical procedures are 
employ~d. Transport of many samples, however, leads 
t? add1t1onal error sources such as conditioning errors 
(1nput samples) and sample instability (powder 
samples). These errors can be eliminated at on-site 
laboratories. f.lso since any analytical problems will be 
detected while the material will most likely still be 
available for repeat analysis, it is unlikely that any such 
problems w<;>uld influe~ce most or all sample results for 
a reprocessmg campa1gn. 
Ad .4) Any sample conditioning steps (except for 
stra1ght sample transfer from one vial to another) 
carried out by operator's staff decrease the confidence 
the inspector can have in the authenticity of the 
safeguards sample, i.e. his assurance that the sample 
has not been tampered with. 
.
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Ad 5) The conditioning steps and any other activiti.es 
by operator staff involving unsealed samp~es reqUire 
d1rect or indirect surveillance (camera) by Inspectors. 
This can take between 1 hour for product samples and 
several hours for input samples over and above the 
time the inspector has to be present to observe the 
sampling procedure itself. 
Transport documentation has to be prepared by 
operator staff who also have to pack the samples in 
transport containers and to check the containers for 
compliance with national and international transport 
regulations and to measure surface dose. 
Ad 6) The only transports still required are of unusual 
samples or of samples where some form of arbitration 
analysis or quality con!rol analysis. is desirable. Also 
spikes reference matenals and quality control samples 
will ha:ve to be transferred from other facilities to the 
on-site laboratory. 
Ad 7) This is the most controversial point. It is best 
demonstrated using the following symmetry argument. 
The number of samples currently analysed by the 
ECSAM laboratories in one year is approximately 500, 
representing about 75% of the analytical capacity 
available. The additional analysis of 500 samples per 
year per reprocessing plant would require similar 
investments for laboratory extensions, refurbishing and 
new equipment as does the implementation of on-site 
laboratories. The main part of the running costs will 
also be the same since there is no reason why the cost 
of rent or rent-equivalent and services per square 
meter of laboratory space should be more or less 
expensive in industrial nuclear facilities than in nuclear 
research facilities. The only extra costs of the on-site 
solution are the increased staff requirements to make 
up for the time lost in travelling to and from the on-site 
laboratory (expected to be of the order of 50% i.e. 4 
staff members per on-site laboratory, if it is assumed 
that the OSL will be operated by teams of four and 
therefore 8 persons would have to employed for 
corresponding off-site analysis at an ECSAM 
laboratory) and the costs incurred for travel expenses. 
This has to be compared to the costs for transporting 
samples (Currently of the order of 1000 Ecu per 
sample on average), purchasing and maintaining 
containers (estimated at 100 000 Ecu capital costs per 
lab and at least 20 000 Ecu per year running costs and 
depreciation), additional inspector hours required (of 
the order of 500 to 1000 Ecu per sample) and 
additional staff required at DCS and at the ECSAM 
laboratories to organise and/or control transports 
(Expected at least 2 posts i.e. -130 000 Ecu per year). 
When these figures are added up for both options 
there is a clear cost advantage for the on-site 
laboratory ranging from 200 000 Ecu per year to 600 
000 Ecu per year depending on the assumptions made 
for reductions in transport costs per sample and for the 
costs of additional inspector presence. 
7. Conclusions 
Efficient, effective and timely safeguards verification 
analysis of samples taken at large reprocessing plants 
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can, in the opinion of DCS, best be achieved through 
the implementation of on-site facilities for destructive 
and non-destructive safeguards verification analysis. A 
concept for such facilities has been developed and 
negotiations are under way to resolve the questions of 
its feasibility and compliance with licences and site 
regulations. It is expected that the construction and. 
operation of such facilities will be cheaper than to send 
samples off-site to central safeguards laboratories. For 
these reasons the Euratom Safeguards Directorate 
intends to install on-site laboratories at the sites of the 
new large reprocessing plants in the European 
Communities. 
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Abstract 
The ECSAM activities performed in 
collaboration between services of the 
Commission of the European Communities at DG 
XVII-DCS and at DG XII-JRC are described. 
Essential part is the analytical verification 
of samples from the nuclear fuel cycle, taken 
by Safeguards inspectors and meas'ured at ECSAM 
laboratories. Details about the type of 
samples, their origin and flow, about transport 
of samples and its impact on timeliness, and 
the measurement methods and efforts are given. 
Also the central data evaluation is described. 
The activities are supplemented by a quality 
control programme, by in-field measurements and 
by specific development work. The ECSAM system 
works successfully since 20 years. Future 
trends (on-site laboratories, more in-field 
measurements, tighter analytical target values, 
etc.) are indicated. 
1. Introduction 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate (DCS) of 
the Commission of the European Communities has 
the special task and duty to verify that fissile 
materials are not diverted from their intended 
uses as declared by the users and that any 
safeguarding obligations are complied with. To 
this end the Commission deploys a corps of 
safeguards inspectors who carry out inspections 
in nuclear installations within the Community. 
An important element of their verification 
activities is the taking of samples of materials 
at the nuclear facilities, the analysis of these 
samples and the evaluation of the results. In 
the· framework of the European Commission's 
Safeguards Analytical Measurement (ECSAM) 
laboratory network, the majority of these 
samples are sent for chemical analysis to 
laboratories at three institutes of the 
Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), namely 
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the Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements 
(CBNM), Geel, the~rnstitute for Transuranium 
Elements (ITU), Karlsruhe, and the Environment 
Institute (EI), Ispra. 
, After twenty years of successful 
activities, it appears worthwile to present 
ECSAM in more detail. 
2. The ECSAM Scheme 
A schematic view of the relations in the 
DCS verification analysis system is given in 
Fig. 1, indicating also the interactions of the 
ECSAM laboratories CBNM, ITU and EI. 
Special ECSAM procedures have been 
elaborated and sanctioned subsequently by 
inter-DG agreements. They serve as guideline 
for the execution of the daily work 
(verification measurements, special 
developments and assistance), as · well as to 
ensure that the necessary resources are 
available for the support given from DG XII-
JRC to DG XVII-DCS. The activity details are 
laid down in Work Sheets which·. are annually 
reviewed and mutually agreed. 
In 1991, 18 JRC staff members were 
involved in ECSAM activities, 14 in Karlsruhe, 
3 in Geel and 1 in Ispra. 
The three JRC institutes - being services 
of the Commission of the European Communities -
have been chosen as they guarantee independence 
of the measurement results with regard to the 
analyses. The institutes may commission 
measurements to "satellite-laboratories" in a 
coded way, however they remain responsible for 
all results thus obtained. 
The allocation of samples to the various 
laboratories has mainly been done on 
geographical grounds (minimizing transport 
distances and formalities). In cases, umpire 
settlements had to be carried out exceptions 
from this general trend are evident. The task 
of organizing a Quality Control Programme was 
assigned to CBNM. This gave use to the more 
extensive measurement evaluation programme 
REIMEP (Regular European Interlaboratory 
Measurement Evaluation Programme) for which 
participation of ECSAM and satellite 
laboratories is compulsory. 
The analytical programme has also been 
supplemented by some development work in order 
to overcome specific problems or to adapt 
methods to appearing or future requirements in 
Safeguards. These activities were mainly 
performed by ITU and by EI. 
The ECSAM responsibles from the various 
services of the Commission meet regularly, in 
general twice a year, for mutual information, 
discussion of problems and of future trends and 
developments. The 30th ECSAM meeting was held 
on 20 March 1991 at Geel. 
3. Type of samples, origin and flow 
Table 1 gives an overview of the different 
types of DA (destructive analysis) samples 
taken at facilities in the fuel cycle whereas 
in Fig. 2 the distribution of samples between 
the various facilities is given for 1990. 
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37% 
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11% 
38% 
Fig. 2 • SAMPLING ACTIVITIES IN 1990 
BY fACILITY TYPE 
The corresponding repartition for the sample 
material type is shown in Fig . 3, the sample 
flow diagramme in Fig. 4 . The number of 
samples taken from different facilities in the 
nuclear fuel cycle depends on the amounts of 
nuclear material present in the flow and 
inventory of the plant and on the form in which 
the material is processed or stored. The 
majority of samples originate from fuel 
fabrication facilities and reprocessing plants 
whereas the number of samples varies from year 
to year with the number and duration of 
reprocessing campaigns. 
Pu-nitrate 4% 
U-nitrate9% 
Reprocessing Input 27% 
Pu-oxide powder 12% 
Others 4% 
U-oxide powder 17% 
U-oxide pellets 13% MOX powder 2o;. 
Fig. 3 - DESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS SAMPLES 1990 
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RESPONSIBLE : 
INSPECTORATE 
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ANALYTICAL 
LABORATORY 
Fig. 4 • FLOW DIAGRAM OF INSPECTION SAMPLES 
4. Sample taking at site of inspection 
During the preparation for an inspection 
at Headquarters in Luxembourg or on site, the 
inspectors decide on the number and type of 
samples to be taken. The numbers are normally 
calculated on the basis of a stratified list of 
inventory items (for inventories), on the goal 
quantity, the detection probability, the 
expected accuracy of the analytical methods and 
the average nuclear material content per item 
and stratum. Samples for flow verification at 
reprocessing plants are usually taken after the 
nuclear material in the tanks has been 
homogenei'sed before the content is transfered 
across MBA (Material Balance Area) boundaries 
and as well as product powder batches are 
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filled into cans at the hoppers. At MOX 
fabrication facilities they are usually taken 
from input material and when pellet batches 
pass the surface control stage af ter sintering 
and grinding. Samples are chosen at random 
from the population of i terns, tanks or silos, 
except for those sampling points where every 
transfer of nuclear material is sampled. 
The samples are physically taken by 
operators' staff under inspector observation. 
Wherever possible the inspector asks for 
separate samples to be taken into specially 
marked and sometimes preweighed sample bottles 
supplied by the inspector. The samples are 
either placed under seal and/or under camera 
surveillance or remain under observation by the 
inspector until they can be sealed at a later 
point in time. 
Samples of input liquor and some process 
liquors from reprocessing plants need to be 
diluted, aliquoted and spiked and then dried 
before being bagged out. Plutonium nitrate 
liquor of concentrations above 50g.l - 1 must be 
diluted. This sample conditioning process must 
either be directly observed by the inspector or 
by a suitably placed video camera connected to 
recording equipment. Together with information 
obtained during the verification of the basic 
technical characteristics the above ensures the 
authenticity of the samples, i.e. the assurance 
that they originate from the correct item, tank 
or silo and that they have not been tampered 
with. 
5. Sample transport 
·The majority of the Euratom safeguards 
verification samples are transported to the 
ECSAM laboratories. Delays in transport can be 
detrimental to the usefulness of destructive 
analysis with regard to timeliness and quality, 
as changes may occur in the sample adversely 
affecting the quality of the analytical result, 
and since late availability of the results to 
the inspector may make follow-up difficult or 
impossible in case of differences. Figure 5 
shows delays in transport and time between 
sample arrival in the laboratories and the 
availability of the results in Luxembourg. 
2oo.------------------------------------------. 
[d) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
,_ TRANSPORT D ANALYSIS 
Values for 1991 up to 11.03.1991 
Fig. 5 • TIME FOR ANALYSIS AND TRANSPORT 1983 • 91 
The reasons for the delays in transport have 
been examined in detail /1/. 
They are : 
- problems with import/export licenses 
- shipment approvals 
certificates in lieu of end user 
certificates 
- lack of approved or validat~d transport 
containers 
- complicated interaction between several 
organisations. 
In the same publication a new approach to 
transport was suggested which relies mainly on 
forward licensing and global export/import and 
transport licenses. The implementation of this 
concept led to marked improvement until legal 
problems of one carrier in a particular Member 
State in 1988 virtually paralyzed the 
transport of safeguards samples. Since then 
matters have again been improving slowly but 
the delays encountered especially for samples 
of Plutonium oxide, nitrate, MOX and to a 
lesser degree, reprocessing input solution are 
still too high. 
In view of these problems and taking into 
account the high costs for transport of samples 
of nuclear material, the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate decided to introduce mobile 
equipment for in-field analytical measurements 
of UF6 and uo2 samples and to install on-site laboratories at the sites of the large new 
reprocessing plants. For the other facilities 
further concerted efforts by all parties 
concerned are necessary to expedite the 
transport of safeguards samples. 
6. Measurement methods. equipment and efforts 
All three ECSAM laboratories have 25 to 30 
years experience in the handling of radioactive 
material and the destructive and non-
destructive determination of isotope abundances 
and element concentrations of samples from the 
nuclear fuel cycle. Analytical details are 
given below. Whether U and Pu element 
concentrations are determined by direct assay 
by e.g. titration, or by Isotope Dilution Mass 
Spectrometry (IDMS), is decided by DCS and 
indicated in the formal request for analysis. 
CBNM. Geel 
A main part of CBNM' s specific research 
programme concerns the preparation and 
certification of nuclear reference materials 
and spikes at a European level. Already due to 
this task a number of methods for very accurate 
U and Pu analyses exist in this laboratory. 
From the available mass spectrometers four are 
used for work related to ECSAM : Finnigan-MAT 
260 (for U), 261 (for Pu), 262 (for U-minor 
isotopes) and 511 (for UF6). 
For isotope analysis, U and Pu 
purification is done on all samples, including 
the related reference materials, by ion-
exchange procedures prior to analysis. U/Pu 
separation is done twice8 to eliminate8 a possible influence of 2j U on the 2j Pu 
measurements. 
The chemical preparation of samples is 
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considered to be integral part of the 
measurement process and hence contributes to 
the total uncertainty of the end result as all 
other uncertainty components. 
On this basis, s 0.05% uncertainty at the 
2s o.r. equivalent level is d~livered routinely 
on 2j5u in UF6, s 0.3% on 23?u in Low Enriched 
Uranium (LEU) fuel, and s 0.2% on Pu isotope 
r~gios. 2 Pu abundances are exclusively determined by 
mass spectrometry, 2q1Am by y-spectrometry. 
For uranium elemental assay two 
independent methods are available : controlled 
potential coulometry and automated 
potentiometric titration according to the well 
established Davies and Gray method, yielding in 
uncertainties of s 0.05% at the 2s or 
equivalent level. 
Plutonium is determined by controlled potential 
coulometry only. The overall uncertainties lie 
in the range of 0.08%. 
ITU. Karlsruhe 
Specialities of this laboratory are the 
determinations of U and Pu concentrations in 
reprocessing plant input solutions by IDMS, 
supplemented by a- and y-spectrometry, and the 
application of K-edge densitometry for the 
elemental assay of U and Pu. 
For the isotope ratio measurements thermo-
ionic mass spectrometers type Finnigan MAT 261 
and 262 are available, using multicollectors 
and double rhenium filaments. The technique 
used is that of total evaporation which is well 
suited to Pu samples of a few nanograms and to 
U samples of around 30 nanograms. 
For a-spectrometry multichamber counters 
fitted with surface barrier silicon diodes are 
used. The samples are prepared by a modified 
single drop procedure. A peak resolution of 
~ij~ter than 18 keV at 5 MeV is obtained. 
Am is determined by a y-spectrometer with 
germanium detectors. 
The K-edge densitometer, designed and 
built at the KfK, Karlsruhe , consists of a X-
ray generating tube, operating at 150 kV/15mA 
with a tungsten target, a collimating tube of 
le~d and tungsten and a planar Ge detector (200 
mm x 10 mm) /2/. The sample solutions are 
placed in optical absorptiometry vials for the 
measurement. 
Titrations of U and Pu are carried out by 
means of two Radiometer Titralab systems, each 
consisting of a video titrator, autoburettes 
and a sample changer. 
Solution densities are determined by 
measuring the natural frequency of a vibrating 
reed in a Paar DMA 10 density meter. With this 
instrument densities up to 4g·cm-3 can be 
determined with an accuracy of 2.5. 10-4g·cm-3. 
All analytical results are transmitted to 
central computers e.g. POP 11/73, for data 
evaluation, archiving and quality control. 
El. Ispra 
The Environment Institute is taking care 
of uranium analyses only. For ECSAM activities 
one mass spectrometer Finnigan-MAT 261 with a 
variable multicollector system is available, 
and two potentiometric systems (Metrohm 682 
Titroprocessor) are used for the elemental 
assay of uranium by the Davies and Gray method. 
"I:he analytical laboratory is equipped for the 
adequate treatment of the samples. The 
uncertainty routinely achieved is s 0.1% in the 
analysis of pure products. 
A considerable effort was made over the 
past 20 years by the ECSAM laboratories to 
satisfy the DCS requirements for verification 
analyses, as can be seen on Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. 
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1. Quality Control 
Quality of all analytical measurements is 
ensured by the application of adequate 
reference materials and internal laboratory 
control procedures. For isotope ratio 
measurements at CBNM, all mass spectrometers 
are calibrated by synthetic isotope mixtures, 
prepared and certified to 0.01% or, at the 
other institutes, by certified reference 
materials of other sources. 
For the elemental assay by coulometry or 
titration the corresponding EC certified 
nuclear reference materials (e.g. EC-NRM 101) 
or others originating from NBS/NBL are applied 
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for calibration. 
In the frame of the CBNM guided REIMEP 
(Regular European Interlaboratory Measurement 
Evaluation Programme) the participation of the 
ECSAM and satellite laboratories is compulsory 
/3/. The results are evaluated and discussed 
during the regular meetings of the ECSAM 
Committee. Some of the results are presented 
at this Symposium. 
So called "Target Values" for 
uncertainties in Safeguards related analytical 
measurements have been conceived by CBNM, 
discussed in the ESARDA Working Group on 
Standards and Techniques for Destructive 
Analysis, and published /4/. They are used as 
criteria for minimum performance : measurements 
must aim to be at least as good as the Target 
Values indicate, but preferably better. In 
reality the values are reached in most cases, 
if not passed, but in view of the future 
Safeguards development more tighter values 
appear to be necessary. 
8. The central data evaluation 
After the reception of the analytical 
results by DCS, they are entered into a 
database and they are analysed, individually 
and in groups chosen by material type, 
installation, laboratory and by evaluation 
period. At present the modules of these 
procedures exist as stand-alone routines only. 
Work is underway to integrate these into one 
application. Evaluation reports are produced 
which flag samples for which the relative 
differences are larger than expected from the 
ESARDA Target Values and/or other thresholds. 
The standard deviation for operator-inspector 
differences is calculated for all variables and 
again compared to performance values (previous 
evaluation periods) and to values expected from 
the ESARDA Target Values. In case of 
differences or estimators larger than 
predefined thresholds, a follow-up procedure is 
initiated which may involve the analysis of 
reference samples and detailed discussions with 
the facility operator. Table 2 presents an 
overview of evaluation results covering 
approximately 1500 samples taken during the 
period 1986-1990. Attention is drawn to the 
fact that ranges are given rather than average 
values for the standard deviation of operator-
inspector differences because it was found that 
these values may vary significantly with the 
facility-laboratory pairs. 
For most types of material and analytical 
methods the ESARDA Target Values are achieved. 
Where this is not the case, there is strong 
evidence that the problems are partly not due 
to insufficient analytical accuracy but to 
problems with sample conditioning (e.g. 
filtering), sample stability (uptake of oxygen 
or water by powders) or insufficient material 
characterisation. There has been a marked 
improvement in the laboratory performance for 
IDMS over the evaluation period discussed and 
since the use of the Target Values. The only 
areas where there might still be some 
analytical problems are the analysis of MOX 
samples and that of thorium samples. 
Sample Type Number of Facilities (3) Analytical Methods 
s(Pu)(4) 
[%) 
s(U)(4) 
[%) 
Reprocessing Input 6 ;IDMS 
·Hybrid K-edge 
0.2-1.5 
-0.7 
0.1 -1.5 
-0.3 
Plutonium Nitrate 4 
:Potent. Titration ··· "o:i':·a~·i; ..... · ...... ,.. .... ... .. ... · ... · ...... .. 
..... -~ K-_edge ..... ... . ... . 0.2- 0.3 , 
. Potent. Titration t" ...................................... ;..... .. ..... :._ 0.1 ....... .. 
Uranium Nitrate 6 : K-edge - 0.2 
:xRF -1 
4 
· .......... : "~~e~t>rit~~-ii~~ .......... ; ........... '0.2- ·;cif ......... ~ .. ..... ..... .. .............. .. 
Plutonium Oxide Powder i NDA (n/gamma) : 0.5 -1.5 (2) : 
-~-~~-~~:d~~ .. · ..................................... ~ ............... ·T i>-~~e~·i:·rit~~-ii~~- ......... t ........... o:2·: .. ;-,.ii ........... ~- · .. · · · -:... o:2 ............. . 
: NDA (n/gamma) ; 0.5- 2.5 (2) - 0.5 
-~-~-~ ~~i~~~~ ........................................ · · ....... ~ ................. ;. "~~e~t:-rit~~-ii~~ .......... r ................. : .. iij ............... : ................. :... .. o.3 ........... .. 
: NDA (n/gamma) : 0.5- 2 (2) : - 5 (2) 
Uranium Oxide Powder 8 
· .. · "7'P.ot~~t.'rit~~-ti,;-~ .. L~b: ....................................... 7.. .... '0. ;· :· i 1ii ....... · 
· In-field· 0.1 - 0.2 
Uranium Oxide Pellets 
. . ·;· ............ ,.P.~te~i:'iit~'atio~ Lab~.. ... . .. ............. ~ ... 0.03·: o.3 .. . .. 
' In-field! < 0.1 
Uraniumhexafluoride 
....................................... .;- .............................. ''''"1'''"'''''"''''''''""'"'"'"'''" ... '"'""' 
5 : Mass Spectroscopy 235U : 0.2- 0.3 
(1) Upper values believed to be caused by oxygen/water uptake 
(2) Depends on counting time, burn-up,, Pu-242 correlati~n 
(3) Facilities where very few samples w~re taken are not mcluded 
(4) Outliers excluded 
Table 2 - RANGES/AVERAGES FOR RELATIVE INSPECTOR-OPERATOR DIFFERENCES 
(STANDARD DEVIATIONS "s") FOR MAJOR SAMPLE TYPES (1986 -1990) 
9. In-field Measurements 
To overcome the transport inconveniences 
described above, in-field mass spectrometric 
and potentiometric determinations of uranium in 
uranium dioxide pellets and powders and in 
uranyl nitrate product have been tested and 
performed since 1987 /5/. To date, 15 
experiments corresponding to about 300 samples 
analysed have been carried out in four 
different plants. The equipment 
(titroprocessor and mass spectrometer), the 
accessories and the reagents were transported 
to the plants by road. The results obtained 
can be considered as very good. They have 
demonstrated the feasibility of the in-field 
potentiometric analysis, included the isotopic 
determinations, and the quality and stability 
of the equipment. Hence, in-field measurements 
represent an interesting alternative or 
supplement to the conventional analytical 
scheme, especially in view of timeliness 
requirements. 
10. Development work 
The verification measurements are 
supplemented by some analytical development 
activities. 
K-edge densitometry has been adapted 
to determine the U concentration in spent 
fuel solutions, and U and Pu concentration in 
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processing product solutions. When combined 
with X-ray fluorescence, Pu-concentration in 
input solutions can be determined as well. 
After intensive field-testing at ITU the 
instruments have been applied for routine 
analysis /2/ and a K-edge/X-ray fluorescence 
spectrometer is routinely used at the 
reprocessing plant at La Hague, where ECSAM is 
giving the technical support. 
The presence of Np in Pu products so far 
was very difficult to detect. It would, 
however, falsify the Pu-titration methods in 
use. An ICP-MS at ITU was adapted for the 
analysis of Pu-product samples and offers now a 
mean to measure Np in Pu samples. The 
unexpectedly high Np-content observed in Pu 
products caused the development of new methods 
for Pu determination /6/. 
With increasing fuel burn-up the amount of 
plutonium found in residues in the dissolution 
tanks of reprocessing plants increases. At ITU 
methods were developed to determine the fissile 
material content in such highly active 
materials by IDMS, ICP-MS solutions or by laser 
ablation of solids. 
The preparation of the OSL (on-site 
laboratory) concept required development work 
for the automatization and robotization of some 
analytical methods. This has been done 
successfully at ITU. 
The El at Ispra concentrated on the 
development of the in-field measurements which 
were tested with success under real conditions. 
11. Future Trends 
At present the situation for verification 
measurements in the EC seems to evolve in the 
follpwing way : 
a) stabilizing in the LEU sector 
b) increasing in reprocessing because of the 
new - and larger - installations. 
c) increasing in the MOX sector because of the 
successful use of Pu for recycling in 
thermal reactors. 
With three new large reprocessing 
facilities starting or having recently started 
operation the number of reprocessing input 
samples and of plutonium product samples in the 
form of plutonium oxide powder and plutonium 
nitrate liquor will increase drastically. 
Similarly the new or modified MOX fabrication 
plants will lead to a considerable increase in 
the number of MOX powder and pellet samples to 
be verified. 
Especially the much higher throughput of 
nuclear material in the facilities represents a 
challenge and may lead to problems. Constant 
relative measurements uncertainties supposed, 
the uncertainty, expressed in absolute material 
amounts on the overall material balance 
verification, will become unacceptably large. 
Much smaller relative uncertainties on the 
measurements (and the sampling) will have to 
be achieved. Hence it is necessary to tighten 
Target Values for uncertainties and to make 
further analytical progress without increasing 
the burden on the analysts (of both operators 
and inspectors). Fortunately, there are good 
prospects that this can be achieved. 
The total number of Safeguards 
verification measurements will probably 
increase but there is a development in 
different directions on-site laboratories 
(OSL) and in-field measurements. 
The reasons are obvious, both are in 
relation to the considerable time and efforts 
required for the transport on nuclear 
materials, and the first one also with the 
planned large throughput of fuel in the new 
commercial reprocessing plants. 
The OSL concept has been initiated by DCS 
and is being developed by !TU in close contact 
with DCS. By installing highly automatic 
instrumentation with computer link to the !TU 
central laboratory at Karlsruhe, the staff 
number needed can be kept at the minimum of two 
per laboratory (required from safety standpoint 
as well), giving still access to the knowledge 
and experts at the central laboratories /7/. A 
simplified cost balance proves that OSL' s are 
cost neutral compared with the conventional 
off-site concepts. Instead of transporting 
with higher cost (and longer delay) radioactive 
material, the laboratory staff travels to the 
plant site. The costs to install and maintain 
a laboratory on either site are about equal; 
the same is valid for the equipment. The OSL 
staff is planned to be exchanged in a revolving 
system each week. When not staying at the 
plant site they will work at !TU. 
In-field measurements of uranium have been 
demonstrated successfully mainly in LEU plants. 
This is alsg valid for non-destructive assay 
(NDA) of 2j5u-abundances in fuel. In the 
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future it could be of interest to extend this 
concept of in-field measurements also to the 
analysis of plutonium in MOX in fuel 
fabrication plants. The equipment and the 
methods are very similar, but the plutonium 
handling has to be done in 2 - 3 glove boxes 
installed in a controlled area of the plant and 
permanently reserved for Safeguards purposes. 
From this point of view this concept has some 
similarities with the OSL one. Main 
difficulties may be not of technical nature but 
possibly related to the acceptance by the plant 
operator. 
The outlook in the futuri can be 
summarized as follows : 
a) Verification measurements in ECSAM 
laboratories will stabilize in number or 
slightly decrease. 
b) The OSL concept will become reality but 
will provide a new type of challenge to DCS 
and the central laboratory ITU. 
c) The number of in-field and NDA measurements 
should and can increase. 
d) Target Values for uncertainties must be 
tightened and the accuracy of measurements 
must be increased. 
e) In relation to d), new reference materials 
are requested and should be prepared in 
time, aiming at uncertainties of s 0. 05% on 
the certified values ~ 0. 02% for those 
required for reprocessing plantsf 
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Abstract 
In the field of Safeguards (and in parti-
cular of NDA) for many years there has been a 
growing awareness that the emphasis in the de-
velopment of NDA should have been put not only 
on the development of new techniques, but also 
on the assessment of the performances of exist-
ing techniques in different plant conditions, 
and in filling the gap between development of 
instruments and their field use. As a result, 
more and more emphasis was given to customer-
oriented research, thus improv~ng the aspect of 
support and technology transfer. 
At the Joint Research Centre (JRC) Lhis 
guideline has led to building a training and 
PERformance LAboratory (PERLA). PERLA is a com-
plex of laboratories of the Institute for 
Safety Technology of the JRC, set up in the 
framework of its Safeguards and Fissile Materi-
als Management Programme. The basic aim of 
PERLA, right from the beginning, was to improve 
technology transfer from the laboratory devel-
opment to the application of safeguards instru-
ments and techniques in an industrial environ-
ment. The laboratory is oriented specifically 
to non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques. Cur-
rent activities of PERLA are: 
- training of EURATOM and IAEA inspectors; 
- design and execution of NDA performance eval-
uation exercises (neutron, gamma and 
calorimetry experiments); 
- integrated NDA instrument development; 
- basic research. 
The scope of this paper is to give a sum-
mary report on the activities carried on in 
PRE-PERLA (one of the facilities of PERLA), to 
quantify them in terms of resources, to give 
some scientific/technical results achieved and 
to present the future planning. 
1. Introduction 
In the field of Safeguards since some 
years there has been a growing concern that the 
emphasis in the development of NDA should have 
been put not only on the development of new 
techniques, but also on the assessment of the 
performances of existing techniques in differ-
ent plant conditions, and in filling the gap 
between development of instruments and their 
field use /1,2/. As a result, more and more em-
phasis was given by laboratories to customer-
oriented research, thus improving the aspect of 
support and technology transfer. 
At the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
Commission of the European Communities, this 
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guideline has led to building a training ana 
PERformance LAboratory (PERLA) /3/. PERLA is a 
complex of laboratories of the Institute for 
Safety Technology of the JRC, set up in the 
framework of its Safeguards and Fissile Materi-
als Management Programme. The basic aim of 
PERLA was to improve technology transfer from 
the laboratory development to the application 
of safeguards instruments and techniques in an 
industrial environment. The laboratory is ori-
ented specifically to non-destructive assay 
(NDA) techniques. Current activities of PERLA 
are: 
- training of EURATOM and !AEA inspectors; 
- design and exe~ution or NDA performance eval-
uation exercises (neutron, gamma and 
calorimetry experiments); 
- integrated NDA instrument development; 
basic research. 
The laboratory is composed of different 
facilities (Fig.l), i.e.: 
- PRE-PERLA; 
- the Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) laboratory; 
- the spent fuel pool; 
- the NDA field test facility. 
Some of the facilities are 
specifically for Safeguards purposes 
PERLA), and others (e.g. the pool) 
with other programmes. 
PRE·PERLA: URANIUM AREA (bulk quantities) 
used only 
(e.g. PRE-
are shared 
Fig.l: PERLA laboratory -general view. 
PRE-PERLA Facility 
In 1985 the JRC Directorate decided to 
build the PERLA laboratory, restructuring some 
existing facilities. To anticipate the begin-
ning of PERLA-type experiments, four laborato-
ries, storage rooms and handling rooms were im-
mediately made available for the Safeguards 
programme in a protected zone where bulk quan-
tities of fissile material in sealed samples 
could become operative in 1987. 
NDA Laboratory 
' It is a complex of seven laboratory rooms 
where small radioactive samples can be mea-
sured. Operative since 1986, it is dedicated to 
the research and development of NDA techniques. 
NDA Field Facility 
The NDA test field facility will be re-
alized by modifying a large existing labora-
tory. It will have the same characteristics as 
PRE-PERLA, i.e. it will allow the measurement 
of bulk quantities of U and Pu. The facility 
will be operational in 1991. 
The Spent Fuel Storage Pool 
The ESSOR reactor spent fuel pond can now 
become very important in the global PERLA pic-
ture, because it allows the enlargement of the 
portion of the present fuel cycle represented 
in PERLA. When PETRA /4/ (a hot cell facility 
for treating high and very high burn-up LWR 
fuel in batches of 6 kg by the typical PUREX 
reprocessing steps) and the TAME-LAB (a tank 
calibration facility) become operative (1992), 
the JRC will have facilities representing (on 
small scale) spent fuel storage, reprocessing 
and fabrication plants, available for calibra-
tion, training and R&D. 
The scope of this paper is to give a 
progress report of the activities carried on in 
PERLA so far and to report on the future plan-
ning. The paper reports in detail on the acti-
vities and results obtained in the different 
"functions" of PERLA, namely: 
- performance evaluation function; 
- preparation and characterization of large 
standards for NDA, with a methodology and 
prenormative function in the field of NDA 
safeguards; 
- NDA system development and technology trans-
fer functions. 
2. Performance Evaluation Function 
Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) techniques 
have, in the last few years, become more and 
more important and are being used to a large 
extent in nuclear material accountancy and con-
trol by both operators and control authorities. 
This is essentially due to two reasons: 
1) the various improvements in most NDA tech-
niques led some of them (gamma-spectrometry, 
neutron interrogation) to have performances 
closer to destructive analytical techniques 
(DA); 
2) the parallel improvement of statistical and 
procedural inspection approaches led to 
abandoning the traditional scheme in which 
NDA is used only for semi-quantitative or 
consistency checks and DA is employed for 
quantitative measurements. In fact, NDA is 
now more and more u:;ed m; u quan Li La Ll ve 
tool and suitable statistics procedures are 
developed with that aim /5/. 
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As a consequence the performance evalua-
tion of NDA techniques is of particular rele-
vance to safeguards authorities; not having the 
best information about the performances of NDA 
measurement methods means los1ng the potential 
to optimise safeguards operations and reduce 
costs. 
One definition of "performance" has been 
given /6/ in the ESARDA framework: 
Whereas the knowledge of the overall un-
certainty and error sources associated 
with measurement systems is the basic 
question, other important parameters must 
be considered in evaluating performance. 
These parameters are, for example: 
-reliability-ease of implementation; 
-representativeness and authenticity; 
intrusiveness to plant operation; 
- time to obtain a result; 
- cost. 
As far as uncertainty, error sources and 
propagation are concerned, the error structure 
of NDA techniques is complex but generally well 
known /7/ and controllable at the level of the 
single measurement; most of the NDA equipment 
today give at each determination an evaluation 
of the uncertainty of that measurement. Gener-
ally speaking a given NDA method has: 
- random error components linked to statistical 
counting: they are generally well control-
lable through the sample count time. Their 
standard deviation can usually be derived 
from error propagation; 
systematic error components coming from cali-
bration curves (including normalisation and 
nuclear constants) which cover variations in 
the calibration measurements, plus bias vari-
ations among the calibration samples due to 
some dissimilarities in matrix, geometry, 
composition, etc. If these sampling differ-
ences are negligible, the calibration curve 
systematic error can be derived from the 
counting statistics behaviour using error 
propagation; 
- if the calibration "sample set" is not repre-
sentative of the target population, the cali-
bration curve can produce a bias which could 
vary from item to item in a "random" way (it 
will appear as random sampling of the popula-
tion) or, alternatively, the bias will behave 
in a predictable way, i.e. it is constant in 
magnitude or it is a well defined function of 
the mass. 
From what has been said so far it is evi-
dent that statistical modelling is a fundamen-
tal function of any "performance evaluation". 
At present, PERLA staff are, in collabora-
tion with other safeguards laboratories and in 
the ESARDA frame, engaged in designing and car-
rying out specific experimental programmes in-
tegrated by suitable statistical procedures 
with the scope of evaluating NDA performance 
values in field and laboratory conditions, fol-
lowing the principles mentioned above. Such 
values are intended to be used: 
l ) in p 1 nnn i nr; i nsp<'c t i onn by r;a f0gunrd:; 
authorities; 
2) in safeguards verification and accountancy 
to analyse operator-inspector differences; 
3) in defining the accuracy level of NDA stan-
dards. 
Two examples of specific activities ori-
ented to the evaluation of NDA performances are 
summarized here, concerning HRGS (High Resolu-
tion Gamma Spectrometry) on Puo2 and MOX and 
calorimetry on Puo2 bulk samples. 
2.1 High Resolution Gamma Spectrometry (HRGS) 
on Pu-bearing material 
In collaboration with other research cen-
tres an evaluation exercise of gam·ma spectro-
metry codes currently in use for Pu isotopics 
in international safeguards has been carried 
out. The results obtained by the codes, based 
on over 600 spectra collected on 17 Pu-bearing 
samples, were analyzed. The codes were experi-
mentally compared using them to measure in the 
PERLA laboratory a variety of Pu02 and MOX ref-
erence samples (Puo2 of different burn-ups and MOX of 5 different "families"). In the frame-
work of the CEC programme of support to IAEA 
Safeguards, the experiment was carried out in 
collaboration with Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, where two of the codes had been de-
veloped (MGA /8/ and Blue Box), and the Ente 
Nazionale per le Energie Alternative (Casaccia, 
Italy). The experiment was carried out in the 
PERLA laboratory and a code developed at the 
Institute also participated (PUJRC). The effec-
tiveness of each code was judged by comparing 
the measured gamma values with the known refer-
ence values of PERLA samples. The PERLA samples 
in question were a series of Puo2 and MOX sam-ples with well characterised values. The refer-
ence values had been established by JRC-Ispra 
on the basis of mass, alpha and spectrometry 
measurements carried out by ALKEM GmbH, IAEA 
Seibersdorf and CEN-SCK Mol. The procedures of 
preparation, measurement and characterization 
of these reference samples are described in 
/9/. 
An integrated data management system /10/, 
with a variety of tailor-made menus allowing 
the user to select data sets, to apply statis-
tical analyses anbd to create reports from the 
resulting analysis, was created. The system 
operates with a library of gamma spectrometry 
codes or versions of the same code. The system 
is implemented on a PS/2 under DOS using the 
INFORMIX data base management system. The soft-
ware is written in C and INFORMIX 4GL. The sys-
tem can also be implemented under UNIX. 
Results, discussion and conclusions are 
extensively reported in /11/. It is worth men-
tioning here the outcome of that exercise - not 
yet published - concerning two sensitivity 
studies conducted on Pu-240 equivalent and the 
sample Effective Power. 
Pu-240 equivalent. Apart from other 
tasks, the exercise had the aim to assess the 
sensitivity of Pu-240 uncertainty as a func-
tion of Pu-242 uncertarHty and abundance. As is 
well known, the Pu-242 abundance cannot be di-
rectly determined by HRGS; therefore, isotopic 
correlations are generally used by codes to 
evaluate it. Uncertainties on Pu-242 - parti-
cularly on badly known or recycled and blended 
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materials - r.an then rnnge from 5 to 20%. The 
results of the study are given in Fig.2. If the 
MGA /8/ code is used to determine all abundan-
ces but Pu-242, for which DA values are used, 
quite high accuracies of Pu-240 are reached, 
better than 0.5%. With Pu-242 e8etermined by 
correlation with the uncertainties as mentioned 
above, the total uncertainty in Pu-240 can 
increase to 2% for "bad" materials. eq 
3.0 
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11.5 
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Pu242 content {%) 
Fig.2: Pu-240 uncertainty vs Pu-242 abun-
dance:e~uo2. 
Effective Power. An analogous evaluation 
of the error propagation from gamma isotopics 
to the Effective Power of the sample was car-
ried out giving the results shown in Fig.3. The 
uncertainty on Effective Power from pure HRGS 
(MGA) increases with increasing Pu-238 content 
and also increases the· uncertainty when 
"expected uncertainties from DA laboratories in 
1987" are used /12/. The uncertainty behaviour 
on PERLA declared values is generally much 
lower, reflecting the low uncertainty value of 
these samples /9/, which corresponds to the 
"state of the art" (1987), rather than the 
state of the practice. Other samples, charac-
terized also by DA but w1th higher uncertain-
ties, might have rather higher error propaga-
tion as far as the Effective Power is con-
cerned. 
1.4 
1.2 
-- STD (expected by DA labs: 1987) 
+ STD (NDA·PERLA) 
,....... 
-·-
* 
STD (DA·PERLA) 
--- --
0.2 
0.0 
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Pu238(%) 
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Fig.3: Effective power unr.ertainty evaluation 
from DA-NDA: Pu02 . 
2.2 Calorimetry 
In the last few years some attention has 
been paid to the determination of Pu weight by 
means of calorimetry /13,14/. Potentially, 
calorimetry is a powerful tool because of its 
insensitivity to perturbations like geometry, 
matrix, humidity, etc. Calorimetry can be used 
to determine or verify the Pu content of a sam-
ple under the condition that its isotopic com-
position is known. The Pu mass (M) is calcu-
lated following the formula: 
M ( 1) 
where W is the power output of the sample 
(measured by the calorimeter) and P f the Ef-
fective Power (Watts per gram of gfutonium); 
the latter can be obtained by calculating the 
contribution of the different isotopes accord-
ing to the formula: 
(2) 
R. being the isotopic fractions (measured by DA 
oF HRGS); this carries a component of the un-
certainty discussed in the previous section. Pi 
being the corresponding specific powers (Watts 
per gram of isotope). 
Another component of uncertainty is car-
ried by power measurement through the calori-
meter. This measurement cannot be assumed to 
have a negligible error contribution, particu-
larly when very accurate values of P. (i.e. of 
isotopic ratios) are achieved. In PERCA, an er-
ror sensitivity study was carried out and tai-
lored experiments were done. A number of mea-
surements were collected with air and water 
type calorimeters employing both PERLA Pu02 
standards /9/ and MOUND Pu-238 standards. With 
both kinds of samples the power output ranged 
from roughly 2 Watts up to 40 Watts. In Fig.4 
the results for different calorimeters (both 
air and water) are summarized. 
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Fig.4: Comparison between declared and 
measured power values. Air and water 
calorimeters on PERLA and MOUND 
standards. 
The overall conclusion is that the power 
measurement accuracy increases with increasing 
sample power. The water calorimeter is more ac-
curate in the low power range. From roughly 
5 Watts upwards the accuracy of power measure-
ments becomes such that, coupled to accurate 
isotopics, it can guarantee overall accuracies 
in Pu mass better than 1%. Measurement times 
are in the order of 2/3 hours for air calori-
meters and 4-8 hours for water calorimeters. 
3. Preparation and Characterization of 
Standards for NDA 
The increased use of NDA in nuclear mate-
rial accountancy and control and the rapid im-
provement of NDA techniques determine that one 
of the major issues in the applicu U on of ND/\ 
is the availability of adequate Reference Mate-
40 
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rials or Standards. 
The uncertainty with which an NDA standard 
or a calibration curve is known is frequently a 
not negligible component in the overall NDA 
measurement uncertainty. Since the NDA measure-
ment uncertainty, in turn, one of the major 
components of the inventory verification uncer-
tainty, one can see that only when providing 
suitable standards having uncertainties which 
are negligible with respect to other sources of 
error, one can appreciably improve the safe-
guards measurement performances in certain 
types of plants. 
But apart from performing quantitative and 
accurate material accountancy, well character-
ized NDA standards play a primary role in: 
- the normalisation and calibration of measure-
ments; 
- bias corrections; 
resolving discrepancies; 
- authentication of instruments; 
- NDA performance assessment. 
On the other hand, the nature of NDA tech-
niques is such taht the standards should almost 
always be very similar to the items verified in 
the field, which would represent quite a costly 
exercise. From that stems the need to reduce 
the number of standards with ad hoc techniques 
(Monte-Carlo calculations for instance) or with 
appropriate management of the system instru-
ments/standards. 
The need for each NDA inspection measure-
ment to be traceable back to a primary standard 
can be fulfilled following different paths, 
composed of different steps; for instance, a 
measurement may be traced back directly to a 
primary standard when it exists. In other 
cases, the path may be much longer, implying a 
comparison with a secondary standard and a cal-
culation of correction factors. Alternatively, 
few specialized laboratories and facilities 
connected amongst them in a sort of link might 
keep "few" standards which are representative 
of the major nuclear fuel productions, and then 
instruments are to be circulated and 
(inter)calibrated against those standards. 
This section of the paper presents a num-
ber of considerations based on the experience 
gained at JRC during the operation of PERLA, 
and the preparation of some sets of standards 
/9/. 
3.1 Requirements for NDA Standards 
There are a number of requirements that 
have to be fulfilled by the NDA standards if 
they are to be used in the calibration and per-
formance evaluation of NDA techniques for Safe-
guards: 
a) They must be representative of plant samples 
(e.g. Pu02 cans, MOX industrial pins, etc.). b) They should be prepared and characterized 
for specific NDA methods with defined 
"performance values". Therefore, overall 
random and systematic uncertainty must be 
planned "a priori" so that calibrations with 
these standards do not introdur.e an appre-
ciable uncertainty component in the NDA mea-
surements. 
c) Most of them must belong to the same family, 
i.e. come from the same original production 
batch and thus.have the same chemical and 
isotopic characteristics. In this way, for 
instance the gamma spectrometrist can mea-
sure the same sample in powder, pellet and 
•pin form, excluding any influence from the 
above-mentioned chemical and physical para-
meters. 
d) Their characterization must be traceable 
back to primary standards through a certifi-
cate that has to fulfil precise requisites, 
e.g. ISO or ASTM norms. 
e) A quality control procedure has to be prede-
fined and then followed in the preparation 
and certification of the standards in order 
to ensure that the required levels of accu-
racy are met. 
f) All possible error 
fined, investigated 
in mind the future 
nique and predefined 
sources have to be de-
and evaluated, bearing 
application (NDA tech-
uncertainty) • 
In the following we give a list of uncer-
tainty sources. 
A. Homogeneity definition 
Precision and accuracy requirements for 
the knowledge of weight and composition of the 
original batch are so stringent that the homo-
geneity of the batch itself is one of the major 
concerns in the characterization of standards. 
Homogeneity is requested at any stage of the 
preparation process. To define the homogeneity 
qualitatively and quantitatively, the following 
points can be made: 
1) At the sampling level the original batch 
must be homogeneous with respect to the sin-
gle sample size, i.e. a few grams. There-
fore, DA tests at the level of approximately 
1 g nnd coll.i.mntcd high resolution gamma 
spectrometry (HRGS) on different positions 
of the batch have to be planned and carried 
out. 
2) At the single standard sample level the ho-
mogeneity is generally conditioned by the 
gamma spectrometry technique uncertainty. 
B. Weighing 
Careful sample weighing protocols have to 
be established for both DA and NDA samples. The 
characterizing laboratories have to be required 
to establish carefully documented balance con-
trols based upon reference weights. 
C. Humidity 
One of the most important parameters which 
might affect NDA measurements (particularly 
neutrons) is the humidity content. General H2o 
content limits must be imposed so as to ensure, 
on the one hand, a representative sampling and 
DA analysis and, on the other, that no further 
H20 pick-up occurs after sampling. 
D. Impurities 
According to the specifications, impuri-
ties must be kept at a minimum level, espe-
cially those which might affect the character-
istics of the chosen materials. 
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E. DA analytical measurements 
Very detailed procedures must be adopted 
and imposed to DA laboratories, ranging from 
the number of repetitions, to the determination 
of the DA expected uncertainties for the labo-
ratories and techniques used, to the types of 
containers to be used, to the transport of the 
analytical samples, to the chemical treatments 
and to the nuclear data set to be used in decay 
calculations. 
Quality control measurements must be made 
during the analyses, employing certified refer-
ence materials in order to evaluate and correct 
systematic errors, if any, in the analytical 
techniques. 
Finally, a predetermined data analysis 
(ANOVA or similar), evaluating averages and 
SDs, must be employed which is tailored to the 
data structure and protocols as "imposed" to 
the laboratories. 
3.2 Standards Available at PERLA 
In Table 1 a summary of the standards 
available or under procurement at PERLA is 
given. In the table the 'level of certifica-
tion', i.e. the number of DA laboratories par-
ticipating in the characterization and the or-
ganization issuing the certificates, is also 
given. 
TABLE 1: Nuclear materials for PERLA 
Material type 
HEU MTR platelets, plates 
MTR asse1blies (18) 
UO powders, pellets (g.kg) 
TH~R Particles, pebbles 
Metal buttons (kg) 
LEU uo2 p~wder, pellets (g.kg) 
uo 2 p1ns . Short assembhes 
u3o8 CBNM/NBS 
Pu02 Small cans (g) Large cans (kg) 
CBNM 
PI DIE 
MOUND HPu-238H 
MOX Pins 
Pellets 
Powders 
enrichments 
enrichments 
not yet procured 
enrichments 
4 burn-ups 
3 burn-ups 
samples 
sa•ples 
samples 
fast theraal 
recycle 
certification levels are as follows: 
Certific. 
level* 
4 
4 
3 
3 
5 
*The 
I) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
International reference •aterial or 
PERLA certificate (3 laboratories) 
PERLA certificate (2 laboratories) 
PERLA certificate (1 laboratory) 
Others 
many laboratories 
4. NDA System Development and Technology 
Transfer Function 
Experience over the years has shown that 
the main problem in transfering safeguards 
techniques from the development laboratory to 
the field is that of producing reliable safe-
guards instruments Ior in-field use and of 
which the measurement capabilities under field 
conditions are well understood. It was becoming 
increasingly evident that most of the tech-
niques when applied in-field had a lower per-
formance than when used in the laboratory. The 
fundamental reasons were: 
1) the fact that physical and statistical 
models were frequently borrowed from appli-
cations where error behaviour was different 
from that of nuclear safeguards measure-
ments; 
2) lack of careful attention of the developers 
who frequently developed "good instruments" 
instead of "good safeguards instruments", 
specifically customer-dedicated; 
3) lack of definition of needs and functional 
specification from the side of the cus-
tomers; 
4) lack of suitable laboratories where the in-
struments could be tested in field condi-
t~ons; 
5) weakness of "after sales services" like 
field support, manuals, trainin?, etc. 
These deficiencies were carefully identi-
fied and discussed by ESARDA in the Como meet-
ing of 1990 /15/. 
It is the scope of this section of the pa-
per to show general lines of instrument devel-
opment in PERLA, giving a few examples, as well 
as to report on the progress made in training 
services. 
4.1 Development of Integrated Instruments and 
Software Products 
Modern NDA safeguards field instruments 
are quite complex tools. They must have tai-
lored software that integrates different disci-
plines such as: 
- physics; 
- statistics; 
- accounting techniques; 
- safeguards procedures; 
- software science. 
Much effort must be placed in designing 
the architecture of the systems such that the 
product be really customer (inspector) ori-
ented. Instruments must then link to a Head 
Quarters (HQ) data evaluation system, where 
historical data are stored in a structured 
fashion, to evaluate their long-term perfor-
mances. HQ software must fulfil safeguards 
authorities' needs of retrieval and analysis 
functions, and must be able to identify the 
long-term behaviour of the random and syste-
matic uncertainties of their devices in terms 
of parameters such as: 
- characteristics of the samples (containers, 
material type, etc.); 
characteristics of the strata (e.g. impor-
tance of one stratum on the inventory); 
- characteristics of the plant; 
- measurement set-up; 
calibration curves; 
- measurement procedures used. 
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The HQ system must be fully compatible 
with the field instrument in the sense that the 
field system must provide all the necessary in-
formation with the proper structure, must be 
tailored to it, but must provide wider statis-
tical tools to elaborate very large amounts of 
data of the same or of different nature coming 
from different instruments, e.g.: 
- gamma or neutron data; 
- gamma and neutron data; 
- DA or NDA data; 
- DA and NDA data; 
- NDA or C/S data; 
- NDA and C/S data. 
In fact, future (and even some present) 
developments consider to operate NDA in 
surveillance mode, or to activate NDA monitor-
ing by surveillance, or to record NDA data in 
permanence but analyse only those that are 
"earmarked". 
The role of statistics software tools and, 
in general, of system modelling in the next ten 
years in developing field and HQ integrated 
systems will be determinant, perhaps encompass-
ing (in resources) that of other disciplines. 
Some examples of integrated systems developed 
at PERLA in the last few years are given in the 
following. 
The PHONID Systems: PHONID (Photo Neutron 
Interrogation Device) is an instrument designed 
by the JRC for the monitoring of U and Pu-bear-
ing samples. The latest development in the 
PHONID line of ipstruments led, on the one 
hand, to the construction or four exemplaires 
of the PHONID 3b series (three of them to be 
delivered to EURATOM). On the other hand, an 
intense measurement campaign, integrated by 
Monte-Carlo studies /16,17/ was launched to im-
prove the electronics and to assess plutonium 
measurement. The entire U and Pu PERLA standard 
inventory was measured and the results are 
shown in /16/. 
Field and Head Quarters PHONID software 
have been designed and produced and will be de-
livered together with the instruments /18/. 
A lighter version or PIIONID (version 4) is 
in the prototype phase and is developed partic-
ularly for Pu monitoring. 
As far as Neutron Coincidence Counting 
(NCC) is concerned, some integrated field soft-
wares for inspectors have been developed under 
EURATOM request and specifications, or are be-
ing written (HLNCC and AWCC) /19,20/. The next 
product will concern NCC for fuel bundles in 
active mode. 
In the field of Gamma Monitoring the 
latest products were: 
- the Pu Meter /21/: a field device for analy-
sis of Pu spectra with MGA /8/, currently in 
use at EURATOM. A detailed inspector-oriented 
user interface has been realized around the 
Lawrence Livermore tool; 
- the Enrichment Meter /22/: the old tool to 
derive U-235 abundance is undergoing a pro-
cess of updating using the same hard-
ware/software environment as the Pu meter; 
- the MTR Gamma Scanner /22/: the device was 
designed to monitor MTR fuel elements in 
emission/transmission mode. Both hardware 
TABLE 2: PERLA software-hardware products in support to EURATOM 
Project 
PHON ID 3b 
PHONID 4 
HLNCC 
AWCC 
NCC (bundles) 
rield instrument 
Hardware 
mechanics 
exemplaires 
I prototype 
electronics 
exemplaires 
I prototype 
Software 
completed 
partially completed 
completed 
completed 
IIQ software 
completed 
partially completed 
see n + gamma 
MTR scanner I exemplaire 
Gamma plutonium 
Enrichment meter (U) 
OA-NOA db 
exemplaire 
exemplaires (EUR) 
under development 
under completion 
completed under def. specif. 
under def. specif. 
under def. speci f. 
Neutron + gamma 
automated systems 
(scanning bench electronics) and software 
have been completely reviewed; 
- the HQ data base for isotopic abundances: in 
the line of the software developed and used 
for the exercise described ih 2.1 on Pu 
isotopics /10/, a Head Quarter data base for 
data coming from NDA-DA devices is under 
development on demand of EURATOM; 
- a contribution in design specifications for a 
software for Gamma-Neutron automated systems 
has been given for EURATOM field devices 
/24,25,26/. 
Table 2 gives a summary of the latest 
achievements and of products under development. 
Such products were realized by JRC mainly for 
EURATOM. Design specifications of most of them 
have been prepared by EURATOM. The realization 
itself was predominantly carried out with 
EURATOM collaboration. 
4.2 Training 
In recent years the training of safeguards 
inspectors has been seen with more and more at-
tention, on the one hand, as a tool of technol-
ogy transfer from the instrument developer to 
the customer and, on the other, it is under-
going a process of evolution. In the past, the 
major effort was put on ensuring that inspec-
tors were able to make good measurements. Much 
attention is now paid to training courses 
which, apart from teaching the correct use of 
instruments, also provide a more integrated 
view of verification activities. Typically, the 
Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) type 
courses on plutonium and uranium, where inspec-
tors are taught to plan an inspection, perform 
measurements and draw conclusions on a statis-
tical basis, are being designed and given. Typ-
ical examples of the new kind of training in 
PERLA are Pu and U PIV courses, given in PRE-
PERLA to EURATOM and IAEA inspectors. More than 
50 training courses have been given in the last 
12 years by JRC to EURATOM and IAEA inspectors 
on neutron and gamma techniques. The present 
training menu of PERLA consists of: 
- basic disciplinary courses (neutron and gamma 
detection, calorimetry, statistics); 
- integrated courses employing combined tech-
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under completion 
specifications 
niques (e.g. neutron and gamma); 
training in full-scale Physical Inventory 
Verifications in U and Pu fabrication plants, 
where several disciplines are involved 
(physics, chemistry, accounting, auditing, 
etc.). 
5. Conclusions 
The scope of this paper was to give a sum-
mary report on PERLA activities after four 
years of cooperation and to outline future 
trends. The previous chapters outlined some 
achievements and milestones of PERLA such as: 
- development and production of NDA integrated 
instruments for inspectors; 
- field and HQ software architectures, specifi-
cations and production; 
-training and technology transfer functions; 
- preparation, characterization and production 
of general guidelines of bulk U-Pu standards 
for NDA; 
- NDA performance evaluation experiments and 
related statistical modelling. 
A staff o·~ about 25 people (roughly 50% 
R&D, 50% support to the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities) is currently engaged in the 
above activities. The breakdown figures are 
approximately: 
40% NDA instrument development, modelling 
and t•riented research; 
- 25% NDA performance assessment and charac-
terization of standards; 
- 20% training; 
15% basic research. 
Trends for the future are: 
- more involvement in training; 
- development of automated "intelligent" safe-
guards instrument~; 
- steep increase in modelling and software ac-
tivities for field and HQ data evaluation 
packages; 
- more caref'll attention to supplier/customer 
approach; cherefore privileging: 
oriented research 
integrated systems at different levels: 
* neutron and gamma, calorimetry and gamma 
systems 
* active/passivft 
* DA/NDA 
* NDA/C/S 
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ON THE USE OF TIME-RESOLVED LASER-INDUCED 
SPECTROFLUOROMETRY IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 
C. Moulin*, P. Decambox*, P. Mauchien*, T. Davin**, B. Pradet**. 
*CEAIDCC/DPE/SPEAISPS/LSLA. BP n•6- 92265 Fontenay aux Roses 
**CEA/DCC/DPR/SEMP/SGCA. BP n•t71- 30205 Bagnols sur C~ze Cedex 
Time Resolved Laser-Induced Spectrofluorometry 
(TRLIS) has been used for actinides trace analysis and 
complexation analysis in the nuclear fuel cycle. Results 
obtained in the different fields such as in geology, in the 
Purex process, in the environment, in the medical and in 
waste storage assessment are presented. 
Introduction 
Fast and sensitive methods are more and more 
required in the nuclear fuel cycle for ultratrace 
determinations of actinides and lanthanides. Time-
Resolved Laser-Induced Spectrofluorometry (TRLIS) is a 
method of choice for such determinations and has been 
used for now more than 10 years. The principle of this 
technique consists in pulsed laser excitation followed by 
temporal resolution of the fl uot:escence signal which 
leads to the elimination of short lifetime fluorescence. 
The main advantage of TRL!S aside rapidity and 
sensitivity is its triple selectivity. Excitation selectivity by 
the proper choice of the laser excitation wavelength, 
emission selectivity since each fluorescent element gives 
a characteristic fluorescence spectrum and finally time 
resolution selectivity which characterizes the fluorescent 
element environment. Among the actinides and 
lanthanides, the ones that are fluorescent in solution are 
uranium, curium, americium and europium, terbium, 
dysprosium, samarium, gadolinium, cerium, thulium. 
These elements have been studied in different 
complexing media (nitric, phosphoric, sulphuric, 
carbonate, micellar) and can be analysed from ppt and 
sub ppt level for uranium and curium to ppb level for 
lanthanides and americium /1-3/. 
The different fields of interest in the nuclear fuel 
cycle where TRLIS has been used arc in : 
- Geology, for ultratrace determination of uranium (ng/1 
level) in waters from different localities in order to 
obtain a better understanding of uranium mobilization 
under natural reducing conditions and so to validate 
thermodynamic data /4/; 
- All the different steps of the Purex process, in plutonium 
matrices for quality control, in organic matrices (TBP, 
TPH) where uranium used as tracer allows to calculate 
decontamination factors of new installations and hence to 
ameliorate performances of the process ; 
- Medical surveillance for direct and' fast determination of 
uranium in human urines. Hence, based on the uranium 
concentration in urine, metabolic models are established 
to estimate the body burden of uranium from persons 
exposed to uranium ambience /5/ ; 
- Environment control for uranium determination in water 
and soil samples in order to have a "cartography" of 
specific areas ; 
- Waste storage assessment, for the determination of 
complexing constants at very low level between actinides 
and organic matters. TRLIS allows to work directly at 
trace level and has been applied to curium /6/. 
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Moreover, in Purex process control, remote 
measurements are performed in hot cell with the 
adaptation of fibte-optics and optode and would be used 
for in-line control in '•the nuclear fuel process. This 
feature allows real time analysis. 
Material and Methods 
Avparaf!IS 
The experimental set-up is schcmatically shown in 
Fig. 1. 
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Figure I : TRLIS experimental set-up. 
A nitrogen laser (Model 804, SOPRA) operating at 337 
nm and delivering about 1.5 mJ of energy in a 5 ns pulse 
with a repetition rate of 25 Hz is used as excitation 
source. The laser beam is focused into the cell of the 
spectrofluorometer "FLUO 2001" (DILOR, Lille, 
France) by a quartz lens. In order to increase the 
sensitivity, two concave mirrors placed in the cell holder 
double the distance travelled by excitation and 
fluorescence emission. The radiation coming from the 
cell is focused on the entrance slit of the monochromator. 
Taking into account dispersion of the holographic grating 
used in the monochromator, measurement range extends 
to approximately 200 nm into the visible spectrum. The 
detection is performed by an intensified photodiodes 
(512) array cooled by Peltier effect and positioned at the 
monochromator exit. Recording of spectra is performed 
by integration of the pulsed light signal given by the 
intensifier. The integration time adjustable from 0.1 to 
30 s allows for variation in detection sensitivity. Time-
resolution is obtained by tlie control unit that assures 
pulsed running of the intensifier and the photodiodes 
array. A photodiode located in the vicinity of the cell 
produces with each laser pulse, a reference signal from 
\ 
which command signals for the high voltage are 
obtained. The logic circuit used to generate the signals 
allows measurements with a delay adjustable from 1 to 
999 JJS during a time of 1 to 99 ps. The signal 
acquisition is performed via DMA (direct memory 
access). All functions of the apparatus (temporal delay, 
gate width, integration time, reading of spectra, ... ) are 
programmable by the use of an IEEE 488 interface. The 
whole system is controlled by a PC-AT microcomputer. 
Analytical software automatically calculates 
concentrations by the standard addition or the initial 
fluorescence methods. 
Procedure 
Samples are directly diluted in phosphoric acid (0.75 
M), sulphuric acid (4.5 M) or Fluran (10 %) depending 
on the matrix composition. Then one millilitre of this 
solution is introduced into the quartz cell. The standard 
addition method is used for uranium concentration 
determination. Small quantities of a known uranium 
solution are successively added in the cell, fluorescence 
intensity is measured at 494 . nm (phosphoric and 
sulphuric acid) or 499 nm (Fiuran) and then background 
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(450 nm) subtracted. For each solution, uranium 
concentration in the sample is obtained by plotting 
fluorescence intensity versus concentration and 
extrapolating back to the origin. 
~-
In this paper, only three examples of the previously 
quoted fields of application of TRLIS will be given. In 
geology, the acquisition of thermodynamic data for 
uranium in atkaline solution is hampered by problems 
such as the ionic strength of the experimental solution, 
the stability of U (IV) complexes and uraninite and the 
very low level uranium concentrations. As a result, 
published data are often conflicting. A set of waters from 
French Pyrennes at temperature ranging from 60 to 70°C 
were chosen to check on the accuracy of solubility data. 
The two possible equilibria between U(VI) and uraninite 
are considered. 
U(OH)40 =;; U02 + 2 H20 (1) 
Log K = 9.47 ± 0.3 (100-300•C) 
U(OH)5- + H+ = U02 + 3 H20 (2) 
Log K = -19.86 ± 0.3 (25°C) 
From the concentrations determinations of these different 
sample, figure 2, where the activity of uranium in 
solution is plotted versus pH was obtained. 
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Figure 2 : Activity of uranium versus pH of groundwter 
samples. Solid lines represent the relation given by Eqns. 
I and 2, respectively; dotted lines give the possible limits 
with respect to the data accuracy. 
From this figure, it seems that with equation 2, the 
uranium-pH correlation agrees better with the observed 
trends. This trend seems to confirm that uranium is 
controlled in solution by a mineral .phase. 
In the Purex process and recently in the TEO (Organic 
Waste Treatment) project where the main goal was to 
determine the decontamination factor (DF) of an 
installation by using uranium as tracer in the organic 
phase (fBP, TPH) to simulate radioactive elements 
behaviour. This installation is briefly shown on figure 3. 
CO-CURRENT 
EVAPORATOR 
RESIDUE 
Figure 3 : Oversimplified scheme of the TEO project. 
The DF factor simulated by calculation was expected to 
be in the 103 to 104 range. The uranium initial 
concentration in the feeding was set to 10 mg/1 and 
practical measurements by TRLIS in the pg/1 to sub pg/1 
have confirmed previously quoted figures. These 
numerous data (more than 1000 determinations) have 
allowed to visualize effects of eventual modifications of 
the installation on the decontamination factor. 
In waste storage assessment, the knowledge of 
radioelement behaviour is of great importance. In 
particular, complexation reactions of radioelements with 
natural organic ligands such as humic substances 
(humic/fulvic acids) present in aquifer systems are 
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important, because of the strength of complexes that 
humic substances form with cations, in particular 
trivalent elements like americium and curium. TRLIS is 
the only technique that allow to work directly at trace. 
levels. 
Typical titration curve · (fluorescence signal 
versus humic substance concentration) of curium (Ill)· by· 
humic acids is presented on Figure 4 at fixed pH and 
ionic strength. 
l 
120,-------------------. 
100 -
80 
;['-.,..---L---------
1 f' 
s1 I 
I I 
•/ I 
2:-60 I I 
o/ I ) 
40 o/ I 
I I 
•I I 
20-/ ! 
(o I 
10 
FA concen1ralion (mg/1) 
15 
Figure 4 : Curium fluorescence intensity as a function of 
fulvie acids concentration. [Cm] 2.10-7 M,pH 5, I=0.1 
The complexation of curium by humic substances 
leads to an increase of the curium fluorescence signal 
until saturation of the complexing sites occurs. From 
similar titration curve, different binding parameters are 
obtained such as the complexing capacity W (expressed 
in mmoles/g) and the conditional stability constant {1. 
Several factors such as the concentration, pH and ionic 
strength have been investigated. 
Conclusion 
Time-Resolved Laser- Induced Spcctrofluorometry is a 
fast, sensitive and selective technique for uranium 
determinations in the nuclear fuel cycle. Other elements 
such as curium, americium and several lanthanides can 
also be analysed. One great advantage of this technique is 
the possibility to perform in-line measurements by the 
use of fibber optics and optodes for real time analysis. 
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1. Abstract 
The components under development for an on-
site Safeguards laboratory are described. These 
include the instrumentation necessary for the bulk 
analysis of Pu and MOX samples, and for the IDMS 
analysis ofU and Pu in input solutions. 
2.lntroduction 
The concept of on-site laboratories has been 
introduced previously /1/. It includes automatic 
analytical instruments which could analyse nuclear 
fuel samples taken under routine nuclear material 
safeguards inspections. 'l'o reduce the labour costs in 
such an on-site laboratory, expert systems and 
computer links to a central laboratory would be 
employed. 
The present status is described here, including: 
the bulk analysis ofPu and MOX samples, 
which employs robot techniques 
extensively, 
the components needed for alpha- and 
mass-spectrometry, again employing robot 
techniques, 
an expert system which delivers the 
necessary information to the laboratory 
robots for the appropriate conditioning 
procedures for the samples. 
Under the present time schedule, the development 
and construction, followed by field-testing is planned 
for 1992. 
3. Methods 
Bulk analysis ofPu and MOX samples 
For the bulk analysis of Pu and U in 
rel?rocessing output samples (nitrate solutions or 
oxide powders) and from fuel production (mainly 
MOX pellets), three options are foreseen: 
titration for quantitative element analysis 
and thermal ionisation mass-spectrometry 
(TIMS) for isotopic analysis, 
K-edge densitometry for quantitative 
elemental analysis, y-spectrometry for 
isotope analysis of Pu and 'J'IMS for the 
isotope distribution of U (for the MOX 
samples only), 
passive neutron counting for Pu-
containing powders plus y-spectrometry 
for the isotope ratios. 
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The layout of a glovebox (Fig. 1) which houses 
instrumentation for bulk analyses is given here. 
<D J,hcroweM oven @ Robot 
® Balance lor 1olld ••mple• ® Capper 
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Fig. 1 Layout of glovebox for bulk analysis of Pu and 
MOX samples 
Titration ofU and Pu 
For the titration of U and Pu, a commercial 
titrator (type RADIOMETER) has been adapted for 
glove-box operation and is now in routine use. All 
manipulations are carried out by a laboratory robot 
(type ZYMARK) which posses exchangeable hands 
for gripping (3) and for dispensing solutions. 'rhe 
samples are weighed (2) and dissolved. Weighed 
aliquots of the dissolved samples a•·e conditioned 
(dccappcr (5), mixer (7), dispense•· (9)) before 
titration. To limit any possible spread of 
contamination and to contain corrosive fumes, the 
glovebox is divided into three compartments with 
sliding connecting doors which can be opened and 
closed by the robot (A,B,C). 
The setup has been coupled into the laboratory 
data system so that the expert system, described 
below, designates which samples have to be analysed. 
Barcode labels are printed which are attached to the 
flasks and checked at weighing (Fig. 2). 
The procedure is given in Fig. 3. After 
dissolution and weighing of the samples aliquots the 
titration is then carried out automatically. All 
necessary data are sent to the main laboratory 
computer (Fig. 2). After the titration is finished the 
concentration is calculated so that the analyst is in 
the position to judge if the analysis is acceptable or 
not. 
Blank measurements and standards are 
measured routinely. The results from these are 
archived. At the end of each day or on instigation of 
the operator all measured samples in the period are 
recalculated using the latest standards and blank 
values as a basis. 
The results can be checked by the operator who 
is in the position to recall each titration curve onto 
the computer screen. All measurements are archived 
for further statistical control and also for internal 
fissile material control purposes. 
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Fig. 2 Automatic titration and data flow 
u 
Fig. 3 Titration procedures 
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Enhanced robotised conditionin of solutions for 
isotope ilution 
A system based on a laboratory robot installed 
in a glovebox for the spiking, conditioning and 
separation of reprocessing input samples has been 
successfully implemented in the Safeguards 
laboratory of the Institute and has been fully 
operational since 1987. This first version (Fig. 4) has 
been improved and extended with the intention of 
implementing it in the on-site Safeguards 
laboratories. . 
'l'wo pieces of appar-atus have been developed 
which extend the function of the robot and are 
described here. The first is a sample changer for alpha 
counting (10) to determine the 238Pu I (239+240JPu 
ratios. The robot, after preparing the samples for 
alpha spectrometry, loads the sample changer and 
signalises that the first batch can be counted. It has 
positions for 18 samples and can measure 6 samples 
simultaneously. '!'he spectr-a ar-e sent fr-om the 
mullichannel analyser to a computer which 
calculates the peak ratios for the subsequent 
determination of 238Pu and also an approximate 
value of the concentration of the plutonium in the 
solution as well as that of uranium from the 
concentration of 23:JU. These concentrations are used 
to calculate the optimal amounts of solution to be 
loaded on the filaments for mass-spectrometry. 
The second apparatus is for the preparation of 
mass-spectrometer filaments (8,13). An Eppindorf 
pipette is used by the robot to deposit a volume of 
between 1 and 10 pl of the sample on the filament. 
The filaments are mounted on a magazine which is 
rotated under robot control to expose the next 
filament. After all filaments have been prepared, 
they are heated by an electrical current to dry the 
samples and are then ready to be taken out for mass-
spectrometry. 
Extension of the expert system for the automatic 
safeguards laboratory 
'l'he expert system as described previously /2/ 
has been extended and can now choose between 22 
different analytical procedures. All types of 
Safeguards samples can be dealt with. The program 
works out the following necessary parameters for the 
preparation of the sample: 
determination of the analysis code from the 
sample data with a simultaneous check of 
the completeness and coherence of the data, 
assignment of internal numbers which are 
used to check the flow of the sample through 
the measurement steps, 
calculation of the analytical parameters: 
dilution factor (should a dilution be 
necessary), amounts of the redox reagents in 
the chemical conditioning stage and weights 
of spikes and sample, 
determination of the number of alpha 
planchettes and mass-spectrometry 
filaments to be prepared. Later on the robot 
(after huvinl:{ identified the sample by its 
bar-code) will employ this information 
together with the parameters calculated as 
above. 
The samples are measured and the results evaluated. 
Measurement repeats where necessary are then 
reinitialised by the expert system. Different types of 
repeats are possible: 
a new dilution of the original sample, assuming 
enough material is available, followed by a 
complete new measurement process, 
the chemical conditioning only is repeated, 
further measurements are needed: the robot 
then prepares fresh filaments and/or alpha 
planchcttes. 
The expert system at present covers the isotope 
dilution mass-spectrometry. It is being extended to 
include the bulk analysis methods for Pu and MOX 
samples. 
Data aquisition and evaluation for bulk and isotope 
analysis ofU and Pu 
A system of automatic data collection, reduction 
and evaluation has been developed for all the 
analytical techniques at present being employed. The 
instruments are presently situated in different 
laboratories where dedicated processors collect and 
partially reduce the data before sending them to a 
PDP 11/73 computer. The full evaluation takes place 
later in a Micro V AX II computer. 
The information from the expert system (see 
above) for the robot is filed in the PDP 11173. Allhe 
same time data files specific for the sample are 
opened into which the reduced data are deposited 
after each measurement. For the moment some 
instruments have to be programmed by the operators 
according to instructions given by the expert system. 
In the future this step will be eliminated as far as 
possible. 
The status of the analysis of each sample can be 
followed, to see for instance if the results are already 
available from mass-spectrometry. 
For each of the instruments and robots, 
individual software has been written. 'l'he software is 
at present either being tested or in routine use. For 
the future an extension is planned to include an 
expert system for the quality assurance of the 
measurements. 
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Fig. 4 Robotised conditioning for isotope dilution 
analysis 
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APPLICATION OF THE BUBBLING TECHNIQUE 
FOR THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
- EVOLUTION OF THE DEVICE -
M. Neuilly, J.L. Dufour, M. Orloff, B. Thaurel 
(CEA/IPSN) 
Abstract 
The paper describes an evolution of the 
device presented at Luxembourg in May 89 for 
direct measurement of liquid densities in tanks 
and determination of filling levels. 
It appears that these two parameters can be 
measured with a reproductibility of 5E-5 and an 
accuracy of 5E-4 in relative values. 
Initial device gave a result in 15 minutes, 
the new one provides the same result in less 
than 4 minutes without accuracy damaging when 
using a specific computer programm. 
Nowadays this system is used in a 
reprocessing plant : ' 
- to measure on line the density of an 
organic solvent in order to determine when 
recycling is necessary, 
- to check the homogeneity of uranium 
nitride in large tanks. 
1. Introduction 
Le dispositif baptisA "monocanne" (figure 1) 
permet la mesure in situ de la masse volumique 
et du niveau de remplissage de liquides contenus 
dans des cuves. En particulier, il s'applique 
aux liquides agressifs, ionisants, dangereux ou 
creant un milieu hostile soit pour le materiel 
soit pour l'opArateur. 
Le systeme n'utilise aucune source 
Alectrique au niveau de la prise d'information 
de pression au point de mesure; seul l'air ou 
un gaz inerte (azote) est utilise comme 
transmetteur jusqu'au capteur de pression. Ce 
dispositif permet en outre, par son deplacement 
vertical dans la cuve, un contr6le d'homogenAite 
en concentration et en temperature de la 
solution contenue (seuil de quelques 1E-5). 
2. Rappels theoriques 
2.1. MAthode qAnArale (cf. figure 2) 
Le principe de la monocanne est exposA dans 
la reference [l] : soit une monocanne immergee 
dans une solution de masse volumique W501 et dans laquelle on insuffle un gaz de masse 
volumique W9 az· Les bulles se forment 
successivement aans les chambres de bullage A et 
B et a l'extremite C de la canne. Lorsque la 
bulle se forme en C, par exemple, la pression du 
gaz dans la bulle est : 
pc = psurt + he Wsol 9 + 6P 
0~ psurf est la pression atmospherique a la 
surface libre du liquide, h la distance du 
point C a cette surface et 6P l~accroissement de 
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de pression du a la tension superficielle. 
Le manometre est place au point H a un 
niveau h0 en-dessous de la surface libre. En ce point la pression du gaz est : 
(pH ) = pc + ( ho - he ) Wg a z g 
c 
La pression atmospherique en H est 
Le manometre indique la difference de 
press ion 
(PH- Pole = hc(Wsol- Wgazl9 + 6P + ho(W9 az- Wairl9 (1) 
Des formules analogues donnent les 
indications du manometre lorsque la bulle se 
forme en A et en B. 
Lorsque la bulle grossit dans des conditions 
voisines de l'equilibre (bullage lent, 
cf. reference [2]}, la pression 6P passe par un· 
maximum dont la valeur est independante de la 
profondeur et pratiquement independante de la 
vitesse de bullage. Si on prend les points de 
pression maximum en A et B on peut Acrire : 
ou 6H est la difference de profondeur des points 
A et B. Cette distance est constante par 
construction. 
Pour determiner la valeur de Wsol, la 
quantitA (g.6H) est determinee a l'avance par 
etalonnage, c'est-a-dire en utilisant un liquide 
de masse volumique connue, l'eau en general. 
La masse volumique du gaz est calculee a 
partir de sa valeur W0 dans les conditions 
normales (pression P0 et temperature absolue T0 }, de la pression P du gaz et de sa temperature 
absolue T : 
p To 
wg • z = wo P T 
0 
Il faut done mesurer la temperature T au 
moment du bullage. La pression P est donnee par 
la mesure au point C : 
2.2. Mesures relatives 
La masse volumique mesuree W&ol est celle de 
la solution au point C. Une appl1cation pratique 
de la monocanne est done la verification de 
l'homogAneite d'une solution contenue dans une 
cuve. 11 suffi t en effet de fa ire p 1 us i eurs 
mesures en des points differents de la solution. 
Si l'on neglige les variations de W98 avec la pression (done avec la profondeur}, ia mesure 
directe de la difference de pression entre A et 
B suffit, sans .etalonnage prealable, pour 
deceler les variations de w. 1 , qu'elles soient dues a des variations de concentration ou de 
temperature. 
3. Dispositif utilise (figure 3) 
Le systeme actuel est un ensemble industriel 
totalement autonome et mobile : il peut etre 
dispose dans le coffre d'une voiture. Outre la 
monocanne immergee dans la solution a contr6ler, 
le systeme de mesure est compose d'un coffret 
electronique dont les elements sont les 
suivants : 
Le capteur de pression utilise est un 
manometre de marque CROUZET, de type 44/3. 
Celui-ci est relie a un multimetre HP 3456 A, 
utilise en voltmetre. Un calculateur HP 9816 est 
connecte a l'ensemble de mesures ; il enregistre 
et visualise, en temps quasi-reel, la pression 
existant dans le circuit pneumatique associe a 
la monocanne. Les variations necessaires pour 
obtenir le bullage de gaz sont.obtenues avec 
deux debimetres massiques BROOKS de type 5850 E. 
Les consignes de ces debimetres ainsi que les 
electrovannes utilisees sont commandees 
directement par l'ordinateur, pilote du 
dispositif, via une interface. Un clapet 
anti-retour, monte directement sur la canne, 
evite toute remontee imprevue de la solution 
dans le circuit pneumatique. 
De fa~on generale, la premiere mesure n'est 
pas prise en compte pour les calculs, cette 
mesure sert uniquement au rin~age de la canne et 
a sa mise en equilibre thermique avec la 
solution a mesurer. 
Un programme informatique de traitement 
automatique enregistre en continu les variations 
obtenues pendant la remontee et la descente du 
menisque dans la monocanne (figure 4). La 
detection du passage du menisque aux points 
particuliers PSA et PSB du menisque provoque des 
changements de consigne des debimetres pour 
permettre un bullage lent en A et B. Une 
optimisation de l'usinage de la monocanne en 
PSA et PSa et une etude specifique du programme 
de depou1llement informatique ont permis de 
reduire le temps necessaire a une mesure de 
15 minutes a moins de 4 minutes. 
Un ecran visualise le profil des pressions 
pendant toute la duree de la mesure. 
4. Mode operatoire 
On descend tout d'abord la monocanne en fond 
de cuve, tout en insufflant un gaz (azote) a une 
pression estimee superieure a la pression 
regnant en ce point. Apres reduction du debit de 
gaz, on provoque la formation de bulles en C. 
Puis on fait remonter le menisque au-dessus du 
point A. On enregistre pendant ce temps les 
variations de pression de maniere a determiner 
l 'echelle de visualisation lors de la mesure 
effectuee (pendant la descente du menisque dans 
la canne). 
On effectue alors 5 cycles de mesures entre 
les points A, B et C en faisant varier la 
pression dans le circuit pneumatique. 
Cette serie de mesures etant terminee, on 
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remonte la monocanne a une nouvelle hauteur. On 
observe ainsi un bullage libre du a la 
diminution depression dans le liquide. On peut 
alors effectuer une nouvelle serie de mesures en 
respectant le protocole decrit precedemment. 
5. Mesures 
5.1. Verification de l'homogeneite d'une cuve 
remplie de nitrate d'uranyle 
La campagne d'essais, realisee sur une cuve 
contenant du nitrate d'uranyle recycle (presence 
de produits de fission), a pour objet un 
contr6le d'homogeneite de la solution. Une 
mesure absolue de la masse volumique n'etant pas 
demandee, l'emploi de la methode de mesure 
simplifiee est suffisante : on n'effectue done 
pas d'etalonnage en eau, ni de mesure de 
temperature de la solution analysee. 
Les mesures presentees dans le tableau 
ci-apres sont faites a 3 hauteurs differentes. 
Les differences de pression observees entre les 
points A et B sont exprimees en mV ; elles 
devraient etre exprimees en unite de pression 
(coefficient de conversion lie au capteur 
CROUZET) si l'on desirait obtenir la masse 
volumique. 
Fond de cuve Mi 1 ieu de cuve Sonrnet de cuve 
121 '571 121,694 121 '719 
121 '520 121,863 121 '764 
121,611 121 '789 121,746 
121,656 121 '794 
121,550 121 ,693 
-- -- --
Moyenne : 121 '582 121 '767 121 '743 
o!cart-type 
relat1f: 4,4 E-4 6,0 E-4 1,9 E-4 
soit une estimation moyenne de l'ecart-type 
relatif de 0,04 %. 
Ces resultats montrent que la reproductibi-
lite des mesures etant meilleure que 5 E-4, elle 
permet de deceler des variations de densite 
entre le fond et le sommet de la cuve. 
5.2. Verification industrielle sur du solvant 
recycle (figure 5) 
Une application particuliere du bullage lent 
permet, en exploitation industrielle, la mesure 
en continu et en temps quasi-reel de la masse 
volumique du solvant organique recycle dans 
l'installation. Ceci est realise en utilisant 
une canne de bullage fixe, immergee dans un pot 
specifique monte en derivation sur le flux de 
circulation de solvant, la solution ayant un 
niveau de remplissage maintenu constant par 
deversement. Dans ces conditions, en supposant 
la temperature constante, toute variation de 
masse volumique se traduit par une variation de 
press ion. 
6. Conclusion 
L'experience d'utilisation de la monocanne 
en milieu industriel, avec un niveau de 
reproductibilite de 5 E-4, a montre qu'il etait 
possible d'utiliser un tel dispositif meme en 
milieu contaminant. En cas de mise en oeuvre par 
un inspecteur charge du contr6le des matieres 
nucleaires, les manipulations de la canne, sur 
la cuve, doivent toutefois etre prises en charge 
par un inspecteur aguerri aux problemes de 
con'tamination. En fin d'experience, il faut 
prevoir un certain temps pour effectuer les 
operations de decontamination et de contr6le de 
radioprotection. 
Un avantage de la monocanne pour les mesures 
in situ est la possibilite de son remplacement, 
en cas de deterioration, par une autre monocanne 
etalonnee hors cuve. 
[1] 
[2] 
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Moyennant un appareillage specifique, une 
autre utilisation de ce systeme pourrait etre la 
mesure sur echantillons en laboratoire, sans 
avoir pour cela a utiliser toute une serie 
d'etalons, un seul etant suffisant (eau par 
exemple). 
La mise en oeuvre d'un systeme de bullage a 
niveau constant a montre, que les techniques de 
bullage lent permettent a l'exploitant 
d'effectuer des mesures rapides, simples et 
fiables des parametres necessaires a la conduite 
d'un precede (densite du TBP par exemple). 
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FIBRE OPTIC NETWORKS FOR SAFEGUARDS APPLICATIONS 
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Abstract 
The Euratom Safeguards .. Directorate has 
recently installed .. a ~ibre optic network in a new large 
scale nuclear fac11ity 1n the European Communities. 
. The s~lection, in~tall?tion, and commissioning of 
the f1bre opt1c network 1s d1scussed from the viewpoint 
of network topology, physical testing, trouble shooting 
and authentication. 
The future use of fibre optic networks for safeguards 
applications is discussed. 
1. Introduction 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate has over 
the last 6-7 y~ars acquired a ~onsiderable pool of 
safeguards equ1pment, e.g. NDA Instrumentation, video 
recorder systems, sealing hardware, etc. for use 
throughout the nuclear facilities of the European 
Comm~nities. Whilst this equipment is essentially stand-
alone 1n nature nevertheless there is an increasing 
demand for customized installation of equipment as a 
fun~t!on of specific nuclear facility characteristics. In 
addition the Euratom Safeguards Directorate has over 
~he past .2-3 years been increasingly requested to 
1ntrt?duce 1n to ne':V nuclear facilities specially designed 
equ~pment as an Integral part of the facilities handling 
rout1nes and general layout. This approach has 
involved the following: 
- equipment included in to the routine handling 
arrangement of the facility 
- automation of equipment to the point where direct 
inspector presence is no longer necessary or even no 
lon~er possible 
- s1gnal and data transmission network linking the 
safeguards equipment distributed throughout the 
nuclear facility to recording and computer systems in a 
central office. 
With respect to this last point the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate has installed in one particular 
lar!i!e scale nuclear facility in the European Communities 
a f1bre-optic network. This network is presently being 
used for the transmission of video and sensor signals 
and some non-des~ructive assay (NDA} measurement 
data. The network Installation was started in mid-1989 
and commissioned more than 1 year ago. In Fig. 1 is 
show~ a general schematic of the network topology 
were 1t can be clearly seen that the objective is to 
provide a single Integrate approach to data 
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co~munication between local information acquisition 
po1nts and a central hub for data recording and 
analysis. The fibre-optic network has been used to for 
video signals, sensor information, and some limited 
data communications. There have been no fibre-optic 
network component failures detected to date. The 
potential of the fibre-optic network for the transmission 
of all safeguards relevant signals and data is also being 
evaluated. 
. T~e principle justifications for deciding to install a 
f1bre-opt1c cable network were that it was a proven 
technique •. phxsic?!ly f?Ossible, and reasonably priced. 
The technical JUStifications for the selection of a fibre-
op~ic ~.able as opposed to a metallic conductor were: 
- Significantly lower signal attenuation 
- greater transmission bandwidth capabilities for 
baseband transmission 
- galvanic separation between components 
- immunity to electrical interference and cross-talk 
- safety in hazardous or volatile environments 
- smaller weight and size for the same ruggedness and 
flexibility as metallic conductors 
- communication security, ie. more difficult to 
reQenerate signal and introduce passive taps or beam 
splitters. 
Here it is worthwhile to note that whilst fibre-optic 
cables are of course preferred for situations requiring 
high bandwidth nevert~el~ss they are _also extremely 
useful for the transmiSSion of low b1t rate signals 
through extremely noisy electrical environments such 
as those potentially found in the new automated nuclear 
facilities. The use of fibre-optic cables is not new in 
safeguards although the implementation described 
below appears to be the first large scale use specifically 
for safe~uards purposes. Fibre-optic cables are used in 
the fabncation of several new types of sealing systems 
for example, the Cobra or Vacoss, and for specifi~ 
types of measurement instruments such as on-line 
spectrophotometry. Fibre-optic data transmission has 
also been implemented in the Consulha safeguards 
project/1/, and video signals are transmitted on fibre-
optic cables for safeguards purposes in PFPF/2/. 
One of the principle difficulties encountered in 
establ!shing a communications network, based upon 
metallic conductors or fibre-optic cables, is the lack of 
standard set of recommendations concerning the type 
of ~abies a.nd ~etwork. topology to be used in any 
particular s1tuat1on. This problem was one of the 
reasons why the Euratom Safeguards Directorate used 
Fig. 1 Schematic of Network Topology 
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both a main contractor with a prov~n experience in 
installing a fibre-optic network and specialised sub-
contractors. In addition the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate participated in the implementation of a set of 
detailed hardware test protocols and imposed a 
complete document trace for future reference. The 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate also participated in 
factory and on-site reception tests with contractors and 
performed separate functional tests on installed 
systems. 
2. Topology of the Network 
The first phase in the project was the selection of 
type of network and planning of the network topology. 
G1ven that there existed at that time no consistent set of 
recommendations that would have helped in the 
decision making process several types of networks, 
e.g. star, bus, ring, etc. were considered/3/. One of the 
main decision criteria was to provide an initial network 
which would reduce or remove the need for future 
installation work in what then would be active areas of 
the nuclear facility. This implied the initial installation of 
fibre-optic cable runs having a high level of redundancy 
and a built-in possibility of future development and 
expansion. Both the bus and ring topology were felt to 
have little overall resistance to failure since a single 
optic-fibre break would affect the complete network 
unless cable runs were duplicated and expensive 
additional electronics components added. 
The star topology was felt to offer more 
advantages than disadvantages, it was considered as 
being more resistant to single fibre-optic cable breaks 
although it was expected to require more cable than 
other layouts. lt was decided to adopt a point-to-point 
network for the video signals and to design it in such a 
way as to facility a physical star topology for the 
transmission of measurement data, etc.. The star is 
considered one of the most flexible and manageable 
types of network. The star can include logical buses 
and logical rings, so it supports Ethernet, token ring, 
and Fibre Distributed Data Interface (an ANSI LAN 
standard) networks. The physical star is preferred and 
even endorsed in the USA by Commercial Building 
Telecommunication Wiring Standards-made by 
Telecommunication Industry Association and Electronic 
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Workstations 
Data Loggers 
Industries Association/ 4 I. 
The planning of the topology of the network, i.e. 
establishing the cable runs and paths, was dependent 
upon many factors, including: 
- number and location of cameras, instrumentation, 
sensors, etc. 
- location of hub 
- nature of terrain, i.e. inside, outside, physical 
obstacles, etc. 
- presence of existing cable runs 
- funnelling and refilling of wall penetrations 
- security and redundancy requirements 
- safety standards and applicable codes of practice. 
lt was also felt necessary to establish some rules 
concerning the laying and pulling of the fibre-optic 
cables which would reduce the overall installation costs, 
permit easy functional testing and technical reception, 
and facility future authentication activities. These 
requirements were: 
- use existing outside cable paths 
- use existing cable paths, trays, etc. as those used by 
the operator 
- cable paths, trays, etc. should provide for visual 
inspection of cables 
- all distribution cabinets and all termination boxes, etc. 
to be sealable 
- all cables etc. to be adequately labelled. 
The network topology, once finalised, was drawn 
on to a set of site plans. Fig. 2 shows a more detailed 
view of the fibre-optic network topology. The network 
installed included:-
Rbre-Optic Cable Requirements 
A total of 43,430m of fibre-optic cable was 
required, including 1 ,600m of multi-strand fibre-optic 
cable (24 single strands) and 2,515m of dual fibre-optic 
strand cable. The multi-strand fibre optic cable was 
required in three separate portions, two 700m portions, 
and a 200m portion. The multi-stranded fibre-optic 
cable functions as a type of "backbone" with pairs of 
individual fibre-optic strands connected locally to dual 
stranded fibre-optic cables. The dual stranded fibre-
optic cable was used for both video signals and 
information transmission, e.g. measurement data, 
sensor signals, etc. A total of 1 ,935m of dual stranded 
Central Fibre-opti 
transmitters 
Fibre-optic 
receivers Sealed h,;::ou::::•ln~g --~ 
VIdeo and Data Signals 
Local1 
Fibre-optic 
distribution panel 
Local2 
Sensors 
Sealed housing 
Fig. 2 Detailed Schematic of Cable Layout 
fibre-optic cable was used for the video signals with 
local cable runs of between 25m to 110m. Information 
transmission is carried over 580m of dual stranded 
fibre-optic cable with local cable runs of 35m to 1 OOm. 
lt can thus be seen that most video or 
information signals are carried over 750m to 850m 
between the point of local acquisition and the point of 
central recording. 
Infrastructure 
A total of 615m of additional cable trays were 
installed with open cable trays widths ranging between 
50mm and 200mm. The general rule was to use where 
possible existing cable trays of the facility operator. The 
Installation of additional cable trays was conditioned 
either by the absence of cable trays in a given part of 
the facility or by the need to conserve a 25% reserve 
occupancy in the facility operators cable trays. lt should 
be noted that more than 60 wall penetrations were 
performed including load bearing walls and walls being 
part of the physical and biological protection. 
One obstacle to the use of fibre-optic cables for 
the transmission of video signals is that the camera 
power supply must be provi~ed u~ing an indep~ndent 
set of electrical cables. In th1s particular case th1s was 
not see as being disadvantageous given that an 
elaborate uninterruptable power supply had to be 
installed for other reasons, but in other applications the 
cost of installing a separate set of power cables would 
need to be factored in to the overall cost/benefit 
analysis. A total of 4685 m of power cables were laid 
and pulled at the same time as the fibre-optic cables. 
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3. Selection of Rbre-Optic Cable and Associated 
Hardware 
In the previous section the decision to select a 
physical star topology was described along with the 
quantities of fibre-optic cable and cable trays needed. 
The next phase was the selection of the hardware 
components, i.e. type of fibre-optic cable, terminations, 
transmitters, receivers, etc. Elements in the hardware 
decision procedure were:- . 
transmission requirements, bandpass and opt1cal 
power budget 
- power coupled to the fibre-optic strands by 
optical sources 
- fibre-optic strand attenuation 
- any fibre-fibre coupling losses, e.g. splices, etc. 
- fibre-receiver coupling loss 
- receiver sensitivity 
- system power budget safety margin 
mechanical plannin~J 
- cable runs;paths 
- nature of terrain 
-type of soil, etc. 
- mode of laying. 
Three very important points had been 
established during the preparation of the topology. 'fhe 
first was a requirement for a certain level of physical 
redundancy, i.e. red~i!dant fibre-optic able strands. in 
active areas of the fac1hty were costs would be very h1gh 
if additional cables were to be laid or pulled after active 
trials. The second was the decision not to mix cable 
types, i.e to not install a mixture of cable types such a 
fibre-optic, coax, twisted-pairs, etc. A single cable type 
reduces the management burden. The third was the 
need for secure links, i.e. fibre-optic links containing no 
connectors, splices, or passive/active components. 
In addition details concerning test and reception 
procedures were establishe~ as wer!3 the s~andards to 
be respected in documenting the Installation. lt was 
decided that the main contractor would perform the 
factory reception of the hardware but that the Euratom 
S,afeguards Directorate would observe these tests. 
Selection of the Rbre-Optic Cable 
The selection criteria for the fibre-optic cable was 
based upon both the need to transfer both video and 
data signals. There appeared to be at the time of 
installation no set of standards which would have 
facilitated the decision making process. lt was decided 
to try to conform to a physical specification for a fibre-
optic cable recommended at that time for IEEE 802.8 
approval, see Annex I. . . 
Additional criteria for the selection of the fibre-
optic cables were: 
-the requirements conditioned by the se)ected.topoiOQY 
- linking all local transmitters to a pa1r of f1bre-opt1c 
strands for redundancy 
- the need to lay an outside underground set of fibre-
optic cables . . . 
- the availability of armored mult1-,stranded f1bre-opt1c 
cables 
- local codes and practices concerning fire safety, etc. 
Several different suppliers were consulted and 
the final choice was based first upon technical 
specifications and secondly_ upon the ov~~all ~ost after 
installation, test, and recept1on. The spec1f1cat1on of the 
separate fibre-optic cables were:-
Outside Underground Multi-Strand Rbre-Optic Cable 
-Manufacturer: Techmation 
- Model: B 24 A4 FB CST /FR 
- Type: 24 strand multi-fibre breakout (type B) cable, 
tight fibre with PVC sheath 
-Fibre Size: A4 "graded index" 50/125 microns 
- Fibre Wavelength and Attenuation: attenuation 
5db/km max. at 850nm 
- Fibre Bandwidth: FB 400Mhz/km at 850nm 
- Operating Temperature: -40 oc to + 85 oc 
-Jacket/Coating/Protection: 
FR flame retardant (type C1) 
CST protected cable 
anti-rodent for direct burial 
armorjoverjacket steel tape armor 5 mil. 
corrugated copolymer coated 
lighting protection for aerial installation 
polyethylene outer jacket 
fungus resistant 
colour coded strands 
tight buffer isolates fibre coating from moisture 
fibre coated strands. 
Inside Dual-Strand Rbre-Optic Cable 
-Manufacturer: Techmation 
- Model: B 02 A4 FB FR 
- Type: 2 strand multi-fibre breakout (type B) cable, tight 
fibre with PVC sheath 
-Fibre Size: A4 "graded index" 50/125 microns 
- Fibre Wavelength and Attenuation: attenuation 
5dbjkm max. at 850nm 
- Fibre Bandwidth: FB 400Mhz/km at 850nm 
- Fibre Coating Diameter: 250 micron 
-Operating Temperature: -40 octo +85 oc 
-Jacket/Coating/Protection: 
FR flame retardent (type C1) 
colour coded strands. 
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Termination of Rbre-Optic Cable 
A total of 284 stainless steel SMA 906 were used. 
lt should be stressed that no splices were used and all 
connectors were housed in sealable distribution 
cabinets. 
Distribution panels were placed in three sealed 
distribution cabinets, one placed centrally, at the hub, 
and two distributed at the ends of the multi-stranded 
fibre-optic cables. The distribution p~nels wer~ supplied 
by Techmation and we_re sl?ec1ally . designed for 
interconnection of outs1de f1bre-opt1c cables tp 
transmission or terminal equipment for point-to-point 
connectior.t The panels were front lock1ng 19" rack 
mounted. 
Rbre-Optic Emitters and Receivers 
In order to provide for t~e signal ~ransmis~ion 
over the fibre-optic strand a spec1al transmitter jrece1ver 
pair must be installed. The following are the 
specifications of these transmitters and receivers:-
Rbre-Optic Video Emitter /Receiver Modules 
The FX-1000 is a analog transmitter that conve~s a 
standard composite video signal to modulated light. 
The FR-1000 is an analog receiver that converts 
modulated light to a standard composite video signal. 
The specification is: 
-Manufacturer: Math Associates Inc. (USA) 
-Model: Rbervision FX-1000, FR-1000 
-System Bandwidth (+0, -3d8): .10Hz- 8Mhz 
-Signal to Noise Ratio: 67dB typ1cal 
- Linearity: 1% or better 
- Emitter /Receiver: LED and photo diode 
- Operating Wavelength: 820nm 
- Optical Connection: SMA type 
- Transmission Distance: up to 3km. 
R5-232C Transceiver Modules 
The XR-1100 is a pure DC coupled digital transmission 
module that can convert electrical input in to light, or 
light in to electrical output. A pair of the modules require 
a pair of fibre-optic stands, can operate with any duty 
cycle and code format, and are suitable for simplex, or 
full duplex asynchronous transmissions. The modules 
are fully compati~le with EIA sta~~ar~ R~-232C at data 
rates up to 100kbltsjs. The spec1f1cat10n 1s: 
- Manufacturer: Math Associates Inc. (USA) 
-Model: Fibervision XR-1100 
-System Bandwidth: DC to 100kbitsjs 
- System RisejFa/1 Time: 200ns typical 
-Emitter/Receiver: LED and photo diode 
- Operating Wavelength: 820nm 
- Optical Connection: SMA type. 
4. The Installation of the Network 
Topology and Cable Runs 
In order to ensure a satisfactory project 
management for the installation, testing, and functional 
acceptance of the fibre-optic network a single main 
contractor was selected to oversee the whole project. lt 
was necessary to select a main contractor that was not 
only technically valid for the installation of fibre-optic 
cables but also one that had both a detailed knowledge 
of national and local codes of practice and a proven 
experience in the nuclear facility construction field. 
The company selected as main contractor had 
the additional advantage in that they had already been 
involved in laying a similar fibre-optic network on the 
same site and thus were particularly familiar with sub-
contractors having experienced and qualified staff with 
rights of access to the site. lt is useful to note that more 
than 15 different sub-contractors were employed on this 
project. 
lt was decided from the outset that there would 
be agreed meeting notes and that the main contractor 
would prepared acceptance documentation for both the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate and the facility 
operator. In addition the main contractor would also 
prepare documentation for submission at end of 
project. 
Outside 
The layout of the network required that the two 
700m 24 strand fibre-optic cables be laid outside. Direct 
burial, aerial installation and installation in trenches and 
conduit, existing or otherwise, was considered. The 
most cost effective solution was to use existing sets of 
specially prepared trenches. The justifications for this 
were: 
- for long outside runs a separate trench or conduit 
would have been too expensive 
- aerial installation was not considered acceptable or 
reasonable (it is an unusual approach) 
- trench and conduit provides best physical protection 
(normally used approach) 
- would simplify future cable placement, replacement, 
and retrieval 
- space was available in the existing trenches 
- pulling was straight forward 
- no problems with codes of practice 
- existing trenches were below frost line 
- the existing trenches conditioned the cable bends, etc. 
and thus limited eventual cable damage during laying 
and pulling. 
The cable laying and pulling conditions are very 
similar for metallic and fibre-optic cables although it was 
expected that greater care would needed to be taken 
with bending the fibre-optic cable. The cables were 
pulled by hand (max. 6001b pulling tension) and left 
under limited tension (max. 1351b) to favour long term 
reliability. 
Inside 
The remaining 200m 24 stranded fibre-optic 
cable and the 2.5km of dual stranded fibre-optic cable 
were laid inside existing buildings. The connection 
between the outside and inside fibre-optic cables was 
performed in a sealable distribution cabinet. The 
termination of the outside fibre-optic cable in a central 
cabinet was the most cost effective way despite the fact 
that connectors and not splices were employed. 
Important considerations in pulling and laying 
fibre-optic cables inside building were: 
- the topology inside building was more complex due to 
the severe physical limitations imposed, e.g. horizontal 
and vertical runs, more short runs, more terminations, 
more bends, etc. 
- often new cable trays had to be installed 
- new wall penetrations had to made 
- the laying of extra fibre-optic strands in difficult or 
complex areas for redundancy or future needs was 
nevertheless considered less expensive than to pull 
new cables later 
- cable runs did not have to be placed under false floors 
or drop ceilings since in nuclear facilities everything is 
normally open for ease of access 
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- the way the installation of fibre-optic cables was 
combined with other installation operations, e.g. laying 
of power cables, etc .. 
The fibre-optic cables were laid in either existing 
or newly installed cable trays. The use of cable trays 
was obligatory, but nevertheless besides providing 
physical support they do assure greater easy of 
management. The installation of new cable trays, or the 
use of existing cable trays of the facility operators, 
requires that local codes for cable arrangement and 
tray inter-distances be respected. Specifically cables 
carrying electrical power, lighting, low current, control 
signals and measurement signals must be placed on 
separate cable trays. 
lt is useful here to also note that the facility 
operators cable annotation and labelling standards had 
also to be adopted, i.e. language, colour codes, sizes, 
etc. when installing cables for safeguards purposes. All 
cabinets etc. had to be labelled with descriptive text and 
warning messages against impromptu access by 
operator staff or sub-contractors. Naturally all cabinets 
had to sealable. 
Cable laying and pulling conditions inside 
buildings and outside were relatively similar. However 
pulling tensions were often lower inside buildings given 
the shorter distances and smaller cables used. 
Termination 
In the distribution cabinets the individual strands 
in the multi-strand fibre-optic cable were directly 
connected to the continuation strand of the dual fibre-
optic cables (2 strands) using 2 SMA 906 male 
connectors and a female-to-female connector. 
Given that the exact length of the fibre-optic 
cables to be pulled were often not exactly known it was 
not possible to use pre-fabricated lengths of fibre-optic 
cable. Polishing and terminations were thus performed 
by hand. 
The termination of the fibre-optic cables for the 
nuclear cameras took place in a termination box 
outside the cell. The nuclear camera was connected 
through the cell biological shield with a coax cable. The 
connector to the nuclear camera was selected so as to 
permit the connection to be made and broken using the 
cell manipulators. The connection of the nuclear 
camera directly to the fibre-optic cable inside the cell 
would not have permitted the removal and exchange of 
the nuclear camera using the cell manipulators. 
Independent cell biological shield cable 
penetrations were included as were independent mobile 
camera supports on separate camera support rails 
fixed to the cell walls. 
All redundant fibre-optic strands were 
terminated in the same manner as for those is use, thus 
providing a immediate reserve connection in case of 
failure of the principle strand. 
5. Testing and Installation Procedures 
Factory Testing 
A protocol was established by the main 
contractor for the factory testing and reception of 
components at the sub-contractors. Representatives 
from the main contractor and the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate were present during the factory acceptance 
at sub-contractors. 
The sub-contractor performed detailed tests on 
each component, e.g. attenuation on the reels of fibre-
optic cable to be supplied, etc .. The attenuation tests 
were then documented and compared with the required 
specification, i.e. max. 5db/km which is relatively 
relaxed as compared td the typical 1-3 db/km used for 
multimode fibre-optic cables. 
One other important technical requirements was 
that no splices would be used throughout the network 
so no additional attenuation losses were expected due 
to splices. This requirement is considered of 
fundamental importance for safeguards purposes since 
it provides the assurance that any splice detected on 
the fibre-optic cable would automatically compromise 
the authenticity of the data being transmitted. 
A cont1nuity test was performed by the main 
contractor. This test consisted of the transmission of a 
video image over each fibre-optic strand of the different 
cables and connection to each and every fibre-
optic/video emitter and receiver. Other tests involved 
the conformity of the components used, technical 
verification of earth, electrical isolation, transmitted 
image characterisation, and video signal quality. 
The fibre-optic/RS-232 connectors used for data 
transmission and remote control functions were also 
tested. 
on-site Testing 
On-site tests involved also the preparation of test 
protocols and the presence of the main contractor and 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate during the tests. 
The first requirement was to adjust the fibre-optic 
emitters and receivers. These tests involved using a 
sinusoidal signal and provided a test of signal amplitude 
and bandwidth. 
The principle test for those fibre-optic cables intended 
to carry video picture involved the recording of a video 
test card. The test card image was used to assess the 
focus of the camera and to correct any eventual 
distortion in the image and excessive loss in resolution. 
These tests were performed with a "standard" camera, 
monitor, and video recorder. Additional tests, outside 
the scope of this review, were performed once each 
individual fibre-optic link was established with the 
definitive video camera and recording system. Separate 
checks and verifications were performed by staff of the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate upon commissioning 
of the different systems. It is possible that additional 
tests would be required if the fibre-optic cable were to 
be used for highly specialised data transmission, e.g. it 
has been mentioned that more stringent tests would be 
required if a tamper resistant link were to be installed on 
the video signal. 
The data transmission and remote control fibre-
optic connections were also functionally tested. 
Fibre-optic strands that did not meet the required 
specifications were examined usin~ an optical time 
domain reflectrometer (OTDR) wh1ch can measure 
individual connector splice losses, locates cable 
damage, and document using an internal printer. The 
availability of an (OTDR) is essential for commissioning 
trials, technical reception, and fault finding, and is of 
great use in providing a means for authenticating the 
physical layout of the fibre-optic network. 
Installation Protocols 
In order to ensure that correct procedures were 
applied and that a sufficiently clear trace of the 
installation work was made available each and every 
step of the installation was defined by a series of 
working protocols. These protocols were issued by the 
main contractor and a complete set of documentation 
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was provided to the Euratom Safeguards Directorate. 
The first protocol established the conformity of 
the drawings of the fibre-optic cable runs with the reality 
and the availability of all necessary equipment and 
material. The conditions of each fibre-optic cable run 
was checked as were the locations where the cable 
was to be physically supported and terminated. 
Particular attention was given to places where the fibre-
optic cable pulling would be delicate or critical. All 
locations where wall penetrations were envisaged were 
also inspected. 
After the introduction of the necessary 
equipment and materials additional protection was 
applied to those locations considered delicate or critical 
for fibre-optic cable pulling. Additional lighting was 
introduced in certain specific areas, i.e. fibre-optic 
cables were not pulled in obscurity. 
A detailed protocol was issued covering the 
operation of fibre-optic cable pulling. An important 
feature of this protocol was than pulling was performed 
manually using lubrification for pulling distances of 
greater than 20m. 
A separate very detailed protocol was issued for 
the termination of the fibre-optic cable. lt required that 
the personnel be trained and holding certificates of 
qualification. The connectors were fixed using an epoxy 
resin and the ends of the fibres were machine polished. 
The quality of the polishing was controlled using a 
portable microscope. 
The complete fibre-optic link was then controlled 
using optical time domain reflectrometry to check for 
faults, to measure the length of the fibre-optic cable, 
and to verify the overall attenuation. A protocol of the 
tests was then issued by the sub-contractors and the 
existence of the fibre-optic cables was introduced in to 
the cable log-book. The cable log-book describes all 
the cables used, their types, identification codes, 
locations, external diameters, lengths, and type of 
connectors. 
In addition to the installation protocols all the 
factory reception tests were also documented 
according to a separate set of test procedures and 
protocols. These factory reception tests covered the 
examination of the material to be supplied, technical 
control of components, performance checks, and a 
type examination to ensure that component dimensions 
and operating requirements corresponded to that 
envisages on-site. 
Installation protocols for the nuclear cameras 
was particularly detailed given that once commissioned 
any defect or deficiency in camera installation or 
performance would be very difficult to correct after the 
cells went active, i.e. Irradiated nuclear material 
introduced in to the cells. 
Installation Diary 
The followin~ installation diary covers the entire 
project schedule Including, where appropriate, the 
Installation of power supplies, purchase and installation 
of cameras, etc. 
Day 1 
Order placed, project started, and team assembled. 
Day 12 
Shield wall inserts tender issued (9 units). 
Fibre-optic cables and general hardware (supports, 
etc.) tender issued. 
Day 19 
Detailed contract study started. 
Tender issued for fibre-optic transmitters and receivers. 
Day33 
Civil engineering started for wall penetrations and cable 
trays. 
Day 51 
Fibre-optic cable purchased. 
Day60 
Study completed involving verification of main cable 
routes, cable distribution points identified and 
termination points verified. ' 
Shield wall inserts purchased. 
Shield wall penetrations started. 
Day71 
Fact?ry reception of fibre-optic transmitters and 
recervers. 
Day87 
Civil engineering finished for wall penetrations and 
cable trays. 
Shield wall penetrations finished. 
Pulling of electrical cables started. 
Day 105 
Factory reception of fibre-optic cables finished. 
Factory reception of non-nuclear cameras and sensors 
finished. 
Day 107 
Pulling of electrical cables finished. 
Day 108 
Fibre-optic transmitters and receivers on-site. 
Day 109 
Shreld wall inserts delivered on-site and installation 
started: 
Day 119 
Installation of fibre-optic cables started. 
Day 144 
Installation of shield wall inserts finished. 
Day 160 
Installation of fibre-optic cables finished. 
Installation of fibre-optic distribution cabinets and cable 
terminations started. 
Installation and connection of non-nuclear and sensors 
started. 
Day 174 
Installation of fibre-optic distribution cabinets and cable 
terminations finished. 
Installation and connection of non-nuclear and sensors 
finished. 
Day 190 
Functional tests completed on non-nuclear cameras 
sensors, and associated fibre-optic cables. ' 
Day 195 
Factory reception of nuclear cameras finished. 
Day 225 
On-site tests of nuclear cameras finished. 
Day 255 
Functional tests completed on nuclear cameras and 
associated fibre-optic cables. 
The total effort for this project was estimated at 
> 1 000 man-hours (6 people) for the project 
management, i.e. study (approx. 400 man-hours), 
purc~ases,_ contract follow-up, on-site supervision, etc., 
~nd rncludrng > 150 man-hours for the testing of the 
frbre-optic cables and terminations as compared with 
154 man-hours for the testing of all the camera and 
sensors installations. 
In addition the installation effort was estimated at 
~pproximately 3000 man-hours (5 people). This 
rnv?lved > 60q man-hours for the fibre-optic cable 
layrng and pullrng, and > 110 man-hours for the fibre-
optic cable termination and installation of the 
drstribution cabinets. 
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. Generally fibre-optic cables can cost up to 3 
trmes as much as coax cables although it is probable 
that more coax cab!e would be needed for any given 
network topology. lt IS equally true that installation costs 
depend upon the network topology but nevertheless 
manpower costs for laying fibre-optic or metallic cables 
are more or !ess th~ same. However the total 
manpower requrrement rs greater for laying fibre-optic 
cables than for metallic cable. 
. As a percentage of the installation costs for fibre-
optr~ cables the largest portion was for the cable laying 
rangrng between 72% and 92%, the termination costs 
rang~d between 3% and 12%, with testing overheads 
rangrng between 5% and 16%. 
The use of a multi-stranded fibre-optic cable over 
a series of single or dual strand cables probably saved 
up to 45% on the cost of the cable and almost certainly 
influenced also the installation costs. 
. <?able trays providing the possibility of visual 
rnspectron are between 50-90% cheaper, dependin!;J on 
type and width of tray, than laying stainless steel prpes 
which would also require some for of occasional 
inspecting. 
6. Discussion 
Security and Authentication 
There are several factors to be considered in the 
area of security and authentication of fibre-optic cables. 
These can be divided in to two separate sub-areas: 
- transmission security and authentication 
- physical security and authentication. 
Transmission security and authentication 
meaning the confirmation of the genuineness of the 
transmitted information in not considered here. 
. The most import~nt asp~ct in authenticating the 
physrcal layout of the frbre-optrc network is to detect 
any un~ccepta~le physical intervention, i.e. splice, 
connectron, etc. 1n the network. As has been mentioned 
in a preyious ~ection physical security of the link implies 
a physrcal . link havrng no connectors, splices, or 
actrvejpassrve components, i.e. make it easier to detect 
regenerated signals and the introduction of passive 
tap~ o~ beam splitters: "'fhen the optical equivalence of 
a hrgh rmpedance tap rs rntroduced it produces a loss in 
the transmitted signal power of about 0.2dB/km 
~850nm step index multimode fibre). A splice or joint 
Introduces between 0.1 to 3 dB attenuation and a 
passive tap between 0.1 to 1 dB attenuation. A 
de~ermin~d effort to minimise losses could produce 
splices wrth losses less that 0.01 dB, these splices can 
also be performed in less that 1 minute using an 
automatic high-speed fusion splicer. lt is with these 
possibilities in mind that optical time domain 
reflectometry (OTDR) is . int:odi..!ced as a practical 
means of physrcal authentrcatlon, 1.e. a practical means 
of detecting the illicit introduction of splices connectors 
etc. on the fibre-optic cable. For an OTDR there are four 
fea~ures of great importance, the ability to detect all 
splices, connections, etc., a minimum event dead zone 
the precise deter~ination of the fibre-optic strand 
length, and the physrcal representation of the fibre-optic 
strand "signature" for future reference and comparison. 
The required specifications for these features are: 
- mi_ni_mum loss readout resolution + /-0.001dB 
- mrnrmum event dead zone 0.2m, for a pulse width of 
10cm and with a multimode fibre-optic strand at 850nm 
~ distance measurement accuracy + /-0.001%, or 1cm 
rn 1km 
- ability to display, print, record and perform 
comparisons of fibre-Qptic strand "signatures". 
Topology mapping using OTDR should be possible at 
the maximum sensitivity so as to record every 
imperfection in the link. Retesting of the link should be 
performed systematically in order to detect the smallest 
deviation from the mapped data. 
The use of OTDR is not the only means that 
should be used to physically authenticate an fibre-optic 
link. The physical accessibility of the cab_le for 
inspection should not be overlooked or underestimated 
as a authentication technique. The fibre-optic cable 
should follow routes which permit inspection, i.e. where 
possible using accessible cable runs, few wall 
penetrations, and open cable trays. The cable itself 
should be easy to identify and all cable distribution 
boxes, patch panels, termination cabinets, etc. should 
be identified and sealable. The physical layout should 
be well documented at the moment of delivery and all 
eventual modification should be equally well 
documented. 
Future Directions 
The principle justifications for selecting to install a 
fibre-optic cable network were that' it was a proven 
technique, physically possible, and reasonably priced. 
In addition a fibre-optic cable network provides the 
greatest level of long term flexibility to the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate since the expected lifetime of 
the installations could well be in excess of 25 years. lt 
can be clearly understood that cameras, physical 
sensors, measurement systems, etc. may change over 
the next few years and that it is important that the 
physical network provide a stable, flexible platform for 
future data communication needs. 
The topology chosen, i.e. point-to-point physical 
star, and the specification of the fibre-optic cables, 
"graded-index" multimode, would permit the network to 
be upgraded or expanded to provide both modulated 
transmission of video and sensors signals and the 
transmission of measurement data. 
In practical terms the fibre-optic cable network 
provides: 
- excess bandwidth permitting future redundant path 
configurations, increased overheads on information 
transmission, retransmission protocols, etc. 
- greater efficiency in the use of future electronics 
systems since the network permits them to be installed 
centrally and to have common network circuity 
- increased capability to install additional processing 
and storage capacity 
- high reliability, maintainability, physical configuration 
flexibility, and lower hardware and software costs. 
Looking to the near future this particular network 
will be developed to include the direct transfer of 
measurement data from the detector electronics to a 
central computer system for archival and analysis. 
Naturally this will also involve the installation on the 
network of intelligent terminals and workstations 
accessing common disk drives and peripherals. In 
addition a number of presently autonomous simple 
input-output devices will also be connected. 
Another project under development by the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate and its partners is the 
installation of a broadband network for the transfer of 
video, sensor, and measurement signals on a single 
physical carrier. This project relies on the development 
of industrial data communications techniques and is 
expected to commissioned in the next 1-2 years. 
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7. Conclusions 
A fibre-optic cable network consisting of more 
than 45 km of fibre-optic strands has been installed for 
the transmission of camera, sensor signals, and 
measurement data, for safeguards purposes. After 
more than 1 year of operation there have been no 
hardware component failures in the fibre-optic network. 
The topology is based upon point-to-point 
connection following a physical star layout. The 
specification of the fibre optic cable, the selection of 
connector types and associated ancillary hardware has 
been discussed. Particular emphasis was placed on the 
physical redundancy and availability of the network 
through the use of redundant fibre optic strands, etc .. 
Attention has been paid to the problems of physical 
security and authentication of the network. 
The following two points are worth repeating:-
This type of project requires a project management 
approach that is best implemented through a main 
contractor and a series of sub-contractors, with the 
main contractor handling all the project management, 
purchase routines, factory and on-site reception tests, 
etc. 
An optical time domain reflectometer is an essential tool 
in the process of authentication of a fibre-optic cable 
used for safeguards purposes. 
A fibre-optic cable network of the type described 
is a mature approach to the central recording of both 
camera and sensors signals, and measurement data. 
The fibre-optic cable network installed is being 
evaluated by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate for 
use as a local area network (LAN) for the 
communication of measurement data, i.e. Ethernet. 
Other transmission media are also under evaluation by 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate for the networking 
of both camera and sensor signals and measurement 
data on one physical carrier, i.e. broadband 
technology. 
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Annex I - Selection of the Rbre-Optic Cable 
The physical specification for a fibre-optic cable was that 
recommended at that time for IEEE 802.8 approval: 
-Fibre Size: 62.5/125 microns 
-Fibre Core Size Tolerance: + /-3.0 microns 
-Fibre Cladding Size Tolerance: + /-3.0 microns 
-Fibre Nominal Aperture (NA): 0.275 
-Fibre NA Tolerance: + /-0.025 
-Fibre Coating Diameter: minimum 250+ /-15 microns 
-Fibre Wavelength and Attenuation: 3.0- 5.0 dB/km at 850 nm 
- Transmit Device Wavelength: 790-860 nm 
-Fibre Bandwidth: 100-500 Mhzjkm at 850 nm 
- Connectors: no recommendation 
-Optical Power Budget: proposal dependent. 
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ISOTOPIC MEASUREMENTS BY GAMMA RAY SPECTROMETRY 
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Abstract 
As a result of collaboration between the 
IAEA and the Research Institute of Atomic 
Reactors Uranium Enrichment Reference Materials 
fo gamma- and X-ray spectrometric measurements 
have been manufactured and characterized. The 
main features of the UERM: it is 
"quasi-infinitely thick" for photons up to 186 
keV, and metallic uranium was used in it as 
reference material. The set of eight samples 
covers the full range of U-235/U abundances from 
0.47% to 90%. Each sample is sealed in a rigid 
capsule. Abundances of the uranium reference 
material samples were characterized by three 
laboratories and UERMs characteristics were 
investigated by the NDA technique. In 
addition, a set of metallic Uranium Gamma 
Sources (UGSl was fabricated to be used as 
normalization sources. 
1. Introduction 
Two types of new standards for the NDA 
ga.mma.-spectrometric measurements were produced 
in the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors 
(RIARl, USSR, as the result of close 
collaboration with the IAEA. The first one is a 
set of eight Uranium Enrichment Reference 
Materials (UERM) for an apparatus calibration 
a.nd the second - Urani urn Ga.mma Source lUGS l, as 
normalization sample. Main characteristic 
features of both standards: metallic uranium as 
reference material and a rigid, hermetic 
stainless steel (SS) capsule. Each sample of the 
UERM is made of a 100 gram metallic uranium disk 
(2.6 mm thick), sealed in SS capsule (68.5 mm in 
diameter and 8 mm in height! with 0.48 mm SS 
window for photon passage. The set of eight 
UERMs covers the range from 0.47 to 90 at % of 
U-235, the U-235/U abundances have been measured 
by three laboratories by means of a samples mass 
spectrometry assay. The NDA technique (gamma 
spectrometry and gamma transmission! was used 
for homogeneity tests of every UERM. The aim 
of the paper is to describe UERMs and UGS 
preparation and performances and discuss the 
analytical results obtained. 
2. General Requirements for the Standa.rd 
The nondestructive gamma spectrometric 
assay of the U-235 enrichment has reached a high 
level of accuracy, somewhere comparable /1/ with 
the destructive one. But without reliable 
standards NDA measurement is a relative 
measurement. 
In /2/ it is shown that a characterization 
level better than 0.1% is required for 
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standards of the U-235 abundance determination. 
This target performance level was in mind 
to the moment when the decision was formulated: 
in frame of the USSR Support Program to design 
and create standards of metallic uranium in 
wide range of U-235/U abundances. Previously it 
was proposed to manufacture secondary 
standards, which are less expensive and 
relatively quick to prepare. Such reference 
materials could be still very useful for 
qualifying the field measurements, improving NDA 
performances and create gradually an improved 
traceability of NDA measurement to primary 
standards or International Reference Materials. 
Principal requirements to Reference 
Materials (RM) were worked out rather long ago 
/3/ as follows: 
uncertainties of the main characteristic 
(in our case-it is enrichment U-235/Ul have to 
be small and well known; 
. predictability in the response produced in 
the measurement process. (Ideally, the 
measurement process will respond to the 
reference material in the same way as to the 
unknown to be measured. If there is a 
difference in measurement response to the 
measured parameter arising from other 
measure-affecting factors, these effects must be 
known and quantifiable); 
adequate stability with respect to 
all measurement-affecting characteristics of the 
Reference Material. (It is necessary to avoid 
systematic errors due to changes in such 
properties as density, concentration, shape, and 
distribution); 
availability in quantities adequate 
for the intended application. 
The analysis of factors, which 
influenced the enrichment measurement by gamma 
spectrometry /3/ makes us confident, that 
meta.llic uranium is the best materia.l for 
standards: uranium- a very stable material, 
and is not so difficult to fabricate any 
form specimen from it, with very gooa 
measurable geometry. Because of high density 
and nuclear charge of uranium Reference 
Material become very compact (small in size). 
Being sealed hermetically into the proper 
capsule the uranium specimen keeps its 
characteristics for a very long time. 
Specific requirements for enrichment 
reference material have been formulated by 
Agency employee concerning the to following 
features: 
physical form of the RM - uranium metal 
disk; 
dimensions of the RM: about 52 mm in 
diameter and "quasi infinite" thick for 185.7 
keV gamma-rays; 
. diameter of the capsule- 67.5 mm. 
quantity o..f standards - not less than 
seven standards, covered enrichment range up to 
90% U-235/U; 
exact value of the enrichment must be 
known with uncertainty about 0.5% (relative). 
Later on, when procurement scheme was 
worked out and manufacturing process was 
initiated, the characterization possibility by 
mass spectrometry assay of uranium samples in 
several laboratories of Agency net was 
coordinated . 
3. Short Description of th~ UERMs 
Practically all the range of enrichments 
is covered by means of two sets of standards 
(named Ura.nium Enrichment Reference Ma.terial, 
UERMl. Set Nl of four low enriched uranium (LEU) 
UERMs inclu.des 0.7; 1.9; 4.9; 12% . enrichments. 
Set N2 includes three high enriched uranium 
(HEUl standards (90; 60; 26%% enrichments) and 
additional to- 0.47% standard. The complete set 
conta.ins a.lso a.n empty capsule of UERM, a 
window material disk and stainless steel (SS) 
transport contain8r (fiq 1). The last one has 
nearly the same dimensions ( 88 mm in diameter 
a.nd 92 mm height ) , as one of well known 
Certified Referenr.e Material EC-171/NBS-SRM-969 
( 80 mm in diameter and 90 mm high l. 
Fig . 1. Set of four UERMs 
The standard design (fig 2) provides 
perfect mechanical property and seals the 0.1 
kg ura.ni um disk (51. 86+-0. 16 nun in diameter and 
2.60+-0.05 nun thick) The capsule ha.s the 
window (0.483 +-0.002 rrun thick) for qamma rays 
passage slightly recessed in capsule body so 
that uranium disk situated at 1.20+ ... _. o.oa mm 
from window site surface of the UERM. The 2.6 mm 
uranium disk ii quasi infinitely thick for 
185.7 keV gamma rays of U- 235. 
Most of identifications deposited on the 
capsule surface in a. form of TiN 3 mkm coating: 
.on the top cover there is sign "UERM", 
three figures after point mean enrichment in 
parts (like ".119-3") and throuqh dash the 
number of set, mass of uranium in the form of 
".1 kg- U". 
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Cover 
Window 
5~.1 
U d.Ls k 
Fig.2. Cross section of the IJERM 
.on the 
"Ra.~ioactivity". 
window there is the 
4. Procurement and Qualitv Control 
8.1 
sign 
Only five LEU and five HEU sets of all were 
manufactured. Making of the standards can be 
divided conventionally into severa.l sta.qes: 
.define preparation and characterization 
schemes to attain specific requirements to all 
elements of the standard; 
.prepa_ra.tion of urani um disks with 
enrichment required; 
.capsule details fabrication; 
.elements quality control and sets 
compiling; 
. s tanclards assembl inq and cha.racter izat ion 
test. 
For each of these problems the requirements 
were defined and uncertainty of element 
parameters were assumed, securing minimum of the 
uncertainty when applying the set of standards. 
At the stage of uranium disk preparation 
these parameters characterized the qua.lity of 
the details and manufacturing process: 
.enrichment U-235/U value and uncertainty; 
.inhomogeneity of enrichment; 
.local aria.! ura.nium density ; 
.uranium disk dimensions and mass. 
Uranium disk fabrication was conducted aa 
foLlows: 
Initi.al ma.terials proper 
of enrichments 1.9; 4.9; 12 
metal 0.47% and 26.1%, and 
standard was composed with 
uranium. 
to composite set 
%% were uran ium 
60% enrichment 
90% a.nd 26.1% 
Proper amount of initial materials (0.8 kq 
in all l wa.s mel ted together in an inductive 
vacuum smelting furnace in MgO cap . The uranium 
ingot was crashed into small peaces and a. part 
of the amount was smelt again to prepare a 0.16 
kg ingot in succession. 
Each ingot was tested for enrichment (by 
gamma spectrometry) and density lby hydro-
weighting in CC14). Then the ingot was subjected 
to hot pressing in the vacuum furnace to get the 
ingot in form of i1 mushroom convenient ·to lathe 
processing. 
Uranium disks were passed through complex 
tests allowing to determine all the parameters 
required. 
There is some peculii1rity in the capsule 
design. The first one is connected with the 
window material-calibrated and polished 
.stainless steel sheet, that provides window 
thi'ckness uncertainty less than 0.005 mm (last 
one value of thickness uncertainty may result in 
0.1% gamma-ray 186 keV emission change /3/l. 
The second one: recession of the window 
into capsule body that prevents the window from 
accidenta.l mechanical failure. This parameter 
was included in the set certificate. · 
The window, the cap and capsule body were 
connected by argon arc welding hermetically. 
Before standard assembling all details were 
sorted carefully in such a manner, that one set 
of standards had characteristics and parameter 
values with minimum discrepancies. 
5. Standards Characterization 
The standards characterization scheme 
foresees the use of NDA and DA at different 
stages of fabrication. 
The most important analysis ·for enrichment 
standards - isotopic distribution was made by 
means of the mass spectrometry (M.S.l assay. The 
impurities in metal by the emission 
spectroscopic analysis and ~hromatography 
measurements. 
Different gamma count rate measurements 
have been performed with the help of the high 
resolution Ge counting system: 
.the uniformity of the gamma count rate of 
U-235 at 185.7 keV as a measure of the 
enrichment uniformity of the uranium disk; 
.the transmission tests were done using a 
collimated gamma-beam of Cs-137 for 
determination of the count rate of the 
transmitted gamma-rays at 661.6 keV. They are a 
measure of the uniformity of the disk local 
areal density; 
the occurrence of spurious gamma-lines 
uranium minor isotopes and daughter products. 
5.1. Mass Spectrometry Measurements 
The mass spectrometric characterizations 
analysis for enrichment reference materials were 
performed using the uranium samples in form of 
metallic uranium turnings. 
The detailed isotopic abundance data 
measured in RIAR (further marked as Hl are shown 
in table 1 
Table 1. Isotopic abundances (mass %) of the UERMs 
Sample I Isotopic abundances, mass % 
1---------------------------------------
id. I U-235 (RSD,%)1 U-234 I U-236 I U-238 
--------l---------------------------------------
.005 I 0.458 (0.65!1 I I 99.542 
.007 I 0.707+-0.57 I I I 99.293 
.019 I 1 .. 839+-0.24 I 0.018 I 0.004 I 98.102 
.0194 I i.931+-0.26 I 0.013 I 0.004 I 48.028 
.049 I 4.863+-0.05 I 0.034 I 0.023 I 95.021 
.119 I 11.894+-0.06 I 0.081 I 0.034 I 87.858 
.261 I 26.086+-0.04 I 0.188 I 0.094 I 73.413 
. 600 I 60.067+-0.03 I 0.556 I 0.078 I 38.946 
.900 I 89.916+-0.03 I 0.890 I 0.270 I 8.85 
Isotopic measurements were performed also 
in analytical laboratories of Seibersdorf (S) 
and Petten (P) using the following special 
scheme: 
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The sample (1 g) was split into two equal 
parts and they dissolved independently. 
Two aliquotes from each dissolution were 
taken for analysis of uranium concentration. The 
results of four measurements - laboratory mean 
enrichment and RSD, which is really only a 
measure of scatter of the values. 
The comparison of uranium materials 
characterization results is shown in table 2 in 
the form of the relative difference "laboratory 
mean" for each couple of the laboratories, all 
measurements "grand mean" and RSD of the "grand 
mean". 
Table 2. Differences between "laboratory means" 
H,P,S laboratories , "grand mean" 
enrichment value and its RSD. 
Samplel Relative difference, % I Grand RSD 
I -------------------------1 mean 
id. I H-P I H-S I P-S I at% % 
------------------------
--------
---------------
.005 -8.66 0.46 9.19 0.477 5.33 
0.463* 0.32 
.007 0.98 0.10 - 0.88 o. 713 0. 54 
0.716* 0.07 
.018 3.13 -0.19 l. 47 1. 881 1. 90 
1.861* 0. 14 
.019 -0.36 -4. 16 3.80 1.978 2.02 
1.958* 0. 18 
.049 -0.63 -0.06 -0.57 4.933 0. 34 
4.924* 0.04 
.119 -0.06 -0.19 0.25 12.032 0.13 
.261 0.07 0.08 0. 15 26.301 0.08 
.600 0.05 0.254 0.30 60.385 0. 15 
60.341* 0.04 
. 900 0.03 -0.16 -0. 11 90.006 0.06 
89.977* 0.02 
-------------------------------------------------
Relatively great standard errors of some 
"grand mean" allow to propose that some 
of the measurements results are biased. 
Suppose that is .005; .007; .019; .049 (for 
lab Pl and the second dilution sample 
measurement of .0194 and - .600 (for labS). 
When rP.movlng these results we can get the 
"hP.st" standard error, which value seems to 
be more realistic and nearer to the declared 
laboratory uncertainty (about 0.1% for uranium 
samples with more than 2% enrichments. 
5.2. Comparison w!th G~mma-R§~~surements 
All uranium "bare" disks were carefully 
counted by means of high resolution 
gamma-spectrometry (G.S.) system. The 
experiments had several goals: to characterize a 
consistent wide-range set of the enrichment 
reference materials, t.o clarify some 
discrepancies of the mass spectrometry 
measurements, and display a consistency between 
the certified (by M.S.) parameters and measured (by G.S.) quantities . 
The count rates of 185.7 keV line were 
measured with precision from 0.04% (for 90%) to 
about 0.1% for 0.47% uranium. The pile-up 
correction by Am-241 reference source method 
obta \ ned not exceed 1% for 90% uran i urn. Averaged 
5 disk count rates was used for determination of 
the ratio n/AI (where Al - enrichment U-235/U in 
at%). Which, in principle, should be a constant 
for every UERM in-a wide range of enrichments. 
The parameter n/A analysis showed, that for all 
disks with enrichments 4.9% and more , and for 
all M.S. laboratory means the average value was 
n/A=7!.61 1/(c*%) with RSD=O.lS%. In table 3 
there is relative deviation of individual 
laboratory n/A from this average value. 
Table 3. The relative deviation (%) of 
laboratories n/A from averaged value 
for UERMs with enrichment >4% 
Samplel Relative Deviation, % I RSD I Adjusted 
1-----------------------1 n/A, I 
id. I H I P I S I % I A, at% 
------I-------I-------I-------I------I----------
. 005 l-0.44 l-8.84**1 2.2 I 2.8 I 0.462 
.007 I 0.91 I !.9 **I 1.01 I 1.5 I 0.722 
.019 I 0.72 1-2.41**1 0.91 I 0.441 1.875 
.0194 1-0.28 1-0.63 l-0.45* I .0.431 1.950 
.049 I 0.16 1-0.47**1 0.10 I 0.161 4.930 
.119 I 0.!8 I 0.24 1-0.01 I 0.121 12.048 
.261 1-0.05 1-0.12 I 0.04 I 0.051 26.290 
.600 1-0.11 1-0.06 1-0.04* I 0.071 60.297 
. 900 1-0.05 l-0.02 1-0.13 I '0.061 89.946 
* Excluded: 2.038 and 60.519 at% of the 
second dissolutions assay. 
** Suspected. 
A first general comments of Table 3 
concerns the rather good consistency between the 
laboratory M.S. values that are tied together 
by normalizing to the average n/A for five 
reference materials: 4.9; 12; 26; 60; 90%% 
enrichments. Only one of the lab P value (.049 
concerned) occurs outside of +-0.3% limits 
value. 
But it does not desirable to suspect this 
result, because of the "grand mean" of all .049 
measurements is within +-0.3% certified value, 
(see fig 3). The RSD of the "grand mean" is a 
scatter therein. 
0.1 
(1,2 
~ 0.1 
c 
c 
..... 
...., 
«! 
..... 
> 
a:-
Cl 
0 
-0.1 
-------r----------
H 
p 
H 
H 
p 
p 
p 
)!:> 
H 
H 
-11,'3 - -----------------
DO 
..... 
\0 
N 
c Cl 
Cl Cl 
\0 Cl' 
Fig.3. Plot of the n/A "grand mean" 
deviations for five RM : .049; .119; .261; .600; 
.900; from the average n/A for these RM 
For these 5 lots of uranium, there is no 
reason to doubt that the average value of the 
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mass spectrometry results is the best value of 
the average enrichment, and they can be 
designated as the primary working uranium 
enrichment reference materials. 
Secondly. As for materials with enrichments 
lower than 4.9 % - most of the M.S. and G.S. 
measurements had unsatisfactory the consistency 
difficult to explain now. That is why the 
enrichments of the UERM with lower than 4.9% 
enrichment have to be adjusted to make the gamma 
counting measurements on them consistent with 
the 5 "primary" standards, as it can be seen in 
column "Adjusted A, at%" table 3. Then, four· 
reference materials: .005; .007; .019; .0194 can 
be designated as secondary standard because of 
greater error for gamma-ray counting statistic, 
mass spectrometer determinations and sample 
representativeness problems . 
5. 3. somtidd i t ion a I Uncer ta tntY -~!1..[_«-ti 
The gamma spectrometric measurements showed 
that enrichment inhomogeneity for the 5 
"primary" reference materials does not exceed 
0.15 % for .119 RM and is less than 0.1% for 
others . 
The results of the gamma transmission 
measurements by 661 keV gamma-rays transmission 
gaves average areal density value 4.84 g/cm2 
(RSD=0.4%) for most (but two) of the 45 uranium 
disks. Minimum value of local area! density was 
still higher than 4.7 g/cm• for quasi-infinite 
thick uranium and did not influence the 
enrichment determination by gamma spectrometry. 
ImpuritY analysis by emission spectrometry 
and chromatography (for carbon) assured that 
contents of the impurities with Z<30 did not 
exceed 0.5 wt%, with Z>30 - not more than 0.02 
wt%. These amounts of impurities decrease 185 
keV gamma-rays emission by not more than 0.07 % 
compared with pure uranium metal. 
The UERM window thickness uncertainty 
q0.002 mm is less than the tolerance steel wall 
thickness and will generate about 0.04 % 
uncertainty of the measured counting rate. 
We have not found any unforeseen 
interfering to 185.7 keV line gamma-rays sources 
except the trace of the Pb-212 (U-232 
descendant) for .600 and .900 reference 
materials. 
It should be mentioned that most of the 
individual physical properties of the UERM are 
well specified and it is possible to correct 
most of the systematic errors. An estimation of 
the overall uncertainty has given 0.15% for HEU 
sets of UERMs, and about 0.35 % - for LEU sets . 
One more Reference Material prepared in 
RIAR is the Uranium X-ray and Gamma ray Source 
(UGS) which can be used as a norm3lization 
source to: 
check instrument reproducibility; 
revalidate physical standards integrity; 
normalize data at a later date. 
A complete set of the UGS consists of the 
source capsule and aluminum support ring (67.5 
mm in diameter and 8 mm in height). The sealed 
SS capsule (40 mm in diameter . 4 mm in height) 
contains ss substrate (20 mm in diameter, 1 mm 
thickness) one side of which is covered with 
meta.l uranium ( 90i enrichment). Uranium layer 
thickness ranqes from 0.1 to 0.15 q/cm2 and 
has an areaJ density irregularity not more than 
15%. The mass of the uranium defined with the 
standard error less than 0.1%. Gamma rays go out 
of source throuqh the 0.47 mm SS window . UGS is 
an easy to use tool because of all necessary 
signs and data deposited ed on the surface of 
capsule and the ring. 
The experience of the Agency and RIAR 
(USSR) collaboration in new standards 
procurement and characterization was successful. 
NDA and DA investigations of the Uranium 
Enrichment Reference Materials confirmed that 
the set of UERMs possessed some useful features: 
two sets LEU and HEU UERMs cover a wide 
range of enrichments up to 90%; 
characterization uncertainty for UERMs 
with enrichments ranqed from 4.9, to 90% do not 
exceed 0.3%, and are confirmed by 
inter-laboratory measurements of the uranium 
samples and careful NDA of the UERMs; 
set of UERMs rigid, compact and 
transportable, convenient to use in laboratory 
and field. 
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It is worth to emphas1ze, that the results 
Jf the mass spectrometry measurements were 
)btained recently and analysis of them has to 
be qualified as a preliminary. It would be very 
useful to confirm declared UERMs performances by 
means of testing them in one of the 
internationally recognized NDA laboratory, like 
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Abstract 
The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) of the 
IAEA has been equipped with a hybrid K-edge/XRF 
analyzer for the measurement of nuclear materials 
in liquors. The purpose of the instrument is to 
establish at SAL the technical capability to provide 
IAEA inspectors with experimental support and 
training in the use of such instrumentation for in-
field measurements. Typical performance data for 
different applications are presented and discussed. 
The work presented is done in the frame of the 
Joint Programme of the IAEA and the Federal 
Republic of Germany for the Development of 
Safeguards. 
1. Introduction 
The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) 
of the IAEA has been equipped with a hybrid K-
edge/XRF analyzer similar to the instrument 
recently installed by the Euratom Safeguards 
Inspectorate at the UP3 spent fuel reprocessing 
plant at La Hague /11. The decision for both 
installations has been made upon the successful 
demonstration of a prototype hybrid K-edge/XRF 
system designed for the uranium and plutonium 
assay in dissolver solutions from a reprocessing 
plant. The previous performance tests with this 
prototype, conducted between 1986 and 1988 in 
the frame of Joint Programme of the IAEA and the 
Federal Republic of Germany for the Development 
of Safeguards, have demonstrated the potential of 
such instrumentation for on-site safeguards 
verification measurements /2/. 
The instrument installation at SAL, carried 
out in the frame of a task within the German 
Support Programme to the IAEA, represents a 
follow-up action to the aforementioned work. The 
main purpose of this project is to establish at SAL 
the in-house experience and the technical capa-
bility to provide IAEA inspectors with experimental 
support and training in the use of such instrumen-
tation for in-field measurements. In addition, the 
analyzer is also designated for providing support 
to some of the routine analytical work on safe-
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guards venfication samples at SAL. 
The present paper reviews the joint work of 
lA EA-SAL and KfK so far done under this project. A 
significant portion of this work has been devoted 
to careful performance studies for a range of 
applications. The results from these studies are 
presented and discussed along with a description 
ofthe principal features ofthe analyzer. 
2. Instrument Design 
General Layout 
The principal design of the analyzer is based 
on the proven 'Hybrid Instrument' configuration, 
which combines the techniques of K-edge densito-
metry (KED) and X-ray fluorescence analysis (XRF) 
of K-series X-rays /2, 3/. 
The analyzer design for SAL had to take into 
consideration the following criteria : 
Simple adaptation to one of the standard 
gloveboxes at SAL with the least possible 
modifications; 
Incorporation of a sample changer for un-
attended automated measurements on a lar-
ger set of samples; 
Optimization of the measurement precision 
for KED at element concentrations of about 
100 mg/ml; 
Layout of the countmg geometry for XRF to 
allow precise measurements on mg-size 
quantities. 
The system assembled to meet the above 
criteria is shown on the photograph in Fig. 1. The 
mechanical assembly together with the shielded X-
ray tube and the detectors for KED and XRF are 
mounted on a wheel table located beside the 
glovebox. A linear sample changer, driven by a 
stepping motor, extends into the box and moves 
the samples to the measurement position in the 
analyzer. The set-up is coupled to the box by 
means of a sealed flange in its side wall. 
Counting Geometry 
The sectional drawing in Fig . 2 details the 
counting geometry of the analyzer. The trans-
mission measurements for KED are made on high-
precision glass cells, 4 em long and 0.6 em wide, 
requiring a minimum sample volume of about 
2.5 mi. The straight-through beam is collimated by 
means of a 10 em long tungsten collimator with a 
beam hole diameter of 0.1 em. A micrometer 
allows to adjust the horizontal position of the 
collimator relative to the beam axis for maximum 
counting rate . 
The XRF measurements are made on thin-
walled PE vials with an inner diameter of 0.5 em at 
the beam level. The effective sample volume seen 
by the XRF detector is about 0.2 ml, which 
represents the minimum sample volume required 
for an XRF measurement. This sample geometry 
was chosen to concentrate mg-size quantities into 
the smallest possible volume . The XRF vial is 7 em 
distant from the focal spot of the X-ray tube. The 
solid angle for the detection of the fluoresced X-
rays can be varied by means of exchangeable 
apertures, which are mounted into a tungsten 
sleeve in front of the XRF detector. 
Different sample magazines are available 
with positions for glass cuvettes or PE vials only, or 
with alternating positions for both types of vials as 
shown in Fig . 2. The center-to-center distance 
between adjacent sample positions on a magazine 
is 1.4 em . Two sample magazines, each having 
HpGe Detector 
\ 
I 
I 
positions for 14 samples, can be put in series into 
an adapter mounted on the sledge of the linear 
drive for automated measurements on up to 28 
samples. 
Fig. 1 : View of the KED I XRF analyzer. 
- Linear Drive 
____ Sample Carrier 
KED 
__ Shielding (W) 
10 
Fig. 2: Cross-sectional plan of the source- sample-
detector configuration. 
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Equipment 
The basic equipment components include 
the automated sample changer, an X-ray unit, two 
HpGe detectors with associated electronics for 
pulse processing, and a data acquisition and ana-
lysis system. 
A compact 0.6 kW X-ray unit (Seifert ISOVOLT 
160 H 1) was chosen for the present analyzer. lt 
provides highly-stabilized dc-voltages up to 160 kV 
at a fixed current of 4 mA. The standard operating 
voltage is 145 kV. The two HpGe detectors are of 
the LEGE type (200mm2 x 13 mm). Fast pulse 
processors based on the time-variant filtering tech-
nique /4/, which have previously been evaluated 
for KED measurements /5/, are used for signal 
processing. Data acquisition and analysis is accom-
plished with a VAX-based multi-user system (Genie 
ND 9900), which serves as central acquisition 
system for the different alpha and gamma coun-
ting equipments at SAL. 
Modes of Operation 
The analyzer provides options for different 
modes of operation. Depending on the type of 
analysis, the KED and XRF channels can be utilized 
for individual or for combined measurements. The 
desired mode of operation, and the type of 
analysis, is selected by the operator on a menu 
basis. 
The existing software for automated analysis 
allows to run separate KED measurements for 
single-element samples (Th, U, Pu), and for dual-
element samples (Th-U, U-Pu). The latter can also 
be measured in the combined KED/XRF mode. In 
this mode the XRF channel determines the ratio of 
both elements, whereas the KED measurement 
provides the reference concentration for the main 
element. Another option for separate XRF 
measurements on spiked Pu samples will shortly be 
implemented. 
3. Methods of Data Evaluation 
Concentration from KED 
The software for KED has to evaluate the 
ratio of photon transmission across the K-edge 
from the measured spectra. The logarithm of this 
quantity is directly proportional to the volume 
concentration of the respective element. Linear 
least-squares fitting procedures are utilized for the 
evaluation of the transmission jump /6/. The fitting 
regions adopted for the analysis of single-element 
samples, and for dual elements differing by two 
units in atomic number, are indicated in Fig. 3. The 
displacements of the window limits E _ and E + 
from the edge energy, 2.36 keV below and 1.65 
keV above the edge, were determined empirically 
to exclude those spectral regions from the fitting 
intervals, where distortions of the measured 
photon transmission due to tailing effects may 
occur. 
The software for data analysis includes two 
fitting modes : 'nonextrapolated' and 'extrapo-
lated'. In the nonextrapolated mode the ratio of 
photon transmission across the edge is determined 
at the window limits E _ and E + of the fitting 
regions, whereas in the extrapolated mode the 
transmission jump is evaluated directly at the edge 
energy EK from extrapolations on both sides. 
t Single Element Dual Element Lower Z for Minor Element Dual Element Higher Z for Minor Element 
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Fig. 3: 
E. 
EK(Z) 
{A) {B) {C) 
Energy 
Adopted fitting regions for the evaluation of KED spectra from 
single-element and dual-element (!!.Z = 2) samples. Energy 
intervals given in units of keV. 
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The reported result for the concentration is 
normally based on the nonextrapolated evalua-
tion. This mode provides significantly better 
measurement precision (by a factor of 2 to 3) 
compared to the evaluation from extrapolations. 
On the other hand, the evalvation of the 
transmission jump at energies E _ and E + displaced 
from the edge may be slightly biased, if the 
sample contains high atomic-number elements 
other than the analyte. The extrapolated analysis, 
in principle, should eliminate such matrix effects. 
The availability of the results from both evalua-
tions, and their comparison, provides a helpful and 
sensitive diagnostics tool to flag possible 
measurement biases associated with the compo-
sition of the sample. 
Magnitude of Matrix Effects 
For an assessment of the KED performance it 
may be useful to quantify for some practical 
examples the expected magnitude of systematic 
error introduced by matrix effects into the 
nonextrapolated analysis. The effects are normally 
negligible for matrix elements of low and medium 
atomic number, but should be taken into account 
if other actinide elements are present. 
The (negative) bias for the concentration of 
the analyte A can be calculated from physical 
constants, if the concentrations Pi [g/cm3] of the 
interfering elements i are known : 
3 1 ,. 
Biaslg/cm J=-- L~ll-· p., ~!lA j I I 
taking the differences of the total photon mass 
attenuation coefficients p of the respective ele-
ments to 
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Fig. 4: Calculated effect of minor elements 
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The diagram in Fig. 4 indicates for some 
binary actinide samples the expected bias for the 
major element caused by a minor actinide element 
at different weight percentages. The respective 
values of dpj lower the effect by about a factor of 
3, if the atomic number of the minor element is 
greater than the atomic number of the analyte. 
For minor element concentrations up to 1% 
the bias remains below 0.2% in any case. The 
minor elements may easily be detected and 
quantified for a bias correction by the XRF channel 
of the analyzer. An example for an XRF spectrum, 
taken from a Pu sample with traces of U, Np and 
Am at about 1%, is shown in Fig. 5. With increasing 
concentration of the minor element the KED 
measurement itself will be capable to provide an 
estimate for its concentration. The existing soft-
ware for dual-element samples automatically cor-
rects for the mutual bias effects. Results for binary 
samples will be given below. 
If the atomic number of the minor element 
differs by only one unit from the atomic number of 
the analyte, the situation becomes less predictable 
for the existing procedure for data evaluation. This 
is because the absorption edge of the interfering 
element, then separated only by about 3 keV from 
the edge of the analyte, will fall into the fitting 
region denoted in Fig. 3 by Fo. A practical example 
for this situation refers to the influence of Np on 
the Pu assay. A recent study has shown that the 
existing software designed for dual-element 
samples with D.Z = 2 can also handle this case very 
well m. 
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Fig. 5: Detection of minor elements in a 
Pu sample by XRF. 
Element Ratios from XRF 
The XRF channel is utilized for the analysis of 
minor elements in support of the KED measure-
ment for the main element. For this purpose it is 
sufficient to evaluate element ratios from the XRF 
spectra. They are determined from the peak areas 
of the respective K X-rays. 
The calibration factor required for the 
conversion of the measured peak area ratio into 
the element ratio slightly depends on the heavy 
element concentration in the sample .. An example 
for this dependence, calculated from basic physical 
data, is shown in Fig. 6. The software for data 
evaluation calculates the correct calibration factor 
for the actual sample composition. The necessary 
information about the heavy element concentra-
tions is determined to the required degree of 
accuracy from the XRF measurement itself, or it is 
obtained from the parallel KED measurement. 
Another correction, required for the relative detec-
tion efficiency as a function of energy, is also 
determined from the measured XRF spectrum. In 
this way the calibration for the element ratio 
measurement is actually reduced to the determi-
nation of a single calibration factor. 
4. Performance Studies 
This chapter summarizes relevant perfor-
mance studies so far carried out with the K-
edge/XRF analyzer at SAL. The emphasis was put 
on the evaluation of performance characteristics 
for the KED channel of the analyzer, because it 
provides the reference measurement for most 
applications. The studies carried out on a range of 
samples provide a fairly good overview on the 
overall instrument performance. 
Calibration for KED 
The initial set-up for KED incorporated a 
relatively short collimator, 1.5 cm long with a beam 
hole diameter of 0.3 cm, between sample and 
detector. Calibration runs conducted with this 
configuration on uranium solutions in 4 cm cells 
revealed an unexpectedly large nonlinearity of the 
instrument response (Fig. 7). Similar measurements 
performed on 2 cm cells did not show this beha-
viour. 
The cause has been identified as a result of 
insufficient beam collimation between sample and 
detector, which allowed a significant fraction of 
the forward-peaked coherently scattered radiation 
reaching the detector. As a matter of fact it was 
found that for measurements on 4 cm cells the 
solid angle subtended by the collimator between 
sample and detector must not significantly be 
larger than about 10- 4 sr in order to maintain an 
approximate linear calibration curve. 
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Table 1 : Calibration of KED for uranium. 
2 cm Cell, ~P = const 
DA (g/1) KED-DA (%) 
52.32 0.034 
97.62 -0.040 
108.69 -0.028 
148.61 -0.013 
182.83 0.044 
Stand. Dev. of 0.037 Differences(%) 
With tighter beam collimation (0 0.1 cm x 
10 cm) the nonlinearity with the 4 cm cell decrea-
sed by about a factor of 10. A small residual non-
linearity of ± 0.5% remained as shown in Fig. 8. 
The calibration data were approximated by a para-
bolic fit. For a 2 cm cell the calibration curve turned 
out to be perfectly linear for the investigated 
range of concentrations (52-183 g/1). The results of 
the calibration runs for both cells are summarized 
in Table 1. 
Precision for KED 
The measurement precision for KED depends 
on the type of analysis. The precision curves in 
Fig. 9, experimentally established for the present 
system, refer to the measurement situations for 
single and dual-element analysis as illustrated in 
Fig. 3. For the optimum range of concentrations 
(about 80 to 150 g/1) the precision obtained for a 
1000 s run varies between 0.13% and 0.18% for 
the indicated cases. For dual-element samples the 
given precision values for the major element hold 
for minor element weight percentages of up to 
10%. Increasing beam attenuation at higher 
weight fractions of the minor element will slightly 
decrease the precision for the major element. The 
measurement precision is about the same forTh, U 
and Pu. 
Uranium Solutions 
A comparison between KED and DA was 
made for a series of uranium solution samples in 
order to qualify KED for the uranium analysis at 
SAL. The comparison measurements were done on 
reference materials and on dissolved UOx powder 
samples. The results are summarized in Tables 2 
and 3. The KED results represent averages from 5 
repeat runs of 1000 s. The mean differences 
between KED and DA were well below 0.1% for 
the different sets of measurements. 
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4 cm Cell, Para b. Fit to ~P 
DA (g/1) KED-DA (%) 
21.48 0.016 
45.77 0.030 
88.69 - 0.118 
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Fig. 9: Measurement precision for KED. Cases 
A, Band C refer to the measurement 
situations illustrated in Fig. 3. 
Table2: Differences ~ = KED-DA for uranium 
reference materials (2 cm cell). 
Date of ~(%) 
Me as. NBS 960 EC 110 NBS 960 (40g!l) (60 g/1) (1 00 gll) 
09/27/89 0.31 0.07 0.09 
09/28/89 -0.25 -0.14 -0.06 
09/29/89 - 0.17 0.16 -0.20 
10/02/89 0.20 -0.16 0.12 
10/03/89 - 0.18 -0.27 -0.12 
10/05/89 0.29 0.03 0.10 
Mean 0.033 0.052 -0.012 
SD (%) 0.260 0.163 0.134 
Table 3 : Differences!!.. = KED-DA for dissol-
ved UOx powders (2 cm cell). 
DA !!.. (%) 
(g U/1) 
84.82 0.20 
84.78 0.13 
87.29 0.03 
87.32 0.18 
87.43 -0.02 
86.37 -0.08 
85.71 -0.02 
85.72 0.06 
87.28 - 0.11 
87.32 - 0.13 
Mean 0.024 
SD (%) 0.117 
Th and Th-U Solutions 
The performance of KED for the determi-
nation of Th was evaluated from measurements 
done on pure Th solutions and mixed Th-U 
solutions containing uranium admixtures between 
about 8 and 17%. The mixed samples were also 
analyzed by XRF for the Th/U ratio. 
The KED measurements on the carefully 
characterized Th-U solutions offered a good 
opportunity to test the KED software for dual-
element analysis, and to compare predicted and 
actually measured bias effects for the different 
fitting modes. The results plotted in Fig. 10 are in 
good agreement with the expected behaviour of 
the extrapolated and nonextrapoJated evaluation. 
The slight decrease of the measured thorium 
concentration with increasing uranium concentra-
tion (about 0.05% per wt% uranium) as obtained 
from the uncorrected nonextrapolated evaluation 
will vanish, if the software for dual-element 
analysis is applied which automatically corrects for 
the mutual interferences. This is confirmed by the 
results given in Table 4. The table also lists the KED 
result for the minor element uranium, which is 
determined with a precision as indicated in Fig. 11. 
The standard deviation of 1.5% for the uranium 
results in Table 4 is in good agreement with the 
expected precision of about 1 to 3% for the measu-
red range of uranium concentrations. 
The measurement precision for the minor 
element considerably improves, if it is determined 
from the XRF measurement. For the given set of 
Th-U solutions with element ratios ranging from 
5.5 to 15.5 the precision obtained for the Th/U 
ratio from an XRF measurement of 1000 s was 
0.3% for the lower ratio, and 0.6% for the larger 
ratio. For these measurements, done with a tube 
voltage of 140 kV, the total counting rate in the 
XRF detector was relatively low (8 kcps). This rate, 
and hence the. precision for the Th/U ratio, could 
have been increased by using a larger aperture in 
front of the XRF detector. 
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Table 4: Differences!!.. = KED-DA forTh and U in 
mixed Th-U solutions. 
DA (g/1) !!..(%) 
Th 
74.76 
75.29 
78.46 
79.32 
99.48 
100.45 
101.41 
102.21 
103.54 
105.59 
123.62 
124.25 
124.69 
126.51 
Mean 
SD (%) 
u 
6.057 
12.959 
6.385 
13.539 
9.122 
18.316 
18.626 
11.027 
9.476 
9.548 
22.142 
12.822 
12.882 
21.562 
Th 
0.05 
-0.05 
-0.17 
0.13 
0.19 
-0.10 
0.06 
-0.36 
-0.10 
-0.15 
0.19 
0.10 
0.00 
0.28 
0.005 
0.17 
u 
1.35 
1.23 
-0.87 
0.52 
- 1.13 
0.51 
-1.24 
-2.86 
0.98 
-0.93 
- 1.46 
-3.40 
0.53 
0.96 
-0.42 
1.52 
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Fig. 10: KED results forTh analysis in mixed Th-U 
solutions obtained from the non-extrapo-
lated (uncorrected) and extrapolated 
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U-Pu Solutions 
Similar studies as for the Th-U solutions were 
also done on mixed U-Pu solutions. The samples 
used for the measurements covered a larger range 
of element ratios. The KED results shown in Fig. 12 
include measurements on samples with U/Pu ratios 
ranging from 3.5 to 240. 
The results for the major element uranium 
obtained from an uncorrected nonextrapolated 
evaluation agreed within less than 0.2 % with the 
DA values for the whole range of U/Pu ratios. 
Unexpectedly, they did not reveal the predicted 
small negative bias for lower U/Pu ratios as 
indicated by the dashed line in Fig. 12. On the 
other hand, a small positive bias was observed at 
the lowest U/Pu ratio for the extrapolated 
evaluation, which is supposed to be insensitive to 
matrix effects. No further studies were made on 
these small deviations from the expected beha-
viour. 
The precision of the KED measurement for 
the minor element plutonium is plotted in Fig. 11. 
For improved precision it is recommended to use 
the XRF channel of the analyzer. The measured 
precision for the U/Pu ratio, based on a counting 
time of 1000 s, is shown in Fig. 13. For concentrated 
samples the measurement precision for the U/Pu 
ratio is about 0.7% at an element ratio of 100. This 
is about the measurement precision of the Hybrid 
Instrument for the plutonium analysis in typical 
reprocessing input liquors/1, 2/. 
Mg-Size Pu Samples 
Dried liquid samples containing about 4 mg 
of plutonium represent one type of verification 
samples received at SAL for analysis. The quan-
titative determination of plutonium in those 
samples, which in field are prepared from liquors 
by evaporation to dryness in glass vials, is usually 
accomplished at SAL by means of IDMS. 
The design of the K-edge/XRF analyzer 
considered the possibility to employ its XRF chan-
nel for this analysis. For a quantitative measure-
ment the dried samples would have to be redis-
solved with an internal standard, thus reducing the 
task of the XRF analysis to its standard application 
of measuring an element ratio. 
The criteria for the choice of a suitable 
internal standard element are evident : the 
element should not occur in the samples to be 
analyzed, and its K X-ray energies should be as 
close as possible to those from plutonium. Thorium 
as a candidate has been ruled out for two reasons : 
First, its Kp X-rays partly interfere with the most 
prominent plutonium X-ray (K0 1). Second, its Ka X-
rays are expected to fall into a region of strongly 
sloping background from inelastically scattered 
primary radiation, which makes a correct peak area 
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evaluation more difficult /8/. 
For this reason the use of lead as internal 
standard has been considered as an alternative. 
Some test measurements were carried out to 
investigate this approach. For the given excitation 
conditions the X-ray production rate for lead is 
about 5 times higher than for plutonium. Thus, 
working with a Pb/Pu element ratio of about 5 is 
usually sufficient to determine the X-ray intensity 
fluoresced from the internal standard with a 
precision of 0.1% or better. However, some 
difficulties were encountered in establishing 
reliably the overall relative detection efficiency for 
the Pb and Pu X-rays. The relatively large 
separation of the X-ray energies from both 
elements, and the presence of a discontinuity for 
the photon attenuation in between at the K-
absorption edge of lead (88.0 keV), add to this 
problem. 
From the viewpoint of the XRF measurement 
uranium definitely would represent the best choice 
as internal standard for the determination of 
plutonium. This option, initially ruled out because 
of possible interferences with uranium contami-
nations in the plutonium samples, is now being 
reconsidered. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has presented another example 
for a hybrid K-edge/XRF system designed for the 
measurement of nuclear materials in liquors. The 
principal performance characteristics of such ins-
trumentation are now well established for a range 
of applications. 
The system does not claim to provide the 
ultimate measurement accuracy nowadays achie-
ved with carefully controlled analytical chemistry 
methods. But it combines a remarkable level of 
measurement performance for applications in its 
very domain with a high degree of operational and 
procedural simplicity. lt is the combination of both 
features that makes an interesting tool for 
safeguards out of it. Up to now the scope of 
potential applications has not yet been exploited 
to its full extent. 
The concept of measurement, and its prac-
tical realization, provides some flexibility for 
instrument installation and operation under dif-
ferent boundary conditions. The present paper has 
described a laboratory set-up coupled to a stan-
dard glovebox. In other applications such instru-
mentation has been adapted to heavily shielded 
hot cell facilities for safe measurements on highly 
radioactive samples. 
The hybrid K-edge/XRF analyzer is built up 
from commercially available components. The 
overall instrument reliability depends, of course, 
on the combined reliability of those products. For 
the assembling of the present analyzer at SAL 
some latest technological products, promising a 
further upgrade of system performance, were 
selected. During the initial period of instrument 
operation just those components failed frequently. 
This kind of typical 'kinderkrankheiten' have now 
been mastered, but a more conservative instru-
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ment design certainly would have saved some 
troubles. 
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Abstract 
The paper deals with recent work on high-
resolution alpha-particle measurement and 
accurate analysis of complex spectra. Attention 
is given to a number of experimental 
parameters, e.g. source, detector, measurement 
geometry and optimization of measurement 
conditions. The procedure for doing accurate 
determination of the 238Pu/(239+240Pu) activity 
ratio without need to analyse the fine 
structure, is demonstrated. Examples of 
analysed high-resolution spectra are given and 
it is shown that the alpha-particle peak shape 
may be considered as constant in practical 
energy intervals. Experimental consequences of 
recoil emission in case of short-lived 
daughters are discussed. Finally, the non-
linear response of Si detectors to alpha 
particles is briefly mentioned. 
1. Introduction 
Alpha-particle spectrometry with Si 
detectors has become an accurate technique for 
analysis, certification of reference materials 
and decay-data measurements, especially in 
actinide research /1-8/. The technique has also 
found large application in environmental 
measurements because of the typical very low 
background. With ~espect to measurement 
accuracy, the main corrections and 
uncertainties result from peak tailing. The 
improvement of peak-fitting models and detector 
resolution have significantly reduced this 
tailing problem /9-11/. 
With the introduction of ion-implanted Si 
detectors, improved resolution due to the 
thinner detector entrance window and smaller 
bias current (less than 10 nA), was obtained. 
The typical resolution of 12 keV FWHM for a 50 
mm2 Si surface-barrier detector has become 
almost 9 keV in the case of an ion-implanted 
Si detector of that size. 
As a result, a number of effects which so 
far had been hidden, now require attention in 
order to exploit the improved capabilities. In 
addition, the gain stability of preamplifiers, 
in terms of a drift of the alpha-particle peak, 
has improved from roughly 0.3 keV/d to 
0.07 keV/d. Our laboratory has been, for almost 
17 years now, involved in the improvement of 
accuracy in alpha-particle spectrometry, 
especially for the measurement of emission 
probabilities. Much of this work was done in 
the frame of an IAEA Co-ordinated Research 
Programme, on decay data of the transactinium 
nuclides /12/, and via intercomparison 
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measurements to solve problems which were 
identified within the International Committee 
for Radionuclide Metrology (ICRM). 
2. Experimental Environment 
A number of experimental parameters are 
critical in high-resolution spectrometry. 
Alpha particles which are emitted from a 
thin layer of radioactive material suffer energy 
loss and straggling in the source layer and in 
the detector entrance window. Sources prepared 
by sublimation in vacuum using highly-pure 
radionuclides generally produce lowest 
straggling and peak tailing /3,13/. Source 
thickness could be a problem in the case of 
long-lived radionuclides since for a counting 
rate of 1 s-1, a counting time of 1 day is 
required for 0.3 % uncertainty from Poisson 
statistics. For spectrometry of 237Np, with a 
half life of 2.14 x 106 a, source deposits (8 mm 
diameter) of 76 Bq have been produced with which 
a peak resolution of 9. 1 keV FWHM was obtained 
and doublet peaks of 5 keV energy separation 
were successfully analysed /14/. 
Sublimation in vacuum is a rather expensive 
technique for source preparation because of the 
low yield of deposition and the requirement to 
eliminate cross contamination. For a number of 
analyses, quantitative sources are needed for 
which the technique of drop deposition with 
tetraethylene glycol (TEG) added as a spreading 
agent, is very well suited /3,13/. When using 
high-purity solutions, the problem of source-
thickness is seldom a major one with respect to 
high resolution work, provided one is prepared 
to limit the source activity and increase the 
measurement time. 
We have measured dead-layer thickness of 
50 nm on PI PS detectors I 15/ of 50 mm2 active 
area (7 keV energy loss for 5.5 MeV alpha 
particles). Increased tailing is generally 
produced by border effects, e.g. the edge of the 
diaphragm formed by the detector housing, and 
the inhomogeneous electric field across the 
sensitive area. In some cases, peak distortion 
in the form of a small shoulder on the peak 
tailing may occur. The use of a diaphragm which 
covers about 1 mm of the border part of the 
detector eliminates the problem and improves the 
resolution. In order to keep the input 
capacitance at the preamplifier low, the latter 
should be directly coupled to the detector. An 
increase of the input capacitance by about 5 pF, 
due to the microdot vacuum feedthrough and BNC 
connector, is acceptable. 
The counting geometry is an important 
parameter with respect to resolution and 
tailing. For a point source which is coaxial 
with the detector of unit radius, a geometry of 
1 % of 4n sr is obtained at a distance of 4.92. 
If also the source has unit radius this 
distance becomes about 4 .8. Little improvement 
in resolution and tailing can be obtained by 
reducing the geometry beyond 1 % of 4n sr. Peak 
deformation by pulse pile-up is negligible for 
counting rates of less than 100 s-1 if the 
electronics, especially the pole-zero 
adjustment is properly set. 
Fig. 1: Alpha-particle spectrum of a plutonium 
sample C used in the AS-76 interlaboratory 
comparison exercise, measured in June 1977. A 
25 mm2 surface-barrier detector and TEG drop-
deposited source were used. The activity ratio 
of 238Pu/(239+240Pu) was re-analysed with the 
CBNM code in April 1991. 
Finding out optimal amplifier and bias 
settings for minimum noise is very much eased 
by monitoring, without a source and pulser, the 
noise level at the output of the main amplifier 
using a rms voltmeter. A typical value for a 
50 mm2 detector is 1.5 mV rms. However, the 
bias for minimal noise does not always meet the 
requirement of saturation as to minimize 
recombination of charge carriers. Peak 
positions, at optimal bias with respect to 
noise, still vary with detector bias, depending 
on the detector material, from 1.5 keV/V to 
less than 0.1 keV/V. For this reason, the 
detector bias should be kept unchanged for 
longer periods of time to avoid the problem of 
poor resettability which still characterises 
some modern bias supplies. 
Temperature effects at the detector and 
preamplifier can be reduced by using a 
thermostat. In our particular environment, the 
temperature effect for the alpha peak (+0.3 
keV/°C) was less of a problem than it was for 
the pulser peak (-1 keV/°C). Alpha-particle 
peak drift, which is characteristic for an 
aging field-effect transistor, implies that, in 
long-term measurements, the stability of the 
pulser peak is not a measure for the stability 
of the alpha peak. 
The performance of the measurement system 
will be badly affected in case of poor pole-
zero adjustment at the main amplifier. A clamp 
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circuit facilitates inspection of the pulse 
tail in the oscilloscope near the baseline in 
order to eliminate the slightest overshoots 
/16/. Alpha pulses always show a small 
undershoot; the pulser undershoot is larger. 
The vacuum system should provide at least 
0.1 Pa and be essentially free from oil vapour. 
In case of a faulty manipulation by which oil 
droplets from the rough pump may backstream 
into the measurement chamber and deposit on the 
detector or source, the resolution degrades 
completely. The front of a PIPS can be 
cautiously flushed with acetone to clean off 
the oil film. 
The importance of isolating the vacuum 
system galvanically from the measurement part 
and the use of a single earth connection for 
the latter must be stressed, to avoid extensive 
noise. 
3. Examples of Analysed Spectra 
The many overlapping peaks are a 
characteristic feature of most alpha-particle 
spectra. In the course of a measurements 
programme on alpha-particle emission 
probabilities, the CBNM and CIEMAT codes 
19,11/ for peak fitting have been extensively 
tested and intercompared /14/. The development 
of a code which does not require the trained 
eye of the spectrometrist is not for the 
immediate future. In the context of the present 
paper the performance of the CBNM code will be 
reviewed. 
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Fig. 2: The old source, used for the 
measurement in fig. 1, was re-measured and 
analysed. a: spectrum measured with a 50 mm2 
PIPS detector, showing the analysed peaks. A 
magnetic field was used to reduce coincidence 
summing of alpha particles 'and conversion 
electrons. Resolution is 12.4 keV FWHM. b: 
spectrum of the relative residuals. 
In the period 1976 to 1978, considerable 
effort was spent by four laboratories to 
characterize plutonium samples for the AS-76 
interlaboratory comparison /17/. As a result, 
this material became of the quality of a 
reference material with respect to the 
plutonium isotopic composition and the activity 
ratio R = 238Pu/(239+240Pu). One of the old 
spectra was re-analysed for R using the CBNM 
code. Figure 1 shows the spectrum which was 
obtained from a TEG drop-deposition source, 
measured with a 25 mm2 surface-barrier detector 
(June 1977). The code computes a tailing 
distribution which fits the long-range tailing. 
This tailing distribution is the convolution of 
the measured spectrum and a linear function of 
the exponential function. The procedure does 
not require information on the fine structure 
in the multiplets and has negligible effect on 
the ratio of the two groups in the spectrum. By 
subtracting the computed tailing, the two 
groups of peaks become fully separated which 
facilitates the calculation of their ratio. The 
value R = 2. 97·6( 12) from the present analysis 
is in full agreement with the characterization 
value 2.985(3). /17/. The 238Pu peaks were also 
analysed and relative peak intensities obtained 
were: 0.709(1), 0.2906(10) and 0.0005(1) which, 
for the two major peaks, is in good agreement 
with the known alpha-particle emission 
probabilities (Pa) of this nuclide /12,18/. The 
standard deviations are given in brackets. A 
peak resolution of 14.6 keV FWHM we>c; found for 
this measurement. 
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Fig. 3a: Measured alpha-particle spectrum of 
237Np showing the analysed peaks and the 
computed tailing distribution. b: Spectrum of 
relative residuals which shows the effect of 
coincidence summing produced by alpha particles 
and conversion electrons. 
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Fig. 4. a: Spectrum from a mixed source 
produced by sublimation in vacuum. All peaks 
have been analysed; a resolution of 8.6 keV 
FWHM was obtained in a 6 h measurement. 
b: Spectrum of the relative residuals. 
The old source which was used for that 
spectrum was re-measured using a 50 mm2 PIPS 
detector, and analysed. The result is shown in 
fig. 2. The peak resolution of 12.4 keV FWHM 
this time is better than that for the spectrum 
of fig. 1. The fitting of the 238Pu and 241Am 
peaks provided the peak-shape !:Jarameters which 
were also used for the 239Pu and 240pu 
analysis. The measured 241Am!238Pu activity 
ratio as of April 4th 1991 was 0.50( 1) which 
has to be compared with the calculated ingrowth 
of 0.507 /17/. The new analysis of 239Pu;240pu 
= 0.73(2) has to be compared with the AS-76 
reference value of 0.720{1), derived for the 
above reference date. The spectrum of the 
relative residuals in fig. 2b shows the 
difference between the experimental spectrum 
(after subtraction of the computed tailing) and 
the fitting, relative to the standard deviation 
for the counts in the channel. In this case, 
peaks were analysed without making use of the 
known Pa for these nuclides. It is expected 
that the use of the Pa data in the fit will in 
general improve the result. 
Another example is the analysed 237Np 
spectrum shown in fig. 3. It was measured with 
a 50 mm2 PIPS detector with an overall 
resolution of 9. 1 keV. A particular difficulty 
of this spectrum were the two doublets with for 
both an energy difference of only 5 keV. The 
relative residuals (fig. 3b) reveal the effect 
of coincidence summing of alpha particles and 
conversion electrons despite the use of a 
magnetic field to stop conversion electrons and 
the 1 % geometry. Further details can be found 
in ref. /14/. 
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Fig. 5. To the process of recoil emission and 
implantation in vacuum. 
The spectrum of fig. 4 shows a recent 
measurement of a mixed-actinides source. The 
measurement geometry was 0.5 % of 4n sr, 
duration 6 h1. and the resolution was 8.6 keV FWHM. The 24'1Cm group was first analysed and 
the peak-shape parameters obtained in this fit 
were also used for the analysis of the two 
other groups. The residuals in fig. 4b show 
that, at least in an energy range of 640 keV, 
the assumption of constant peak shape holds 
very well. Relative peak intensities obtained 
were: for 244cm: 0.770(5), 0.230(4); for 238Pu: 
0.709(3), 0.290(3), 0.00096(10); and for 240Pu: 
0.724(4), 0.275(4), 0.00073(13). The 240pu 
contained some 239Pu. There is good agreement 
with published Pa data /12,18/. 
When measuring radionuclides which produce 
short-lived daughters, a number of precautions 
and subsequent corrections have to be 
considered. Figure 5 shows schematically what 
happens when a 228Th source is in the vacuum 
chamber. When the source is sufficiently thin, 
a substantial fraction E of the recoiling 224Ra 
ions, nearly 50 % for a vacuum sublimed source, 
is ejected by the source and could be implanted 
into the detector if not stopped by a thin 
foil. A VYNS foil. of 15 ~g/cm2 is sufficient to 
stop the recoils which have an energy of about 
100 keV. The other fraction, 1-E, will produce 
a typical profile of implants in the source and 
backing. The VYNS foil is transparent to 220Rn 
ions. Host of the radon fraction in the source 
and backing, however, does not leave the 
source. 
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When no VYNS is used, recoils produced in 
every stage of the decay chain will be 
implanted in the detector were the geometrical 
efficiency for detection of the emitted alpha 
particle is nearly 0. 5. For modern detectors, 
which have a very thin dead layer, the recoils 
can reach the depleted region and produce a 
small satellite peak /19/. A consequence of the 
implantation profile which builds up during the 
measurement is that the resolutions of the 
alpha peaks differ for the different members of 
the decay chain. Furthermore, the measured 
"equilibrium state" in the source is changing, 
except for the 224Ra for which the VYNS is part 
of the "sealed" source. When the open source is 
stored under atmospheric conditions the 224Ra 
recoils are recaptured on top of the source 
layer. 
Identification of alpha-particle emitters 
in the spectrum is guided by their estimated 
peak energies. If the energy of the unknown 
peak can be obtained by linear interpolation, 
the estimate will in general be quite reliable. 
However, estimates obtained by extrapolation 
are much less reliable since they are based on 
an estimation of the slope in a given point of 
the response curve. The fig. 6, which has been 
reproduced from ref. /20/, gives a magnified 
view of the non-linear response of the detector 
to alpha particles. 
It can be seen that the apparent energy 
difference t.Eexp, obtained by considering the 
digital offset used in the measurement and a 
linear system, is smaller than the energy 
difference t.Eh measured by the detector. The 
error which results from neglecting the non-
linear response is approximately 4 keV for a 
peak-energy difference of 650 keV. However, the 
error introduced by an extrapolation in case 
the reference peaks are too close together, and 
the unknown peak is at a much larger energy 
distance from them, may be much larger. 
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Fig. 6. Non-linear response of an ion-implanted 
Si detector to alpha particles. The non-
linearity parameter has been arbitrarily 
multiplied by a factor 14 to show the effect 
(from ref. /20/). 
4. Conclusions 
Alpha-particle spectrometry has become an 
accurate technique for measuring decay data and 
for analysis. It should, however, be kept in 
mind that the high performance of codes for 
peak fitting cannot compensate for medium 
quality measurements. In this respect, the code 
cannot analyse beyond the limits of specific 
information available in the spectrum. One can 
say that what the well-trained eye is unable to 
reveal, the code can most often not resolve. 
Accurate calculation of the 238Pu content is 
possible without need for resolving the fine 
structure in the spectra. Finally, the 
confirmation that routinely made TEG drop-
deposition sources are stable with time and can 
be of fairly high quality for spectrometric 
work, is certainly an important fact. 
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PREPARATION AND CERTIFICATION OF REFERENCE 
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v.G.Khlopin Radium Institute, Leningrad, USSR 
Abstract 
The report presents the results of 
preparation and certification of three reference 
materials (RM) of 235u, 236u, 238u, and RM of 
233u, 235u, 238u to 236u isotope ratios. 
The certified values of the first three 
samples are the mass fractions of the main 
uranium isotopes in solutions no :!: 0.004 mgfg), 
for the last one, they are the molar ratios of 
isotopes 233u, 235u, 238u to 236u (N1 :!: o.0004). 
The starting materials were the high enriched 
RM's of uranium isotopic composition in u3o8 form 
dissolved in HN03 (235U>99.99Y., 236U>99.97Y., 
238u>99.9999t.). 
The certification was done by potentiometric 
titration method and by isotope dilution mass 
spectrometric method (IDMS) with internal 
standard. 
The produced RM are intended for use in mass 
spectrometric measurements of the mass fraction 
of uranium in uranium containing materials by the 
isotope dilution method, as well as for 
calibration of mass spectrometers. 
1. Introduction 
At present the isotope dilution 
mass-spectrometric method (IDMS) is one of the 
most widespread destructive methods for analysis 
of spent nuclear fuel for determination of the 
uranium and plutonium content in it. correct 
application of the method requires reference 
materials (RM), the so called spiKes. First of 
all, the RM are used for control of correctness 
of the analysis results, i.e. for account of 
systematic errors arising in different stages of 
analysis: chemical operations of separation, 
dilution, evaporation, etc. as well as in 
mass-spectrometric measurements due to the mass 
discrimination effect. RM can be used also for 
calibration of mass- spectrometers, especially of 
multicollector devices of the MAT 261 type. 
Most widespread spiKes are RM of uranium-233 
solution - NBL 111 and uranium-235 solution -
NBL 135. In the USSR a RM of the uranium-233 
solution - reo 3213-85 - has been produced. 
Recently an increased interest arise in 
application of double spiKes. In particular, the 
IAEA initiated the production of RM solution 
enriched with 233u, 236u,242pu,244pu - QS 85 and 
as 87 111. 
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The present worK is devoted to preparation of 
three types of RM solution-spiKes 235u, 236u,238u 
and of isotopic composition RM containing 
233u,235u, 236u and 238u in approximately equal 
amounts. 
The worK was done within the frameworK of the 
Soviet support programme to IAEA (tasK SSR-3-3) 
and, partly, within the scope of the research 
contract 5065/TC. 
2. Preparation and Certification of RM 
SpiKe Solutions of 235u, 236u and 238u 
Preparation of the RM starting materials 
The starting materials were the state RH's of 
uranium isotopic composition in U305 form 
dissolved in HN03. The certified values are given 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Isotope composition of uranium for starting 
materials (molar fraction, 1.) 
234 235 236 238 
reo 
2706 0.0042 99.9942 0.0015 <0.00015 
-83 _±0.0001 _±0.0002 _±0.0001 _±0.00015 
4213 <0.00001 0.0043 99.9732 0.0225 
-87 _±0.00001 _±0.0001 _±0.0002 _±0.0002 
2681 <0.000001 0.000011 <0.000001 99.999987 
-63 _±0.000001 _±0.000005 .±0.000001 _±0.000005 
The solution were prepared so as to be mass 
fraction of uranium in the solution N 11.. After 
mixing the solutions were filled into ampoules of 
borosilicate glass or pyrex glass. Each ampoule 
was sealed off immediately after filling. 
certification analysis 
Potentiometric titration of uranium was used 
as the main method for certification of RM. lt 
was based on the oavies - Gray - NBL method /2/ 
modified to determine 5-10 mg of uraniumin a 
sample /3/. The titration was done by an 
automatic titrator Mettler DL 40 RC. 
The value of the RSO didn't exceed 0.04 X. The 
total error included also the systematic 
error, connected with uncertainty of RM 
certification value used (for example for NBS 
960 this uncertainty is equal 0.017 X). The 
total error of analysis result was equal 0.03 • 
0.04 X with an acceptable number of titrations 
(about 20). 
Besides for analysis of RM 236u and 236u a 
mass- spectrometric isotope dilution method with 
internal standard (mass-spectrometer TH-5) was 
used. 
Results of potentiometric titration 
6-9 ampoules with each type of RM solution 
were selected for analysis. After opening up an 
ampoule 3 aliquots of the solution with exactly 
Known mass (weighing with an error 0.05 mg) were 
taKen from the ampoule. The mass of each aliquot 
was about 1 g (about 10 mg of uranium). This 
allquots were titrated. 
Simultaneously with the solution of the 
sample under development the solutions prepared 
of samples of reo 2396-63 and NBS 960 were 
titrated. 
The order of titration was as follows: an 
aliquot of a reo 2396-63n or NBS 960 solution 
was titrated, then an aliquot of the sample 
being developed, then again an aliquot of reo 
2396-83n or NBS 960, etc. Such an alternative 
order of titration of samples and RM, enables to 
reach a maximum possible identifY of the 
conditions of measurements of the developed 
sample and RM. Thus the results of each 
measurement were calibrated with use of two 
different RM. 
This procedure reduced the error owin~;~ to 
attenuation of the influence of such factors as 
the change of the titer of the potassium 
dichromate solution as a result of evaporation, 
the titration end point shift connected with 
change of temperature, pressure, reagents' 
composition, etc. 
The mass fraction of uranium isotope in the 
RM solution was calculated by the formula: 
RM RM 
I Yo,n-1 Yo,n+1 Hi 
An= - (------ + ------)·Yn· -------- lloi ( 1) 
2 RH RH 238.0289 
Yn-1 Yn+1 
I 
where An i s the mass fract i on of uran i urn i sotope 
1 in the n-th al iquot, X; 
RM RM 
Yn-1•Yn+1- the results of the (n-1)-th 
and (n+1)-th measurements of the mass fractions 
of uranium In RM solutions creo 2396-63n or 
NBS 960), X; 
166 
RM RM 
Yo,n-1•Yo,n+1- the mass fraction of uranium 
in RM solutions calculated proceeding from 
certified values and the results of preparing 
the solutions , Xi 
Y n - the result of the n-th measurement of 
the mass fraction of uranium in the sample 
solution under development; 
Hi g{mole - the molar mass of uranium in 
the RH under development; 
238.0289 g{mole - the molar mass of uranium 
of natural Isotope composition creo 2396-83n 
or NBS 960); 
lloi - the mass fraction of uranium isotope 
i in the uranium of the RH under development. The 
results of analysis are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Results of potentiometric 
(mass fraction of uranium isotope 
RM SOlUtion) 
titration 
in developed 
Sii'Jl)le 
!lq). 235u 236u 238u 
At SO• nt At SO• nt At SO• nt 
105 105 105 
1 0.95341 27 2 0.96615 25 4 0.92767 17 5 
2 0.95231 5 2 0,96794 24 4 0.92836 19 4 
3 0.95299 41 3 0.96756 24 4 . 0.92610 46 5 
4 0.95269 16 3 0.98625 18 5 0.92627 30 4 
5 0.95260 56 3 0.98788 21 3 0.92816 30 5 
6 0.95331 24 2 0.98652 41 4 0.92625 32 5 
7 0.95290 17 3 
6 0.95295 32 3 
9 0.95259 29 3 
A 0.95263 0.96607 0.92616 
E: 0.00020 0.00034 0.00013 
Validation of certified values and their errors 
All results were checKed on distribution 
normality, gomogenity of variances and mean 
values (one way variance analysis). The mean 
values for all RH are taKen as the certified 
values. For 235u and 236u all results were 
uninform. The random error in this case was 
calculated by the formula /4/: 
1 2 = 
E:=to.95,f (------(~tSt+Iht(At-A> 2>> 0 • 5 
N(N-1) t t (2) 
For 236u the mean values were nonuniform, 
i.e. the variance between the ampoules is 
significantly greater than the variance inside 
the ampoules. The random error in this case was 
calculated by formula: 
= 
e = to,95,5 <~ nt<At - Al 2 I 5 ~ nt> 0 •5 
t t (3) 
The systematic error is determined by the 
certification errors of the applied RM - reo 
2396-83n (0.0002Y.) and NBS 960 (0.00017Y.), and 
by the weighing errors in preparation of the 
solution. For a confidence level 0.95 it is true 
e = 1.1·A (6~M+ 6Cma+ 62ARMl 0 •5 = 
= 0.00022 ;: (4) 
where 6mRM = 5·10-5 - the relative error of 
weighing the RM samples, 
6ms = 5·10-7 - the relative error of 
weighing the RM solution, 
6ARM = 2•1o-4 - the relative error of 
the RM certified values. 
The total error of the certified value, 
according to /4/ will be equal 
.1=K(9+e) (5) 
= 
K depends on 9/S(A) and on the value of 
= 
confidence level. For P = 0.95 and 9/S(A)N2, 
K N 0.7. 
The values of error components are given in 
Table 3. 
Table 3 
The characteristics of the RM solution 
Mass fraction of isotope in the RM solution, ;: 
certified 
Sarp. = = e 
value, A S(A) 
235tJ 0.9528 0.00009 0.00020 0.00022 0.0003 
236tJ 0.9881 0.00013 0.00034 0.00021 0.0004 
238u 0.9282 0.00006 0.00013 0.00021 0.0003 
Results of mass-spectrometric measurements 
A variant of the method of isotope dilution 
with internal standard was used in this case. we 
use the next double spiKes 
- for the RM 236u - the double spiKe 235ut238u, 
- for the RM 238u - the double spiKes 235u;236u 
and 233u;236u, 
The double spike solution 235u;236u was 
prepared by mixing of weighted solution obtained 
by dissolving RM NBS 960 and weighted solution of 
235u, The double spiKe 235ut236u was prepared by 
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m1xmg of solutions of 235u and 236u (table 3). 
The RM reo 4363-66 of isotope ratio 233u;236u 
was used as the spike in the second case. The 
ratios 235ut238u, 235ut236u and 233ut236u were 
equal approximately to one. The solutions of 
double spiKes were added to developed RM solution 
and the isotope ratios in obtained mixtures were 
measured. 
The relation between the measured and "true" 
isotope ratios in mass-spectrometric measurements 
is determined by the formula /1/: 
(6) 
were Ril j, Ril jt1 are "true" and measured ratios 
of isotopes i and j, 
.1 = Mi - M j - the difference of molar 
masses of isotopes i and j, 
F - discrimination factor per unit of the 
mass difference. 
For the mixture 235ut236ut236u (developed RM 
- 236u, double spike _235ut238u) one may write 
5/6 6 
5/6 Ct'Nt + Rn 'Cn'Nn 5/611 
Rm = ------------------- = Rm • ( 1 - F) (7) 
6 6 
Ct•Nt + Cn·Nn 
8 6/6 6 
8/6 Ct'Nt + Rn ·<;,·Nn 8/611 
Rm = ------------------- = Rm • ( 1 + 2F) (8) 
6 6 
Ct'Nt + Cn'Nn 
where Cti - the concentration of isotope i in 
double spike solution, mol/g, 
Cn6 - the concentration of uranium-236 in 
the solution of the RM under development, mol/g, 
Nt, Nn- the mass of the solutions of 
double spike and RM. The index m refers to the 
mixture, n - to the RM, t - to the double spiKe. 
Excluding F from (7) and (8), we obtain an 
equation with one unKnown Cn 6: 
6 
<;,= 
5 5/611 8 8/611 6 
Nt <2Ct!Rm + Ct!Rm - 3Ctl 
5/6 5/611 8/6 8/611 
Nn<3-2Rn IRm -Rn /Rm l 
Here Cn 6is expressed in ;:, 
100 
(9) 
236.0456 
For RM solution of 238u analysed with use of 
the double spiKes 235ut236u and 233u;236u the 
formulas looks as 
8 
Cn= 
5 5/611 8 8/611 6 
Nt <2Ct/Rm + Ct/Rm - 3Ctl 
6/811 5/8 5/611 8/611 
Nn (3/Rm -2Rn /Rm -1 !Rm l 
100 
( 10) 
236.0508 
8 
Cn= 
6 8 8/6• 3 3/6• 
Nt (5Ct +3Ct/Rm -2Ct/Rm ) 100 
( 11) 
8/6• 3/8 3/6• 6/8 
Nh<3!Rm +2Rn !Rm - 5Rn ) 238.0508 
The characteristics of double spiKes Cti 
Table 5 
Certified values of uranium isotope 
composition (molar fraction, Y.) and the molar 
ratios of uranium isitopes in RH 
Isotope reo 2702-63 reo 4363-66 
and isotope composition of developed RH's Rni/ j 233 49.703 
(table 1) are Known. After measurement of the 234 0.367 1.3549 
ratios in mixtures Rmil j• one may find the mass _±0.002 
fractious of corresponding isotopes in developed 
RH solutions (table 4). 235 49.588 0.0482 
Table 4 
Results of IDMS analysis 
(mass fraction of isotope in RH solution, Y.) 
~ule 
6 
C.,(5/8) 0.98839 
so 0.00025 
8 
C.,(5/6) 0.92858 
so 0.0003 
8 
C.,(3/6) 0.92775 
so 0.00014 
3 4 5 Mean 
0.98742 
0.00008 
0.98841 0.98807 
0.00011 0.0006 
0.92779 0.92842 
0.0004 0.0007 
0.92767 0.92760 
0.00020 0.0003 
0.92826 
0.0004 
0.92767 
0.00006 
Taking into account a systematic error 
~aMMIU~te~d with the error of certified values of 
double spiKes we can see nonsignificant 
differences between results of potentiometric and 
mass-spectrometric measurements (Tables 3, 4). 
The developed RH solutions has been registered as 
235u - reo 4343-88 
236u - oeo 95.046-68 
238u - oeo 95.057-89 
3. Preparation and Certification of RH of Ratios 
233u1236u, 235ut236u, 238u1236u 
Preparatjon of the startjng materjal 
RM of uriilnium isotope composition (reo 
2702-83) in the form of u3o8 and RM of isotope 
ratio 233u;236u and the mass fraction of 
uranium-233 creo 4383-88) were used as the 
starting materials, The certified values of these 
RM are given in Table 5. 
The mass fraction of isotopes in the reo 
4383-88 solution are 
233u (0.09917 :!: o.oooo7) Y., 
236u - (0.09873 :!: o.ooo07) r., 
u - (0.20060 :!: 0.00016) Y.. 
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.±0.012 
236 0.4569 48.653 
_±0.0005 
238 49.588 0.0415 
_±0.012 
235/238 1.0000 
.±0.0005 
233/236 1.0174 
_±0.0006 
U305 (reo 2702-83) was dissolved in HN03. 
The exactly Known mass of this solution was 
mixed with exactly Known mass of 233u (reo 
4383-88) solution. After thorough mixing 
~;~olution WJI!;I pacKed into glass ampoules per 
1 ml of the solution in each. 
certjfjcatjon analysjs 
Seven ampoules of the RH solution were 
selected for analysis. Mass- spectrometric 
measurements were carried out with TH-5 mass 
spectrometer, getting measured isotope ratios in 
the mixture. 
Treatment of results. 
Validation of the certified values 
For evaluation of the certified 
characteristics molar ratios of isotopes 
233u;236u, 235u;236u, 238u;236u in the mixture 
the calculation method described in /1/ was used. 
In this case reo 4383-88 was considered as 
sample with Known isotope composition, and 
reo 2702-83, as RH - internal standard. lt 
le possible to write on the basis of the 
material balance equation /1, 5/: 
6 3/6 3/6 5/6 5/6 8/6 8/6 
Nh Rm- Rt Rm- Rt Rm- Rt 
= ---------- = 
----------
= ---------- ( 12) 
6 3/6 3/6 5/6 5/6 6/6 8/6 
Nt Rn - Rm Rn- Rm Rn - Rm 
where Nn6• Nt6 - the numbers of moles of 
uranium-236 in the sample and the RM, 
Rnil j , Rtil j , Rmil j - the isotope ratios 
in the sample, the RM and the mixture. 
The relation between the "true" Ril j and the 
measured Ril j 11ratios is given by the expressions, 
for instance, for Ri16: 
were 
mass 
i/6 i/611 
Rn ; Rn (1 + Ai/6 Fn (13) 
i/6 i/611 
Rm ; Rm (1 + Ai/6 Fm ) (14) 
A- the difference between the 
numbers of the denominator 
isotope 
and the 
numerator, 
F n• F m the discrimination coefficients 
per a unit of mass difference for the sample 
and the mixture. 
Substituting (13) and (14) into (12) we 
obtain a system of 3 linear equations with 3 
unKnowns Nn6/Nt6, Fn, Fm solved which find Rmi/6, 
The calculation procedure is described in detail 
in /5/. The results of the calculation, the 
corrected ("true") isotope ratios in the mixture 
are given in Table 6. 
Estjmat;on of the certified values errors 
The random error was estimated on the base of 
the results of certifica"tion analysis (Table 6) 
and formulas (2) and (3). The data were checKed 
against the hypotheses about uniformity of 
variances and mean values. The confidence limits 
of the random errors for isotope ratios in the 
mixture were 
(233/236) ; 0.00016, 
(234/236) ; 0.00006, 
(235/236) 
= 0.00012, 
(236/236) ; 0.00012. 
The systematic error In this case was caused 
by the errors of the certified characteristics of 
reo 2702-63, the mixture's component used as 
the internal standard in the certification 
calculations. The systematic error was estimated 
in the way described in /5/. lt was supposed 
that the molar fractions of isotopes in reo 
2702-63 were random values having normal 
distribution with mean values Indicated in the 
certificate (Table 5) and SO equal to the errors 
of the certified molar fractions. Drawing by 
means of a random number generator the values of 
the isotopes' molar fractions independent of one 
another, thus we obtained a "set" of reference 
materials (internal standards). The whole "set" 
of internal standards (about 200 values) was used 
;n calculation for the sample (reo 4363-66) 
and the mixture with present isotope 
compositions. 
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Table 6 
Results of analysis of the mixture 
Measured isotope ratios in the mixture 
Ml>· 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Mean 
SD 
233/236 
1.0094 
1.0095 
1.0107 
1.0105 
1.0096 
1.0090 
1.0061 
1.0095 
0.0009 
234/236 
0.03462 
0.03473 
0.03460 
0.03459 
0.03472 
0.03462 
0.03460 
0.03464 
0.00006 
235/236 
0.95645 
0.95639 
0.95667 
0.95653 
0.95619 
0.95659 
0.95566 
0.95641 
0.0003 
236/23€ 
0.95576 
0.95525 
0.95444 
0.95474 
0.95523 
0.95563 
0.95577 
0.95526 
0.0005 
corrected Isotope ratios in the mixture 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
233/236 
1.0066 
1.0064 
1.0063 
1.0066 
1.0067 
1.0062 
1.0062 
Mean 1.0065 
so 0.0003 
234/236 
0.03460 
0.03472 
0.03454 
0.03455 
0.03470 
0.03460 
0.03460 
0.03462 
0.00007 
235/236 
0.95626 
0.95606 
0.95610 
0.95596 
0.95591 
0.95632 
0.95569 
0.95607 
0.00017 
236/236 
0.95613 
0.95592 
0.95597 
0.95564 
0.95576 
0.95616 
0.95575 
0.95593 
0.00017 
As the result of the calculation a "set" of 
values Rmi/6 for the mixture was received, the 
number of the values Rmi/6 being equal to the 
number of used internal standards. 
The values of so calculated for the obtained 
Rmi/6 were considered as the estimations of 
the systematic errors of the isotope ratios in 
the mixture. They were 
8(233/236) 0.00033, 
8(234/236) = 0.00019, 
8(235/236) = 0.00020, 
9(236/236) : 0.00020. 
The total errors of the isotope ratios were 
calculated by means of formula (5), 
Table 7 
Certified values of RM of isotope ratios 
233u;236u 234u;236u 235l.J;236u 236u;236u 
Molar 1.0065 0.03462 0.95607 0.95593 
ratio 
Total 0.0004 0.00021 0.00023 0.00023 
error 
The certified values of the molar ratios 
233u;236u, 234u;236u, 235u;236u, 236u;236u, and 
their total errors for a probability 0.95 are 
given in Table 7. 
The RM of isotope ratios has been registered 
as a branch RM oco 95.060-89. 
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ELIMINATION DES CHLORURES DANS LA METHODE DE 
DOSAGE PRECIS DE L'URANIUM OU DU PLUTONIUM, 
UTILISANT LES IONS TITANEUX COMME REDUCTEUR 
Ch. Nicol, J.F. Wagner 
Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique 
Centre d'Etudes de Fontenay-aux-Roses- France 
Abstract 
The Corpe! and Regnaud's procedure for the 
precise determination of uranium and plutonium, 
using titanous (III) chloride as reductant has been 
modified in arder to be compatible with the throwing 
out standards in nuclear plants. 
The removal of chloride reagents has been 
studied. On the original method, there are two: lita-
nous chloride and ferric chloride. 
We propose titanous sulphate and ferric nitrate 
as substitution reagents. 
As commercial titanous sulphate can't be found, 
an easy procedure has been set and described with 
storage conditions : experimental conditions have 
been optimized and adapted for manufacturing on a 
laboratory scale. 
1. Introduction 
L'enjeu économique, le respect de l'environne-
ment et la sécurité en entreprise rendent de plus en 
plus nécessaire un contrôle analytique précis des 
procédés industriels. 
Par les risques supplémentaires qui lui sont 
propres (sûreté, criticité), l'industrie nucléaire est 
sans doute parmi les plus exigeantes dans ce 
domaine. Ainsi, les matières nucléaires sont l'objet 
de contrôles nationaux et internationaux, assurant la 
validité des mesures de l'exploitant. Ces analyses 
sont obtenues par des méthodes physiques, de plus 
en plus utilisées aujourd'hui, mais aussi chimiques 
qui, comme le montre cet article, présentent:toujours 
un intérêt certain. Au CEN/FAR, le Laboratoire de 
Métrologie des Matières Nucléaires (LAMMAN) 
dont les compétences dans le domaine de l'analyse 
précise sont reconnues, utilise de façon courante des 
méthodes chimiques pour les dosages précis de 
l'uranium et du plutonium. Pour adapter ces 
méthodes à l'évolution des normes dans les 
installations nucléaires, de nouvelles procédures de 
mise en oeuvre de ces méthodes ont été mises au 
point ; c'est le cas de la méthode d'analyse précise de 
l'uranium et du plutonium, utilisant les ions titaneux 
comme réducteur, dans laquelle l'utilisation des ions 
chlorure a été éliminée. 
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2. Intérêt de l'analyse chimique 
Prenons l'exemple des installations de retraite-
ment : tout le long du procédé, des contrôles analy-
tiques destinés à en vérifier le bon fonctionnement 
sont installés. 
Toutes ces analyses sont évidemment coûteuses 
et la tendance actuelle est de développer des 
méthodes non-destructives utilisables en contrôle en 
ligne, celui-ci présentant le double avantage d'être 
auto01atisé et de ne pas produire d'effluents. 
Cependant, la détection de dérive est difficile et 
la précision est souvent moins bonne que celle des 
méthodes chimiques concurrentes; d'ailleurs, les 
méthodes physiques sont en général étalonnées au 
moyen de références préparées par chimie. 
En pratique, les méthodes destructives sont 
encore les méthodes de choix pour les mesures liées 
aux bilans. 
En effet, à ce stade du procédé, l'objectif est de 
comptabiliser le plus précisément possible la masse 
de matière. Celle-ci est estimée à partir de la 
relation: 
M C x~ xV 
où: 
Ç est la concentration massique de la solution, 
() est la masse volumique de la solution, 
V est le volume de solution contenu dans la cuve. 
A titre d'exemple, une incertitude de 1 % sur 
une tonne de matière correspond à 10 kg, ce qui est 
inacceptable. Les performances actuelles sont de 
l'ordre de 0,1 % en valeur relative, soit 1 kg pour 1 
tonne /1/ et /2/. 
L'objectif visé pour l'avenir est d'obtenir une 
incertitude relative de 0,01 %, soit 100 g pour 1 
tonne. 
Il est clair que pour obtenir la meilleure préci-
sion sur la masse, chaque facteur doit être minimisé. 
Les performances actuelles de chacun d'entre-eux 
sont de l'ordre de: 
5.1Q-2 % pour la mesure de la masse volumique et 
du volume, 
5.10-2 % à 10-1 % pour la mesure de la 
concentration selon les conditions opératoires. 
La substitution de ces réactifs pouvant entraîner 
une diminution des performances des analyses 
précises, nous avons étudié leur effet sur les résultats 
de dosage, en terme de reproductibilité. 
Remplacement du chlorure titaneux 
La majeure partie de l'étude a consisté à 
optimiser le mode opératoire de préparation de 
sulfate titaneux. L'objectif est d'obtenir une solution 
de titane (III) suffisamment concentrée, de concen-
tration équivalente au chlorure 1itaneux, c'est-à-dire 
environ molaire, et suffisamment stable dans Je 
temps, tout en s'assurant que les modifications 
apportées n'ont pas une influence néfaste sur les 
performances du dosage : 
blanc faible et reproductif, 
dosage le plus exact et reproductible possibles. 
Le principe de préparation consiste en une oxy-
dation ménagée de titane métal par de l'acide sulfu-
rique 3M. 
Les différents paramètres mis en jeu dans celle 
dissolution oxydante ont été testés : 
température et temps d'attaque, 
concentration en acide sulfurique, 
rapport "masse titane/ volume d'acide". 
L'exploitation des résultats par une analyse de 
variance montre que les conditions de mise en 
solution n'influencent pas la qualité des dosages : 
exactitude et reproductibilité sont comparables, voire 
meilleures que celles obtenues avec TiC13. 
Ainsi, dans le cas du dosage de l'uranium : 
l'intervalle de confiance du blanc de réactifs est 
(0,1350 ± 0,0036)g de solution cérique, alors que 
pour les dosages d'uranium, on utilise environ 
50 g de Ce(IV) ; le blanc n'entraîne pas 
d'incertitude notable sur le dosage ; 
la reproductibilité du dosage de l'uranium est de 
l'ordre de 0,1% en valeur relative pour 4 à 5 
essais. 
Néanmoins, pour obtenir une solution d'ions 
titaneux suffisamment concentrée (- 1 mol.J-1) toul 
en disposant des quantités de réactifs nécessaires à 
des dosages de routine (par exemple 250 ml), les 
conditions de mise en solution sont plus restrictives. 
Un mode opératoire, facile à mettre en oeuvre, 
a été défini pour préparer des lots de 250 ml de 
solution de Ti(III) de capacité réductrice suffisante. 
Il consiste en une attaque à chaud, en milieu 
sulfurique 3M, de titane métal de grande pureté 
(99,98 %) ; on procède en deux paliers de 
température : le premier palier, à faible température 
(- 50°C), permet de déliter l'éponge de titane et 
facilite ainsi la mise en solution durant le deuxième 
palier à température plus élevée (- 80°C). 
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Stockage des solutions d'ions titaneux 
L'étude de la variation de la capacité réductrice 
en fonction du temps, dans différentes conditions de 
conditionnement, montre qu'il est souhaitable de 
fractionner la solution de Ti(III), une fois filtrée, en 
flacons de 25 ou 50 ml (selon les besoins du 
laboratoire), bien remplis et protégés de la lumière 
(cf. figure 1). 
1.2 ....-----------.., 
. ............... , .. ,0 ....... u···············O····o· 
1 x {1) 
0.8 -
"""' s 0.6 
~·0.4 
0.2 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
0 10 20 30 40 50 
Temp.:; (jours) 
(1) Solution conservée à l'abri de l'air (c'est-à-dire dans un flacon 
bien rempli) 
(2) Solution conservée sans précautions particulières (c'est-à-dire 
dans un flacon peu rempli) 
Figure 1 : Variation de la capacité réductrice de 
solution de Ti(Ill) conservées dans 
différentes conditions (1) et (2), en 
fonction du temps. 
Remplacement du chlorure ferrique par le nitrate 
ferrique 
Une étude systématique a été menée dans le cas 
du dosage de l'uranium. Elle montre que le rempla-
cement du chlorure ferrique par du nitrate ferrique 
de concentration équivalente (soit 1,7 mol.l-1 
environ) n'altère ni la justesse, ni la reproductibilité 
des dosages (cf. tableaux 1 et 2). 
Moyenne* Ecart -type** 
(g) (g) 
FeC13 0.2185 0.0106 
Fe(N03h 0.2025 0.0039 
Masse moyenne, sur 5 mesures, de solution cérique consom-
mée pour le dosage du blanc 
• • Ecart-type correspondant 
Tableau 1 : Comparaison du blanc de réactif obtenu 
en utilisant soit du chlorure ferrique, 
soit du nitrate ferrique 
Cette remarque montre qu'il est nécessaire de 
disposer de mesures les plus précises possibles pour 
la concentration massique, le volume et la masse 
volumique. 
3. Le Laboratoire de Métrologie 
En réponse à ées besoins, le CEA a créé une 
structure : le Laboratoire de Métrologie des 
Matières Nucléaires (LAMMAN), dont quelques 
unes des réalisations marquantes sont résumées ici : 
préparation et conditionnement en ampoules de 
verre scellées d'échantillons de référence pour 
des circuits interlaboratoires, à la demande de la 
CETAMA (circuit EQRAIN), 
préparation et conditionnement de solutions de 
référence "secondaires", pour étalonner des 
méthodes d'analyse (réalisations pour l'IPSN, 
EURATOM, ... ), 
participation à la certification de matériau de 
référence dans le cadre de la CET AMA, 
mesures de volumes de cuves et de masses volu-
miques pour COGEMA, en collaboration avec 
l'IPSN. 
Evidemment, l'amélioration des performances 
des méthodes est un souci permanent. 
Les principales caractéristiques qui rendent 
compte des performances des analyses précises sont : 
la justesse, 
la reproductibilité. 
sachant que l'objectif final est de déterminer la 
concentration massique à mieux que 0,1 % en valeur 
relative. 
Pour maintenir, voire améliorer, les perfor-
mances d'une méthode analytique, ces deux facteurs 
doivent être maîtrisés. Comment cela est-il réalisé en 
pratique? 
Une des premières conditions est d'utiliser une 
méthode éprouvée. Tout particulièrement pour 
maîtriser le critère de reproductibilité, il faut 
travailler toujours dans les mêmes conditions 
parfaitement définies, avec des opérateurs bien 
formés et soucieux des précautions à suivre. 
En ce qui concerne le critère de justesse, il faut 
utiliser une méthode de traçabilité démontrée, c'est-
à-dire qui se réfère à des étalons primaires élaborés 
par des laboratoires reconnus /3/. 
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4. Adaptation de la méthode d'analyse précise 
Principe de la méthode 
' Nous allons maintenant illustrer ces idées par 
l'exemple d'une des principales méthodes d'analyse 
précise de l'uranium ct du plutonium, utilisée dans 
notre laboratoire. C'est la méthode Corpe! et 
Regnaud, dite "méthode au titane", qui met en jeu le 
couple rédox Pu(III)/Pu(IV) et U(IV)/U(VI) /4/ et 
/5/. 
Le principe de la méthode est résumé ici dans 
l'exemple de l'uranium. Les étapes suivantes sont 
successivement mises en jeu : 
réduction de l'uranium au degré d'oxydation 
+ IV, en milieu sulfonitrique, par du chlorure 
titaneux ajouté en excès, et destruction de l'excès 
de Ti(III) par les ions nitrate, 
oxydation de l'U(IV) par les ions ferriques et 
dosage des ions ferreux produits, 
titFage au moyen d'une solution cérique étalon-
née ; le point équivalent est détecté photométri-
quement par décoloration de l'orthophénanthro-
line ferreuse. 
Les permormances de la méthode, sont les sui-
vantes: 
sur une moyenne de 5 mesures, l'intervalle de 
confiance de la concentration massique de la 
solution considérée est déterminé à mieux que 
0,1 % en valeur relative (probabilité : 0,95), les 
prises d'essais étant comprises entre 40 et 80 mg 
de matière, 
sur des séries plus importantes de mesures, on 
peut obtenir des résultats à quelques 10-2 %. 
L'inconvénient de cette méthode est qu'elle 
produit des efOuents chlorés qui proviennent de 
certains réactifs utilisés, à savoir le chlorure titaneux 
et le chlorure ferrique, ce qui la rend incompatible 
avec les normes de rejets des installations nucléaires. 
En outre, la qualité des lots commerciaux de 
chlorure titaneux est apparue moins satisfaisante 
qu'auparavant: en particulier, la reproductibilité des 
"blancs" de réactifs s'est dégradée, ce qui altère les 
performances de la méthode. 
Afin de rendre cette méthode compatible avec 
les normes de rejets des installations nucléaires vis-à-
vis des ions chlorure, nous avons étudié le rempla-
cement de ces réactifs chlorés. 
Moyenne* Ecart-type** 
(g) (g) 
FeC13 5.291 0.0096 
Fe(N03)J 5.2907 0.0072 
• Masse moyenne, sur 5 mesures, de solution cérique consom-
mée pour le dosage du blanc. 
Ecart-type correspondant. 
Tableau 2 : Comparaison du dosage d'une solution 
de référence d'uranium, de concen-
tration massique égale ((5,29 ± 0,01) 
g.kg-1, en utilisant soit du chlorure, soit 
du nitrate ferrique 
5. Conclusion 
L'élimination des ions chlorure dans la méthode 
de dosage précis du plutonium ou de l'uranium est 
une avancée importante puisqu'elle permet de mini-
miser les problèmes induits par la gestion ultérieure 
des effluents, sans en altérer les performances. 
Le mode opératoire de préparation de sulfate 
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titaneux est simple à mettre en oeuvre et adapté à la· 
préparation des quantités nécessaires aux dosages de 
routine. 
Celte méthode de dosage est à préconiser en 
usine pour les analyse de bilan des produits finis 
(Pu02 et nitrate d'uranyle), en remplacement de la 
méthode CuCl (pour le Pu02) qui est responsable à 
l'heure actuelle de 20 à 25 % des effluents chlorés 
des usines. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF ISOTOPE DILUTION GAMMA-RAY SPECffiOMETRY 
FOR PLUTONIUM ANALYSIS* 
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We are studying the feasibility of determining the plu-
tonium concentration and isotopic distribution of highly 
radioactive, spent-fuel dissolver solutions by employing 
high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometry. The study 
involves gamma-ray plutonium isotopic analysis for both 
dissolver and spiked dissolver solution samples, after plu-
tonium is eluted through an ion-exchange column and 
absorbed in a small resin bead bag. The spike is well 
characterized, dry plutonium containing -98% of239Pu. By 
using measured isotopic information, the concentration of 
elemental plutonium in the dissolver solution can be deter-
mined. Both the plutonium concentration and the isotopic 
composition of the dissolver solution obtained from this 
study agree well with values obtained by traditional isotope 
dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS). Because it is rapid, 
easy to operate and maintain, and costs less, this new tech-
nique could be an alternative method to IDMS for input 
accountability and verification measurements in reprocessing 
plants. 
1. Introduction 
Isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) has long 
been the most accepted technique for determining the pluto-
nium content of input spent-fuel dissolver solutions in repro-
cessing plants./1/ However, IDMS is time consuming, 
sample preparation is lengthy, and the equipment and opera-
tion are costly. Recently, a hybrid K-edge and K x-ray fluo-
rescence (XRF) densitometer for determining the uranium 
and plutonium element concentrations of dissolver solutions 
was developed at Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe./2/ 
However, the hybrid instrument does not measure isotopic 
compositions. To avoid IDMS's disadvantages, but yet 
deliver acceptable measurement accuracy and precision, and 
to complement the hybrid K-edge/K-XRF measurement of 
plutonium concentration, we are developing a new tech-
nique-isotope dilution gamma-ray spectrometry (IDGS)-
for simultaneously measurin~ the plutonium concentration 
and isotopic composition of htghly radioactive fuel-dissolver 
solutions. IDGS is similar to IDMS except that the isotopic 
distributions of both unspiked (unknown dissolver solution) 
and spiked (by adding to the dissolver solution a spike of 
well-characterized plutonium) samples are measured by 
high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometry rather than mass 
spectrometry, and that sample preparation is simpler for 
IDGS. Gamma-ray measurements of highly radioactive 
dissolver solutions from reprocessing plants require rapid 
and efficient separation of plutonium from fission products 
and other actinides. A two step ion-exchange separation was 
*This work is supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, 
Office of Safeguards and Security, in cooperation with the 
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation 
of Japan. 
175 
developed to obtain satisfactory purification and recovery of 
plutonium for the IDGS measurement. Spectral analysis for 
the required full-energy peak areas and isotope ratios is 
accomQlished by well-established methods. The isotopes 
236pu, 238Pu, 239Pu, and 240pu are all good candidates as a 
known spike for the IDGS technique. However, for reasons 
of cost and availability, 239pu is the best choice. Two 
proof-of-principle experiments have been carried out at the 
Tokai Reprocessing Plant. We used large-size dry (LSD) 
spikes of 239pu (97.9%), prepared by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency's (!AEA) Safeguards Analytical 
Laboratory (SAL), for our experiments./3/ Their certified 
isotopic compositions (in weight percent) are listed in 
Table I. 
This paper describes IDGS measurement principles 
and the preparation of the resin bead sample, and discusses 
plutonium element concentrations and isotopic compositions 
of dissolver solutions obtained by IDGS. 
2. Measurement Principles 
Plutonium Isotopic Composition 
The measurement method of plutonium isotopic ratios 
is based on high-resolution, gamma-ray spectrometry tech-
niques. In general, the atom ratio N(m)IN(n) of two iso-
topes m and n can be determined by measuring their respec-
tive gan1ma rays a and b. 
where A 
I 
Tl/2 
e 
TABLE I. 
Isotope 
238pu 
239pu 
240pu 
24Ipu 
242pu 
(1) 
full-energy peak areas, 
absolute emission probability of gamma 
rays, 
half-life of isotope, and 
= relative efficiency of selected gamma 
rays, including detector intrinsic effi-
ciency, counting geometry, and attenua-
tion. 
Plutonium Isotopic Abundances (wt %) of 
LSD Spikes 
I st l!xpcnmcnt [2ll<! l!XllCflmcnt 
0.00245 0.00247 
97.921 97.914 
2.0604 2.0628 
0.0141 0.0138 
0.00132 0.00543 
Because of the small sample volumes (containing less 
than 1 mg of plutonium) in these experiments, the isotopic 
ratios 23"8puJ239pu, 240p\IJ239pu, and 241 Puj239pu are 
determined by measuring the high-intensity, low-energy 
gamma-ray ratios 43.48 keY/51.63 keY, 45.23 
keY/51.63 keY, and 148.6 keY/ 129.3 keY, respectively 
/4,5/. The absolute 238Pu, 239Pu, 240~u, and 24 Pu _fr~c­
tions in the sample can then be determmed by comb~mn_g 
isotopic ratios and correcting ~or the 242~u content, which 1s 
predicted by isotope correlatiOn techmques /6/, that work 
well for material from known reactor types. All gamma-ray 
peak areas are calcul~ted ~y using a. cha~nel-by-channel 
summation method with a lmear, straight-line background 
subtraction. Minor interferences in the full-energy peaks are 
taken into account in the assay equations. The E(b)/E(a) 
ratios are also determined from internal spectral information; 
the factors Lf(b)/l(a)] and LTI/2(m)ITJ/2(n)] are known and 
thus the R may be computed. 
Total Concentration of Plutonium 
By measuring the isotopic compositions of both 
unspiked and spiked dissolver solution_samples, the ~oncen­
tration of plutonium in the. unknown d1ssolver ~olution, ~u. 
can be determined. Let W1, C, and V be the weight fraction 
of isotope i, concentration (g/l), and volume (l), respec-
tively, and the subscripts u, s, and m stand ~or the unsp~ked 
sample (dissolver solution), spike (LSD spike), and sp_Iked 
sample (mixture of dissolver solution and LSD spike), 
respectively. Assuming frr~t a mixtu~e of sp~e solu~~n and 
unknown solution, the weight fraction of Isotope l m the 
spiked (mixed) samples is 
(2) 
This is the basic isotope dilution relation. However, in 
applying the IDGS method to the plutonium conce1_1trati_on <;>f 
dissolver solutions it is advantageous to work pnmanl~ m 
terms of isotopic ratios. The reason for this is that 24 Pu 
does not emit a usable gamma ray and its normally small 
fraction must be estimated by a correlation technique in order 
to convert the directly and accurately measured isotoJric 
ratios to absolute fractions. Furthermore, when using 23 Pu 
as the spike we get optimal results when using the 
240puf239pu ratio. Thus, using i = 0 for 240pu and i = 9 for 
239Pu, we use Eq. (2) to write 
Wh't _ W~ Cs Vs + W3 Cu Vu 
W~ - Wi Cs Vs+ W~ Cu Vu (3) 
Solving for the plutonium concentration of the 
unknown dissolver solution, Cu. we obtain n I 
(4) 
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where Ms Mass of plutonium in the spike, 
W£!W~. the 240puf239pu ratio in the 
spiked sample, 
www.?. the 240puf239pu ratio in the 
spike, and 
W9JW3, the 240puj239pu ratio in the dis-
solver solution sample. 
In this equation, the values of Ms, WJ, Rs, and Vu are 
known. Therefore, only the values of Ru and Wi in. the 
unspiked dissolver-solution sample and Rm in the spiked 
sample need to be measured by gamma-ray spectrometry. 
The precision and accu_racy t~ be expected from. IDGS 
measurements of Cu are obviOusly Important. There IS con-
fidence that the random and systematic errors of Ms, Vu. 
W9, and Rs are all <0.1 %. Preliminary results indicate that th~ systematic error in Cu introduced by the g~mma-ray 
spectrometric measurements of Rm, Ru, an~ .wr IS a small 
fraction of a percent. The random errors ansmg m the mea-
surements of Rm, Ru, and Wi will dominate the preci~i<;>n. 
An approximate expressi~:m! of reasonable ac.curacy, glVlng 
the relative standard deviation (RSD) of C u m terms of the 
RSDs of Rm, Ru. and Wi can be easily derived. Ru and 
Wi are not fully independent statistically because of the way 
their values are extracted from the gamma-ray spectra, but 
they are "near independent." If we .as~ume independence 
and propagate by usual methods we obtain 
This expression is slightly conservative and quite acc':lfate 
when compared to results of RSDs computed from replicate 
assays. The analysis routines that produce Rm, Ru. and Wi 
also give good estimates of their RSDs for use in Eq. (5). 
3. Resin Bead Sample Preparation 
Two proof-of-principle experiments have been carried 
out at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant. Because IDGS mea-
surements of highly radioactive dissolver solutions require 
rapid and efficient separation of plutonium from fission 
products and other actinides, _we have developed a t'Yo-step 
ion-exchange method to punfy and recover plutomum on 
resin beads. The procedure for preparing the resin bead 
sample is shown in Fig. 1 for the sp~ed samp~e (solid line) 
and the unspiked sample (dashed line). Spiked samples 
were prepared by mixing dissolver solutions (1 ml) with 
LSD spikes and then completely dissolving them at 90°C 
with 3 M HN03 (5 M HN03 and 0.01 M HF were used in 
the first experiment). After evaporation and redissolution 
with 8 M HN03, plutonium in spiked solutions was com-
pletely adjusted to tetra-va_lency wi~h Fe(I9 and Na_N02. 
Because the dissolver solution used m the fmt expenment 
was over one month old, the valency was not adjusted. For 
each batch of dissolver solution, a 1-ml aliquot was also 
taken as an unspiked sample to be used for the plutonium 
isotopic composition measurement. Each spiked and 
unspiked sample was split into two or more subsamples. 
Each subsample was individually passed through the anion 
exchanger column (BIO-RAD AG-MP1 N03 form, 0.5 ml, 
5 mm$), followed by washing with 8 M HN03 to remove 
fission products and americium and. 3 M HN03 to :emove 
uranium. To better separate plutomum, we approximately 
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Fig. 1. The resin bead sample preparation procedure used in the second 
experiment for the spiked (solid line) and unspiked (dashed line) 
samples. This procedure is slightly different from the first experiment 
described in the text. 
doubled the amount of 8 M HN03 solution used in the sec-
ond experiment. Plutonium was eluted with 0.01 M HN03, 
the acidity was adjusted with 8 M HN03, and the plutonium 
was then absorbed on resin beads contained in small gauze 
bags. Each resin bead sample was placed in a plastic bag, 
removed from the glove box, and placed directly against the 
end cap of the high-purity germanium detector for gamma-
ray measurements. The sample preparation flow originally 
proposed had been such that a certain amount of resins con-
taining plutonium were taken from the ion exchange column 
for gamma measurement. It was, however, found that 
ruthenium, one of the major fission products, was hardly 
rinsed from the first stage of the ion separation. Therefore, 
the idea of plutonium elution-reabsorption mentioned above 
was adopted. 
In the first experiment, we spiked four 1ml samples of 
input dissolver solution from one batch with four LSD 
spikes. Each LSD spike contained -4.5 mg of plutonium. 
In the second experiment, six spiked samples were made 
from three different batches of dissolver solution. Two 
1-ml dissolver-solution samples from each batch were 
individually spiked to make six spiked samples. The mass 
of plutonium in each spike was -2 mg. The spike-to-dis-
solver-solution plutonium ratio changed from -4:1 in the 
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first experiment to -2:1 in the second experiment to decrease 
the amount of spike used. In addition to plutonium masses, 
isotopic compositions of the spikes were also slightly differ-
ent in the two experiments as shown in Table I. 
4. Results and Discussion 
Plutonium Isotopic Compositions 
Figure 2 shows the low-energy gamma-ray spectra of 
(a) the pure LSD spike, (b) the unspiked (unknown) dis-
solver solution, and (c) the spiked dissolver solution from 
the first experiment. Notice the dramatic differences in 
gamma-ray intensities among the three samples. In the sec-
ond experiment, gamma-ray peaks of 239pu (at 38.66 and 
51.63 keY) are relatively smaller compared to gamma-ray 
peaks of 238pu (43.48 keY) and 240pu (45.23 keY) because 
of the smaller spike-to-dissolver solution ratio. Table II 
shows the gamma-ray plutonium isotopic compositions (in 
weight percent) for the dissolver solutions. All IDGS data 
shown are averages from two or three independent mea-
surements of subsamples. A few subsamples of sample 1 in 
the first experiment were contaminated by fission products; 
data from these are not included in the averages. The K 
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Fig. 2. Low-energy gamma-ray spectra of (a) pure LSD 
spike, (b) unspiked dissolver solution, and 
(c) spiked resin bead samples in the first 
experiment. 
Table II. Plutonium Isotopic Abundances (wt %) of 
Dissolver Solutions as Determined by IDGS 
Batch 
No. 
238pu 239pu 240pu 24lpu 242pu 
1 1.50 56.68 27.02 9.62 5.18 
2 1.50 56.63 27.14 9.56 5.18 
3 1.53 58.22 25.13 10.25 4.87 
4 1.55 56.63 26.75 9.83 5.25 
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x-rays from fission products directly interfere with the pluto-
nium low-energy gamma rays to affect the accuracy of the 
measurement. Furthermore, the dramatically increased con-
tinuum background produced by higher energy gamma rays 
from fission products reduces the precision of measurement 
for a given counting time and geometry for the same mass of 
plutonium. Figure 3 shows a comparison of the low-energy 
gamma-ray spectrum from a fission-product-contaminated 
resin bead sample (dotted spectrum) with the spectrum from 
the same sample after it was rewashed to remove fission 
products. No low-energy gamma rays from fission products 
interfered in the second experiment (samples 2-4). This may 
be due to the double amount of 8 M HN03 solution used in 
the fission-product washings. However, some weak high-
energy gamma rays from ruthenium that produce a higher 
continuum background were observed in spectra in both 
experiments. Figure 4 compares a dissolver solution spec-
trum with the higher continuum background with a pure 
LSD spike spectrum. 
Table III(A) shows the comparison of the plutonium 
isotopic compositions of dissolver solution as determined by 
IDGS and IDMS. The agreement between IDGS and IDMS 
is generally good, especially so for the 240PuJ239pu ratio 
(average IDGS/IDMS ratio is 0.993) and the weight percent 
of 239pu (average IDGS/IDMS ratio is 0.999), which are 
important for calculating the total plutonium concentration. 
Using Table III(B) we can compare the IDGS and IDMS 
plutonium isotopic measurements of the pure LSD spike 
used in the second experiment. The agreement between the 
IDGS method and the IDMS method is excellent except for 
241 Pu, which has a very low fraction in the spike. Of 
course, gamma-ray measurements of the isotopic fractions in 
the spike need not be made, but were made in this case to 
increase confidence in the gamma-ray plutonium isotopic 
measurements. 
Total Plutonium Concentration 
From Eq. (4), the total plutonium element concentra-
tion of the unknown dissolver solution can be calculated by 
using measured 240puj239pu values for the spiked solution 
(Rm) and for the unspiked dissolver solution (Ru), the mea-
sured weight percent of 239pu in the unspiked dissolver 
solution (Wff), and certified values for wJ and 240puJ239pu 
(Rs) for the LSD spike. The results of the plutonium ele-
ment concentrations from IDGS and IDMS are compared in 
Table IV. The average IDGS/lDMS ratio is 1.0005 and the 
sample RSD of the average ratio is 0.12%, indicating that 
any bias between IDMS and IDGS methods is ~0.2%. 
Because each of the 10 IDGS plutonium concentration val-
ues in Table IV was computed from the average isotope 
ratios from an unequal number of counts of varying times, 
the sample RSD of the 10 ratios just mentioned says little 
about the precision of single measurements. The precision 
will be a function of sample plutonium masses, detector 
efficiencies, count times, and isotopic distributions. For the 
1 OOO-mm2 detector used, with -Q.5 mg of plutonium in the 
spiked samples and -Q.2 mg of plutonium in the unspiked 
samples (although less than 60% was trapped on the resin 
beads), and 100-min counts on both spiked and unspiked 
resin bead samples, Eq. (5) estimates the RSD of the random 
error to be -1.2%. By optimizing the sample preparation 
and perhaps using somewhat larger samples of dissolver 
solution, the precision could be 1.0% for 1-h count times on 
both samples. 
5. Conclusions 
In summary, we have demonstrated for the first time 
the simultaneous determination of plutonium concentration 
and isotopic composition of spent-nuclear-fuel dissolver 
solutions from a reprocessing plant by the IDGS technique. 
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the low-energy gamma-ray spectrum from a fission-product-con-
taminated, unspiked resin bead sample (dotted spectrum) and from the same sample 
after the fission products were washed again (solid spectrum) . 
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Fig. 4. Comparison of continuum background in gamma-ray spectra of (a) LSD spike and 
(b) spiked dissolver solution resin bead samples. 
179 
TABLE III. Comparison of Plutonium Isotopic Abundances as Detennined by 
!DGS and IDMS 
IDGS/!DMS 
lllatch I 
No. 238pu 239pu 240pu 24lpu 242pu 240Puf239pu 
A. Dissolver Solution 
I 1.149 0.997 0.993 1.003 1.029 0.995 
2 1.152 0.996 0.997 0.996 1.028 1.000 
3 1.123 1.005 0.989 1.013 0.950 0.984 
4 1.125 0.997 0.991 1.007 1.034 0.994 
Av 1.137 0.999 0.993 1.005 1.010 0.993 
B. LSD Spike 
0.984 1.000 1.001 1.275 - 1.001 
TABLE IV. Comparison of Total Plutonium Concentrations of 
Dissolver Solutions as Determined by IDGS and 
IDMS 
IDGS ID MS 
Sample (g PulL) (g PulL) IDGS/IDMS 
A. First Experiment 
1 0.9702 0.9769 0.9931 
2 0.9750 0.9778 0.9971 
3 0.9838 0.9822 1.0016 
4 0.9811 0.9806 1.0005 
Average 0.9991 
B. Second Experiment 
5 1.2968 1.298 0.9991 
6 1.2933 1.298 0.9964 
7 1.3852 1.375 1.0074 
8 1.3776 1.375 1.0019 
9 1.2713 1.266 1.0042 
10 1.2708 1.266 1.0038 
Average ~.0021 
Because IDGS is adequately accurate and precise, easy to 
operate and maintain, and costs less than IDMS, this new 
technique could be implemented as an alternative method for 
input accountability and verification measurements in repro-
cessing plants. It could also complement K-edge/K-XRF 
measurement of plutonium concentration by providing the 
isotopic distributions of dissolver solutions. In this case, 
because only dissolver solution is to be measured and ana-
lyzed, no spiked sample is involved. The IDGS technique 
may also provide useful accountability and verification 
information on intermediate-process and hot-waste-streams, 
which are important for near-real-time accounting at repro-
cessing plants. 
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IDGS could also be a potential on-site verification 
method for IAEA inspections. At present, spiked and un-
spiked aliquots from each dissolver batch are prepared by the 
plant operators and given to the inspectors for shipping to 
the SAL for IDMS analysis. The turnaround time in getting 
the results of these analyses is usually more than one month 
because of difficulties in shipping plutonium-bearing sam-
ples. A simple, prompt, verification analysis for each dis-
solver batch that could be done at reprocessing plants would 
be important. By implementing the IDGS technique for on-
site verification, the IAEA and domestic inspectors could 
promptly detect anomalies and significantly reduce the num-
ber of samples sent to the SAL for IDMS analysis. 
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Abstract 
After the interruption of the SALE 
Programme, CBNM has established a Regular 
);;.uropean Interlaboratory Measurement !;;_valuation 
Erogramme (REIMEP) with the support of the 
ESARDA Working Group for Techniques and 
Standards for Destructive Analysis (WGDA), the 
ESARDA Working Group for Techniques and 
Standards for Non-Destructive Analysis (WGNDA) 
and the !AEA. 
On the basis of a questionnaire with 
answers from 41 laboratories, 36 laboratories 
have announced their interest for such a 
programme. In this paper we report on the 
1986/87 round of the programme establishing the 
measurement capability or ~state-Of-the­
Practice" in UF6 isotopic measurements by 
methods left at the discretion of the 
participants (thermal ionization mass 
spectrometry, electron impact mass spectrometry 
and gamma-ray spectrometry). 
Pictures of the "State-Of-the-Practice" 
are presented as graphs displaying 
participants' results. 
1. Introduction 
With the support of the ESARDA Working 
Group for Techniques and Standards for 
Destructive Analysis (WGDA), CBNM organized an 
Interlaboratory Measurement Evaluation 
Programme on UF6 in 1982 amongst UF6 
measurement laboratories in Western Europe and 
reported on it in 1983 /1/. 
The present paper reports on a similar 
programme carried out in 1986/87 as a part of a 
more general and regular programme called 
REIMEP (Regular g_uropean Interlaboratory 
Measurement g_valuation Erogramme). Through this 
programme, CBNM intends to provide nuclear 
analytical laboratories with a regular 
opportunity 
for an external check on the quality of 
their measurements; 
to establish the State-Of-the-Practice of 
assaying common nuclear materials for 
isotope and element content; 
to present a true picture of the real life 
interlaboratory spread of given measurements 
on given materials. 
This paper reports on the first UF6 round 
in REI MEP, ( "REIMEP UF6 1987"). As opposed to 
the previous UF6 interlaboratory evaluation 
programme /1/, participants could choose their 
methods to perform the UF6 isotopic 
measurements. 
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Consequently a number of y-ray spectrometry 
laboratories chose to participate with this 
technique. Some of them took the occasion to 
purchase or loan the EC NRM 171 Nuclear 
Reference Material set, (5 U308 "infinitely 
thick" layers in Al cans with 235u abundances 
from 0.3 % to 4.5 % certified to 0.07 % of 
values) /2/ in order to calibrate their 
measurements. Also some participants sent in 
results obtained by thermionic mass 
spectrometry. 
2. Participation List 
2.1 Participating laboratories with measurements 
by Mass Spectrometry. 
1. !AEA-SAL, Mr. Deron, 
Seibersdorf Austria 
2. CDTN-NUCLEBRAS, Mr. Campos, 
Belo Horizonte, Brazil 
3. Balzers, Mr. Rettinghaus, 
Balzers, Liechtenstein 
4. LCAC Grenoble, Mrs. Chaussabel, 
Grenoble, France 
5. COGEMA, Mr. Journoux, 
Pierrelatte, France 
6. FBFC, Mr. Navard, 
Romans, France 
7. Eurodif, Mr. Aubeau, 
Pierrelatte, France 
8. Urenco Deutschland, Mr. Abt, 
Gronau, FRG 
9. KfK, Mr. Bley, 
Karlsruhe, FRG 
10. RBU, Mr. von Wachtendonk, 
Hanau, FRG 
11. CEC-JRC, Mr. Guzzi, 
Ispra, Italy 
12. URENCO, Mr. Zeckendorf, 
Almelo, The Netherlands 
13. BNFL, Mr. Ogden, 
Capenhurst, United Kingdom 
14. BNFL, Mr. Hayes, 
Preston, United Kingdom 
15. NBL, Mr. Bingham, 
Argonne, USA 
16. Goodyear Atomic Corp., Mr. Vito, 
Piketon, Ohio USA 
17. M. Marietta En. Syst., Mr. Woolridge, 
Paducah, Ohio USA 
2.2 Participating laboratories with measurements 
by Gamma-Ray Spectrometry 
1. !AEA, Mr. Dragnev, 
Wien, Austria 
2. SCK/CEN, Mr. Fettweiss, 
Mol, Belgium 
3. BAM, Mr. Thiele, 
Berlin, FRG 
4. KfK, Mr. Ottmar, 
Karlsruhe, FRG 
5. ENEA, Mr. Cresti, 
Roma, Italy 
6. JRC, Mr. Guardini, 
Ispra, Italy 
7. ECN, Mr. Harry, 
Petten, The Netherlands 
8. NBL, Mr. Bingham, 
Argonne, USA 
9. LANL, Mr. Reilly, 
Los Alamos, USA 
10. M. Marietta En. Syst., Mr. Beverly, 
Paducah, Ohio USA 
3. Preparation of the Material Batch, 
Verification of its Isotopic Homogeneity and 
Verification of Sample Identity with regard to 
Isotopic Composition 
The UF6 material for this programme was 
prepared by mixing 2 UF6 materials of different 
isotopic composition, 235U/U = 0. 007 and 0. 05 
131, until it was homogeneous. This homogeneity 
was verified and results are shown in Fig. 3.1. 
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Fig. 3.1 - Verification of isotopic homogneity 
by sampling (157-267-262-89) during the 
distillation process and subsequent UF6 mass 
spectrometry 
To check the isotopic homogeneity of all 
samples issued UF6 mass spectrometry was used 
on the basis that it allows intercomparison of 
235u/238u ratios in two samples of materials 
with good prec1s1on (2s s 0.02 % of ratio 
value) /4/. The results are displayed in Fig. 
3.2 and allow to conclude to an isotopic 
homogeneity of the UF6 material as bottled of 
better than 0.02 % (2s). This is expressed as 
the possible maximum variability of the 
235U/238u ratios throughout all samples. 
Also, all samples intended for gamma-ray 
spectrometry were compared to each other by 
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Fig. 3.2 - Verification of isotopic identity 
(by UF6 mass spectrometry) of all samples 
distributed in the programme 
gamma-ray spectrometry. Results are displayed 
in Fig. 3.3. It can be concluded that the 
maximum variability of the apparent 235u 
abundance is 0.06 % (2s) as measured by gamma-
ray spectrometry. A full report is available 
separately /3/. 
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Fig. 3.3 - Verification of sample uniformity of 
all samples versus sample 4 by measuring the 
counting ratio of the 185.7 KeV gamma ray of 
235u 
4. Characterization of the Samples Distributed 
The material distributed was extensively 
characterized by UF6 /5/,/6/ and thermionic 
mass spectrometry /7/ at CBNM for all the 
quantities evaluated in this programme. The 
sample preparation and the measuring technique 
of both methods were different but gave the 
same results within the accuracy of the 
measurement. A conservative uncertainty range 
was placed on each "declared value" which 
contains all uncertainties from possible 
uncertainty components or corrections and of 
the Reference Materials or synthetic isotope 
mixtures used in the characterization process 
/8/. A full report on the characterization is 
available separately /3/. 
5. Description of the Samples for Gamma-Ray 
Measurements 
Details of the samples for gamma-ray 
measurements are given in Fig. 5. 1. Details of 
the accompanying calibration discs in monel and 
aluminium are given in Fig. 5.2. 
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Fig.5.1- UF6 sample 
y-ray spectrometric 
measurements 
Fig. 5.2 - Calibration 
disks 
A special note for gamma-ray participants 
was mailed with their sample, intending to 
assist them with their measurements. 
6. Results 
The results are graphically displayed in 
Figs. 6. 1 to 6. 8 They display the situation of 
measurements of various quantities. 
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molar isotope ratio 236u238u (mass 
spectrometry only) 
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ratio determinations 
7. Conclusions 
1. The 1987 State-Of-the-Practice of the molar 
isotope ratio and mass abundance determinations 
in lo~ enriched UF6 isotopic measurements by 
mass spectrometry can be summarized as follows 
(expressed as interlaboratory spread of 
participants• values computed on a 2s basis and 
as average deviation from the Reference Value): 
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Molar Spread Average 
Isotope (on 2s Basis Deviation from in % of Reference Ratio Value) in % of Value 
234u;238u ± 3.71 - 0.44 
235u;238u ± 0.05 + 0.01 
236u;238u ± 9.94 * + 1.41 * 
* caused by the result of one laboratory 
Isotope Spread Average (on 2s Basis Deviation from Abundance in % of Reference (mass %) Value) in % of Value 
234u ± 3.25 - 0.05 
235u ± 0.08 + 0.03 
236u ± 18.65 * - 3.41 * 
238u ± 0.004 - 4.46 X 10-4 
* caused by the result of one laboratory 
Spread Average 
Molar (on 2s Basis Deviation from 
Abundance in % of Reference 
Value) in % of Value 
235u;u ± 0.05 + 0.01 
2. The measurement capability for minor isotope 
abundance measurements is good and has been 
quantified. It is now usable for evaluating the 
usefulness of MIST (Minor Isotopes Safeguarding 
Technique). 
3. The 1987 State-Of-the-Practice of 235u;u 
abundances in low enriched UF6 isotopic 
measurements by gamma-ray spectrometry can be 
summarized as follows (expressed as 
inter laboratory spread of participants' values 
computed on a 2s basis and as average deviation 
from the Reference Value): 
* 
** 
Molar Spread (on Average 
Isotope 2s Basis Deviation from in % of Reference Abundance Value) in % of Value 
235u;u ± 0.98* - 0.21* 
± 0. 19** + 0.000 4** 
caused by the result of one laboratory 
not taking in account the previously 
cited one laboratory 
This 
accuracy 
previous 
increased 
Material. 
denotes a drastic improvement of the 
of gamma-ray spectrometry over the 
situation, possibly due to the 
use of the available Reference 
References 
/1/ P. De Bievre, W.H. Welters, 
G. Milschenborn, W. De Belle, Proc. 5th 
ESARDA Symposium, Versailles, France, 
April 1983 p. 177. 
121 P. De Bievre, H.L. Eschbach, R. Lesser, H. 
Meyer, J. Van Audenhove (CBNM), B.S. 
Carpenter (NBS), "235Uranium Isotope 
Abundance Certified Reference Material for 
Gamma Spectrometry. EC Nuclear Reference 
Material 171 Certification Report COM 
4153", available from CBNM. 
131 W. De Belle, R. Damen and W. Lycke, 
"Preparation, Isotopic Characterization 
and Verification of Isotopic Homogeneity 
of UF6 Material for the Regular European 
Interlaboratory Measurement Evaluation 
Programmes REIMEP", Internal Report, 
CBNM-R-MS-96-87. 
/4/ W. De Belle, G. Milschenborn and P. De 
Bievre, "The Potential of Double Collector 
UF6 Mass Spectrometry for Verification of 
185 
/5/ 
/6/ 
171 
/8/ 
Isotopic Homogeneity. Application to U308 
RMs for Gamma Spectrometry", Proc. 7th 
ESARDA Symposium, Liege, Belgium, May 
1985, p. 277. 
G. Milschenborn and W. De Belle, 11 235u;238u 
Isotope Ratio Measurements on Double 
Collector UF6 Mass Spectrometers", Internal 
Report CBNM-R-MS-74-84. 
R. Werz and G. Milschenborn, "Memory in UF6 
Mass Spectrometers", Internal Report CBNM-
R-MS-4-80. 
W. De Belle, "Conversion of UF6 in Uranyl 
Nitrate for Isotopic Measurements by 
Thermionic Mass Spectrometry", Internal 
Report CBNM-R-MS-25-83. 
P. De Bievre, R. Damen, L. Traas, W. De 
Belle, A. Verbruggen, W. Lycke, M. Gallet, 
R. Werz, M. van den Berg, "Uncertainties 
and Certainties in Isotopic Measurements 
of Uranium: Keys to accuracy", Invited 
Plenary Lecture at the International 
Conference on Nuclear and Radiochemistry 
ICNR-86, Beijing China, September 1986 

WHY SHOULD WE DO SOME MORE "ISOTOPE-SPECIFIC" THINKING 
IN MEASUREMENTS FOR SAFEGUARDS? 
P. DE BIEVRE 
Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements, 
Commission of the European Communities - JRC 
B-2440 GEEL,Belgium 
R. PERRIN 
Isotope Geochemistry Group 
Los Alamos National Laboratory - INC 7 
LOS ALAMOS, NM 87544, USA 
Abstract 
A number of reasons are given why more 
isotope-specific or isotope-related thinking 
should occur in measurements for Safeguards and 
Nuclear Material Management. It is isotopes 
which are fissile. Isotope-specific methods 
are available for direct quantitative 
determination of isotopes without a "detour" 
via elemental content with its problems in 
sample stoichiometry. Fissile isotopes in 
input solutions of reprocessing plants are 
a 1 ready assayed by an i sotope-speci fi c method 
( IDMS*) and enab 1 e direct isotope-accountancy. 
Within the same amount of element. fissile 
isotopes (e.g. 235U) can be substituted for 
non-fissile isotopes (e.g. 238u) using isotope 
separation techniques of the near future 
leaving the total amount of element the same 
but changing the Safeguards character of the 
material drastically. Isotope-specific ratio 
of ratio measurement approaches. applied to 
IDMS have the potential of breaking through the 
0.1% uncertainty barrier, at the same time 
making measurements easier. Large dynamic 
ratio measurement capability would enable the 
determination of the total amount of fissile 
isotope within a nuclear material batch (e.g. 
an input tank) directly against a small (ppm) 
but known added amount of a spike isotope (e.g. 
233U) without the necessity of separate 
ea 1 i brat ion of the tank for mass or vo 1 ume of 
solution. Large dynamic isotope ratio 
measurement capability could also make it 
meaningful to "tag" material batches by means 
of small amounts of a "tagging" isotope, 
resulting in a highly specific "identity card" 
and the possibility to monitor the "tag" by a 
measurement anytime. 
*IDMS = Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry 
1. Introduction 
It is isotopes which are fissile for 
thermal neutrons : 233U and 235U, 239Pu and 
241Pu. Consequently it is these isotopes which 
determine the economic and safeguards value of 
nuclear material and it is the amount of 233U, 
235U, 239pu and 24lpu which is of primary 
interest. 
187 
However, in the early years of the nuclear era, 
analytical methods to determine the amount of a 
nuclear element (U, Pu) in a nuclear material 
(radioactive solution, oxide, ••• ) were 
borrowed from classical analytical chemistry 
and were, therefore, methods for elemental 
assay (U element •••• ). A second step had to be 
added - isotopic analysis- which yielded the 
fissile isotope content(235u;u. • •• ) of the 
nuclear element (U, ••• ). The way of thinking 
in two steps - first element. then isotope - is 
so deeply entrenched in the minds that it is 
even used in cases where the direct assay of the 
fissile isotope by an isotope-specific method 
(e.g. Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry IDMS) 
in one step is possible : IDMS is universally 
used to assay element content followed by an 
isotopic analysis (two step approach) whereas it 
is basically a method to directly assay isotope 
content (one step approach). In addition : two 
steps necessarily carry more error possibilities 
and a larger uncertainty of the end result than 
one step. but even this simple consideration 
does not prevent analysts from taking the two 
step approach. 
It is occasionally argued that isotopic 
ana lyses are too expensive. Consider. however. 
the value of the electricity generated by one 
ton of fuel rated at 30,000 megawatt days/ton. 
At $0.06/kWh this fuel will generate $50 400 000 
in electrical sales. A 0.2 % uncertainty in 
fissile content represents a $100 800 
uncertainty in revenue. 
2. The lack of sensitivity of elemental assay 
for change in fissile isotope content 
Elemental analysis/accountancy is very 
insensitive to variations in fissile isotope 
content. Consider the two extremes represented 
in Table I. It will be obvious that the 235U 
(fissile) content has been reduced by 500 %. 
However, the atomic weight of the U has changed 
by only 0.06 %. The measured elemental 
concentration of two solutions of identical 
molar concentrations, but of wildly different 
isotopic assays. will only differ by 0.06 % even 
when measured by the most accurate elemental 
procedure available. To define the true 
economic and safeguards value of the fuel, 
one needs to multiply the elemental 
concentration by the 235u abundance, 
n(235U)/n(U). 
Uranium Uranium 
(fresh fuel) (after 80% burn-up) 
r-
mol % 234U 0.030 0.015 
mol % 235u 5.500 1.100 
mol % 236u 0.053 0.600 
mol % 238~ 94.417 98.285 
Atomic Weight 
(Mo Jar Mass) 
237.883 238.005 
Table I - Identical molar concentrations of 
fresh fuel and burn-up solutions are 0.06% 
different when recomputed in g·L-1 
A similar example for Pu is as follows 
Plutonium Plutonium 
(low burn-up) (med1um burn-up) 
mol % 238Pu 0.01 0.35 
mol % 239Pu 98.00 72.32 
11101 % 240Pu 1.90 24.50 
mol % 241Pu 0.08 2.58 
mol % 242Pu 0.01 0.25 
S F1ss1le 
IsQtopes 98.08 74.90 
Atomic Wel9ht 239.073 239.353 
(Molar Mass) 
Table II - Identical molar concentrations of 
low burn-up and medium burn-up solutions are 
0.12% different when recomputed in g·L-1 
The change in atomic weight and therefore in 
elemental concentration, is 0.12 % for two 
samples with the same molar concentration. 
3. Exploiting Better the Isotope-Specific 
Character of Classical IDMS 
In Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry {IDMS) an unknown amount of U is determined 
traditionally against a known added amount 
(spike) of 233U by measuring the ratio 
n(238U)/n(233U), where n is a number of atoms 
or of moles : see Fig. 1. The 238U isotope is 
taken because it represents almost the tot a 1 
element amount (measured values for 234U - 235u 
- 236u are added up to make up for the tot a 1 
element). A subsequent calculation by the 235U 
abundance n(235U)/n(U) yields the 235U fissile 
isotope content. 
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spike unknownn 
.,..._1-t----i .. ~ amount of U 
Fig. 1 Classical IDMS 
n(238U) 
measured:~ 
n( U) 
The uncertainty of the measurement has two 
main components : a contribution from the 
23Bu;233u measurement and a contribution from 
the 235U/U isotopic analysis. Recognising the 
isotope-specific character of the (IDMS) 
method, it is possible to measure directly the 
unknown 235U amount against the known 233U 
amount by a ratio measurement R = 
n(235U)/n(233U). See Fig. 2. This would yield 
a measurement with one main uncertainty 
component, hence half the uncertainty of the 
previous approach. In addition much less 233U 
is consumed in the process : spike 233U should 
be added to match the 235U content rather than 
the 50-200 times higher 238u content, thus 
reducing consumption of 233U by a factor of 50-
200. Result : an isotope-specific method, 
properly applied, can define the fissile 
isotope content of the fuel in a direct, simple 
transparent measurement at half the uncertainty 
and much less spike consumption. A similar 
case can be made for Pu especially when us1 ng 
the very rare 244pu isotope. 
spike I unknownn .....  1-+--~--~ amount of U 
n(235U) 
Fig. 2 Isotope-specific IDMS : measured:--
n(233U) 
4. Transparency of the Isotope-Specific 
Measurement - Traceability to the Mole 
Note that the measurement under point 3 
above is carried out in an isotope mass 
spectrometer (IMS) as a simple ratio 
determination of 233u and 235u ion currents 
(Fig. 3). 
233u -1 
----........ 
Fig. 3 - The ratio measurement 
n(235U)/n(233U)(n = amount of substance 
expressed in numbers of atoms or moles) 
It is fully analogous to the determination 
of the ratio of weights or masses by means of a 
balance (Fig. 4). 
Fig. 4 The ratio measurement of masses 
(weights) 
However, the ba 1 ance compares amounts of 
substance in g or kg, whereas the IMS compares 
amounts of substance directly in numbers of 
atoms or of moles. The determinations are 
directly traceable to the mole, our 
international SI unit for amount of substance, 
in a simple, transparent way. At a time when 
the chemical measurement community starts to 
worry about the traceability of chemical 
measurements in order to ensure their 
comparability, time has also come for the 
Safeguards measurement community to demonstrate 
• traceabil ity 11 of its measurements. In both 
cases (chemical and Safeguards) traceability to 
our accepted international unit of measurements 
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wi 11 have to be demonstrated if we want true 
compatibility of measurements. 
5. Potential for Inherent Accuracy of an 
Isotope-Specific Methods such as IDMS 
5.1 Once the sample and the added spike have 
been equilibrated, the newly est ab 1 i shed ratio 
is the same for any portion of the sample as it 
is for the entire material batch. Therefore, a 
knowledge of the chemical yield of any 
purification chemistry is not required. Or, 
simpler, the quantitativity of any sample 
treatment and handling is not anymore required 
as is a requisite in classical analytical 
chemistry. 
5.2 Only isobars at the mass positions of the 
sample and spike isotopes in the mass spectrum, 
could create an error in the measured abundance 
ratio. But isobars can be detected easily for 
their presence/absence examining the 
neighbouring mass positions in the spectrum for 
the "isotopic fingerprint" related to the 
isobar. 
5.3 The uncertainty terms associated with 
measuring the amount of other isotopes of the 
element do not now affect the uncertainty of 
the determination of the concentration of 
fissile isotope. 
5.4 The measurement of the isotope ratio can 
be calibrated by means of Isotopic Reference 
Materials (IRMs) or even synthetic isotope 
mixtures, available from CBNM and certified to 
0.1-0.01 %of value. 
5.5 Considerations on neither stoichiometry 
nor chemical purity nor atomic weights must be 
made in an isotope-specific method such as 
IDMS, as must be done in classical elemental 
assay. 
6. Evaluation of Process Losses 
Plutonium exhibits more complex chemistry 
and presents a greater potential for selective 
fissile isotope process losses than uranium. 
The neutron density is not constant along the 
entire length of a fuel rod. For this reason, 
a higher percentage of the plutonium will occur 
in the centre of the assembly as isotopes of 
higher mass. ·Thus, in these regions, the 
amount of the fissile isotope 239 may be lower 
per gram of elem.ental Pu. Table II shows a 
typical isotopic composition for burn-up fuel. 
Only 74.9 % of the isotopes are fissile. In 
contrast, the Pu near the ends of the fuel rod 
may consist of more than 97 % fissile isotopes. 
It is also true that, because of differences in 
physico-chemical structure, the ends may have 
different solubilities than the centres and 
thus exhibit ·different recovery rates when 
subjected to the same separation chemistry. 
Because the process is optimized for elemental 
recovery, it may be more efficient in 
recovering more plentiful 74.9 % fissile 
plutonium. If the overall recovery effic~ency 
of the process is 99 %, the elemental analysls 
will show these 99 %. If the 1 % elemental 
loss is entirely the "end 11 97 % 239pu component 
of the fuel, the fissile isotope loss is 
1 % •97/74.9 = 1.3 %. The actual recovery of 
fissile isotopes is only 98.7 %. The waste 
stream from the first extraction would 
represent an attractive diversion path. The 
0.3 % which represents selective isotopic loss 
would be a continuous source term that would be 
undetected by elemental analysis. 
7. Diversion Scenarios 
Recent advances in photon-induced isotope 
specific chemical reactions raise the 
possibility that a small portion of any isotope 
might be selectively precipitated, extracted or 
complexed on a continuous basis. A number of 
such systems have been described for uranium. 
Let us assume that fuel is reprocessed of the 
same isotopic composition shown in the 80 % 
burn-up column in Table I. By using one of the 
photon-induced isotopic reactions it is 
possible to remove 1.0 % of the 235U isotope 
from the fuel on a continuing basis. The 
missing 235U is then rep 1 aced by 23Bu. For 
every 10 000 kg of uranium processed, the 
diversion would result in a loss of 1 kg of 
high purity 235u. The elemental assay of the 
fuel remains the same and the fissile isotope 
loss goes undetected by elemental analysis of 
the product. 
An isotopic accountancy clearly shows that 
all of the 238U is still in inventory but that 
1 kg of 235U is missing : the accuracy for 
determining the unknown amount of 235u by an 
isotope-specific method ( IDMS) is better than 
0.1 % in properly calibrated systems. 
Application of the same scenario to a solution 
phase in a fuel fabrication facility where the 
fissile isotope abundance is 5 %, the "losses" 
could be correspondingly greater. A similar 
diversion scenario possibility is given using a 
hypothetical enriching scheme for 2]9pu : 
a an isotope separation process has been 
developed which is compatible with small-
scale operation as a loop within a fuel 
reprocessing facility 
b the process can produce a product that can 
enrich 83 % 239Pu to 98 % 239Pu; the 
remaining 2 % is 240Pu. 
c the system is being operated on a scale to 
remove 0.5 %of the available 239Pu. 
d the annual Pu production of the facility 
is 2000 kg. 
e the mean isotopic assay of the input feed 
material 
238pu 
239pu 
240Pu 
241Pu 
242Pu 
mol % 
0.247 
83.128 
12.069 
3.991 
0.565 
The effect of this scenario then could be : 
at 0.5 % removal, 8.31 kg of 239pu is 
removed per year as well as 0.17 kg 240Pu; 
this will affect the total Pu material 
balance by - 0.424 %; 
this same loss wi 11 shift the 239Pu/240Pu 
ratio by - 0.432 %. 
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the 240pu loss will shift all of the other 
isotope ratios relative to 240Pu by 
+ 0.07 %. 
This diversion can very we 11 take p 1 ace 
within present measurement capabilities as 
represented by the "Target Values" (0.5 % for 
random and 0.5 % for systematic error component 
in element assay of inputs and 0.3 % in 
239Puj240pu isotope ratio measurements) /1/. 
The calculations here indicate that it can 
easily be detected with existing techniques if 
maintaining an isotopic material balance across 
the process and calculation of mean isotope 
ratios at regular intervals. AddItionally, the 
degree of the consistency of the other isotope 
ratios provides a means of evaluating 
systematic errors in the isotopic measurements. 
This leads to the following conclusions : 
1. The elemental assay of total Pu will 
probably not detect this type of 
diversion. 
2. The diversion could take place within the 
present "Target Values for Uncertainty 
Components in Nuclear Material 
Measurements" in element assay of inputs 
/1/. 
3. .The shift in isotope ratios is within the 
0.3 % presently indicated in the Target 
Values for isotopic measurements /1/. If 
the Operator and Inspector can each have 
0. 3 % uncertainty. then v'O. 32+0. 32 = 
0.42 % is allowed on the difference. 
4. To detect this type of diversion it will 
be necessary to maintain material balances 
by isotope rather than by element. 
5. The data for maintaining isotopic material 
balances is available. It includes 
elemental and isotope assay for input 
accountability tank batches and el ementa 1 
and isotope assay for product batch. 
6. Small errors in elemental assay of either 
input or output batches will not 
significantly alter the calculated ratios 
of isotopes in either materials balance. 
This fact reduces the effect of systematic 
errors due to tank calibrations and is the 
reason that isotopic material balances are 
superior for the detection of this type of 
diversion. 
7. This same test will detect any systematic 
loss of one isotope that may be caused by 
failure to achieve isotopic equilibrium in 
the dissolution process. 
8. Effects of Emerging Measurement Techniques 
Direct Assay of Fissile U Isotope in an Input 
Tank 
The modern commercial isotope mass 
spectrometer is capable of accurately measuring 
the ratio of amounts of two isotopes of an 
element. The major limitations to accuracy 
have been twofo 1 d : ( 1) the dynamic range of 
the ion detectors have been no better that 105 
- 106 and (2) the abundance sensitivity (the 
ability to measure a small peak next to a large 
peak) has been limited to several ppm for 
adjacent masses. Recent advances that couple 
pulse counting and faraday cup detectors show 
promise of calibrateable dynamic ranges of 109 
- 1010: 10-llA (6·109 ions·s-1) down to 10-19A 
(1 ion·s-1), A 1 ppm added "minor" isotope 
(e.g. 233U or 244Pu) would still measure at 
10-l7A (6·103 ions·s-1), An integration time 
of lOO s would still yield < 0.2 %. Recent 
advances in ion optics on a commercial mass 
spectrometer have demonstrated abundance 
sensitivities of 2 x 108, The combination of 
these two technologies has made it possible, 
for the first time, to consider the possibility 
of measuring ratios of about 10-6 to an 
accuracy of 0.1 % or better. See Fig. 5. 
233U 235U 238U 
n(233U)/n(235U) = 10-6 
n(235U)/n(238U) = 10-2 
Fig. 5 - Direct spiking of input tanks to assay 
fissile 235U 
All that has been lacking were suitable 
Reference Materials. Recently, a suite of 
uranium RMs with certified ratios in this range 
has been re 1 eased by CBNM and work is underway 
at Los Alamos and the Central Bureau for 
Nuclear Measurements to verify the accuracy 
capabilities of the new technologies (see Table 
Ill ) . 
Application of this technology can 
eliminate one of the 1 argest error components 
associated with measurements of input amounts 
in fuel reprocessing facilities by spiking the 
whole tank with a suitable amount of £33U, 
perform isotopic equilibration and measure 
fissile 235u directly against this known 233u. 
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Molar isotope ratios 
Code 233Uf235u 235Uf238U 
number certified to certified to 
± 0.03 % of ± 0.000 20 
value 
CBNM-IRM 
072/ 1 1.000 33 0.991 03 
072/ 2 0.699 67 0.991 68 
072/ 3 0.499 85 0.992 12 
072/ 4 0.299 87 0.992 56 
072/ 5 0.100 01 0.992 99 
072/ 6 0.050 091 0.993 10 
072/ 7 0.019 994 0.993 17 
072/ 8 0.010 165 0.993 19 
072/ 9 0.005 000 0 0.993 20 
072/ 10 0.002 001 2 0.993 21 
072/ 11 0.000 968 92 0.993 21 
0721 12 0.000 500 88 0.993 21 
072/ 13 0.000 101 82 0.993 21 
072/ 14 0.000 019 996 0.993 21 
072/ 15 0.000 001 999 5 0.993 21 
Table Ill - CBNM Isotopic Reference Material 
Set to test linearity of mass spectrometers 
Equation 1 shows the calculation presently 
required to measure that input by isotope 
dilution techniques. 
235 m7' R 233 
11( V)= -. 235tl33. 11( V) [1] 
ms 
where : 
11(235u; = tot a 1 number of 235U atoms in the 
input accountability tank 
ms the mass of solution sample taken 
mr the mass of so 1 uti on in the input 
accountability tank 
R2351233 the ratio numbers of 235U atoms to 
2~3U atoms in the sample after 
spiking with 233U 
n(233U) = the known number of 233U atoms, added 
to the measurement sample prior to 
purification chemistry 
The term m7•/ms represents the 1 argest 
uncertainty because the problem of the 
calibration of an input tank has been there 
"forever" and is still unsolved as far as 
independent verification is concerned. 
If one adds the 233U spike directly to the 
tank rather than to a proportion a 1 samp 1 e from 
the tank (see Fig. 5), the equation for 
determining the fissile uranium in the tank. ·is 
simplified to 
[2) 
or 
[3) 
where n(233U) is the number of 233U atoms added 
to the tank. A separate prior measurement will 
determine the traces of 233U a 1 ready present, 
permitting to correct for them. 
The number of atoms of 235U is expressed 
in terms of total atoms contained in the input 
tank rather than as atoms/gram of solution. 
The term mrfms is eliminated from the equation. 
Only the uncertainty terms associated with 
measuring terms R235/233 and n(233U) must be 
considered. Note also that after equilibration 
of the added spike, R235/233 is the same for 
any portion of material withdrawn from the 
tank. This fact permits removal of very small 
aliquants of material suitable for direct 
chemical processing without any dilution or 
weighing. Because of the small amounts 
involved, it is likely that spiking and 
separations chemistry can be accomplished in 
the much cleaner environment of a minimum 
shielding facility or after a rough 
decontamination in a hot cell. At a 
U concentration of 250 g · L -1, the 235u isotope 
concentration in the tank is about 2.5 g·L-1. 
Spiking with 233U at the 1 ppm level relative 
to 235u would only require 25 mg 233u for a 104 
L tank. 
9. Effects of Emerging Measurement Techniques : 
Direct Assay of Fissile Pu Isotope(s) in an 
Input Tank 
Let us now look at a possible measurement 
technique which could be used to determine the 
fissile plutonium content of the same batch of 
material. First prepare a mixed spike of 233U 
and 244Pu in which the ratio n(244Pu)fn(233U) = R 413 
1 ~g·mL-1/2 ~g·mL-1 is accurately determined to 
0.1 %. Assume a tank solution at normal 
concentrations : n(Pu)/n(U) ~ 2 mg·mL-1/250 
mg·mL-1 meaning n(23~Pu)/n(235U) 1.2 mg·mL-1/ 
2.5 mg·mL-1 (see Fig. 6). 
Spiking 1 ml of the tank input solution 
with 1 ml of the mixed spike, the relationship 
between the numbers n of atoms of i so to pes in 
the blend can be written as (see also Fig. 6) 
ZllU ZlSU 
Fig. 6 - Ratios in spiked input sample 
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ne44Pu) 
--· 
n(ZJ3U) 
[4] 
in our example 10-3·0.5·103 
or [5) 
since n(239Pu}/n(235U) in the spiked sample is 
the same as the ratio n(239Pu)T/n(235U)T in the 
tank : 
n(235u)T has previously been determined from 
the direct tank spike measurement. R35 and R94 
can be measured in the spiked sample. R43 has 
been determined during the preparation of the 
mixed spike. Therefore, n(239Pu) in the input 
tank has been defined. What is needed is 
measurement capability over a larger dynamic 
range on commercially avail ab 1 e instruments of 
higher abundance sensitivity which can 
accurately measure large ratios (10-3 to 
< ± 0.1 % for use in Eq. 4). Similar 
equations can be solved for all isotopes of 
plutonium : 
Any traces 244Pu already present can be 
determined in a separate measurement and 
corrected for. Summed up, they define the 
total number of atoms of plutonium in the input 
tank, yielding a detailed verification of all 
Pu isotopes independently. 
The following points should be considered 
when evaluating the value of pursuing the proof 
testing of this potential new measurement 
technique for input analysis : 
1. only one weighing operation is required 
(on the 233u added to the tank) • This 
weighing can be performed in the 
controlled conditions af the analytical 
laboratory. 
2. aliquots for either the uranium isotope 
ratio determination R35 or the plutonium 
isotope ratio determinations R94 do not 
require additional weighings or volume 
measurements. 
3. because the amounts of material withdrawn 
do not need to be quantitative, very small 
aliquots can be directly spiked with very 
small amounts of mixed spike thereby 
conserving the spike. 
4. the isotope ratios to be measured are 
fixed at the moment of spiking thereby 
eliminating the error terms associated 
with evaporation and salting. These 
errors are of concern when subs amp 1 i ng is 
required prior to analysis. 
5. no dilution errors can occur all. 
aliquoting is non-quantitative. 
6. the error terms associated with the very 
difficult task of input accountability 
tank calibration are totally eliminated as 
are the error terms associated with 
determining the precise amount of sample 
removed. 
Simply summarised : all measurements are 
isotope ratio measurements which can be 
calculated to < ± 0.1 %. 
Further to point 8, it may be suggested 
that the adding of 233U in a sma 11 amount to 
the input accountability establishes a unique 
isotopic fingerprint for that batch. The 
degree to which that fingerprint is distorted 
will provide previously unavailable insight 
into the mixing processes which occur during 
process operations. Again it is subject to 
measurement capability with "higher abundance 
sensitivity" mass spectrometers. Such 
"tagging" technique provides a nuclear material 
batch (not only "inputs") with an unequivocal 
"isotopic identity card" which can be monitored 
by "isotope-specific" measurement at any time 
during the entire lifetime of the material 
batch. Other (enriched) isotopes could be used 
for "tagging" as well. 
Conclusions 
1. Since it is the fissile isotopes in 
nuclear fuel that define both the economic and 
strategic importance of the fuel, thinking 
about measurements for Safeguards and nu cl ear 
material management should concentrate 
primarily on isotopes. 
2. Not only do e 1 ementa 1 ana lyses a 1 one not 
provide adequate information to define the 
fissile content of nuclear fuel when applied 
alone on materials such as depleted U and high 
burnup Pu, they would not detect "isotope 
substitution". 
3. Because current practice requires both 
elemental and isotopic analyses, all 
information required for isotope-specific 
accountancy exists, but should be better 
exploited. In particular, calculation of 
measurement results and their uncertainties 
should centre on isotope contents, and handle 
e 1 ement contents as a secondary product. A 
real reduction of uncertainty is thereby 
possible. 
4. Isotope-specific accountancy provides a 
far better visibility of subtle diversion 
scenarios of fissile isotopes than does 
elemental accountancy. 
5. Isotope dilution measurement techniques 
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provide data for isotope-specific accountancy 
which is more directly traceable to our 
internal SI unit of substance (the mole). 
6. Emerging measurement technologies provide 
the potential for eliminating major error terms 
associated with input accountability 
measurements in fuel reprocessing facilities 
at the same time making the measurements much 
simpler under plant conditions and reducing the 
measurement uncertainties. 
7. Direct spiking of input tanks does not 
require (ultra-)pure 233u, nor does the spiking 
of an input smap 1 e require (ultra-) pure 244pu. 
Isotopes a 1 ready present can be corrected for 
after a separate measurement of them. 
8. Manufacturers of isotope mass 
spectrometers should take inspiration from the 
needs and justifications for development as 
explained here, so as to make available on the 
commercial market the required instrumentation. 
9. Nuclear Reference Material Institutes 
should actively prepare the required Spike and 
Isotopic Reference Materials enabling the 
performance of the above measurements and their 
calibration. 
The answer to the question "Why shou 1 d we 
do more Isotope-specific thinking in 
measurements for Safeguards?" appears to be : 
because we can then conceive measurements for 
Safeguards which are 
simpler and more transparent 
have reduced uncertainty 
are less burdensome for the analyst 
thus providing better basic data for isotope 
specific accountancy in Safeguards. 
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BY POTENTIOMETRIC TITRATION 
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Commission of the European Communities 
Joint Research Centre 
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1. Introduction 
Upon request of the ESARDA Working Group 
on "Low Enriched Uranium Conversion and Fuel 
Fabrication Plants" (ESARDA-LEU WG) the Central 
Bureau for Nuclear Measurements (CBNM) 
organized an lnterlaboratory comparison 
exercise for the determination of uranium by 
the potentiometric titration method. The 
special aim of this intercomparison, apart from 
giving the laboratories the opportunity to 
intercompare their results and their individual 
laboratory deviations from the certified 
values, is a general asessment of the prec1s1on 
and accuracy of this potentiometric titration 
method. 
The exercise is to be executed in two 
phases. The first phase dealt with pure 
uranyl-nitrate solutions; the second phase 
deals with similar uranium solutions doped with 
impurities. 
The whole exercise is a prec1s1on 
experiment. Methods of measurement are 
characterized by their prec1s1on and their 
accuracy. Accuracy is defined as the closeness 
of agreement between the results of a 
measurement and a reference value. The 
precision experiment is used as the test method 
to investigate the type of the variability of 
the data, and the difference between the 
results and the certified value(s). 
The statistical treatment included: 
calculation of the intra-laboratory variance; 
calculation of the inter-laboratory variance; 
- comparison of laboratory means; 
- calculation of the repeatability; 
- calculation of the reproducibility; 
- comparison of the laboratory means with the 
certified value. 
A similar statistical treatment was 
applied in 1983 for assessing the repeatability 
and reproducibility of gravimetric uranium 
determinations in U02 pellets /1/. 
The following 
(in alphabetical 
institution). 
laboratories 
order of 
BAM 
CNEN 
ECN 
EIR. 
ENUSA 
FBFC 
FBFC 
FBFC 
IAEA 
Berlin 
Rio De Janeiro 
Pet ten 
Wuerenlingen 
Salamanca 
Dessel 
Romans 
Pierrelatte 
Vienna 
participated 
company or 
D 
BR 
NL 
CH 
E 
B 
F 
F 
A 
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JRC 
JRC 
NUKEM 
RBU 
SCK 
Ispra 
Karlsruhe 
Hanau 
Hanau 
Mol 
I 
D 
D 
D 
B 
2. Arrangement of the Interlaboratory Exercise 
2.1 Sample Distribution. 
For the distribution of the samples to be 
analysed CBNM prepared two solutions of uranyl-
nitrate (called A and B) slightly different in 
concentration. Both solutions had a nominal 
uranium concentration of about 7.50 mg·g-1 
solution, which had been certified by CBNM. 
Samples of the solutions A and B were 
distributed in sealed glass ampoules, each 
containing about 60 ml. Each of the fourteen 
participating laboratories received 
simultaneously three ampoules of solution A and 
three ampoules of solution B. The certified 
values were not communicated to the 
participating laboratories before the report of 
the results. 
2.2. Analyses and Submission of Results. 
The laboratories were requested to perform 
the analyses on three different days (here coded 
with sequence numbers I, II, and Ill). The first 
day of analysis should be within two weeks after 
receipt of the ampoules; the second and third 
day should follow four and eight weeks later, 
respectively. The analysis was to be performed 
immediately after opening the corresponding 
ampoule. 
For the comparison it was necessary to 
perform the uranium determinations always in 
pairs: on each of the three days or analysis one 
ampoule of solution A and one of solution B 
should be investigated. For each ampoule the 
analysis should be performed in duple. 
Therefore two aliquots of about 20 g of solution 
had to be taken from each ampoule. 
The laboratories were asked to give a 
detailed description of their procedure, as well 
as their calibrations results including 
information about the reference materials used. 
The results of the uranium determinations 
(expressed as mg·g-1 solution) and the 
description of the method were sent to CBNM, 
where they were coded before submission to ECN 
for the statistical treatment. 
2.3. Preparation of the Reference Solutions. 
CBNM has in stock a batch of a certified 
reference material, EC- NnM 110. It consists of 
sintered uranium dioxide pellets, containing 
about 1g of uranium each. Information about 
this material is given in the certification 
report /2/. Its uranium content has been 
certified calling on the application of ~he 
(100-X) route X being the total of the 
impurities determined via specific methods. 
A known mass of this reference material 
was carefully dissolved in hot concentrated 
nitric acid. The solution was evaporated to low 
bulk and then diluted with 0. 1 molar nitric 
acid until the required concentration (about 
7.5 mg U per ml) was obtained. This solution 
was then homogenized and weighed. 
The uranium concentration is expressed in 
mass of uranium per mass of solution thus 
resulting in two reference values (7.4911 ± 
0.0015 mg·g-1 for solution A and 7.7415 ± 
0.0015 mg·g-1 for solution B). The 
uncertainties of these values take into account 
the uncertainty of the reference material and 
the uncertainties of the different weighings on 
the basis of a 95% confidence interval. 
3. Statistical Treatment 
The statistical treatment of the original 
data set was performed in cooperation with the 
Netherlands Energy Research Foundation, Petten, 
Netherlands. The description of the procedure 
and the detailed results are laid down in an 
ECN internal report /10/, some additional 
information is given in an internal report of 
the Commission of the European Communities 
/11/. 
3.1. Statistical approach. 
Many reasons may lead to the variability 
of data. For this experiment involving many 
laboratories, factors such as differences in 
operators, equipment, calibration, environment 
and sample preparation on different days may 
give a large contribution to the variability. 
In practical situations two numerical measures 
of variability are recommended to take into 
account differences in the circumstances of new 
measurements, repeatability and 
reproducibility. Repeatability refers to the 
variability of results obtained at short 
intervals of time in one laboratory by one 
operator using the same apparatus. 
Reproducibility refers to the variability of 
results obtained in different laboratories, 
which implies different operators, equipment 
and/or at different times. 
For the interpretation of the results 
obtained with this exercise the analysis of 
variance technique is a very powerful tool. It 
gives a good indication of the interlaboratory 
as well as of the intralaboratory variance and 
it investigates whether the average outcomes of 
the laboratories are equal taking into account 
the experimental uncertainties. 
As mentioned earlier two solutions with 
slightly different uranium concentrations were 
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used. This is known as a split-level 
experiment. At first, data for both solutions 
were treated separately as uniform-level 
experiment, and afterwards the split-level 
approach was considered. 
In summary, the evaluation of the data set 
comprised the following steps: 
tabulation of data; 
test on homogeneity of the laboratory 
variances; 
search on the raw data to trace and 
eliminate wild results; 
analysis of variance; 
determination of repeatability and 
reproducibility; 
comparison with certified value. 
3.2. Data Treatment. 
3.2.1. Preliminary Overview. In the tables 
1 and 2 the raw data are presented for solution 
A and B, respectively. The supplementary 
information as supplied by the laboratories 
made it clear that only laboratory 13 had 
incorporated a buoyancy correction in its 
results. Since this correction had been applied 
in the determination of the certified uranium 
concentration of solution A and B the results 
coming from the other laboratories were also 
corrected for this effect (0.105%). 
Data Sequence Code Standard Variance Coefficient 
Lab Code Lab Dcvio.Lion 
•' 
of 
Mean . Vanation 
I 11 Ill (-ID-3) (-106) v(~) 
7.4901 7 5001 7.5021 
I 7.4981 4.69 2200 0.063 
7 4991 7.4951 7 5021 
7.4881 7 4901 7.4911 
2 7.4903 1.16 I 350 0.016 
7.4901 7.4911 7.'19JI 
7.4956 7 4936 7.4945 
3 7 4948 0955 0912 0 013 
7 4959 7.4953 74939 
7.4662 74741 7.4691 
4 7.4763 12 42 154 2 0 166 
7.4971 7 4662 74851 
7.4960 7,4938 7.5001 
5 7.4972 3 47 12 05 0 046 
7 5028 7.4952 7.4953 
7 5211 7.5211 7.5211 
6 75118 10. 1111 0,140 
7 50GI 7 4981 7 5031 
7.4931 7 4942 7.4910 
7 7.4926 1.95 3 78 0 026 
7 4943 7.4936 7.4895 
7 4911 7,4891 7 4891 
8 7.4906 1.97 3.89 0.026 
7.4911 7,4941 7.4891 
7.4115 7.4739 7 4757 
9 7.4397 305 929.7 0,410 
7.4377 7 4028 7 4370 
7.5001 7.4911 7 4931 
16 74949 3.43 11.75 0.046 
7 4981 7.4941 7.4931 
7.5021 7,4961 7.5051 
ll 7.4998 4 76 22 65 0.063 
7.4921 7.5021 7.5011 
7.6919 7 6919 8.2913 
12 7.7918 2681 718561 3,44 
7 5920 7.5920 7 8917 
7.4899 7 4926 7.4829 
13 7.4892 4.32 1865 0,058 
74911 7.4936 7.4849 
7.4801 7.4891 7.4991 
14 74931 807 65 19 0.108 
7.4921 74951 7.5031 
overall solution A 
mean 7.4999 7.5000 7.5345 7.5114 
5(-(0~I 47 13 46.61 1671 103 8 
52(-(0I) 221.6 172.1 79196 10780 l 
v('ll) 0628 0.621 222 I 38 
Table 1: Data for solution A. 
Oala Sequence Code SLandard Variance Coefficient Lab Deviation or Lab Code Mean . •' Vanalion 
I 11 Ill (·103) (·101) v('l.) 
7 7449 7 7558 7.7598 
I 7 7553 679 4613 0088 
7 7648 7,7519 7 7548 
7.7399 7.7409 7 7419 
2 7 7407 1.18 1355 0 015 
7.7389 77409 7 7419 
7,7494 7.7485 7 7465 
3 7 7482 161 2 29 0020 
7 7502 7 7481 7 7465 
7.7099 7 7289 7.6989 
4 7.7176 13 94 194.3 0181 
7.7169 7 7129 7 7379 
7.7377 7 7421 7.7493 
5 77417 6 41 41 08 0 083 
7.7405 7 7324 7.7483 
7.7359 7 7489 7,7469 
6 7.7489 871 75.84 0 112 
7.7828 7.7819 77469 
7.7469 7.7466 7.7434 
7 77457 242 5 67 0 031 
7 7487 77464 7 7422 
7 7449 7.7469 77469 
8 7 7452 I 36 1.85 0.018 
7.7469 7.7429 7 7449 
7.6937 7.712<& 7.8807 
9 7,7597 79 00 6241.8 1.02 
7.6816 7.7888 7 8213 
77489 77419 7.7U9 
10 7,7459 4.00 15.99 0 052 
7.7479 7.7409 77509 
7.7858 7.7608 7 8438 
11 7 7815 49 4 2437.6 0.634 
7 8428 7.7439 7 7319 
7.7918 79918 7.8917 
12 80083 299 I 89487.4 374 
7 7918 7.9916 8 5910 
7.7491 7,7461 7.7443 
13 7 7458 232 5.41 0.030 
7 7467 77422 7 7461 
7.7479 7.7538 7 7509 
14 7 7474 694 48 16 0090 
77399 7.7379 7 7538 
overall solulaon 0 
mean 7.7474 7 7613 7.7910 7.7666 
5(-11)-3) 2979 66.10 162.7 103 2 
52(·101) 887 69 368 8 64757 10657 8 
v('ll) 0.386 0.852 209 I 33 
Table 2: Data for solution B. 
To get a first impression, some 
characteristic data were calculated such as 
mean, standard deviation, variance and 
coefficient of variation. The average results 
of the measurements found by each laboratory 
are illustrated in the graphs of figure 1 and 
figure 2 for both solutions. A general 
inspection shows that the data contain several 
deviating values in each of the solutions. Some 
values among the original results (for example 
those from laboratory 12) deviate so much from 
comparable entries in the same tables, that 
special attention was given to the search of 
outlying data, at first on a graphical basis, 
to get a rough, preliminary insight. 
7.53...------------------,.. 0.11 
0.4 ~~ ~~ 
.§ 7.51 0.2 ll 
!i 7.50 • I . ' i i I 0.1 ~ 
e! 7.41 .}zz:z;z>*'"'f"zzt>:z:zhz4.:zz:Z:.d=i.db:zz==t o.o :!: z I 1 .o.1 8~ ~~ 
~~ ~c 
7.411··L_:;...-,..-,--..,.--,--,-,..--,--,--,--.,--,-_.r·0.4 
z 3 4 s e 1 e v w n u 
LABORATORY NUMBER 
Fig. 1. Data for solution A (buoyancy corrected, coding 
different from text). 
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7.78 
7.78 
11 
r7.77 
- 7.70 
ffi 7.75 
~ 7.74 
0 7.73 
~ 
7.72 
7.7 1 
r .,,,l•tl 
! 
l 
1 2 3 4 5 • 7 • ' 10 11 12 13 
LABORATORY NUMBER 
0.11 
0.11 
0.4 ~ 
0.3 ll 
0.2 ~ 
0.1 > 
o.o! 
.o.1 .J 
.o.z 1:! 
·0.3 
.o.4 
Fig. 2. Data for solution B (buoyancy corrected, coding 
different from text). 
This was performed by means of a Youden 
diagram /3, 4/, where the results of the 
measurements for two series (A and B) 
constitute the co-ordinates of points in a 
plot. One pair of results yields a single point 
in the diagram, furthermore horizontal and 
vertical lines denoting the median values are 
presented based on all results in a series. 
In an ideal situation the points are 
expected to constitute an elliptic cluster 
around the point with median value co-
ordinates. Because the two solutions are 
nearly equal in uranium concentration, it is 
possible to have an indication of the precision 
of the data in the figures by means of a circle 
(centered on the intersection of the median 
lines).A radius of about 2.5 to 3.0 times the 
standard deviation gives the smallest region 
that can be expected when a normal distribution 
approximately applies. 
The graphical presentations show that at 
least one laboratory (coded 12) yields 
deviating results (figures 3a, 3b, 
3c).Suspected data from other laboratories such 
as 9 and 11 look also incompatible with other 
entries. In these cases numerical outlier and 
straggler tests have been applied. Since it is 
necessary to handle deviating results with 
care, and since various outlier tests have 
different levels of discrimination, a 
combination of several tests was chosen. 
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Fig. 3a. 
mg U.g-1 solution A 
Youden diagram solution A versus B 
(average data laboratories series 1). 
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Fig. 3b. and c. Youden diagram solution A versus B 
(average data laboratories series 11 and Ill). 
Experience had shown that between the 
laboratories large differences exist in the 
intra-laboratory variances (see tables 1 and 
2). Therefore, Cochran's maximum variance test 
seemed very useful /6/, investigating the 
significance of the difference between one 
large variance value and the other remaining 
variance values in a set of data. It considers 
only the highest value in a set of ranges and 
is therefore a one-sided outlier test. Small 
values of range may be strongly influenced by 
the degree of rounding of the original results 
and are for that reason not very reliable. Due 
to the present lack for recommendations of 
statistical tests designed for simultaneous 
examination of the presence of several 
outliers, the procedure of repeated application 
of the single outlier test was applied. 
The next step in the analysing of the data 
set was the application of the Dixon test 11 I. 
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A summary of the most important results of 
these tests is presented in table 3 (using 
laboratory and sequence codes). 
Cochran Test Dixon Test 
Sol. 
Outlier Straggler Outlier Straggler 
A 91I;9UI; 121,1211; 411; 91;911; 121; 61; 611 
12lll; 12ll; 12lll 
6ll 
B 4lll; 911; 9III; lll; 61 41;4lll; 91;9III; 411 
UIII; 12lll Ill; lliii; 121; 
1211; 12lll 
Table 3: Results of Cochran and Dixon test . 
Examination of these results makes it 
clear that statistical outliers are present for 
the laboratories coded 9 and 12 at nearly all 
levels. Therefore it was concluded that it was 
ju:.~Llflcu Lu ul:.~cut·u ull Lite uuLa cumlng ft•um 
laboratories 9 and 12. 
After this deletion still some statistic 
outliers remain on the results of solution A 
and B at single levels for the laboratories 
coded 6, 4 and 11. Due to the repeated 
application of the tests and the fact that 
these outliers occur only at single levels it 
was not thought to be justified to discard 
these data at this stage of the analysis. Also 
all stragglers were kept in the further 
analysis due to the fact that repetition of the 
tests makes decisions of removal questionable. 
3.2.2. Analysis of Variance. The analysis 
of variance method investigates the 
significance of differences between the 
laboratory outcomes. For more details of the 
calculations see reference /10/ and /11/. 
The results for solution A are presented 
in table 4. The large differences in the sample 
variances between the original and cleaned data 
sets confirm earlier conclusions concerning the 
presence of the outliers for the laboratories 9 
and 12. The test on main effects (labs) was 
done leading to the conclusion that the 
expected laboratory means are not equal. 
Deleted labs 
all data 
N=84 9 and 12 9,12,4and6 
N=72 N=60 
Source of Sample Variance (·10-4) 
varlation 
between labs 406.6812 4.0490 0.7558 
between days 
within labs 96.8378 0.2795 0.2602 
residual 22.6002 0.4074 0.0970 
total 107.8014 0.9284 0.2528 
mean 7.5ll4 7.4941 7.49H 
Table 4: Analysis of variance (sol A). 
The results for solution B are presented 
in table 5. The test on the presence of inter-
laboratory effects leads to the same 
conclusions as for solution A: the laboratory 
mean values are not equal. 
Deleled labs 
all data 
N=84 9 and 12 9,12, 4 and 6 
N=72 N=60 
Source of Sample Variance (·10·<) 
variation 
between labs 301.2114 12.0322 0.9776 
between days 
within labs 83.5630 1.3576 0.1901 
residual 61.6781 3.0892 0.2800 
total 106.5782 3.8894 0.3559 
mean 7.7666 7.7470 7.7465 
Table 5: Analysis of variance sol. B). 
In accordance with the approach for 
chosing the concentrations for this precision 
experiment the split-level analysis is 
suitable. The results are presented in table 6. 
Analysis of variance for solution A and B 
(random errects; laboratories 9 and 12 deleted; N=72) 
source of sum of squares degrees of (.~'8'f)le variance 
variation (·10 4) freedom 
between labs 68.4480 12-1-11 6.2225 
between days 
within labs 10.3290 12·(3-1)=24 0.4304 
residual 31.6738 72-12·3=36 0.8798 
total l10,4508 72-1=71 1.5556 
Table 6: Analysis of vanance (split level). 
It is shown that earlier conclusions concerning 
main effects for solution A and B separately, 
are still valid as well as the conclusion that 
at least one laboratory mean value deviates 
significantly from the remaining mean values. 
In neither of the three parts of variance 
analysis a time effect was proved to be 
present. 
The next step was a further investigation 
of the laboratory effect, i.e. of the question 
which laboratories show mean results differing 
significantly from other laboratory means. 
Therefore, the test of Link-Wallace was applied 
/8/, excluding a priori the laboratories 9 and 
12. The conclusion was found justifiable that 
for solution A the laboratories 4 and 6 give 
significantly deviating means, and for solution 
B the laboratories 4 and 11. 
The repeatibility r and the reproduc-
ibility R results are shown in table 7. 
Solution r R m 
Unifonn A 0.0169 0.0279 7.4941 
Level B 0 0438 0.0566 7.7470 
Split Level both A and B 0.0237 0.0360 7.6205 
Table 7: Repeatibility and reproducibility results. 
3.2.3. Distribution of Differences. The 
evaluation so far was based on the analysis of 
variance technique. A possible drawback of the 
straight-forward application of conventional 
definitions for averages as well as for 
standard deviations is that extreme data can 
influence the results of these calculations 
seriously. For this reason, and in particular 
concerning the interlaboratory standard 
deviation, a comparison with the "Distribution 
of Differences" method (DoD) /9/ between the 
results was of interest. 
The interlaboratory standard deviation 
("sDoD") was calculated for the data sets of 
solution A and B, as well as for the smaller 
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data set with only average laboratory results 
for each solution and the results are shown in 
figures 4 and 5. To investigate the effect of 
the outlying laboratory 12 the plots are shown 
for the two situations with and without this 
laboratory. 
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The numerical value for SooD remains the 
same for the two situations. The comparison of 
the values for sooD and stot is given in 
table 8. 
Quantity 
Calculated Situation Sol. A Soi.B 
•o.o All data involved 00112 0.0143 Average lab data 0.0135 0.0134 
Conventional 
Stot without outliers 0.0096 0.0197 
Table 8: Comparison of so0 o and Stot· 
It is noteworthy that for solution B the 
conventional standard deviation Stot is 
appreciably higher than s000 . This indicates 
that in case of solution B still extreme values 
are present in the data set. The results show 
that all standard deviations have more or less 
the same order of magnitude. 
4. Discussion 
4. 1. General. 
The method most often used was the 
potentiometric titration by Davies and Gray. 
There were variations of the working procedure, 
for instance according to the modification by 
J. Cherry or the use of the method calling upon 
addition of vanadium as described by A.E. 
Eberle et.al. Other variations (concentration 
and volume of reagents, intervals of time 
between the successive steps of the chemical 
reactions, approach towards the end-point) were 
as well present. Some laboratories have used 
automatic titrators, some others did not 
mention the type of equipment. 
All the reference materials used, except 
in the case of one laboratory (metal chips), 
seem to be valuable reference materials. 
Nevertheless some of them have better 
confidence limits attached to their certified 
value than others because of a more elaborate 
characterization. The handling of the 
reference material by the laboratory might 
influence the quality of the reference 
solution, for some of these materials need a 
preliminary treatment like calcination or 
cutting of a large piece followed by a chemical 
cleaning of the surface. The non adherance to 
strict rules when dissolving the material 
(avoiding loss of material when heating 
solutions, contaminations, etc.) may also 
influence the accuracy of the calibration. 
4.2. Comparison with Certified Values. 
In tables 9 and 10 a comparison is 
presented between the average values found by 
each laboratory and the certified values for 
both solutions (A and B). As shown in these 
tables the average absolute deviation from the 
certified value Id/ as well as its standard 
deviation old/ were also calculated with and 
without the data of the outlying laboratories 9 
and 12. These tables show that the deviations 
of a lot of laboratory mean values with respect 
to the certified values are larger than the 
standard deviation stated for certification. 
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Standard d, 
deviation rrom di Lob mean 
ccrtJfiedval 
Cod• {inmgU g-1) (7.49111 bo • 
Code Material (lnmgU·g-1) 
I '1:85960 Umet.al 7.4981 +0 0070 0.710 
2 uo, 7 4903 ·0 0008 ·00812 
3 ECIIO uo, 7.4948 +0 0037 0375 
4 ~BL97 U30e 7.4763 .o 0148 ·I 50 
• EC 110 uo, 7 4972 +0 0061 0619 
6 :-.l'DS9150a U30a 7.5118 +0.0207 2 10 
7 ~85960 Umetal 7.4928 +0 0015 0.152 
8 :-i'BS960 Umetal 7.4906 -0.0005 ·0.0507 
9 CEA F I Anemone Umet.al 7.4397 .. ·0 05t4•• ·5.21 
10 ~US960 Umetal 7 4949 +0 0038 0.385 
11 :'1/05960 Umctal 7.4998 +0 0087 0.883 
12 :-JUS950b U30a 7791&·· +0 3007 .. 305 
13 EC 101 Umel.al 7.4892 ·0 0019 .o 193 
.. NDS960 UmeLal 7.4931 +0 0020 0203 
Id I alllaboratoric• 0 03026 Id I = 0 383 
oldlalllaburalorie• 0 07898 ui,JI 
Id! wtthout labs 9 and 12 0 005958 ldl = 0.962 
oldl without labs9 and 12 0.006196 Oldl 
-• oa o 009857 
•• outliers 
Table 9: Comparison with certified value for solution A. 
Staru.IRtd d, 
l.nb mean dcvlntion rrom di 
certified vnl Codo (mmgU·gl) (7 74151 ... Codo Materaal OnmKVRIJ 
I NIIS960 U mt~lul 7.71'.1'.3 t-OOI:IIS 0690 
2 uo, 7.7407 .o.ooos -0 0400 
3 EC 110 uo, 7.7482 +0 0067 0 335 
4 NDL97 U301 7.7176 -0 0239 ·I 20 
5 EC 101 uo, 7.7417 +0.0002 0010 
6 NUS950a U301 7 7489 +0 0074 0370 
7 NDS960 Umcl.al 7.7457 +0 0042 0 210 
8 ND59GO UmeLal 7 7452 +0 0037 0.185 
9 CEA Fl Anemone Umel.al 7.7597 .. +0 0182 .. 0 910 
10 NUS960 Umel.al 1.7<59 +0.0044 0 220 
11 NUS960 UmeLal 7.7815 .. +0 0400 .. 2.00 
12 NIJS950b U301 8.0083 .. +0.2668•• 13 3 
13 F.C 101 UmeLal 7 7458 +0 0043 0.215 
14 NDS960 U metal 7.7474 +0 0059 0295 
Id! all laboratories 0 02859 Id/ = 0 412 
oldl all laboratories 0.06941 ot,)l 
id I withoutlabl9 and 12 0.009608 Id I = 0 835 
Oldl without labs 9 and 12 0.001151 Oldl 
Table 10: Comparison with certified value for solution B. 
For calibration purposes of the titration 
method used, verification by comparison with an 
appropriate internationally recognized uranium 
reference material is necessary. Part of the 
calibration procedure is the dissolution of 
reference material. Considering a possible 
dissolution effect the results were clustered 
according to the type of reference material 
used (table 11a). Based on these data the 
general idea arose that the use of uranium 
oxide as reference material causes roughly a 
two or three times higher standard deviation. 
Also the laboratories using a NBS 960 or 
an EC standard were investigated (table 
11b).The laboratories using the EC reference 
materials show for both solutions slightly 
smaller deviations from the certified values 
than the laboratories using the NBS reference 
material. Nevertheless this difference can not 
be considered as significant enough to justify 
a conclusion. 
Material Mean ... , 
Solution Umetal inclusive outliers 7.4873 0.0195 
A exclusive outlter (lab9) 7.4940 0.0038 
Uoxide inclusive outliers 7.5437 0.122 
exclusive outlier (lab 12) 7.4941 0.0128 
Solution Umetal Inclusive outliers 7.7520 0.0124 
B exclusive outlier (lab 11) 7.7483 0.0060 
U oxide inclusive outliers 7.7927 0.121 
exclusive outlier (lab 12) 7.7389 0.0146 
Table 11 a: Results arranged by reference material. 
Standard Deviation from 
cert. value Mean .... No. Labs. 
Solution EC 110; 101 +0.0026 7.4937 0.00410 3 
A NBS960 +0.0038 7.4949 0.00350 6 
Solution EC 110;101 +0.0037 7.7452 0.00328 3 
B NBS960 +0.0120 7.7535 0.0124 6 
NBS960 
excl. Lab.11 +0.0064 7.7479 0.0042 5 
Table 11 b: Results arranged by reference material origin. 
4.3. Statistical Evaluation. 
The original data set consisting of 84 
observations originating from 14 laboratories 
comprises for nearly all determinations on 
solution A as well as solution B statistical 
outliers. It was found justified to discard all 
the data coming from laboratories 9 and 12. 
This conclusion is demonstrated in the summary 
of results given in table 12. 
Uniform level Split Level 
Sol. A Sol.B Sol.AandB 
original m 7.5114 7.7666 
data set •' 0.0108 0.0107 
• 0.1038 0.1032 v(in%) 1.38 1.33 
cleaned m 7.4941 7.7470 7.6205 
data set •• 0.000093 0.000389 0 000156 (without s 0.00964 0.01972 0.01247 
labs9 and v(in%) 0.129 0.255 0.164 
12) 
Repeatability r 0.0169 0.0438 0.0237 
Reproducibility R 0.0279 0.0566 0.0360 
Table 12: Summary of results. 
The overall variances for the complete 
data sets of each solution separately are 
roughly 10 times larger than those of the clean 
data sets (without the outliers). These sets do 
not show significant deviations from the normal 
distribution of Laplace-Gauss.Furthermore, the 
existence of a time effect is not proved. 
The following overall conclusions can be 
drawn : 
The best estimate for the repeatability 
standard deviation is 0.0060 (i.e. 
relatively 0.080 %) for solution A, 0.0155 
(i.e. 0.20%) for solution B, and for the 
split-level approach 0.0084 (i.e. 0.110%). 
The best estimate for the inter-laboratory 
standard deviation is 0.0079 (i.e. 
relatively 0. 105%) for solution A, 0.0127 
(i.e. 0.164%) for solution B, and for the 
split level approach 0.0096 (i.e. 0.126%). 
The best estimate for the reproducibility 
standard deviation is 0.0099 (i.e. 
relatively 0. 132%) for solution A, 0.0200 
(i.e. 0.258%) for solution B, and for the 
split-level approach 0.0127 (i.e. 0.167%). 
It may further be concluded that a 
relative standard deviation of about 0.25% 
describes very well the total reproducibility 
variability in the interlaboratory comparison. 
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An experienced laboratory will have a within-
laboratory standard deviation as low as 0.08%. 
The conclusions above concern the cleaned 
data sets (without the results from the 
laboratories 9 and 12), and are drawn confirm 
the recommendations in the report ISO 5725 /5/. 
The test of Link-Wallace was applied to 
find indications about laboratories with 
significant deviations. A further reduction of 
the data sets by excluding the results of the 
laboratories 4(sol A and B), 6(sol A) and 
i1(sol B) was not allowed, because outliers 
occur not on all levels. Such an action would 
not affect the overall conclusions but the 
variances would be reduced importantly. 
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Abstract 
The interest in the safeguards of fissile 
material focuses on a limited number of 
compounds which play key roles in the nuclear 
fuel cycle. Amongst these materials uranium 
dioxide powder is of considerable importance as 
it is the base material for pellet production. 
In LWR's uranium dioxide with an initial 235u 
content of about 3 mass % is used, whereas 
natural or depleted material is applied for the 
breeding zone in FBR's. 
The 89/90 round of REIMEP covered uranium 
materials with 235u abundances in the range of 
natural or depleted material. U02 powder was 
distributed to 20 laboratories for destructive 
analysis. Two laboratories participated with 
non-destructive methods. 
The participating laboratories were asked 
to determine the uranium content and the 
isotopic composition of the material. The 
results reported by the participants are 
presented as graphs thus giving a picture of 
the 'state-of-the-practice'. 
1. Introduction 
In the frame of the REIMEP programme in 
1989 a U02 powder was distributed. Through 
this CBNM intends to provide nuclear analytical 
laboratories with a regular opportunity 
- for an external check on the quality of 
their measurements 
to establish the state-of-the-practice of 
assaying common nuclear materials for 
isotope and element content 
to present a true picture of the real life 
interlaboratory spread of given measurements 
on given materials. 
This paper reports on the first U02 powder 
round in REIMEP. 
All participating laboratories reported 
values obtained by destructive analysis. The 
choice of the method was up to the 
participants. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
2. Participation List 
Martin Marietta Energy Systems 
Piketon,Ohio, USA,Mr. Akers 
Martin Marietta Energy Systems 
Paducah, Kentucky, USA, Mr. Beverly 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Los Alamos, NM, USA, Mr. Abernathey 
WAK 
Karlsruhe, Germany, Mr. Stojanik 
ENEA 
Saluggia, Italy, Mr. Pagliai 
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6. NMCC 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Tokai-Mura, Japan, Mr. Nomura 
EN USA 
Salamanca, Spain, Mr. Marin 
BNF 
Springfields, UK, Mr. Hayes 
New Brunswick Laboratory 
Argonne, Ill., USA, Mr. Lewis 
Inst. for Energy Techn. 
Kjeller, Norway, Mr. Stijfhoorn 
Belgonucleaire 
Dessel, Belgium, Mr. Eeckhout 
University of Helsinki 
Helsinki, Finland, Ms. Keinonen 
ECN 
Petten, Netherlands, Mr. Woittiez 
14. FBFC 
Dessel, Belgium, Mr. Pauwels 
15. I AEA/SAL 
Seibersdorf, Austria, Mr. Deron 
16. TUI 
Karlsruhe, Germany, Mr. Koch 
17. JRC 
Ispra, Italy, Mr. Guzzi 
18. BAM 
Berlin, Germany, Mr. Tamberg 
19. CEN 
Grenoble, France, Ms. Andreani 
20. SCK 
Mol, Belgium, Mr. De Regge 
21. ECN 
Petten, Netherlands, Mr. Aaldijk 
22. AERE 
Harwell, UK, Mr. Brown 
The numbers do not correspond to the 
laboratory codes mentioned in the graphs. 
3. Preparation, Verification of Homogeneity and 
Certification of Element Content 
3.1 Preparation 
A batch of U02 powder was obtained from a 
comm7rcial nuclear fuel fabrication facility. 
Port1ons of about 10 g of material were filled 
in pre-weighed bottles. After several days of 
storage under controlled conditions (relative 
humidity, temperature, pressure) the bottles 
were closed and weighed again. 
3.2 Verification of homogeneity and 
certification of element content 
The uranium mass fraction was obtained 
through direct uranium measurements by means of 
potentiometric titration calibrated against EC-
NRM 101 (uranium metal) and controlled potential 
coulometry calibrated against EC-NRM 110 
(uranium oxide) . 
The potentiometric titration was applied 
to three bottles of U02, the respective results 
were within each others uncertainty. 
Controlled potential coulometry was applied to 
two bottles, here again the individual results 
were within each others uncertainty. 
The uranium element content was certified 
as the weighted mean of uranium contents found 
respectively by two methods. The following 
value was obtained : 
859.91 ± 0.36 g·kg-1. 
A verification of this value was 
performed by the so-called (100-X) route, i.e. 
the determination of the total impurity 
content expressed as oxide and subtracted from 
100 percent. This was applied independently 
to five bottles yielding a mean value of 
859.97 ± 0.12 g·kg-1. 
4. Certification of Isotopic Composition 
4.1 Determination or the 235u;238u ratio 
In order to minimise the uncertainty on 
the 235u;238u ratio, this figure was determined 
by UF6 gas mass spectrometry. The conversion 
of the uranium oxide to UF6 was done in the 
following way. 
The U02 powder was dissolved in excess 
HN03, the solution was then evaporated to 
dryness. The residue was heated to 350°C 
overnight. The resulting U03 · xH20 was heated 
to 250°C in vacuum for 35 minutes. The 
resulting U03 was treated in vacuum at 250°C 
for 35 minutes in order to remove the water. 
The waterfree U03 was then mixed with CoF3 and 
the mixture degassed in vacuum at 200°C for 30 
minutes. Subsequent heating to 425°C for 70 
minutes and condensation of the reaction 
product UF6 at -196°C. The UF6 was purified at 
-78°C and then homogenized at 150°C during 60 
minutes. 
For the determination of the 235u;238u 
molar isotope ratio of the sample, the double 
standard method was applied. The two isotope 
reference materials (IRM) are chosen such that: 
z.Jsu J238U (sample) z.Jsu J238U (sample) 
-----:-:-:----- > 1 > ------
Z3SUJZ38U(IRMI) Z3SUJZ38U(IRM,) 
The 235u;238u molar isotope ratio was 
determined as : 
0.007 283 4 ± 0.000 002 9 
4.2 Determination of the Isotopic Composition 
The minor abundant isotopes 234u and 236u 
as well as the major compmonents 235u and 238u 
were measured by thermal ionisation mass 
spectrometry. 
For this purpose several fractions of the 
powder were dissolved in nitric acid, 
evaporated to dryness and redissolved in 
1 molar nitric acid. The uranium concentration 
was adjuested to about 5 mg·g-1. The 
measurements were performed on a Finnigan MAT 
260 instrument. Parallel measurements on a 
Finnigan MAT 262 equipped with a decelerating 
system for enhanced abundance sensitivity and 
an ion counter were made in order to determine 
the minor abundant isotopes more accurately. 
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The measurements were calibrated against 
synthetic isotope mixtures: the isotope 
reference materials EC 183 to EC 186. The 
uncertainties on the reference materials were 
taken into account for the final accuracy 
statement. 
4.3 Calculation of the isotopic composition 
Using the calibrated 234u;235u and 
236u;235u ratios determined by thermal 
ionisation mass spectrometry and the result of 
the gas mass spectrometric determination of 
235u;238u, the reference values for the 
isotopic composition of the sample were 
calculated. 
The accompanying uncertainties were used 
for the calculation of the final uncertainty 
statement. 
The following values of the isotopic 
composition were certified : 
234u o.oo5 13 ± o.ooo o6 
235u 0.713 97 ± o.ooo 29 
236u < o.ooo 10 ± o.ooo oo 
238u 99.280 90 ± o.ooo 29 
5. Results 
Basing on the results reported by the 
participants, graphs were worked out which give 
a picture of the state of the practice. These 
graphs are shown on the following pages. 
In addition to the graphs we report also 
the interlaboratory spread as calculated by the 
DoD (2istribution Qf 2ifferences) method /1/ 
and the interlaboratory mean. The median value 
of the reported results is also mentioned. 
6. Discussion 
The analysis of uranium dioxide powder 
requires handling, weighing and dissolving of 
powder material. 
The graph displaying the results of the 
element assay shows that the capability for 
this determination is for the majority of 
laboratories under good control. The values 
indicated in brackets could not be corrected 
for weight change during transport, thus the 
values appear somewhat too low. 
The determination of 235u and 238u 
abundances showed that some of the laboratories 
seem to have problems with the 235u;238u ratio 
measurement. These laboratories reported too 
high 235u and too low 238u abundances as 
compared to the reference values. 
It seems that not all the laboratories do 
estimate their accuracy realistically. 
The standard deviations on the 
interlaboratory means were determined using the 
DoD (2istribution Qf Qifferences) method /1/. 
The DoD software was worked out by 
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe. 
The external quality control programme 
REIMEP is under sponsorship of the Euratom 
Safeguards Authorities, Commission of the 
European Communities, DG XVII, DCS. 
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Abstract 
The interest in the safeguards of fissile 
material focuses on a limited number of 
compounds which play key roles in the nuclear 
fuel cycle. Amongst these materials uranium 
dioxide pellets are of considerable importance 
as they enter the reactors in order to generate 
energy. In LWR' s pellets with an initial 235u 
content of about 3 mass % are used, whereas 
natural or depleted material is applied for the 
breeding zone in FBR's. 
The 89/90 round of REIMEP covered uranium 
materials with 235u abundances in the range of 
natural or depleted material. U02 pellets were 
distributed to 21 laboratories for analysis. 
The participating laboratories were asked 
to determine the uranium content and the 
isotopic composition of the material. The 
results reported by the participants are 
presented as graphs thus giving a picture of 
the 'state-of-the-practice'. 
1. Introduction 
In the frame of the REIMEP programme in 
1989 a uranium dioxide material was 
distributed. Through this CBNM intends to 
provide nuclear analytical laboratories with a 
regular opportunity 
for an external check on the quality of 
their measurements 
to establish the state-of-the-practice of 
assaying common nuclear materials for 
isotope and element content 
to present a true picture of the real life 
interlaboratory spread of given measurements 
on given materials. 
This paper reports on the first U02 pellet 
round in REIMEP. Although a number of 
laboratories received both samples for 
destructive analysis (DA) and non-destructive 
analysis (NDA) only one laboratory reported a 
NDA value. 
2. Participation List 
1. Martin Marietta Energy Systems 
Piketon,Ohio, USA, Mr. Akers 
2. Martin Marietta Energy Systems 
Paducah, Kentucky, USA, Mr. Beverly 
3. New Brunswick Laboratory 
Argonne, Ill., USA, Mr. Lewis 
4. Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Los Alamos, NM, USA, Mr. Abernathey 
5. NMCC 
Tokai-Mura, Japan, Mr. Nomura 
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6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Inst. for Energy Techn. 
Kjeller, Norway, Mr. Stijfhoorn 
!AEA 
Seibersdorf, Austria, Mr. Deron 
BNF 
Capenhurst, UK, Mr. Ogden 
BNF 
Salwick, UK, Mr. Hayes 
10. ENEA 
Saluggia, Italy, Mr. Pagliai 
11. FBFC 
Dessel, Belgium, Mr. Pauwels 
12. Belgonucleaire 
Dessel, Belgium, Mr. Eeckhout 
13. WAK 
Karlsruhe, Germany, Mr. Berg 
14. ENUSA 
Salamanca, Spain, Mr. Marin 
15. JRC 
Ispra, Italy, Mr. Guzzi 
16. SCK 
Mol, Belgium, Mr. De Regge 
17. ECN 
Petten, Netherlands, Mr. Woittiez 
18. TU! 
Karlsruhe, Germany, Mr. Koch 
19. BAM 
Berlin, Germany, Mr. Tamberg 
20. AERE 
Harwell, UK, Mr. Brown 
21. CEN 
Grenoble, France, Ms. Andreani 
The numbers do not correspond to the laboratory 
codes mentioned in the graphs. 
3. Preparation. Verification of Homogeneity and 
Certification of Element Content 
The material used for this REIMEP round was 
the CBNM Reference Material No. 106. 
Preparation, homogeneity tests and determination 
of uranium mass fraction are described 
extensively in the certification report a copy 
of which is available from CBNM/1/. ' 
The certified value of the element content is : 
0.881 43 ± 0.000 24 g·g-1 of material 
4. Certification of Isotopic Composition 
4.1 Determination of the 235u;238u ratio 
In order to minimise the uncertainty on the 
235u;238u ratio, this figure was determined by 
UF6 gas mass spectrometry. 
The conversion of the uranium oxide to UF6 
was done in the following way. 
A pellet was dissolved in an excess of 
HN03, the solution was then evaporated to 
dryness and the residue heated to 350°C 
overnight. 
The resulting U03 xH20 was heated to 
250°C in vacuum for 35 minutes. The waterfree 
U03 was then mixed with an excess of CoF3, the 
mixture degassed in vacuum at 200°C for 30 
minutes. Subsequent heating to 425°C for 70 
minutes and condensation of the reaction 
product UF6 at -196°C. The UF6 was purified at 
-78°C and then homogenized at 150°C during 60 
minutes. 
For the determination of the 235u;238u 
molar isotope ratio of the sample, the double 
standard method was applied. The two isotope 
reference materials (IRM) are chosen such that: 
ZJ5U! 238U (sample) 
Zl5U/ZJ8U(IRM) 
I 
4.2 Isotopic Composition 
The isotopic composition was determined by 
thermal ionisation mass spectrometry. 
For this purpose pellets were dissolved, 
the solution then adjusted to 1 molar nitric 
acid and a uranium concentration of about 
5 mg/g. The measurements were performed on a 
Finnigan MAT 260 instrument. Parallel 
measurements on a Finnigan MAT 262 mass 
spectrometer equipped with a decelerating 
system for improved abundance sensitivity and 
with an ion counter were made in order to 
determine the minor abundant isotopes more 
accurately. 
The measurements were calibrated against 
synthetic isotope mixtures the isotope 
reference materials EC 183 to EC 186. The 
uncertainties on the reference materials were 
taken into account for the final accuracy 
statement. 
As the accuracy on the 235u;238u molar 
isotope ratio achievable by UF6 (gas) mass 
spectrometry is far better than that of 
thermionic mass spectrometry the isotopic 
composition of the sample was calculated by 
taking the 235u;238u ratio as determined by gas 
mass spectrometry and the 234u;235u, 236u;235u 
ratios from the thermal ionisation mass 
spectrometry. 
The 235u;238u molar isotope ratio was 
certified to be : 
0. 007 308 1 ± 0.000 002 9 
The following values of the isotopic 
composition (in mass %) were certified 
234u o.oo5 51 ± o.ooo 50 
235u 0.716 43 ± o.ooo 29 
236u < o.ooo 40 ± o.ooo oo 
238u 99.278 o6 ± o.ooo 57 
5. Results 
Basing on the results reported by the 
participants, graphs were worked out which give 
a picture of the state of the practice. These 
graphs are shown on the following pages. 
The uncertainties on the reference values 
were established on a 2s basis. 
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The analysis of a uranium dioxide pellet 
requires weighing and dissolution steps. 
The determination of the element content 
did not pose problems to the majority of the 
laboratories. A tendency to lower than the 
certified value is observed for those 
laboratories with deviating values. 
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A similar trend is observed for the 235u 
abundance values. Some of the laboratories 
reported too low 235u abundances, while their 
238u abundance values are too high compared to 
the reference value. 
The reference value for the 234u abundance 
is the highest of all values displayed. 
However, the majority of the laboratories 
reported values that lie within the range of 
uncertainty of the reference value. 
The standard deviations on the 
interlaboratory means were determined using the 
DoD (Distribution of Differences) method /2/. 
The DoD software was worked out by 
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe. 
The external quality control programme 
REIMEP is under sponsorship of the Euratom 
Safeguards Authorities, Commission of the 
European Communities, DG XVII, DCS. 
/1/ 
/2/ 
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Abstract 
The interest in the safeguards of fissile 
material focuses on a limited number of 
compounds which play key roles in the nuclear 
fuel cycle. Uranylnitrate solution is a 
material which appears in several stages of the 
nuclear fuel cycle. Wherever uranium is to be 
determined by destructive methods nitric acid 
is the solvent of choice. Therefore the 
measurement capability of nuclear analytical 
laboratories of this material is of interest. 
The 89/90 round of REIMEP covered uranium 
materials with 235u abundances in the range of 
natural or depleted material. Uranylnitrate 
solution was distributed to 16 laboratories for 
destructive analysis. 
The participating laboratories were asked 
to determine the uranium content and the 
isotopic composition of the material. The 
results reported by the participants are 
presented as graphs thus giving a picture of 
the 'state-of-the-practice'. 
1. Introduction 
In the frame of the REIMEP 
uranylnitrate solution 
Through this CBNM intends 
analytical laboratories 
opportunity 
programme in 1989 a 
was distributed. 
to provide nuclear 
with a regular 
for an external check on the quality of 
their measurements 
to establish the state-of-the-practice of 
assaying common nuclear materials for 
isotope and element content 
to present a true picture of the real life 
interlaboratory spread of given measurements 
on given materials. 
This paper reports on the results of the 
first uranylnitrate solution round in REIMEP. 
All laboratories reported values obtained by 
destructive analysis. The choice of the method 
was up to the participants. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
2. Participation List 
Savannah River Plant 
Mr. Satkowski 
Martin Marietta Energy Systems 
Piketon,Ohio, USA, Mr. Akers 
Martin Marietta Energy Systems 
Paducah, Kentucky, USA, Mr. Beverly 
ECN 
Petten, Netherlands, Mr. Woittiez 
Belgonucliaire 
Dessel, Belgium, Mr. Eeckhout 
New Brunswick Laboratory 
Argonne, Ill., USA, Mr. Lewis 
BNF 
Capenhurst, UK, Mr. Ogden 
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8. BNF 
Springfields, UK, Mr. Hayes 
9. WAK 
Karlsruhe, Germany, Mr. Stojanik 
10. Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Los Alamos, NM, USA, Mr. Abernathey 
11. SCK/CEN 
Mol, Belgium, Mr. De Regge 
12. JRC 
Ispra, Italy, Mr. Mousty 
13. TU! 
Karlsruhe, Germany, Mr. Koch 
14. BAM 
Berlin, Germany, Mr. Tamberg 
15. !AEA 
Seibersdorf, Austria, Mr. Deron 
16. CEN 
Grenoble, France, Ms. Andreani 
The numbers do not correspond to the 
laboratory codes mentioned in the graphs. 
3. Preparation of the Solution 
The solution was prepared by dissolving 
quantitatively a known mass of a reference 
material. The concentration of the solution has 
therefore been calculated on weight basis. 
The reference material used for this 
purpose was the EC reference material No. 110. 
It consists of sintered uranium dioxide pellets. 
Detailed information on this material is 
available in the certification report /1/. 
A known mass of this reference material 
35 g) was carefully dissolved in hot 
concentrated nitric acid. The solution was then 
evaporated and subsequently diluted with 0.1 
molar nitric acid until the required 
concentration was obtained. The solution was 
then homogeneised and weighed. In place of the 
apparent mass used in conventional weighing 
procedures, the true mass of solution is 
calculated by appling the buoyancy correction. 
Thus, the reference value was established 
on a gravimetrical basis. The uranium 
concentration is expressed in mass of uranium 
per g of solution : 
7.491 1 ± 0.001 5 mg·g-1. 
The uncertainty attached to the reference 
value is established on a 2s basis for all 
uncertainty for all uncertainty components. 
4. Certification of Isotopic Composition 
4.1 Determination of the 235u;238u ratio 
In order to minimise the uncertainty on 
the 235u;238u ratio, this figure was determined 
byUF6 gas mass spectrometry. The conversion to 
UF6 was done in the following way. A pellet 
(EC 110)was dissolved in excess HN03, the 
solution was then evaportaed to dryness. The 
residue was heated to 350°C overnight. The 
resulting U03 x H20 was treated in vacuum to 
25o•c for 35 minutes in order to remove the 
water. The waterfree U03 was then mixed with 
an excess of CoF3 and the mixture degassed in 
vacuum at 2oo•c for 30 minutes. Subsequent 
heating to 425°C for 70 minutes and 
condensation of the reaction product UF6 at -
196•c. The UF6 was purified at -78•c and then 
homogenized at 15o•c during 60 minutes. 
For the determination of the 235u;238u 
molar isotope ratio of the sample, the double 
standard method was applied. The two isotope 
reference materials (IRM) are chosen such that: 
235u t 238U (sample) 235u t 238u (sample) 
------- > 1 > -----~-
235U/238U (IRM 1) 235U/238U (IRM.} 
The atomic isotope ratio was determined 
to: 235u;238u = o. 003 204 5 ± o. ooo 002 o 
4.2 Determination of the isotopic composition 
The minor abundant isotopes 234u and 236u 
as well as 235u were determined by thermal 
ionisation mass spectrometry. 
For this purpose one of the ampoules was 
opened, the solution evaporated to dryness and 
redissolved in 1 molar nitric acid. The 
uranium concentration was adjusted to about 
5 mg·g-1. The measurements were performed on a 
Finnigan MAT 260 instrument. Parallel 
measurements on a Finnigan MAT 262 equipped 
with a decelerating system for enhanced 
abundance sensi ti vi ty and with an ion counter 
were made in order to determine the minor 
abundant isotopes more accurately. 
The measurements were calibrated against 
synthetic isotope mixtures the isotope 
reference materials EC 183 to EC 186. The 
uncertainties on the reference materials were 
taken into account for the final accuracy 
statement. 
4.3. Calibration of the isotopic composition 
Using the calibrated 234u;235u and 
236u;235u ratios as determined by thermionic 
mass spectrometry and the results of the gas 
mass spectrometric determination of 235u;238u 
the reference values for the isotopic 
composition of the sample were calculated. 
The accompanying uncertainties were used 
for the calculation of the final uncertainty 
statement. 
The 235U/238U ratio was certified as : 
0.003 204 5 ± 0.000 002 0 
The following values of the isotopic 
composition were certified : 
234u 0.001 96 ± o.ooo 27 mass % 
235u 0.315 36 ± 0.000 20 mass % 
236u 0.012 58 ± 0.000 28 mass % 
238u 99.670 10 ± 0.000 43 mass % 
5. Results 
Basing on the results reported by the 
participants, graphs were worked out which give 
a picture of the state of the practice. 
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These graphs are shown on the following. 
The uncertainties on the reference values 
were established on a 2s basis. 
Discussion 
The analysis of a uranylnitrate solution 
is the easiest case amongst the materials 
distributed as no dissolution of the material 
is required. 
Nevertheless the interlaboratory spread 
in the element concentration determination is 
about 0.4 %. 
The determination of 235u and 238u 
abundances showed that some of the laboratories 
seem to have problems with the 235u;238u ratio 
measurement. These laboratories reported too 
high 235u and too low 238u abundances as 
compared to the reference values. 
It seems that not all the laboratories do 
estimate their accuracy realistically. 
The standard deviations on the 
interlaboratory means were determined using the 
DoD (Distribution of Differences) method /2/. 
The DoD software was worked out by 
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe. 
The external quality control programme 
REIMEP is under sponsorship of the Euratom 
Safeguards Authorities, Commission of the 
European Communities, DG XVII, DCS. 
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FLUORESCENT DETERMINATION OF NEPTUNIUM IN PLUTONIUM 
V.M.Aiexandruk, A.S.Babaev, T.A.Dem•yanova, A.V.Stepanov 
Khlopin Radium Institute, Leningrad, USSR 
Abstract 
This paper describes a new procedure for di-
rect determination of neptunium in plutonium us-
ing laser indused time resolved fluorescence me-
thod. The procedure based on measurement of fluo-
rescence intensity of neptunium followed its con-
centration in effective layer of pellet of calci-
um fluoride. Detection 1 imit of determination of 
neptunium is 2·1o-12 g. At the level of neptunium 
content in plutonium more than 5 ppm relative 
standard deviation is equal 0.06-0.12. For carry-
ing out of single measurement it is necessary 
neither more nor less 5 mkg plutonium. 
1. Introduction 
The determination of neptunium in the solu-
tion of spent fuel particularly in plutonium is 
usually performed by alpha-spectrometric or spec-
trophotometric methods. These methods require to 
conduct a time-consuming process for the separa-
tion of neptunium from accompanying alpha-emit-
ting nuclides or elements which show similar pho-
tometric reactions, especially from uranium and 
plutonium. Rather high detection limit of neptu-
nium by means of these methods (0.05-0.1 mkg) ne-
cessitate to use comparatively large amounts of 
highly radioactive samples. 
One of the most sensitive ways for neptunium 
determination is the fluorescent method based on 
car2:Np crystallophosphor intensity measurement 
/1/. This crystallophosphor under ultraviolet ir-
radiation exhibits fluorescence in the region of 
630-720 nm and has characteristic structure of 
the spectrum with maxima at 637, 651 and 663 nm 
(Fig. 1), the two latter being more intensive. 
The fluorescence of car2:Np in visible region is 
observed only on cooling crystallophosphor below 
120 K. Neptunium detection limit is 0.1 ng for 
0.1 g mass of cristallophosphor. 
High sensitively of fluorescent method al-
lows to determine neptunium in a wide variety of 
objects, including spent fuel solution with ra-
ther high content of neptunium. However further 
lowering of neptunium detection 
ble. This enables to decrease 
limit is possi-
considerably the 
amount of sample needed for analysis, what is 
great importance In the case of highlY radioacti-
ve samples. 
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Fig. 1. Fluorgscence spectl'um of NP 
The present work is concerned with the deve-
lopment of a procedure for the determination of 
neptunium in plutonium solutions. 
2. Apparatus and Reagents 
The work was conducted by using a fluores-
cent homemade spectrometer (Fig. 2) on the basis 
of MDR-23 monochromater with reciprocal linear 
dispersion of 1.2 nmvmm. Fluorescence was induced 
by means of nitrogen laser ILGI-503 having light 
pulse duration of 10 ns and pulse frequency of 
100 Hz. Emission pulse energy was 50 mkJ. Tfme 
resolved technique was used with counting delay 
of analytical pulses relative to laser pulse at a 
certain value of time gate. Delay time and gate 
width could be controlled within 1-10000 mks. The 
spectrometer permitted to record spectrum and me-
asure fluorescence lifetime. The measurements 
were performed when cooling the samples to 77 K. 
All chemicals excepting plutonium were high 
pure grade. Solutions were prepared in double 
distilled water. For preparation of standard 
solutions 0.3 g ~lutonium dioxide were dessolved 
in nitric and hidrofluoric acids. Plutonium nit-
rate was cleaned from trace of neptunium with use 
Flo. 2. Bloc~-scheme of fluorescence spectrometer. 
of chrom8tographic separation. standard solutions 
of plutonium (IV) were prepared by suitable dilu-
tions. Concentration of plutonium was determined 
by liquid-scintillation technique with Sr=0.3 X. 
Ratio Np/Pu in this solution was not higher 
than 0.1 ppm, Standard solutions of neptunium 
were prepared bY su.itable di Jut ions of reference 
stock solution. 
3. Results and Discussion 
The mentioned-above limit for neptunium by 
fluorescent method was obtained in homogeneous 
distribution of neptunium in care:Np. However in 
this case in processes of fluorescence exitation 
and emission merely a small part of cristallo-
phosphor sample is involved while the value of 
this contribution depends on beam diameter of 
laser emission (e mm) and depth of effective 
fluorescence layer which constitutes commonly 
for crystaJJophosphor powders 0.06-0.1 mm ;e;. 
One can show that the detection limit of 
neptunium contained in this volume showed be 
about 1o-1e g, The achievement of such detection 
limit demands to change the gomogenous distri-
bution of neptunium in the volume care on its 
concentration in surface layer of crystallophos-
phor. The possibilities of ion-exchange concent-
ration of neptunium in surface layer of calcium 
fluoride pellets were investigated. The pellets 
were manufactured from car2 powder by using a 
hand press. Pellet diameter was 6 mm, thickness 
about 1 mm. 
The sorption of Np(IV) and Np(V) from nitric 
and hYdrochtorical acids solutions on car2 pow-
der was studied under static conditions. The in-
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vestigation of neptunium sorption was conducted 
by means of synthetized CaFe specimens and c~ 
mercial high-pure care specimen. 
No appriciable sorption of Np(V) from nitric 
or hydrochloric acid solutions of 0.01-0,5 H was 
observed. On the contrary Np(IV) was sorbed on 
care powder from 0.05-5 H HCJ solutions with 
distribution coefficient near to 100. 
All the investigated speciments of calcium 
fluoride developed the similar ion-exchange pro-
perties, therefore the commercial high-pure 
calcium fluoride was used for further experi-
ments. 
The preparation of crystallophosphor consis-
ted in applying the neptuniumrcontaining solution 
on the surface of Cafe pellet with subsequent 
drying under Infrared lamp and calcining In a 
muffle furnace. Then the pellet was placed In 
spectrometer cuvette department and cooled by li-
quid nitrogen. The measurement of intensity and 
fluorescence was carried out at 651 nm. Widths of 
monochrom8ter slits were 0.5 mm. 
Optimum press effort for preparation the 
pellets was 3 tonns. Under the stresses less than 
1 tonne the pellets proved to be mechanicallY 
unstable and under the stress more than 6 tonnes 
they began to laminate. 
The volume of solution once applied on a 
pallet should not exceed 0.03 ml. so, larger so-
lution volumes were appl led by 0.02 ml parts with 
subsequent drying. 
When applying of o.oe ml solution, the pel-
let is completely wetted and neptunium is uni-
formly distributed over the whole surface, as 
revealed by laser scanning of the pellets. 
lt was shown earlier /1/ that when prepa-
ration of crystallophosphor powder the fluores-
cence intensity does not depend on the oxidation 
state of neptunium in solution. Therefore, the 
difference in behaviour of Np(IV) and Np(V) may 
be assumed to be caused by their different 
ion-exchange properties in relation to CaFe. 
The f I uor escence i ntens it y of' Np (I V) is 
independent of' HCJ concentration in the range 
of 0,05-5 H. With increasing solution volume, 
specific intensity expressed counts·s-1·ng-1 
remains constant up to V=0.1 ml. Np(IV) is 
consentrated in surface layer of care pellet. Its 
distribution In depth obeys the exponential law 
and some 90Y. of' neptunium are accumulated in the 
layer to depth less than 0.07 mm for the solution 
volume from o.oe to 0.1 ml. 
The fluorescence intensity of Np(V) is con-
stant within 0.01-0.1 H HN03. At the concentra-
tion of HN03 above 0.5 H the decrease in fluores-
cence intensitY Is observed due to increasing Np 
distribution depth In pellet. 
The fluorescence intensity of' Np(V) drops 
with increasing the solution volume appJ led to. 
This results from high mobility of' Np(V). How-
ever, at the constant volume of applied solution J / l 
the fluorescence intensity depends I inearly on ° 
the amount of neptunium applied to the pellet. 2 
Just as for Np(IV) solution, neptunium (V) 
is distributed in the surface layer to depth no 
more than o.t nm when applying 0.02 ml solution 
of NP(V) in o.ot-o.t H HN03. The distribution 
follows the exponential Jaw as well. 
The linear dependence of fluorescence inten-
sity is valid up to to ng both for Np(IV) and 
Np(V). Further tests were conducted with Np(V) 
solutions in order to eliminate the stage of 
Np(V)-NP(IV) reduction in the course of analysis. 
The fluorescence intensity has a maximum on 
calcining the the pellet at 800 °C for 20 minu-
tes (Fig. 3). When calcining at higher tempera-
ture, the fluorescence intensitY decreases due to 
neptunium diffusion into pellet. After heating at 
t200 oc the fluorescence of Np is observed on the 
opposite side of pellet. 
0.6 
0 
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Fig. 3. Influence of temperature end 
durotlon of coiclnotlor on Np fluorss-
c e nee intensity 
Fluorescence spectrum of neptunium on pel-
lets is similar to that of crystallophosphor pow-
der (Fig. 1). Np fluorescence lifetime is 450 
mks, background fluorescence lifetime - 12 mks. 
on the basis of these data, the delay time of too 
mks and gate-width of tOOO mks were established. 
The crysta!Jophosphor based on CaF2 pellets 
retains its fluorescent properties when prolonged 
storage in air and also on repetitive cooling in 
I iquid nitrogen. Stable properties enable to use 
the same reference specimens during a long period 
of time. 
The intensitY of neptunium determination was 
t•to5 count·ng-1 for pulse counting time of 10 s. 
Neptunium detection I imit is equal to 2·1o-12 g 
(H0.05 mBk). This value is somewhat higher than 
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Fig. ~. Influence of some quenchers on Np 
fluore see nee intensity 
one could be expected, what is caused by a grea-
ter value of pellet diameter as compared to the 
diameter of laser beam. The attained limit for 
neptunium detection by fluorescent method is 
rather low and compares favourably with the 
detectability by neutron activation (5·to-t3 g 
Np) [3), However for performing the latter a 
high-flux reactor is necessary. 
The dependence of fluorescence intensity on 
concentration of several elements, including plu-
tonium, is presented on Fig. 4. For the most ca-
tions under investigation, the linear dependence 
is observed between the ratio of 10/l and the 
concentration of quencher. 
The mass of plutonium at which the fluores-
cence intensity halved comes to 5 mkg. For 
Fe(lll) this mass is 1 mkg. Alkaline and earth-
alkaline elements do not affect the fluorescence 
intensity of neptunium up to 5 mkg per a pellet. 
The most cations produce no spectral 
disturbances, expect for uranium and aluminium. 
Uranium generates intensive emission in calcium 
fluoride with maximum at 530 nm, which rise to a 
significant increase of background in 65t region. 
The permissible content of uranium, without any 
increase of background in 65t nm region, consti-
tutes 0.2 mkg per pellet. 
In the presence of aluminium calcium fluo-
ride exhibits fluorescence peak with a maximum at 
694 nm. The maximum permissible content of alumi-
nium which does not require to take into account 
the background changes is 0.1 mkg. 
The determination of neptunium in plutonium 
Table 1. Comparison of the data on determination 
of ne2tunium in 21utonium 
N' N!!,!PU 1 Y. 
fluoresc. x-ray fluor. all!ha-sl!ectr. 
10.6 .± 1.2 9.1 .± 0.5 
2 6.9 .± 0.5 7.2 .± 014 
3, 0.61 .± 0.04 0.94 .± 0.04 
4: 0.69 .± 0.07 0.70 .± 0.06 
I 
I 
5; (2. 9,!0. 2) • 1 o-2 :(2.9.±0.2)•10-2 
solutions could be carried out according to 
method of standard additions. In this case the 
effect of all quenchers is taken into considera-
tion. However if the content of other quenchers 
does not exceed some per cents with respect to 
plutonium, the determination could be performed 
according to graduated plot constructed for pure 
neptunium solutions. correction for fluorescence 
quenching by plutonium itself might be introdused 
in accordance with Pu dependence shown on Fig. 4. 
On the base of both the detection limit of 
neptunium in pure solution and the value of 
fluorescence quenching by plutonium, it is possi-
ble to estimate the detection limit of neptunium 
in plutonium. This value comes to 1-5 ppm depen-
,ding on mass of the latter on pellet. For 5 mkg 
'pu mass and content of 5•1o-4 Y. Np, the value Sr 
was 0.12, for 5•1o-3 Y. and more- 0.06. In any 
case, plutonium mass on pellet should not exceed 
,5 mkg. on neptunium content above 5·1o-2 Y., the 
amount of plutonium applied to pellet should be 
respectively decreased because of high pulse-co-
unting rate. Experimental value of detection 
limit ~etermlne~ os ~ouble~ value of bacKgroun~ 
IntensitY was close to the data mentioned-above. 
lt was shown that F-, cl-, and c2o42- at 
concentration up to 0.1 K have no Influence on Np 
fluorecsence intensity. In the presence of 
l--Ion, fluorescence is observed in 694 nm region 
similarlY to that In the presence of Al. 
The Table 1 presence the comparison of the 
,~ota on the ~etermlnation of neptunium In pluto-
nium by fluorescent method and the results of 
'alpha-spectrometrr and x-ray fluorescence analy-
sis. When determining neptunium by two latter 
methods, its seperatlon from plutonium was con-
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ducted by means of partition-chromatography, The 
yield of neptunium was determined from 239Np. 
Good agreement is observed within the error 
limits for the compared methods. 
When determinating neptunium in plutonium 
below 5•1o-4 Y., the separation of these elements 
is requled. We used prosedure of exstraction-
chromatographic separarion /4/ with trimethYI-
octyl ammonium (THOA) applied to porous teflon . 
Neptunium was eluate~ by 0.03 Y. oxalic acid, 
Neptunium yield was determined by 239Np. 
Using 1-2 mg Pu, neptunium up to 10-6 Y. 
could be determined in such a manner. 
4. Conclusion 
This work has proved that consentration of 
neptunium in effective layer of pellet of calcium 
fluoride allowed to decrease the significantly 
detection limit of fluorescent determination of 
neptunium in plutonium in compare with gomogeno-
us distribution of Np in volume of cristaJJophos-
phor. lt is possible to carry out direct determi-
nation of neptunium of in plutonium in spite of 
high quenching action of latter using simple di-
lution of initial solution. High sensitivitY of 
the method allowed to use for measurements two 
order less quantity of plutonium in compeare with 
other methods. For determination of 5 ppm or less 
of neptunium in plutonium 5 mkg it is necessary 
to carry out chemical separation of these ele-
ments. Nevetheless in this case the quantitY of 
plutonium used for analysis will be smaller as 
compared with other methods. 
Technique of concentration in surface layer 
of crystallophosphor may be also appJay for de-
crease of detection limit of other elements. For 
example detection limit of uranium in this case 
can be reduce down to 1o-14 g. 
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Abstract 
The Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry 
(IDMS) measurement technique provides a 
means for determining the unknown amount of 
various isotopes of an element in a sample 
solution of known mass. The sample solution is 
mixed with an auxiliary solution, or "tracer" 
containing a known amount of the same element 
having the same isotopes but of different relative 
abundances or isotopic composition and the 
induced change in the isotopic composition 
measured by isotope mass spectrometry. The 
technique involves the measurement of the 
abundance ratio of each isotope to a (same) 
"reference" isotope in the sample solution, in the 
tracer solution, and in the blend of the sample 
and tracer solution. These isotope ratio 
measurements, the known element amount in the 
tracer, and the known mass of sample solution 
are used to calculate the unknown amount of one 
isotope in the sample solution . Subsequently 
the unknown amount of element is determined. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine 
the optimization of the ratio of the estimated 
unknown amount of element in the sample 
solution to the known amount of element in the 
tracer solution in order to minimize the relative 
uncertainty in the determination of the unknown 
amount of element. 
1. Introduction 
The Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry 
(IDMS) measurement technique provides a 
means for determining unknown amounts or 
concentrations of elements in solutions by finding 
the unknown amount of one or more of the 
various isotopes in a sample. To accomplish this, 
one uses an auxiliary solution, called "tracer'' 
containing a known amount of the same element 
with some or all the same isotopes as the sample 
but of a different isotopic composition. 
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Three sets of measurements obtained using 
isotope mass spectrometry are needed. These are 
the abundance ratios of the various isotopes 
relative to one reference isotope in (i) the 
original sample; (ii) the tracer and (iii) the 
blend of the sample and the tracer solutions. 
From the three sets of ratio measurements, the 
known masses of the tracer and sample solutions, 
and the known amount of element in the tracer, 
one calculates the unknown amount of element in 
the solution. All measurements in this procedure 
are performed with known uncertainties. Note 
that any amount of tracer in the IDMS scheme 
provides a value for the amount of sample; the 
answer, however, might not be optimal as far as 
the associated uncertainty is concerned. 
provides a value for the unknown amount of sample; 
the answer, however, might not be optimal as 
far as the associated uncertainty is concerned. 
Consequently, one is interested in deriving the 
optimal blend ratio, i.e., the one with the smallest 
relative uncertainty. The main steps of this 
optimization process are as follows. 
Following De Bievrent we use R,(x), R;(y), 
( where i = 1, 2, .... , n and n is the 
number of isotopes ), to denote the number of 
isotope ratios in the sample and in the tracer. 
Let N i (x) denote the number of atoms of the 
ith sample isotope. Then 
where isotope 1 is the arbitrarily chosen reference 
isotope. It is best to choose a major abundance 
isotope in the sample as the reference. 
Likewise for the tracer 
The blend of the sample and the tracer is 
uniquely described by the ratio 
where isotope 2 is any isotope other than the 
one used for the reference. It is better, however 
to use the most abundant isotope in the tracer. 
These two isotopes then become the only ones 
that must be measured in the blend. 
The problem as posed in /11 is to minimize 
the relative uncertainty of the quantity 
where q is the ratio of the amount of element 
in the sample relative to the amount of 
element in the tracer. 
2. Optimization Model 
In isotope ratios q can be expressed as follows 
/1/ 
The novel features of this paper are that 
q is expressed as a function of Rb, the optimum 
is determined in terms of Rb, and the 
contribution to the uncertainty of all the isotopes 
in a poly-isotopic mixture is considered. 
Computationally, the problem treated in this 
fashion is advantageous for 
Next, the Var(q)!l must be determined. 
Here, we apply the propagation of error 
technique based on the first order Taylor 
approximation of the multivariate function 
The function to be minimized in terms of 
Rb is Var(q)/q2 : 
Var q = [ R,_ (x) + R,_ (x) r Var R,_ (x) 
q2 Rb - R,. (x) :E R, (x) Ri<x) 
• 2 !: Rj (x) Var R(i) (x)fR,2(x) 
+ 1•3 
{:E R, (x))2 
[ 
R,_ (y) R,_ (y) r Var R,_ (y) 
+ R,_ (y) - Rb - !: RI (y) Ri (y) 
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E R,2 (y) Var R1 (y)fiJ (y) 
+ 1-3 
(E R, (y))2 
+ RJ R,_ (x) - R,_ (y) r Var Rb 
'l (Rb - R,_ (x)) (R,_(y) - Rb) R; 
Note that the second and the fourth terms 
do not contain Rb. Using simplified notations the 
problem consists of minimizing the positive 
function f(t) defined as follows: 
with: 
(!) t = Rb 
x1 = R;(x); y1 = R1(y) (i=l, ... , n) 
c. = Var R,_(x)fi;.(x); 
C
1 
= Var R,_(y)fJii(y); 
2 Cb = Var RJRb 
(ii) min(~, y2) < t < max(x2, Y2) 
The first derivative of f(t) can be written 
as the ratio of a fourth order to a sixth order 
polynomial 
/(t) = p<4>(t), where 
p<6>(t) 
+ C, y: (t - A2)3 ( 1 - (Y~ ~~t)) 
+ Cb t (x2 - Y2)2 (t2 - XV'2) 
The function to be minimized in terms of 
Rb is Var(q)/q2 : 
Var q = [ R,_ (x) + R,_ (x) r Var R,_ (x) 
q2 Rb - R,. {x) !: R, (x) Ri<x) 
• 2 
:E Rj (x) Var R(1) (x)fR,2(x) 
+ 1·3 
[ 
Rz (y) Rz (y) r Var Rz (y) 
+ Rz (y) - Rb - E RI (y) Ri (y) 
Note that the second and the fourth terms 
do not contain Rb. Using simplified notations the 
problem consists of minimizing the positive 
function f(t) defined as follows: 
f(t) = ~ -- + ~ c, + Y2 -- - ~ c, ~ 1 1 )2 2( 1 1 )2 t - Xz "- XI y2 - t "- Yl 
+ r2 (.xz - Y2)2 cb 
(t - .xz)2 (Y2 - t)2 
with: 
(i) t = Rb 
x1 = R;(x); y1 = R;(y) (i=l, ... , n) 
C:r = Var R,_(x)/J?i(x); 
2 C
1 
= Var R,_(y)fR;,(y); 
2 Cb = Var RJRb 
(il) min(.xz, Yz) < t < max.(xz, Yz) 
The first derivative of f(t) can be written 
as the ratio of a fourth orde,r to a sixth order 
polynomial 
(4l(t) 
J'(t) = _P __ ' where 
p<6l(t) 
p<4>(r) = - cri (Y2 - r)' (1 + (t ~ ~)) 
Oat a given : ==> R. () vector conponents: (U238/U238, U235/U238, U234/U238, U236/U238) 
RxO Rel. error (X) 
1.000000 
0.135800 
0.001100 
0.000175 
Ry() 
1.000000 
17.269300 
0.184400 
O.On408 
Rb() 
Nunerical results : 
0.000000 
0.220000 
1.000000 
1.000000 
Rel. error (X) 
0.000000 
0.100000 
0.500000 
1.000000 
Rel. error (X) 
0.150000 
RbOpt 
OptQ 
: calculated optimal isotopic ratio of the blend of sa~le & spike; 
: optimal mass ratio of sa~le to spike; 
Rel. err. 
osl 
Opt. Osp 
: relative error of mass ratio of sa~le to spike (for short); 
: sa~le quantity (mg); 
: optimal spike quantity (mg); 
Spike 
(mg) 
1.00000 
2.00000 
3.00000 
4.00000 
5.00000 
6.00000 
7.00000 
8.00000 
9.00000 
10.00000 
Rel. error 
0.30350 
0.22757 
0.20505 
0.19519 
0.19024 
0.18767 
0.18643 
0.18602 
0.18616 
0.18668 
Figure 1 
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===> 1.700215 
===> • 6106591 
===> .1860134 
===> 5 
===> 8.187875 
1 
From (ii) it follows that the denominator 
of f'(t) is not zero on the open interval (x2> y:J, 
and is > 0. Thus the problem consists of 
determining the zeros of the numerator of f:(t). 
The analysis of the function shows that f'(t) 
could have only one zero of multiplicity of order 
2 or 4 which indicates that the function f(t) has 
only one minimum in the interval (x2> y:J. 
3. Computer Code and Example 
A computer code in Microsoft Basic has 
been developed to calculate the optimum blend 
ratio R6 for given sample and tracer isotope 
compositions and relative uncertainties. Figures 
1 and 2 present sample outputs of two examples. 
To facilitate the proper selection of tracer 
amount a table of tracer amounts together with 
the corresponding relative error of sample to 
tracer ratio is generated. Typically the curve of 
relative error of sample to tracer ratio vs. spike 
amount is rather flat close to its minimum value, 
therefore a near optimal blend ratio can be 
achieved with less amount of tracer. The curves 
of Figure 3 show this phenomenon. 
4. Conclusion/Comments 
A simple algorithm has been designed to 
calculate the minimum value of Var(q)/q2 in 
terms of Rb for the polyisotopic case. 
The form of Var(q)/q2 makes the 
optimum value calculation easy, since 
min(~(x), ~(y)) < Rb < max(~(x), ~(y)) . 
Data given : ==> R.() vector components: (Pu240/Pu240, Pu239/Pu240, Pu241/Pu240, Pu238/Pu240, Pu242/Pu240) 
Rx() Rei. error <X> 
1.000000 
3.608000 
0.105030 
0.006166 
0.033270 
Ry() 
1.000000 
21.194700 
0.226210 
0.001435 
0.001844 
Rb() 
Nunerical results : 
0.000000 
0.100000 
0.200000 
1.500000 
0.500000 
Rel. error (X) 
0.000000 
0.200000 
0.200000 
2.000000 
2.000000 
Rel. error (X) 
0.150000 
RbOpt : calculated optimal isotopic rotio of the blend of SD!11'le & spike; 
OptQ : optimal mass ratio of S8111'le to spike; 
Rel. err. : relative error of mass ratio of sall1'le to spike (for short); 
Dsl : sa!l1'le quantity (mg); 
Opt. Dsp : optimal spike quantity (mg); 
Spike 
(mg) 
1.00000 
2.00000 
3.00000 
4.00000 
5.00000 
6.00000 
7.00000 
8.00000 
9.00000 
10.00000 
Rel. error 
0.93874 
0.60143 
0.49729 
0.45175 
0.42985 
0.41990 
0.41688 
0.41826 
0.42261 
0.42910 
Figure 2 
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===> 8.425359 
===> .5617742 
===> .4168476 
===> 4 
===> 7. 120298 
Re!. Error or q vs. Blend Ratio (Rb) 
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Figure 3 
It has been demonstrated that there is a 
unique minimum value for Var(q)!l attained. 
The calculation of the optimal mix of 
sample and spike which achieves Rb,opt must 
be achieved through an iterative procedure. 
To prepare the optimal mix one has to 
know the amounts to be mixed, but one of the 
components of the blend is what is to be 
determined either in terms of atoms or mass 
or solution concentration. A good approximate 
knowledge of the sample amount guarantees a 
good approximation of the optimal blend 
ratioRb,opt . (Note that lack of knowledge of the 
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sample amount does not preclude its 
determination from R(x), R(y) and Rb and 
the spike amount. In such a case IDMS simply 
does not produce the smallest possible relative 
uncertainty). 
5. Reference 
Ill P. J. De Bievre, G. H. Debus, "Precision 
Mass Spectrometric Isotope Dilution 
Analysis", Nuclear Instruments and 
Methods, 32 (1965), 224-228 

SYNTHETIC 239PUt242pu ISOTOPE MIXTURES AS BASIS FOR ABSOLUTE Pu ISOTOPIC MEASUREMENTS AT CBNM 
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Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements 
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B-2440 GEEL, Belgium 
Abstract 
In view of the characterisation of 
reference materials for isotopic measurements 
of Plutonium, a series of 20 synthetic isotope 
mixtures have been made. Highly enriched 239Pu 
and 242Pu materials were mixed gravimetrically 
as Pu oxides in ratios ranging from 10-1 to 
10+1. 
Taking into account the different 
uncertainty sources chemical impurities in 
the starting materials, isotopic composition of 
the starting materials, hygroscopicity, 
stoichiometry and weighing, the total 
uncertainty for any of the mixtures is s 0. 02 
~. This means that the correction factor for 
isotope fractionation of two neighbouring 
masses (e.g. 239Put240pu) can be determined to 
± 0.01 % for all practical purposes. 
These mixtures are stored at CBNM in units of -
1 mg and will form the basis of "absolute" Pu 
isotopic measurements at CBNM for the next 20 
years. 
1. Introduction 
Synthetic mixtures of Pu isotopes serve 
for the calibration of mass spectrometers, used 
in the characterisation of isotopic reference 
materials. 
2. Preparation of the mixtures 
Principle of making the mixtures (Fig. 1) 
The mixtures were made gravimetrically 
(Pu02 form). 
Laboratory Layout 
A complete new facility was installed. In 
order to avoid cross contamination between the 
enriched isotopes, the chemical operations were 
kept strictly separated. Figure 2 shows 
schematically the laboratory layout. 
A microbalance with a total weighing range 
of 4. 1 g and a standard deviation < 1 11g was 
selected and installed in a very stable metal 
glovebox. 
The successive steps in the procedure 
The base materials for the mixtures were 
highly enriched 239Pu and 242pu (Table 1). in 
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Fig. 1 
Fig. 2 
PROJECTED 
UNCERTAINTY 
IN % 12sl 
,0.01% 
TOTAL: 
,0.021. 
oxide form. These materials were taken in 
solution, chemically purified by means of ion 
exchange on anion resin, precipitated in oxalate 
form and calcinated to Pu02. The calcination 
was done heating Pu oxalate in steps up to 
1250"C and calcining for 2 hours. Under these 
conditions, the stoichiometry of the Pu02 is 
known to be 0. 01 %. On this figure we put an 
uncertainty of ± 0.01 %. 
Experiments on the water uptake of several 
Pu02 samples, calcinated at 1250°C, showed a 
reproducibility such that we decided only to 
keep the humidity conten_t of the air stable 
during the weighing procedure. 
ENRICHED 239 Pu ENRICHED 242 Pu 
ATOM '1. UNCERTAINTY ATOM '1. UNCERTAINTY Ion 2s basis) Ion 2s basis) 
23Bpu 0.000 30 ± 0.000 20 0.003 50 .l: 0.001 00 
239pu 99.966 56 ± 0.000 77 0.004 79 j; 0.000 10 
24DPu 0.026 06 ± 0.000 64 0.019 39 ! 0.000 40 
241Pu 0.005 87 ± 0.000 37 0.025 94 :to.ooo 54 
242Pu 0.001 11 ± 0.000 03 99.946 03 :!:0.001 20 
244Pu 0.000 10 :t 0.000 01 0.000 35 :!:0.000 01 
Table 1 
Determination of the chemical impurities 
The purity of the Pu ox ides was 
by means of Spark Source analysis. 
gives the impurities in ppm. 
measured 
Table 2 
CALIBRATED* 23op0 2"'2pu 
Ll 0.062 0.023 
B 5.5 2.2 
Na 0.17 0.30 
AI 3.3 8.0 
SI 15.0 3.8 
p 0.35 0.30 
Ca 1.2 1.1 
Tl 0.26 0.018 
V 0.020 (0.010 
Cr 1.1 0.32 
Mn 0.21 0.021 
Fo 2.5 1.9 
Co 0.036 (0.010 
NI 1.0 (0.070 
Cu 0.33 0.55 
Zn 1.5 0 51 
In 0.095 0.090 
Sn 1.8 0.77 
Ba <0.015 __ 0.40 
w 0.86 (0.030 
Pb 0.23 0.29 
Th 11.0 5.5 
.f 47 .f 26 
UNCALIBRATED 23flpu 242pu 
s 14.0 9.7 
Cl 9.2 7.9 
K 12.0 8.0 
Co < 0.10 0.40 
Np 14.0 0.53 
.f 49 .f 26 
.f TOTAL 98 r TOTAL 52 
*CALIBRATED: THE MEASUREMENTS HAVE BEEN CALIBRATED 
WITH IMPURITY STANDARDS FOR THE ELEMENTS 
CONCERNED. ALL IMPURITIES ARE MEASURED 
RELATIVE TO THE 230 Pu ISOTOPE, USED AS 
" INTERNAL STANDARD ". 
Table 2 
IN THE CALCULATION OF THE RATIO VALUES 
FOR THE SYNTHETIC MIXTURES, TOTAL IMPU· 
RITY LEVELS OF 75 t 50 ~g ·o·' HAVE BEEN 
USED !THESE ARE HIGHLY CORRELATED!. 
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3. Total uncertainty on the 239Pu;242Pu ratio 
The total uncertainty on the ratio is the 
sum of different contributions : 
the uncertainty on the isotopic composition 
of the starting materials 
the uncertainty on the purity grade of the 
starting materials. In consideration are 
to be taken chemical impurities as well as 
the water uptake on the materials 
the uncertainty on the stoichiometry 
th~ uncertainty on the weighings 
Table 3 is an example of the mixture with 
239Pu;242pu ratio = 0.235 75. 
"SING THE MIXTURE WITH 239Pu/242Pu ' 0.23575 AS AN EXAMPLE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ENRICHED 
ISOTOPE MATERIAL 
pp m. 
!RELATIVE TO VALUEI 
ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION 27.6 
31.6* 
14.8* 
ELEMENTAl PURITY 
IDENTITY Of STOICHIOMETRY 
MASSES IWEICHINGI 50 8 
TOTAL 67.5 
*TA KING INTO ACCOUNT THE HIGH CORRELATION. 
Table 3 
4. Verification Measurements 
Each of the mixtures has been measured several 
times on a thermal ionisation mass 
spectrometer. The average value of the K 
factors 
calculated value 
K= 
measured value 
are represented in fig. 3. 
'5 -; 1000 50 
g ~ 
·:. ·::.. 1000 00 
, , 
.... a a o 010 60 
w w 
3 3 008800 
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0 o.na Go 
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0 :I; 
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'''\~-1 
Fig. 3 
11: AVERAGE VALUE OF 11 OIFFERENf MASS SPECTROMETRIC 
MEASUREMENTS Ill FILAMENT LOAOINGSI ON INDEPENDENTLY 
PREPARED SYNTIIETIC ISOTOPE MIXTUHES. 
UNCERTAINTIES ARE 18 REPRODUCIBILITIES OF MASS SPEC~ 
TROMETRIC MEASUREMENTS 
TUE UNCERT AINTV OF TilE PREPARA liON OF ANY 
ISOTOPE MIXTUME IS (0 01 ~ lCOMPUTED ON 28 BASISI. 
c 
I I r I 11100 I I 1111101 
230Pu/ 2"2Pu RATIO 
In consequence of these measurements one of the 
mixtures (F) has been rejected. 
5. Conclusions 
Synthetic 239Pu/242Pu mixtures have been 
prepared with an uncertainty of s0.02 % on the 
ratio 239Pu;242Pu. From 19 different mixtures 
with 239pu;242pu in the range 0.1 to 10, units 
of 1 mg Pu as dried Pu nitrate were prepared 
(see Table 4). 
Table 4 
Pu SYNTHETIC ISOTOPE MIXTURES 
AS Pu NITRATE (DRIED FORM) 
239pu /242 Pu UNITS 1 mg 239pu /242 Pu UNITS 1 mg 
0.101358 490 1.025140 86 
11 83 
0.101884 482 1.013450 96 
11 82 
0.099926 488 1.000730 95 
11 82 
0.232119 472 2.31008 291 
16 16 
0.235754 450 2.28691 290 
16 16 
0.229387 479 2.25369 286 
16 16 
0.466521 279 4.65674 486 
33 31 
0.476282 271 4.54568 498 
33 30 
0.477061 275 4.78777 511 
33 32 
10.0574 481 
11 
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SOLID SPIKES FROM CBNM FOR INPUT ANALYSIS 
P. DE BIEVRE, C. INGELBRECHT, A. VERBRUGGEN, J.M. OREA-ROCHA 
Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements, 
Commission of the European Communities - JRC 
Abstract 
B-2440 GEEL, Belgium 
J.N. BARRANDON 
CNRS, Centre de Recherches Ernest-Babelon 
F-45045 ORLEANS, France 
Base material 
Two types of 235Uj239Pu solid spikes for 
the assay of reprocessing plant input solutions 
are under study at CBNM. Dried U/Pu nitrate 
spikes have been prepared from metallic 
reference materials and uranium and plutonium 
concentrations and isotopic compositions have 
been certified (CBNM IRM-1027 a and b). 
Metallic U/Pu spikes are prepared by 
quantitative crucible-less alloying with 
quality control carried out by IDMS and by 
gamma counting on solid and dissolved samples. 
Consideration of IDMS error propagation shows 
that, for typical LWR input solutions, the 
optimum Pu/U+Pu ratio for CBNM solid spikes is 
0.025 to 0.1. 
For the preparation of both batches the 
base materials given in Table 1 have been used. 
1. Introduction 
Solid spikes for isotope dilution mass 
spectrometry (IDMS) analyses offer a simple and 
reliable procedure for the uranium and 
plutonium assay of reprocessing plant input 
solutions /l-3/. The solid spikes used are of 
235Uj239pu composition, avoiding the use of the 
more exotic 233U and 242Pu isotopes. They are 
relatively large in size (- 100 mg) and spiking 
can be carried out on undiluted input samples 
eliminating the need for quantitative dilution 
and simplifying the spiking process in the hot 
cell. The large size of the samples and spikes 
also means that they are relatively insensitive 
to chemical contamination. The dried nitrate 
version of the solid spike, the Large Size 
Dried Spike (LSD}, has been successfully used 
by the IAEA at inspections in Japan /4-5/. 
This paper reports on the preparation and 
certification of LSD U/Pu nitrate spikes and 
describes the status of the preparation and 
characterization of U/Pu met a 11 i c spikes. The 
procedure used to optimise spike composition 
and size is also discussed. 
2. Large Size Dried Spikes 
Two batches of LSD spike, CBNM IRM-1027a 
and CBNM IRM-1027b have been prepared on a 
semi-commercial scale. The preparation 
procedure is described in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1 - Preparation route of LSD spikes 
mol \ mass \ uncertainty 
NBS 950b 
2HU : 0.005 71 0.005 61 0.000 07 
235U : o.719 eo 0. 710 77 0.000 29 
236U : 0.001 20 0.001 19 0.000 01 
238U : 99.273 29 99 .2e2 42 0.000 30 
NBS SRM U-970 
234U : 1.665 3 1.658 2 0.001 5 
235U : 97.662 7 97.662 5 0.002 5 
236U : 0.149 1 o. 149 7 0.000 5 
238U : 0. 522 9 0. 529 6 0. 000 5 
NBS SRM 949f 
238Pu 0.003 7 0. 003 7 
239Pu 97.148 7 97.136 8 
240Pu 2.802 5 2.813 9 
241Pu 0.039 1 0. 039 5 
241Pu 0. 006 0 0.006 1 
Table 1 - Base materials used to prepare LSD 
spikes. (Uncertainties are 2s} 
Chemical preparation 
Before weighing any of the uranium 
batches, both materials were ignited in an open 
furnace at aoo•c for one hour and cooled in a 
dessicator just prior to use in order to ensure 
the stoichiometry of U309. 
The fraction of NBS SRM 950b was weighed 
directly into a flask. The fraction of 
SRM U-970 was weighed in a recipient and 
subsequently transferred into the same flask. 
One unit of NBS SRM-949f plutonium reference 
material was added to the flask, after 
verification of the certified mass. All 
operations were performed in a specially 
equipped weighing glove-box. 
Nitric acid was added to obtain final 
uranium and plutonium concentrations of about 
19.4 mg U/g and 0.6 mg Pu/g solution. 
Aliguoting 
Each solution was aliquoted by transfer 
into 50 ml syringes in order to avoid 
evaporation losses. Metrological aliquots of 
2.5 g or 5 g were subsequently weighed into 
borosilicate glass 10 ml penicillin vials 
(approximately 250 units per batch}. Weighings 
were carried out on a Mettler AE-163 analytical 
balance, by weighing the syringe before and 
after transfer of the aliquot into the 
recipient. 
After dispensing the whole batch, the content 
of each unit was evaporated until dryness on a 
hot plate. After addition of a THF solution, 
each unit was heated unti 1 dryness at 60"C. A 
glassy material was formed which adhered very 
well to the walls of the vial. The vials were 
then closed with a fluoelastomere (iso-
versinic} stopper and aluminium tear-off seal. 
The outside wall of each vial was checked for 
radioactive contamination. After sea 1 i ng in a 
plastic bag CBNM IRM-1027 is ready for 
transport. This procedure was used to prepare 
two batches : 
CBNM IRM-1027a 
CBNM IRM-1027b 
144 units containing about 
47.5 mg uranium and 1. 6 mg 
plutonium 
96 units containing about 
97 mg uranium and 3 mg 
plutonium 
160 units containing about 
47.5 mg uranium and 1.6 mg 
plutonium 
68 units containing about 
97 mg uranium and 3 mg 
plutonium 
Provisional certification 
Preliminary certification values are based on 
the metrological data of the weighings and the 
certified values of the base materials. 
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We1ghings: 
SRM 950b : (15.734 5 • 0.001 Ol q material (0308) 
SRM 0-970 : (3.813 67 • 0.000 10) q material (0308) 
Calculated amount uranium: (16.565 7 • 0.003 1) q uranium 
SRM 949£ (tube N164) : (0.51 1 52 • 0.000 05) g material (Pu) 
Total amount of solution : (854. 175 • 0.010) q nitric acid 5M 
Isotop1.c composition (uranium): 
mole % mass \: uncertainties ( 2s) 
2340 0. 332 3 0. 327 5 0. 000 3 
2350 19.797 6 19.597 7 0.002 2 
2360 0. 030 3 0. 030 1 0.000 1 
2380 79.839 8 80.044 6 0.002 2· 
Isotop1c composition (plutonium): 
mole \: mass \: 
238Pu 0.003 7 0. 003 7 
239Pu 97.148 7 97.136 9 
240Pu 2.802 5 2.813 9 
241Pu 0.039 1 0. 039 4 
242Pu 0. 006 0 0. 006 1 
Certified concentration: 
(19.393 8 • 0.003 6) mq O/g solution 
(0.598 44 • 0.000 31) mg Pu/g solut>on 
Table 2 - Certification data for CBNM IRM-1027a 
Weighings: 
SRM 950b : (13.981 2 ' 0.001 0) g material (0308) 
SRM 0-970 : (3.403 72 • 0.000 10) q material (0308) 
Calculated amount uranium: (14.732 5 z 0.002 7) 9 uranium 
SRM 949£ (tube N164) : (0.454 68 • 0.000 05) q material (Pu) 
Total amount of solut1on : (757 .290 t 0.010) q nitn.c acid SM 
Isotop1.c composJ.tJ.on {uram.um): 
mole \: mass t uncerta1.nties (2s) 
2340 0. 333 4 0. 328 6 0. 000 3 
2350 19.865 4 19.665 0 0. 002 2 
2360 0. 030 4 0. 030 2 0.000 1 
2380 79.770 7 79.976 1 0.002 2· 
Isotopic composition (plutonlum): 
mole \ mass \: 
238Pu 0. 003 7 0. 003 7 
239Pu 97.148 7 97.136 9 
240Pu 2.802 5 2.813 9 
241Pu 0.039 1 0. 039 4 
242Pu 0.006 0 0.006 1 
Certified concentration: 
(19.454 2 • 0.003 6) mg 0/q solution 
(0.599 99 • 0.000 31) mq Pu/g solution 
Table 3 - Certification data for CBNM IRM-1027b 
Verification measurements 
Verification measurements of the 
metrologically established certified value for 
element assay of uranium and plutonium will be 
performed by IDMS. 
3. Metal Spikes 
Metal spikes are easily handled during the 
spiking operation in the hot cell and offer the 
advantage that the excess urani urn reduces a 11 
the plutonium to Pu4+ in solution obviating the 
need for a redox cycle. 
Uranium-plutonium alloys are made by 
crucible-less induction melting /6/ usually 
with a 10 to 15 g sample supported on a water-
cooled copper pedestal. There is no 
significant contamination of the melt and, with 
an atmosphere of 5 x 104 Pa argon, evaporation 
losses are small. This method can be described 
as "quantitative alloying" with the alloy 
composition determined by the mass of the 
components, and the uncertainty on the 
composition calculated from the mass loss, 
should this be measurable. During melting, 
vigorous electromagnetic stirring occurs, and 
combined with relatively rapid cooling and 
solidifation, ensures good homogeneity in the 
button. Complete solubility of plutonium in 
the uranium matrix means that even micro-
inhomogeneity should not occur. 
The uranium-plutonium alloys so far 
produced (0.1-5 % plutonium) are brittle and 
the spikes have been prepared by breaking the 
alloy buttons under a press into pieces of 
about 100 mg. These are weighed and sealed 
individually into glass ampoules. 
Spikes are characterised by IDMS and the 
homogeneity of past series of met a 11 i c spikes 
( RSD of p 1 utoni urn content) has been determined 
as 0.17-0.5 %. The uncertainty statement is 
limited by the measurement method. Metal spike 
homogeneity has also been investigated by gamma 
spectrometry on both solid and dissolved 
samp 1 es /7 I. In order to reduce the effect of 
the variation in self-absorption arising from 
the irregular shapes of the individual spikes 
in solid form, the specific count rate ratio 
R1 = Pul/U1 was calculated from the 185.72 keV 
U count rate and the 129.28 KeV Pu count rate. 
However, because the change in self-absorption 
for different spike masses depends on gamma-ray 
energy it is necessary to make a further 
correction using the specific count-rate ratio 
Ru = U1/U2, where U2 is the specific count rate 
for 143.76 KeV gamma rays i.e. this uses the 
235u in the spike as an internal standard. A 
corrected R1 value can then be calculated 
where 
56.44 KeV 
41.96 KeV 
and Rua is the Ru value for a spike of average 
mass. 
This method has been demonstrated using 
spikes of U-3% Pu alloy with 235u enrichment of 
93 %. The RSD of R1C (indicating Pu content) 
achieved with solid samples was 0.5 % and with 
dissolved samples was 0.2 %, which was 
comparable with the RSD achieved by IDMS 
carried out on the same solutions. A series of 
gamma counting results for liquid samples ~re 
given in Fig. 2, showing that the correct1on 
factor for the R1 ratio eliminates the 
influence of spike mass. 
Current work is concentrating on the 
deve 1 opment of U-Pu-X met a 11 i c spikes that can 
be fabricated into foil or wire form by 
appropriate cold work and annealing. The 
advantage of this type of improved spike is 
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SPECIFIC 
COUNTRATE 0•478 
RATIO 0 .476 
Pu (129 keVI 0_474 
U (186 keVI 
0.472 
• UNCORRECTED 
• CORRECTED 
SPIKE MASS lmgl 
Fig. 2 - Correction of count rate ratio R1 for 
spike mass using U-235 as internal standard 
better homogeneity following the mechanical 
working and spikes of more regular shape; 
either discs or wires. This reduces random 
errors in gamma counting arising from irregular 
spike shapes, and allows more efficient quality 
control of the solid spikes. 
4. Spike Optimization 
The precision of a uranium or plutonium 
assay by IDMS depends not only on the quality 
of the spike, but it is also limited by the 
precision E with which isotope ratios can be 
measured and by the propagation of 
uncertainties in the subsequent calculation of 
concentration. The effect of using spikes of 
unsuitable size or isotopic composition can be 
dramatic and it is important to optimize the 
spike to suit the input solution to be assayed. 
The uncertainty propagation for the case of bi-
isotopic samples and spikes is discussed in 
ref. 8 and is considered here for 240Puj239Pu 
and 235Uj238U ratio measurements on spiked 
input solutions. The error magnification 
factor (emf), when multiplied by E, gives the 
expected relative precision a(q)/q of a 
measurement of element concentration in the 
sample; q = NT/Ns, where NT the number of atoms 
of that e 1 ement in the samp 1 e and Ns is the 
number in the spike. 
Figure 3 shows the influence on emf of 
uranium and plutonium content in the spike. 
Two curves for each are shown representing 
the maximum and minimum concentrations from LWR 
input solutions. In this example the isotopic 
composition of the sample corresponds to a fuel 
of 30 000 MWd/t burn-up and 3.3 % initial 
enrichment. The lowest attainable emf in this 
case is about 2. The optimum uranium and 
plutonium content in the spike are directly 
proportional to the corresponding concentration 
in the sample. In Fig. 4 the effect of the 
isotopic composition of the sample is 
investigated, assuming typical average values 
of uranium and plutonium concentrations in the 
sample. The emf minima, representing optimum 
spike compositions, lie between 1.5 and 3 for 
the extremes of isotopic composition taken. 
These curves indicate that the optimum 
composition of the CBNM solid spikes(239Pu/Pu 
= 0.97, 235U/U = 0.20) is Pu/Pu+U = 0.025 -
0.1. However, the selection of a single spike 
composition remains a compromise and the IDMS 
error magnification factor could be at least a 
factor of two above the lowest achievable value 
in unfavourable cases. 
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Fig. 3 - IDMS error magnification curves for 
input concentrations U = 150-250 g/kg, 
Pu = 0.5 - 1.5 g/kg 
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5. Conclusions 
CBNM solid spikes prepared using 97 % 
enriched 239Pu and 20 % enriched 235U fall 
within the optimum composition range (Pu/U+Pu 
= 0.025 - 0.1) for LWR input solutions. A 
batch of large size dried U/Pu nitrate samples 
has been prepared and certified as reference 
materials CBNM IRM-1027 a and b. Metallic U/Pu 
spikes have potentially excellent homogeneity 
and can be improved to allow routine quality 
control by gamma counting of solid samples • 
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Abstract 
A first batch of MOX pellets certified in 
plutonium and uranium has been prepared and 
characterised in France to meeL the nceds of laboratorics 
which are engaged upon destructive analysis for 
safeguards purposcs especially in fuel fabrication plants. 
The pellets sintering has been obtained in a special 
fabrication to achieve an homogeneity betLer ù1an 0,1 %. 
The plutonium and uranium characterisation by 
chcmical analysis has bccn carr·icd out by Iwo 
laboralorics using aL lcasl two diiTcrcnt mcLhods. 
Les combustibles d'oxyde· mixte (U,Pu)02 
per·mettent de recycler le plutonium dans les t•éacLeurs à 
eau légère. Alors que la production de combustible pour 
réacteurs à neutrons rapides stagn~, ces combustibles 
·sont appelés à un grand développement. Leut· 
fabrication, le contrôle des garanties, nationales ou 
internationales font appel à des matériaux de référence, 
en particulier dans le domaine de l'analyse destructive. 
La CETAMA engagée depuis de nombreuses 
années dans la réalisation de matériaux de réfét·cnce /1/ 
a entrepris la réalisation de pastilles frittées (Pu, U)02 
du type MOX certifiées en l)ranium ct plutonium. CeLLe 
réalisation, coordonnée pm· le Secrétariat de la CETAMA 
a été effectuée au sein d'un de ses groupes de travail. 
L'objectif visé dans un premier temps est de fournir aux 
laboratoires d'analyse destructive des références 
représentatives pour ce qui concerne la teneur en 
plutonium des lots de pastilles présents cL fut1u·s. 
2. Produits de départ 
Pour la réalisation de cc lot, les poudt•cs d'oxyde 
d'uranium et d'oxya-e de plutonium ont été choisies pour 
leur bonne aptitude au frittage. En particulier l'oxyde 
d'uranium uo2 en provenance de l'atelier du 
CE/CADARACHE .a été obtenu par le procédé voie 
humide ADU, dont les poudres qui en sont issues 
présentent une excellente aptitude au ft·ittage. L'oxyde de 
plutonium provient du retraitement de combustible de 
réacteurs à eau légère. Un produit "frais" à faible teneur 
en américium a été choisi. 
Les compositions isotopiques qui ne sont pas 
certifiées, ont cependant été mesurées avec une justesse 
suffisante pour la détermination des masses atomiques 
moyennes. La teneur en américium, le rapport 0/M ont 
également été déterminés. 
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3. Fabriration des pastilles 
Le procédé adopté est celui du cobroyage direct, 
dit procédé "COCA". Utilisé au CE/CADARACHE pour la 
fabrication des combustibles de réacteurs à neutrons 
rapides, il conduit, sur une base industrielle, à 
l'obtention d'une homogénéité interpastilles satisfaisante 
/2/. Un matériau de réfét·cnce (appelé "VENDEMIAIRE") 
certifié aux valeurs suivantes en 1983 : 
- U : '{(4,83 ± O,Ot!) <y., 
- Pu : ( 1 3,025 ± O,:lO) •){, 
l'abt·iqué par cc même pr·océdé présentait une 
hétérogénéité interpastilles de ± 0,025 %. 
Compte tenu des caractéristiques des 
combustibles actuels ou en projet, la teneur en 
plutonium souhaitée pour cette nouvelle fabrication a été 
fixée à 6 %, sans toutefois vouloir obtenir une valcut· 
précise. 
En raison de l'objectif visé et de difficultés 
éventuelles ducs à la faible teneur en plutonium, ce 
Lnwail ·a été confié à un Labomloirc de Recherche et 
Développement, afin de mieux choisir et contrôler les 
différents paramètres du procédé. 
En pm·ticulicr le cycle de fri ttagc, effectué sous 
atmosphèr·e réducu·icc, d'une dut·éc de tlQ heures a 
comporté un palict· de 4 heures ù 17.50°. 
Des conli'Ôlcs ont été ciTcclués au cout·s des 
différentes étapes de la fabrication, notamment: 
- la granulométrie des poudres initiales eL des 
mélanges (U02, Pu02) après broyage, 
- la métrologie des comprimés crus. 
Après frittage, les caractéristiques suivantes ont 
été examinées : 
- métrologie des pastilles, 
- aptitude à la dissolution, 
- structure métallographique, 
• homogénéité de la solution solide (U, Pu)02 à 
l'échelle macroscopiqu<' pm· autoradiographie 
ct à l'échelle microscopique par analyse à la 
microsonde. Comme on peut le voir sut· la 
ligure 1 le résultat est satisfaisant ; les profils 
de concentration en U eL Pu obtenus sur une 
traversée diamétrale de la pastille indiquent des 
répartitions assez homogènes, avec toutefois 
quelques surconccntrations I<Jcalcs, de faibles 
diamètres (~20 J.un) ct d'une teneur évaluée à 
15%. 
4. Contrôle de l'homogénéité 
Cc contrôle a été effectué sur 12 pastilles 
prélevées au hasard. Chaque pastille a été dissoute et 
Surconcentratlon locale en plutonium 
Pu 
200~m 
Fig. 1 - Profils de concentration sur section diamétrale 
trois déterminations de la tcncui' en plutonium ont été 
effectuées. 
La méthode utilisée est celle dite ù "l'oxyde 
argentique" /3/. Au LOta] 36 dosages ont été effectués 
dans un ordre aléatoire de façon à écarter l'influence 
d'une dérive éventuelle au cours elu temps, la campagne 
d'analyse ayant duré environ un mois et demi. 
L'analyse de variance a un facteur contrôlé /!J./ 
effectué sur les 36 résultats conduit ù un écart type 
d'homogénéité non significatif ct estimé ;\ une valcui' 
nettement inférieure ù 0,1 %. 
5 Mesures de cerri ficçllion 
Pour cc premier lot, on ne certifie que les teneurs 
en plutonium ct en uranium, L'Il fi1isant appel ;\ deux 
Jaboralüircs, les méthodes employées étant les suivantes : 
-Plutonium: coulométric, 
titri-gmviméti·ic /5/ 
méthode à "l'oxyde argentique" /3/ 
- Uranium dilution isotopique, spectrométrie 
de masse, 
méthode au titane, 
Davics ct Gray. 
Les impuretés intcrfé-mnt dans ces méthodes font 
l'objet d'analyses spécifiques. 
6. Hesultat~ 
Les valeurs provisoires, au stade actuel, toutes les 
mesures n'étant pas terminées sont les suivantes : 
-Pu : (5,7335 ± 0,0048)% 
-u : (82,18 ± 0,06) <y., 
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7. Conclusions 
Les résultats obtenus sur cc premier lot sont 
satisfaisants. Un second lot de taille plus importante, 
environ 800 pastilles, est prévu, de mêmes 
caractéristiques sauf' pour cc qui concerne le plutonium, 
qui sem très I'ichc en 239pu (- 91,5% ). Cc choix 
présente les <W<lntagcs d'l-vitci' une teneur en 241Am 
importante au. bout de quelques années, ct donc 
d'assurer une Jlércnnité du matériau de référence sur 
plus de 10 ans. Pa1· contre, sui' cc point n'étant pas 
représentatif des litbrications, il n'est pas appproprié aux 
analyses non destructives, ù l'exception éventuellement 
de la fluorescence - )' - XK. · 
/1/ 
/2/ 
/3/ 
/5/ 
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Abstract 
A new EC plutonium reference material is 
made available in the form of 5 g samples of 
plutonium dioxide powder. The plutonium content 
(880.26 ± 0.44) g·kg-1 has been derived from 
plutonium measurements performed by three 
different laboratories applying each a 
different oxydo-reductive method. The results 
of the plutonium measurement, the statistical 
evaluation of the uncertainty of the plutonium 
content together with information on the 
impurities present in the material are given in 
the contribution. 
1. Introduction 
The reference materials essential to 
guarantee the elemental analyses of uranium and 
plutonium were among the high priority needs 
demonstrated by an inquiry in the European 
Community (EC) /1, 2/. 
The first EC material with a certified 
plutonium content was a well characterized 
reference plutonium metal (EC-NRM 201) having a 
plutonium mass fraction known with an 
uncertainty of 0.5 g.kg-1 /3/. 
On the basis of the information collected 
during the inquiry on the needs, CBNM, in 
collaboration with national experts, came to 
the conclusion that the production of a second 
certified reference material in the form of a 
dioxide seemed necessary. It was felt that this 
second material, although less stringently 
characterized, would be very useful to those 
laboratories that perform a large number of 
control analyses. 
Today the need of this material has become 
more imperative because it is intended to 
replace the EC-NRM 201, the stock of which is 
exhausted, and thus to be the unique material 
with an EC certified plutonium content. 
2. Base material 
A batch of plutonium dioxide powder was 
produced in the BNF plc nuclear plant by 
thermal decomposition of purified plutonium 
oxalate at a temperature of about 550°C 
followed by an ignition at 1250°C /4/. The 
powder was subdivided and filled into polythene 
container, each containing about 5 g Pu02. 
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3. Characterization of the material 
3.1 Working scheme 
Bearing in mind the considerable efforts 
required to obtain reliable results for a 
characterization via the substraction of the 
total impurities (100-X method) the plutonium 
working group experts agreed to perform direct 
plutonium measurements for the characterization 
of the material and to take the figures on 
impurities for a rough verification. 
The members of the Working Group, 
discussing a scheme for the plutonium 
measurements, agreed that: 
- the number of measuring laboratories should 
be at least three; 
the applied methods should call on different 
oxide-reduction systems and should have 
different responses to the impurities present 
in the material; 
the participating laboratories should be 
dispersed through-out the different EC member 
countries. 
The following scheme was adopted: the work 
accomplished by each particular laboratory was 
discussed by the experts on the basis of a 
report on the analysis of the material and the 
results were combined to obtain the certified 
plutonium value for the mass fraction, and the 
connected uncertainty. 
3.2 Homogeneity of material 
The approach choosen was to derive a figure 
characterizing the inhomogeneity from the 
between samples variance in one particular lab. 
The results of lab 3 were the most appropriate 
because it shows the best precision in 
replicating the measurements on 12 different 
samples. As a consequence, the inhomogeneity of 
the material is characterized by a standard 
deviation of 0.013 weight percent plutonium. 
3.3 Americium content 
The americium content at the date of 
Dec. 8, 1978 (period of preparation of the 
material) was 10 mg.kg-1. On May 30, 1980 it was 
measured by gamma-spectrometry and found by two 
different laboratories to be equal to 205 and 
238 mg.kg-1, respectively. The americium content 
calculated from the decay of Pu-241 [for the 
same date] was 228 mg.kg-1. When discussing 
these results it was agreed to include in the 
certificate a recommendation for calculating 
the americi~m content by decay from the isotopic 
composition at the date of preparation of the 
material. The americium at the date of 
(30.05.1988) was calculated as being 1170 
mg.kg-1 metal to plutonium metal. The decay 
data used for the calculation of the americium 
content are given in /5/. 
3.4 Uranium content 
The uranium content at the date of Dec. 8, 
1978 was found to be less than 1 mg. kg-1 . It 
was measured as being respectively 83 and 85 
mg.kg-1 by two different laboratories on May 
30, 1980. As for the americium it will be 
recommended on the certificate to calculate the 
uranium content by decay of the plutonium 
isotopes. The uranium content at the date of 
certification (30.05. 1988) was calculated as 
being 325 mg.kg-1 relative to plutonium 
dioxide. 
3.5 Iron content 
The iron content has been measured by 
different laboratories using different methods. 
The mean of all sample measurements is 34 
mg.kg-1 iron relative to Pu02. The mean of the 
spectrophotometric measurements taken 
separately is also 34 mg.kg-1. 
3.6 Impurity measurements 
The concentration ranges of the major and 
minor impurities in the material have been 
determined mostly using spark source mass 
spectrometric, spectophotometric and emission 
spectographic methods. 
After combining the lowest limits of the 
major and minor impurities (expressed as 
oxides), the detection limits of the non-
volatile impurities as well as the uranium and 
americium contents (around the time of May 30. 
1988), a lowest limit of the total impurities 
of about 1690 mg.kg-1 has been estimated. 
A similar calc::, ~a tion, taking into account 
the highest (instead of the lowest) limits of 
the major and minor impurity leads to a figure 
of about 1790 mg. kg-1 as the highest limit of 
the total impurities. 
Using a stoichiometric factor of 0.881975 
(oxygen to metal ratio measurements have shown 
that the values obtained on the calcined 
material are within ± 0.001 atoms oxygen per 
metal atom of stoichiometric Pu02) to calculate 
the plutonium content of the oxide it can be 
estimated that the plutonium content of the 
material is between 88.039 (88.04) and 88.048 
(88.05) weight percent. 
3.7 Isotopic composition of the plutonium 
The isotopic composition of the material 
at the date of Dec. 8, 1978 was the following 
Pu-238 0.013 atom percent 
239 93.329 
240 6.298 
241 0.319 
242 0.041 
The atomic weight calculated for this date 
is 239. 121 . It was agreed to report on the 
certificate an atomic weight of 239.12. 
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3.8 Loss on heating at 1250°C 
To be mentioned briefly the figures 
reported by different laboratories are: 0.18, 
0.05, 0.20 and 0.04 %. 
3.9 Plutonium content 
1 
99.976 ± 2 v (0.0115)2 + - (0.0225)2 
n 
for a confidence level of 95 percent, n being 
the number of samples of reference material 
used. The first component is the uncertainty 
inherent to the plutonium determination in the 
reference material. The second component is 
inherent to the inhomogeneity of the reference 
material and is of random nature. 
As each of the three collaborating 
laboratories have used two samples of reference 
material for their calibration this component 
becomes (0.0225)/V2. 
Working procedures. A summary of each 
working procedure /7 to 10/ is given in the 
following. The calibration factor (its mean 
being expressed in the relevant unit according 
to the working procedures followed by the lab) 
is calculated from a given number of 
repetitions and accompanied by a statement on 
the uncertainty of this factor. This statement 
includes both the uncertainty of the reference 
material as stated above and the uncertainty of 
the calibration measurements themselves; it 
corresponds to a confidence interval for a 
confidence level of about 95 percent. This 
uncertainty will, later on, be converted into 
an uncertainty figure attached to the plutonium 
content. 
Laboratory 
Method: The sample of plutonium oxide 
heated in a platinium crucible at 1250 oc 
during two hours and accurately weighed is 
dissolved in a mixture of hydrochloric and 
hydrofluoric acids into a ptfe dish (duration: 
about half a day). The solution is transferred 
to a polythene bottle. A weighed fraction of 
the solution is evaporated to near dryness in 
the presence of a small amount of sulphuric 
acid, and it is then diluted with a mixture of 
0.5 M sulphuric/1M nitric acids. To this 
solution is added excess titanium (III) 
chloride solution to reduce plutonium to the 
trivalent state. The mixture is then allowed to 
stand until the excess titanium (III) ions have 
been oxidised by the nitric acid whilst the 
plutonium remains as plutonium (III). The 
progress of these reactions is followed 
potentiometrically by means of platinum and 
calomel electrodes. The plutonium (III) is then 
oxidised quantitatively to plutonium (IV) by 
means of a cerium (IV) sulphate solution which 
is added by weight burette until a small excess 
is present. The excess cerium is titrated with 
a iron (II) ammonium sulphate solution, and the 
equivalence point is measured potentio-
metrically. 
Calibration: The titrations were completed 
with titrations prepared from the EC-NRM 201 
reference material. These titrations were 
carried out at the beginning, middle and end of 
each run. Twelve fractions of plutonium EC-NRM 
201 reference material solution were taken for 
calibration. The mean calibration factor with 
its confidence interval at a 95 percent 
confidence level is (11.1405 ± 0.0054) mg Pu/g 
cerium sulphate. 
Laboratory 2 
Method: The sample of plutonium dioxide 
heated in a platinum crucible at 1250°C during 
two hours and accurately weighed is dissolved 
(duration: three to five days) under ·reflux 
either in 11 M HN03 I 0.05 M HF (first two 
samples) or in the same mixture completed with 
a perchloric acid addition (a further seven 
samples). The solution is evaporated to near 
dryness and is then diluted with 1 M nitric 
acid. To a weighed aliquot of this solution is 
added (300 ± 10) mg of silver (II) oxide to 
oxidize the plutonium to the hexavalent state, 
the excess of silver (II) oxide being destroyed 
by heating the solution. The plutonium (VI) is 
reduced to the quadrivalent state by a known 
amount of iron (Il) solution. The excess of 
iron (II) is determined using a cerium (IV) 
solution as titrant. The equivalent point is 
measured spectrophotometrically (510 nm) by 
recording the change of colour of iron (II) 
orthophenanthroline (the amount added being 
constant for each measurement). 
Calibration: The oxidizing power of the 
cerium sulfate solution used as titrant has 
been determined using the plutonium EC-NRM 201 
reference material. Seven fractions of this 
plutonium reference solution have been taken 
for the calibration. The mean calibration 
factor with its confidence interval at a 95 
percent confidence level is ( 0. 94672 ± 
0.0058).10-5 equivalent per gramme. 
Laboratory 3 
Method: The sample of plutonium oxide 
heated in a platinum crucible at 1250°C during 
two hours and accurately weighed is dissolved 
under reflux (duration: one day) in a mixture 
of hydrochloric and hydrofluoric acid (11M 
HC1/0.05M HF). The solution is evaporated in 
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the presence of sulfuric acid (three times) and 
is diluted with 0.5 M sulfuric acid. A weighed 
aliquot of this solution is transferred into 
the coulometric cell. The plutonium is reduced 
at + 0.230 V via the saturated calomel 
electrode until a constant background current 
of about 4 ~A is obtained. The solution is then 
oxidized at + 0.710 Volt until a slmllar 
background current is obtained. The first step 
is carried out in 180 to 220 minutes and the 
second step in 70-75 minutes. After being 
corrected for the background effect the read-
out is converted into an plutonium amount. 
Calibration: A chemical calibration factor 
has been determined by titrating eight aliquots 
of EC-NRM 201 reference plutonium solution. The 
mean calibration factor with its confidence 
interval at a 95 percent conference level is 
(40 345 ± 14) counts/mg Pu. The electrical 
calibration factor is 99.966 counts per coulomb 
and corresponds to 40.341 counts per mg Pu. The 
difference between the two factors (about 0.01 
percent) is not significant. As a calibration 
via the EC-NRM 201 reference material was 
requested from each laboratory the results 
obtained by coulometry had to be reported on 
the basis of the chemical calibration. Keeping 
in mind the difference between the two 
calibration factors it seemed relevant to take 
half of it into account (arbitrarely assuming 
it as a random error) so as to include that 
half in the overall uncertainty of the 
calibration. By doing so only a slight increase 
of the overall uncertainty of the calibration 
is obtained. This additional uncertainty is 
included in the uncertainty figure quoted 
above. 
4. Statistical evaluation of the results 
4.1 Statistical tests 
A number of statistical tests have been 
applied to the results reported by the three 
collaborating laboratories /11/. All tests have 
been applied at a probability level of 
95 percent. 
- Outlier test on all the replicates of a 
particular laboratory, (Dixon test). 
Test of equality of variances, (Cochran 
test). 
The within-samples variance which 
characterizes the spread of a replicate 
measurement on a particular sample. 
4.2 Estimation of the uncertainty of the 
plutonium content in a particular laboratory 
- Estimation of the uncertainty of the 
experimental results (scheme of evaluation): 
for both the calibration factor (F) and the 
plutonium content of oxide (C) the mean-
value (MF or Me ) and its uncertainty have 
been derived from the following approach: 
M = m + 2 OM where: 
m is the mean of the n determinations of a 
particular laboratory, a being the 
corresponding standard deviation, 
oMF being equal to 
oMc being equal to 
2 1 2 Va 11M + -a~, and n 
oF or ac is deduced from the estimated 
standard deviation s by applying the 
relation a = s. t/2 where t is the Student 
factor corresponding to (n-1) degrees of 
freedom for a 95 % probability level. 
- Estimation of the random uncertainty of the 
calibration factor: 
For the calibration factor (F) the random 
uncertainties attached to the plutonium 
content value are given in table 1. 
Laboratory OMp 
1 0.021 
2 0.027 
3 0.016 
Table 1 
- Estimation of the random uncertainty of the 
plutonium measurements: 
The random uncertainties of the plutonium 
content measurements of the oxide (C) are 
given in table 2. 
Laboratory OMc 
1 0.023 
2 0.029 
3 0.008 
Table 2 
OMc is expressed as a figure attached to the 
plutonium content value. 
Estimation of the random uncertainty of the 
plutonium content: 
The random uncertainty of the plutonium mean 
value in a particular laboratory is obtained 
by combining according to the law of error 
propagation, the uncertainties OMF and OMc. 
These combined uncertainties OM are given in 
table 3 together with the plutonium content 
found. 
Pu content M Random uncertainty Laboratory in wt % of the Pu content OM 
1 88.041 0.031 
2 87.965 0.040 
3 88.036 0.018 
Table 3 
A test of comparison of the means using the 
figures given in table 3 
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shows that the 
means are sufficiently homogeneous for the 
treatment reported in section 4.3. 
4.3 Evaluation of the plutonium content and 
overall uncertainty 
The most probable value of the mean 
plutonium content is given by the weighed mean 
of the plutonium contents found respectively by 
the three participating laboratories. The 
statistical formula used to calculate this 
weighed mean (M) is the following: 
Ml M2 M3 
2+2+2 
01 02 03 
M=------
1 1 1 
2+2+2 
01 02 03 
The random uncertainty attached to M is 
derived from 
1 1 1 
2+2+2 
01 02 03 
Using the set of figures given 
following values are obtained: 
M = 88.026 
a = 0.015 
in table 3, 
When taking into account the uncertainty 
(first component, see section 3. 9) inherent to 
the reference material the overall uncertainty 
of the plutonium content is characterized by a 
standard deviation s given by s2 = (0.015)2 + 
(0.0102)2 = (0.018)2. 
As the samples are unique (about g 
oxide) at the time of the sampling in a 
particular laboratory the uncertainty on this 
unique sample will then be characterized by a 
variance ou2 resulting from a total of two 
variances 012 and 022. The variance 012 is 
attached to the plutonium mean-content of the 
material. The variance 022 is attached to the 
heterogeneity of the material: 
au2 = a 12 + ai This heterogeneity is characterized by a 
variance which has been derived from an 
analysis of variance applied to the results of 
laboratory 3 which shows the lowest within-
samples variance (see section 3.2). The 
resulting variance is a22 = (0.013)2. As a 12 is is equal to (0.018)2 the variance ou2 becomes: 
ou2 = (0.018)2 + (0.013)2 = (0.022)2. 
An overall uncertainty of the plutonium 
content is obtained by multiplying the 
corresponding standard deviation, 0.022, by a 
factor two. This corresponds to forming a 
confidence interval for a confidence level of 
about 95 percent. 
Thus the plutonium content is (88.026 ± 0.044) 
weight percent. 
5. Certified value 
On the basis of the results given 
previously the plutonium mass fraction 
( 880.26 ± 0. 44) g · kg-1 is certified. An overall 
uncertainty of the plutonium mass fraction of 
an individual one gramme sample was estimated 
by combining the standard deviation of the 
plutonium measurements, the standard deviation 
of the calibration measurements, the standard 
deviation of the plutonium content of the 
reference material and the standard deviation 
characterizing the random variation of the 
plutonium mass fraction between samples 
(inhomogeneity) according to the law of error 
propagation. 
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Abstract 
A highly enriched 244Pu Isotopic Reference 
Material (CBNM IRM-042a) has been prepared and 
certified for 244Pu isotope concentration. The 
certified value of (2.257 7 ± 0.004 4).1018 
atoms 244Pu·kg-1 of solution has been 
established by isotope dilution mass 
spectrometry. 
The plutonium isotopic composition has been 
determined by thermal ionization mass 
spectrometry and calibration of these 
measurements by means of synthetic 242Puj239Pu 
mixtures. 
The Isotopic Reference Material is supplied in 
a sealed glass ampoule containing approximately 
10 g of a 5 M nitric acid solution at an 
approximate concentration of 1pg Pu per g 
solution. 
This Isotopic Reference Material is part of a 
systematic CBNM programme to supply spike 
isotopic reference materials of various 
isotopes at different concentrations. 
1. Introduction 
244Pu is an isotope which is not normally 
present in current Pu materials. It is, 
therefore, used sometimes in Isotope Dilution 
Mass Spectrometry (IDMS) : both the Isotope 
Dilution measurement and the isotopic 
composition can be performed in one 
measurement. 
However, it is a very scarce materia 1 : the 
world's stock is probably only a few grammes. 
Its use in IDMS does NOT increase the accuracy 
of the measurement over the use of 242Pu. It 
should, therefore, not be used in routine 
analysis, but in special cases only. 
CBNM has proceeded to make available an 
independent Spike Reference Material for such 
uses. Its characterisation was achieved 
against well known 239pu solutions. 
All uncertainties given are 2s where s = 
standard deviation of the single determination. 
They are indicated under the digits of the 
values to which they apply. A determination 
does not only i ne 1 ude the measurement but a 1 so 
a full independent chemical preparation of the 
sample and - in the case of isotope dilution -
an independent spiking. 
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2. Preparation of the Candidate 244Pu Isotopic 
Reference Material 
A mother solution was prepared starting 
from 10 mg 244Pu02 (ORNL batch No. Pu-244-315A). 
By dissolution in 5 M HN03, a concentration of 
about 40 pg 244Pu·g-1 solution was obtained. A 
weighed fraction of this stock solution was 
diluted with distilled water in a glass flask, 
leading to a concentration of about 1 pg 
244Pu·g-1 solution. Using a dispenser, 10 ml 
aliquots of this solution were distributed in 
glass ampoules in a special "244Pu" glove box. 
Subsequently the ampoules were transferred out 
of the glove box and sealed in an oxy-acetylene 
flame in a fume hood, under adequate Health 
Physics protection and control. About 230 
ampoules were prepared. 
3.Preparation of the 239Pu solution 
NBS Standard Reference Material, SRM 944 
with plutonium content certified as (47.50 ± 
0.05) weight percent of plutonium, was used to 
prepare a solution with known 239pu 
concentration. The solution, coded as SRM-
944/25, was achieved by dissolving the plutonium 
sulphate tetrahydrate in 5 M nitric acid to 
obtain a concentration of 23.605 ± 0.026 mg 
239Pu·kg-1 solution. 
4. Preparation of the blends for certification 
measurements 
A series of 6 ampoules were randomly taken 
from the batch of candidate reference material 
CBNM IRM-042a. A weighed fraction from each 
ampoule was transferred to a recipient and 
spiked with a weighed fraction of SRM-944/25. 
Weighings were carried out using a syringe which 
was weighed before and after transfer of 
a 1 i quots into the recipient. After mechani ea 1 
mixing the samples were stored to be chemically 
treated before mass spectrometric control 
measurements. 
CBNMIRM· 
Blend 042a mass CBNM IRM·042a mass SRM 944/25 
ampoule solution (in g) solution (in g) 
number 
1 12 5.249 0 2.040 4 
2 2 
2 54 5.596 7 2.110 4 
2 2 
3 lOO 5.316 3 2.124 4 
2 2 
4 129 5.508 4 2.049 7 
2 2 
5 195 5.327 4 2.102 6 
2 2 
6 244 5.435 9 2.112 8 
2 2 
Table 1 - Metrological data of weighings 
5. Chemical Preparation Prior to Mass 
Spectrometric Measurements 
Before mass spectrometric analysis an 
appropriate chemical preparation has to be 
applied in order to condition the samples to be 
analysed and to give them all a similar 
chemical pre-history. Separation from 
impurities is also carried out at this 
occasion. 
The solutions were evaporated to dryness and 
dissolved in 200 ~1 2M HN03. To achieve 
valency homogeneization in the Pu4+ state, 
50 ~1 1.25M FeC12 was added to convert all Pu 
to the Pu3+ valency state. Subsequently, 
lOO ~ 1 1M NH20H · HCl and 100 ~ 1 lM NaN02 were 
added. Finally 430 ~1 concentrated nitric acid 
was added to obtain a Pu4+ SM HN03 solution. 
This solution was brought on an anion exchange 
column AG1-X4. After adding of BM HN03, 
plutonium was eluted with 0.35M HN03. This 
eluted fraction was evaporated, dissolved in 1M 
HN03 to obtain a 1 mg Pu·ml-1 solution and 
transferred to the mass spectrometer for 
measurement. 
6. The mass spectrometer used in the 
measurements 
Isotope abundance ratio measurements were 
performed by thermal ionization mass 
spectrometry using a Finnigan MAT 261 mass 
spectrometer equipped with a 13 locations 
sample turret and a fixed double collector. 
The measurements for the determination of the 
isotopic composition and of the 239puj244Pu 
ratios of the blends were done on single 
collector by mass jumping and using an electron 
multiplier when necessary (minor isotopes). 
The measurements of the 239Puj242Pu ratios of 
the synthetic mixtures for the purpose of 
calibrating the mass spectrometer, were done in 
static mode using the doubJe collector. 
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7. Sample loading 
Loading of the filaments was performed in 
a glove box. One microl itre of the plutonium 
solution was put on the filament using a 
commercial transfer pipette. The droplet was 
dried by passing an electrical current through 
the filament. This current was generated by a 
programmable device allowing to do the filament 
heating in reproducible steps, standardizing 
temperatures and heating times. After final 
adjustment of the filaments, the sample turret 
was transported to the mass spectrometer 
according to the existing prescriptions of the 
local health physics services. 
8. Data Acquisition 
Generation of the ion currents through 
highly reproducible heating procedure, was 
controlled by a HP 9000-216 and performed fully 
automatically. This was always done in the 
presence of the analyst in order to notice 
possible erratic occurrences, in which case the 
measurement was immediately terminated and 
discarded. 
For each filament the isotope abundance ratios 
were measured over a time period of about 100 
min. During this period 4 groups of ratios were 
measured. Each group represented 7 scans during 
which the ion currents of all isotopes were 
measured alternately. One scan took 4 to 15 s 
depending on the number of different isotopes 
to be measured (for 5 isotopes: 15 s per scan, 
15 s waiting time, 7 scans totalling to about 
17.5 min per group). 
A computer program calculated directly the 
isotope abundance ratios at time t as the mean 
value of these 7 scans. The results of 4 groups 
per filament were then fitted versus time using 
a linear least square fit computer program 
(FITPY). An interpolation at t=70 min 
provided the isotope abundance ratio used in 
all calculations. 
9. System calibration 
The determination of the correction factor 
for systematic errors, mainly mass 
fractionation, was done by means of synthetic 
239Pu/242Pu isotope mixtures, accurate to 
0.01% /1/. 
10. The isotopic composition of the plutonium 
in the spike solution 
The isotopic composition of SRM-944/25 was 
established by measuring isotope abundance 
ratios on 12-16 filament loadings, according to 
the method previously described.The ratios 
238Puj241Pu and 242Puj241Pu were measured using 
an electron multiplier the abundance ratios 
239Puj240Pu and 241Puj24bpu were measured on a 
Faraday collector 
abundance interpolated and K-corrected value 
ratio (at t = 70 min) 
238Puj241Pu 0.100 
10 
242Puj241Pu 0.054 66 
32 
239Puj240Pu 44.073 
28 
241Puj240Pu 0.012 25 
22 
244Puj240Pu ;::: 0.000 001 
1 
by fitting of the observed values and 
interpolating at 70 min 
abundance interpolated and 
ratio K-corrected value (at t = 70 min) 
238Puj240pu 0.008 0 
1 0 
239Puj244Pu 0.000 341 9 
4 0 
240Puj244pu 0.006 918 
14 
241Puj244pu 0.000 684 0 
4 4 
242Puj244pu 0.013 611 
12 The observed values, were corrected for mass fractionation and "EM factor" (correction for 
electron multiplier error). The isotopic 
composition and its uncertainty was derived and 
using a fully orthodox data reduction and 
uncertainty propagation. The correction factor 
for mass fractionation was determined to be 
K(239;242pu) = 0.998 82 with an uncertainty of 
0. 000 96 ( ~s) on the measurement of K and of 
0.000 10 per mass unit, resulting from the 
uncertainty of the gravimetric preparation of 
the synthetic mixtures. 
The isotopic composition is valid for 10 
December 1986 : 
mol % mass % 
238Pu 0.002 72 0.002 70 
28 28 
239pu 97.750 70 97.741 40 
1 51 1 51 
240Pu 2.217 91 2.226 99 
1 40 1 40 
241Pu 0.027 18 0.027 41 
49 49 
242Pu 0.001 49 0.001 50 
3 3 
244Pu < 0.000 001 < 0.000 001 
1 1 
Ar{Pu) 239.074 936 
17 
11. The isotopic composition of the candidate 
spike reference material 
The isotopic composition of the candidate 
spike reference material CBNM IRM-042a has been 
established in a similar way, measuring 12 to 
16 filaments. Following values were calculated 
243 
mol % mass % 
238pu 0.005 41 0.005 28 
68 68 
239pu 0.033 47 0.032 79 
40 40 
240Pu 0.677 16 0.666 20 
30 30 
24lpu 0.066 95 0.066 14 
44 44 
242Pu 1.332 33 1. 321 69 
10 10 
244Pu 97.884 68 97.907 90 
40 40 
Ar{Pu) 244.006 306 
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12. Certification of CBNM IRM-042a 
The concentration expressed in number of 
atoms 244pu per kg of so 1 uti on can be derived 
from the general equation: 
When N = c • m with 
c = concentration of e 1 ement ( Pu) in numbers 
of atoms per kg of solution 
m = mass of solution in kg 
then 
my 
C(Pu,X) = C(Pu,Y) · 
Dividing nominator and denominator by Ry and 
rearranging, yields 
1 
C(Pu){) · ~ = C(Pu,Y) · 
LRix 
We choose R = 239Puf244Pu 
then 1/ERiX = 244Pu abundance in the unknown 
material X which must be certified (CBNM IRM-
042a) 
and Ry/ERiy = 239pu abundance in the spike 
material Y (SRM-944/25) 
Considering that Ry + «, we obtain 
Table 2 gives the values of the number of 244pu 
atoms per kg of CBNM IRM-042a solution, 
obtained for each individual determination. 
The uncertainty was determined using the 
recommended procedure of the Bureau 
International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM) : 
C(244Pu) 
cSx 
sx 
mean 244Pu concentration of 12 
measurements 
uncertainty of systematic nature 
on the 244pu concentration due 
to : 
- the concentration of SRM-944/25, 
- the spiking, 
- the measurements of the 
correction factor K for isotope 
fractionation, 
- the synthetic Pu mixtures used 
in the calibration, 
- the isotope ratio measurements 
of SRM-944/25, CBNM IRM-042a, 
b 1 ends, and ea 1 cu 1 ated by error 
propagation of the individual 
uncertainty contributions of 
equation (3) (uncertainties of 
systematic nature) 
standard deviation on the 
concentration calculated from 
the 12 measurements 
(reproducibility). 
The 244Pu concentration of CBNM IRM-042a is 
certified as: 
(2.257 7 ± 0.044)·1018 atoms 244Pu•kg-1 of 
solution 
244 
244Pu atoms 
blend ampoule (xl018 kg-1 of 
solution) 
1 12 2.256 94 
2.256 61 
2 54 2.256 60 
2.257 75 
3 lOO 2.256 99 
4 120 2.256 99 
2.257 45 
5 195 2.256 33 
2.256 77 
6 244 2.259 67 
2.260 73 
2.259 21 
mean value 2.257 7 
2 8 
Table 2 Determination of the 244Pu 
concentration of CBNM IRM-042a 
Relative Uncertainties in 10-3 
Quantity 
of value of cert 1f led 
concerned end-value 
Weighing of base material 0.095 
Certified purity of N8S SRM-944 1.1 47.50 s 
Atomic weight 239Pu 0.000 022 
239.052 157 6 
Avogadro Constant 0.002 0 
6.022 134 1023 
Abundance 239Pu in N8S SRM-944 0.015 
97.741 4 0101e S 1.1 
Measurement of Ry (239Put244Pu) 0.0 
Calculated correction factor 1.0 
my : 11ass of SRM 944/25 in blend 0.098 
(approx. 2 g) 1.1 
Measur0110nt of Rx (239Put244Pu) 12 
Calculated correction factor 1.6 
•x : •ass of IRM 042a in blend 0.038 
(approx. 5 g) 1.1 
Measurement of R8 0.60 
Calculated correction factor 1.6 2.0 
Standard deviation on the mean 0.36 
(n • 12) 
Total relative uncertainty 2.0 
Tab 1 e 3 - Uncertainty Components Pertaining to 
Equation (3) 
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Abstract 
An automated analytical system for mixed 
oxide sample has been developed to increase 
analytical capability as well as to improve 
timeliness of measurement at the conversion and 
the mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants. 
The analytical system can be divided into a 
sample preparation system, an x-ray fluorescence 
and a gamma-ray spectrometer, and a computer 
system for operation control and data 
processing. The sample preparation system 
consists of two revolute robots and various 
kinds of component devices such as a sample and 
a crucible storage, a sampling device with a 
balance, an electric furnace and so on. In 
this system 0.3 g of sample and 7 g of anhydrous 
sodium tetraborate are taken and fused in a 
platinum crucible at 11oo•c for ten minutes to 
prepare a glass bead disk. Concentrations of 
uranium and plutonium are determined by 
measuring intensity of L series x-ray line of 
each element. Isotope composition of plutonium 
in the sample is also determined by passive 
gamma-ray spectrometry without sample pre-
treatment. 
The results obtained with this system on 
0.2 g of uranium gave a precision of 0.2 - 0.5 % 
( RSD, n=5) and an accuracy of 0.3 - 0.7 % 
(relative deviation). The automated sample 
preparation and measurements for one sample 
with two sub-sampling are accomplished in 1. 5 
hours. 
1. Introduction 
Timely evaluation of measurement results as 
well as accuracy and precision is very important 
when destructive analysis techniques are used as 
one of the safeguards measures. In safeguards 
implementation in Japan , no delays in the 
evaluation have been observed for uranium 
bearing samples at present. The criteria of 
timely verification are, however, still no met 
for plutonium bearing samples because of the 
delays of sample pretreatment and shipment. 
When a large reprocessing and conversion plant 
comes into operation, it is quite certain that 
the number of samples to be verified will 
increase significantly and delays in evaluation 
would become more serious unless some new 
proposal is investigated. 
In order to overcome these problems, on-
site verification measurement possibilities, 
e.g., construction of an inspectorate laboratory 
at the site, use of operator's procedure and/or 
apparatus with appropriate authentication 
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techniques, are now under consideration. The 
present paper describes the status of the 
development of an automated analytical system 
for mixed oxide powder samples, which will be 
installed at the on-site inspectorate 
laboratory or the operator's space of the future 
large reprocessing and conversion plant in 
Japan. 
2. System Description 
2.1 Specification 
Specifications of the system design are 
described below. 
Analytical method 
x-ray fluorescence and gamma-ray spectro-
metry 
MOX sample 
chemical composition 
Pu/U ratio 
bulk density 
sample size :for XRF 
for HRGS 
Analytical capability ) 
(Pu,U)02 0.01 - 2 
~ 2.2 gjcm3 
~0.3 g 
~10 g 
600 samples per year ( 200 working days 
except calibration and quality control 
samples. Number of samples per analytical 
batch is up to five. 
Operator ) 
one including system operation and 
maintenance 
enclosure ) 
glove box ( 4.4m x 1.2m x 1.2m) 
2.2 Analytical procedure 
Figure 1 shows the standard routine 
operation procedure of this system for analyzing 
uranium and plutonium concentrations and isotope 
composition of plutonium in the mixed oxide 
powder sample. 
The system starts its operation from the 
positioning test of robots and the moving 
test of component devices for checking whether 
their movements are normal or not. After that, 
the robot A picks a sample vessel and transfers 
it onto the turn table of a bar code reader for 
identification of the sample. Then the cap of 
the vessel is removed and two 0. 3 g of mixed 
oxide powder samples are taken and about 7 g of 
anhydrous sodium tetraborate is added as a flux 
into a platinum crucible, respectively, by the 
sampling device including three vibrating 
spatula on moving tables and a balance. 
After sampling process is completed, the 
robot B picks the crucible and transfers it into 
an air cooled electric furnace. The crucible 
containing the sample and the flux is heated at 
11oo•c for ten minutes to prepare a glass bead 
sample disk. By slow movement of the crucible 
table during the heating process, the crucible 
is agitated continuously to ensure homogeneity 
and to aid the expulsion of gas bubbles. The 
crucible and the charge are allowed to cool to 
room temperature, and are then inverted, then 
the bead disk drops out. If no crack is found 
on the bead disk, the robot B holding a disk 
carrier transfers the bead disk onto the sample 
turn table of an x-ray fluorescence spectre-
meter. Concentrations of uranium and plutonium 
in the sample are determined by standard x-ray 
fluorescence spectrometric procedure. In 
parallel with bead disk sample preparation, 
gamma-ray spectrum of the sample in the vessel 
is measured for determination of isotope 
composition of plutonium. After the 
measurement process is completded, the bead disk 
carrier discards the bead disk used into a waste 
vessel, and the cleaning device removes residual 
mixed oxide powder on spatula and feeder 
automatically to avoid cross contamination of 
samples. 
2.3 Details of analytical system 
( sample preparation system ) 
The system consists of various component 
devices shown in the illustration, Fig. 2: two 
commercially available robots ( MITSUBISHI, 
MOVEMASTER EX model RV-M1), a sample and a 
crucible storage, a bar code reader, a cap 
remover, a sampling and flux feeding sub-system, 
an air cooled electric furnace, a crack 
detection device and so on. Maintenance is a 
prime consideration in designing analytical 
systems used in the enclosure, Consequently, 
standard commercially available parts are used 
whenever possible. Some component devices in 
this system are actuated pneumatically in place 
of electrically because pneumatic control has a 
lot of advantages, e.g.,simpler mechanism, easy 
control and maintenance, less trouble, low cost 
and so on. The sample storage in which twelve 
sample vessels can be stored is surrounded by a 
lead shielding wall of 5 mm in thickness for 
personnel radiation protection, and the crucible 
storage can also store ten platinum crucibles. 
Prior to transfer of the bead disk onto the 
sample turn table, any crack on tbe bead disk 
can be detected by measuring of pressure change 
in evacuating line connected to the disk 
carrier. The standard bead disk storage can 
store four standard bead disks under dry 
atmosphere for calibration of the x-ray 
fluorescence spectrometer. 
( gamma-ray spectrometric system ) 
The system includes a planar type high 
purity germanium detector(ORTEC, model GLP-
25300/13-S), a multichannel analyzer (ORTEC, 
model 7800-8A2), a high voltage power 
~upply(ORTEC, model 659), an amplifier (ORTEC, 
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model 672) and a computer system ( HP, model 
360C+ with peripherals). The detector with 1 
mm thick cadmium and copper filters is inserted 
into a lead shield mounted under the glove box. 
The software for automatic data acquisition and 
analysis, which has been originally developed 
for field measurement, is written in HP BASIC. 
( x-ray spectrometric system ) 
A multichannel x-ray spectrometer 
(SHIMADZU, model VXQ-PF2 ) having three fixed 
and one scanning channels is used to measure 
intensity of L series x-ray spectral line of U, 
Np, Pu and Am after minor modification. That is 
to say, LiF(220) crystals are equipped in place 
of LiF(200) because L series spectral lines of 
actinides are resolved much better by the former 
than by the latter. And only a sample turn 
table is installed in the glove box so that 
maintenance of other parts of the x-ray 
spectrometer can be done as usual way. To 
excite L series spectral lines of actinides 
preferentially, a rhodium target x-ray tube 
(Varian Eimac, type OEG-76H ) is equipped in 
this spectrometer. During the system 
operation, the inside of specimen compartment 
having beryllium window is passed with 
nitrogen at flow rate of 10 ml/min to protect 
the window from oxidation. 
(control system ) 
As shown in the block diagram of the 
control system, Fig. 3, the system includes 
three desk-top computers ( NEC 98RL, 9801UX and 
HP 360C+) with peripherals, a control module 
consisting of a programmable sequencer ( 
MITSUBISHI, MELSEC-A series ) which controls not 
only movement of robots and components devices 
through drive units but also sequence of the 
operation, a temperature controller for the 
furnace and so on. Various digital signals 
from the system components are incorporated into 
this module, which links to the computer through 
a PlO interface. Inside and on the module 
panel, many switches - for selecting manual, 
semi-automatic or automatic operation, setting 
sample and flux size, setting the heating 
period, etc. - are provided. Each function 
that the system performs ( bar code reading, cap 
removing, sampling and sub-sampling, fusion, 
etc.) can be controlled independently by means 
of switches for each operation. In addition, 
a pendant digital switch box also allows an 
operator to manipulate the movement of each 
component device. 
3. Preliminary Tests and Results 
Results of preliminary tests of the system 
developed are briefly described bellow. 
Because positioning of the robot having 
five joints and a pair of finger is the most 
important function for reliability of the system 
operation, the repeatability of positioning 
involving simultaneous movement in many degrees 
of freedom has been tested. All results 
obtained arc within :!. 0. 3 111111 as described in 
the technical specifications. 
For the safety system operation, 
temperature distribution on the surface of the 
air cooled electric furnace during the normal 
operation at 1100'C has been measured, and it is 
found that temperature on the surface of the 
furnace is lower than 33'C. 
It is well known that the most common 
fluxes for preparation of specimen in the form 
of glass bead disk are sodium tetraborate and 
lithium tetraborate. In addition to these 
fluxes, sodium polyphosphate, a mixture of 
sodium carbonate and silicon dioxide have been 
tested qualitatively for the resistance of disks 
to cracking, degree of bubble formation, 
hygroscopic nature of disks during storage, 
stickiness of the melts to the crucible, melting 
point and so on. As a result of these test, it 
is found that anhydrous sodium tetraborate is 
preferable to other fluxes for preparing bead 
disks containing uranium. 
X-ray fluorescence spectrum of a mixture 
of strontium, yttrium and zirconium oxides is 
measured to confirm the resolution of the 
spectrometer having LiF(220) crystal. As shown 
in Fig. 4, K series spectral lines of these 
three elements are well resolved except 
overlapping of strontium K beta and zirconium K 
alpha spectral lines, and wavelength difference 
of each spectral line is approximate 1.8 degree 
(29). By the fact described above, it can be 
expected that spectral lines of U, Np, Pu and Am 
could be still resolved each other in spite of 
smaller wavelength difference,that is, 
approximate 0.9 degree (29) each. 
Figure 5 shows two kinds of calibration 
curves for uranium in the bead disk. Standard 
bead disks were prepared as follows; after 
mixing a known amount of uranium oxide with 7 g 
of anhydrous sodium tetraborate in the platinum 
crucible manually, the mixture was fused at 1100 
·c for 10 min. Then, the intensity of uranium L 
series line excited with Rh x-ray tube operating 
at 40 kV and 50 mA was measured five times for 
50 seconds. The upper calibration curve in Fig. 
5 was prepared by polynomial fitting of uranium 
concentraion and line intensity. The curve 
showed the typical one of higher atomic number 
analyte in low atomic number matrix. The 
caribration curve need not be linear to be of 
analytical value, although certainly a linear 
curve is preferable. As the lower curve shown 
in Fig. 5, the linear calibration curve can be 
obtained by adding high-absorption diluent (e.g. 
lanthanum oxide) to the flux if necessary. 
Analytical results of uranium in synthetic 
sample bead disks prepared by the above 
procedure gave a precision of 0.2 - 0.5 % (RSD, 
n=5) and an accuracy of 0.3 - 0. 7 % (relative 
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deviation). In addition, there is no significant 
difference between analytical results obtained 
by two calibration curves in Fig. 5. During the 
tests it was also found that correction of 
analytical results for weight loss in the 
fusion process could improve the accuracy of 
analytical results. 
After the measurements, the disks were 
tested by placing them in an x-ray 
diffractometer and observing their Debye-
Scherrer diffraction patterns. The appearance 
of no diffraction peaks indicates the absence of 
residual crystalline material in the bead disk. 
4. Discussion 
Dissolution of refractory plutonium 
dioxide is a major problem in the analytical 
chemistry of plutonium bearing samples. In this 
case, the most common method used in the past is 
the use of nitric acid containing a small 
concentration of fluoride. However, this 
technique is not adequate to automation because 
it is almost impossible to detect automatically 
the time of completion of dissolution process by 
some sensor. So, our laboratory decided to 
develop the automated sample preparation system 
based on the flux fusion technique which provide 
a homogeneous glass bead disk suitable for 
direct use as a specimen for x-ray spectromery. 
The fabrication of the whole system has been 
completed on the end of last year. As the 
second step, performance tests of the whole 
system including the sample preparation and x-
ray spectrometry using iron oxide powder sample 
are now under way to confirm the reliability of 
system operation. In order to improve the 
accuracy of concentration determination, a minor 
modification of the sample prepration process is 
in progress as follows ; addition of weight loss 
measurement operation prior to the x-ray 
spectrometry, and correction of analytical 
results by using obtained data. 
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ABSTRACT 
Final results from the PI DIE intercomparison 
exercise organised by the ESARDA Working Group on 
Techniques and Standards for Non-Destructive Ana-
lysis are presented. 
The aim of this exercise carried out in 1988 
was to test the gamma-ray spectrometry methods 
used to determine the plutonium isotopic ratios 
in a large range of isotopic composition, in or-
der to analyse the parameters and the error 
sources influencing the results. 
Sets of seven sealed samples of different 
plutonium isotopic composition were sent to nine 
participating laboratories. The final results 
with uncertainty indicators are reported; they 
are compared with complementary mass-spectrometry 
determinations. 
No important bias has been observed from this 
exercise. Significant improvements in plutonium 
isotopic determination by gamma-ray spectrometry 
come from both more elaborate spectrum analysis 
methods and better equipment. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In several meetings, the ESARDA Working Group 
on Techniques and Standards for Non-Destructive 
Analysis has expressed the need to evaluate the 
different methods used for the determination of 
the isotopic composition of plutonium. After an 
earlier interlaboratory exercise based on measu-
rements of plutonium Certified Reference Mate-
rials ( CRM' s) and completed in 1981 [ 1], it was 
decided to organize the international comparison 
called PIDIE, i.e., Plutonium Isotopic Determina-
tion Intercomparison Exercise. 
The aim of the PIDIE exercise was to test the 
X and gamma-ray methods used for measuring pluto-
nium over a wide range of isotopic composition, 
to give an opportunity to improve them, to inves-
tigate sources of error and, if possible, to im-
prove the knowledge of emission probabilities. As 
a general rule, these methods are based on the X-
and/or g~ma-r~ radilj.tion elllitted by the iso-
topes 2j~Pu, 2j9pu, 2L!Opu, 2111pu and 2111Am and 
they offer the advantage that the use of external 
standards is not essential. However, an addi-
tional aim was to examine the possible improve-
ment of such measurements by using CBNM pilot 
reference samples. 
Because the PIDIE exercise started about 10 
years ago, the aims described above have somewhat 
changed since then and the questionnaire reflects 
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the problems faced at that time. For example, no 
part of the exercise was devoted to measurements 
at high counting rates, low-quantity measurements 
or other experiments testing screen effects. 
Nevertheless, due to the strict anonymity and 
secrecy maintained, the PIDIE exercise can be 
considered as a real blind test to confirm the 
present possibilities of X/gamma-ray spectrometry 
for isotope abundance measurements. 
The participants received the sets of pluto-
nium samples and carried out their measurements 
in 1988. After a synthesis of the first results 
provided by eight participants, a preliminary 
report was written in 1989 [2]. Shortly after, a 
ninth participant sent his results before the 
deadline. Mass-spectrometry measurements of small 
samples of each plutonium batch were carried out 
in 1989 and 1990 by six other laboratories to 
complete the final analysis of the X/gamma-ray 
spectrometry results. 
The present paper summarizes the final X and 
gamma-ray spectrometry results [3]. As some of 
the participants gave several sets of results 
using different methods for the determination of 
the plutonium isotopic composition, a total of 
sixteen sets are available for this final evalua-
tion. 
2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1 PIDIE plutonium samples 
UKAEA-AERE Harwell was charged with realizing 
identical sets of seven plutonium samples. The 
containers were designed about ten years ago and 
the preparation of the samples began not long 
after, but the final dispatch was delayed due to 
obstacles encountered in the export of nuclear 
materials. Each sample was in the form of a 
sealed capsule containing 0.45 gram of plutonium 
oxide in pellet form with the following isotopic 
abundances: 
Batch number Isotope ratios (%) 
238Pu/P 239Pu/P 240Pu/P 241Pu/P 
1 0.01 94 6 0.2 
2 0.02 89 10 0.4 
3 0.05 85 14 1.0 
4 0.1 78 20 1.8 
5 0.1 76 21 2.0 
6 1.0 69 25 5.4 
7 1.3 65 27 6.8 
2.2 Participation 
Nine laboratories participated in the PIDIE 
exercise. An arbitrary code number was allocated 
to each participant: a subscript - 1, 2 or 3 was 
added to the code number of the laboratories 
which sent in several questionnaires. The list of 
these laboratories is as follows: 
ANMCO HARWELL (United Kingdom) 
CEC/CBNM GEEL and SCK/CEN MOL (Belgium) 
CEC/JRC ISPRA (Italy) 
ECN/PETTEN (The Netherlands) 
ENEA CASACCIA (Italy) 
!AEA (Vienna) 
LANL (U .S.A.) 
LLNL (U.S.A.) 
DAMRI/LMRI (France) 
3. ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION DETERMINATION 
3.1 General principles 
Except for 242pu, all the isotopes of pluto-
nium emit gamma rays; for this reason, the gene-
ral procedure used for determining the plutonium 
isotopic composition is based on the measurement 
of the X and gamma radiations emitted by these 
isotopes and, als~ by the two other decay pro-
ducts, 237u and 2 lAm. Combining the information 
from different peaks in the gamma spectrum with 
their specific X- or gamma-ray emission probabi-
lities and the half-lives, the atom ratios can be 
determined after a relative efficiency calibra-
tion without the use of external standards. 
Two types of methods were used in the PIDIE 
exercise. The first and most recent type [4] 
exploits the X and gamma-rays in the 94 to 
104 keV region, with some gamma-rays from other 
regions; the efficiency calibration has to take 
account of the discontinuity at the K-absorption 
edge at 121 keV. The second type is related to 
other methods [5 to 10], where the data process-
ing mainly uses several peaks in the 120 to 
500 keV region. One of the main sources of un~er­
tainty is the determination of the 2L!Opu 
abundance by its sole gamma-ray at 160 keV, which 
is not very intense and is perturbed by the 
interferences. 
A letter was assigned to each 111ethod to cha-
racterize each set of final results. The letter A 
is for the methods of the first type, the letters 
B, C and D for the methods of the second type, B 
when UCRL-52139 [11] or UCRL-53506 [5] photon 
emission probabilities were used, C when CBNM 
pilot reference samples [8] were used to get cor-
rected parameters and D when other nuclear data 
were used [12,13]. Several participants used the 
same analysis code with similar nuclear data and 
some participants used the same analysis code 
several times, but with different nuclear data. 
The half-lives used by participants and taken 
from literature [11 to 13] present some slight 
differences but the consequences on measurements 
have been considered as insignificant. 
3.2 Instrumentation and measurement conditions 
A precise determination of the isotopic com-
position of plutonium samples is strongly 
dependent on good energy resolution and, at high 
counting rates, on good charge collection. The 
error made in plutonium parameters can be doubled 
when the resolution at 2o8 keV goes from 0. 7 to 
1.0 keV. It is generally recommended to have the 
experimental ratio FWTM (Full Width at Tenth 
Maximum)/FWHM (Full Width at Half Maximum) lower 
than 1.9, as close as possible to the theoretical 
value of 1.82 obtained for a Gaussian peak shape. 
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Now, the FWFM data (Full Width at Fiftieth Maxi-
mum) seems more appropriate to estimate the 
detector tailing. 
One participant used a coaxial n-type germa-
nium detector, the others used small-sized planar 
intrinsic germanium detectors, 1. 4 to 10 cm3 in 
volume, which had an energy resolution better 
than 600 eV at 125 keV and 700 eV at 208 keV at 
low counting rates. Because of the small quantity 
of plutonium in the samples, it was impossible to 
test the instrumentation at high counting rates, 
the highest value was about 9000 counts per 
second. It would be interesting to test this fac-
tor in a future exercise. 
Most participants used a cadmium absorber, 1 
to 2 millimeters thick, and sometimes, a cooper 
absorber in addition. Generally, the samples were 
measured close to the detector window, with a 
source-to-detector distance below 4 centimeters. 
Under these conditions, the counting rates were 
low, a few kilo-counts per second. 
4. EVALUATION RULES 
4.1 Compilation of individual results 
For participant k giving an ith partial 
result designated xi j k for the jth component, 
and a corresponding' uncertainty designated 
6xi,j,k• the final result adopted is given by the 
weighted mean Xj,k estimated as follows: 
m Xi,j,k 
I: 
i=1 (tuci,j ,k)2 
Xj,k"' 
1 m 
I: 
i=1 (t.x· . k)2 J., J. 
[m = number of experiments] 
Because the number of experiments was limited 
(3) and the participants evaluated their uncer-
tainties following different rules, the attribu-
tion of comparable final uncertainties was not 
obvious. Provided that systematic components were 
considered predominant in most cases, it was con-
sidered that repeated measurements under iden-
tical conditions could not improve the uncertain-
ties significantly. Then, the uncertainty t:.xj k 
in the final result was taken as the maximUm 
value of the mean of the uncertainties in the 
partial results quoted by the laboratories, and 
the standard deviation of the weighted mean. 
4.2 Final results 
Taking account of the results of each parti-
cipant, it was possible to calculate the mean 
values and various uncertainties for the jth 
component defined as follows: 
- unweighted mean: 
n Xj,k 
I: 
k=1 n 
(n = number of results) 
- relative standard deviation of a result (from 
the unweighted mean) 
1 
- relative standard deviation of the mean (from 
the unweighted mean) 
- average of relative uncertainties 
n L1Xj ,k 
L1Xj = l: --
k=l n 
where L1Xj,k is the uncertainty in the result Xj,k 
- weighted mean: 
n Xj,k 
E 
k=l (L1Xj,k)2 
Xnj 
1 n 
E 
k=l (llX· k)2 J. 
- relative standard deviation of the weighted 
mean (also called the external error) 
Sxnj 1 (n-1) 
n 
E 
k=l 
n 
E 
k=l 
(X11 j - Xj ,k)2 
(L1Xj,k)2 
1 
5. RESULTS FROM THE PIDIE EXERCISE 
5.1 238Pu to 241Pu and 241Am results by X and 
gamma-ray spectrometry 
a) Comparison of final results 
The following parameters are given in Table 1 
and Figure 1 : 
- unweighted means with the corresponding rela-
tive standard deviations of a single result and 
of the mean for all D.A. and N.D.A. results, 
and results from the X/gamma-ray spectrometry 
methods A,B,C and D. Because the number of 
results available for methods C and D is 
limited, i.e., 2, the relative standard devia-
tion is not significant and is not, therefore, 
given. 
- weighted means for all N.D.A. results with, in 
the Table, the corresponding relative standard 
deviations of the mean (external errors). 
- average of the relative uncertainties for all 
N.D.A. results and for methods A,B,C and sepa-
rately. 
The dispersion obtained in all the X/gamma-
ray spectrometry results versus atom ratios were 
about: 1 to 4% for 238Put{P, 0.2 to 1.4% for 
239Pu/P, 2 to 3.5% for 2 OpujP, 1 to 2% for 
241pujP, 3 to 5% for 241Am/P. 
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b) Comments 
Several observations can be made with respect 
to the above results: 
- The PIDIE exercise is based on aims which were 
defined about ten years ago, therefore it is 
not designed to take account of recent techno-
logies at best. New analysis techniques which 
are tested are utilized by a number of partici-
pants which is too limited for studying a pos-
sible specific bias. 
- Many parameters, such as measuring conditions, 
equipment, nuclear data, range of energies, 
softwares, differ from one participant to 
another, so that conclusions relate to general 
points only. Nowadays, it could be possible to 
obtain more specific conclusior.s, by limiting 
the number of influencing parameters and taking 
account of recent developments. 
- In general, the relative standard deviation for 
a single result is of the same order of magni-
tude as the average of the relative uncertain-
ties, which means, on average, that the latter 
have been cor~ectly estimated. 
Except for 2L!1Am where the bias is analyzed 
below (Section 5.3), the N.D.A. results are, 
overall, in agreement with the D.A. results. 
The latter are, nevertheless, character~zed by 
a very small scatter of the 239Pu/Pu, 2 Opu/Pu 
and 2L!1Pu/Pu ratios. 
- With respect to the determination of 240pu, 
which turns out to be rather difficult by 
gamma-ray spectrometry, the results are in 
agreement with the D. A. values. Nevertheless, 
it can be shown after a careful analysis that 
the results obtained with the type B methods, 
are, on average, lower than the D. A. values, 
while the results obtained with type A methods 
are slightly higher. In contrast the results of 
the determination of 239Pu from the type B 
methods are somewhat higher than the D.A. 
values. 
- With respect to the other methods based on 
gamma-ray spectrometry, significant progress 
can be seen with the type A methods. The 
results obtained, in agreement with the D.A. 
values are characterized by uncertainty levels, 
relative standard deviation of a single result 
and average of the relative uncertainties, 
definitely lower than those obtained with the 
other meth~ds. I~ addition, for the determina-
tion of 23 Pu, 2 lA~ and occasionally, for the 
determination of 2L!lpu these type A methods 
appear to be more precise than the destructive 
methods. 
c) Results from X/gamma-ray spectrometry 
using an additional absorber 
The participants were asked to measure 
samples N 2 and N• 6 with an additional absorber, 
thus, reducing the efficiency for low-energy 
peaks. This part of the exercise shows that the 
analysis of Pu spectra in the KX-ray energy 
region, which provides significant improvements, 
appears to be limited in the presence of screens. 
Then, usual methods turn out to be an indispen-
sable complement in some applications, such as 
the measurement of nuclear wastes or hold-up. 
Other experiments relating to screen thicknesses 
and low quantities measurements, seem worthwhile. 
d) Corrections based on the use of the CBNM 
pilot references samples 
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As too few participants used the CBNM pilot 
reference samples, it is not possible to draw 
general conclusions. However, it can be seen that 
the differences between the N. D. A. results and 
the D.A. ref;lults were reduced by a factor of 3 
for 239Pu, 2~0Pu and 241Pu. 
5.2 Results from 
results) 
destructive analyses (D.A. 
In order to compare the X/gamma-ray spectro-
metry results with other values obtained diffe-
rently, several PIDIE samples were distributed to 
a number of laboratories for destructive analysis 
D. A. -Mass spectrometry was used to determine 
the abundances of all the plutonium isotopes 
except 238Pu, and alpha counting or another tech-
nique was used for the measurement of 239Pu and 
241Am abundances. The results of seven sets of 
PIDIE destructive analyses collected recently 
[15] are also reported in Table 1 and compared 
with the N.D.A. results in Figure 2. The ratios 
of the average N.D.A. values to average D.A. 
values are thus represented with standard devia-
tions resulting from the quadratic summing of the 
primary standard deviations of the average 
values. 
5.3 Remark for 
abundance 
the determination of 241Am 
A significant bias can be seen from Figure 2 
for the determination of 241Am; at low concentra-
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tions, the values determined by X/gamma-ray spec-
trometry are lower than those obtained from des-
tructive analyses, on the other hand, the 
converse holds at high concentrations. The 
Figure 3 shows that this bias is also observed 
with the type A methods; in addition, it is simi-
lar to the bias observed between the results 
obtained by mass spectrometry using the double 
spike technique and those obtained by alpha-
counting. This observation implies that there is 
probably a systematic error in the alpha-
counting. 
5. 4 Measurements of 242pu by isotopic correla-
tions 
242pu cannot be measured by X/gamma-ray spec-
trometry. The questionnaire included an optional 
question for participants willing to give a 
result for 242pu using isotopic correlations. 
Eight results from five laboratories were recei-
ved. Rather large dispersion can be observed 
(around 20% relative standard deviation) for the 
results. This may be expla~ned by the different 
ways of dealing with the 2~1Am/2~1Pu ratio cor-
rection. A significant bias relative to the des-
tructive analysis results may be noted for low 
abundances (around lOO% bias below 0.2% 242pu 
abundance) that could be partially explained by 
the unknown history and mixed origins of the 
samples. But this could representative of future 
actual materials, such as re-cycled fuels. A pos-
sible conclusion of this exercise (which was not 
the main purpose of PIDIE) is the need to study 
new isotopic correlation formulas. 
5.5 Remark 
Due to large number of factors influencing 
the measurement, X/gamma-ray spectrometry equip-
ment, different experimental conditions, methods, 
and nuclear data, PIDIE cannot be expected to 
yield general conclusions. By fixing some fac-
tors: same equipment, same measurement condi-
tions, same samples, the PERLA exercise, which 
was initiated more recently [16], is turning out 
to be a valuable follow-up since it makes it pos-
sible to validate, in principle, the methods and 
to analyze their specific biases. 
6. CONCLUSION 
From this comparison, it is evident that 
there is no significant bias between the values 
given by X/gamma-ray spectrometry and the values 
provided by destructive analyses with the excep-
tions of 2q2pu and 241Am. 
Appreciable progress in both precision and 
accuracy have been recorded, due to a combination 
of better equipment and improved procedures, as 
for example, the method based on the analysis of 
the plutonium X/gamma-ray spectrum in the low-
energy region. 
Characterized by different and independent 
analytical methods, the PIDIE samples can turn 
out to be a very useful means for verifying the 
isotopic composition of plutonium. 
Thus, PIDIE has made it possible to under-
stand better the possibilities offered by X and 
gamma-ray spectrometry for the non-destructive 
monitoring of nuclear materials. 
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FISSILE MATERIAL MEASUREMENTS AND DETECTION LIMITS 
BY GAMMA-RAY SPECTROMETRY IN 220 I WASTE DRUMS 
R. Carchon, P. De Baere, P. De Regge 
Nuclear Research Center, SCK/CEN, Mol, Belgium 
Abstract 
The estimation of the content of fissile 
materials in routinely produced waste drums 
necessitates appropriate measurements to meet 
material balance requirements as well as sorting 
criteria for disposal. 
About 500 typical 220 1 waste drums con-
taining incinerator ashes and compactable 
materials have been assayed by passive gamma-ray 
spectrometry. The detection system has been 
calibrated by 152Eu sources. Selfattenuation 
corrections and varying source inhomogeneities 
have been investigated. From the measurement 
results the fissile material content in the 
wastes has been determined and detection limits 
are predicted. 
The performance of a relatively simple and 
fast measurement technique for fissile material 
content in typical waste drums provides valuable 
field data in support of material balance system 
studies and waste segregation policies. 
1. Introduction 
Part of the characterization of nuclear 
waste barrels is the determination of the inven-
tory and the quantity of the radionuclides 
present in the barrel. 
Generally, the methods for the determina-
tion of the nuclide inventory of a container are 
of a non-destructive nature, because in many 
cases it is not feasible to take a representa-
tive sample for destructive analysis. These NDA 
methods generally rely on gamma-ray spectrometry 
or neutron counting of the radiation emitted by 
the drum. Both passive and active techniques 
have been investigated and applied in the past. 
Of those methods high-resolution gamma-ray 
spectroscopy (HRGS) has proven its utility over 
the years. It has however inherent limitations 
because of gamma-ray attenuation which is depen-
dent on gamma-ray energy as well as on matrix 
material density /1/. 
Using techniques which correct for this 
phenomenon, it has been possible to assay some 
500 drums that differed in matrix density, 
composition, origin or drum size. 
The experience gained by the routine use 
of HRGS on this batch of waste drums is reported 
here. 
2. Experimental set-up and equipment 
2.1. Drum scan mechanism : Segmented gamma-
scanner 
The assay mechanism for the drums consists 
of a turntable, a vertical motion unit and a 
detector with collimator. 
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The rotation of the drum during the mea-
surement averages out the radial inhomogeneity 
of the assayed material. The vertical motion 
(with 5 predetermined, computer controlled 
measurement steps) in combination with the use 
of a detector collimator enables the measurement 
of the drum in 5 segments. 
By performing a separate assay on each 
segment, the effect of vertical inhomogeneity is 
reduced. A transmission source on the opposite 
side of the drum with respect to the detector 
provides data for the matrix attenuation correc-
tion in each segment. 
2.2. Detector 
The detector in this set-up is a Philips 
Ge ( Li) detector coupled to a preamplifier and 
mounted on a 35 1 cryostat. The efficiency of 
the detector is 10.9 %. 
2.3. Electronics 
The electronic units consist of a spectro-
scopy amplifier (Canberra Model 2020) and a fast 
ADC (Canberra Model 8075) linked to the Canberra 
System 100. This is an advanced PC based 
Multichannel Analysis Workstation that features 
high performance data acquisition, analysis and 
report generation. Further it corrects for the 
dead time and pulse pile-up effects in the 
shaping amplifier and ADC. 
It runs under Microsoft Windows which 
expands the DOS operating system allowing mul-
tiple application programs to be run simulta-
neously on the host computer (Compaq 386/25). 
The spectra are stored on the hard disk. 
Spectra analysis was hand made through the 
indication of the regions of interest. Peak 
centroid determination, background subtraction 
and peak integration is made by software. Energy 
calibration was carried out with the 152Eu 
source. The efficiency curve was registered in 
a separate measurement with an 152Eu source. 
These elements allowed the identification of the 
nuclides and the determination of their quant-
ities. 
A more sophisticated peak analysis program 
(SPECTRAN-AT) is available. It fits a semi-gauss 
curve to the peak and decomposes multiple peaks. 
With the use of an efficiency curve, the nuclide 
vector can be calculated. 
3. Sample description 
The 500 waste drums that have been assayed 
to the present time with the segmented gamma 
scanner, can be classified in a few main 
groups : they may contain ashes, compressible 
wastes or concrete conditioned waste. 
Both 180 1 and 220 1 size drums had to be 
measured. In some cases 180 1 drums were over-
packed in 220 1 drums. 
For the ashes from the incineration of 
combustible waste a density of about 450 kg/m• 
was reported. The concrete filled barrels 
(always 220 1 size) had net weights between 500 
and 550 kg. On the other hand the density of the 
compressible waste varied from very low ( 100 
kg/m• like thermal insulation materials) to high 
(1000 kg/m• for metal or glass parts). 
4. Measurement procedures 
All barrels have been scanned in 5 seg-
ments and each segment was measured for 300 
seconds. The spectra accumulated for each indi-
vidual segment were added so that finally one 
spectrum per barrel was registered. 
The interpretation of the experimental 
results was different depending on the waste 
category. 
4.1. Ash barrels 
The ashes of the Evence Copp~e furnace had 
a mean density of 400 to 450 kg/m3 and were 
supposed to be homogeneous over the entire 
barrel volume. Calcined clay balls have been 
shown to provide a satisfactory non-active 
simulator for these ashes. 
The determination of the efficiency curve 
was carried out with this clay matrix using an 
1~Eu source located in different radial posit-
ions. The efficiency showed little radial de-
pendence, disregarding very excentric positions, 
and thus represented a fair calibration for the 
actual measurements. All attenuation effects of 
the emitted gamma's were intrinsically included 
in the efficiency curve. An example of effi-
ciency curve is given in figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 Efficiency curve by 152Eu source 
empty barrel 
EFFICIENCY 
l.OOOE-03 ~--------------~ 
1.000E-05L---~-~-~~-L~~L----J 
100 ENERGY (keV) 1000 
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The nuclide source strength was then calculated 
with the well known formula 
I - A llT.B.e 
where I the nuclide intensity 
A the area under the peak 
u the measurement time 
B the branching ratio 
e the efficiency 
4. 2. Non-combustible wastes 
For the case of non-combustible, compress-
ible wastes, the preceding procedure is not 
applicable because of the unknown matrix dens-
ity. 
In order to get an adequate attenuation 
correction factor over the full energy range, an 
152Eu transmission source was measured together 
with the waste barrel. 
The comparison with an empty barrel mea-
surement provided the energy dependent attenu-
ation curve and thus allowed the calculation of 
a correction factor, which was related to half 
a barrel thickness, as a function of gamma 
energy. 
The obtained spectrum was analyzed, using 
the efficiency curve for the case without matrix 
present and the nuclide content was augmented by 
using its corresponding correction factors from 
the attenuation measurement. So the formula 
mentioned in 4.1 is corrected by e~'x wherein J.L is 
the energy dependent attenuation and x is the 
waste barrel radius. 
4.3. Concrete barrels 
Because of the high attenuation of gamma 
rays due to the concrete matrix, the methods 
previously discussed cannot be applied and gamma 
measurements on concrete barrels seem meaning-
less in general. 
However for the case of a homogeneous 
distribution of the radioactive material in the 
concrete matrix, a method /2/ has been described 
to establish a correlation between the specific 
activity of voluminous radioactive waste and the 
count rate in a collimated external gamma 
detector. 
5. Experimental reuslts 
5.1. Detection limits 
Detection limits have been det~rmined for 
235u and 239pu as they could be measured by their 
gamma emissions. They are based on the analysis 
of a typical spectrum, and although this calcu-
lation is spectrum dependent and affected by the 
presence of other radionuclides, the order of 
magnitude is representative. The procedure that 
was followed has been described by Currie /3/. 
The lower limit of detection Lo is given 
by the following formula : 
L0 - 2.71 + 4.65 o 8 
wherein <TB means the standard deviation on the 
observed background value. 
The coefficients used in the expression 
correspond to a 95 percent confidence level. 
The activity detection limit a0 can be 
obtained,from the following formula 
wherein c 
B 
L0 . C 
ao-
e.8.!1T 
AT. (1-e-"· 4T) 
counting efficiency for the 
gamma-ray considered 
the photon emission proba-
bility. 
Applied to our example we found the 
results as reported in table I. 
TABLE I Detection limits for fissile isotopes 
isotopes for ash barrels 
Back- De tee- Effi- Detec-
ground tion ciency tion 
uncer- limit limit 
tainty counts 
<TB mg 
2J5u 
185 keV 727 3382 24 .1o-5 204 
239pu 
129 keV 485 2258 28.10-5 37 
375 keV 283 1319 13 .1o-5 188 
413 keV 390 1816 12 .1o-5 294 
5.2. Mean composition of different waste 
barrels. 
All waste barrels have been scanned and 
the gamma spectra were processed as described in 
paragraph 4. After analysis, the nuclid inven-
tory could be determined : the distribution over 
the barrel population is given in table II. 
Considerable differences can occur between 
the different waste barrels and values vary 
between zero and the maximum. The distribution 
is given as the number of barrels containing a 
given percentage of that maximum quantity. The 
numbers are reproduced for three classes of 
wastes : pool ashes, pool compressible wastes 
and miscellaneous wastes. 
It becomes clear from the distributions 
that the maximum quantities are only obtained in 
a few cases while the highest frequency lies in 
the ea tegory containing up to one quarter of 
that maximum amount. 
There are also serious differences between 
different groups of ashes and compressible 
wastes, depending in some cases on the origin 
and the reactor type. 
Less isotopes could be identified in the 
compressible waste category because of the 
measurement method applied a transmission 
source was used, thus increasing artificially 
the background and masking the presence of weak 
isotopes. 
5.3. Mean attenuation in the matrix 
Matrix attenuation has been taken into 
consideration in a particular way as described 
in paragraph 4. In case of the ash barrels, the 
matrix could be simulated by non active material 
and attenuation effects were accounted for in 
the efficiency curve. 
TABLE II Distribution of Radionuclides in the waste barrels 
Maximum content Number of barrels with inventory relative to maximum value 
MBq 0 0-10 % 10-25 % 25-50 % 50-75 % > 75 % 
Pool Ashes - Total barrels 189 
57 eo 84.65 179 188 
- - -
1 
60co 777 0 32 124 21 3 1 
54Mn 6.7 5 34 76 69 7 3 
134cs 9.3 115 156 26 4 0 3 
IJ7cs 176.2 7 174 12 1 1 1 
23su 4.01 155 164 14 5 4 2 
12ssb 31.3 11 77 52 44 13 3 
Pool Press - Total barrels 84 
6oco 104 26 26 53 0 4 1 
54Mn 9 74 74 8 0 0 2 
J37cs 31.4 57 57 26 0 0 1 
Miscellaneous Waste - Total barrels 70 
60co 56.7 9 66 2 1 0 1 
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In case of non combustible but compress-
ible waste, a transmission measurement was made 
with a 152Eu source. Comparison with an empty 
barrel, provided a series of correction values 
over the energy region of 120 keV to 1.4 MeV, to 
which a function of the form y = a1 exp (a 2x) was 
fitted, with y the correction factor and x the 
gamma-ray energy. 
Because this procedure was rather complex 
for routine measurements, a simplified method 
was investigated, based on the weight determina-
tion and calculation of the mean density of the 
matrix. 
FIGURE 2 Correction factor distribution 
for 6°Co 
Compressible Wastes 
CORRECTION FACTOR 2·----------------------------------
1.8 -
1.6 -
1.4 
1.2 -
. 
.. 
. ·. -
... 
.· 
·. 
1~-L--~~~-L--~~--~--~-L--~~--~ 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 
DENSITY (1000 kg/m3) 
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A correction factor for the 60co line is 
given in figure 2 as a function of matrix dens-
ity. It turns out that all corrections can be 
made within an error of 10% over the entire 
energy region. 
6. Conclusion 
Different kinds of waste categories have 
been investigated routinely for the determina-
tion of the nuclide inventory. For this purpose 
HRGS has been used succesfully. Gamma-ray atten-
uation correction over the entire energy region 
could be simplified by the det~rmination of the 
barrel density. 
Although not particularly suited for the 
determination of the alpha content in voluminous 
waste barrels the detection limits for U and Pu 
have been investigated and amount to approxi-
mately 200 mg per barrel for the lower density 
wastes. 
/1/ 
/2/ 
/3/ 
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Abstract 
An Isotope Monitoring System (IMS) for unattended 
spectrum acquisition is described. This consists of a 
s1mple low cost flexible software package running on a 
Compaq 80386 and controlling up to 4 Canberra 
Packard System 1oq multi~channel analyze~ (MCA} 
cards. The IMS perm1ts the Independent configuration 
of each of the 4 . MCA cards for different monitoring 
cycles ~nd for different spectrum acquisition cycles 
each be1':lg based upon different trigger criteria. In this 
way IMS IS able to al!tomatically identify events, time tag 
them, and acqu1re and store valid spectra 
corresponding to those event. 
An additional feature of IMS permits to run a Multi-
Group . An.alysis (MGA}_ so~are package for the 
determ1nat1on of plutomum ISotopic compositions in 
batch mode. 
One particular application is discussed which consists 
of 4 high resolution gamma-ray detector systems 
conn~?~ed together t<? the IMS for unattended spectrum 
acqUISition. The off-hne batch mode analysis of the 
spectra using MGA is also discussed. 
1. Introduction 
. "'fhe Euratom Safeguards Directorate is being 
1ncreas1ngly called upon to develop and install non-
destru?tive. assay (NDA) systems for unattended 
operation 1n new large scale nuclear facilities in the 
European Communities. Some of these NDA systems 
cons1st not only of neutron coincidence counters but 
~lso of . high resolution gamma-ray detectors. The 
1ntroduct1on of NDA measurement systems for 
unattended operation becomes obligatory: 
- when nuclear material is handled automatically in 
remote controlled nuclear facilities 
where nuclear material is inaccessible for 
measurement or sampling by inspectors in the normal 
way 
- to reduce the radiation dose to operator staff and 
inspectors caused by the increased number of 
~ea~urement needed on large quantities of plutonium, 
~.e. h1g~~throughputs and larger quantities in a single 
1tem 
- when the investment in new measurement systems for 
unattended operation becomes cost effective due to the 
considerable increase in manpower overheads 
associated with the use of conventional attended 
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measurement systems in these new large scale nuclear 
facilities. 
The first substantial effort to design NDA 
safeguards measurement systems for unattended 
operation was initiated in the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL} for neutron coincidence counters in 
th_e PFPF project/1/. Recently the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate has also developed an acquisition system 
having similar features/2/. LANL thus laid down the 
fundamental guide-lines for future development of 
unattended safeguards measurement systems, and in 
particular neutron coincidence counter systems. These 
principles can be summarised as follows: 
- redundancy in neutron coincidence electronics and 
computers 
- continuous collection with short measurement times 
e.g. 1 minute ' 
- infrequent data review, e.g. 1 per month 
- sealed cabinets 
- continuous cable runs 
- software self-diagnostics 
- data collection in electronics cabinets near to the 
detectors. 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate took these 
guide-lines and investigated the possibility of adapting 
them. ~~ the case of un~ttende~ gamma-ray spectra 
acqu1s1t1on. The follow1ng pnnciples were thus 
established: 
- separate .sp~ctrum acquisition. from spectrum analysis 
- no momtonng mode operat1on, i.e. the monitoring 
mode of the neutron coincidence counters can be 
considered as being part of the C&S measures 
- no connection between gamma-ray spectra and 
external hardware, e.g. neutron coincidence acquisition 
electronics, etc. 
- use of commercial electronics and spectrum 
presentation software 
- a hardware platform based upon the IBM compatible 
personal computer 
- use of closed cycle helium refrigerators for the 
gamma-ray detectors 
- reduction of the data to be stored through "front-end 
data processing" involving: 
- triggering only on the item once positioned in 
front of the detector 
- only storage of spectra of interest 
- user definable thresholds to exclude background 
spectra from spectra of interest 
- user definable frequency for logging the correct 
functioning of the hardware 
- status log indicating the type of acquisitions 
performed. 
There are many different existing high resolution 
gamma-ray systems having sophisticated automated 
acquisition cycles for unattended operation but all of 
them appear to be linked to external hardware. As an 
example, one recent application of the TRIFID/EPICS 
system/3/ used a hardware trigger from an external 
controller to start the spectrum acquisition. Another 
important different between the approach described 
here and that often implemented elsewhere is that in the 
other systems the spectrum analysis is performed 
immediately after acquisition. In the approach 
described here the immediate analysis is not possible 
since the system is connected to 4 different spectrum 
acquisition chains and the execution of any complex 
analysis routines would adversely affect the 
performance of the internal triggering software and 
would cause conflicts should events occur 
simultaneously at two, or more, of the acquisition 
chains. 
Signal 
Item in stable position 
In measurement cavity 
·f 
0 
c ClQ) 
.EE ~ ~ 
., :J 
-., 
~ :ll 
=E 
Time 
~~~~~1~1~1 ~~~~---~ 
TiggerOn Trigger Off \ ,IJL[ M. Neutron Signal 
~~~-'= --------~------------~·----------1~ 
Acquire spectrum Gamma-Ray Signal 
Fig. 1 The Measurement Signal as a Function of Time 
The difference between the approach for neutron 
coincidence raw data acquisition and spectrum 
acquisition is best shown by reference to Fig. 1. The 
neutron coincidence counter raw data is collected in a 
way which is independent of the passage of the items 
through the measurement cavity, i.e. there is no 
triggering of acquisition as a function of the items 
passage through the detector cavity. lt is true that the 
raw neutron coincidence data are analysed during 
collection to determine if they belong to a background 
event, a source, or the passage of a plutonium item, 
however it is only during the review phase that data is 
identified for subsequent analysis. This approach can 
not be efficiently used for the unattended acquisition of 
gamma-ray spectra since spectra should only be 
acquired when meaningful, i.e. when the item has 
stopped in the correct measurement position. The 
archival overhead for the collection of uninteresting 
spectra, e.g. from background or during the arrival or 
departure of the item, would be substantial if the system 
were to have, say, 30 days autonomy. Another 
import(lnt boundary condition was the optimisation of 
the acquisition time since for some applications the 
residency time of the item in front of the detector is as 
little as 4 minutes. lt was thus not possible to adopt a 
trig~ering approach which would reduce the time 
available for spectrum acquisition, i.e. the spectrum 
acquisition must be started as soon as the item is 
positioned correctly and stopped just before the item 
moves on. 
Once the principles mentioned above were 
established the Euratom Safeguards Directorate 
decided to adopt a commercial multi-channel analyser 
(MCA) card, the Canberra S100 MCA card, and an IBM 
compatible personal computer, and to develop 
application software using the software supplied with 
the MCA card selected. 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate considers 
that the selection of the S100 MCA card and personal 
computer have the following advantages: 
- installation of up to 4 MCA cards in an IBM compatible 
personal computer 
- software provides a common user interface, Microsoft 
Windows 3, with other applications under development 
-flexible commercial spectrum presentation package 
- professional user descriptions/manuals 
- limited cost for purchase and maintenance 
- flexible, reasonably priced, development engine for 
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safeguards applications. 
As mentioned above a custom applications 
software was developed, the Isotope Monitoring 
System {IMS). The role of IMS is to acquire spectra only 
when a plutonium item is positioned in front of the 
gamma-ray detector and to do this automatically for 4 
different measurement systems in an unattended way. 
Once started IMS controls the 4 different gamma-ray 
acquisition systems in a monitoring, or cycle, mode. 
This involves collecting continuously, with each of the 
S100 cards, spectra for short periods of time. Each 
spectra is examined for the total counts in a user 
defined peak region of interest (ROI) and for the ratio of 
that peak ROI with a user defined background ROI. A 
flag is set if the total counts in the ROI is in excess of 
some user defined threshold. This, in principle, 
indicates that an item is arriving. However, in order to 
distinguish this from a simple increase in background, a 
second flag is set if a user defined ROI ratio threshold is 
also exceeded. If neither of the thresholds are 
exceeded, for a given spectrum, it is erased and a new 
monitoring cycle started. 
When the user defined thresholds are exceeded 
IMS changes from the monitoring, or cycle, mode to 
acquisition, or sampling, mode. This change is made 
only for the measurement system where an item has 
been detected, the other measurement systems remain 
in monitoring mode. For the acquisition, or sampling, 
mode one or more spectra can be acquired and stored 
for future analysis. Each spectrum acquired 
corresponds to a user defined time slot, or period, 
corresponding to a period when the items is known to 
be correctly placed 1n front of the gamma-ray detector. 
When the acquisition, or sampling, mode is completed 
the monitoring, or cycle, mode is reintroduced until the 
next item is detected. 
2. Automatic Plutonium Gamma-Ray Spectra 
Acquisition 
System Hardware 
The system hardware can be separated in to two 
parts, that linked with the gamma-ray detector system; 
and that linked with the MCA card and computer. The 
first type of hardware will be listed but not described in 
detail. The following components were used: 
- HPGe LEGe detector 200mm2 x 10mm 
- Canberra CRYOLECTRIC electrically refrigerated 
Cryostat 
-Canberra Model3105 High Voltage Power Supply 
- Canberra Model 2025 Fast Research Amplifier 
- Canberra Model 8077 Fast ADC 
- Canberra Remote ADC Transmitter /Receiver Units. 
The gamma-ray detector hardware layout has 
three novel features:-(i) The use of closed cycle helium refrigerators running 
continuously unattended. 
(ii) The use of custom ADC transmitter /receiver units in 
order to connect the ADC's to the S100 MCA cards. 
The ADC's were placed about ?m from the gamma-ray 
detectors and the S100 MCA cards and computer were 
connected via the ADC transmitter /receiver units. The 
connection between the ADC transmitters and receivers 
was over twisted pairs which can be up to 500m long 
and provide full ADC data transfer. 
(iii) The fact that the gamma-ray detectors are mounted 
on to neutron coincidence counters so that 
simultaneous measurements are performed. 
The Canberra S100 MCA card was selected 
because of its known compatibility with the other 
Canberra equipment used in the measurement chain 
and because of the flexible software that is supplied 
with the card. One S100 master card and 3 S100 slave 
cards were used. 
The four S100 MCA cards were installed in a 
Compaq 386-20e. The hardware layout is shown in Fig. 
2. 
Neutron 
Detector 
Cold Head 
r···-r::.::.···::::.·::::: ... :::.::·::········· ···············] 
(/) 
Cl. 
> ::r: 
ci.. 
E 
<( 
Twisted pair 
S100 card 
Compaq 
Fig. 2 Hardware Layout 
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System Software 
The system software relies upon two different 
sets of software, the first the commercial software for 
the Canberra S100 MCA card, the second the specific 
application routines programmed for the Isotope 
Monitoring System (IMS). 
Application Software 
The S100 MCA card was packaged with 
Microsoft Windows 3 and the Canberra Application 
Manager. The Application Manager came with three 
components, the first the application manager itself 
which provides for the control of the S100 cards, 
second the Microsoft spreadsheet EXCEL providing the 
communication link in to the S100 cards, and the MCA 
command summary which provides EXCEL with a 
library of commands. 
The custom software, IMS, was thus written 
using EXCEL macros and the library of S100 
commands. The use of EXCEL has many advantages 
since custom menus, dialogue boxes, and user 
messages can be employed to enhance the user 
friendliness of the system. 
Isotope Monitoring System 
As has been stated above the user, in starting 
the Isotope Monitoring System (IMS), initiates the 
program through a macro in an EXCEL spreadsheet. 
The presence of up to 4 S100 MCA cards are detected 
automatically, the communication DOE link established, 
and the cards configured according to a set of 
configuration files. 
Once the S100 cards have been configured the 
main menu of IMS is presented, see Fig. 3. The main 
user menu provides options for: 
- starting monitoring 
- configuring each of the 4 MCA cards 
- accessing the status file 
- accessing the spectrum files 
- leaving system. 
The first three options are linked directly to the IMS, 
whilst the last two are service options. 
Start Monitoring 
The start monitoring option accesses an 
additional menu screen, see Fig. 4, where the user can 
select: 
-which of the 4 S1 00 MCA cards are to be used 
- the frequency with which status information on the 
correct functioning of the system is to be written to the 
status file 
-the first spectrum index file number to be used. 
The status information is a state of health signal 
written to the status file so that the user, upon review, 
can confirm that the system was functioning correctly. 
This status information is only written if nothing 
happened during the time period specified. The status 
file is updated if nothing occurs, say, during 1 hour, and 
continues to be updated every hour. 
MCA Card Configuration 
The option to configure one, or more, of the 
S100 MCA cards leads the user to another menu 
screen, see Fig. 5, the gamma-ray detector 
configuration menu. This menu is where the different 
monitoring thresholds and sequences are 
programmed. 
A schematic of the monitoring and acquisition 
modes is shown in Fig. 6, and is described in detail 
below. 
Fig. 3 The IMS Main Menu 
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The user is presented with two distinct sets of 
configuration parameters, the first related to the ability 
of the system to detect an item arriving, the second 
related to the acquisition of one, or more, spectra. 
The fir$t set of fields, numbers 1 to 5, relate to 
the detection of an item, i.e. the monitoring, or cycle, 
mode. The definition of the fields are as follows:-
1. Cycling time in sec. (1 0 -> 1 000) 
The acquisition time for which a "background" 
spectrum will be acquired and evaluated to determine if 
an item is arriving. This time must be set as a function of 
the speed of movement of the items as they are 
handled and presented before the gamma-ray detector. 
The user can define a period between 10 and 1000 
seconds. 
2. Total count threshold (1 -> 1000000) 
A integral count 1s calculated for a predefined 
cycle time, see field 1, and a predefined ROI, see field 4, 
and compared to the user defined total count threshold. 
If the threshold is exceeded then IMS considers that an 
item is arriving and the spectrum acquisition sequence 
is triggered. This threshold can be set so as to ensure 
that an acquisition is not triggered by a background 
signal or by event defined not to be of interest. The user 
can define a threshold of between 1 and 1 000000 total 
counts in the ROI. 
3. Ratio threshold (1 -> 1 0000) 
A ratio value is also calculated for the same cycle 
period as for the threshold calculation, field 2. The ratio 
1s defined by the ROI field 4 which provides a file name 
where the two ROI's are defined and by the location of 
the background ROt to the peak ROt, field 5. The ratio 
threshold provides for a isotope specific trigger 
independent of the total count trigger. lt is thus possible 
to use the total count and ratio thresholds in order to 
finely select the type of event for which spectra are 
required, and to ensure that the triggering of spectrum 
acquisition is resistant to background changes or the 
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passage of items having other isotope signatures. The 
user can define a threshold of between 1 and 10000 for 
the ratio of the ROt's. 
4. S100 ROt file name 
This file contains the two user defined ROt's 
which are used for the determination of the total count 
threshold and the ratio threshold. The user can identify, 
and define, the exact ROt's to be used with the normal 
S100 application manager software. 
5. ROt order (x=R -> L} 
This indicates which of the two ROt's is the peak 
ROt and which the background ROt. 
Field 6 provides for an identifier tag which would 
be useful if the different S100 MCA cards were set to 
trigger on different isotope specific ROt's. The field 7 
defines the number of channels to be acquired in the 
S100 spectra. 
Once a item has triggered either the total count 
threshold or the ratio threshold the S100 must be 
configured for the acquisition of spectra for archival and 
subsequent off-line analysis, i.e. the acquisition, or 
sampling, mode. Fields 8 and 9 provide for the user to 
configure the acquisition time and number of spectra to 
be collected. The slots are user definable sequential 
time periods, or slots, during which the S100 MCA card 
will be instructed to acquire spectra. The field 9, 
corresponding to each time slot in field 8, permits the 
user to indicate if that particular spectrum, once 
acquired, should be stored on the hard disk of the 
computer for future off-line analysis. This arrangement 
of user definable time windows and spectrum archival 
options provides the user with the following options:-
(i) Not to store a spectrum acquired during an initial 
period when the item is known st1ll to be moving. If the 
trigger thresholds are set to be sensitive to small items 
then larger items will trigger the acquisition prematurely. 
lt is for this reason that the user can decide not to store 
the first spectrum acquired. 
(ii) The user can ask to store one, or more, spectra 
during the period when the item is known to be in 
position in front of the gamma-ray detector. 
(iii) If it is known that the item will move at 
predetermined times and that different portions of the 
1tem will be automatically presented to the gamma-ray 
detector for measurement then the user can insert short 
periods where no spectra will be stored. 
(iv) At some specific time the item will be automatically 
removed from in front of the gamma-ray detector and 
the acquisition of the last spectrum will have been 
stopped and the spectrum stored. If the control fo the 
S100 MCA card were to be handed back directly from 
the acquisition mode to the monitoring mode then it is 
probable that the acquisition mode would be 
retriggered by one, or other, of the thresholds. In order 
to avoid this an additional time period can be inserted at 
the end of the acquisition cycle although no spectrum 
would be stored for that period. 
Each of the 4 S100 MCA cards can be 
configured differently in the gamma-ray detector 
configuration menu. 
Status File 
The status of an active S100 MCA card is 
regularly dumped to a status file and can be read and 
listed by the user though the main menu. Each status 
line in the status file, or status log, is date and time 
tagged and has a syntax ff ff ff ff with each ff 
representing one of the S100 MCA cards. The ff can 
have the following different states: 
- 00 means that the S100 MCA card did not receive a 
trigger 
- 1 0 means that the total count threshold was exceeded 
- 01 means that the ratio threshold was exceeded 
- 11 means that both the trigger thresholds were 
exceeded. 
From this status log the user can clearly see the source 
of all triggering operations and when they occurred. In 
addition the status log provides a rapid overview of the 
number of spectra that have been acquired and stored. 
There is a second type of status log with a 
syntax f f f f, with each f representing one of the S100 
MCA cards. The f can have the following states: 
- 0 means that particular cards was not selected by the 
user 
- 1 means that monitoring was initiated with that card 
- 2 means that the card was not available at the end of a 
monitoring cycle 
- 3 means that the card became again available at the 
end of a monitoring cycle 
- 8 means that a spectrum storage problem occurred 
- 9 means that a communication problem occurred with 
the card. 
The 0 and 1 are written when a monitoring cycle is 
initiated and 2 and 3 written when the monitoring cycle 
is completed. 
Canberra Packard 
MGA Controle Program Parameter Entry 
1. Detector nunber (1 --> 4) : 
2. Month of cycle <1 --> 12> : 
3. Day of cycle (1 --> 31) : 
4. First spectrun index (1 --> 9999) : 
5. Last spectrun index (1 --> 9999) : 
6. Show analysis results on screen (Yes/No) : 
7. Spectrun format conversion (Yes/No) : 
8. MGA input file : 
Other Features 
Access to the spectrum files is through an 
additional user menu which provides the user with 
options to copy and delete spectra, to display or print 
spectrum file lists by month, day, S100 MCA card, etc. 
3. Gamma-Ray Spectra Analysis Using MGA 
In section 2 the gamma-ray spectrum acquisition 
routines were described. The resultant gamma-ray 
spectra once acquired and stored are available for 
further off-line analysis. The gamma-ray spectrum 
acquisition routines are configurable for the acquisition 
of any type of gamma-ray spectrum, i.e. they are not 
specific to the acquisition of plutonium gamma-ray 
spectra. In the particular application described above 
the objective was to acquire plutonium gamma-ray 
spectra in an automated and unattended manner, and 
to provide for the off-line analyse of those spectra using 
the Multi-Group Analysis (MGA) program developed at 
(LLNL)/4/. 
Once the different plutonium gamma-ray spectra 
have been acquired in unattended operation t.he u~er 
can intervene manually to perform the analys1s us1ng 
MGA in a "batch mode", see Fig. 7. 
The menu screen is divided in to three parts: 
- the upper header contains title information and the 
date and time 
- the central part shows the program parameters 
- the lower part shows the menu options and 
information about the command keys. 
The program parameters are as follows: 
- gamma-ray detector number x: only spectra 
mmddiiii.dex where xis the number (1-4} of the gamma-
ray detector will be analysed 
- month mm of cycle: only spectra mmddiiii.dex where 
mm is the month during which acquisition took place 
will be analysed 
- day dd of cycle: only spectra mmddiiii.dex where dd is 
the day during which acquisition took place will be 
analysed 
- first spectrum index iiii1: index of the first S100 
spectrum mmddiiii.dex of ttie series of spectra to be 
analysed 
- last spectrum index iiii2: index of the last S100 
spectrum mmddiiii.dex of the series of spectra to be 
analysed 
- show MGAPC analysis flag: the user can select either 
to see the MGA analysis on screen and initiate the next 
analysis, or to have the series of analyses performed 
automatically 
- MGAPC spectrum storage flag: the user can select to 
have the S100 spectrum file format converted to an 
ASCII format according to the a froposed "ASCII 
Transfer Spectral Data File Format"/5 
- MGAPC input file name ffffffffff: during the execution of 
15-feb-91 15:41:28 
2 
1 
29 
35 Fig. 7 The Front End Menu to MGA 
40 
yes 
no 
input.dat 
<Esc> : exit /stop MGA analysis I T ~ : select parameter <F1> : start MGA analysis <Enter> : feed typed value 
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MGA the program requests for user input are directe~ 
to an input file generated by the user to perm1t 
automatic analysis. . 
Upon execution of t~e prograf!l the f1rst 
spectrum file to be analysed IS that def1ned by the 
gamm~:ray detector number, ~ay and month of 
acquis1t1on and the spectrum 1ndex number. The 
program ensures that the MGA analysis is perfor~~d 
for each spectrum having an index number b~tween 11111 
and iiii2. The spectra are analysed accord1ng to the 
input data in the MGA input file ffffffffff generated by the 
user. A completed analysis is then printed if the correct 
instruction is embedded in the input file ffffffffff. Should 
MGA produce an error message, via its error file, the 
error 1s classified in to fatal or non-fatal. Fatal errors 
stop the control program, non-fatal errors require user 
input to continue. The S100 spectra can also be 
converted to the ASCII format if requested. 
4. Discussions 
The use of a Canberra S1 00 MCA card when 
coupled with the special software IMS provides a 
reasonably versatile system for both unattended 
spectrum acquisition. The position of the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate is that this solution provides one 
approach to the problem of unattended ~pectra 
acquisition and subsequent off-line data analys1s. The 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate views this solution as 
being particularly effective when: 
- unattended gamma-ray spectra acquisition is required 
without connection to external hardware to obtain 
triggers 
- only assay functions are needed, i.e. no C&S role 
- when immediate data analysis is not required, i.e. 
when the inspector only expects to service the data 
acquisition system, say, every week or every month 
- when subsequent off-line data analysis is acceptable, 
i.e. whP.n there are only a limited number of items 
passing through the detector cavity. . 
The implementation as described her~ 1s 
particularly addressed to the case where _the 1tem 
handling routines are automated, very well def1ned, and 
reproduced identically for each item presented before 
the ~amma-ray detector. In addition it is assumed that 
the time available for acquiring the spectrum is normally 
very short, i.e. 4-5 minutes, so that the trigger technique 
must maximise the time available for spectrum 
acquisition. A future area of developme~t. for the IMS 
application software could be the add1t1on of other 
trigger techniques for determining when to start and 
stop spectrum acquisition, i.e. monitoring of the stability 
of throughput or dead time, etc .. 
The IMS application software itself is not li~ked _to 
the acquisition of plutonium spectra for analys1s w1th 
MGA. Other applications could involve the unattended 
performance of enrichment measurements or, through 
an improved status log, the simple counting and 
identification of radioactive items passing before the 
gamma-ray detector. The S100 card and the IMS could 
equally be adapted for Nal type detectors. 
Areas where the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate is concentrating its future developments for 
unattended measurement systems are: 
- unattended operation of combined neutron and 
gamma-ray measurem~r:t.systems . . 
- networkin~ data acqu1s1t1on systems to prov1de rap1d 
data analys1s and failure detection 
- automatic recognition and analysis of events of 
safeguards importance. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper describes a simple, low cost and 
flexible solution to the unattended acquisition of 
gamma-ray spectra. 
The solution consists of a dedicated software 
package running on a Compaq 80386 and controlling 
up to 4 Canberra Packard System 100 multi-channel 
analyzer (MCA) cards. This system is called the Isotope 
Monitoring System (ISM) and permits the independent 
configuration of each of the 4 MCA cards for different 
monitoring cycles and for different spectrum acquisition 
cycles each being based upon different trigger criteria. 
The IMS is able to automatically identify events, time tag 
them, and acquire and store valid spectra 
corresponding to those event. 
The IMS permits the independent customization 
of the monitoring mode for each of the 4 MCA cards. 
Each of the MCA cards has its own monitoring cycle 
and each provides for time tagged spectrum acquisition 
when both a gross count threshold and a 1sotope 
specific ratio threshold are triggered. Up to 10 separate 
spectra, each for a different measurement time, can be 
acquired per acquisition cycle. 
In addition a time tagged status file is updated 
when ever either of the thresholds are triggered. This 
status file also contains data on the active status of 
each MCA card and various diagnostic indicators. 
An additional feature of the present 
implementation of IMS permits to run a Mult1-Group 
Analysis (MGA) software package for the determination 
of plutonium isotopic compositions in batch mode. The 
MGA package is treated as an independent engine and 
multiple cycles of MGA can be initiated in batch mode 
from a menu employing a separate user generated 
MGA input file. 
One particular application is discussed which 
consisted of 4 high resolution gamma-ray detector 
systems connected together to the IMS for unattended 
spectrum acquisition. 
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CADMIUM TELLUP.IDE DETECTORS F'OP. NONDESTRUCTIVE CONTROL 
OF' NUCLEAR FUEL 
Y.A.Petukhow, A.K.Khusainov, S.E.Khinoverov, A.E.Luchansky 
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Abstr-act 
The results of creation of 
spectr·ometr·y ionizing radiation units on 
the basis of p-i-n structures from 
cadmium tellur·ide al'e pr-esented in the 
r-eport. The detector and the 
head-section of the pr·eamplifier· were 
cooled to -35°C by a small-si zed 
thermoelectr-ic cooler·. P-i-n str-ucture 
of the detector· allowed to achieve 
~~1er·gy r·esol uti or, on 1 i ne 122 keV of 
13fo isotope- 1,78 keV and 662 keV of Cs isotope 6,41 keV. Peak/valley 
ratio of the spectral line 122 keV makes. 
the value more than 80. 
The possi bi 1 i ty of appl i ca-Li on of 
the detector for r,ondes.-Lruc-Li ve con-Lr·ol 
of nuclear fuel arises from r-es.ear·ch 
resul -Ls. 
1. Introduction 
The technique of nondesll'UCl-i ve 
cor,trol of nuclear· fuel with gamrua 
spectrometry is widely used in the IAEA 
for- the Ol'ganization of production and 
pr-ocessing ol' nuclear· f·ueL 
Ger·marlium and scin-Lillation 
detectors ar-e used mainly for detection 
of gamma r-adiation of nuclear· fuel. 
But la-Lely due to successful 
crea"LiOI'l of de-Lector-s with accep-Lable 
energy resolution on the basis of 
cadmium tellul'ide ar,d mel'cur·ic iodide 
-Lhere is an oppor-tunity to have devices 
on the basis of these de-Lectors and 
me"Lhods of cent r ol /1 , 2, 3/. Limit a ti ens 
in application of these detectors occur· 
because of the fact that their· values of 
energy l'esolution and efficiency of 
registr·atior, al'e r,ot high enough. Values 
of the parameter-s deper,d c_,n the 
charac-Leris-Lics of initial materials and 
-Lechnol ogi ea! and cor,str ucti ve 
peculiarities c_,f their· manufacture. F'or 
precise spec-Lrometr-y measur-ements the 
most impol'tant ar-e: ener-gy resolution, 
range of detected energies, peak/valley 
ratios, efficiency and s.ens.i ti vi t y of 
r-egistration, stability in time. These 
par-~meters are interd~penden-L func.tions., 
very often discrepant, iL means lhal of 
or1e of the par·arneter·s impor·es the other-s 
deterior-ate. 
Works on er-ea-Lion of detector-s on 
the basis of c.admi Ul!i tell ur· i de wer· e he! p 
mainly in ruanuf act ur i ng of de tee. ti r,g 
uni tJs of -Lhe M-S-M C metal -semi conductor·-
metal) type. The best r-esults in this 
field have been achieved by -Lhe 
scientis-Ls of the fir-m EURORAD CF'rar,ce) 
/4/: 
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energy resolution of the detector-s 
2,5 keV on line 59,6 keV and 3,2 keV on 
line 122 keV. Thl', Sf"'~·c-1.fic:"lions of s.uc,h 
delec.Lors are defined malnly by the 
par-alnetel'S 
tellur·ide. 
of the initial cadmium 
At the pr-esent wo1w;,nt it is 
prac.tic.ally impossible to manufacture 
detector-s on the basis. of M-S-M 
str-uctures with better· char-acteristics. 
The value of the pr-oduct of lifetime to 
the mobility of charge car-riers in 
cadmium tell ur i de is not high. But just 
this value defines the spectrometry 
characteristics of the detector 
(J-I<>T<> ::;; 3·10-3cm2 V-1 , 
J-lpTp ::;; 3 ·1 0 - 4 cm2 V-1). 
But at the present time M-S-M CdTe 
detector-s and detecting units on their 
basis ar-e successfully used for 
pr-actical pw·poses in nondestructive 
ar,alysis of nuclear· fuel mater-ials. The 
authors /1/ put into pr-actice the 
commercial detector-s of EURORAD in tJhe 
complex with the system of pulse 
se! ecti on and achieved ener-gy r·esol uti on 
< 5 keV at the semiheight for· gamma 
r·adi ati on with ene1·gy 662 keV. But it is 
WOl'th mentior,ing that in this case high 
er,er·gy r·esol uti on was achieved by 
r·educir1g of efficiency count to 20-;-50:Y.. 
With the he! p of this system the 
quantitative par-ameter-s of the bur·nup 
fuel wer-e measur-ed. 11-,e r·esulls of these 
measuremer,ts agr-ee with the values 
defined with a high r·esol uti on GeCLi) 
detector·. 
The Riga Research Institute's 
detecting unit with the CdTe detector· of 
semispher·ical geometry was successfully 
used for· the control of fr-esh and bur·nup 
fuel of NPP /2/. The detecting unit had 
the ener-gy r-esolution better then 15 keV 
for gamma l'adiation with the er1ergy 662 
keV and was able to distinguish in the 
rJ-'f'c:tr·um gamma-lines of the isotopes: 
CsC605 keV, 796 keV) and 
137 Cs:C662 keV). 
Tite methods of measur-ements used by 
lhe author-s is based on measur-ing 
gamma-spectr-a in the region of high 
(~Tll',r·9ie~. f·rom 'JOO l.o 1000 ko<:·V. The r·ar,ge 
o!' .,r,er·gies 100-;-500 keV is of great 
ir,ter·est in solving the problems of 
nor,destructive cor,trol of nuclear· fuel. 
And in par· ti cul ar· for the analysis of 
conter1t of Ur·ani um and Pl utcmi um 
i so-Lopes in llii xed fuel. This demands 
high value of the ener-gy r-esolution c_,f 
the detector-s justJ in this r-egion. 
The results of the cr·eati on of CdTe 
detector-s with p-i-n str-uctur-e and 
det.ecti ng units on their· basis having a 
wide rar,ge of r·egist.er·ed ener-gies fr·om 6 
t.o 1000 keV wi t.h high er,er-gy resol uti or, 
and contr-ast.ing spect.r-al lines allowing 
to solve var-ious tasks of nondestr·uct.ive 
cont.rol at' nuclear- fuel ar·e pr·esent.ed in 
t.he report.. 
G.:_ Results 
For· manufacturing det.ector·s with 
p-i-n str·uctur·e chlor·ine doped hi~h 
resist.ivity cadmium telluride C10'~ 
~1 o" on cm) of p-type conduct! vi ty was 
used. It. was gr·own by the method of 
horizont.ally oriented crystallizatiort 
fr-.om the mel t.i ng of stoi chi ometr· i c 
compos! "Lion. Monocryst.al!? of cadmi urn 
t.elluride had t.he value of t.he 
product. of mobility to lifet.ime 
(0,5 ~ 1) · 10-3 cm2 V-1 for electrons and 
C0,1 ~ 0,5) · 10-4 cm2 V-1 for holes. 
The t-echnology of t.he creat.ion of 
p-i-n str-uct.ur-es consists of t.he 
creat.ion of electron-hole and 
heterojunctions on the subst.rat.es of 
monocryst.als of the initial cadmium 
t.ellur-ide. Aft.er- t.hel'mical t.r-eat.ment. t.he 
plat.es with p-i -r, junct.ion were t.r·eat.ed 
mechanically and chemically for the 
leakage curr·ent. reduct.ion. Exper·imental 
dependencies of dark cur· rent. and vel t.age 
for t.he de-Lector wi t.h p-i-n str-uctw-e 
and M-S-M st.r·uctur·e ar·e given in Fig. 1. 
J,nR 
150 
100 
50 
~5 tc:::::::::= 
O tOO ZOO 
... 
u,v 
Fig.1. Reverse curr-ent. as a 
function of bias voltage 
for· M-S-M struct.ur-e C 1) 
and p-i-n struct.ure C2). 
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The advant.age of p-i-n str·uct.ur·e t.o 
M-S-M st.r·uct.ure when con,pal' i ng t.he value 
of dark cur-rent at the equal volt.age is 
evident.. So t.he usage of p-i -r, str-uct.ur·e 
allows t.o solve t.he task oi· r·eal izat.ion 
of high t.ension of the elect.ric field in 
the sensitive volume of the detector· at. 
consider-ably less current noises. 
The dar·k curr·ent in p-i-n str·uctur·e 
has the value Ct ~ '3) · 10-"A cm-2 at 
300K and is defined by the pr-ocesses of 
gener·ati or, in t.he space char·ge l'egi on: 
e rn W 
I = , wher·e [1] 
e chal'ge of the el ec:tr·c,rt, 
n concentr·atior, oi c.har·ge carl'iers 
i rt cadmium t.ell Ul' i de, 
T lifetime of char·ge carr·ier-s, c, 
W widt.h of space charge r-egion. 
Tempera-Lure dependence of the dar-k 
cur·r·ent is: 
ICT)~expC-Eg/2KD. E2l 
where EgCCdTe) 1, 48 eV at r-oom 
temper-atur·e. 
At. t.emperatur·e -30 -40°C t.he value 
of the dark cur-rent. is 
10 -12 10-13 A clu-2 giving ener-gy 
resol ut.ion 30 eV which is compar·able 
with the curr·ent of ger·mani um and 
silicon detect.or·s at the temper·atur·e of 
liquid nitr-ogen. It is possible to 
achieve such temper·atur·es for p-i-n 
str·uct.ure with a bel p of small-si zed 
thermoelectric coolers. based on Pel tier 
effect.. 
P-i-n st.r·uctures were influenced by 
high and low temper-at.ures, infr-ar·ed 
r-adiat.iort Ct.he r-esul t.s will be published 
s.epar·ately). The t.es.ts. show that the 
width of the space chaJ'ge r-egion in 
p-i-n st.r·ucture whi eh is the sensitive 
r·egion of t.he detect~or· limits. itself by 
t.he concent.r·at.ion ot' deep impurit.ies 
wi t.h er1ergy levels. near· the middle of 
t.he forbidden zone. In our cryst.als t.he 
concentration ~1; de"'Ys irnpw'ities has the 
value NT ::;; 10 cm allowing t.o have 
t.he width of t.he space char·ge r-egion up 
t.o 500 mkm. The measur·ement.s of t.he 
dist.r·ibution of t.he elect.r-ic field in 
p-i-n structures showed corr-elation 
betweer1 t.he thickness of the sens.i ti ve 
region and the lifetime of holes. So in 
our· opinion the mair• obstacle for having 
p-i-n detect.ors with high values of 
operat.ion volume for- cadmium tellur·ide 
cr·yst.als gr·owr, accor·ding t.o our· 
t-echnology is absen~e of perfection in 
!-'art of concentl'ati on of accept. or 
cemtr-es whose ener·gy levels ar-e si t.uated 
near· the middle of the for· bidden zone. 
When obtaining cadmium tell ur i de 
crystals with the lifetime of holes 
3 5 10-6 S it fs possible to 
manufacture p-i-n detectol'S: with 
sensitive C depleted) thickness a1' ea 
1 -;- 1,5 mm and high energy resolution. 
French colleagues /4/ have crystals with 
such characteristics. 
On the basis of the detector· with 
p-i-n structure a detecting unit 
consisting of a head section and a 
service unit has been !c,anui·actur ed. The 
head s.ectior, is a ther·m(:_,stat on the 
basis. of small-sl :;:ed ther n,acool er 
situated inside the shell-radiator 
transmitting heat from the hot joint of 
the ther·mocooler·. The detector and the 
head section of the chargesensi ti ve 
preamplifier· are on the cold joint and 
are cooled to the optimal temperature 
-30 -;- 40°C. The head detecting unit is 
connected with the service unit by a 
flexible cable. The service unit 
contains a sour-ce of a high voltage for· 
the detector· , a r·egul ated amplifier· for 
agr-eeing signals fr-om the output of the 
detecting unit with the input of the 
standard pulse analysel' CORTEC 7500, 
NOKI A or· other· s: of the same type) . 
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ener·gy spectra c.•f Am, 
Cc and Cs r-eceived with the help of 
the detecting unit on the basis of the 
p-i-n detector are given in Fig.2,3,4. 
Fig. 2:. 241Am spectr-um detected 
with p-i-n cadmium 
telluride detector 
273 
1,78 
122 l<o;oV 
li ~'-11 
ill :> I 1 
I ~ 
11 
Fig.3. 57Co spectrum detected 
with p-i-n cadmium 
tell ur· i de detector· 
662 k<>V 
Fig. 4. 197Cs spectrum detected 
with p-i -r, cadmium 
tellur-ide detector 
The ar· ea of the ser1s:i ti ve ser· vice of 
the detector is: 30 mm2 , thickness: of the 
s.er,s.i ti ve r·egi on 300 mkm. Det,;,ctor-
voltage 700 V, temper·atur·e 35°C. 
En,;,r· gy r- esol uti an on a half of 
amplitude distr-ibution height for energy 
144 keY is 1.1 keY at the noise of the 
generator 1 keY is due to the capacity 
of the detector 10 pF. The increase of 
the thickness of tJhe s.ensi ti ve region to 
1 mm allows to decrease the capacity 
impact of the detector· to the noise of 
electronics and using s:peci al 1 ownoi se 
field transistors the noise of 
preamplifier· is achieved with a 
detector· • value of 500 eY. The width of 
spectral lines: 59,6 keY and 122 keY 
give values 1,34 keY and 1,78 keY 
respectively. One of the peculiarities 
of energy spectra of 24tAm and ~7Co 
isotopes is: contr·as:t and symmetr-y of 
spectral 1 i nes. Rate peak/valley 1'01' 
59,6 keY and 122 keY lines is more than 
80 and a very typical for CdTe detectors 
on the basis of M-S-M structure pull i r1g 
of the left par·t of spectr-al l!r,es is 
absent. 
At the detection of gamma radiation 
of 197Cs isotope the energy resolution 
on line 662 keY is 6,4 keY at the rate 
peak/compton mor·e than 3. 
3. Conclusion 
The given results pr·ove that the 
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detecting unit on the basis of p-i-n 
c:admi um tell ur· i de detector- can be used 
fol' nondestructive analysis of nucleal' 
fuel accor· di r1g to methods us.ed in the 
wol'ks /1,2,3,5/. But detecting units 
with p-i-n detector- will have 
advantages in comparison with cadmi urn 
telluride detectors for· better· energy 
res.ol uti on as compar-ed with 
hemispherical detectJors and do not 
demand usage of add! lienal units for· 
pul s:e s:el ecti on whi eh ar· e used with the 
detectors of the firm EURORAD. 
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Abstract 
An "Expert System" software procedure has 
been developed for use with isothermal calori-
meters in order to improve the sample end-point 
power prediction process. The procedure examines 
the measurement data and determines the onset 
of the exponential end-point prediction procedure. 
It also determines when sample thermal equilibrium 
conditions have been reached. The procedure has 
been tested using nrchivcd data from two different 
calorimeters and sumple power predictions urc 
obtained in a total measurement time of about 2 
hours with sample power errors of less than 0.5%. 
1. Introduction 
Recent measurements with isothermal calori-
meters/1,2,3/have demonstrated both the accuracy 
in the technique and reductions in measurement 
times compared to conventional heat-flow calori-
meters. The present work has been directed towards 
further reductions in measurement times. This is 
motivated, in part, by the needs of safeguards 
inspectors for short measurement times. 
2. Measurements 
Table 1 contains results from isothermal 
calorimeter measurements performed using PERLA 
plutonium oxide standards. Although the results 
are generally satisfactory, typically a period 
of about 4 hours was required for each measurement 
to achieve a satisfactory predicted sample end 
power. The reason for the long time period to 
reach an adequate prediction value can be seen 
in Fig. 1. The figure is a plot of the measured 
sample power P ( Po-IC) a'nd the predicted sample 
power P (Pred) as a function of time. From the 
figure it is clear that the predicted sample 
power reaches an asymptotic value after a period 
of about 3 hours and only after a large number 
of power measurement data points are included 
in the exponential fitting algorithm. It would 
appear that the prediction process is being 
biased by early data points which do not fit 
the assumed single exponential form of the pre-
diction equation. 
3. Analysis 
On the basis of measurement data from two 
calorimeters an analysis of the behaviour of the 
prediction procedure was undertaken. In particular 
the behaviour of the coefficient of the expo-
nential was examined. It was found that for most 
measurements this exponential coefficient reached 
an asymptotic value in a range of time from 
about 20 minutes to 60 minutes from the start of 
the measurement. It was further observed that if 
275 
the onset of prediction was delayed until the 
exponential coefficient achieved an asymptotic 
value a better prediction was obtained at an 
earlier time. This is in contrast to the previous 
prediction procedures where the prediction was 
started after a fixed delay period (usually 15 
minutes) following the start of the measurement 
(sample insertion into the calorimeter measure-
ment chamber) • 
A software procedure has now been devised 
Lo control the prediction process. A rolling 
value of the exponential coefficient of the fitting 
function is calculated using 18 averaged sample 
power data points and the achievement of an 
asymptotic value is tested using a rolling linear 
least squares fit to the last six values of the 
calculated exponential coefficient. The test 
criteria involve a number of parameters including 
the slope and standard deviation in slope of the 
coefficient itself. Once the criteria are satisfied 
the single exponential fitting/prediction pro-
cedure is initiated and similar tests and criteria 
are used to determine the earliest acceptable 
value for the predicted sample power. 
4. Results and Conclusions 
The new procedure hns been tested on data 
from two calorimeters including measurements of 
both plutonium metal and oxide samples. The 
results are displayed in Table 2. Sample numbers 
with a suffix of Pl or P2 have been preheated 
for one or two hours respectively. 
The results ~re very satisfactory and show 
that the new procedure works well. At the time of 
the "first guess", which corresponds to the first 
predicted value, the error (when compared to 
equilibrium or certified values) is less than 5% 
and this is achieved in times ranging from about 
one hour to about 90 minutes for samples with no 
preheating. The prediction achieves an acceptable 
value (error less than 0.5%) in about two hours. 
These results represent a significant improvement 
in measurement times when compared to the results 
from the conventional prediction procedures. It is 
anticipated that additional refinements to the 
prediction procedure will further improve the 
results. 
This work was partially supported by the 
UKAEA Nuclear Materials Control Office. 
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JRC lspra Plutonium Assay Calorimeter • Measurements with PERLA Pu01 Sta•tlards 
Sample No. Data File Calculated Measured Predicted Error Final Predicted Error s~ Treatment 
Power Power Power AP(%) Power (after AP(%) 
(Watts) (after 3 Hrs) (after 3 Hrs) 5 or 6 Hrs) 
(Watts) (Watts) (Watts) 
Pull3 15.44 14.866 15.4971 + 0.32 15.4425 + 0.02 no pr-eheating (V 1.5) 
Pu113 30019001 15.511 14.06 15.574 + 0.38 15.60 + 0.58 1 hr preheat (V 1. 7) 
Pu113 30019003 15.512 14.93 15.585 + 0.44 15.565 + 0.34 1 hr pr-eheat, AI, (Vl.7) 
Pul13 01029001 15.513 14.79 15.473 -0.25 15.512 0.00 no preheatin~. AI (V 1.7) 
Pull3 02029001 15.514 14.73 15.559 + 0.29 15.523 + 0.06 0.5 hr pr-eheat 
Pu113 05029001 15.516 14.77 15.582 + 0.42 15.548 +0.20 1 hr pr-eheat 
Pull3 06029001 15.517 14.85 15.478 -0.26 15.587 + 0.45 2 hrprcheat 
Pull3 07029001 15.518 15.10 15.460 -0.37 15.528 + 0.06 3 hr pr-eheat 
Pu113 08029001 15.519 14.80 15.506 -0.08 15.528 + 0.06 0.25 hr pr-eheat 
Pu106 123039001 1.566 1.512 1.578 + 0.78 1.5615 -0.28 1 hr preheat, canister top 
Pul06 122039001 1.566 1.458 1.571 + 0.32 1.5706 + 0.29 I hr pr-eheat, canister centn: 
Pu106 121039001 1.566 1.496 1.554 -0.77 1.5555 -0.70 1 hr pr-eheat, canister bottom 
Pu111 3101900:! 5.872 4.556 5.753 -2.0 5.859 -0.22 1 hr preheat, brass packing 
Pull1 1301101 5.845 5.20 5.863 + 0.3 5.8398 -0.08 
Pu115 120039001 22.440 21.245 22.5307 + 0.43 22.466 + 0.11 Po without canister 
Pull5 119039001 22.438 21.07 22.466 + 0.10 22.436 -0.00 Po with canister 
Pu120 ISP281102 37.96 36.48 38.04 + 0.21 37.918 -0.12 no pr-eheating 
Error AP (%)=(Predicted Power)- (Calculated Power) X 100 
(Calculated Power) 
Table 1 
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MEASUREMENT RESULTS USING EXPERT SYSTEM SOFTWARE 
SAMPLE END FIRST GUESS PRED. RESULT 
No POWER (W) TIME % ERR. TIME % ERR. 
(min) (min) 
A 15.731 69 2.1 138 0.2 
R 15.723 TL ?.9 108 (). ) 
c 15.724 81 1.1 112 0.2 
D 15.723 56 4.9 109 0.2 
E 15.723 80 1.5 124 0.5 
F 15.115 69 2.0 121 0.2 
G 15.726 11 3.6 96 0.9 
HP2 53.653 46 0.6 82 0.1 
IP1 57.542 44 0.8 83 0.2 
JP1 59.880 36 3.4 81 0.3 
KP2 58.481 40 3.1 73 0.4 
L 39.010 46 0.3 94 0.3 
TABLE 2 
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A REVIEW OF PLUTONIUM MEASUREMENT 
BY PASSIVE NEUTRON COINCIDENCE COUNTING 
BWHOOTON 
NUCLEAR CONSULTANCY SERVICES Ltd. 
Abstract 
The paper presents a summary of a 
comprehensive review of the theory and practice of 
passive neutron coincidence counting for the 
determination of plutonium. lt describes the methods 
used to extract the spontaneous fission component in 
a train of pulses from neutron detectors and it 
examines the latest methods used to correct for 
neutron multiplication effects. Examples of 
measurement stations and electronics are presented 
with procedures for their calibration and quality 
assurance. An assessment of errors under field 
conditions is also presented. 
1. Introduction 
For many years the determination of plutonium by 
passive neutron coincidence counting has been the 
basis for plutonium verification in international 
safeguards. lt has been the cornerstone of the 
strategy for independent verification of the plutonium 
account. The early instruments were rather crude by 
today's standards, having a detection efficiency of 
perhaps 7% compared to 18% for instruments in 
routine use today and up to 50% for special systems. 
The coincidence method is well established but 
significant development work is still in progress and 
safeguards can probably look forward to an even 
better reliability of results as methods for a more 
detailed analysis of the data, using improved counting 
systems, come into routine use. The Review attempts 
to cover all aspects of the technique but since some 
readers will not wish to dwell on the mathematical 
derivations most of the underlying theory is given in 
Annexes.The Review covers the areas given below 
but since I will not have time to cover every aspect of 
the technique this presentation will concentrate on 
describing the state of the practice today and what 
further development of the technique can be expected 
in the near future. The Review does not cover active 
neutron methods. 
The Contents of the Review are: 
1. Introduction 
2. Principles of the Coincidence Method 
2.1 Spontaneous Fission 
2.2 A General Model 
2.3 The Variable Dead Time Counter 
2.4 The Shift Register 
2.5 Alpha/n Effects 
2.6 Moisture and Matrix Effects 
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3. Neutron Multiplication Effects 
3.1 Induced Fission 
3.2 Self-Multiplication Correction 
3.3 Monte Carlo Calculations 
4. Equipment 
4.1 HLNCC-Type Counters 
4.2 Neutron Collar 
4.3 Other Systems 
5. Measurement of Plutonium 
5.1 Quality Control and Calibration 
5.2 Measurement Strategy 
5.3 Measurement Uncertainties 
5.4 Waste Measurement 
6. Time Correlation Analysis 
6.1 The Interpretational Model 
6.2 Electronic Pulse Train Analysis 
6.3 Time Correlation Examples 
Annex A Nuclear Data 
Annex B Neutron Counters and Electronics 
Annex C Shift Register Theory 
Annex D Neutron Production by Alpha/n 
Reactions 
Annex E Time Correlation Theory 
References 
The Review is intended to be a source document for 
anyone with a general interest in coincidence 
counting. lt will include a wealth of basic nuclear data 
on the neutron emmission characteristics of 
nucleides, both by spontaneous and induced fission. 
lt will also include data to facilitate the calculation of 
(a,n) yields in mixtures. There are so many results on 
measurements in the literature that it has not been 
possible to cover many, and the Review was not 
intended as a complete survey of the implementation. 
Nevertheless 1 hope it will cover sufficient to illustrate 
the chief principles behind measurements and a 
measurement strategy. In summarising the Review I 
have selected areas of interest to this audience. I will 
use a general model to lead into the shift register as 
the current state of the practice and then I will look at 
time correlation analysis since it may well come into 
more routine use as improved equipment, electronics 
and methods of analysis are developed. 
2. General Model 
The measurement techniques used to determine 
plutonium by coincidence counting uses equipment 
designed to analyse the pulse train produced by a set 
of neutron counters. The system components are 
illustrated in Fig 1. 
NEUTRON SOURCE TERM 
Pu SPONT. FISSION Ssp 
(a.n) NEUTRONS Sa 
(OTHER SPONT FISSION) 
' SAMPLE EFFECTS 
NEUTRON MUL TlPUCATlON 
ABSORPTlON 
WATER VAPOUR 
IMPURITIES 
f 
NEUTRONS LEAVE SAMPLE 
AND 
ENTER THE DETECTOR 
+ 
EFFICIENCY 
DIE-AWAY TIME 
REFLECTlON INTO SAMPLE 
ELECTRONIC DEAD TlME 
t 
INTERPRETATIONAL 
MODEL CONTAINING f-.-+ DATA/MODEL UNKNOWN COMPARI90N 
PARAMETERS 
t 
DETERMINED 
PARAMETERS 
Fig 1 
The General Model 
The experimental data are collected and then 
compared with a theory based on an interpretational 
~- The model may be simple, as in the case of 
the shift register or it may involve a complex analysis 
of the pulse train using a more sophisticated 
interpretational model. In the case of the shift register 
the model is simple in its assumptions and easy to 
Interpret. lt assumes that the source is a mixture of 
random neutrons from a/n reactions and bursts of 
neutrons from spontaneous fission. The equipment is 
assumed to have a constant detection efficiency and 
a fixed neutron decay time. Under these 
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circumstances the "coincidence" signal is 
proportional to the spontaneous fission strength of 
the sample and a simple calibration will yield the 
constant of proportionality. 
Instruments in routine use today apply the shifl 
register algorithm, which can be explained in terms ol 
the time distribution of pulses shown in Fig 2. 
L_j 
W1 
Time T 
L._j 
W2 
A distribution function for 
the number of neutrons at 
a time T before the arrival 
time of each neutron 
Random neutrons plus 
fission bursts 
Fig2. 
A random pulse train has a constant distribution for 
the intensity of pulses in a period at any time T after a 
pulse has occurred; i.e. there are no correlations, but 
if fission occurs a small number of neutrons will be 
close together in time. Under these circumstances the 
distribution is greater for small time intervals. lt has an 
exponential decay from time zero with a decay 
constant equal to the moderation and detection time 
for neutrons in the equipment. This distribution 
function is well known as the Rossi - Alpha 
distribution from the theory of reactor noise analysis. 
The number of neutrons in a time interval dt at a 
time T after {or before) any neutron in a random pulse 
train is constant and given by the mean number of 
neutrons per second {R) multiplied by the time 
interval dt. The number measured in the time window 
w2is: 
N2=R.W2 
The number measured in the time window W1 is 
equal to the random rate plus the extra contribution 
from fission. The difference between the two areas is 
proportional to the fission rate even for large samples 
and, in the absence of neutron multiplication effects, it 
is a measure of Pu240{eff). 
The shift register measures the extra contribution 
from fission by sampling the distribution in the 
window W1 and subtracting the background signal in 
W2. This is achieved using the electronics illustrated 
in fiQ 3. 
Fig 3. 
Shift Register 
1ms 
DELAY 
Consider the shift register response to a burst of n 
neutrons, all within the gate width of the register W1. 
The first neutron to arrive will see zero in the gate, the 
second neutron will see the first in the gate, the third 
will see the first two and so on. The recorded signal is 
therefore: 
0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + ... (n-1); which equals 
n(n-1 )/2 . 
This response is characteristic of the shift register. If 
two neutrons arrive the response equals 1 and the 
shift register is recording the number of pairs. If more 
than two neutrons arrive the shift register records, 3 
for a burst of 3 and 6 for a burst of 4. The overall 
response is proportional to n(n-1) , which is itself 
proportional to v (v - 1). 
The quantity v ( v - 1) , is defined as: 
v (v- 1) =I v (v - 1) P(v) 
V 
where P(v) is the probability for the emission of v 
neutrons from fission. lt is also, by definition, the 
second moment of the neutron multiplicity distribution 
The quantity measured in the shift register n(n-1) is 
directly proportional to Pu240(eff) but this statement 
needs confirmation since the multiplicity of neutrons 
emitted by plutonium is not the same as the 
multiplicity of those detected. Consider the probability 
for the detection of i neutrons in a detection system of 
efficiency E when v neutrons are emitted by a source 
Prob(i,V,E) = Ei ( : ) (1 - E)v- i 
Where ( v ) = -~ (the binomial coefficient) 
i (V-1)!1! 
Since the number entering the detector is not 
constant and has a distribution with a mean value 
of v the probability of detecting i neutrons after 
fission is given by: 
Prob (i,E) = Ei r. ( ~ )(1 -E)v- i P(v) 
V =I I 
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The summation is up to N, the maximum number of 
neutrons emitted in a fission event. 
When i neutrons are detected the shift register 
response is i (i - 1 )/2 and the overall response is 
given by 
R ~ i (i - 1) Pr b (' ) .~ 2 . 0 I~ 1=2 
substituting for Prob (i,E) then R can be shown to be 
equal to 
lt is interesting to note that this complete response 
depends only on E2 even though it includes the 
effects of triple and higher order bursts. 
This response must now be modified to take into 
account the electronics, which measures only a 
fraction of R depending on the time window Wand its 
position. The experimental distribution is not perfect 
close to the origin since there is a limit on how close 
together two pulses can be. This is taken into account 
by having a delay time between the input pulse and 
the window W. The fraction of the area under the 
exponential measured by a gate width W and a pre-
delay P is given by: 
where p is the predelay time, typically 5 IJS. If these 
parameters are constant then this fraction is constant 
and the shift register response is given by 
R = Pu240(eff). £2 . e·'i (1- e·~) I P(v) v(v- 1) 
V 2 
The quantity R is only proportional to the amount of 
plutonium in the absence of any perturbation to the 
stream of neutrons detected by the shift register. 
Absorption or multiplication effects will perturb the 
neutron leakage from the sample and any variations 
in detection efficiency or the die-away time of the 
detectors will also change the measured response. 
There are several ways for dealing with multiplication 
effects and for the special case where the (a,n) rate 
~an be calculated and the efficiency and die-away 
t1me are constant the self-multiplication correction 
method of Ensslin /1/ can be applied. 
I think it is fair to say that the current state of the 
practice in coincidence counting is based on the shift 
register approach with a calculated (a,n) contribution 
to deal with multiplication. In a high percentage of 
measurements this method can be used. lt is 
unfortunate that it does not have a built in check to 
confirm the validity of the (a,n) calculation since if the 
calculation is in error it may escape un-noticed. There 
are some checks that can be used to give added 
confidence in the result, such as an examination of 
the multiplication parameter itself to see if it conforms 
to expectations /2/, but this requires some data on 
how the multiplication parameter M is expected to 
vary with plutonium mass. 
The effect of moisture on the sample has been 
carefully examined in recent years /3/ and the most 
significant effect is on the (a,n) rate because of the 
added oxygen. The effect of hydrogen on the 
moderation and neutron multiplication is not large 
and in any case the multiplication, whatever its cause, 
is determined by the model. There is a minor effect 
due to the change in the energy spectrum of the 
neutrons but this is not the only way that the energy 
can change and the sample and its container will 
normally degrade the spectrum to a greater extent 
than the effect of moisture. 
3. Further Development 
The shift register produces only two pieces of 
information on the sample, the total count and the 
coincidence rate. In reality the system has many 
unknowns and the models must make assumptions 
about the system parameters to reduce the unknowns 
to a manageable level. The chief unknowns are: 
Fission Source Intensity (Pu240(eff)) Sst (or Fs) 
Ratio of (a,n) to spent. fiss. neutrons a (or Sa) 
Efficiency E 
Induced Fission p (or M) 
Die-away Time 
The efficiency is a variable since it is a function of 
neutron energy. The energy of the neutrons entering 
the detection region may vary a little with isotopic 
composition, the (a,n) component and multiplication 
but the biggest perturbation comes from the sample 
size and composition. Most of the secondary 
interactions in the sample, e.g. induced fission, take 
place quickly at epithermal energies and there is 
often ample justification for treating the die-away 
parameter as a constant. Nevertheless the system 
would still contain four unknowns. 
A method for dealing with more unknowns was 
suggested by Bondar /4/ at the 1982 IAEA Technical 
Symposium. lt was based on a detailed analysis of 
the pulse train to obtain more than two pieces of 
information. The approach is generally refered to as 
Time Correlation Analysis and the shift register can 
be viewed as a rather simple example of the time 
correlation analysis of the pulse train. The approach 
was pursued by workers at lspra with parallel 
development of the electronics and the 
interpretational models. Hage /5/, /6/ has produced a 
formal theoretical treatment which enables the 
method to be applied on a sound foundation. Let me 
explain the approach and discuss its limitations. 
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The instrumental basis of the Euratom Time 
Correlation Analyser is the opening of a gate of length 
g either at a regular period (Pulse Fluctuation 
Analysis) or by each pulse in the pulse train (Pulse to 
Pulse Analysis) and thereafter the counting of the 
number of pulses, k, which appear within the gate 
length. This leads to a count rate distribution Rkg. A 
typical distribution is shown in Fig 4. 171 which also 
shows how critical the dead time corrections can be to 
the detailed shape of the distribution This distribution 
clearly has a lot of information on the pulse train but 
the usefullness of the approach depends on how 
sensitive the data are to the independent unknowns. 
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Distributions from Pulse to Pulse Analysis 
An interpretational model which may be used to 
determine the unknowns from the data has been 
formulated by Bondar /4/. The treatment is general 
and can be viewed as in two stages. In the first 
instance the problem is defined in terms of the 
intensities of singlets, doublets , triplets etc. 
originating from a single random event, either 
spontaneous fission of alpha/n. These are 
designated C1, C2, C3, etc. and the only other 
unknown necessary to define the pulse train is the die-
away time "A. There is no need to consider the 
efficiency since the parameters Ci relate to detected 
groups. 
This specification of the pulse train is complete and it 
leads to a theoretical expression for R k,g in terms of 
the values of Ci and A. 
R k,g = F(C1,C2,C3, ... , A) 
The precise form of this function is given in ref /4/. 
The next stage is to use a model to derive equations 
for the Ci components in terms of the amount of 
Pu240(eff), the alpha/n source strength, the efficiency 
of the detection system and the neutron multiplication 
parameter p. The equations can be expressed by 
adding the individual contributions to each group, as 
follows: 
Singles= C1 = Ssp.P(1 ,c:,p)+ pSa. 0(1 ,c:,p)+c: (1-p)Sa 
Doubles = C2 = Ssp . P(2,c:,p) + pSa . Q(2,c:,p) 
Triples = C3 = Ssp . P(3,c:,p) + pSu . Q(3,c:,p) 
where Ssp and Sa are the spontaneous fission and 
alpha/n event intensities, c: is the detection efficiency, 
P(i,c:,p) is the probability for the detection of i neutrons 
when induced fission takes place with a probability p, 
and Q(i,c:,p) is the probability for the detection of i 
neutrons from the alpha/n source with the same 
induced fission probability p. The values of P(i,c:,p) 
and Q(i,c:,p) are calculated using 
P(i,c:,p) = L T_L_I c;n (1 - c:)v- nPv(p) 
v~n v. (v- n). 
where Pv(P) is the probability that n neutrons are 
emitted from a fission event with an induced fission 
probability of p. The procedure used to analyse data 
is to determine the unknowns Sst, Sa, c:, and p by a 
least square fit of the R k,g data to the theoretical 
predictions. lt can be seen from fig 4. that there are 
sufficient degrees of freedom to carry out a minimum 
x2. In practice the sensitive to p may be small and 
there may be a large error on the source terms. The 
accuracy of the measurement improves as the 
efficiency increases to give a greater contribution from 
the triples and higher order terms. 
An alternative treatment by Cifarreli and Hage /5/ is 
based on the moments of the Rkg distribution, defined 
as: 
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These moments are calculated from the measured 
data Rkg. They are then used to used to obtain values 
for the correlated singlets, doublets and triplets in the 
pulse train which, using the notation of Cifarelli and 
Hage /5/ are expressable as: 
2-"' • v•<2> + - ~~~ ~ -- -- ( + a) R -<"2F M2[ (M I) VH(i)Vi(2) I ] 
VI (I)- I 
R3 = £3 F. M3 
[ 
Vs(J) + 2 (M· 1) Vs(!) VI(:!)+ (1 + a)(M- 1) ... 
VI (1) • 1 
.•. ~ { V[(J) + 2 (M. I) Vs(!) VI(2)\] 
Vi(!)- I VI (I)- 1 I 
The R1, R2 and R3 values, above, have been obtained 
from the experimental data Rkg and they include the 
effect of the die-away time, the gate width and the 
predelay in the electronics. The expressions on the 
right hand side of each equation are the result of an 
interpretational model and they have been derived 
with the following assumptions: 
1. Instantaneous neutron multiplication 
2. A constant probability for induced fission 
3. A pure exponential die-away time 1/A 
4. A single value detection probability 
The nuclear data constants in the equations are the 
moments of order lJ for the neutron distributions 
associated with spontaneous fission, Vs(IJ)• and 
induced fission VI(IJ)· Within the constraints of the 
model there still remains the practical limitations of 
dead time corrections and the sensitivity of the results 
to each unknown. 
In practice the method is limited to three unknowns, at 
best, since the accuracy on triples is already poor and 
there seems to be little point in attempting to measure 
higher moments. The effects of dead time are critical 
at high counting rates and although the technique has 
had significant success with waste, by treating the 
efficiency as a variable, the application to high mass 
samples will only be established with the 
implementation of high quality dead time corrections. 
In summary, although the determination of plutonium 
by passive neutron coincidence counting is subject to 
some minor problems of moisture and difficulties if the 
(a,n) contribution is unknown it is in a healthy state for 
most samples. The shift register method is well 
developed and on a sound foundation. However, if 
further development takes place it can be expected to 
be an implementation of the more sophisticated time 
correlation analysis models. These will require careful 
attention to dead time losses but the method has a 
special merit for waste measurement if the detection 
efficiency varies betwen samples. lt may also prove to 
be useful! for large samples if the equipment has a 
high efficiency and the electronics can accurately 
process a high count rate. 
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NEUTRON MULTIPLICITY COUNTER DEVELOPMENT* 
D. G. Langner, M. S. Krick, N. Ensslin, G. E. Bosler, and N. Dytlewski** 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Los Alamos, NM 87545 
We have designed and built two multiplicity counters 
to test the usefulness of multiplicity counting for the safe-
guards assay of plutonium-bearing materials. The first pro-
totype counter has been characterized and a variety of pluto-
nium-bearing materials have been measured with it. Assays 
accurate to -0.7% have been obtained for both pure and 
impure plutonium oxide samples in reasonable measurement 
times. Assays accurate to -5% have been obtained for metal 
samples. A second multiplicity counter has been designed 
using experience gained from the first as well as Monte 
Carlo simulations. The second counter was designed to be 
more suitable for in-plant measurement of pyrochemical pro-
cess materials. This paper presents the results of characteri-
zation studies of the two instruments. 
I. Introduction 
A conventional passive neutron coincidence assay of 
plutonium measures the first and second moments of the 
neutron multiplicity distribution of a sample and deduces 
from them the sample's fertile mass. The problem with this 
technique is that there are actually three variables in the mea-
surement problem: the sample mass, the (a,n) neutron rate 
of the sample, and the multiplication of neutrons by the 
sample. Thus, conventional coincidence techniques only 
provide accurate assays for pure materials; for samples 
whose impurities are known well enough to compute the 
ratio, a, of their (a,n) neutron rate to their spontaneous-
fission rate; or for impure samples whose self-multiplication 
is known /1/. 
The goal of neutron multiplicity counting is to obtain a 
third quantity from the multiplicity distributions and to de-
duce all three variables from measured quantities. Our first 
assays using multiplicity counting and a conventional 
thermal-neutron detector were obtained from measurements 
performed in a modified, active-well counter using special-
ized shift-register electronics designed and built just for the 
purpose /2/. These assays were accurate to -2% (1cr) for a 
variety of pure and impure materials. However, very long 
measurement times were necessary to obtain this accuracy 
for large samples with an a greater than about 0.5 because 
of the large statistical error in the measured triples to doubles 
ratio. 
Assays of this accuracy can be obtained in more rea-
sonable measurement times if the neutron counter is de-
signed to have a very high detection efficiency relative to 
most thermal-neutron counters used for safeguards mea-
surements and a low die-away time. Short electronic dead-
time is also essential if accurate deadtime corrections are to 
be performed. This paper reports on two thermal-neutron 
counters that have been designed and built at Los Alamos to 
achieve the goal of accurate multiplicity assays in reasonable 
measurement times. The first prototype counter was built to 
study the effects of counter design on multiplicity assay. It 
*This work is supported by the US. Department of Energy, 
Office of Safeguards and Security. 
**Visiting Scientist from the Australian Nuclear Science and 
Technology Organization, Private Mail Bag, Menai NSW 
2234, Australia. 
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was designed to be used with multiplicity-sorting electronics 
that could sort multiplicities up to seven and a moment anal-
ysis technique that greatly reduces the measurement times 
needed to obtain good statistical precision for large samples. 
Using the experience gained from this first counter, we de-
signed and built a second counter to be more applicable to 
facility measurements. 
2. The Dual-Mode Multiplicity Counter 
The first multiplicity counter consists of 130, 50.8-
cm-active-length 3He tubes. A schematic diagram of this 
counter is shown in Fig. I. In the counter's initial configu-
ration, each of the 3He tubes was wrapped in a 0.7-cm-thick 
sleeve of high-density polyethylene followed by an outer, 
0.081-cm-thick sleeve of cadmium. Each wrapped tube was 
then placed in the aluminum core as shown in the diagram. 
From the Monte Carlo design calculations we expected this 
configuration of the counter to have a low detection effi-
ciency but a very low die-away time. The short die-away 
time was essential so that short coincidence-gate widths 
c~uld be used without loss of counting precision. Short gate 
w1dths were necessary so that the multiplicity circuit would 
not overflow for large samples. The counter was called the 
dual-mode counter because it was also designed to operate in 
a high-efficiency mode with the cadmium sleeves removed. 
Early characterization studies of the counter in its low-
efficiency mode (cadmium sleeves in place) revealed a detec-
tion efficiency of 17% for a 252Cf source placed in the center 
of its 16.5-cm-wide by 25.4-cm-high sample chamber and a 
Top End Plug 
Removable Section 
Bottom End Plug 
HV Junction Box 
He Tubes 
Viewed with Poly Inserts 
Removed 
Aluminum Matrix 
Polyethylene Sleeves 
Cadmium Sleeves 
Polyethylene Reflector 
Fig. 1. Schematic of the dual-mode multiplicity counter. 
die-away time of 11.8 J.lS. In the high-efficiency mode, the 
measured detection efficiency was 53% for 252cf and its die-
away time was 57 JlS. 
Using assay variance as a figure-of-merit for multiplic-
ity counters, Ensslin et al. /3/ have written a program that 
predicts the statistical accuracy of a multiplicity assay as a 
function of a detector's efficiency and its die-away time; a 
sample's effective 240pu content, self-multiplication, and 
(a,n) neutron rate; and the measurement count time. They 
have calculated the precision of assays performed by this 
prototype counter for samples whose a is less than 5 and 
whose 240Pu-effective content is between 7.6 and 143 g. 
These calculations predicted that the dual-mode counter will 
perform more accurate assays in the high-efficiency mode 
than in the low-efficiency mode for samples of this type. In 
the high-efficiency mode, however, the shift-register multi-
plicity circuit had to be upgraded to handle higher multiplici-
ties. In Ref. 3, Ensslin et al. report on measurements made 
with this counter in the low-efficiency mode using the origi-
nal multiplicity circuit that could sort multiplicities up to 
seven. Measurements made in the high-efficiency mode 
with a new multiplicity circuit capable of sorting multiplici-
ties up to 32 are reported here. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the spatial response of the dual-
mode counter in the high-efficiency mode measured with a 
252Cf source centered in the sample chamber and moved ax-
ially and radially. This detector's response is uniform in the 
central region of the cavity, decreases near the end plugs, 
and increases near the cavity's outer walls. 
Eight pure plutonium oxide samples, seven impure 
oxide samples, and eight plutonium metal samples were 
measured using the new multiplicity electronics package and 
the dual-mode counter in the high-efficiency mode. For the 
oxide samples, the predelay was set at 3 J.lS and the coinci-
dence gate width was 32 J.lS. For the metal samples, the 
predelay was also 3 J.lS, but the gate width had to be de-
creased to 12 J.ls to keep the multiplicity circuit's sorting 
register from overflowing. All samples were centered in the 
sample cavity where the detector's response was most uni-
form. The oxide samples were measured for 5000 s each; 
the metal samples were measured for 1000 s each. 
Because the multiplicities counted with the new circuit 
ranged from 1 to 32 for these samples and available dead time 
correction schemes could not provide accurate correction for 
multiplicity distributions this large, a new scheme was 
derived so that measurements from the new circuit could be 
properly corrected. This new technique by Dytlewski is de-
scribed in Ref. 4. All assays were based on measured mul-
tiplicity distributions corrected using this approach. The 
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Fig. 2. Axial response to a 252q source of the dual-mode multiplicity 
counter in the high-efficiency mode. 
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analysis of the corrected multiplicity distributions to yield as-
say results was based on the emitted moments calculated by 
Boehnel /5/ and Cifarelli and Hage /6/. The calibration pa-
rameters were the detector's efficiency for a nonmultiplying, 
pure plutonium oxide sample; gate fractions derived from the 
die-away response to 252Cf; and known values for the first, 
second, and third induced-fission moments for 239pu at 
2MeV. 
The multiplicity assay results for the 23 samples are 
given in Table I. Figures 4 and 5 giv~ the assay results 
derived as above for these samples relatiVe to therr known 
reference values. Included in these plots, for comparison, 
are the assay results obtained using conventional passive, 
neutron coincidence assay methods. For the oxide samples, 
the conventional two-parameter assay analysis included a 
multiplication correction based on a value for a calculated 
from the known isotopic ratios for the samples. For the 
metal samples, no multiplication correction was performed. 
The calibration parameters for the conventional assays were 
derived from the characterization with 252Cf and a relation-
ship derived for the pure oxides between the multiplication-
corrected coincidence rate and the known 240Pu-effective 
mass. 
Table II gives a comparison of the overall assay results 
obtained for these samples with the multiplicity approach to 
the conventional assay results. The improvement attained 
with the multiplicity analysis is striking. The results of the 
multiplicity assay compared to reference values for the pure 
and impure oxide samples display no statistically significant 
bias, and the scatter in the results is consistent with the ex-
pected uncertainty in the reference values and the statistical 
precision predicted by Ensslin et al. /3/ A more recent effort 
has been made to predict the statistical precision of multiplic-
ity assays from measured quantities. The results of this ef-
fort are reported in Ref. 7. 
The metal sample results display a bias and their scatter 
is slightly larger than expected. Although the reason for 
these discrepancies is not yet completely understood, several 
factors have been identified that may be responsible for 
them. One factor is that the reference values for three of the 
samples were suspect. These samples arc starred in Table I. 
However, removing the results for these samples from the 
calculation of the average and standard deviation of the 
assays only improves the latter. The bias remains about the 
same. 
Several factors may contribute to this bias. One factor 
is that the die-away response for this counter was not expo-
nential. Figure 6 displays the measured die-away response 
for this counter for 252Cf with an exponential fit overlayed. 
At early times the die-away is faster; at later times there is a 
TABLE I. Multiplicity Assay Results Obtained with the Dual-Mode Multiplicity Counter in 
the High-Efficiency Mode 
Totull'u l40pu-cffective 
Sample Type (g) (g) 
Pure oxide 59.91 10.10 
Pure oxide 171.9 29.29 
Pure oxide 321.9 54.33 
Pure oxide 384.8 65.10 
Pure oxide 543.8 92.14 
Pure oxide 612.7 104.5 
Pure oxide 848.6 144.3 
Pure oxide 876.6 149.1 
Impure oxide 19.97 1.977 
Impure oxide 74.89 7.414 
Impure oxide 149.8 14.83 
Impure oxide 299.6 29.66 
Impure oxide 458.4 43.33 
Impure oxide 614.0 64.95 
Impure oxide 777.7 81.31 
Metal 585 34.46 
Metal 1000 57.66 
Metal 1352a 81.66 
Metal 1678a 98.33 
Metal 172')a 101.7 
Metal 2000 115.3 
Metal 2200 130.8 
Metal 2962 141.3 
aReference values may not be accurate 
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Fig. 4. A comparison of the mu/tip/icily assay results obtained with 
the dual-mode multiplicity counter in the high-efficiency mode to con-
ventional assay results for plutonium oxide samples. 
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Fig. 5. A comparison of the multiplicity assay results obtained with 
the dual-mode multiplicity counter in the high-efficiency mode to con-
ventional assay results for plutonium metal samples. 
TABLE ll. Comparison of the Overall Multiplicity Assay Results Obtained with the Dual-
Mode Multiplicity Counter in the High-Efficiency Mode to Conventional Assay 
Results 
Average Assay/Reference with Sllllldard Deviation 
Multiplicity 
Sample Type Conventional Assay Results Assay Results 
Pure plutonium oxides 1.004 ± 1.4% 1.006 ± 0.66% 
Impure plutonium oxides 1.039 ± 8.2% 1.005 ± 0.68% 
Plutonium metal 2.665 ± 81% 0.894 ± 7.1% 
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Fig. 6. The die-away response of the dual-mode multiplicity counter in 
the high-efficiency mode and the pyrochemica/ multiplicity counter for 
252Cf The former is normalized to 1; the /alter is normalized to 10. 
tail. This behavior complicates the determination of the 
effective die-away time for the counter and the subsequent 
determination of the gate fractions needed to analyze the 
detected multiplicity distributions. The oxide assays are not 
as sensitive to errors that may result as a consequence of this 
complex die-away behavior because their third moment is 
small (that is, their self-multiplication is small). However, 
the metal assays are much more sensitive to such errors, 
because their third moments are substantially higher relative 
to their first and second moments. 
Another possible source of the bias is that the average 
energy of the neutrons emitted by the metal samples is prob-
ably slightly different from that for the oxide samples. The 
multiplicity assay calibration was based on a small plutonium 
oxide source. Spontaneous-fission neutrons from 240pu 
have a mean energy of -2.0 Me V. Induced-fission neutrons 
have a mean energy of -2.2 Me V; (a,n) neutrons from oxy-
gen have a mean energy of -1.8 Me V. The average energy 
of the neutrons emitted by these samples will be a complex 
combination of these neutron energy spectra and spectra 
resulting from (a,n) reactions with any other impurities. 
The calculated energy response of the dual-mode counter in 
the high-efficiency mode relative to 2 Me V is given in Fig. 
7. These calculations were made with MCNP version 3B /8/ 
for a monoenergetic point source placed in the center of the 
sample chamber. From these calculations, if the mean 
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energy of the neutrons emitted by the metal samples is larger 
on average than for the oxide samples, the detection effi-
ciency of the dual-mode counter will be lower and the assay 
will be biased low. A multiplicity analysis will be especially 
sensitive to such effects because the detected third moment 
depends on the third power of the detection efficiency. 
The metal assays were re-evaluated, for the subset of 
samples whose reference values were believed to be accu-
rate, using a relative calibration based on a small metal sam-
ple whose multiplication was known. Using this relative 
calibration approach instead of a calibration based on pluto-
nium oxide substantially reduces the bias, which suggests 
that the bias is indeed caused by an effect related to the gen-
eral sample composition. The overall results for this relative 
calibration method are included in Table 11. More study is 
needed to understand the effect of sample composition on 
multiplicity assays. 
3. The Pyrochemical Multiplicity Counter 
The assay results discussed above suggest that not 
only does a multiplicity counter need to have a high effi-
ciency and a low die-away time, it should also have a detec-
tion efficiency that does not vary with the emitted neutron 
energy spectrum and a well-behaved, exponential die-away 
response. The dual-mode counter was designed as a 
research tool and was not optimized in this sense. Also, its 
sample cavity is too small to accommodate the large range of 
container types that may be encountered in facilities. 
A second counter has been designed and built at Los 
Alamos to be more suited to in-plant use and to optimize, as 
much as reasonably possible, the parameters that have thus 
far been identified as important in multiplicity assays by 
thermal-neutron detectors. We determined the optimum ar-
rangement of tubes in the body of the counter and the best 
choice for end-plug materials to yield a high and invariant 
detection efficiency by using Monte Carlo simulations. 
These calculations are reported in detail in Ref. 9. The body 
of the counter was constructed only from polyethylene to 
simplify its die-away response. In Figure 7 we compare the 
calculated energy response of this new counter to that of the 
dual-mode counter. 
The new counter, named the pyrochemical multiplicity 
counter, consists of 126 3He tubes with 71-cm active lengths 
arranged in four rows. Figure 8 gives a schematic diagram 
of this new counter as it was conceived after the calculations. 
The cadmium-lined sample cavity is 24 cm in diameter and 
38 cm high, and its efficiency profile was optimized for cans 
up to 20 cm wide and 36 cm high. The end plugs are made 
of graphite. To allow the counter to be used for both at-line 
and in-line applications, it was built in two identical halves. 
To accommodate the physical separation of the halves, one 
tube from the third ring was moved to the outermost ring and 
the tubes in each ring were moved together slightly to allow 
for the split in the junction box. The calculations were not 
repeated for this new configuration because we did not 
expect it to significantly affect the results. Each half in the 
final counter then contains 63 tubes. The halves can be 
brought together to form a single free-standing counter or 
can be split and then placed around a glove-box well for in-
line applications. 
The calculations predicted that the counter would have 
an average detection efficiency of 57.0%, an exponential die-
away behavior, and a die-away time of 49.4 J.!S. The mea-
sured efficiency of the counter is 57.7% for 252Cf and its 
I=:J Polyethylene 
~Graphite 
!llm Aluminum 
~ 3He 
[2] Air 
~~-~-~-~1 Junction Box 
126 Tubes 
Tube Spacing is 1.59 cm 
106.7 
cm 
measured die-away time is 47.2 llS. The differences be-
tween the calculations and the measured quantities are con-
sistent with the above-mentioned design changes. The mea-
sured die-away response of the pyrochemical multiplicity 
counter is given in Fig. 6 along with an exponential fit. 
These data do not display the nonexponential behavior of the 
dual-mode counter. 
Figures 9 and 10 show the spatial response of the 
pyrochemical counter measured with a 252Cf source centered 
in the sample chamber and moved axially and radially. Sev-
eral of the calculated points are overlayed for comparison. 
This detector's response is more uniform in the central and 
lower regions of the cavity than the dual-mode counter and 
increases less near the cavity's outer walls. The agreement 
between the calculations and measurements suggests that the 
Monte Carlo model may also be useful to understand sam-
ple-related variations in the detector response that cannot 
practically be ascertained any other way. 
1.05 .-----.---.--.---,----.--..---,---, 
• Measured Total Neutron Rate 
& Measured Coincidence Rate 
0 Calculated Total Neutron Rate 
!> Calculated Coincidence Rate 
SOURCE POSITION ABOVE THE CAVITY FLOOR (cm) 
Fig. 9. Axial response of the pyrochemical multiplicity counter to a 
252q .wurcc. 
1~--.. ---60.6 cm----.. ~1 
Sample Cavity is 24.1 cm x 37.5 cm 
and is Cadmium Lined 
Fig. 8. Schematic of the pyrochemical multiplicity counter. 
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Fig. 10. Radial response of the pyrochemical multiplicity counter to a 
252q source. 
4. Future Development 
Although these early characterization studies demon-
strate that the goals identified for the new counter from the 
lessons learned from the dual-mode counter have been 
achieved, actual sample measurements need to be performed 
in it. Some preliminary assays of very small samples have 
been successful, but measurements of more characteristic 
samples have been postponed until a new multiplicity elec-
tronics package is completed. This new package will allow 
for sorting multiplicities up to 256. Thus, larger coincidence 
gate widths can be used and the precision of the results for 
high-rate samples will improve. Also any effects as a result 
of fluctuations in the die-away response caused by the nature 
of the sample should be reduced by using longer gate 
widths. 
Because it is probably not possible to build a thermal-
neutron detector in which the detection efficiency does not 
vary, future measurements will include an analysis of corre-
lations between sample size and composition and the relative 
counting rates of the individual rings of the pyrochemical 
counter. The effect of reducing the number of rings in a 
multiplicity counter will also be studied to determine if a 
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multiplicity counter, which is smaller and less costly but 
perhaps is limited to a smaller range of sample types, is 
practical. 
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SIMPLE AND EFFECTIVE METHOD OF DETERMINING 
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SIGNIFICANT SELF - MULTIPLICATION EFFECT 
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1. Introduction 
At developing new methods of non-destructive 
determination of plutonium full mass in nuclear 
materials and products being involved in uranium -
plutonium fuel cycle by its intrinsic neutron 
radiation, it may be useful to know not only 
separate moments /1/ but the multiplicity 
distribution law itself of neutron leaving this 
material surface using the following as parameters 
-firstly, unconditional multiplicity distribution 
laws of neutrons formed in spontaneous and induced 
fission acts of the given fjssionoble material 
corresponding nuclei and unconditional 
multiplicity distribution law of neutrons caused 
by (~ ,n) reactions at light nuclei of some 
elements which compose this material chemical 
structure; 
- secondly,probability of induced fission of this 
material nuclei by an incident neutron of any 
nature formed during the previous fissions or (o& 
,n) reactions. 
An attempt to develop similar theory has been 
undertaken, for example, in /2/.Here the author 
proposes his approach to this problem. 
The main advantage of this approach, to our 
mind,consists in its mathematical simplicity and 
easy realization at the computer. In principle, 
the given model guarantees any good accuracy at 
any real value of induced fission probability 
without limitations dealing with physico-chemical 
composition of nuclear material. 
2. Theory 
Preliminarily let us make some comments and 
give definitions. 
Primary neutrons neutrons born in 
spontaneous fission acts of fissionable material 
nuclei or in (& ,n) reaction acts at light element 
nuclei being part of its composition. 
Secondary neutrons of the first generation 
neutrons born in induced fission acts of this 
material corresponding nuclei from the port of 
primary neutrons. 
Secondary neutrons of the second generation -
neutrons born in result of induced fissions of 
material nuclei from the part of secondary 
neutrons of the first generation. 
Secondary neutrons of the third generation 
neutrons born by the part of neutrons of the 
second generation, etc.* 
* If we are 
general, we 
generations. 
speaking about secondary neutrons in 
mean their combination over all the 
USSR 
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Number of primary or secondary neutrons 
formed in the corresponding single producti.on act 
is a random value wh~ch distribution law is called 
an unconditional mult~plicity distribution law of 
primary or secondary neutrons. 
From the point of view of processes of born 
primary and secondary neutrons interaction with 
the fissionable material nuclei, only two of them 
are significant: processes of fission and 
scattering. The influence of the rest interaction 
processes is neglected. 
We consider that "prehistory" 
secondary neutron orLgLn has no influence 
ability to cause induced fission 
fissionable material either nucleus. This 
is quantitatively described by so-called 
fission probability p. 
of any 
on its 
of the 
ability 
induced 
The specified unconditional multiplicity 
distribution laws of neutrons and induced fission 
probability are determined a priori for examined 
object with nuclear material and are included into 
the proposed model as constants. 
If fissionable material conta~ns uranium in 
its composition, from the point of view of its 
specific activity, it is considered to be stable 
in comparison with plutonium. 
Thus the mathematical idea of the method 
consists in the following (see F~g.1): if induced 
fission from primary neutron is absent in 
principle (K=O in Fig.1),"random" value which is 
a number of neutrons leaving th1s material 
surface for this case is -7~>=1. 
In case of str~ct assumption that 
primary neutron gives only one induced fission 
(K=1), random value ](I} of neutrons number passing 
through this material surface for this case is 
(see also Fig.1): 
J(~x +o-x:) 2. J (O) 
this 
(1) 
_M. 
h X d 1 k . 1 "1" ;f w ere - ran om va ue, ta 1ng va ue 4 
induced fission from primary neutron is absent and 
"0"- in opposite case (so-eo 11 cd char ne teristi c 
random value of absence of induced fission at 
primary neutron ); 
JVL - random value equal to number of 
secondary neutrons formed in this induced fission 
act. (t) 
In other words, random value ~ with 
probability (1-p) is equal to 1 and with 
probability p it equals to sum of random number of 
M units (independent "random" values ]<" 1). 
Now let us assume that this primary neutron 
produces sctrictly two induced fissions (K=2). 
Then random value J(2 ) of neutrons number passine 
through the fissionable material surface for this 
case is :J<;>X+O-X)r.Jc•> (Z> 
.1'1-
-i-P 
~- p 
(o) 
J ~ 
j (2./ 
f/1 
.. 
.. 
0 
0 
t 
K ......;;. :::>D 
S,J, (J.
1
l1)- {' t:r>1Clt;J I<Jt~ftol1 
pwdud<C)., excl. 
Lf.- ~rtdt(ad -hHi:l) 11 Otct 
-fl:;. ,( 
(t) 
J 
·+ 
·+ J'i) 
_M_ 
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because each of M secondary neutrons of the first 
generation forms a situation described above for 
K=l (see Fig.!). 
Extending the similar considerations, it can 
be stated that for a chain of K induced fissions 
(
11 K11 generations of secondary neutrons) random 
value of neutrons number passing through the 
material surface is : ( ) 
:/;X_+ O-X_)'[ J r:--1 
M 
I<-::. J 2 . '. 
(3) 
> I 
Now let us determine 
this random value. 
(1<} 
distribution law 'Jp for 
First of all, it is obv;ious ,that 11 ranqom11 
value](#} has distribution law ~i"f= s~,l ,where~4,1 -
Kronecker symbol. Further let us note that 
distribution law of finite sum of independent 
random values can be described by means of 
successive usage of mathematical convolution 
operations (the distribution law convolution of 
the random summands first pair is calculated, then 
the convolution of this result with the third 
summand distribution law is determined, etc.). 
From this it follows that conditional distribution 
law w/J', m) of fixed number m sum of independent 
11 J 11 1 ._, t ~~ I , f J ranc om va ucs v (oJ , • l li.JV 1 ng, as spccj le< , 
distribution laws w-:: s•· is: • 
(4) rr. (D) (t>} J I /(0)? ('d,ln v/(~\\'11)= L\Vq) * 'yjiJ )fwrd'J J*·--·=o 
('-t) 
where * - symbol designating convolution operation 
With regard for (4) random valuer'1distribution 
1 uttJ, 1 ' 
aw VV(J> 1s equa to : (I/ (' 0 ~ 
wSi-=-"L p ~(YI1) \J(j I m)+ 0-- PJo '= 
1"'1 (ll m ('a 1 ($") 
L,:P;JCm)o' +0·-P)o' 
1'1 
where :J(m) - random value M unconditional 
distribution law of neutrons number born in 
induced fission act (so-called unconditional 
distribution law of secondary neutron multiplicityl 
Obviously, distribution law vJ/j of random 
value J 1'2.) is: cl , 
. ) (1.) ~J -I W(~~~ L f';j-(I'YI)wt·j,.,)-r(/-P) ' (t) 
...., 
(2-) 
where conditional distribution law ~j/l'l)is equal 
to: (t) \ - (I) (t) 
1 
. ( t) l 
Wql f'll)·=? [WriJ * W(jJ _ * WrJ 1 y1- J• .. (6 ') 
(m - r ) t l rn e-6 
Thus, for any large preset number of 
secondary neutron generations 11 K11 , random value]'~) 
distribution law w//J of neutrons passing through 
the material surface per one primary neutron of 
any nature is : . 
((J . - J ! '-I J I 
W(jJ-=- >;,P~(I'>l)i.N(JI ... )·t-{f-P)S J (':1-) 
LK.J f- c~-'' c,:-n r;-o1 \VcJirn)~ Z l WCJ J * \N(,j) J-Y<- W(J J fY-··~· 
{tn-() t<me,I 
If we are interested in distribution law of 
neutrons number from material surface directly per 
primary neutron production act of the 
corresponding nature, we should write: 
~~~ , I r.t.J \iJC~>=~~~~(v)W(ilv) g 
(t;} ([ (,:) (t:}J (~)] ( ) W(~l-v)::( vv'w·:rrWCJJ r.-\Jri; ~to·· 
~
( "))- 1) t,·rn.e.-s 
h V. ~ )l) d. . 1 1 . 1" . d. . b . were~ +- uncon 1t1ona mu t1p 1c1ty 1str1 ut1on 
law of primary neutrons in (d. , n) reaction act 
(index "J..") or in spontaneous fission act (index 
" .J. "). (Unconditional multiplicity distribution 
law of primary neutrons). 
Evidently, according Lo (8) mean numbers of 
neutrons;:' and n~l passing through the material 
surface per reaction (oC,n) or spontaneous fission 
act is : ~(t..) ·:t~) 
~d.)l =. J 'V.;.) 
·-; (~} (t..) 
where 't - mean va7ue of random value :J having 
distr}bution law ~JJ ; 
v~,~ - mean value of primary neutrons in 
(d. ,n)reaction or spontaneous fission act . 
In its turn, from formula (7) it follows that: 
"";(~) '\ • I j(>;) \ ( J[\ '\ j(l:) J :=. £,.-. 6 wq J = P f;;; 'if~"~ 1,-! W{J\I'"fi)+{-1-P)-=-
~ - <! 
• ' o(t) - -::et.·() :::(A-P)+ft--5/-(m)fj~"~ =PL_~(m)mJ + (.1.-p)·::. 
, ·- n1 :p;;jp~-~~(1-P) (to} 
where m - mean number of secondary neutrons in 
induced fission act. 
Using this formula successively, we obtain: 
J~> U-P)+ m p j Jl~ ({-Ph·mp(~-P)-+ (tijf/·j 
·~•Ot.~c.oo•~•·'"••,•v•• 
"";(I:) [1 - - 2. - 1<•1] - K 6=(1-P) .,·trnp+(mP)-r···+(mp) +(Y>tf) 
Di.1 Yi1 p < 1 t h e n : 
· o :-<t:J - - .i:.f_ (n) }ot ,-=--um } ~ Y.<. o-=- ~ ·' 1- r;;p 1-+ 1:-»~ ,1- 1r 
Expression (11) is an exact expression 
(received for infinite number of secondary neutron 
generations) for mean number of neutrons per 
spontaneous fission act or (~ ,n) reaction, so the 
divergence between this value and its estimation 
J~ .. l for any finite preset "K" can be considered 
at'an error of presentation of the sought true 
neutron multiplicity distri?.ytion lawW ... ,e(J) by its 
corresponding estimation~ j. (J) . Obviously the 
number of secondary neutron' generations "K",taken 
the calculation, can be chosen a priori as a 
rather large one to reduce this error to any small 
value. 
Now some 
mathematical 
for discrete 
integer-valued 
laws mentioned 
words about the procedure itself of 
convolution calculation. Obviously 
positively definite functions of 
argument as all the distribution 
in this paper without elimination 
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are of this kind, the operation of (m-1) -multiple 
convolution calculation for any K~ 1 value can be 
described by the following step-by-step summation 
procedure: 
(K) 
w( ~~~) 
for all m'>,.Z:(sec cxprcssJo.n (7)) 
(~l (K-t) I ;U-1) .<:..-:.¥ (t:) './~·1) 
\J(J\2.)=- WrJII)x- W(d)-= b Wr<it)W(j-0 
c~:) v./rcr.-o ·(~<-1) z.,;. (I<) rr-•> vv{~\3)= Cj\2.)*WCi) = 2 Wctlz)Vvh.z) 
t~o 
• 41 ._,. • f# " V • ~ • "' 4o 4 0 • .. • "" •(12} 
(~<) (1:) (t:-1) (=j (1<) (K··I) 
\v'rJ 1 V"')= Ykj I wr-J l-' ~~(J) = [. vvrq~_ 1 J VJ(i -ZJ 
L =o 
The expressions (12) follow from the 
convoluLion mathematical definition with the only 
difference that the correspond1ng integral is 
substituted by finite sum because of discreteness 
and positively definite area of its integrand 
determination. 
It should be noted that if one is interested 
in the 1nultiplicity distribution law of neutrons 
from tl1e material surface per any primary neutron 
pro~~~cion act in general, such a distribution law 
can be given as 
1 ; ol))e ~~t(.J() 1-lr • J = - ~v v ( P ,.. , + ";) J.... ~ J 13 J -1+--.JtJ.. f. f 
wi1ere d..,- ratio of intensity of primary neutrons 
received in (~ ,n) reactions to number of primary 
neutrons of spontaneous fission.This ratio is 
determined by isotope-element cQmposition of 
nuclear material. The moments :t: of this 
distribution are easily determined by formula: 
Now some words about certain ways of 
deternrining ]nput consLanLs in Lhe given model, 
namely, unconditional multiplicity distribution 
laws of primary ( ~ f ( -i>) ) and secondary{J("t}) 
neutrons and induced liss1on probability p. ~·~ 
The distribution law ~(-JJ is obvious: ~hi)=O '. 
The distribution lawVr~)is assumed to be equal to 
the corresponding spontaneous f1ssion neutron 
multiplicity distribution law for Pu-240 isotope 
/3/ which usually introduces significant 
contribution into total intensity of spontaneous 
fission acts. 
The unconditional distribution law j.(m) is 
represented here as "weighted" sum of individual 
distribution laws rh (Wl) of separate fissionable 
nuclides including into the given nuclear 
composition which can be conveniently given by the 
following expression /4/: 
where f. - index characterizing the specified 
fissionable nuclide type in the nuclear 
composition being considered; 
nn_~ - upper boundary of distribution 
which equals to six; 
hie - mean number of neutrons formed in the 
induced fission act for e -- type fissionable 
nuclide. 
If it is assumed that total cross-sections of 
primary and secondary neutron interactions with 
nuclei of all uranium and plutonium isotopes for 
secondary and primary neutron energy values are 
practically equal to each other, then the 
distribution law ;j-(Ytl) can be expressed as: 
9(tt1}=- I :6~ ~ c;; <'~YJ) I) ~fe Ae 
e f-t.e '/1 
where 6/ -nuclei fission cross-sections of l -
type fissionable nuclide by primary and secondary 
neutrons; 
Ae -concentration of l-type nuclide nuclei 
in the given nuclear composition. 
Similarly the corresponding moments of 
distribution J.(nJ} are determined: 
m~ I6!)fm; /[ d/~~ £~t, 2 .... 
e ' ee 
The cross-sectionst?/ averaged over neutron 
energy spectrum and the first moments me of 
individual distributions J~ (m) are commonly used 
nuclear constants which are sufficiently well 
known for all uranium and plutonium isotopes. 
One should,of course, use the most exact 
information on these constants; the appearance 
of new experimental data on distribution laws 'J)'"') 
themselves which can be easily used in the given 
model instead of expression (14) is also rather 
important . 
If there is an assurance that value oC is 
sufficiently well determined from isotope-element 
composition of the given nuclear composition and 
if there is a possibility to have results of the 
examined material neutron measurements at any 
device of neutron-neutron coincidence counter 
HLNCC family, then value p can be determined from 
condition: _ 1 
(Te ·I -z J. R Y E 
I ell (PJ z'IJ «-Y. --1,.-l.l e1.,(t'> "'" 
and as is given in /1/: 
~ {F)- .(- p r·- - -. t) 
11 - 1 ... ~;;,:); vf~2.1'>6) l)f(~-{):=3.t?2v/3/; 
f;'l. (F)- lJ.{(1-PJ • f (P)= ~)(1-P/ P 
- .{- m p ) Zt ( 1- f ;'f J3 
~ (p)::: ('-P 1 1..1~ cv. _1)+- r~f. ~2.] 
22 1- f>i{J/ L'.f .{ -{- f>rC:,. 
Here 7'"1 ~ all count rates of neutrons and 
neutron-neutron coincidences, respectively, 
measured at HLNCC device; 
E, r detector efficiency and samplin3 
coefficient of neutron coincidences,respectively, 
which are known instrument constants for the given 
measuring means. 
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In conclusion it should be noted that the 
solution of the sought distribution law 
determination task is obtained in implicit form, 
so as a final result ready for practical usage the 
version of the operating computer program 
realizing the given algorithm is proposed.The 
program text is presented in Appendix. 
The author considers this program only as an 
example and assumes its modernization by other 
engaged users. 
The given 
materials with 
atp~0.15. 
program version is operable for 
any isotope-element composition 
3. Results of Practical Usage 
As a result of practical usage, the 
multiplicity distribution law of neutrons from 
surface of really existing products,made of 
fissionable material.In one case it was a ball 
with mass of N 83g of pure metal plutonium with 
abnormally high Pu-240 content (N90%) /5/ and in 
the second case it was a fresh assembly made of 
MOX material /6/ containing about 10 kg of 
plutonium (full mass of fuel was about 40 kg). 
The usage of results of these objects neutron 
measurements by means of HLNCC family devices and 
~ value estimations received on the basis of data 
on their isotope-element composition /5/,/6/ allow 
to determine according to the above-mentioned 
principle the p values for them and then the 
multiplicity distribution laws themselves of 
neutrons from their surfaces which are given in 
Table. The corresponding moments of four orders 
are also given there. In this Table the similar 
distribution laws for the given materials at 
hypothetic case of p=O are presented for 
comparison. 
These results show everything by themselves 
and hardly need any comments. The only note which 
can be done deals with the necessity of taking 
into account about nine generations of secondary 
neutrons for achieving required accuracy of these 
distribution laws calculations for p/0 (about some 
characters after decimal point for moment J H ) • 
4.Conclusjon 
In the present paper the analyllcnl model and 
the corresponding computer program for determining 
the multiplicity distribution law of neutrons from 
the surface of object containing fissionable 
material with significant multiplication effect 
are given. 
The algorithm has no limitations in part of 
nuclear material isotope-element composition and 
during the calculations as many induced fission 
neutrons are taken into account as is needed for 
achieving preset calculation accuracy. 
As input data for calculation, commonly used 
nuclear constants such as mean number of neutrons 
born in the induced fission act for each 
fissionable nuclide composing the given nuclear 
composition averaged over energy spectrum and 
their corresponding fission cross-sections in 
intrinsic neutron field of the given nuclear 
material are used. 
If there is an assurance that the ratio of 
primary neutrons to spontaneous fission neutrons 
depends only on fissionable material isotope 
element composition and there is a possibility to 
carry out additional neutron measurements of the 
object at HLNCC family device, the problem of 
determining the sought distribution is solved very 
simply. 
The author hopes that the proposed model will 
be useful at developing new fissionable material 
monitoring methods and in this sense will 
successfully supplement the known Bohnel theory. 
TABLE 
~ETAL /5/ ~OX FUEL /6/ 
! • 
! ~ P=O ! P=0.0516 ! P=O ! P=O.OB02 I 
I 
---· 
! 0 ! 0.655(-1)! 0.657(-1)! 0.295(-1)! 0.301(-1)! 
! 
-! 1 ! 0.232 ! 0.221 ! 0.654 I 0.606 
! 
-! 2 ! 0.329 I 0.301 ! 0.148 ! 0.138 
! 
-
! 3 ! 0.251 ! 0.228 ! 0.113 ! 0.109 
! 
-
!4!0.101 ! 0.103 ! 0.457(-1)! 0.544(-1)! 
I 
----! 5 ! 0.184(-1)! 0.365(-1)! 0.828(-2)! 0.243(-1)! 
I 
---! 6 ! 0.240(-2)! 0.196(-1)! 0.108(-2)! 0.140(-1)! 
! 
-
! 7 ! 0 ! 0.112(-1)! 0 ! 0.868(-2)! 
! 
-
! 8 ! ! 0.605(-2)! ! 0.530(-2)! 
! 
-! 9 ! ! 0.330(-2)! ! 0.327(-2)! 
! 
-
!10 ! ! 0.191(-2)! ! 0.211(-2) I 
! 
-
!15 ! ! 0.145(-3)! I 0.279(-3)! 
! 
-!20 ! ! 0.131(-4)! ! 0.441(-4)! 
! 
-
!25 ! ! 0.131(-5)! ! 0.771(-5) 1 
! 
-
!30 ! ! 0.669(-7)! ! 0.143(-5)! 
! 
-
!40 ! ! 0 ! 0 
! 
-
!50 ! 0 ! 0 ! 0 ! 0 
!IU!UUUUU!UUUUU!UUIIUU!IUIUUU! 
! } ! 2.156 ! 2.428 ! 1. 520 1.842 
I /11 
!-! 
.·J.. 5.98 ! 8.58 ! 3.242 ! 6.121 ; JH; 
-
!-:-)! 
I~ I 18.96 ! 41.38 ! 9.088 ! 35.36 ; H; 
1-1 
... 'f. 
!J ! 68.45 ! 273.04 ! 30.47 ! 313.71 
I HI 
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556 
8 
555 
41 
31 
38 
71 
55 
c 
26 
APPENDIX 
PR06RA~ DISTR. 
DI"ENSION BP(600) 1Y(7) ,PR(600,2) ,6(7) 
CO""ON SVER I 600, 6) 
00 8 1=1,600 
BP (I )=0.0 
CALL !SOT (6,SN,AN,SF,AL1) 
HEL=O 
JJ=1 
110=7 
N6=1 
60TD 2 
JJ=2 
NE=7 
IF (JJ.E0.2) 60TD 31 
Y(l)=O.O 
Y(2)=1.0 
00 41 1=3,7 
Y(I)=O.O 
GOTO 38 
V(1)=0.065 
V(2)=0.2319 
V(3)=0.3289 
V(4)=0.2514 
V(5)=0.1015 
Y(6)=0.0184 
Y(7)=0.0024 
IF (JJ.E0.2) 60TD 19 
IF (H6.6T.1) 60TD 19 
FOR"AT (11 1 'I.F."O"ENTS:' 151 1 '"1=' ,F6.3,5X, '"2=' ,F6.3151 1 
1'F1=' 1F6.3,5X, 'F2=' ,F6.3) 
6"=6 12 l +216(3 )+316( 4 )+416( 5 )+St6( 6) +616( 7) 
6"1 =G (2) +416(3) +9161 4) +16161 5) +2516 (6) +3616 17) 
6F1=216(3) +6t6( 4 )+1216(5) +2016(6 )+3016 (7) 
6F2=616( 4) +2416( 5) +6016( 6) + 120t6 17) 
TYPE 71,6" 1 6~1,6F1,GF2 
FOR"AT j15X,SE10.3) 
TYPE 55,(6(1),I=1,7) 
TYPEI,' ', 'NEUTUEASUR.? (0-YE5;1-NO)' 
ACCEPH,"H 
IFI"H.EO.O) 60TD 5 
TYPE 26 
FO~AT (' I.F.PROBAB.=' 1$) 
ACCEPH,PY 
GOTO 19 
5 CALL TR (AL1,G",GF1,PY) 
19 CONTINUE 
IF (JJ .E0.2) GOTD 433 
IF (HG.EO.l) GOTO 22 
DO 85 1=1 17 
Y(I)=GIIHPY 
85 CONTINUE 
22 IF ING.6T.1) GOTO 433 
BP(1)•6(1)1PY 
BP(2)=1 +PYI (6(2)-1) 
DO 17 I=3,7 
17 BP(I)=G(I)IPY 
60TO 89 
433 00 599 1=1,NO 
BP(I)=PR(I,l) 
599 CONTINUE 
89 CALL SY (NO,BP) 
DO 77 1=1,600 
77 PR (I ,JJ )=0.0 
00 79 1=2,600 
DO 79 "R=1 16 
79 PR (I ,JJ)=PR(I ,JJ )+SYERI I ,"R)IVI"R+l) 
IF (H6.E0.1) &OTD 14 
IF (JJ.E0.2) &OTD 14 
14 
81 
113 
111 
143 
139 
140 
52 
72 
2 
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c 
2 
PRI2,JJ J=PR(2,JJ )+( 1-PY I 
PRS=O.O 
DO 81 1=2,600 
PRS=PRS+PR I I, JJ I 
PR(1,JJ)=1-PRS 
IF (JJ .ED.21 SOTO 113 
DO 111 1=7 ,NOS6 
IF (PR(! ,JJ) .6T.1E-7) NE=NE+1 
3 
CONTINUE 6 
IF (NEL.ED.NE) GOTO 1 
IF (JJ.E0.2) SOlO 143 
HEl=HE 
NS=NS+1 
NO=NE 
SOTO 2 
DD 139 1=1,600 
BP( 1)=0.0 
OD 140 1=1,HE 
BP( I )=PR(! ,2)1SF+PR( I ,1 )SAN 
TYPES,· ','OUTPUT DISTR.LAW:' 
TYPES,'---:--:-:-:::::---------
TYPE 551 (BP(I),I=1,NEJ 
TYPES,'------------
OIS1=0.0 
OIS2=0.0 
DIS3=0.0 
A"All=O.O 
DD 52 I=1,NE 
SS= I 
DIS1=0IS1 +(SS-1 )U2.0S8P( I I 
OIS2=0IS2+(SS-1)U3.0SBPI I I 
DIS3=DIS3+(SS-1 I U4.0l8P( I I 
A"AT1=AMT1+(SS-1)SBP( I I 
CONTINUE 
D IS=O I 51-A"A T1 
TYPES, 'MO"ENTS: ·, • J1=' ,A"All, 'J2=' ,DIS1, 'J3=' ,DIS2, 'J4=' ,DIS3 
TYPE 72,AL1 
FDR"AT (51, ·mu·, 'ALPHA=' ,F6.3, ·mu· I 15 TYPES, 'COEFF .OF MUl T.=' ,A"ATU (1,+ALU2.1563) /2.1563/ (1. +All I 
TYPES,' CONTINUE? (0-NO;ANY-YES)' 
ACCEPU,IY 
IF(IY.NE.O) SOlO 556 16 
STOP 
END 
DEFIN.DF CONYDL _______ _ 
SUBROUTINE SY I NO, 8 I 
DI"ENSIDN 8(600) 
CDMON C(600,61 
DO 1 1=1,6 
OD 1 J=1,600 20 
CIJ,I)=O.O 
DO 2 J=1,NO 
CIJ,1)=8(JJ 22 
DO 300 "R=2, 6 
DD 300 J=l,NOS"R C 
DO 300 I=l,J 
CIJ •"Rl=C(J ,"RJ+CI I ,"R-1)S81H+1 I 
CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
DEFIN.DF ISOT.CO~.---::~:-::---­
SUBROUTINE !SOT (6,SN,AN,SF,Al11 
DI"ENSIDN PU5(7) ,PU8(7) ,Pl8(7) ,Pl9(7) ,Pl0(7) ,Pll(7) ,Pl2171 ,6171 
TYPE 1 
FOWl I' XPU-238=' ,$1 
ACCEPTI,C1 
TYPE2 
FOR"AT (' XPU-m=· ,SI 
ACCEPH,C2 
TYPE 3 
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FORMAT (' IPU-240=' ,SI 
ACCEPH,C3 
TYPE 4 
FOR"AT I' IPU-241=',$) 
ACCEPH,C4 
TYPE 5 
FOR"AT I' IPU-242=' ,SI 
ACCEPH,C5 
TYPE 6 
FDR"AT I' IA"-241=' ,SI 
ACCEPH,C6 
TYPE 7 
FORMAT I' U/(U+PU) (I) =' ,$) 
ACCEPU,U 
TYPE B 
FOR"AT I' U235/U ENRICHHENT (I I =',$I 
ACCEPH,U7 
TYPES, '"ATERIAL? (0-"ETAL;l-OXIDE;O,---->-OTHER KIND)' 
ACCEPU,Al 
SO=(!. 971C1 +1.831C2+1.311C3+1.391C4+ 1. 031C5) I ( 100.0-UJ 
1+UI ( 1.261U7+0. 52l (100.0-U71 I 
S1=1.97lCU(100-U) 
S2=1.831C21 1100-U) 
S3=1.311C31 (100-UJ 
S4=1.391C41( 100-U) 
S5=1.03tC51(100-U) 
S6=1.26tU71U 
S7=0. 52t (100-U7)lU 
DATA PU5/0 .032 ,0.149 ,0 .288,0.297, 0.173, 0.0536,0.00693/ 
DATA PU8/0.0239 ,0.124 10.267 ,0.307 ,0.2, 0.0687,0.00989/ 
DATA PlB/0. 0156,0.0937 ,0.234, 0.313,0. 234,0.0937,0.0156/ 
DATA Pl9/0.0031 10,0597,0.2211,0.3367 ,0.233,0.1263,0.0141/ 
DATA PL0/0. 0144,0.0883,0.228, 0. 312,0. 241,0. 0988 10.0169/ 
DATA Pll/0, 0103,0.0708,0. 202, 0. 308 ,0.264,0.12,0.023/ 
DATA Pl2/0.0169, 0. 0988,0.241 ,0.312, 0.228,0.0888,0.0142/ 
DD 15 1=1,7 
6( I J=ISUPl81 I )+S21Pl91 I )tS3tPLOI I )+S41Pll I I J+S5tPl211 Jt 
1S61PU5(1)+SHPU8(1) )/SO 
CONTINUE 
SN=O.O 
DD 16 I=1,7 
SN=SN+(l-11*6111 
CONTINUE 
IF (U.E0.100.0) SDTO 20 
A=(134.01C1 +0.38UC2+1. 411C3+0.0131C4+0 .021C5+26. 9tC6) IAL 
S=4. 731 (2. 54lC1 +2E-5SC2+C3+1E-81C4+1.691C5 I 
AN=A/(A+S) 
SF=S/IA+S) 
All=AN/SF /2.1563 
SOlO 22 
AN=Al 
SF=1.0-Al 
All =99999999. OtAl 
RETURN 
END 
USING OF HLNCC.-,-:-:-:--:-::::-:-~-­
SUBROUTINE TR IAll,G",SFl ,PYJ 
TYPEI, 'DEVICE: EFF, (I),', 'DIE-AWAY TI"E ("KC),', 'SATE I"KC) 
ACCEPU,E 1Tl 1TS 
E=E/100. 
TYPES 1 'TOTAli1/SEC),','REAl COIN. (1/SECJ:' 
ACCEPU, T,R 
Y=EIP(-4. 5/Tl) I I 1. -EXP(-16/Tl I I 
DD 1 I=1 ,1000 
PY=(l-1)t0.0002 
A11=(1.-PY)/(1,-PYI6"l 
A12•2.1563tA11 
A21=6F 11Ali1121PY I (I. -PYIGHI 
A22=AIIU21 (3.824+PYI2.15631Sf1/ ( 1. -PYISM) I 
V= (T /EIA22-A12t2. SR/Y /EU2 I I ( A1U2. lR/Y /EU2-A2UT /E I 
1 
2 
IF(Y.6T.ALH2.1Sb3) SOlD 2 
CONTINUE 
TYPEI I • I.F. PROBAB. =. I py 
RETURN 
END 
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MEASUREMENT OF A FRESH MOX-LWR TYPE FUEL ASSEMBLY 
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!AEA - Department of 
1\batrnct 
A fresh MOX-PWR type fuel assembly in a 
17xl7 configuration has been assayed under water 
with an adapted FORK type detecto~ wherein 
fission chambers were replaced by He tubes. 
Shift register electronics were used, revealing 
total neutrons and real coincidence rate. 
The influence of pin removal was 
investigated at the periphery and in a central 
position. 
The 
gradually 
ppm and 
examined. 
boron concentration in the water was 
increased to a maximum value of 2200 
the influence on totals and reals was 
1. Introduction 
With the use of mixed oxides (U+Pu)(MOX) in 
Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuel, there is an 
increased tendency to store fresh MOX fuel 
assemblies in the reactor pool under water, in 
view of their loading in the reactor. 
This material becomes more or less 
inaccessible for verification, and as there is 
currently no adequate tool for independent 
verification available, a safeguards problem 
arises in confirming non diversion of nuclear 
material. 
In order to overcome this inconsistency, an 
agreement was made with the Euratom Safeguards 
Inspectorate to modify an existing FORK 
detector, so as to incorporate the relevant 
equipment, appropriate to measure the output of 
a non-irradiated fuel assembly. 
These technical feasibilities are outlined 
in paragraph 2. 
The system 
order to have 
performance of 
!AEA inspectors 
this test phase. 
has been tested as well, in 
an appropriate idea about the 
the system in field conditions. 
were invited to participate in 
Fuel of the Venus critical facility was 
used, as described in paragraph 3, and full 
account of the experimental results is given in 
paragraph 4. 
Throughout the text, comparison is made to 
results obtained in a similar exercise at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). 
(Belgium) 
Inspectorate (Luxembourg) 
Safeguards (Vienna) 
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2. Experimental Set Up and Equipment 
2.1. The installation of the fuel in the water 
tank. 
MOX fuel, originating from the VENUS 
critical facility, was set up in a mock-up frame 
simulating a real 17xl7 LWR fuel assembly. This 
mock-up was installed in a cylindric container 
of 1 m diameter and a height of 1.2 m. 
In order to make sure the safety of the 
operation, a calculation of the k ff of the 
system has been made by the SCALE-~ computer 
code. A 17xl7 square configuration, containing 
289 pins of fuel composition as described in 
paragraph 3, and a pitch of 12.6 mm yielded a 
k = 0.727 ± 0.004. Although the calculation yi~lded a fair confidence in the undertaking, 
the approach to criticality [1] was followed, in 
order to assure remaining in the subcritical 
state. 
This 
exercise, 
change 
removal. 
procedure was followed to start the 
and in the follow-up, to make any 
in the pin configuration, like pin 
2.2. The eguipment: the modified FORK detector 
Starting from the existing FORK II detector 
that is regulary used for the verification of 
irradiated fuel [2], a number of modifications 
have been made: 
* the relative insensitive fission chambers 
(Centronic type FCj67, 0.12 c/n cm2 s ) have 
been replaced by He counters (Reuter-Stokes 
type RS-P3-0805-223, 20 c/n cm2 s). The two 
pairs of He tubes are put symmetrically in the 
polyethylene inserts and no Cd shielding is 
applied. The pairs of counters are wired 
separately (representing an adequate perfor-
mance check), but both signals can be added and 
treated together, improving count rate and 
statistics. 
* a gross gamma measurement is no longer 
required, so that the ionization chambers could 
be removed. 
* it was decided to readjust the discriminator 
settings of the original AMPTEK A-lllA's and to 
'djust them for the lower output pulse of the 
He counters. They were moved inside the FORK II 
head. The lead shield for the preamplifiers was 
no longer required so that shield and stainless 
steel covers were replaced by two blind flanges. 
* signal transmission was made to an HLNCC 
electronics shift register, and totals and reals 
count rates were obtained. Data treatment is 
made as in the traditional HLNCC experiment. 
* in the final version the high voltage DC 
converter is mounted in the FORK II detector 
head itself because the multicoax connectors are 
rated for SOOV only. During this experiment the 
shift register HV convertor was used. 
* a general 
interconnections 
AMPTEK's is given 
view 
of the 
~f 
He 
in figure 1. 
the electronic 
counters to the 
so that prototype was choosen that was 
declared having the best performance in an 
earlier experiment [5,6]. 
I I ,...__ A/7TEK l OUtllUt l-=t;:== AHPTU Z autout 
Fig.l. Electronic interconnections from the 3He 
counters to the AMPTEK's 
3. Description of the Fuel Assemblies 
The fuel pins used in this experiment 
originate from the VENUS critical facility with 
characteristics as given in Table 1. 
Herein Pu isotopic composition is given at 
analysis and measurement date, as well as the 
weight per rod, amounting to 7g Pu at the 
analysis date. Other parameters mentioned are 
chemical composition, linear specific weight, 
and physical parameters concerning fuel and 
cladding materials. 
For this experiment a basic mock-up of 
17xl7 pins was used. The grid from which the 
pins are easily removed (pin removal 
experiments) and/or replaced (absorber rod 
experiments) has a pitch of 12.6 mm. 
The mock-up was positioned in a stainless steel 
cylindrical tank ( diameter 1 m, height 1.2 m, 
water level 0.8 m). 
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Table l: FUEL CHARACTERISTICS 
Pu lsotop1cs/rod 
Isotope November 15, 1966 
(g) (wt\) 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Pu-242 
Am-241 
Isotopic 
Composition 
(wt\) 
0.005 
5.547 
1.204 
0.213 
0.031 
Stoichiometry 
Chemical 
Composition 
(wt\) 
Linear spec. weight 
{per rod) 
Fuel diameter 
Fuel lenght 
Cladding 
Claddlng thickness 
0.068 
79.247 
17.197 
3.044 
0.-145 
0.075 
U-234 
U-235 
U-236 
U-238 
u 
Pu 
4. Experimental Results 
October 25,1990 
(g) (wU) 
0.005 
5.547 
1. 204 
0.066 
0.031 
0.058 
80.969 
17.538 
0.979 
0.455 
2.159 
0.016 
2.002 0.005 
O.Ol3 
97.970 
2.046 
97.30 
2.70 
5.0 
7.0 
g 
g 
0.005 
0.03 
0.902 t 0.004 cm 
so.oo o.so cm 
ss 304 
0.038 0.002 cm 
4.1. Die-away time measurements 
To start with, the die-away time of the 
system has been determined. In a classical way, 
the gate length was varied over 8, 16, 32, 64 
and 128 ~s and the related totals and reals 
count rates were registered. During the whole 
exercise, the pre-delay was kept fixed at 4.5 
~s. These data are presented in Table 2. It is 
interesting to note that the totals count rate 
is fairly constant. 
Table 2: REALS COINCIDENCE RATE AS A FUNCTION OF GATE 
LENGHT 
(HT • 1680 V, 2200 ppm Boron) 
Gate lenght R T 
(JIS) (c/s) (c/s) 
8 28.66 6720.84 
16 50.58 6713.40 
32 90.47 6700.95 
64 145.02 6702.33 
128 221.03 6702.84 
A DEMING curve fitting to the reals count 
rate was made of the form: 
y al [ 1 - exp(-a2x) 
in which x is the gate length ~s ) and y the 
reals count rate ( cps ). 
The fitting parameters obtained are: 
a1 289.98 ± 10.66 
a2 1.1174E-2 ± 7.9413E-4 
From this equation the die-away time of the 
detector was determined as l/a2 : 89.5 ~s. 
consequently, the gate length of 128 ~s has been 
used in the measurements. 
4.2. Influence of the high-voltage on the 
neutron detectors 
The influence of the bias voltage on the 
neutron detector response was investigated as 
well. The high-voltage was varied between 1300 V 
and 1850 V in 50 V steps in different pin 
configurations. Gate length was set at 64 ~s and 
128 ~s. 
Some experiments were performed in the waterbath 
containing 2200 ppm Boron. The obtained totals 
and reals count rates are given in Table 3 and 
displayed in Fig. 2 . 
Consequently, it was decided that the optimum 
detector bias voltage was at 1650 V. 
4.3. Calibration experiment 
Measurements started from a 17xl7 
configuration with the 25 locations for control 
rods empty, as shown in Fig.3 , corresponding to 
commercially available assemblies. 
A complete row and column of fuel pins was 
removed from the original set-up reducing it to 
a 16x16 fuel assembly, in which 20 empty 
positions were left , corresponding to actual 
16xl6 fuel assemblies (3]. The MOX FORK position 
was adjusted as to have the fissile mass 
centrally placed between the fork arms. This 
situation doesn't really correspond to a 16xl6 
fuel assembly measurement, because the pitch is 
not changed, and is probably to be considered as 
pin removal in a very pronounced way. 
The same philosophy applies to a reduction 
to 15x15 and 14xl4 assemblies, that have been 
formed from previous models by removing rows and 
columns in the appropriate way and leaving empty 
places as in commercial assemblies (3]. 
The totals and reals, as well as multiplication 
corrected reals are given in Table 4. 
Multiplication correction was applied, 
using the Ensslin formalism (4], with the 
following values: 
a : 0.6434 
r : o.oo43 
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Table 3 MOX FORK HIGH VOLTAGE PLATEAU 
HV 
1300 
1350 
1400 
1450 
1500 
1550 
1600 
1650 
1680 
1700 
1750 
1800 
1850 
1! 
h 
l~ 
~E 
Gate lenght 64~s Gate lenght 128~8 
2200 ppm Boron ID12 
T R T R 
(c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) 
904.45 0.53 
2517.09 13.84 
6189.54 136.08 
4872.13 75.89 7478.34 263.32 
6055.90 ll3.94 7787.99 269.96 
6544.61 150.90 7905.31 3ll. 39 
6656.44 149.40 8100.25 257.83 
6702.33 145.02 8428.47 311.97 
6775.30 152.99 8526.91 303.75 
7165.63 163.90 10444.69 186.19 
9398.90 91.99 17023.00 80.33 
19306.92 -160.26 25868.77 68.75 
pie lenpb 128fa 
:18 
26 
24 I 
22 I 
a) I 
18 11 
16 
I 
.. 
I 12 
V 
10 
I,/ 
1-t-/-r------t----!---- ---~ -:-:-::-:-: ----
0 --- --- ---- ---- - ------------
1<450 1500 1550 lfiOO 16.50 1700 1750 1800 1850 
Fig.2. MOX FORK HV plateau 
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Fig.3. 17xl7 VENUS Mock-up fuel pin location 
X : empty fuel pin location 
(simulating control rod thimble) 
A DEMING curve fitting was made of the 
form: 
y = al x + a2 
with y the reals coincidence rate and x the 
Pu-240eff mass loading (from table 4), given by 
the expression 
Pu-240eff = 2.52 f(238) + f(240) + 1.68 f(242) 
with f(i) the weight percent fraction of the 
appropriate Pu isotope. 
The results obtained are: 
al 2.2185 ± 5.4584E-2 
a2 -1.3949 ± 3.2109E-l 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.998187. 
The different patterns have very close 
normalized to Pu-240eff density: 
pattern 17xl7 
16xl6 
15xl5 
14xl4 
2.00 counts/s/g/cm 
1.99 
1.96 
1.91 
4.4. Pin removal experiment 
Re 
Additional pin removal experiments were 
performed, such as the removal of 20 pins in the 
outer respectively second rows, and a removal of 
16 pins from row 7, always squared around the 
assembly midpoint. 
The experimental data concerning pin 
removal location are given in Table 5. From this 
table it becomes clear that pin removal of 7.6% 
(20 pins) causes a reduction in reals 
coincidence count rate of 6.1% in the outer rows 
whereas a 6.1% pin removal in the inner rows 
yields a 5% reduction in the count rate, clearly 
giving a non-linear effect. 
This fact is not surprising: a pitch of 
12.6 mm does not represent an optimized 
situation concerning the effective 
thermalization of neutrons. By removing pins 
from the second row, or even any other inside 
row, thermalization can take place in a more 
effective way, increasing the reactivity of the 
assembly. A general trend should be that the 
more central the pins are removed, the least 
will be the effect per pin on reals coincidence 
count rate. 
This effect is moreover confirmed by a 
recent study [5,6], looking for similar effects 
on a 15xl5 fuel assembly. In this case 6% pin 
removal in the outer row caused a 14% reals 
count rate reduction, whereas in the second row 
a 6% increase was seen. Although the general 
trend being similar, this clearly indicates the 
sensitivity of the result to the pitch of the 
fuel assembly as well as to the exact location 
where pins are removed. 
4.5 Absorber and poison effects 
The influence of absorber pins was 
investigated as well. AginCd pins were used, and 
were introduced in the 17xl7 mock-up as 
displayed in Fig.3 and once in combination with 
stainless steel pins, put alternately in the 
empty positions. 
The results are given in Table 6. 
Adding 16 AginCd pins reduces the reals 
count rate by 9.4%. If 8 absorber pins are again 
replaced by 8 stainless steel pins, the reals 
count rate is reduced by 6.9%. 
If the absorption process were linear, then the 
8 stainless steel pins were supposed to 
contribute for an additional 2.6% absorption of 
the neutrons. 
Poison rods obviously reduce totals (T), 
(R) and multiplication corrected 
(Re) count rates. 
coincidence 
coincidence 
4.6. Measurement in borated water 
Up to this point the experiments were based 
on pin removal and absorber rod influence, but 
all were performed in a bath of demineralized 
water. 
As can be expected in actual reactors, the 
pool water may contain more or less boric acid, 
that is used to absorb the neutrons from the 
stored fuel assemblies. 
An experiment was carried out to estimate 
the influence of boron concentration on the MOX 
FORK performance. 
Concentrated boric acid solutions were added to 
the tank, followed by homogenization and sample 
taking. Target boron concentrations of 250 ppm, 
500 ppm, 750 ppm, 1000 ppm, 1500 ppm, 2000 ppm 
and 2200 ppm were in reality 503, 758, 1080, 
1520, 2020 and 2170 ppm. 
So we relied on sample taking and chemical 
analysis, or on operator declared values. If an 
independent NDA check of boron concentration is 
required, propositions are made elsewhere [5,6], 
consisting of either the use of a boron detector 
or thj use of detector ty~e 2 that contains a 
bare He and a Cd wrapped He chamber (similar 
to the FORK detector for spent fuel). 
All measured (T & R) and calculated (M & Re) 
values are considerably affected by boron. The 
multiplication correction procedure is the same 
as for unborated water, but a boron adjustment 
factor is determined from a calibration 
measurement, so that Re= RI rMf(B). 
The results of the MOX-FORK performance as 
a function of Boron concentration is given in 
table 7 and the boron adjustment factor f(B) is 
given in figure 4. It is clear that the reals 
count rate is reduced to half its value at 2200 
ppm boron concentration. 
Table 4 : Totals & Reals in pin removal experiment- No Boron 
pattern Pu-240eff T dT R dR r M CF Re dRc A dA 
(n° pins) (g/cm) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s/g/cm) 
17x17(264) 6.818 16804.14 84.13 1211.52 15.12 27.55 3.23 88.88 13.63 0.17 2.00 0.02 
17x17(244) 6.301 14738.39 73.78 927.26 11.54 24.05 3.04 73.08 12.69 0.16 2.01 0.03 
16x16(236) 6.095 13580.71 68.01 783.78 10.72 22.06 2.93 64.58 12.14 0.17 1.99 0.03 
15x15(205) 5.299 10841.17 54.24 530.86 6.20 18.71 2.73 51.07 10.40 0.12 1.96 0.02 
14x14(180) 4.648 8523.99 42.73 344.37 5.74 15.44 2.52 38.85 8.86 0.15 1.91 0.03 
Table 5 · Totals & Reals- geometrical positions of pin removal 
pattern Pu-240eff T dT R dR r M CF Re dRc A dA 
(n° pins) (g/cm) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s/g/cm) 
17x17(264) 6.818 16804.14 84.13 1211.52 15.12 27.55 3.23 88.88 13.63 0.17 2.00 0.02 
row 1(244) 6.301 14738.39 73.78 927.26 11.54 24.05 3.04 73.08 12.69 0.16 2.01 0.03 
row 2(244) 6.301 15953.78 4.21 1202.18 8.60 28.80 3.29 ° 94.72 12.69 0.09 2.01 0.01 
row 7(248) 6.404 16509.18 4.28 1285.50 8.90 29.76 3.34 99.30 12.95 0.09 2.02 0.01 
Table 6 : Totals & Reals with absorber rods 
pattern Pu-240eff T dT R dR r M CF Re dRc A dA 
(n° pins) (g/cm) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s/g/cm) 
17x17(264) 6.818 16804.14 84.13 1211.52 15.12 27.55 3.23 88.88 13.63 0.17 2.00 0.02 
16AglnCd(280) 6.818 12208.74 3.68 527.29 6.56 16.51 2.59 42.71 12.35 0.15 1.81 0.02 
8AglnCd+8SS(280) 6.818 13626.78 3.89 714.56 7.33 20.04 2.81 56.31 12.69 0.13 1.86 0.02 
Table 7 · Totals & Reals as a function of Boron Concentration 
Boron cone. Pu-240eff T dT R dR r M CF Re dRc A f(B) 
(ppm) (g/cm) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s/g/cm) 
17x17 no boron 6.818 16804.14 83.13 1211.52 15.12 27.55 3.23 88.88 13.63 0.17 2.00 1.000 
250ppm 6.818 12862.08 3.78 810.32 6.93 24.08 3.04 73.23 11.07 0.09 1.62 0.812 
503ppm 6.818 11121.17 3.52 608.49 5.99 20.91 2.86 59.84 10.17 0.10 1.49 0.746 
758ppm 6.818 9701.95 3.28 462.68 5.23 18.23 2.70 49.18 9.41 0.11 1.38 0.690 
1080ppm 6.818 8752.25 3.12 390.13 4.72 17.04 2.62 44.67 8.73 0.11 1.28 0.640 
1520ppm 6.818 7794.53 2.94 299.26 4.20 14.67 2.46 36.14 8.28 0.12 1.21 0.607 
2020ppm 6.818 6962.22 2.78 233.78 3.75 12.83 2.33 29.90 7.82 0.13 1.15 0.574 
2170ppm 6.818 6708.65 2.73 214.32 3.61 12.21 2.28 27.88 7.69 0.13 1.13 0.564 
Table 8 · Totals & Reals in a positioning experiment 
positioning Pu-240eff T dT R dR r M CF Re dRc A dA 
(g/cm) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s/g/cm) 
14x14 Right 4.648 8658.88 43.41 368.16 5.94 16.25 2.57 41.77 8.81 0.14 1.90 0.03 
Symmetric 4.648 8523.99 42.73 344.37 5.74 15.44 2.52 38.85 8.86 0.15 1.91 0.03 
Left 4.648 8526.56 42.74 347.75 5.76 15.59 2.53 39.37 8.83 0.15 1.90 0.03 
16x16 Right 6.095 13539.24 67.81 809.96 10.90 22.86 2.97 67.99 11.91 0.16 1.95 0.03 
Symmetric 6.095 13580.71 68.01 783.78 10.72 22.06 2.93 64.58 12.14 0.17 1.99 0.03 
Right 6.095 13576.90 68.00 803.47 10.86 22.62 2.96 66.94 12.00 0.16 1.97 0.03 
Table 9· Totals & Reals in a positioning experiment- 17x17- Boron 1520ppm - f(B)=O 607 
distanced Pu-240eff T dT R dR r M CF Re dRc A dA 
(cm) (g/cm) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s) (c/s/g/cm) 
0 6.818 7794.53 2.94 299.26 4.20 14.67 2.46 36.14 13.64 0.19 2.00 0.03 
1 6.818 7751.48 2.94 282.74 4.18 13.94 2.41 33.61 13.86 0.20 2.03 0.03 
2 6.818 7706.46 2.93 289.54 4.15 14.36 2.44 35.05 13.61 0.20 2.00 0.03 
3 6.818 7585.04 2.90 276.51 4.09 13.93 2.41 33.58 13.56 0.20 1.99 0.03 
4.5 6.818 6823.77 2.75 230.46 3.68 12.91 2.34 30.15 12.59 0.20 1.85 0.03 
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4.7 Sensitivity to mispositioninq 
In all previous measurements, the fuel was 
kept in the middle of the two detector arms, to 
avoid any asymmetry effect that could be caused 
by the equipment. 
Now, because of the complex nature of the 
measurement, it is often difficult to keep the 
FORK in a stable position. 
Therefore we did like to investigate the 
sensitivity of the measurement to incorrect 
positioning of the detector around the fuel 
bundle. The symmetry effect was tested with a 
16xl6 and a 14x14 fuel assembly in a pure water 
bath. 
The results are given in Table 8. The 
position uncertainty within approximately 2 cm 
in any direction has no significant effect on 
the measurement results. Within statistical 
errors, no distinction could be made. The 
distance d between the assembly and the FORK 
backplate was varied as well between 0 cm (close 
contact) and 4.5 cm. The results are given in 
Table 9. Up to 3 cm distance from the backplate 
of the FORK, positioning seems to have no 
influence on the measurement results. 
Because of the boron content of 1520 ppm the Re 
values include the boron adjustment factor too 
(f(B) = 0.607). 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
Tests 
detector. 
have been made with the MOX-LWR FORK 
The effects 
poison rods in 
investigated. 
of pin removal and absorber-
the fuel assembly have been 
The removal of a number of pins 
corresponding to a 6\ decrease in Pu content, is 
clearly detectable based on evaluating the 
multiplication corrected count rates. 
The uncertainty in positioning the FORK detector 
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does not significantly affect the verification 
results. 
A correction coefficient can be established 
to account for the boron concentration in water. 
The multiplication corrected reals rate is more 
sensitive to pin removal in borated water than 
in unborated. 
Measurements of different fuel assembly 
configurations show very close values of 
multiplication corrected reals rates normalized 
to Pu linear specific weight . 
Poison rods obviously reduce the detector 
response even after multiplication correction. 
Based on that fact, one possible way of 
diversion - simultaneous removal of poison rods 
and a corresponding quantity of fuel - requires 
further investigation. 
Although good agreement was found with LANL 
results, a different assay efficiency was found 
for which the explanation is not evident and 
that needs further consideration. 
Even if the problem of verification of 
MOX-LWR fuel under water is not completely 
solved, a lot of progress has yet been made. 
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Abstract 
The moisture effect on plutonium 
measurements by neutron coincidence method was 
investigated experimentally using the advanced 
shift register electronics tmit that realizes the 
first three coincidence moments counting. Two 
samples were used for experiments: one of them 
contains about 50 g Pu02 powder, another - 500 g 
mixed dioxide fuel. 
The measurement results are presented for 
water contents up to about 12 wt%. The 
coincidence moments determination was used for 
combined evaluation of multiplication factor M 
and alpha-ratio of (a,n)-neutron to spontaneous 
fission neutron yields. The use of the obtained M 
and a values for multiplication correction 
allowed to reduce the moisture effect on 
corrected coincidence cotmt rate to less than 1% 
measurement statistical error level. 
1 Introduction 
Moisture is one of the spread matrix 
impurities contained in oxide plutonium fuel that 
causes the error of plutonium measurement by 
neutron coincidence counting. The two main 
processes are at the l)ott.om of moisture effect on 
measurement results. Firstly, the presence of the 
moisture in the fuel increases the (a,n)-reaction 
neutron yield due to the water oxygen. Secondly, 
the neutron moderation by water hydrogen enhances 
the multiplication effect. Furthermore, the 
softening of neutron energy spectrum due to 
moderation usually causes the neutron detection 
efficiency to be 
Fig. 1. Experimental facility. 
increased. As a result the increase of 
coincidence rate is observed owing to the 
moisture effects. 
The known correction technique /1/ is used 
usually in practice to overcome the effects of 
neutron multiplication on the assay results. This 
correction method requires a knowledge of the 
a-ratio of (a,n) to spontaneous fission neutron 
yields in the aside materiaL The coincidence and 
total count rates are two measured parameters and 
the ratio of count rates serves as an informative 
parameter of multiplication. The value of this 
ratio for a nonmul tiplying sample is used as a 
base constant specified for the detector and 
depends on the neutron detection efficiency. 
Thus, it is necessary to consider the changes in 
the a value and the detection efficiency 
depending on the water concentration in the 
sample in order to take into account the moisture 
effect on the assay results. 
According to Monte Carlo calculations /2/ 
for detector system of HLNCC type the major 
effects of water in the assayed samples can be 
accounted for by a change in the a value whereas 
the change in neutron detection efficiency is 
less important. This allows the multiplication 
correction to be accomplished for moist plutonium 
oxide samples if the moisture content is known. 
A simple algorithm to account for the 
moisture effect is given by Stewart /3/. In this 
algorithm the a-value calculated for the 
plutonium oxide from its isotopic composition 
data was multiplied by a coefficient determined 
as a quadratic function of the known weight % 
(wt%) of the moisture content in a sample. The 
increase of detection efficiency due to moisture 
was considered to be negligible. For monitoring 
the moisture amount in aamples the compound 
detector systems with a different effective 
moderator thickness can be used /4/. The 
principle of monitoring is similar to the 
two-ring measurement method based on neutron 
energy spectrum shift as a result of the moisture 
moderating properties. It is not easy to apply in 
practice this moisture correction method for 
various samples differing in form, mass and 
composition. In addition to, it is necessary to 
know the initial a-value for the dry fuel that is 
a source of the assay error, if the impurities 
presented in a sample affect the (a,n)-neutron 
yield. 
The more perspective way for the problem 
solution is the analysis of neutron coincidence 
statistics which gives the information for 
multiplication correction with the unknown 
(a,n)-neutron contribution. This way is connected 
with development of measurement technique. The 
convenient analysis method is based on 
determination of coincidence statistical moments. 
The essence of this method is given in the report 
/5/. The method was applied in the work 
investigated experimentally the moisture 
influence on the plutonium oxide fuel 
measurements by neutron coincidence counting. The 
essential results of investigation will be 
presented in this paper. 
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2 Experimental equipment 
Work was carried out at the experimental 
facility (Fig. 1) including the glove box with 
special equipment allowing to manipulate with 
open fuel containers, to supply the controlled 
amount of water into the container and to extract 
it by means of evaporation. Two neutron well 
detectors were used for measurements. One of them 
with 30% efficiency for fission neutrons was used 
for continuous monitoring of neutron emission 
from fuel sample in the process of moisture 
supply and removal. The monitor detector is 
installed immediately under the glove box so that 
the sealed measuring channel passing through the 
glove box bottom entered into the detector cavity 
by ita lower part. The fuel container screwed 
tightly to the lower end of the special probe was 
located in the center of the detector through 
measuring channel. The controlled doses of water 
were supplied into the container through 0.5 m 
polyethylene tube. The water dosage was 
performed by means of a measuring stopcock 
burette providing accuracy about 0.02 ml per 1 ml 
of water. 
The electrical heater and special condenser 
mounted at the top of probe and cooled by water 
were applied for the moisture extraction. To 
intensify the extraction process the dry air was 
passed through the container. 
The second detector of high efficiency 
(about 40% for fission neutrons) is not connected 
directly with the glove box. The simple device 
with measuring stopcock burette was used for 
moisture addition. The father moisture extraction 
was performed in the glove box. 
No means of fuel agitation for the moisture 
homogenization were applied. 
In both detectors the neutrons are counted 
by He-counter tubes symmetrically embedded into 
the polyethylene moderator block around the 
central cavity in circular geometry. To reduce 
dead-time counting losses the counter tubes are 
divided into groups. The outputs of groups can be 
combined so that the neutron pulses from the 
inner and outer rings of counter tubes can be 
counted separately or together. 
The detectors are supplied with the common 
electronic equipment located into the CAMAC 
crates. Three coincidence electronics units have 
been made in CAMAC standard and can be used in 
experiments. Two of them realize the ordinary 
shift-register coincidence logic and are similar 
functionally to the HLNCC coincidence circuit. 
The third electronics unit realizes the advanced 
version of coincidence circuit which allows the 
first three statistical moments of neutron 
coincidence to be determined. 
The coincidence units are managed by 
program. The accumulated counting data are read 
through the CAMAC data-way into the computer 
memory for proper processing. 
3 Algorithm for coincjdence 
moments cqunting metbod 
Six output counts of advanced coincidence 
unit are the measurement results: 
• total number of detected neutrons To; 
• accumulated sums of coincidence numbers from 
prompt and delayed gates of coincidence circuit 
(R+A)l and (A)1, correspondingly; 
. accumulated sums of the squared coincidence 
numbers from prompt and delayed gates (R+A)2 and 
(A)2, correspondingly; 
. accumulated sum of the cubed differences of 
these numbers (R)s. 
The count rates for the first three real 
coincidence moments were determined using these 
six couots normalized to the counting time t: 
Rl=(R+A)l/t-(A)l/t, 
R2=(R+A)2/t-(A)2/t-2·R1·(A)1/Io 
Rs=(R)s/t-6·Rl·[(A)2/To-(A)l2/T2o]. 
These count rates as well as the total cotmt rate 
T=To/t are the four measured parameters which 
after dead-time correction can be used for 
solving of the assay problem. 
The problem solution is described in ref. /5/. 
The count rates for coincidence moments is shown 
to be defined via the fission rate and factorial 
moments of neutron multiplicity distribution. The 
Bohnel model /6/ was applied to make allowance 
for multiplication effect on the factorial 
moments. In point geometry and one-group energy 
assumption this model allowed to obtain the set 
of four equations relative to four unknowns: 
spontaneous fission rate, efficiency of neutron 
detection E, multiplication factor M and a 
parameter. 
However, examination of method with plutonium 
fuel samples showed that application of the third 
coincidence moment is unsuccessful due to the 
high statistical measurement error. Thus, the two 
first moments only were used to evaluate in 
common M and a parameters, considering the 
neutron detection efficiency as a constant value. 
The multiplication factor M is determined by 
solving the cubic equation 
AM3+BM2+CM+D=O, (1) 
the coefficients of which present the following 
expressions: 
A=d(d2-d1), 
B=dRl/(Tro)-A, 
C=(d1-d)R1/(Tro), 
D=(Rl-R2)/(4Tro2), 
where d=(WlapW2~n)/[W2sp(Wl~n-1)], 
dl=(WlspW3sp)/(3W2sp2), 
d2=(Wlsp·Ws~n)/(3·W2sp·W2~n), 
ro=G·E·W2sp/(2·Wlsp), 
w_, sp and w_, ~n - j -th factorial moments of 
neutron multiplicity distribution for spontaneous 
and induced fisaiona correspondingly, 
G - probability to get into coincidence 
gate for neutrons of the same fission event. 
The value of ro parameter depends on neutron 
detection efficiency and therefore, in general it 
can be changed al ightly because of the matrix 
effect. In constant efficiency assumption the 
value of parameter can be determined by direct 
measurement using a small "nonmultiplying" 
plutonium sample 
The multiplication factor M is found as the 
following solution of the cubic equation (1): 
M=2·Pl/2·coa(9/3)-B/(3·A), (2) 
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where P=B2j(9·A2)-C/(3·A), 
9=arccoa{[BC/(3A)-2B3j(27A2)-D]/(2AP3/2)} . 
Having determined M, the unknown value of 
a-parameter is found 
a=t1/[R1/(Tro)-t1· (M-1) ·d]-1 (3) 
and multiplication-corrected real coincidence 
rate is calculated 
Rcor=R1/{M2·[1+(M-1)·(1+a)·d]}. (4) 
The foregoing algorithm was implemented in 
software of the neutron coincidence system with 
the coincidence moments cotmting unit. 
4 Measurement of moisture effects 
Preliminary experiments 
Before the fuel samples measuring the 
preliminary experiments were performed in order 
to test the procedures of moisture supply and 
extraction, to try out the main characteristics 
of counting system and to choice the mode of 
measurement and data acquisition. 
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Fig. 2. Relative change of totals for 262Cf 
depending on amount of water in Zr02. 
As in studying the moisture effects it is 
necessary to measure during the long time the 
special attention was given to stability of 
detector response. The response drift in 2-3% of 
initial value was observed for both detectors 
during the first day after switching in the high 
voltage supply. However, after two days of 
operation the response drift from the reached 
saturation level did not exceed 0.2%. 
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Fig. 3. Relative change of reals for 26 2Cf as a 
function of water amount in Zr02 before and after 
correction for efficiency variation due to water. 
The measurements were performed in 
multiscalar mode allowing to carry out the 
operative statistical processing of data in order 
to evaluate the random error of measurement 
results and response drift during the 
measurement. 
As a rule two coincidence units were used 
simultaneously in the experiments. The ordinary 
coincidence unit was applied to measure the 
response of inner (or outer) 3He-counter ring. 
The response of the whole detector was measured 
by the coincidence moments cotmting unit. 
Procedures of water supplying into container 
and moisture extraction were preliminary tested 
using a container filled with Zr02 powder. A 
small californium source was fixed in the middle 
of the container. The neutron absorption in Zr02 
is negligible and so the experiments with adding 
of water in Zr02 allow to study the moisture 
effect as a neutron moderator on the efficiency 
of californium neutron detection. Fig. 2 shows 
the relative change of the total count rates 
(totals) from the counter rings and from the 
common output of monitoring detector as a 
function of water amount in Zr02. Growt~ in 
totals T of the whole detector is occurred by 
increasing of totals T1n of the inner ring while 
totals Tout of the outer ring varies slightly and 
even has an opposite tendency. The two-ring 
measurements allow to obtain the information 
about the detector efficiency change due to the 
moisture influence. For example, totals ratio 
T1n/T can be used as an informative parameter for 
rough estimation of relative efficiency variation 
according to the relation 
Ka:f=1+Tin/T-N, (5) 
where N is a value of T1n/T ratio for dry Zr02. 
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The real coincidence count rate (reals) can 
be corrected for efficiency variation due to 
moisture using this relation as it is shown in 
Fig. 3, where the corrected reals Ra:f was 
determined as R1/Ke:f2. 
Experiments witb tuel samples 
Two fuel samples were used in experiments. 
The fuel is contained in the thin-walled 
stainless steel containers 44 mm in diameter, 145 
mm in height. One of them contained Pu02 powder 
(with 96% abundance of 239Pu), another one -
electrodeposited mixture of Pu02 and dioxide of 
natural uranium. The characteristics of samples 
are given in table 1. The given values of 
effective 240Pu mass and a-parameter were 
Table 1. Characteristics of plutonium fuel 
samples. 
I S~ple I Fuel mass, g 240Pu effect a Pu02 U02 mass,g 
[][] 48.69 - 1.68 1.131 124.93 374.80 38.65 0.861 9 
calculated using the known data of plutonium 
isotopic composition. 
The more careful measurements of the 
moisture effect were performed in the detector 
with 40% efficiency. As it was mentioned no tools 
were used for agitation of moist fuel in the 
container. The natural homogenization of moisture 
in fuel was expected to be during some time after 
adding the every water portion. The atabilization 
of detector response was considered to correspond 
with the end of homogenization process. It was 
determined that the transition period doean"t 
exceed 20 minutes. The measurement results of 
this period were leaves out of account. 
The observed count rates for coincidence 
moments after water adding into MTK-9 sample up 
to 12 wt% are shown in Table 2. The random error 
of measurement is characterized by the standard 
deviation of reaul ta with 10 minute measurement 
time. The results averaged for 17-20 measurements 
are given in table. One can note the significant 
growth in the count rates with the moisture 
increasing. 
Table 2. The observed count rates for MTK-9 
sample after adding of moisture. 
Moisture Cotmt rates, sec-~ 
ml wt% T R1 R2 R3 
0 0.0 34207± 7 4840±26 6500±52 10656±336 
1 0.2 34304± 9 4850±24 6514±55 10790±522 
3 0.6 34534±11 4868±29 6542±46 10712±507 
4 0.8 34579±11 4875±18 6571±47 10858±621 
5 1.0 34693± 8 4885±19 6588±59 11005±546 
6 1.2 34743± 9 4892±29 6591±62 10629±705 
7 1.4 34866±12 4905±26 6618±57 11000±543 
12 2.3 35522± 8 4959±25 6701±53 11073±539 
15 2.9 35747± 6 4991±21 6757±52 11108±427 
20 3.8 36094± 9 5040±26 6828±56 11386±472 
25 4.8 36392± 8 5083±29 6892±59 11401±494 
30 5.7 36594±12 5137±23 6982±42 11560±514 
35 6.5 36652±20 5144±30 6985±54 11662±644 
40 7.4 36657±16 5131±25 6969±56 11586±328 
45 8.3 36688±10 5149±25 7010±68 11500±606 
50 9.1 36720±11 5146±17 7001±36 11484±511 
55 9.9 36756± 9 5165±22 7040±66 11621±706 
60 10.7 36782±11 5176±13 7054±47 11703±635 
65 11.5 36797±10 5189±25 7067±52 11651±499 
70 12.3 36801±13 5186±26 7076±49 11690±522 
The high measurement error is observed for 
the third coincidence moment. For this reason the 
first two coincidence moments only were applied 
for multiplication correction in accordance with 
algorithm set down above. The values of 
multiplication factor M and a-parameter were 
estimated assuming that the neutron detection 
efficiency does not depend on the moisture amotmt 
in the sample. The parameter ro=0.226±0.001 was 
determined from measurement of the small sample 
containing the Pu02 thin layer the neutron 
multiplication in which can be neglected. The 
factors d=2.06, d1=0.26 and d2=0.36 in cubic 
equation ( 1) were calculated from the neutron 
multiplicity distribution for spontaneous and 
induced fiaaiona of plutonium isotopes. The 
calculated values M, a and 
multiplication-corrected reala Roor are shown in 
table 3. 
One can see that the growing of a-value is 
observed mainly with the moisture increasing. The 
increase of a relative to ita value for dry fuel 
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reaches about 10%. The increase in multiplication 
factor M is leas than 1%. The a-value measured 
for dry fuel is rather more than that calculated 
from plutonium isotopic data. lt is necessary to 
note that this value is estimated in accordance 
with the model based on the one-group neutron 
energy assumption and can 
Table 3. Calculated parameters and corrected 
reala for MTK-9 sample. 
Moisture Calculated parameters 
ml wt% M a Rcor Ref 
0 0.0 1.0428 0.959 3795 ±20 3789 ±20 
1 0.2 1.0429 0.961 3802 ±21 3795 ±21 
3 0.6 1.0432 0.970 3807 ±20 3797 ±20 
4 0.8 1.0447 0.985 3778 ±21 3768 ±21 
5 1.0 1.0449 0.991 3778 ±22 3766 ±22 
6 1.2 1.0444 0.986 3795 ±19 3782 ±19 
7 1.4 1.0452 0.997 3786 ±25 3770 ±25 
12 2.3 1.0459 1.021 3806 ±17 3774 ±17 
15 2.9 1.0468 1.032 3808 ±22 3769 ±21 
20 3.8 1.0473 1.036 3836 ±21 3783 ±21 
25 4.8 1.0476 1.039 3861 ±22 3796 ±21 
30 5.7 1.0489 1.040 3874 ±17 3796 ±16 
35 6.5 1.0484 1.037 3890 ±26 3807 ±25 
40 7.4 1.0486' 1.046 3873 ±27 3789 ±26 
45 8.3 1.0498 1.051 3861 ±26 3775 ±25 
50 9.1 1.0494 1.050 3867 ±15 3779 ±14 
55 9.9 1.0503 1.054 3861 ±23 3771 ±22 
60 10.7 1.0504 1.051 3869 ±21 3778 ±20 
65 11.5 1.0500 1.041 3891 ±23 3798 ±22 
70 12.3 1.0509 1.053 3865 ±18 3773 ±17 
differ little from ita actual value due to 
difference in detection efficiency of (a,n) and 
fission neutrons. However, the main reason for 
disagreement of calculated and determined a-value 
is presence of impurities in fuel affecting on 
(a,n)-neutron yield. According to the estimations 
obtained from the data about impurities in MTK-9 
fuel their presence causes 10 -15% addition in 
(a,n)-neutron yield that is in a good agreement 
with the a-value determined. 
The multiplication-corrected reala changes 
little within the moisture range up to about 3 
wt%. However, when a large ammmt of water are 
contained in the sample so that the fuel is 
supersaturated with the moisture and even a layer 
of water formed above the fuel column the 
corrected reala exceeds noticeably ita value for 
dry fuel. Evidently it occurs due to significant 
increase of neutron detection efficiency caused 
by water. To correct this effect the measurements 
of totals from the inner counter ring of detector 
were used. The relative efficiency change was 
defined using the totals ratio T1n/T in 
accordance with equation (5). The value of 
constant N in this equation was determined as an 
average value of this ratio from the measurements 
of several samples with dry plutonium oxide fueL 
To take account of efficiency variation the 
corrected parameter ref=roKef was applied in 
cubic equation ( 1) to estimate the new values of 
multiplication factor 11ef and parameter aef. The 
multiplication-corrected reals was determined 
then as 
The value of R..f calculated for MTK-9 sample is 
shown in the last cohunn of table 3. 
By the same way the measurements of l1TK-1 
sample have been carried out. The water was added 
into the sample by 0. 5 ml portions up to 7 ml 
(about 12 wt%, accordingly). 
Table 4. Bias percent (c5R) of reals relative to 
its value for dry fuel before and after 
multiplication correction. 
1._,. I Moisture Bias, % 
ml wt% oR1 oRcor c5Ref 
1 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.16 
3 0.60 0.58 0.31 0.21 
4 0.79 0.73 -0.46 -0.57 
5 0.99 0.94 -0.44 -0.61 
6 1.19 1.08 0.00 -0.19 
MTK-9 7 1.38 1.34 -0.24 -0.51 
12 2.34 2.46 0.30 -0.40 
15 2.91 3.13 0.36 -0.53 
20 3.85 4.14 1.08 -0.16 
30 5.66 6.14 2.07 0.19 
40 7.41 6.01 2.07 -0.00 
50 9.09 6.33 1.89 -0.28 
60 10.71 6.94 1.94 -0.31 
70 12.28 7.16 1.84 -0.44 
0.5 1.0 0.62 -0.06 -0.20 
1.0 2.0 1.26 -0.33 -0.54 
1.5 3.0 1.78 0.57 0.30 
2.0 3.9 2.54 0.54 0.19 
2.5 4.9 3.22 0.68 0.27 
3.0 5.8 3.60 . 0.91 0.45 
l1TK-1 3.5 6.7 4.48 0.57 0.02 
4.0 7.6 4.54 1.21 0.56 
4.5 8.5 5.11 1.95 1.22 
5.0 9.3 5.46 LOO 0.19 
5.5 10.1 5.66 1.55 0.64 
6.0 11.0 5.42 1.92 0.92 
6.5 11.8 5.36 2.24 1.22 
7.0 12.6 4.77 1.34 0.33 
The main results of moisture effect 
measurements are stwmarized in table 4, where the 
bias percent for reals relative to its value 
for dry fuel is shown as a ftmction of moisture 
content before and after multiplication 
correction. As the results analyzed show the 
multiplication correction using the first two 
coincidence moments allows to reduce the moisture 
influence on corrected reala to level of 
measurement statistical error (leas than 1%) 
within the moisture range up to about 3 - 4 wt%. 
It should be noted that this range overlaps 
the area of possible values of fuel moisture in 
practice. The overestimated values of 
multiplication-corrected reala (up to about 2%) 
is observed when the too large quantity of water 
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is added into the sample. The use of the inner 
counter ring to whole detector totals ratio to 
take account of the moisture influence on 
detector efficiency allows to remove a bias of 
multiplication-corrected real a within the whole 
range of measurements. 
5 Conclusion 
The use of the first two coincidence moments 
for multiplication correction is an effective way 
to minimize the moisture influence on plutonium 
assay in oxide fuel samples with unknown moisture 
content. The main advantage of this way consists 
in that the multiplication factor M and 
a-parameter for the assayed sample are estimated 
directly from measurement. In addition to 
moisture this allows to consider the matrix 
impurities influence on the asaay results. 
It should be noted that the long measuring 
time is necessary in order to obtain the high 
precision in determining of the second and in 
some caaes the third coincidence moments. It is 
essential that the dead-time correction of count 
rates for coincidence moments is accurate over 
the whole cotmt rate range. The solution of last 
problem is necessary to make possible the assay 
of large ammmta of plutonium oxide fuel. 
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ABSTRACT 
The interpretation of passive and 
active neutronic measurements to 
evaluate the U-Pu residual mass in 
spent fuel assemblies is presented as 
follows : 
- passive neutron measurements are 
well correlated to the plutonium 
mass, 
- active neutron measurements give 
information linked to the fissile 
mass content of the assembly 
( 235u + 239 pu + 241 Pu) and, using the 
passive neutron measurement, lead 
to the 235u mass content of the 
assemblies. 
1 - INTRODUCTION 
Le contrôle non destructif des 
assemblages irradiés à l'aide de 
méthodes neutroniques passive et 
active s'avère intéressant pour 
l'évaluation des paramètres physiques 
caractéristiques de ces assemblages 
(taux de combustion, réactivité ... ) 
[1. 2. 3] . 
Ce papier présente l'interprétation 
de ces mesures neutroniques en termes 
de masse résiduelle d'Uranium et de 
Plutonium des assemblages irradiés. 
La démarche suivie consiste à décrire 
successivement : 
- les principes physiques des mesures 
neutroniques passive et active, 
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- les corrélations envisagées pour 
évaluer, à partir · de ces mesures, 
les masses de Pu et d' 23Su 
résiduelles, 
- la vérification de la validité de 
ces corrélations sur des résultats 
expérimentaux. 
2 -PRINCIPE PHYSIQUE DES MESURES 
UTLISEES 
2.1-Mesure neutronique passive 
Cette mesure repqse sur la détection 
des ne~trons émis par les noyaux 
lourds du combustible irradié 
(fissions spontanées et réactions (a, 
n)). Le tableau ci -dessous montre la 
contribution des différents noyaux 
lourds à 1 'émission neutronique pour 
deux taux de combustion (l'assemblage 
considéré est un REP 17 x 17 
d'enrichissement initial en 235U 3.1 % 
et de temps de refroidissement 
3 ans) : 
Isotope Contribution à l'Emission 
Neutronique ('%.) 
TC=18000MWJ/T TC=36000MWJ/T 
238Pu 3.76 o. 75 239Pu 1,016 0,05 
HO Pu 5,7 0,46 242Pu 0,9 0,19 241Am 1.66 0,14 242cm 4,4 0,77 244cm 81 91,74 246cm 1,08 5,75 
Pour les taux de combustion usuels. 
(> 25000 MWJ/T). le 244 Cm contribue de 
façon prépondérante (> 90 %) à 
l'émission neutronique du 
combustible. 
Celui-ci étant formé à partir des 
isotopes du Plutonium 241 Pu et 242 Pu. 
une mesure de l'émission neutronique 
passive s'avère intéressante pour 
l'estimation de la masse de 
Plutonium. 
2.2 -Mesure neutronique active 
Cette technique a été développée afin 
d'obtenir une information directement 
interprétable en termes de réactivité 
de l'assemblage (Keff) et donc de 
masse fissile résiduelle [3. 4, S. 
6]. La méthode nécessite que 
1 • assemblage soit sous eau (borée ou 
non). 
Le principe physique en est le 
suivant : 
- une source de neutrons est placée à 
proximité d'une des faces de 
1 • assemblage (face A de la figure 1) 
pour créer des fissions dans le 
milieu, 
- un détecteur de neutrons. placé de 
l'autre côté (face B de la figure 1) 
compte, pendant la présence de la 
source, les neutrons prompts issus 
des fissions provoquées par la 
source. Afin d'améliorer le 
raa a fAŒ 1 
sourceT . 
_,._ 
détecteur 
détecteur en 23.5U . (adapté pour comptage du flux rap1dE 
détectiQil des neutrons promptsJ 
Figure 1 : Schéma de principe d'une 
mesure neutronique active 
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contraste, ce détecteur est entouré 
d'un absorbant aux neutrons 
thermiques. 
-du fait de l'émission neutronique 
passive de l'assemblage, la source 
est positionnée alternativement en 
position éloignée de l'assemblage (on 
mesure dans ce cas le signal 
11 passif 11 ) puis en position proche de 
1 'assemblage (on mesure dans ce cas 
le signal 11 actif + passif 11 ). Cette 
modulation permet par la suite de 
distinguer ces deux signaux. 
Le signal 11 actif" obtenu est lié â la 
réactivité résiduelle de l'assemblage 
et donc à la masse fissile 
e3su + 239pu + 24lpu). 
3 -DEFINITION DES CORRELATIONS 
3.1-Corrélation émission neutronique-
Masse de Plutonium 
La corrélation entre la masse de 
Plutonium (MPu) et l'émission 
neutronique (En) peut s'écrire (cette 
relation est spécifique pour chaque 
géométrie d'assemblage) : 
avec 
c Constante de calibration 
Fonction dépendant de 
l'émission neutronique 
Fonction de correction due à 
l'enrichissement initial en 
23su 
Fonction de correction due 
au temps de refroidiss~ment 
Une étude théorique concernant des 
assemblages REP 17 x 17 a permis 
d'évaluer les différentes fonctions 
décrites ci-dessus. 
On considère premièrement un 
enrichissement initial en 235u de 
3 .1 % et un temps de refroidissement 
de 1 an. Le tableau ci-après donne la 
masse de Plutonium en fonction de 
l'émission neutronique : 
TC MWJ/T MPu kg/ass En n/s/ass 
10000 2,03 1.91 106 
18000 3,15 1. 96 107 
24000 3,80 6,34 107 
30000 4,34 1.61 108 
. 
36000 4.77 3.40 108 
40000 5,02 5,21 108 
La figure 2 ci -dessous, qui présente 
ces valeurs, montre la grande 
sensibilité de la masse de Plutonium 
à l'émission neutronique 
600.00 
~0.1)5 
480.0 
; 420.15 
lJ60.20 
!_J00.25 
'e240.JO 
~ 
.... ..,J5 
120.40 
60.45 
0~+-~-----,==~_,--,--,--,--,~ 
\!JO 1.90 uo 2.70 l.ll l!iO 330 4.JO 4.70 ~1) ~ 
- de I'Uoriol1l {llq) 
Figure 2 Variation de la masse de 
Plutonium en fonctfon de 
l'émission neutronique 
Ces valeurs permettent par lissage, 
d'expliciter f(En) 
f(E ) • {E )0.153 
n n 
avec En en neutrons/s/assemblage 
On considère deuxièmement un taux de 
combustion de 36000 MWJ/T et un temps 
de refroidissement de 1 an. Le 
tableau ci-après donne la masse de 
Plutonium en fonction de 
l'enrichissement initial en 235u : 
Enr HSu ~ 1.8 2,4 3.1 3.68 
a(Pu) lt&fass 4.3 4.79 4.77 4.60 
Correction par 
rapport à 3.1 " 1.0ll 1.0043 1 0,96486 
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Ces valeurs permettent d'obtenir la 
fonction de correction t 1 due à l'enrichissement initial en 235U sous 
la forme d'un polynôme d'ordre 2. 
On considère troisièmement un taux de 
combustion de 36000 MWJ/T et un 
enrichissement initial en 235U de 
3,1 ~. Le tableau ci-dessous donne la 
masse de Plutonium en fonction du 
temps de refroidissement : 
T1t ... o.s 1 3 • IS 
•(Pu) kV••• 4. 79 4, 77 4, 71 4. se •• 53 
Correcdoo pu 
rapport l 1 u 0.9971 1 1.0127 1.042 1.0522 
Ces valeurs permettent d ·obtenir la 
fonction de correction t 2 (TR) due au 
temps de refroidissement, sous la 
forme d'une exponentielle. 
Remarques 
- Cette corrélation est obtenue en 
considérant un historique 11 standard 11 
d'irradiation . 
- Il est à · noter que les termes de 
correction t 1 (EI) et t 2 (TR) 
n'interviennent que pour quelques ~ 
dans la relation (1) alors que 
l'émission neutronique du combustible 
varie fortement avec la masse de 
Plutonium, ce que justifie le bien 
fondé de la méthode. 
3.2-Corrélation mesure active -
Masse de matière fissile 
Le taux de comptage obtenu avec la 
mesure neutronique active ( corres-
pondant aux neutrons prompts de 
fissions) est lié de façon directe à 
la masse fissile de 1 'assemblage par 
une corrélation de la forme : 
Ta • a MF + ~ ( 2) 
avec 
MF :Masse fissile résiduelle (kg) 
Ta :Taux de comptage •actif 11 (coups 
s·I) 
a~ :Constantes de calibration 
dépendant de la géométrie des 
assemblages considérés et des 
conditions de mesure 
(concentration en Bore de la 
piscine. intensité de la source 
neutronique ... ) 
La relation (2) est 
directement à l'aide de 
expérimentaux. 
Remarque : 
explicitée 
résultats 
La constante ~ correspond aux neu-
trons prompts de la source direc-
tement comptés. Le dispositif de 
mesure est optimisé de façon à 
minimiser ce terme. 
4 -RESULTATS EXPERIMENTAUX 
4.1 -Description du dispositif de 
mesure 
Le dispositif utilisé pour les 
mesures neutroniques active et 
passive est présenté dans la figure 3 
ci-après : 
Les deux ensembles de détection du 
dispositif sont positionnés dans 
deux alvéoles en fond de piscine et 
l'assemblage à mesurer est introduit 
entre ces deux alvéoles à l'aide du 
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pont de manutention. Les signaux 
"gamma total 11 11 neutrons passifs 11 et 
"neutrons actifs 11 sont obtenus 
simultanément. L'interprétation des 
mesures est effectuée en ligne par un 
micro-calculateur et permet de 
valider le taux de combustion et le 
temps de refroidissement et d'évaluer 
le facteur effectif de 
multiplication. On se propose ici 
d'utiliser les résultats des mesures 
neutroniques passive et active afin 
de tester les corrélations 
développées au S 3. 
4.2-Mesure neutronique passive 
Ce paragraphe présente premièrement 
une analyse des différentes sources 
d'incertitudes intervenant dans 
l'évaluation de la masse de Pu et 
deuxièmement une validation de la 
corrélation "masse de Plutonium -
Emission Neutronique 11 sur des 
résultats expérimentaux. 
4. 2.1 - Précision sur la masse de Pu 
estimée 
a) Incertitude de calibration 
L'expérimentation a montré que cette 
incertitude est inférieure au %. 
b) Incertitude statistique 
L'incertitude 
l'estimation de 
statistique 
l'émission 
sur 
neutre-
. 6En 
n1que --- est fonction du taux de 
En 
combustion et est ici en moyenne de 
2 % à 2 a ce qui amène une 
incertitude sur la masse de Pu telle 
que 
ft.MPu 
MPu 
0,153 
ÂF.n 
En 
(cette relation est obtenue 
différenciant la relation (1)) 
~HPu 
soit --- = 0,3 % 
MPu 
en 
Enr 
\ 
1.8 
3. 25 
3. 25 
l.U 
3. 7 
3. 7 
c) Incertitude de positionnement de 
l'assemblage 
Le fait d'utiliser la moyenne des 
signaux neutroniques obtenus sur deux 
faces opposées de l'assemblage permet 
de réduire cette incertitude à une 
valeur faible(< 1 %). 
d) Incertitude due à la corrélation 
Une étude paramétrique en fonction du 
taux de combustion, de 
1' enrichissement initial en 235U. du 
temps de refroidissement et de 
l'historique d'irradiation a montré 
que cette incertitude est au maximum 
de 2.5% et qu'elle est due en grande 
partie à l'historique d'irradiation. 
Elle peut donc être réduite si la 
corrélation tient compte de ce 
dernier. 
e) Incertitude globale 
L'incertitude globale représente la 
somme quadratique des incertitudes 
décrites précedemment soit 
6MPu/MPu ..=_ 3 % 
4.2.2 - utilisation des résultats 
expérimentaux 
La constante de calibration de la 
relation ( 1) a été déterminée sur un 
assemblage de référence qe qui permet 
d'évaluer pour les assemblages 
mesurés. la masse de Plutonium 
est1mee d'après la corrélation (1). 
Le tableau ci-après présente, pour 
quelques assemblages irradiés mesurés 
par comptage neutronique passif : les 
caractéristiques de ceux-ci, 
l'incertitude statistique obtenue à 
2 a (c'est-à-dire avec un niveau de 
confiance de 95 %) sur la mesure 
passive, la masse de Plutonium 
TC Tr E•usion Incertitude Masse !\asse b.MPu 
Kllj/t ans neutronique statistique Pu Pu -
n/s/ass à 2 o sur kg corr~- Hpu 
la mesure annoncée lat ion (\) 
pasSl ve '1 k& 
15~00 7.5 1.527 107 8 .s 2.95 3.12 s.u 
35200 3.9 2 .1~~ 101 2. 5 ~ .63 ~-56 1.~ 
38200 0.6 ~. 557 108 o. 75 ~.92 5.02 2 
~2100 1.7 ~ .851 108 1. 74 S .Il s .os 1.5 
34700 0.6 2. SIO 108 1 ~.58 4. 50 1.7 
39700 0.6 ~ .196 101 1 5.01 ~ .85 3 
315 
annoncée et la masse de Plutonium 
évaluée par la corrélation (1) : 
L'écart moyen d"environ 2,5% entre 
la masse de Pu calculée par la 
corrélation et la masse réelle de Pu 
conforte la relation obtenue au § 3.1 
et l'étude de précision du § 4.2.1. 
4.3- Mesure neutronique active 
De même qu'au § 4. 2, on présente 
premièrement une analyse des 
différentes sources d'incertitudes 
intervenant dans l'évaluation de la 
masse fissile résiduelle et 
deuxièmement une validation de la 
corrélation "Taux de comptage actif -
Masse fissile résiduelle" sur des 
résultats expérimentaux. 
4. 3.1 - Précision sur la masse 
fissile résiduelle estimée 
a) Incertitude de calibration 
L ·expérimentation a montré que cette 
incertitude est inférieure au %. 
b) Incertitude statistique 
Cette incertitude, due à l'extraction 
du signal "actif", est en moyenne de 
3 %. 
c) Incertitude due au positionnement 
de l'assemblage 
Cette incertitude a été évaluée 
expérimentalement à environ 2 %. 
d) Incertitude due à la corrélation 
Cette incertitude. liée à 
1 'évaluation de la masse fissile 
résiduelle nécessaire à l'obtention 
de la corrélation peut être 
considérée comme inférieure au %. 
e) Incertitude globale 
L'incertitude globale représente la 
somme quadratique des incertitudes 
décrites précedemment soit : 
6MF/MF 4 % 
Enr 
'1 
1,8 
4.3.2 ·Utilisation des résultats 
expérimentaux 
Le tableau ci -dessous présente, pour 
quelques assemblages mesurés par 
méthode neutronique active : les 
caractéristiques de ceux-ci. 
l'incertitude statistique obtenue sur 
la mesure du taux de comptage "actif" 
à 2 o, la masse fissile résiduelle 
annoncée et celle évaluée par la 
corrélation (2) : 
'IC Incertitude Masse Hasse t.IIF 
Kllj/t statutique à fissile fiss1le -HF 
2 e11 sur ~• annond:e ~valuee 
('1) (k&) (k&) '1 
15~00 3.~5 5,45 5,68 4 
3.25 39500 3.2 6.~~ 6. 68 3. 7 
3.6 3.45 41300 3.1 6,47 6, 70 
3.1 3. 70 32400 3 8,61 8.31 ).1 3. 70 38400 3 7,11 7 0 28 
3. 70 0 1.9 17.06 17,15 1 
Enr 
" 
1,8 
3,1 
L'écart moyen d'environ 3. 25 % entre 
la masse fissile calculée par 
corrélation et la valeur annoncée 
conforte la relation obtenue au § 3.2 
et l'étude de précision du § 4.3.1. 
4.4 -Combinaison des mesures active 
et passive ~our l'évaluation de 
la masse d' 35!! 
Le tableau ci-après présente, pour 
quelques assemblages mesurés : les 
caractéristiques de ceux-ci, la masse 
d · 235U annoncée et celle évaluée par 
combinaison des mesures passive (qui 
donne la masse de 239 Pu + 241 Pu) et 
active (qui donne la masse 
23sU + 239Pu + 241Pu) 
'IC ll.aue '"u Kasae de ll.aue "'u t.~t"'u 2l9Pu+:a4JPu Kllj/t annonc"e ~valu"e 
--6valu6e 2nu 
(k&) (q) (kg) 
" 
15400 3.27 2.3 3,38 3.~ 
3HOO 3.59 2,98 3,41 5.2 
3. 25 35200 3.65 3.1 3,89 6.5 
3.70 32400 5.36 3.19 5,12 ~.5 
3, 70 38~00 4.16 3. 34 3.95 5.3 
Cette évaluation montre que 
l'utilisation combinée des méthodes 
neu troniques active et passive 
permet d'obtenir la masse d · 235u 
résiduelle d'un assemblage irradié 
avec une préci_sion de 1' ordre de 5 %. 
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CONCLUSION 
L'évaluation de la 
d'Uranium et de 
assemblages irradiés 
masse résiduelle 
Plutonium des 
peut s ·effectuer 
à l'aide de méthodes non 
destructives. 
La mesure neutronique passive 
permet l'obtention de la masse de 
Plutonium avec une précision de 
l'ordre de 3 %. 
- La mesure neutronique active permet 
d ·obtenir la masse fissile 
résiduelle avec une précision de 
l'ordre de 4% et donc. par 
combinaison avec la méthode 
passive, la masse résiduelle ~· 235u. 
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A VERSATILE PASSNE/ACI'IVE NEUTRON COINCIDENCE COUNTER 
FOR IN-PLANT MEASUREMENTS OF PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM* 
J. E. Stewart, R. R. Ferran, H. O. Menlove 
E. C. Horley, J. Baca, S. W. France and J. R. Wachter 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Los Alamos, NM 8754:> USA 
A new, weil-type neutron coïncidence counter has been 
developed for nondestructive assay of a wide variety of 
items containing plutonium, uranium, or both. The in-
strument will be used in severa! locations at the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA-55). Both 
active and passive measurements can be made using the 
same instrument by simply changing the weil inserts. By 
combining results of active and passive measurements, assay 
of sorne impure plutonium-bearing items can be 
accompli shed. 
1. Introduction 
We have designed, constructed, and tested a new 
thermal-neutron coïncidence counter /1/ for general use in 
plants processing both uranium and plutonium. Versatility 
and optimum performance were primary goals of the 
development 
Features of the design include: 
removable sample-well inserts for passive and 
active modes; 
both fast- and thermal-mode inserts for active 
measurements; 
removable AmLi sources for combined pas 
sive/active measurements; 
AmLi sources (2) sufficiently intense (5 x 105 n/s 
each) to override passive coïncidence signais for 
mixed U-Pu and/or impure plutonium samples; 
shielding to (1) reduce effects of plant neutron 
backgrounds, and (2) reduce personnel exposure; 
uniform efficiency in the sample cavity volume to 
minimize sample positioning effects; 
low sensitivity to sample matrix, containers, and 
coverings; 
passive efficiency of 37 .4%; 
active efficiency of 37.0% in thermal mode and 
32.7% in fast mode; 
large sample cavities to accommodate a wide range 
of containers; and 
inherent safety, reliability, and maintainability. 
Figure 1 is an elevation sectional view of the in-
strument, showing details of the shielded sample weil, a 
*This work is supported by the US Departrnent of Energy, 
Office of Safeguards and Security and Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, Nuclear Materials Technology Division. 
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81.3 in. 
Fig. 1. Elevation sectional view of the Passive/Active 
Neutron Coïncidence Counter (NCC). 
suspended active insert, and the lifting mechanism, which 
rotates to easily allow changing inserts. The insert-lifting 
mechanism has severa! unique features including both up-
and down-limit switches and a quickly actuating motor 
brake. The lift was designed to enhance both safety and ease 
of operation. 
. Figure 2 is a photograph of the complete Passive/ 
Active NCC system, showing the counter body, the lifting 
mechanism with the passive insert suspended, and the two 
active inserts resting on the floor. Also shown in the photo 
is a JSR-11 coïncidence electronics package and the 
MS-DOS persona! computer with peripherals. A general 
purpose neutron coïncidence counter software package will 
be used with the system. 
Figure 3 displays details of one of the active inserts on 
the left and the passive insert on the right. The 252Cf source 
holder is shown with the passive insert. 
Fig. 2. Photograph of the Passive/Active NCC system. 
ACTIVE 
252cr 
SOURCE 
GRAPHITE 
I 
PASSIVE 
Fig. 3. Active and passive inserts for the Passive/Active NCC. 
The passive insert contains graphite end plugs (each 
178 mm or 7 in. thick) for optimum reflection (and minimal 
absorption) of neutrons originating in the plutonium-bear-
ing sample. Also, the top plug allows placement of a 252Cf 
source in the center of the sample cavity for routine mea-
surement-control checks. The passive cavity will hold 
sample containers up to 216 mm (8.5 in.) in diameter and 
406 nun (16 in.) high. 
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The active inserts hold polyethylene end plugs (each 
273 mm or 10.75 in. thick) that include receptacles for 
AmLi sources immediately above and below the sample 
cavity. Each source is easily removed from its polyethy-
lene end plug using handling rods. Empty AmLi source 
shields (tungsten "bottles") are available for passive/active 
measurements. The first active insert has cadmium sur-
rounding the sample cavity (fast mode). The second insert 
has no cadmium (thermal mode). The active cavities will 
accommodate sample containers up to 216 mm (8.5 in.) in 
diameter and 229 mm (9 in.) tall. 
The neutron moderator body is an annulus of 
polyethylene containing 48 3He proportional counters 
(tubes) placed in two concentric rings. Monte Carlo /2/ 
calculations were used to optimize 3He-tube placement and 
moderator design. This approach resulted in a measured ef-
ficiency of 37.4% for the passive insert. For the active in-
serts, we measured 32.7% efficiency in fast mode and 
37.0% in thermal mode using a centered 252Cf source. The 
high-efficiency design yields very good detection sensitivi-
ties for both uranium and plutonium measurements. 
Intended routine uses for the counter include passive 
measurements of plutonium-bearing samples, active ther-
mal-mode measurements of samples with low 235u masses 
(<50 g 235U), and active fast-mode measurements of sam-
ples with high 235U masses (>50 g 235U). 
2 Inherent Performance Characteristics 
One of the primary goals of the design was to achieve 
nearly constant axial efficiency profiles for both passive 
and active modes. 
Figure 4 shows measured axial efficiency profiles of 
totals, reals, and multiplication-corrected reals /3/ for a 
Pu02 sample (LA02-171 g of plutonium) in the passive-
insert cavity. This is a differential efficiency profile, 
showing efficiency variation for a small sample placed at 
different axial positions in the cavity. The multiplication:-
corrected reals efficiency is uniform to within ±1% from 50 
to 350 mm (-2-14 in.) above the cavity floor. This effi-
ciency profile is nearly equivalent in uniformity to that of 
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Fig. 4. Passive/Active NCC (passive mode) differential axial efficiency 
profiles for plutonium oxide sample LA02. 
the Flat-Squared Counter, /4/ which has the same cavity 
diameter, a 17% taller cavity, a single ring of 24 3He tubes, 
and a cadmium-polyethylene insert to flatten its profile. The 
Flat-Squared Counter is a passive counter only. We 
·evaluated the cadmiurn/polyethylene insert idea for the 
Passive/Active Counter using the MCNP code. This ap-
proach was not chosen because (1) the improvement in axial 
efficiency shape was only marginal (for the cadmium 
compared to the no-cadmium case), (2) the centered source 
reals efficiency was lower by 13%, (3) the active-mode per-
formance was compromised, and (4) the mechanical com-
plexity was greater. 
Efficiency profiles were also measured for both the 
active-fast (AF) and active-thermal (AT) modes using a 
235U-metal disk. Figures 5 and 6 show the results. In con-
trast to Fig. 4, these are integrated profiles, showing the 
effects of sample fill-height. Figure 5 shows that in AF 
mode, response is lowest in the cavity center, but is uniform 
to within ±5% for samples with fill-heights between 2.5 and 
20 cm. Figure 6 shows that in AT mode, response is 
uniform to within ±1% for samples with fill-heights between 
2.5 and 20 cm. These profiles compare quite favorably with 
those of the Active-Well Coincidence Counter or A WCC./5/ 
Other pragmatic, performance oriented goals of the 
design were to achieve low sensitivity to the sample matrix, 
steel container thickness, and polyethylene covering bags. 
To characterize the matrix sensitivitS: of the instrument 
with the passive insert, we measured a 2 2Cf source inside 
identical cans filled with several common matrix materials. 
Figure 7 shows the results. The new counter is approxi-
mately a factor of two less sensitive to the matrices sand, 
ash, lead shot, and iron shot than is the Flat-Squared 
Counter. For polyethylene blocks and chips, the matrix 
sensitivities of the two counters are approximately the same. 
In passive mode, we measured separately the effects of 
steel and polyethylene shells surrounding the LA02 sample. 
Results are shown in Figs. 8 and 9. 
Figure 8 shows relative efficiencies for totals, reals, 
and multiplication-corrected reals vs thickness of the external 
steel container. The two standard steel containers (double 
encapsulation) for sample LA02 are -0.4 mm thick. 
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Results of Fig. 7 are normalized to unity for the case with no 
external container. The effect of external steel on the 
multiplication-corrected reals is essentially nil for radial 
thicknesses between 0 and 5 mm. 
Figure 9 shows relative efficiencies for totals, reals, 
and multiplication-corrected reals as a function of external 
polyethylene thickness. Results of Fig. 8 are normalized to 
unity for the case with no external poly. The effect of the 
external poly on the multiplication-corrected reals is 1% or 
less for radial thicknesses between 0 and 12 mm. 
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The reals counting-rate-loss correction /6/ is made in 
software using a deadtime parameter that varies with the 
measured total count rate ('t'= a+ bTm, where a= 0.7141.l.S 
and b = 0.363 x IQ-6 J.l.s2). These values were taken from a 
least-squares fit using pairs of measurements of individual, 
calibrated 252Cf sources. 
3. Calibration Curves and Detection Limits 
The Passive/Active Counter is meant for routine assay 
and/or verification measurements in a plant environment. 
Capabilities include passive measurements of plutonium-
bearing samples (-5 mg to several kg 240Pucrr), active 
thermal-mode measurements of samples with low 235U 
320 
masses (-2-50 g 235U):i and active fast-mode measurements 
of samples with high 35U masses ( -100 g to several kg 
235U). 
Figure 10 shows the passive-mode calibration data and 
fitted curves for nearly pure Pu02. The measured data were 
obtained using the LAO Series of standards (-10 to -150 g 
240Pucrf). Both uncorrected and multiplication-corrected 
reals curves are shown. Notice the corrected data show less 
scatter from the fitted curve than do the uncorrected data. 
Generally, scatter in the uncorrected data arises from the 
effects of bulk-density and/or plutonium-isotopics variations 
on multiplication. The LAO series of standards has nearly 
uniform plutonium-isotopics ( -17 wt% 240Pucff). From 
radiography and weighing, the largest of the LAO series has 
a bulk density of -2.5 glee. 
Figures 11 and 12 show the active-thermal mode and 
active-fast mode calibrations, respectively, for uranium 
oxide standards that have nearly the same oxide masses, but 
widely varying enrichments (low-enriched and UISO 
Series). n! 
Detection limits and typical mass calibration ranges for 
the three operating modes of the Passive/Active Counter are 
summarized in Table I. Detection limits quoted are for single 
1 000-s measurements. Here, detection limit is defined as the 
mass value yielding a relative precision in the measured reals 
rate of l/3 or 33%. 
The passive-mode detection limit was calculated using 
a general formula that includes the effects of counting time, 
calibration (reals vs mass), and ambient background rates 
(both reals and totals). The formula is similar to one given 
in Ref. 8. Background rates recorded at one of the Los 
Alamos ground-level safeguards measurement development 
laboratories were used in the calculation. The measured 
reals background rate was 0.5 counts/s (primarily resulting 
from infrequent cosmic-ray-induced neutron bursts in the 
counter body) and the measured totals background rate was 
150 counts/s (primarily from neutron sources in shielded 
storage locations in the laboratory). With the lab free from 
sources, the measured totals rate was 30-40 counts/s. Using 
40 counts/s for the background totals rate, the calculated 
detection limit is 1 mg 240Pucff· 
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TABLE I. Passive/ Active Counter Detection Limits and Calibmtion Ranges 
1000-s Measurement Mass Calibration 
Measurement Mode Detection Limits Range 
Passive 1-2 mg 2A0Pu,rr -5 mg to few kg 240Pu,rr 
Active-Fast 50 g235U -100 g to several kg 235U 
Active-Thermal 1 g 235U -2 g to 100 g 235U 
Active-mode detection limits were calculated using a 
simple formula that includes the effects of counting time 
and calibration (reals vs mass). 
4. Combined Passive and Active Measurements 
One of the long-term application goals for the 
Passive/Active NCC is evaluation of combined active and 
passive measurements for pure and impure plutonium-
bearing items as well as MOX samples. To date, we have 
obtained experimental data for pure and impure oxide stan-
dards. Before presenting those data, we will briefly review 
some related work. 
Reference 9 reports A WCC measurements of large 
plutonium oxide and metal standards. It was concluded 
that by using the net active real coincidence count rate 
(active minus passive), the 239pu content of large pluto-
nium oxide and metal samples could be measured with a 
precision of 3-6% using a total counting time of 1000 s. 
The standard method for application of the Neutron 
Coincidence Collar /10/ involves using the net active reals 
for 235Uflength assay of light water reactor (LWR) fuel 
elements. The passive reals rate is sometimes used for 
238Uflength assay, although the reals count rate is low and 
therefore influenced by room-background-induced fissions. 
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Reference 11 reports both passive and net-active cali-
brations (with multiplication corrections) for the Fast 
Neutron Coincidence Counter (FNC or random driver) for 
plutonium oxide and metal standards. The random driver 
uses plastic scintillators (rather than polyethylene-moder-
ated 3He proportional counters) for neutron detection. 
Lead shielding is used in the FNC to reduce gamma-ray 
background. It was concluded that the FNC would yield 2-
4% precision in 500-1000 s counting for plutonium oxide 
and metal samples. 
In an informal Harwell report, Lambert describes 
some of the basic principles of plutonium assay with the 
A WCC. The passive reals rate is related to the mass of 
spontaneous-fission isotopes (238,240,242Pu), and the active-
minus-passive reals rate is related to the mass of the in-
duced-fission isotopes (239,241Pu) for low-bumup pluto-
nium. Lambert concluded that the 239,241 Pu content of 
kilogram quantities of low-burnup plutonium could, in 
principle, be assayed using the net reals rate from active 
and passive measurements made by the A WCC. No exper-
imental data were reported. 
We measured the Los Alamos LAO and PEO Series 
of Pu02 standards in all modes of the Passive/Active NCC. 
From chemical analyses and extensive analyses of neutron 
coincidence counting data, the LAO series is known to be 
nearly free of low-Z impurities (for example, F, Na, Mg, 
and Cl) that increase the (a,n) neutron production beyond 
that expected from pure Pu()z. Similarly, the PEO Series is 
known to contain significant and varying amounts of im-
purities and therefore excess (a,n) neutron production. 
The LAO Series was used for calibration in all mea-
surement modes. In passive mode, the multiplication-cor-
rected reals (Re) assay was used. Table II. (Passive column) 
shows the differences between passive assay and destructive 
analysis values for both the LAO and PEO series. These 
data are also shown in Fig. 13. Because the LAO Series 
was used for calibration, the LAO assay results are excellent: 
the average difference is +0.12 ± 0.63%. However, for the 
PEO Series, the average difference is +8.83 ± 3.51 %. 
These large differences for the PEO Series arise from 
using a value for a [ratio of (a,n) neutrons to spontaneous 
fission neutrons] that is calculated for pure PuOz, and 
therefore too low for the impure samples. For these passive 
measurements, the measurement times varied between 600 
and 2000 s. Using simple propagation of the errors in the 
totals and reals, the resulting precision in Re ranged between 
0.05 and 0.1 %. From this, it is concluded that 0.25% 
precision in Re can be obtained in only 100-s counting time 
for passive-mode measurements of items similar to the LAO 
and PEO standards. Compared to the standard High-Level 
Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNCC-II) /12/ that has an 
efficiency of 17.5%, and the Flat-Squared Counter with an 
efficiency of 24.4%, the Passive/Active Counter can obtain 
the same passive counting precision in one-fourth and one-
half the counting times, respectively. 
By combining results of both passive and active mea-
surements, another measured parameter is obtained that, in 
principle, allows solving for all three sample unknowns 
[spontaneous fission neutrons, (a,n) neutrons and induced-
fission or multiplication neutrons]. Several data-analysis 
approaches were evaluated, but the one selected uses results 
of the active measurement to correct the passive-mode results 
for sample multiplication. A geometry and cross-section-
dependent model of multiplication and an iterative procedure 
are part of the approach. Spectrum- and geometry-averaged 
macroscopic nuclear cross-sections were calculated using the 
MCNP code. Here again the LAO series was used for cali-
bration of both measurements and calculations. Results are 
shown in Table II (passive/active column) and also in 
Fig. 14. These results were obtained using the active insert 
with cadmium (active-fast mode). Compared to the passive-
mode results for the LAO standards, the passive/active 
results show about the same bias (almost nil) and greater 
scatter (+0.14 ± 2.21%). This scatter is probably from 
incomplete knowledge of fill-heights for alt LAO standards. 
A single radiograph of LAOS was used to determine fill-
heights for all LAO cans. This information was then built 
into the calibration. For the impure PEO standards, the 
results are excellent; the average difference between assay 
and destructive-analysis values is +0.08 ± 0.80%. 
Measurement times for the passive measurements varied 
between 600 and 1800 s, with one measurement of 5400 s 
for the smallest sample. Measurement times for the active 
measurements were much longer. These varied between 
1000 and 50 000 s, with two measurements of 100 000 s 
for small samples. Precisions were also calculated for two 
1000-s measurements, one active and one passive. It is 
estimated that for two 1000-s measurements, the scatter in 
the assay-declared differences would be 3-4%. This 
accuracy could be improved by increasing the strengths of 
the AmLi sources. Most of the scatter in the assay values 
shown in Table II is from causes other than counting 
statistics. 
Also in Table II, compare the two columns of a val-
ues. The pure PuOz a column contains values calculated 
from nuclear data for pure PuOz. The passive/active inferred 
a column contains values predicted by the passive/active 
data analysis algorithm. 
TABLE IT. Comparison of Conventional Multiplication-Corrected Passive Assays and 
Combined Passive/ Active Assays of Pure (LAO) and Impure (PEO) PuOz 
Pure PuOz Passive/Active Passive Passive/Active 
Sample 240pu~rr (g) a inferred a (A-D)/D % (A-D)/D % 
LAOl 10.098 0.427 0.471 +0.93 -0.12 
LA02 29.296 0.431 0.472 +0.28 -3.37 
LA03 54.359 0.426 0.463 +0.70 -2.81 
LA04 65.115 0.425 0.408 -0.88 +0.40 
LAOS 92.188 0.433 0.399 -0.63 +2.46 
LA06 104.537 0.426 0.401 +0.49 +2.62 
LA07 144.365 0.423 0.411 -0.06 +1.07 
LAOS 149.126 0.423 0.414 +0.12 +0.85 
I Average +0.12 +0.14 Std. Dev. 0.63 2.21 
PEOl 7.418 0.622 0.870 +12.54 -0.38 
PE02 14.836 0.622 0.817 +11.75 -0.88 
PE03 29.672 0.622 0.788 +11.14 -0.02 
PE04 43.339 0.625 0.704 +6.71 +1.50 
PE05 64.998 0.615 0.722 +7.20 -0.04 
PE06 81.374 0.622 0.677 +3.66 +0.28 
Average +8.83 +0.08 
Std. Dev. 3.51 0.80 
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5. Conclusions 
The new Passive/Active NCC is suited for general use 
in plants processing both uranium and plutonium. Optimum 
performance, safety, versatility, and reliability were primary 
goals of the development. The counter provides 
nondestructive assay of a wide variety of items containing 
plutonium, uranium, or both. Design, construction, testing, 
and initial evaluation have been completed. The instrument 
will be installed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Plutonium Facility (TA-55). 
By combining results of active and passive measure-
ments, assay of impure plutonium-bearing items, and MOX 
samples can be accomplished. We have determined this new 
approach is capable of measuring the 240Pu(eff) in impure 
plutonium-oxide to 2-4% in two 1000-s measurement 
periods. Also planned is an evaluation of combined pas-
sive/active measurements of plutonium-bearing residues and 
MOX. Initial data suggests the combined passive/active 
approach is a reasonable alternative to calorimetry and/or 
multiplicity counting for some impure plutonium-bearing 
items. 
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Abstract 
Pu-containing materials of varied 
compositions have been transferred frc:rn what had 
been their various storage places for up to 25 
years to a rrore central storage place. 'Ihere 
was a requirement for independent NDA 
measurerrents to check that the material being 
transferred corresponded with the values 
recorded when the materials were first stored. 
'Ihe methodology devised for doing this operation 
is described together with the ways in which the 
various difficulties were dealt with. 
1. Introduction 
During a period of rrore than 20 years of 
research, development and manufacture of nuclear 
fuel a considerable quantity of p 1 ut on i urn 
bearing residues had accumulated at a laboratory 
in the UK. It has now been decided that the 
material, mainly of mixed Pu and oxides, but 
varying in nature frc:rn fuel plates to glove box 
sweepings, should be unpacked frc:rn its previous 
containers and repacked into stainless steel 
cans for transfer to centralised long term 
storage until they could be incorporated into 
future reprocessing campaigns. 
'Ihe objective of the NDA measurerrents is to 
either confirm the 'book value' of the Pu or to 
recc:mnend that a 'new value' be declared. 
2. Background 
Most of the material originates frc:rn fuel 
manufacturing campaigns during the 1960s and 
1970s. It consists of pellets (whole or 
fragmented) , powders, metals, alloys and various 
types of Pu-bearing wastes from the 
manufacturing processes. 'Ihere are mixed oxides 
(MOX) in which plutonium is mixed with uranium 
in proportions varying frc:rn alrrost 100% Pu to 
much less than 1% Pu. 
'Ihe records for the materials list the Pu 
and total weights corresponding generally to a 
date around the time of chemical analysis during 
the associated manufacture, a material order 
number (M:)) which is expected to imply a ccmnon 
Pu isotopic composition, and other descriptive 
information. 
Careful procedures were set up to determine 
the gross weight of material being taken out of 
the original containrrent and to cc:rnpare this 
with the recorded book values. 'Ihe material was 
then loaded into the long term storage cans, 
ensuring as far as possible that a can contained 
only one type of material. Each stainless steel 
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can was assigned a book value equal to the sum 
of the fractions by weight of the original book 
values of its constituents. 
During 1986 and 1987 a gamna spectrareter 
had been used to determine the isotopic 
composition of sample containers frc:rn rrost MO 
mnnbers. Analysis of these results indicated 
that several MO batches contained materials with 
significantly different isotopics. 
3 . NDA Measurerrents 
3. 1. Pu Mass by Passive Neutron 
Coincidence Counting 
'Ihe body of the Passive Neutron Coincidence 
Counter (PNCC) used in the main series of 
measurements was manufactured by Jc:rnar and 
utilised 18 Helium-3 tubes of active length 
50. 8 cm operating at 4 atm. 'Ihe processing 
electronics, which used the 'shift 
register' technique were of Harwell design/1/ 
and manufacture, as was the software. 
'Ihe PNCC measures the rate of spontaneous 
fissions, and since Pu240 is the main source of 
these, a value can be obtained for the Pu240 
effective mass/2/. Knowledge of the isotopic 
composition of the Pu allows its mass to be 
obtained frc:rn the Pu240 (eff) mass. 
'Ihe PNCC gives values for the singles count 
rate (TOTALS) and the coincident count rate 
(REALS). A "non-multiplication" (NM) calculation 
can be made: 
Pu240eff = AO + A1*REALS + A2*REALS*REALS (1) 
where AO, A1 and A2 are constants. 'Ihis gives a 
reliable estimate for small non-multiplying 
samples-of-any--geometry, but larger samples 
(i.e. those with significant neutron 
multiplication) require calibration with samples 
of similar type, gearetry and Pu density. 
By using an inherently rrore precise and 
sample gearetry-independent algorithm which uses 
both the TOTALS and REALS, a multiplication 
corrected REALS rate (MULT--cORR REAlS) for the 
sample can be calculated. This algorithm 
requires, in addition to the information listed 
above, an estimate of the (a,n) production in 
the material. 'Ihe a emission rate depends on 
the isotopics of the Pu, while a factor f in 
the calculation lt.Quld be set at 0 for PU metal 
and 1 for Pu oxide or MOX. The measured 
Pu240 (eff) is given by a linear relationship, 
whose constants depend cc:rnparatively little on 
the type of standards used to determine them: 
Pu240eff = CO + Cl* (l'IK: REALS) (2} 
Both NM and l'IK: calibrations were made for 
the PNCC for the follcw.i.ng materials: 
Material Type 
OXide Pa-.Oer(PO) 
OXide Pellets(PE) 
Very Sll1all OXides (VSO) 
Pu240(eff)range (g) 
25-200 
40-200 
0.4-22 
Since very few specimens had the Pu in 
netallic form no !'le tal calibration was made. 
~ver the nean of the oxide pellet and pov.der 
l'IK: calibrations, but with constant f set of 
zero, appeared to work well. 
3. 2 Pu Isotopic Carp?sition by Ga1lina 
Spectraretry 
The Gaimla spectrareter used for I!Ost of the 
neasurerrents consists of a High Purity Gennanium 
(HPGe) detector, 200 mn2 in area and 10 nm 
thick, whose output is fed, via a Canberra 1510 
Integrated Signal Processor to a Canberra 
Multi -channel Analyser SlOO board in an IBM PS/2 
carputer. Spectra are stored on hard disc f<;>r 
later analysis using the Multi -Garmla Analysls 
(M:>A} code of Gunnink and Ruhter/3/. M:>A uses 
the lcw energy, intense peaks fran the Pu and 
is claimed to accuracies within 1% with 
neasurerrent tines of only a few minutes. 
It should be noted that as the Pu242 cannot 
be measured using this technique the code 
incorporates the facility to either insert a 
value bY hand or to calculate a value using 
internal algorithms. 
3. 3 Pu Mass by Calorinetry 
The calorineter was of an isothermal type 
similar to that developed bY Mason et al/ 4, 5, 6/. 
This measures the heat evolved from the 
radioactive decay of the Pu isotopes and Arn241. 
Calorinetry has the advantage that contaminants 
(e.g. oxygen, fluorine etc.) do not interfere 
with the measurerrents and uncertainty in the 
Pu242 content has negligible effect. ~ver it 
is quite sensitive to the accuracy of the Pu238 
neasurerrent. Table 1 ~ an e:xai®le of the 
~r fran a typical sanple. 
Isotope wt.per. Pcw;r Specific 
100g of (nW/g of Pa..er(nw/ 
Pu Isotope) 100g of Pu) 
Pu238 0.048 5.6716 0.273 
Pu239 84.560 0.01929 1.631 
Pu240 14.296 0.07098 1.012 
Pu241 0.887 0.0339 0.030 
Pu242 0.208 0.0011 0.000 
Arn241 1.314 1.1423 1.500 
Table 1. 
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4. The Procedure for NDA Measurements 
The initial vetting of cans was carried out 
with the PNCC because this required only about 
10 minutes counting tine, at least an order of 
magnitude less than that for a typical 
calorineter rreasurement, 
The PNCC neasurerrent procedure requires the 
entry from the keyboard of the sample 
identifier, the calibration to be used (i.e. PE, 
PO, ME or vso) , the isotopic batch identifier, 
Pu and Am isotopic percentages with date of 
applicability and 'declared' Pu mass with date 
of applicability. Fran this data the 'declared' 
Pu240 (eff) is calculated at the date of the PNCC 
measurement and printed. Following the 
measurerrents, the ratio (!'leasured Mass/Declared 
Mass) is computed for both the NM and l'IK: 
calibrations. 
The date of applicability of the 'declared' 
Pu mass is obtained fran the records where 
possible, but otherwise it is set at one year 
after the date of chemical separation of Pu and 
Am which is calculated bY M:>A fran the measured 
Pu241 to Arn241 ratio. 
The PNCC program running on the carputer 
generates both a printed record and data files 
for each measurerrent. Another program produces 
a formal AssesSIOOnt Form for the sanple. 
4.1 PNCC Acceptance Criteria 
Because the accuracy to be expected for a 
PNCC rreasurerrent depends on various factors, 
each specinen was given the score appropriate to 
its rating on each of the attributes A to D in 
Table ~. These are recorded on the AssesSIOOnt 
Form and added together to "give a value S. 
If the l'IK: ratio for the measurerrent lies 
between 1-S and 1 +S the PNCC is considered to 
have confirmed the Book Value, and the 
AssesSIOOnt Form is signed to indicate this. 
When the l'IK: value lies outside the range a 
review procedure is set in I!Otion. Frequently a 
r ray measurerrent is carried out on the can to 
provide new isotopics for a recalculation of the 
PNCC measurerrent. If the l'IK: ratio is still 
outside the acceptance limits a sanple with high 
Pu content might then be measured 
calorinetrically, while for a lcw Pu can an NM 
ratio falling between 1-S and l+S might justify 
acceptance of the book value. 
5 . !'leasurerrent .Experience 
The wide variety of the materials neasured 
during the exercise raised quite a few points of 
interest. 
5 . 1 Problems with Mixtures 
The presence of materials fran different 
M:>s in the sane can gives rise to problems . The 
first occurs if an original container of 
inhomogeneous material is divided among 
several cans. When repacked this can lead to 
an inaccurate value for the quantity of Pu in 
each new can. In addition if the isotopics for 
any carp::nmts are in error the values for the 
whole can will be in error, and although 
spectrareter measurerrents were saretines made at 
several places on such a can this was not very 
satisfactory as thorough mixing of the various 
carp::>nents seldan occurred. 
PNCC Scoring SyStem 
A. The Quality of Material. 
Al. Pu02 or MJX (P~rs, Pellets or 
Spheres) Pu (Metal, Alloys) . 
(Score 0. 01) 
A2. Internediate quality (Score 0. 02) 
A3. Treated sludge, sweepings, ashed 
tissues etc. (Score 0.05) 
B. Chemical Quality of Material 
Bl. Pu02, MJX or Pu rretal with no 
extra major alpha-n (Score 0. 01) 
B2. Pu02, MJX or Pu rretal with suspected 
extra alpha-n, Pu nitrate or carbide 
etc. (Score 0.03). 
C. Quality of Isotopic Information. 
Cl. Several sarrples rreasured, no evidence 
of inhc:xrogeneity. (Score 0. 01) 
C2. Several sarrples rreasured, evidence of 
inhc:xrogenei ty, (Score 0 . 05) . 
D. Quality of Fit to Calibration. 
Dl. 15g < Pu240eff < 300g (PO, PE or ME 
calibration used). (Score 0.01) 
D2. lg < Pu240eff < 15g (VSO calibration 
used). (Score 0.02) 
D3. Pu240eff < lg (VSO calibration used) 
or Pu240eff > 300g (PO, PE or ME 
calibration used. (Score 0. 05) 
Table 2 
5 . 2. Calor:lrnetry 
Calorirretry is very effective for the precise 
rreasurerrent of Pu largely because its result does 
not depend on the chemical or physical fonn of the 
sarrples. lb-lever it cannot canpete with the PNCC 
in tenus of measurerrent speed. For exarrple, a can 
containing of the order of a kilogram of Pu and 
little else could be rreasured in an hour or so but 
a MJX sarrple with low Pu concentration w::>uld need 
to be left in the calorirreter for many hours. For 
this reason the calorirreter was mainly used to 
resolve cases where there was a possibility of a 
sizeable deviation fran the book value. 
A problem occurred in the use of the 
calorirreter due to its unavoidable location in a 
environment with wildly fluctuating mains supply, 
and it was not unusual for argon arc welders to 
be operated in the vicinity, causing the 
instrument to trip out. The problem was 
partially cured by the fitting of electrical 
filters but needs further attention. 
The calorimeter has a prediction routine 
which forecasts the equilibrium result. A 
project is in hand to improve the algorithm of 
this so that rreasurerrent tines may be reduced. 
5.3 Uncertainties Due to Isotopics 
Although rrodem mass spectraretry and gamna 
spectraretry usually give good results there are a 
number of ways in which isotopic errors contribute 
to the scatter of the ratios rreasured in this 
exercise. 
Uncertainties in the isotopic percentages 
will of course contribute to the uncertainties in 
Pu rreasurerrents . For the PNCC for exarrple the 
rreasurerrent uncertainty in the Pu240 fraction will 
propagate almost directly into the PNCC results. 
In addition, because the Pu242 is not measured in 
gamna spectranetry its estimation will initially 
contribute an error although this is unlikely to 
be as great as 1% of the Pu mass for any of the 
materials in the exercise. 
Calorimetric measurements have the 
advantage that virtually all the heat comes fran 
isotopes that can be measured by gamma 
spectrametry, but Table 1 indicates that errors in 
determination of Am 241 will be particularly 
significant. 
5. 4 A Problematic Batch of Cans 
There were tw::> groups of cans containing 
material involving stainless steel (S/S) with 
the sarre MJ number but labelled 'Plates' and 
'Powders' respectively. Although the PNCC 
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ratios for the Plates were all close to unity, 
those for the P~rs shaved much IOClre variation 
and a rrean of about 0. 8. After continuing the 
isotopics and realizing that there were too many 
cans of Powder for calorimetry, the first 
approach was to use the first 15 cans of ~rs 
to produce a new "incestuous" calibration for 
the PNCC. When this was used to recalculate the 
rneasurerrents for the whole batch of cans IOClSt of 
the ratios carre between about 0. 9 and 1. 1. 
Although this sh~ that the problem with 
the ~rs was systematic it did not explain 
it. An enquiry among long-serving staff 
suggested that the Plates had been made by 
sintering with S/S powder sub-millimetre 
diarreter balls of Pu oxide that had first been 
coated with adhesive and then stirred in S/S 
~r. Sore 'of the balls had broken in the 
process, gradually clogging up the S/S coating 
system, and had been disposed of as '~r' . 
If this were true there should be far IOClre Pu 
atans in the ~r with S/S carq;JOnent atans as 
closest neighbours than in the plates, and the 
(a,n) yield fran the ~r should be less than 
fran the Plates. The M: calculation of the PNCC 
uses the (a,n) yield multiplied by factor f, 
where f is nonnally set at unity for Pu in 
an oxide environment. Changing the value of 
f can allow for environments giving 
different (a,n) yields. Trial and error led to 
giving f a value of 0. 716 for the P~rs. 
Figure· 1 is a plot of the resulting M: ratios 
against Pu Book Value for 45 cans of ~r. It 
will be seen that the M: results have been 
brought reasonably close to unity over the Pu 
mass range. A calorirretric rreasurerrent of one 
can was carried out to help justify the 
procedure. It somewhat fortuitously gave a 
ratio of 0.962 for a can whose PNCC ratio was 
0.955 using the chosen f value. 
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Fig.l. PNCC ratios of (Pu Mass/Book Value) for 
43 'Pu Stainless Steel Powders' plotted 
against Pu Book Value. 
5 . 5 . Canparison of PNCC and Calorirretry 
Fig. 2 shCMS as * the ratio (!'leasured Pu 
mass/Book Value) for each of the Calorirreter 
rreasurements plotted against Pu Book Value. In 
all the cases where the PNCC produced M: ratios 
these are plotted as +. 
8 of the 16 Calorirreter IVeasureirellts can be 
seen to have ratios within 2% of the Book Value 
suggesting that the Calorimeter is giving 
results to within 2% accuracy. 
Calorirretric ratios significantly away fran 
unity are believed to indicate errors in the 
Book Values. 
In general the PNCC tends to support the 
Calorimeter ratios but gives less close 
agreeirellt with Book Values that are believed to 
be good. In addition, the PNCC had failed to 
give an M: value at all for 3 of the cans. 
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Fig. 2. Ratios of (Pu Mass/Book Value) obtained 
with the Calorirreter and the PNCC plotted 
against Pu Book Value. 
6. The Results of the !'leasurements so far 
A total of 351 cans of wastes have been 
rreasured so far. A recarrrendation to use the 
Book Value has been made for 290 of the cans, 
New Values have been recarrrended for 4 of the 
cans, a Batch of 48 cans is still awaiting 
checking by calorirretry, and 12 other results 
are still under review. 
Using the rrethodology of section 4. 1 the 
Acceptance Range for the rreasurements varied 
fran can to can, but the average was 0. 93 to 
1. 07. Of the decisions to use the Book Value: 
163 were based on 161 M: results of the 
PNCC falling within Acceptance Range and 2 of 
them falling just outside narrcw ranges. 
25 were based on NM results of the PNCC 
falling within the Acceptance Range. 
9 were based on Calorirreter rreasureirellts. 
7 0 were the Pu Stainless Steel P<:1Mjers 
discussed in Section 5. 4. 
13 were a batch of cans, with material of 
ccmron origin, giving sare M: results outside 
the Acceptance Range but with a ratio of 1. 02 
for the batch. 
7 cans without an acceptable PNCC result 
but for which the arrount of discrepancy did not 
justify further effort. 
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7. Conclusions 
This exercise appears to be fulfilling its 
intention quite well but there have been sare 
problems and sare successes. This experience 
allows a list of recamendations to be drawn up 
for. any future operation of this type: 
(a) History All possible infonnation on 
the material should be obtained in advance 
of the rreasurements. 
(b) Preparation If at all possible 
isotopic rreasureirellts should be carried out 
before material has been rerroved fran its 
original storage. 
A scheme for recording the results and for 
judging the acceptability of book values 
should be set-up before rreasureirellts begin. 
The rreasuring instrurrents should be tested 
in advance at the actual place of 
measurement and under the working 
conditions that are likely to occur. 
(c) Flexibility A PNCC cannot give 
assurance on all types of residues; a 
Calorimeter provides very useful 
infonnation in difficult cases. Ganma 
spectroscopy can check anomalies in the 
isotopics of batches of material. 
Even with a preset set of rules there is 
considerable roan for judgement in deciding 
when New Values are needed. 
The progress so far with this exercise has 
only been possible with the help of many people, 
to whan our thanks are offered. 
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Abstract 
A compact K-edge densitometer has been designed 
for use by safeguards inspectors to verify the uranium 
concentration in product solutions from a reprocessing 
plant. The densitometer is based on multi-energy trans-
mission measurements near the uranium K-absorption 
edge using a single isotopic source ( 57Co) in conjunc-
tion with a uranium converter foil. The compact set-up 
is easily coupled to standard high-resolution spectro-
scopy systems. The measurement accuracy achieved in 
a counting time of I 000 seconds is about 0.2-0.3 % at 
concentration levels typical for product solutions. 
An approach to determine the 235U enrichment from 
aliquots of less than 5 m! with an accuracy of better 
than 1 % within the same measurement time is also 
discussed. 
1. Introduction 
Both the uranium concentration and the mu abun-
dance in uranium product solutions are of interest for 
safeguards-inspection purposes. Two NDA instruments 
are described in this paper that allow the measurement 
of these parameters with due regard to inspection 
specific conditions. 
A simplified version of a K-edge densitometer has 
been developed for use by safeguards inspectors to 
verify the uranium concentration in product solutions 
from a reprocessing plant. The densitometer meets the 
following design goals: 
• to be easily adaptable to existing portable safe-
guards spectroscopy equipment, 
• to keep the required additional hardware, includ-
ing the radiation sources, at a minimum, 
• to reduce the required sample sizes to small 
volumes, 
• to provide simple and reliable operation for field 
applications, and 
• to ensure a measurement accuracy of better than 
0.5 % at U concentrations typical for product 
solutions in counting times of about 1000 s. 
The assay sytem for the mu abundance is based on 
a passive gamma measurement of the characteristic 
radiation emitted from the decay of 235U. Similar design 
criteria will also apply to this instrument. The envisaged 
measurement accuracy in this case was 
• I % relative for 235U enrichments >0.7 % within 
the same counting time of 1000 s. 
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The evaluation of the 235U enrichment in small samples 
from passive gamma measurements requires the U 
element concentration as input value which in turn is 
determind by the aforementioned K-edge densitometer 
assay. Hence the requested result - here the 235U abun-
dance - is determined from the combination of two 
different NDA methods. 
2. K-egde densitometer 
Principles 
K-edge densitometry makes use of the element-
specific discontinuity of the photon absorption cross 
section lhal occurs when the photon energy exceeds lhc 
binding energy of the electrons in the K-shell of the 
particular element. In case of uranium the K-edge jump 
is found at the energy of 115.6 keY (see bottom part of 
Fig. 1). From photon transmission measurements T1 and 
Fig. 1: 
U K X-rays 
converter foil 
Interrogating photon spectrum (~f the compact 
K-edge desitometer (lop) and mass attenuation 
coefficient of uranium (bottom) versus photon 
energy. 
T2 below and above the K-edge, respectively, one gets 
the uranium concentration p11 in the sample by 
_ ln(T1 /T2 ) 
Pu - ~IJ. d (l) 
where ~ll is the difference of the uranium mass-ab-
sorption coefficient at the energies of the interrogating 
photons below and above the K-edge, and d is the 
pathlength of the beam through the sample cell. 
The element-specific effect is largest and the sensi-
tivity to variations of the sample matrix is minimized if 
the energies of the interrogating photons tightly bracket 
the energy of the U K-edge. The problem is to find 
suitable photon sources that fulfill this condition. Two 
approaches are mentiond here. 
1. The Hybrid K-edge densitometer /1/ that uses a 
continuous photon spectrum around the K-edge lrom 
the bremsstrahlung of an X-ray tube. 
2. The Los Alamos/Tokai K-edge densitometer /2/ 
for plutonium. It utilizes discrete gamma lines from two 
different radioactive sources in a revolving source 
holder. The energies of 121.1 keY C5Se) and 122.1 keY 
{'7Co) tightly enclose the plutonium K-edge energy of 
121.8 keY. 
This favorable situation is not given for U K-edge 
densitometry due to the lack of suitable gamma lines 
below the U K-edge. The 88 keY line of 109Cd (indicated 
by an arrow in Fig. 1) could be used along with the 
122.1 keY line of 57Co in a double-source K-edge den-
sitometer for uranium. However, the wide energetic 
distance of the former gamma line to the U K-edge 
leads to a reduced instrument performance. 
The approach realized in the present compact K-
edge densitometer was proposed some time ago /3/. ll 
uses multi-energy transmission measurements by means 
of a single radioisotopic source C7Co), which in turn is 
used to generate additional radiation in the form of K-X 
rays in a uranium converter foil located in front of the 
57Co source. In this way 5 different photon energies -
the X-rays at 94.6 keY (Ka2), 98.4 keY (Ka), 111.3 keY 
(K~t.3 ) of uranium and the 57 Co gamma rays at 122.1 keY 
and 136.4 keY - are available for transmission measure-
ments below and above the U K-absorbtion edge energy 
(see Fig. 1) 
The K-edge densitometer adapter 
A small mechanical assembly has been build that 
contains the 57Co source (-1-5 ·IOK Bq), the uranium 
converter foil (- 0.2 g/cm 2 of depleted uranium), the 
beam collimators, the cavity for the sample vial and 
some shielding parts. In order to save weight this 
compact K-edge adapter is made of aluminium and 
plastic materials, only the beam guiding parts and the 
radiation shielding are made of tungsten. Fig. 2 gives a 
simplified schematic view of the assembly. The essen-
tial parts of the adapter have a total length of 5 em only. 
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Ge 
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Fig. 2: Schematic view (~l the compacr K-edge desiro-
meter. 
Towards the detector the assembly is extended by 
a guiding tube that is slipped over the detector endcap. 
The inner plastic part of the guiding tube is exchangeable 
to allow the adaption to detector caps with varying 
diameters. It is also equipped with a small clamp for 
fixing the K-edge adapter to the detector head. 
The overall dimension of the compact K-edge 
adapter is about 15 em x 8 em 0, its weight amounts to 
less than 800 g. Therefore no stands or supports are 
required. Almost any Ge detector with vertical endcap 
can easily be converted to a K-edge densitometer simply 
by plugging the adapter to the detector's endcap and 
fixing it by the clamp. 
The cavity of the densitometer accepts one standard 
high-precision glas cell with 2 em length, no provision 
is lorseeen for an automated sample changer. 
The photograph in Fig. ] shows the K-edge densi-
tometer adapter plugged to a standard Ge detector. The 
source shielding in front of the adapter, the sample 
cavity with a U sample and the guide tube with clamp 
can be identified. 
Fig. 3: The compact K-edge densitometer adapter 
plu;.:ged to the endcap r~f a Ge de!l)cror. 
Sample fluorescence effects 
In the compact K-edge densitometer described here 
the 57Co lines and the U K X-rays generated in the 
uranium converter foil are used as interrogating pho-
tons. When Uranium is analysed in this set-up - as we 
do - then the 57Co radiation will also introduce K X-ray 
fluorescence in the uranium sample material. This sample 
fluorescence adds to the interrogating U X-ray lines 
used for the determination of the photon transmission, 
and thus disturbs the assay result. This effect has been 
investigated by substituting the uranium converter foil 
by a lead foil exhibiting approximately the same attenu-
ation for the 57Co gamma rays. 
The results of these measurements are given in 
Fig. 4. The percentage contribution of the sample 
fluorescence to the total observed peak counting rate in 
the U K.2 and U K. 1 lines is shown in Fig. 4a for two 
different collimator geometries as a function of the 
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uranium concentration in the sample. "Narrow" colli-
mation stands for both the primary collimator (between 
source and sample) and the secondary collimator 
(between sample and detector) with 10 mm length and 
3 mm diameter. In case of the "wide" collimation the 
diameter of the primary collimator was enlarged to 
4mm. 
Fig. 4a demonstrates that the sample fluorescence 
effect critically depends on the collimation used. For 
the "narrow" collimation it is about a factor of two 
smaller than for the "wide" one. Therefore, when using 
an extremely high collimated beam the sample fluores-
cence effect can be brought down to a negligible level. 
This is, for example, realized in the Hybrid K-edge 
densitometer Ill where the solid angle of the collimation 
is about two orders of magnitude smaller than in the 
present case. This extreme narrow-beam approach how-
ever is not applicable to the compact K-edge densito-
meter due to the limited source strength of commercial-
ly available 57Co sources. The collimation selected is 
therefore a compromise between the desired high 
counting rate of the interrogating radiation to arrive at 
short measurement times on one hand, and an accepta-
ble distortion by the sample fluorescence on the other 
hand. In the present set-up the collimation described 
above as "narrow" collimation has been implemented 
resulting in a maximum sample fluorescence contribu-
tion of about 6 % to the U K02 peak at high uranium 
concentrations. Note that the effect slightly decreases 
with increasing energy of the U K X-rays . 
The impact of the sample fluorescence on the assay 
result as a function of the U concentration is shown in 
Fig. 4b for the most unfavorable case of Fig. 4a (U K.2 
peak, "wide" collimation). The curves have been evalu-
ated according to eq. 1 without and with sample-
fluorescence correction using the same ~!l value in both 
cases. The sample fluorescence appears as positive bias 
that increases nonlinear with the U concentration. 
The sample fluorescence for a given collimation 
geometry is a unique function of the U concentration. 
Once the effect is known and can be parameterized, a 
nonlinear logarithmic function of the U concentration 
Pu can be added to eq. 1. This leads to an implicit 
function of Pu that is solved by iteration. 
A more practical approach is the piecewise linear 
interpolation of the slightly non-linear instrument re-
sponse function. An "effective" ~!l value in eq. 1 has to 
be established from the measurement of suitable cali-
bration standards that enclose the U concentration range 
of interest. The "effective" Ll).l value is then valid only 
for this limited range of uranium concentrations. 
Sample matrix effects 
In K-edge densitometry the transmission values 
required for the evaluation of the U concentration from 
eq. 1 are obtained in general by the measurement of 
both the sample with the unknown uranium nitrate 
solution and a reference nitic acid solution with a HN03 
molarity identical to that of the U sample under assay. 
In this way the influence of sample matrix effects is 
widely eliminated. 
However, if the composition or the density of the 
matrix in the uranium sample and in the reference 
sample are different, a small positive or negative bias 
will be observed in the assay result depending on the 
difference of the matrix composition in both samples. 
This is due to the fact that the mass attenuation coeffi-
cient of the sample matrix is not constant over the 
energy range of the interrogating photons. Fig 5 shows 
the virtual uranium concentrations simulated by differ-
ent sample matrix compositions. The simulated U con-
tent is given for 1 mol, 3 mol and 8 mol HN03 samples 
and is evaluated for the photon pairs 95 /136 keY and 
98 /122 keY, respectively, used for the determination of 
the transmission below and above the U K-edge. The 
3 mol HN03 sample serves as reference, the values are 
taken from repeated measurements of the acid samples 
with good statistical precision. 
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Fig. 5: Bias of measured uranium concentration vs. 
molarity of HN03 solvent for "wide" collima-
tor geometry. 
The sample matrix effect increases with increasing 
distance of the photons from the U K-edge energy. Its 
magnitude is also depending on the collimator geome-
try used. The data given are valid for the "wide" 
collimation. Though the bias introduced by matrix 
variations is small in case of product solutions with 
high U concentrations and generally low and almost 
constant acidity of the solvent a verification of the 
matrix effect and a possible correction for it from the 
known molarity of the samples under assay is recom-
mendable if ultimate measurement accuracy is desired. 
Measurement precision and accuracy 
Fig. 6 shows the relative deviations of the K-edge 
densitometric assay results from the declared values of 
the DA chemical analysis. The results are given for the 
"narrow" collimation geometry. Four samples with ura-
nium concentrations of 50 gU/1, 100 gU/1, 220 gUll and 
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t. 0.178 mm 
• 0.203 mm 
• + 0.228 mm 
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0 0.280 mm 
* 0.356 mm 
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Uranium concentration Pu [g/1] 
% deviation of measured U concemrarion from 
declared DA values versus U concentration. 
427 gUll in 3 mol HN03 solution have been analyzed. 
The values shown are taken from a series of measure-
ments to determine the optimum thickness of the U 
converter foil. 
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The data evaluation was performed according to 
eq. 1 with prior correction for sample fluorescence. The 
figure demonstrates an excellent linearity of the response 
of the assay system over a wide range of U concentra-
tions after proper correction for sample fluorescence. 
The error bars given represent the measurement preci-
sions achievable in 2000 s counting time. The calibration 
constant ~11 for the transmission pair 98/122 keY ob-
tained from these measurements is also given in the 
figure along with its associated error at the level of 
1 standard deviation. The evaluation of other transmis-
sion pairs from the multi-line interrogating radiation 
will definitely improve the precision of the assay result. 
From the measurements we conclude that the target 
accuaracy of better than 0.5 % in 1000 s counting time 
for U product solutions can be met. The observed 
precision for 400 gU/1 samples was better then 0.2 % 
within this counting time for a single transmission-pair 
evaluation (98/122 keY). Reliable values for the 
achievable accuracy of the compact K-edge densitome-
ter cannot be given at present because only a limited 
number of samples have been analyzed (15 in total). 
The planned field test will give more valid information 
about the instrument performance under field conditions. 
3. 235U abundance assay 
Principles 
The 235U abundance in uranium solutions can be 
determined by passive gamma-ray measurements. Dur-
ing the decay of the radioactive 235U isotope character-
istc gamma lines are emitted. A typical gamma- and X-
ray spectrum observed from natural uranium is shown in 
Fig. 7. Four strong gamma lines with energies at 
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Fig. 9: 185 ke V counting rate versus U concentration 
for 1.5 m/ natural uranium solution. 
-
for the attenuation of the 185 keV radiation remain 
unchanged. 
The registered 185 keV counting rate is of course a 
function of the total uranium concentration. Fig. 9 
shows the 185 keV counting rate observed from 1.5 m! 
natural uranium in 1 mol HN03 solution at various con-
centration levels. The deviation from linearity is caused 
by the increasing self-attenuation effect with increasing 
uranium concentration in the sample. This nonlinearity 
necessitates a careful calibration of the system versus 
the U concentration. 
It can also be deduced from Fig. 9 that for 1.5 m! of 
a 400 gfl solution of natural uranium - which is a typical 
value for product solutions - a 185 keV counting rate of 
about 70 cps is expected. Thus a counting precision of 
better than 0.5 % is achievable in 1000 s counting time. 
The gamma counting rate of interest is also affect-
ed when the sample matrix composition and density 
changes between measurements. This effect has been 
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investigated by determining the instrument response for 
pairs of samples with equal uranium concentration but 
diffent matrix molarity: 1 mol I 8 mol HN03 and 4 mol/ 
6 mol HN03, respectively. The matrix attenuation of the 
185 keV line given in units of(% per mol) at various U 
concentration levels is displayed in Fig. 10. The effect 
is small - about -0.2 % per mol difference at all U 
concentrations. For strongly varying matrix and highly 
accurate assays this mol-correction is recommended. 
Another crucial parameter is the sample volume in 
the measurement cell. The sample liquor has to be very 
carefully filled into the test tube using a high-precision 
pipette. Any volume variation directly proceeds into the 
assay result. For a sample volume of 1.5 m1 and and 
envisaged accuracy of better than I % the pipetting 
error should not exceed about ± 5 - 10 J.il. 
Calibration 
The relation between observed 185 keV counting 
rate N and the 235U abundance Enr in its simplest form 
is given by 
Enr = .., N (2) 
(a· Pu - b · Pu) · (1 - c · (mol - mol rer) 
where a, b and c are calibration constants, Pu is the 
uranium concentration (value from the compact K-edge 
measurement), mol and mol,.r are the HN03 molarities 
of the sample under assay and of the reference sample, 
respectively. 
At least three calibration samples are required to 
establish the constants in eq. 2. Two samples CALl and 
CAL2 with identical matrix and 235U abundance, but with 
different U concentration are needed to evaluate the 
constants a and b in eq.2. A third calibration sample 
CAL3 is required to determine the mol-correction con-
stant c. It should exhibit the same U concentration and 
235U abundance as one of the samples CALl or CAL2, 
but the HN03 molarity should be significantly different. 
The use of natural uranium is recommendable for all 
three calibration samples. 
237U interference 
The mu isotope is always present in freshly sepa-
rated reprocessed uranium. Since its predecessor 241Pu is 
removed during the separation process mu will die away 
with a half life of 6.75 days. 237U emits two strong 
gamma lines within the energy region of interest for 
235U assay with energies at 164.6 keV and 208.0 keV. 
There is no direct interference expected for high reso-
lution gamma detection systems because these gamma 
lines are well separated from the 185.7 keV line from 
mu used for the enrichment assay. A problem however 
may arise from the high activity of mu for freshly sep-
arated high-burnup uranium. No such type of material 
was available for testing, therefore we can give only an 
estimate for the expected effect. 
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Fig. 7: Passive gamma- I X-ray spectrum of 1.5 m/ 
natural U solution measured with a Ge well 
detector. 
144 keY, 163 keY, 185.7 keY and 205 keY serve as a 
fingerprint for the presence of 235U. The strongest line 
at 185.7 keY is normally used for 235U abundance de-
terminations. Due to the lack of suitable gamma lines 
from the major isotope 238U near to the energy region of 
the characteristic 235U gamma rays a direct ratio meas-
urement is not possible. Instead the absolute number of 
185 keY gammas emitted from the sample per second is 
determined that is a direct measure of the number of 
235U atoms present in the sample. In practice the 185 keY 
counting rate before registered in the detector is subject 
to various attenuation effects and has to be folded with 
the detector efficiency. These effects will be discussed 
in the following subsections. 
Equipment 
From the inherently low em1ss1on rates of the 
185 keY radiation in low enriched uranium it is easily 
verified that the 235U enrichment determination, when 
performed on a few-ml samples with standard planar or 
coaxial Ge detectors, will yield poor counting statistics 
and precision within acceptable counting times. Count-
ing rates as low as about 10 cps have been observed 
from 5 ml of natural uranium solutions. 
However, the measurement situation significantly 
improves when the samples are counted in a well-type 
detector exhibiting approximately a 41T geometry. A 
schematic view of an assay system using a Ge well 
detector is given in Fig. 8. 
The detector used in the present exercise had a 
well diameter of 14.5 mm, the total depth of the well 
was 35 mm, the active zone inside the detector was 
22 mm deep. The sample cells for the uranium liquor 
were standard test tubes with an outer diameter of 
11.5 mm and an inner diameter of 9.8 mm. In order to 
reduce the influence of small variations of the test-tube 
dimensions the whole sample volume should be kept 
inside the active detector well as indicated in Fig. 8. In 
the present counting set-up this condition leads to a 
maximum recommended sample volume of about 1.5 m!. 
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Fig. 8: Schematic view of the 2.15 U enrichment assay 
system. 
Crucial parameters 
The observed 185 keY gamma counting rate used 
for the determination of the 235U abundance depends 
on a number of parameters that influence the assay 
result which are listed below: 
• 
235U isotope abundance 
• total U concentration 
• matrix composition and density 
• sample volume 
- sample geometry (diameter, form of test tubes) 
- wall thickness of test tubes 
- position of the sample 
- detector efficiency 
The last four factors marked by a minus sign can be 
kept well under control by using always the same type 
of well specified test tubes, by a careful design of the 
sample-cavity adapter and by calibration, respectively. 
The first parameter in the above list is the wanted 
quantity. Keeping all other parameters constant and 
varying only the 235U abundance will result in a strictly 
linear response of the assay system as a function of the 
235U abundance, because all other factors responsible 
In the worst case of freshly separated high-burnup 
uranium the radioactive decay rate of mu may exceeds 
that of 235U by a factor of 180. The 208 keY peak is the 
about 70 times higher than the 185.7 keY peak of 
interest. The more stringent problem is the total detec-
tor counting rate. From a total counting rate of about 
1000 cps for a 1.5 m1 natural uranium solution with 
400 gUlL registered in our experiment we extrapolate 
to a total detector counting rate of more than 100 kcps 
for the above mentioned worst case material. This 
excessively high counting rate can hardly be handled by 
conventional counting electronics without serious deg-
radation of the system performance. 
Possible countermeasures are either the reduction 
of the sample mass at the cost of longer counting time 
or the insertion of a suitable absorber into the detector 
well to reduce the low energy gamma- and X-rays that 
contribute a significant part to the total counting rate 
(see Fig. 7). If any or which of these countermeasures 
has to be taken depends on the conditions found in the 
field test. Two weeks after separation the total counting 
rates will reach an acceptable level in any case. 
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Abstract 
Following successful tests of a hybrid K-edge in-
strument at TUI Karlsruhe and the routine use of a 
K-edge densitometer for safeguards verification at 
the same laboratory, the Euratom Safeguards Di-
rectorate of the Commission of the European Com-
munities decided to install the first such instrument 
into a large industrial reprocessing plant for the 
routine verification of samples taken from the in-
put accountancy tanks. Th1s paper reports on the 
installation, calibration, sample handling proce-
dure and the performance of this instrument after 
one year of routine operation. 
1. Introduction 
In November 1989 the new French reprocess-
ing plant UP3 started operations. During detailed 
discussions held over a period of several years be-
fore plant start-up between its operator, Cogema, 
the French government and the Euratom Safe-
guards Directorate on the implementation of safe-
guards at this facility it was agreed to install a Eu-
ratom owned and operated hybrid K-edge densi-
tometer for independent verification measure-
ments of samples of input and process liquors. The 
number of such samples was estimated at approxi-
mately 250 per annum, the target accuracy was set 
at 1 %. 
Traditionally this type of sample has been 
sent off-site for chemical analysis at one of the Eu-
ropean Commission's Safeguards Analytical Meas-
urement (ECSAM) laboratories. Transport of these 
samples requires sample conditioning such as dilu-
tion, spiking and drying of weighed aliquots by 
operator's staff under observation by the inspec-
tors. This conditioning procedure thus requires 
operator's and inspector's resources, increases 
their dose rate, reduces the inspector's confidence 
in the authenticity of the sample, and it may intro-
duce additional sources of error reducing the over-
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all accuracy of the verification measurement. Addi-
tionally, transport of nuclear materials, albeit in 
very small quantities, is subject to increasing prob-
lems with licensing, shipment approval and public 
acceptance. This may lead to substantial delays be-
tween the date of sampling and the date at which 
the analytical results reach the inspectors. Thus the 
goal of timeliness may not be met, and follow-up 
in case of differences may be difficult if not impos-
sible. Finally, transport of these samples has be-
come very costly. 
Following successful tests of a hybrid K-edge 
instrument at the European Commiss1on's Joint Re-
search Centre Institute for Transuran1um Elements, 
and the routine use of a K-edge densitometer for 
safeguards verification measurements at the same 
laboratory, the Euratom Safeguards Directorate 
decided to implement this instrument for the rou-
tine verification of samples of input and process li-
quors in the large new reprocessing plants. 
2. System Description 
Principal Layout 
The principal instrument layout of the first in-
field installation at UP3 IS similar to the configura-
tion of the prototype system, which has been suc-
cessfully tested at the European Institute for Trans-
uranium Elements, Karlsruhe /1/. 
The combined K-edge densitometry (KED) 
and X-ray fluorescence (XRF) measurements for the 
uranium and plutonium assay in the highly radio-
active dissolver solutions require a compact and ef-
ficient counting geometry, a high-intensity photon 
source, and tight beam collimation for both mea-
surement channels. The standard counting con-
figuration of the Hybrid Instrument is shown in 
Fig. 1. The requ1red primary radiat1on - a photon 
continuum for KED at very h1gh intensity for both 
XRF and KED ·can only be obta1ned from a power-
ful X-ray unit. 
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Fig. 1 : Principal counting geometry adopted for the 
Hybrid Instrument. 
The previous concept of using two separate 
sample vials for the measurements - a glass cu-
vette for KED and aPE vial for XRF - is also applied 
in the present installation. An improvement com-
pared to the previous prototype system has been 
achieved by reducing the distance between the fo-
cal spot of the X-ray tube and the samples from 
8 em to 6.5 em . This modification further reduces 
the sensitivity to the self-radiation from the input 
solutions. 
Mechanical Installation 
For operation with undiluted input solutions 
the Hybrid Instrument must be installed next to a 
well-shielded box for sample handling. The cou-
pling of the instrument to any type of shielded box 
is usually achieved by means of a rigid and tight 
tube of stainless steel, in which the samples are 
transferred from the interior of the box to the in-
strument outside the containment. This principal 
configuration, which maintains and ensures a safe 
sample containment at any time of operation, and 
which leaves the complete equipment outside the 
box in an accessible area, greatly facilitates its in-
stallation and adaptation to existing shielded fa-
cilities. 
A suitable place for instrument installation at 
UP3 was identified in the HA laboratories, where a 
series of shielded boxes are located. The boxes are 
utilized by the operator for part of his analytical 
work on the input solutions. The given boundary 
conditions at the proposed location offered the 
possibility to design a relatively simple and com-
pact mechanical set-up for instrument adaptation 
to the backside of one of the shielded boxes. 
The actual mechanical assembly of the Hybrid 
Instrument at UP3 is shown in Fig. 2. The stainless 
steel tube seen on the photograph, about 60 em 
long with an outer diameter of 8 em, is dimension-
ed to fit into an existing flange of the box . The 
adaptation to the box is indicated on the plan of 
installation given in Fig. 3. The mechanical assem-
bly is mounted on a small table right at the peri-
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Fig. 2: Photograph of the mechanical assembly prior 
to installation. 
phery of the box shielding . It is surrounded by a 
layer of 10 em of lead to provide shielding against 
the high-energy gamma radiation from the input 
solutions. 
A conveyor inside the stainless steel tube car-
ries the samples from the loading position inside 
the box to the position of measurement in the in-
strument. The displacement of the conveyor over 
the relatively short distance of about 50 em is done 
manually . A micro-switch is actuated when the 
sample conveyor has reached its correct position 
for a measurement. 
Equipment 
The different instrument components re -
quired to run the Hybrid Instrument are commer-
cially available units. The block diagram in Fig . 4 
identifies the components, how they are intercon -
nected, and where they are located at the site of 
installation. 
The equipment located behind the shielded 
box comprises the mechanical set-up, two planar 
HpGe-detectors (200 mm2 x 10 mm) for XRF and 
KED and the X-ray tube with associated power 
modules. The X-ray tube - a metal-ceramic tube 
with tungsten target- is operated at 150 kV/15 mA, 
which corresponds to about 75 % of its maximum 
power rating of 3 kW. An air-cooled water circu la-
tor provides the cooling for the X-ray tube. 
The equipment located in the working area 
in front of the shielded box comprises an electron-
ics cabinet containing the NIM modules for the de-
tectors, the X-ray control unit and the micro-switch 
control unit. The NIM modules for the two detec-
tor systems are contained in a single NIM bin. The 
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Fig. 3: Plan of the instrument installation at UP3. 
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respective modules are identical for both detec-
tors, except that the branch for the KED detector 
also includes a digital stabilizer set on the refer• 
ence peaks from a 109Cd source. 
An Ethernet-based spectroscopy workstation 
with associated periphery is used for data acquisi-
tion and analysis. it includes an Acquisition Inter-
face Module (AIM) with built-in IEEE 802.3/802.2 
conforming Ethernet (LAN) Interface connected to. 
a Digital VAX station 3100. The latter runs under 
Digital Micro VMS Operating System and includes 
Micro VMS workstation software providing multi-
windowing capabilities. The dedicated software 
packages for spectrum analysis and data evalua-
tion are written in FORTRAN. 
Test Samples for Measurement Control 
Fig. 4: Block diagram of the instrument components. 
Two test samples for instrument monitoring 
were prepared at TUI /3/. The test sample for KED 
consists of a uranium solution (218 g U/1) sealed in 
a glass cuvette of the same type as used for the in-
put solutions. The stability of the U/Pu ratio meas-
urement from XRF is controlled from measure-
ments on a (U, Pu) MOX-pellet. The latter sample, 
welded in stainless steel, contains about 5 % Pu 
with a 239Pu abundance of 98.3 %. Both test sam-
ples are mounted into a frame and located in a 
stainless steel capsule as shown in Fig. 5. The cap-
sule with the test samples is loaded into the sample 
conveyor in the same manner as the capsule used 
for the input solutions. 
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Fig. 5: Stainless steel capsule with test samples for 
measurement control. · 
3. Operating Procedure 
Samples of liquor taken from the input ac-
countancy tank arrive directly in the shielded box 
to which the hybrid K-edge is attached. Their arri-
val, subsequent transfer to a special storage rack · 
and any other manipulations are observed by avid-
eo camera looking down into the shielded box 
through a leaded window. This camera is connect-
ed to a front end video motion detector, and any 
activity detected in the zones of interest is recor-
ded on a time lapse recorder. The inspector usually 
chooses 3 sample bottles at random from the 20 or 
so bottles which arrive in total before each transfer 
from the accountancy tank into the process. 
When the inspector is ready to carry out the 
verification measurement he first initiates an auto-
mated warming-up sequence for the X-ray tube, 
whose duration depends on the time passed since 
the last operation of the tube. He then asks the 
operator's staff to place the control standard, 
which is normally stored in the sample rack under 
video surveillance, into the sample conveyor and to 
transfer it into the measurement position. After a 
combined measurement of 1000 s each for the K-
edge and XRF chain the control measurements are 
checked and entered into an instrument quality 
control log. 
If the instrument is found to be working 
properly, the operator's staff then transfer ap-
proximately 2 ml of input liquor into the K-edge 
vial and 1 ml into the XRF vial from the sample bot-
tle chosen by the inspector. The samples vials, 
shown in Fig. 6, are placed in a special capsule 
which is closed by a lid to avoid spillage, and the 
capsule is moved into the measurement position 
with the conveyor system. When the control light 
for the micro-switch indicates correct positioning 
the inspector starts the verification measurement, 
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Fig. 6: Sample vials for input solutions. Black dots 
indicate position and size of incident X-ray 
beams. 
which normally consists of 3 repeat acquisitions of 
1000 s live time each. Because of the containment 
and surveillance measures applied to the instru-
ment environment the inspector may leave the 
laboratory during the measurement. The measure-
ment results are entered into a special log . 
They are compared to the results of the ope-
rator's chemical analysis done by Isotope Dilution 
Mass Spectrometry (IDMS) as soon as these have 
been made available to the inspector. If both re-
sults agree within the known measurement uncer-
tainties, the sample and the other bottles taken 
from the same batch are returned to the operator. 
If the operator-inspector differences in ·either the 
uranium or plutonium concentration are larger 
than certain thresholds, a second sample may be 
measured. 
4. Calibration 
Preliminary Calibration 
A preliminary instrument calibration was car-
ried out in November 89 at Karlsruhe, prior to the 
shipment of the instrument to La Hague. A set of 
synthetic U/Pu-solutions, prepared by the Nuclear 
Technology Division of the European Institute for 
Transuranium Elements (TUI), Karlsruhe on a gravi-
metric basis from U metal standard material NBS 
960 and Pu metal standard material NBS 949e, 
were used for this purpose. The reference mate-
rials were mixed to yield samples with a U/Pu ratio 
of about 100. 
The reference solutions served to calibrate 
the XRF channel of the instrument for a correct 
U/Pu ratio measurement. A reliable calibration of 
the KED channel, which is designated for the meas-
urement of absolute uranium concentrations, was 
not possible at that time . There existed indications 
that the calibration solutions, while keeping them 
in the vials for measurement, had slightly increased 
their concentration due to evaporation. Since time 
constraints prior to instrument shipment did not 
allow to characterize new reference solutions, the 
instrument was initially run with a calibration fac-
tor determined for the prototype system at TUI /2/. 
lt was expected that this calibration factor for an 
instrument of similar design should also apply to 
the present instrument within an uncertainty of 
about 0.1 to 0.2%. 
Final Calibration 
In July 1990, after about 7 months of instru-
ment operation, a fairly extensive final calibration 
was carried out with a larger set of reference solu-
tions. The synthetic calibration solutions, again 
prepared from the same NBS reference materials 
mentioned above, were established and characte-
rized at TUI and then shipped to La Hague. They in-
cluded mixed U-Pu solutions at different concen-
tration levels and U/Pu ratios to calibrate the in-
strument for input solutions. Further, there were 
also separate uranium and plutonium solutions 
available with concentrations down to 0.1 g/1 to 
calibrate the XRF channel of the instrument for the 
measurement of other venfication samples at low-
er U and/or Pu concentration. 
Fig. 7 shows the results of the calibration runs 
for KED. The single calibration factor ~11 to be de-
termined from the calibration physically represents 
the difference of the total photon mass atten-
uation coefficient for uranium at energies 
E.= 113.25 keV and E + = 117.26 keV bracketing the 
K-absorption edge. The calibration factor was de-
termined as weighted mean value from the cali-
bration points to ~11 = 3.3374 with a standard error 
of 0.04%. This value differs by 0.13% from the pre-
liminary calibration factor ~ll = 3.3331 determined 
for the prototype instrument at TUI /2/. 
The fission product elements in a dissolver so-
lution cause a small negative bias to the uranium 
assay by KED. The magnitude of the bias depends 
on their concentration, which in turn is proportion-
al to the burn up ofthe fuel. For burnup values bet-
ween 30 and 40 GWd/t the necessary bias correc-
tion is about 0.15%. This correction is automatical-
ly applied whenever the system detects fission pro-
ducts through their gamma radiation. The diag-
nostics is provided by the XRF detector, which is 
more sensitive to this radiation because of the lar-
ger collimator diameter in the XRF channel. 
The XRF calibration factor RutPU. which re-
lates the measured UKa1/PuKa1 peak area ratio to 
the U/Pu element ratio, was determined from the 
calibration runs with a standard error of 0.09%. A 
small non-linearity was observed for this conver-
sion factor at high total heavy element concentra-
tions {>250 g/1). This non-linearity was approxi-
mated by a second-order polynomial. 
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Fig. 7: Determination of the calibration factor ~11 
forKED. 
The option to measure absolute U or Pu con-
centrations at lower levels by XRF alone is not yet 
fully implemented. The calibrat1on runs taken for 
this mode of analysis are currently being used to 
standardize this type of measurement. 
5. Performance 
Instrument Stability 
The short and long-term behaviour of the in-
strument response in both measurement channels 
{KED and XRF) was monitored from regular control 
measurements on the respective test samples. 
Fig. 8 shows the results of control measurements 
for KED, which initially were performed on a test 
sample made from a uranium metal foil. Unexpec-
tedly, large systematic trends of up to 2% were ob-
served from those measurements as shown in the 
left plot in Fig. 8. The large fluctuations, far be-
yond the measurement precision, were attributed 
to a possible local inhomogeneity of the foil thick-
ness. This assumption has later been verified. As a 
consequence, the metal foil was then replaced in 
July 90 by the sealed uranium solution. The results 
of control measurements performed on this sam-
ple over a 9-month period {Aug. 90- April 91) are 
shown on the right-hand side in Fig. 8. The relative 
standard deviation of 0.30% for the differences 
from the mean value is not significantly larger than 
the precision of a single measurement {0.24%). The 
moving average {n = 5) plotted in the figure indi-
cates small instrument drifts of about ±0.3% at 
maximum for this period. 
Similar control charts as for KED were pro-
duced for the XRF channel from measurements on 
the MOX test sample. Two sets of data, obtained 
from two MOX pellets of the same type but of 
slightly different U/Pu ratio, exist for the periods 
from 11/89 - 07/90 and 08/90- 04/91 {Fig. 9). The 
relative standard deviations of the differences 
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Fig. 8: Control measurements for KED performed on a uranium metal foil (left), 
and on a sealed uranium solution (right). Solid line: moving average 
(n=5). 
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Fig.9: Control charts for the U/Pu ratio measurement from XRF. Test measure-
ments performed on MOX pellets. Solid line: moving average (n = 5). 
from the mean values (0.26% and 0.28%) are 
slightly larger than the precision of 0.24% for a sin-
gle measurement. Small drifts of up to 0.3% are 
observed for both test periods. 
Up to now the instrument behaviour for both 
the KED and XRF measurement is only being moni-
tored. The small systematic trends observed have 
not yet been used for a readjustment of calibra-
tion. This may be done in future. 
Results for Input Liquors 
During the first 12 months of operation two 
different types of samples were measured with the 
hybrid K-edge instrument. A first group of samples 
was taken from input liquor after the separation of 
fission products, the second group consisted of 
normal input samples containing fission products. 
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The relative inspector-operator differences for the 
U and Pu concentration, and for the U/Pu ratio are 
shown in Figs. 10 and 11 for the two campaigns. 
Wash batches with very low U and/or Pu concen-
trations are not shown and have not been included 
in the evaluation. The average relative differences 
and the standard deviations of the relative differ-
ences are shown as dashed and dotted lines in the 
figures. Only very few results do fall outside the 2o-
range (6 out of a total of 195 data points). Relative 
differences deviating by more than 3o from the 
average are not observed. 
Table 1 summarizes the results for the two 
measurement campaigns on input liquors without 
and with fission products. Mean values and stand-
ard deviations of relative i.nspector-operator dif-
ferences were calculated for each campaign once 
including all data, and once excluding differences 
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Fig.10: Results from 1st measurement campaign 
on input solutions after separation of 
fission products. 
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Table 1 : Mean Values and Std. Deviations for Relative Inspector-Operator 
Differences. 
Data 
Base 
Mean Rei. Diff. + Std. Dev. (%} 
All (n = 33) 
Diff. > 2cr 
Excluded 
All (n = 32) 
Diff. > 2cr 
Excluded 
U-Conc. 
0.21 ± 0.36 
0.21 ± 0.36 
(none)* 
- 0.11 ± 0.39 
- 0.07 ± 0.35 
(1) 
( )* Number of Excluded Results. 
which deviate from the average by more than 2 
units of the standard deviation calculated for the 
full set. The number of excluded data, ranging be-
tween zero and 2, are given in brackets. 
The results confirm the error estimates for 
the operator's chemical analysis as well as the ran-
dom and systematic error variances calculated and 
estimated for the K-edge measurements. The pres-
ence of fission products does not lead to a deterio-
ration of instrument performance. The standard 
deviation and the average of the relative differ-
ences in U concentration are smaller than those ob-
served for analysis by IDMS. The same is true for 
the average values of the relative differences in Pu 
concentration and in U/Pu ratio. The standard 
deviations of the relative differences in Pu concen-
tration and in U/Pu ratio are better than the aver-
age performance values for paired comparison of 
inspector and operator analyses done by IDMS. 
6. Conclusions 
A hybrid K-edge instrument was installed at a 
shielded cell of the Cogema laboratories at La 
Hague as the result of a very successful coopera-
tion between Cogema, the French government, Eu-
ratom Safeguards Directorate, KfK and TUI Karls-
ruhe. This instrument has been successfully em-
ployed for routine safeguards verification analysis 
of samples of tnput liquor taken from the accoun-
tancy tank of the large new reprocessing plant, 
UP3, for more than one year. For the first time in 
Pu-Conc. U/Pu-Ratio 
ln~ut Liguors without FP 
- 0.01 ± 0.74 0.22 ± 0.62 
-0.00 ± 0.61 0.16 ± 0.55 
(2) (1) 
ln~ut Liguors with FP 
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0.10 ± 0.73 -0.20 ± 0.81 
0.18 ± 0.65 -0.31 ± 0.68 (1) (1) 
the history of Safeguards, inspectors can indepen-
dently verify nuclear material concentrations in in-
put accountancy tanks of reprocessing plants as 
early as two hours after sampling with an accuracy 
of 0.2-0.3 %for uranium and 0.6-0.7% for plutoni-
um. Instrument performance has been consistently 
better than expected from ESARDA target values. 
Considering the costs for transport and chemical 
analysis of samples of this kind the instrument has 
already paid for itself. In future the accuracy of 
measurements may be further improved by in-
creasing measurement time and/or counting rates 
(fast pulse processors) and by using the smoothed 
results of the control measurements for bias cor-
rection. Process samples with lower nuclear materi-
al concentration will be measured with this instru-
ment using the X-ray fluorescence chain on its 
own. Cogema have also purchased and installed a 
hybrid K-edge for their own analytical require-
ments at La Hague. 
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Introduction 
High Purity Germanium Detectors (HPGe) and Nai(Tl) 
detectors are the workhorses used for the verification of 
nuclear material using gamma spectrometry. For some 
applications, however, these detectors are not optimal. 
HpGe detectors need to be cooled by liquid nitrogen. 
Nal d~tectors have only a moderate resolution. 
CdTe detectors have properties which place them in the 
middle between above detector options. They exhibit a 
better resolution as Nal detectors but do not require 
liquid nitrogen for cooling. They have a higher intl:insic 
energy efficiency as above detectors. These proper~ICS 
allow the design of miniature detection systems whtch 
are portable and can e.g. be used to access nuclear fuel 
items which would otherwise have to be moved (isolated) 
for the verification. These features make the CdTe 
detectors attractive for different vel'ification tasks in 
International Safeguards. 
The !AEA has for many years been paying attention to 
the development of CdTe detectors. Considerable 
progress was made within Technical Support Programme 
Tasks of several Member States - France. Germany and 
the Soviet Union - to develop customized detection 
Table 1 Planar Cdl'e detectors 
Type of planar Features Possible use 
detector 
Structure metal • Typical volume of Verification of fresh 
semiconductor single detector Sx5x1· Lim and MOX 
2mm, mosaic replacing Nai 
structures possible; detectors in some 
excellent resolution application cases; 
can be obtained using 
pulse shnpe Attribute testing of 
discrimination (l'SD) spent fnel with short 
cooling time 
Stucture p·i·n Size of single detector As above 
up to 1 sqcm possible, 
mosaic structures 
possible, elTective 
thicknc.!ls 0.2-0.5 mm; 
good resolution can 
Uc obtained using a 
mini Pclticr cooling 
device 
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systems and electronics for use of CdTe for specific 
measurement tasks whet·e other gamma detectors arc 
difficult to use. 
An overview is given below on the properties and the 
usage of CdTe detectors. 
Properties of CdTe detectors Developed for the IAEA 
Two different types of CdTe detectors are available -
hemispherical and planar detectors. Hemispherical 
detectors do not require pulse shape discrimination 
(PSD) and can be used at very high countrates - up to 
several 100000 cps. Planar detectors can only be used in 
conjunction with a PSD module which corrects for the 
different rise times of the pulses at the output of the 
preamplifier. 
Under the French Support Programme large area planar 
detectors and highly sensitive hemispherical detectors 
have been developed. Under a joint French - German 
Support Programme Task the PSD electronics has been 
developed. 
Under a Soviet Support Programme Task and a 
Research Contract high countrate hemispherical 
detectors and other specialized detectors have been 
developed. 
An overview on the properties of the detection systems is 
given in the tables 1 and 2. 
Typical gamma spectra for different detectors and 
sources are shown on the Figures. 
Table 2 Hemi-spherical detectors 
Type of detector Features Applications 
Dual hemispherical High sensitivity for in In situ verification of 
detection system situ verification of the fresh fuel assemblies 
initial cnrichmcnts of 
fresh LWR assemblies 
Large volume Highly sensitive Applications which 
hemispherical detectors with a require a high 
detectors volume of up to 1 ccm sensitivity of the 
detector 
Hemisherical Allows measurements Measurements in a 
detectors with with good resolution high temperature 
integrated up to 60 degrees C; environment, e.g. in n 
prenmplifier coupled intcgml packngc - spent fuel pond; 
to mini peltier cooling detection probe can partial defect test of 
device be well shielded spent fuel if 
combined with 
GRAND·I/Fork 
High countrate Allows measurement CANDU bundle 
system with sepernte of peak area of Cs- verification; 
second stage of 137 rndintion of spent verification of 
prcnmplificr fuel up to a countrntc difficult to access 
of 'cveral 100 kcps :-.pent fuel items 
High countrate Same properties as Verification of 
system with ubovc but integral difficult to ucccss 
integrated prcamplilier·detector nuclear material 
prenmplifier (under allowing n long 
evluation) distance between 
detector and MCA 
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8JO 
Gamma Spectra of WWER-440 Fresh Fuel Assemblies 
Taken by a CdTe Detector Inserted into the Central 
Instrumentation Hole 
c 
a b 
d 
Legend 
a: Enrichment 1.6%, 1000 seconds livetime 
b: Enrichment 1.6%, 100 seconds livetime 
c: Enrichment 3.6%, 1000 seconds livetime 
d: Enrichment 3.6%, 100 seconds livetime 
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Description of Some Application Cases of CdTe Detectors 
Verification by Spent Fuel Specific Attributes of CANDU 
Bundles Stored in Stacks of Trays (access from the side 
with at least 100 mm gap between stacks) 
Short description of the verification task: 
Verify several thousand CANDU bundles stored in stacks of trays with a 
random low sample size. 
Solution: 
Use of a well shielded and collimated miniature CdTe detection probe 
moved along the side of the stacks. The bundles arc verified by a bundle-
gap modulation of the magnitude of the Cs-137 gamma peak area. 
Use of other detector options: 
If HPGe or Nal were used, the spent fuel inventory would have to be moved 
-a technically extremely difficult, expensive, and time consuming procedure. 
Verification of CANDU Bundles Stored in Baskets 
Short description of the verification task: 
Verify CANDU bundles stored in baskets after interbay transfer. 
Solution: 
Same solution as described above. 
Use of other detector options: 
Use of HPGe was considered but would have led to about 5 times more 
costly solution with a higher level of inlru\ion (partial i~olation of the 
bundles required). Gross gamma silicone tlctcctors were used before, hut 
the cfTcctiveness of the method was lower. 
Verification of CANDU Bundles in Dry Storage Canister 
Short description of the verification task: 
Verify inaccessible CANDU spent fuel bundles stored in a dry storage 
Verification of Fresh LWR Fuel Assemblies 
Short description of the verification task: 
In situ verification of the initial enrichment of LWR fresh fuel assemblies. 
Solution: 
A CdTe detection probe with a diameter of 8.2 mm is inserted into an 
instrumentation channel of the fuel assembly. It is not needed to lift or 
remove the assembly from its storage location. 
Use of other detector options: 
Nai detectors can only be used if the assemblies arc accessible from the 
side. This is not always the case. 
In Situ Verification of U0-2 Powder in Drums 
Short description of verification task: 
U0-2 power stored in drums needs to be verified. The number of DA 
samples taken can be reduced if the homogeneity of the powder in the drum 
can be checked by NDA. 
Solution: 
A stainless steel pipe with a diameter of 9 mm can be inserted into the 
powder at nny location. A CdTe detection probe is inserted into thb pipe. 
In this way the enrichment cnn be checked nt nny location inside the dnun. 
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canister; a monitoring channel with a diameter of 2.5 cm is available. 
Solution: 
A unique pattern of the Cs-137 gamma radiation along the axis of the 
canister is obtained by using a miniature CdTe detection system. 
Use of other detector options: 
HPGc or Nal detectors cannot be used because they arc not small enough. 
Verification of Spent Fuel Assemblies Stored in Wells 
Short description of the verification task: 
Verify by attributes spent fuel assemblies stored in dry channels in concrete 
accessible only from above through a narrow channel 
Solution: 
A miniature CdTe detection system is inserted from above into the well. A 
Cs-137 spent fuel signature is obtained. 
Use of other detector options: 
HPGc or Nal detectors arc too large to be sufficiently shielded and inserted 
into the well. The assemblies would have to be removed for the verification. 
Verification of On-Load Reactor Spent Fuel Stored in a 
Double Layered Vertical Storage Geometry 
Short description of the verification task: 
Verify spent fuel bundles of an on-load reactor hanging vertically above 
each other in two layers in ~~ ~torn~e rack allowmg access from nbovc 
through n 100 mm gU(J only 
Solution: 
A shielded and collimated CdTc detection system is inserted into the gap 
and rotated. The bundles can be verified by a modulation of the Cs-137 
gamma signal as a function of the rotation angle. 
Use of other detector options: 
Nal or HPGc detectors can not be used because of their high sensitivity and 
the limited space for shielding · 
Use of other detector options: 
Nal detectors arc too big, Small di:unetcr BGO detectors arc an alternative 
but have n much lower resolution. 
Other application cases which are still in early stage of the 
development: 
development and use of large nrca high sensitive Cc.lTc detectors for 
attribute testing of fresh MOX and LEU assemblies 
development of a detection system to be used for the unattended 
monitoring of spent fuel transfers using spent fuel specific signatures 
(fission products); 
development and investigation of a high performance X-ray CdTc 
detector to be used for CANDU bundle verification with severe space 
limitations 
combination of CdTc detector with the GHAND-I/Fork to nchicvc n 
pnrtinl defect test cupability for spent fuel measurement on LWR 
spent fuel. 
A GAMMA-SPECTROSCOPY SYSTEM FOR BURNUP MEASUREMENTS 
OF NUCLEAR FUEL 
A. Backlin, A. Hakansson, P. Bjorkholm, and A. Dyring 
Department of Radiation Sciences, Uppsala University 
and 
K-G. Gorsten 
Gammadata AB. Uppsala 
Abstract 
A high-speed gamma-ray spectroscopy system for 
verification of nuclear fuel of the BWR type has been 
constructed. It uses a gamma-ray collimator, commer-
cial high-speed NIM electronics, a fast PC and espe-
cially designed software and PC interface. It allows 
accurate determination of e. g. 154Eu in presence of 
strong activities of 134 Cs and 137 Cs. With this tech-
nique isotopic correlations may be used for independent 
determination of fuel parameters. 
1. Introduction 
Gamma-ray spectroscopy is a well-known method 
for non-destructive verification of the burn up of nuclear 
fuel, see e. g. /1, 2/. Usually the 137Cs activity is mea-
sured and the average intensity of this line ( 662 ke V) 
is assumed to be proportional to the average burnup of 
the assembly. Also gamma radiation from 164 Eu is of 
interest for several reasons: It is sufficiently long-lived 
to be essientially independent of the power history of 
the reactor. Since its intensity is approximately pro-
portional to the square of the burn up, the burnup of an 
assembly can be obtained in an alternative way to di-
rect measurements of the cesium radiation, by forming 
the intensity ratio to the cesium intensity. Further, the 
energy of the most prominent peak (1275 keY) has a 
higher penetrability than the cesium radiation, which 
implies a larger potential for examination of the inte-
rior of the fuel assembly for missing fuel rods. On the 
other hand, in normal BWR fuel the europium activ-
ity is one to two orders of magnitudes weaker than the 
cesium activity, which requires that accurate measure-
ments have to be performed at high counting rates. 
We here present a spectroscopy system that allows 
gamma-ray scanning of spent nuclear fuel at counting 
rates exceeding 80 kcps into the computer memory. 
2. Equipment 
2.1. Detector arrangement 
At all BWR power plants and interim storage fa-
cilities in Sweden and Finland, an arrangement consist-
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ing of a horizontal collimator and a specially designed 
elevator for scanning the fuel elements are installed 
/2/. An overview of the equipment is shown in fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1 - Schematic view of the equipment of the in-
terim storage CLAB in Sweden. 
1}. Fuel handling pool. Depth; 13 m, thick-
ness of walls; 1 m concrete. 2}. Fuel as-
sembly in measuring position. During mea-
surements, the assembly is moved in the 
vertical direction. 3}. Horizontal collima-
tor, approximately 1 m of iron. 4). High-
purity germanium detector. 5}. Electron-
ics and computer for data acquisition. 
The collimator is shaped as a horizontal slit with 
a height that can be varied between 1 and 5 mm. The 
opening of the collimator is such that the detector 
views the full width of the measured assembly. In order 
to enhance the radiation in the 1 Me V region relative 
to the large background of scattered radiation, a 4 mm 
lead filter is normally used. 
The detector used is a 40% HPGe n-type detec-
tor. In order to optimize the line shape, the detector 
is irradiated radially /3/. 
2.2. Electronics 
Fig. 2 shows a block scheme of the spectrome-
ter system. The detector is equipped with a transis-
tor reset preamplifier which, together with an Ortec 
973U gated integrator amplifier, allows a throughput 
of over 100 kcps with an energy resolution of about 3 
keV FWHM. The ADC is aND 582 with a fixed con-
version time of 1.5 f.LS and a total busy time of 2.4 f.LS. 
The data are stored and analyzcd in a PC via a 
specially designed fast interface card /4/. The essential 
part of the card is a FIFO circuit which de-randomizes 
the data transfer to the computer. With the ND 582 
the transfer time to the FIFO is 0.6 f.LS. Normally a 
fast PC, like the Toshiba 5200 laptop which has a 386 
processor with a 20 MHz clock frequency, is used for 
data collection and analysis. With a buffer size of ten 
events in the FIFO, data can be transferred into the 
computer memory at a rate exceeding 115 k events per 
second with essentially no deadtime loss before satura-
tion occurs. 
Fig. 2 - Block scheme of the spectrometer system. 
In high count rate systems, the deadtime may be 
considerable and it is essential that it is adequately cor-
rected for. In the present system this is done with the 
pulser method (see fig. 2). A pulser peak is placed at 
the high-energy end of the spectrum, where the back-
ground is negligible. The data taking code automati-
cally evaluates the peak area and corrects the spectrum 
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accordingly. For a spectrum recorded during 3 seconds 
at 50% deadtime and a pulser rate of 2 kHz, the cor-
rection factor will be accurate to better then 2%. 
2.3. Software 
The gamma-ray scanning of a fuel assembly is per-
formed by sequential measurement of a number of spec-
tra while the assembly is moved vertically at constant 
speed in front of the collimator. A special code, "SKI-
D AS", was written in C for sequential storing of spec-
tra. A gross lay-out of the code is given in fig. 3. 
Before starting the data taking, the number of 
spectra N and the recording time per spectrum T are 
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Fig. 9 - Flow diagram of the soft ware used. 
given together with data on the gamma-ray peaks of 
interest in the measurement and the pulser frequency 
used. The code then sequentially record N spectra and 
store them on disc. Three spectrum areas arc used for 
this and the switching between the areas is performed 
with no loss of counts. For controling the procedure, 
two other spectrum areas are used to display the sum 
of all spectra and an optional number of histograms 
showing the intensity of selected gamma-ray peaks as 
a function of the spectrum number. Fig. 4 displays 
three such histograms showing the intensities of the 
137 Cs peak, the 164Eu peak and the 6°Co peak as the 
complete length of a fuel assembly was scanned with 
N=70 and T=3 seconds. The sharp peaks in the 6°Co 
histogram, originate from the rod holders. 
After completion of a scan, all spectra are auto-
matically corrected for deadtime. A corrected summed 
spectrum is created and stored together with histograms 
corrected for dead time. Finally the energies and in-
tensities of the peaks of interest are evaluated from the 
corrected summed spectrum and printed. 
137Cs 
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Fig. 4 - Intensity distributions along an assembly 
with BU=33 GWdjtU and cooling time=39 
months. 
2.4. Results 
The high-rate capacity of this system is such that 
input rates exceeding 200 kcps can be handled. How-
ever, during typical measuring conditions, including 
pile-up rejection, an input rate at 70 kcps gives a 
throughput into the computer of about 40 kcps with 
an energy resolution of 2.6 keV. When a resolution of 
over 3 keV can be tolerated, the throughput into the 
computer can be doubled with a dead time of about 
50%. 
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Fig. 5 is an example of a dead time corrected spec-
trum obtained with the present detector system. The 
total input rate was for this case 70 kcps and the bur-
nup and cooling time were 33 GWd/tU and 39 months, 
respectively. With a measuring time of 200 seconds per 
corner for this assembly, a statistical error of the 137 Cs 
peak of 0.2% is achieved and the corresponding error 
for the 164Eu peak is 0.8%. 
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Fig. 5 - Energy spectrum for the same assembly as 
in fig. 4. 
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A NEW SPENT FUEL ATTRIBUTE TESTER 
FOR IN SITU VERIFICATION OF 
LIGHT WATER REACTOR SPENT FUEL 
R. Arlt, A. Hiermann, Y. Lopatin, M. Tarvainen 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria 
Abstract 
A new spent fuel attribute test method has been 
developed. It allows in-situ verification of Light Water 
Reactor spent fuel assemblies in wet storage ponds. The 
method is essf)ntial for the verification of spent fuel 
assemblies witn 'long cooling time when Cerenkov Viewing 
Devices cannot be used any more. The method uses in the 
most cases spent fuel specific gamma ray signatures allowing 
the establishment of the presence of irradiated nuclear 
material. 
1. Introduction 
The number of spent light water reactor fuel 
assemblies is rising from year to year. Only a small 
percentage of the assemblies undergoes reprocessing. The 
larger part is stored in recently constructed facilities - long 
term or away from the reactor storages. The spent fuel 
assemblies can stay for several decades in a wet type long 
term storage facility. When the age of the fuel assemblies 
approaches 10 years it becomes more and more difficult to 
verify them using Cerenkov Viewing Devices. Other 
available spent fuel verification methods, however, require 
at least partial raising of the spent fuel assembly from its 
storage location in the rack. Fuel movements are, however, 
increasingly undesirable when the spent fuel ages. This 
circumstance has prompted the development and 
implementation of a new spent fuel attribute test method. 
This method and the device are named Spent Fuel Attribute 
Tester (SFAT). Since 1991 is authorized for inspection use 
at the IAEA. 
2. Basic Principle of the Method 
The basic principle of the method (see Fig. 1) is not 
new. An airfilled pipe is positioned vertically above the 
spent fuel assembly to verify. The gamma radiation, 
emerging from the irradiated pellets of the fuel zone and 
penetrating the top structure of the assembly, is channeled 
through an air filled pipe to a suitable gamma detector. If 
the system is properly designed and only unscattered, full 
energy gamma rays are recorded, the influence of the other 
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fuel assemblies surrounding the item to be verified, can be 
made neglectable (near neighbor effect). A similar method 
has been used to verify spent fuel assemblies stored in multi-
element bottles (MEB). In that case, however, only the Co-
60 radiation can be utilized since the 662 keV gamma 
radiation of Cs-137 does not sufficiently penetrate the lid of 
the MEB. 
TOP STRUCTURE OF 
ASSEMBLY 
FUEL ZdNE 
Figure 1 - PRINCIPLE OF THE METHOD 
In an early study /1/, a submergible pipe with a 
gamma detector attached was investigated. The results, 
however, were not convincing since a gross gamma signal 
was used. In that case, the near neighbor effect could not be 
excluded to the extent necessary to establish a reliable 
verification method. 
The device described in this paper uses a Nai(Tl) 
detector to observe the gamma rays. The aperture of the 
collimator is designed so that only gamma rays directly from 
the item to be verified plus scattered gamma rays from· its 
surrounding can reach the Nal detector. The scattered 
gamma rays, however, are excluded by evaluating only 
events which are contained in the full energy peak of the Cs-
137 gamma spectrum. The performance of this method can 
be checked by positioning the device above the gap between 
two adjacent fuel assemblies - as shown on Fig.!. The Cs-
137 gamma peak will disappear and only the background of 
scattered gamma rays remains. The minimization of this 
background of scattered gamma rays is one of the main 
development targets since the its presence reduces the 
sensitivity of the methods and leads to a longer measurement 
time. 
3. Technical Description 
The Spent Fuel Attribute Tester (SFAT) consists of 
the following components (see Figs. 2 and 3): 
SPENT FUEL ATIRIBUTE TESTER (SFAT) - OVERVIEW 
WAITRTIGHT HOUSING / 
CONTAINING THE LEAD 
SHIELDING AND THE 
NAI DETECTOR I 
AIR FlLLED 
PIPE 1.5 TO 
2 METERS 
LONG 
DIMIEITR 
20-JOmm 
_WATERTIGHT CABLE 
LEAD SHIELDING AND COWW.TOR 
1H( TOT~ YIOCHT OF THE [)('.IC( NoKlUHTS TO HJ(}.JT 
J0-100 k9 OCPE~ ~ ll£ }(;( NlO ll£ STQR.IGC 
GEOUETRY Of THE SPENT fVU. 
THE OE'riCE IS t.IAOC Of ST.A.INLESS STEU. 
Figure 2- COMPONENTS OF SF AT 
3.1 Top stn1cture 
The top structure interfaces with the fuel grapple in 
case the device is handled by the operator's fuel handling 
tool. In this case an actual upper tie plate and fuel assembly 
handle is used (see Fig. 4). Otherwise a clasp and eye 
arrangement is used (see Fig. 3). 
3.2 Detector Housing and Shielding (see Fig. 5) 
The detector is lead and copper shielded and encased 
in a watertight, stainless steel housing. This lead shielding 
has the following functions: 1) To reduce the background 
countrate caused by contaminants in the water and by the 
"cloud" of scattered low energetic gamma rays reaching 
several meters above the spent fuel assemblies; and 2) to 
form, by the hole in its lower end, together with the air 
filled pipe a collimator which determines the aperture of the 
SFAT. 
The size and weight of the lead shielding depends on 
the application case. The lead shielding can be made smaller 
and lighter (e.g. 10-20 kg) if long cooled spent fuel has to 
be verified, but must be made larger and heavier (e.g. 50-80 
kg) if old fuel is stored next to spent fuel with short cooling 
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Figure 3- OVERALL VIEW OF A SPENT FUEL 
ATTRIBUTE TESTER FOR FUEL WITH LONG 
COOLING TIME 
time and/or the water is strongly contaminated. 
3.3 Air-filled Pipe 
At the lower end of the detector housing an air-filled 
pipe is attached. The length and diameter of this pipe 
depends on the age and the design of the spent fuel and of 
the storage geometry. Pipes with lengths of 1-2 meters and 
an inner diameter of 20 - 30 mm are used. The tip of this 
pipe is covered by a polyethylene end piece which can be 
removed in case it becomes contaminated. 
3.4 System for Handling the SFAT 
Two different strategies have been demonstrated and 
tested: 1) using the operator's fuel handling tools; and 
2) using a so called "sliding mounting bracket". A sliding 
mounting bracket is equipped with rollers and can be moved 
along the bridge rail (see Fig. 6). On its top there is a 
manual or motor driven winch which to raise and lower the 
SFAT. 
3.5 Gamma Spectrometer 
A Nai detector based gamma spectrometer is used. 
The crystal size is either 2" X 2" or 1" X 1". A Portable 
Multi Channel Analyzer (PMCA) with an upgraded amplifier 
/2/ is used . The upgrade is needed to assure a high 
l 
Figure 4 - TOP STRUCTURE OF AN SF AT FOR BWR 
TYPE ASSEMBLIES 
throughput, good resolution and a low pileup rate at very 
high countrates. Since the gamma peaks have a low 
intensity and reside on a high background of scattered 
gamma rays, a good high countrate performance of the 
gamma spectrometer is essential to reduce the measurement 
time. A watertight underwater TV cable is used to supply the 
voltages to preamplifier and photomultiplier and to transmit 
the signal to the PMCA. 
4. Handling and Verification Procedure 
Handling and positioning of an SF AT can vary 
widely between facilities. It can be handled from the bridge 
with a crane or hoist operated by the facility operator. It can 
be handled from a steel band and hook attached to a "sliding 
mounting bracket" fitted over the bridge railing. It can be 
handled using the facility's fuel handling machine. 
Facility-specific handling procedures are being worked out 
in cooperation with operators. Examples of the handling and 
verification procedures in different facilities were recorded 
for demonstration on video tape. 
The setup and verification procedure /3/ includes the 
following steps: 
test of the device outside the spent fuel pond using 
background radiation or a test source; 
transfer of the SFAT into the spent fuel pond (done 
by the operator); 
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Figure 5- DETECTOR HOUSING 
measurement of the background gamma spectrum 
caused by contamination of the water; 
positioning the SF AT above the fuel assembly to be 
verified (done by the operator); 
measurement of the gamma spectr~m ; the 
measurement time amounts from tenths of seconds in 
favorable cases to several minutes in unfavorable 
cases; and 
optional measurement of the gamma spectrum above 
the gap between the fuel assembly to be verified and 
the adjacent fuel assembly. 
The data evaluation and conclusion drawing is done 
on the spot. If a Cs-137 peak can be recognized visually on 
the display of the PMCA, the assembly is considered 
verified. In marginal cases, the Cs-137 peak area must be 
measured above the assembly and above the gap . The 
determination of the Cs-137 peak area and its error gives in 
these cases a quantitative acceptance criterion. 
The verification procedure and a typical measurement 
result for WWER-440 type spent fuel with short cooling time 
is illustrated on Fig. 7. 
5. Results 
The basic performance of the method has been 
studied for various spent fuel and storage geometries and 
fuel assemblies with different values of the cooling time 
Figure 6-
Figure 7-
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VERIFICATION PROCEDURE AND TYPICAL 
SPECTRA FOR SPENT FUEL WITH SHORT 
COOLING TIME 
ranging from 3 months to about 7 years. This work was 
done in cooperation with several Member States- Bulgaria, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, United States of America, 
Soviet Union, Sweden and Yugoslavia - within Support 
Programme Tasks or Research Contracts (see e.g. /3,4,5/). 
The work started with an evaluation of neutron and 
gamma detection schemes. Experiments and theoretical 
studies on the neutron field above a storage rack showed, 
that this radiation cannot be used because of the strong near 
neighbor effect /51. Subsequently, the work concentrated on 
gamma detectors. Nal detectors, CdTe detectors, ionization 
chambers and Geiger Mueller tubes were compared. The 
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best performance to cost ratio was obtained for Nai 
detectors. In the following, the main results obtained for 
Nai detector based SFAT devices are summarized . 
It was found that the performance of the method 
(defined as sensitivity to detect in a given measurement time 
spent fuel specific radiation features) depends on several 
factors: 
5.1 Cooling Time and Burnup of the Spent Fuel 
Assembly to be Verified and its Neighbors 
The following cases are considered: 
5.1.1 Spent Fuel with Short Cooling Time ( < 4 Years) 
In general, fuel assemblies in this range of cooling 
time can be verified by CVD. In some cases, when the 
transparency of the water is low, it might be required to 
verify also short-cooled fuel assemblies with SFAT. 
In this case, the highly penetrating Pr-144 gamma 
radiation (energy 2186 keV, half life 284 days) can be used 
for the verification (see Fig. 7). For such an application, the 
SFAT has to be designed with a heavier weight and longer 
air-filled pipe (2-2.5 meter). , The method performs well for 
a short cooling time since th.e Pr-144 radiation is highly 
penetrating and located in a low background area of the 
gamma spectrum. Also fast scanning measurements can be· 
considered. With the age of the fuel approaching and 
exceeding 4 years, it becomes more and more difficult to 
recognize the Pr-144 signal on the background of pileup of 
the pulses caused by the strong Co-60 signal. A well 
designed pulse pileup rejection system of the gamma 
spectrometer is essential in this case. 
5.1.2 Spent Fuel Assemblies with Long Cooling Time 
(> 4 Years) 
Cs-137 is used for this verification (gamma energy 
662 keY, half life 30.1 years). There are two factors which 
in this case determine the sensitivity of the method: 1) the 
absorption of the Cs-137 signal in the material layer above 
the fuel pellets; and 2) the level of background radiation 
below the Cs-137 peak. The background radiation below the 
Cs-137 peak has mainly two origins: 1) compton scattered 
gamma rays of Co-60 (gamma energy 1172 and 1132 keV, 
half life 5.3 years); and 2) Pr-144, when fuel assemblies 
with short cooling times are stored next to long cooled fuel 
assemblies. The first case is typical for all wet long term 
storage facilities, the second for some reactor ponds. 
It is obvious that in the first case the method · 
performs better the longer the cooling time becomes. The 
interfering Co-60 radiation decreases with a half life of 5.3 
years while the Cs-137 radiation remains much longer. 
Therefor, it is possible to verify a long-cooled BWR fuel 
assembly in as short as 10 sec only (see Figs. 8 and 9), 
while some minutes are required to recognize the Cs-137 
signal from a 5-year old fuel assembly. 
l 
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Figure 8 - GAMMA SPECTRUM OF BWR ASSEMBLY 
WITH LONG COOLING TIME; 
MEASUREMENT TIME 10 SEC. 
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Figure 9 - GAMMA SPECTRUM ABOVE THE GAP 
5.2 Design of the Top Structure of the Assembly 
Determining the Absotption of the Gamma Rays 
emerging from the Fuel Pellets 
On their way from the fuel pellets to the detector, the 
gamma radiation has to penetrate several material layers -
the gas filled plenum above the pellets, the end plugs of the 
fuel rods, the upper tie plate of the assembly, other 
structural element which might be present and the water gap 
needed for safety reasons between the top of the fuel 
assembly and the lower end of the air filled pipe. Although 
there are differences in the design of fuel assemblies, we 
were able to show that the fuel assemblies of the major types 
(BWR, WWER-440 and PWR) can be verified with this 
method. However, problems can occur if the absorbing 
layer is much larger than for the above mentioned 
predominant fuel assemblies. In this case, it might only be 
possible to use the Co-60 radiation for the verification. 
We also inve~tigated the dependence of the Cs-137 
signal on the water gap between the top of the handle of a 
BWR fuel assembly and the lower end of the SFAT. It is 
recommended that this gap ideally amounts to about 50 mm 
but should not to exceed 100 mm. 
5.3 Design Features of the SFAT (size. weight. length 
and diameter of the airfilled pipe. lead 
collimator/shielding. Nal detector) 
The above mentioned design parameters of the SFA T 
are of great importance for optimizing the measurement 
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method - e.g. to reduce the weight of the device and the 
measurement time. Although a complete theoretical analysis 
and optimization of the design features is still under way, we 
have shown that for long-t~rm storage facilities containing 
only long-cooled fuel, the weight of the device needs not to 
exceed about 20 kg. In case of reactor ponds with 
contaminated water and fuel assemblies with shorter cooling 
times, the weight of the device might have to be 5 to 10 
times larger. 
6. Conclusions 
A new spent fuel verification method has been 
developed and demonstrated for the major spent fuel types. 
From the results obtained, it is concluded that the method 
can be used for spent fuel assemblies with long cooling times 
such as those present in wet, long-term storage facilities. 
The method uses spent fuel specific radiation signatures and 
does not require fuel movement. It is, however, more 
intrusive than Cerenkov Viewing Devices, since equipment 
has to be introduced into the spent fuel pond. More effort 
is underway to optimize the measurement systems improving 
the sensitivity and the method, lowering its intrusiveness and 
extending the method to more difficult application cases like 
research reactor spent fuel and old fuel surrounded by 
short-cooled fuel assemblies. 
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CALCULATION OF Pu 242 FROM ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION 
MEASUREMENTS BY GAMMA SPECTROSCOPY 
P. Louis, M. Boella 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg 
ABSTRACT 
Accuracy of measurements for determination of 
the Plutonium Isotopie composition has notably 
lmproved ln the last few years, due to the 
progress ln hardware and software. ln 
partlcular the use by the lnspectors of 
Euratom Safeguards Dlrectorate (ESD) of the 
MGA code (1, 2, 3) has glven very satlsfactory 
results for the verification of the Isotopie 
Composition declared by the operators. 
The Pu242 ls not measured by gamma 
spectroscopy but calculated wlth an algorlthm. 
ln this paper we present two algorlthms used 
for the calculatlon of Pu242 ln reprocesslng 
plants (one for the Pu reprocessed from PWR 
elements, one for the Pu reprocessed from 
MAGNOX reactors). The results of calculatlons 
presented ln this paper show an lmprovement ln 
the accuracy of calculated Pu242. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
La mesure de la composition Isotopique du 
Plutonium est effectuée régulièrement par les 
Inspecteurs du Contrôle de Sécurité d'Euratom, 
essentiellement pour l'évaluation des mesures 
neutroniques ayant pour but de vérifier la 
masse de Plutonium contenue dans les articles 
sélectionnés lors des Inspections. 
La précision de cette mesure a été très 
notablement améliorée dans les dernières 
années, par l'utilisation d'unités de 
détect lon des rayons gammas de plus en plus 
performantes (détecteurs, unités d'acquisition 
et de traitement), et partlcul lèrement par 
1 'utl 1 lsatlon d'un programme d'évaluation 
(code MGA), qui associé à l'utilisation de 
systèmes Informatiques récents permet des 
mesures rapides et précises des rapports des 
1 sot opes Pu 238, Pu 239, Pu 240 et Pu 241 
(références 1, 2, 3). 
L'Isotope Pu 242 ne peut pas être mesuré par 
spectroscopie gamma, Il est calculé par un 
algorithme en fonction de la balance des 
Isotopes 239, 240 et 241 les deux 
algorithmes actuel lament Incorporés dans le 
code MGA (références 4, 5) sont Indépendants 
de 1 a mat 1ère mesurée. L · expér 1 en ce nous a 
montré que la précision du calcul du Pu 242 
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peut être améliorée en recherchant des 
corrélations spécifiques pour des matériels 
déterminés. 
Dans ce papier, nous présentons deux 
suggestions d'algorithmes tous deux relatifs 
aux usines de retraitement où, compte tenu du 
flux de matières et des nécessités du 
safeguard, l'un des obJectifs est la mesure de 
100% des articles de Pu02 produits. La 
première formule s'appl lque au matériel 
produit après retraitement d'éléments MAGNOX, 
la seconde pour le matériel Issu du 
retraitement d'éléments PWR. Les résultats 
montrent que des corrélations spécifiques 
apportent une Importante amél loratlon dans le 
calcul du Pu 242. 
Il. METHOQES UTILISEES POUR LA RECHERCHE PE 
L'ALGORITHME 
La vérification du produit fini (containers de 
Pu02) est l'un des objectifs majeur dans les 
lnspect lons effectuées en sort le de procédé 
avant entrée dans le stockage. et/ou lors de 
leur expédition dans les Installations de 
fabrication. 
La vérification quantitative du plutonium est 
effectuée par mesure neutronique. L'évaluation 
de la mesure neutronique nécessite la 
connaissance de la composition Isotopique. La 
DCS ut 1 1 1 se des systèmes basés sur 1 a 
spectrométrie gamma pour mesurer la 
composition Isotopique. Nous avons déJà évoqué 
1 ' 1 mpor ta nt progrès dans 1 a prée 1 s 1 on de 1 a 
détermination des rapports des Isotopes Pu 238 
à Pu 241 par l'ut lllsat lon du code MGA (réf. 
1, 2, 3). Compte tenu des précisions obtenues 
avec ce code et de la précision de la mesure 
neutronique, nous avons cherché à améliorer 
l'évaluation du Pu 242 de telle façon que 
l'erreur sur la mesure quantitative d'un 
article basé sur des vérifications 
Indépendantes de 1 'Inspecteur (mesure 
neutron 1 que, spect romét r 1 e gamma 1 ne 1 us 
algorithme de calcul Pu 242) soit minimisée. 
La table 1 montre l'Influence du Pu 242 sur 
l'évaluation de mesures neutroniques 
effectuées sur deux articles mesurés avec un 
compteur UFBR sur des bottes de Pu02 obtenue à 
partir de matières d'origine réacteurs PWR. 
Table 1 
l.C. (1) 
declared 
I.e. <Z> 
Pu 242 -30% 
I.e. <3> 
Pu 242 -20% 
I.e. <4> 
Pu 242 - 5X 
Lot 1 
Pu 238 Pu 239 Pu240 Pu 241 Pu 242 
0.793 62.706 23.507 9.208 3.786 
0.802 63.446 23.784 9.317 2.650 
0.799 63.199 23.692 9.280 3.029 
0.795 62.829 23.553 9.226 3.597 
u.F.B.R. measured PU mass: 
with I.C. (1)= 9876 g. Pu 
with l.C. (2)= 10107 g. Pu 
with I.e. (3)= 10029 g. Pu 
with l.C. (4)= 9912 g. Pu 
On constate que 1 'erreur additionnel le est 
pour le lot 1 de 2.3% (lot 2 : 1.6%) pour une 
est lmat lon erronnâe de 30% de 1 'abondance du 
Pu 242 et de 0.3% (lots 1 et 2) pour une 
estimation erronnée de 5%. 
Divers modes de calcul utl lisent l'historique 
des combustibles retraités. Due à la 
difficulté pour les Inspecteurs de vérifier 
ces Informations, et compte tenu de 
fonctionnement des nouvelles usine en 
dissolution continue, 1 'algorithme choisi 
devait être Indépendant de l'Irradiation et du 
temps de refroidissement du combustible. 
Enfin, compte tenu du fait que par leurs 
activités d'Inspection, les utilisateurs ont 
connaissance de la date de séparation des 
matières à mesurer le principe est d'appliquer 
les formules de calcul à la date de séparation 
après mise à jour des balances Pu 238 à Pu 241 
nesurées. 
Le Pu 242 est forcé à 0 de telle sorte que : 
(Pu238)'+(PU239)'+(Pu240)'+(Pu241)' • 100 
L'algorithme est appliqué pour le calcul de 
(PU242)'. 
La composition Isotopique finale est calculée 
pour une normal lsatlon à 100 de la somme 
(PU238)' à (PU242)'. 
Ill. CORRELATION~ PROPOSEES ET PRECISIONS 
ATTENDUES 
L'analyse des données relatives à 5 
lnstal lat lons de retraitement où de nombreuses 
mesures ont été effectuées par les Inspecteurs 
de 1 a DCS a amené au cho 1 x de deux 
corrâlatlons 
une pour les matlilres Issues de réacteurs 
MAG NOX 
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Lot 2 
***** 
Pu 238 Pu 239 Pu240 Pu 241 Pu 242 
2.546 50.264 26.984 11.995 8.211 
2.614 51.613 27.708 12.317 5.748 
2.592 51.163 27.467 12.210 6.569 
2.557 50.489 27.105 12.049 7.800 
U.F.B.R. measured PU mass: 
wi th l.C. ( 1)= 10731 g. Pu 
with I.e. (2)= 10890 g. Pu 
with l.C. (3)= 10836 g. Pu 
wi th l.C. (4)= 10758 g. Pu 
une pour les matières Issues de réacteurs 
PWR. 
HQ1A: Nous avions proposé originalement une 
corrélation valable pour les réacteurs 
PWR et BWR. L'Intégration de nouvel les 
données et une étude statistique plus 
affinée ont montré que les 
corrélations sont différentes pour ces 
deux types de matière. 
Dans les deux cas et après avoir Intensivement 
testé des corrélations linéaires, 
polynomlnales etc ... , Il ressort que des 
corrélations exponentielles donnent les 
meilleurs résultats. 
Pour les matières de réacteurs MAGNOX, la 
corrélation entre le Pu 242 et les autres 
Isotopes à la date de séparation dans l'usine 
de retraitement est : 
Pu 242' - 3.2646 +(Pu 239)•-1.823 + 
(Pu 240)'2.075 +(Pu 241)'0.003 
Pour les matières Issues de réacteurs PWR 
Pu 242' - 1.594694*(Pu 239)'-1.481 * 
(PU 240)'+1.471*(PU 241)'1.010 
Les tables 2 (réacteurs MAGNOX) et 3 
(réacteurs PWR) montrent quelques exemples de 
calculs sur des lots typiques extraits des 
banques de données de résultats de mesure. 
Les f 1 gu res (réacteurs MAGNOX) et 2 
(râacteurs PWR) montrent les écarts entre les 
valeurs calculées et déclarées en fonction de 
l'abondance du Pu 242 dans les matières 
mesurées. 
t"lot. .. r 1..00 
1 
----1 
1 r-
I 
+---------
1 
1 1 1 -+-~~ 1 : 1 
Figure 1 
TABLE 
0.295 
0.245 
0,17 
0.23 
0.26 
0.15 
0.12 
0.13 
0.31 
0.28 
0.26 
0.28 
p,..ctlot.ct 
65.52 
68.515 
73.585 
71.255 
67.565 
75.085 
77.42 
77.055 
64.14 
66.3 
67.64 
66.38 
REMARKB 1 ( 1) 
TABLE 3 
PU238 PU239 
1 1 
1 
27.285 
25.255 
21.705 
23.41 
25.945 
20.605 
18.935 
19.245 
28,09 
26.75 
25.89 
26.755 
PU240 
1 
5.375 
4.785 
3.765 
4.145 
4.915 
3.49 
2.995 
3.02 
5.755 
5.23 
4.91 
5.145 
PU2U 
1.525 
1.2 
0.775 
0.96 
1.315 
0.67 
0.53 
0.55 
1.705 
1.44 
1.3 
1.44 
PU242 
1.536 
1.204 
0.771 
0.957 
1.307 
0.666 
0.528 
0,551 
1.697 
1.442 
1.298 
1.439 
averaqa 
std.dav. 
Figure 2 
-0.71 
-0.35 
0.57 
0.33 
0.62 
0.54 
0.31 
-0.23 
0.46 
-0.14 
0.12 
0.04 
0.13 
0.40 
1.811 
1.364 
0.800 
1.013 
1.481 
0.676 
0.501 
0,519 
2.083 
1. 687 
1.473 
1.656 
-18.73 
-13.70 
-3.21 
-5.51 
-12.59 
-0.90 
5.39 
5.67 
-22.15 
-17.14 
-13.28 
-14.98 
-9.26 
8.92 
,--. ·-,-, -!-r-'~-· 
! -·----+---J----J 
1.226 
0.985 
0.736 
o.808 
1.041 
0.640 
0.506 
0.527 
1.391 
1.159 
1.037 
1.135 
1 
19.58 
17.88 
5.03 
15.79 
20.86 
4.43 
4.45 
4.22 
18.44 
19.52 
20.20 
21.20 
14.30 
7.04 
... 
lli •• UI 
PU242(1) di!!.% PU242(2) di!!.% PU242(3) di!!.% 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.444 67.869 21.033 8.218 2.437 2.568 -5.36 1.989 18.39 1,864 23.50 
0,498 68.014 21.118 7.853 2.518 2.458 2.37 1.900 24.54 1.873 25.61 
2.456 49.916 26.923 11.842 8.864 9.114 -2.82 6,782 23.486 7.448 15.97 
1.815 54.748 24.877 11.965 6.595 6.976 -5.78 5.263 20.194 5.584 15.32 
1.780 57.061 25.124 10.434 5.601 5.713 -2.00 4.267 23.812 4.946 11.69 
1. 763 56.908 24.694 10.889 5.747 5.854 -1.86 4.400 23.438 4.989 13.20 
1.511 55.497 25.471 11.085 6,436 6.528 -1.42 4,859 24.504 5.006 22.22 
1. 417 56.879 25.298 10.598 5.809 5.906 -1.67 4.392 24.392 4. 595 20.90 
1.133 61.084 25.553 8.268 3.963 4.085 -3.09 3.001 24.27 3.354 15.37 
1.749 55.917 24.553 11.525 6,257 6.356 -1.58 4.797 23.338 5.210 16.73 
1.152 59.500 23.991 10.461 4.895 4.993 -2.01 3,757 23.240 3.828 21.80 
average -2.29 23.05 18.39 
std.dav. 2.05 1.87 4.37 
REMARKB (1) 
m 
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Les résultats sur les mat !ères mesurées 
montrent 
qu'Il n'y a pas d'erreur systématique sur 
le Pu 242 calculé quelque soit le burn-up, 
le temps de refroidissement ou la 
compos ., t 1 on 1 n 1 t 1 a 1 e du combus t 1 b 1 e, 
que la déviation standard des écarts entre 
la valeur calculée et déclarée est 
Inférieure à 5%. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Les discussions constructives avec MM Gunnlnk 
et Ruhter, Wagner et Goerten (voir références) 
nous ont amené à étudier des corrélations 
spécifiques pour amél lorer la précision du 
calcul de l'abondance en Pu 242. Les résultats 
de mesures de composition Isotopique 
effectuées sur l'oxyde de P lutonlum produl t 
dans différentes usines de retraitement de la 
Communauté Européenne ont permis une étude 
statistique montrant que des algorithmes 
dépendant uniquement du type de réacteur 
origine de la matière, permettent d'obtenir 
des prée 1 s lons 1 nfér 1 eu res à 5% dans 1 e cas 
des réacteurs MAGNOX et PWR. D'autres 
corrélations seront développées dans le futur 
pour différents types de réacteur. 
Ces résultats permettent d'affiner 
sensiblement l'évaluation Indépendante des 
résultats de mesures quantitatives de 
p 1 ut on 1 um effectuées par 1 es 1 nspecteurs du 
Contrôle de Sécurité d'Euratom. 
362 
REFERENCES 
1. ti. Gunnlnk, "A new one-detecter analysls 
method for rapld hlgh-preclslon plutonium 
Isotopie measurements", Proc. 9th Ann. 
Symp. European Safeguards Research and 
Development Association, London 1987, May 
12-14 (ESARDA, JRC lspra, ltaly) p. 167 
2. H.G. Wagner, J. Goerten and P. Louis, 
"Experiences wlth ln Field Gamma 
Spectroscopy", Proc. 29th Ann. Meeting 
INMM, Las Vegas 1989, June 26-29 (INMM 
Northbrook) vol. XVI 1 p. 737 
3. H.G. Wagner, P. Louis, J. Goerten, R. 
Gunnlnk, W.D. Ruhter and o.c. camp "Field 
experience of Euratom wlth LLNL-MGA Code 
for Pu Gamma-Spectroscopy", Proc. 11th Ann. 
Symp. European Sa feguards Research and 
Development Association, Luxembourg 1989, 
May 20 - June 1st (ESARDA, JRC lspra, 
ltaly) p. 399 
4. R. Gunnlnk, "Use of Isotopie Correlations 
techn 1 ques to determ 1 ne Pu242 Abundance", 
J. INMM, 9, 83 (1980) 
5. R. Gunnlnk, W.D. Ruhter, "MGA: A Gamma-Ray 
Spectrum Analysls Code for Determlnlng 
P 1 u ton 1 um 1 sot op 1 c Abundances", (Lawrence 
Llvermore National Laboratory, Llvermore) 
Volume 1, page 21, (Aprl 1 3, 1990), Volume 
2 page 21 
EFFECTIVE GO/NO GO ENRICHMENT MEASUREMENTS 
Helen M. Hunt 
Consultant; Princeton, New Jersey, USA 
1. Abstract 
A simple plumbing bypass modification 
would eliminate excessive systematic error 
and improve precision for uranium hexafluoride 
gas enrichment measurements at centrifuge 
enrichment plants having small-diameter 
cascade pipes. Present gas enrichment 
measurements on typical small-diameter 
product pipes are indeterminate, because 
overwhelming systematic errors and large 
statistical errors result from the high 
deposit-to-gas ratios. The bypass would 
essentially eliminate the deposit from 
measurements. The intended purpose of go/no 
go measurements is to confirm that the 
enrichment of randomly selected product 
streams is ~20%. The Hexapartite Safeguards 
Project participants agreed by consensus in 
1983 on the importance of go/no go 
measurements. 
2. Introduction 
Large-scale commercial enrichment of 
uranium by gas centrifuge technology, which is 
commercially highly sensitive, began and 
dramatically expanded in several European 
countries during the 1970's. For proprietary 
reasons, technology holders had strong 
objections to permitting access of IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency) 
inspectors into production areas, called 
"cascade halls". This resistance constituted a 
serious problem in safeguarding large-scale 
gas centrifuge enrichment plants; indeed, for 
large-capacity plants measurement 
uncertainties implied that materials 
accountancy procedures alone were not 
adequate to provide assurance that significant 
quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
were not being produced. 
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Consequently, international safeguards 
inspectorates (the !AEA and EURATOM) and 
technology holders (Australia, Japan, the 
U.S.A., and Troika - comprising the F.R.G., the 
Netherlands, and the U.K.) engaged in the 
Hexapartite Safeguards Project from 1980-83, 
which consisted of joint discussions for the 
purpose of reaching consensus on effective and 
efficient means for safeguarding commercial 
gas centrifuge enrichment plants. Principal 
conclusions of. the Hexapartite Project and 
follow-up discussions) reached by consensus, 
were that: (1) In cascade areas there should be 
limited frequency unannounced inspections 
(LFUA inspections), of short duration, and (2) 
Inspectors should have the right to perform 
so-called "go/no go" measurements - defined 
as fairly quick non-destructive assay 
measurements on cascade-to-header product 
connection pipes, capable of discriminating 
between low enriched and highly enriched 
uranium hexafluoride gas in the pipes. 
There was Hexapartite Project consensus 
that in order to verify absence of production of 
HEU it could be necessary to perform go/no go 
measurements. Hexapartite Project partici-
pants recognized various possible means of 
producing HEU. that would probably not be 
detected through LFUA visual inspections. For 
example, cascade flows could be adjusted to 
yield higher enrichment than declared, batches 
could be recycled through a unit cascade to 
yield progressively higher enrichment, or a 
cascade that includes increased separative 
capacity added after the initial verification 
inspections could be dedicated to HEU 
production. Since the inspectors must allow 
the operator up to two hours before gaining 
access to a cascade hall, visual evidence such 
as portable feed and withdrawal stations could 
be confidently removed from a cascade area 
before entry of inspectors. Consideration of 
such weaknesses led to Hexapartite Project 
consensus on the importance of go/no go pipe 
measurements, intended to confirm that 
randomly selected streams of product gas are 
enriched to ~20% in U-235 /1/. 
Unfortunately, in practice, for plants 
having small-diameter cascade pipes, including 
the URENCO plants in Almelo (the Netherlands) 
and Gronau (Germany), go/no go measurements 
have been repeatedly indeterminate. The 
principal reason for the indeterminacy is that 
the high U-235 deposit-to-gas ratios that are 
common in low-pressure small-diameter 
process pipes create insurmountable 
calibration errors as well as very large 
statistical errors /2&3/. Excessively large, 
unpredictable calibration errors have not been 
sufficiently reduced despite years of research. 
lt is vital that the problem be resolved. 
Indeed, use of gas centrifuge technology is 
expanding. lt would be a terrible precedent if 
the present safeguards failure were permitted 
to persist. 
3. Present Measurements 
The 186-keV Method 
For low-deposit cascade-to-header 
product pipes of all sizes, simple (1-geometry) 
185.7 keV gamma ray detection for U-235, 
when combined with X-ray fluorescence for 
measuring the total uranium in the gas, is a 
reliable and viable method for discriminating 
between ~5% and >20% gas enrichments. Use of 
the 13PO collimator, illustrated below in 
Figure 1 as the "first geometry", has given 
particularly satisfactory results /4/. Because 
the deposit contribution is not subtracted out, 
the gas assay is systematically roughly 70% 
high, but statistical errors are small enough 
for short measurement times that ""70% bias 
allows reliable and practical discrimination 
between 5% and 20% gas enrichment. The 
method's viability for low-deposit pipes at 
Almelo is described by the researcher K. van 
der Meer as follows: "The gas enrichment in 
pipes with low deposit (1 :1) is easily verified 
with the 186-keV method. In 99.6% of the 
cases a total measurement time of 1 1/4 hour 
will be sufficient, if the gas enrichment is 5% 
enr." 151 
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The Deposit Correction Technique 
The deposit correction technique, not 
discussed in this paper, is one of two 
techniques that has been investigated for 
go/no go measurements on medium-deposit and 
high-deposit pipes. With this technique the 
enrichment of the deposit is assumed known. 
Experimental results reported by German 
researchers Lauppe, Richter, & Stein show 
that, especially for high deposits, the 
calculated gas enrichment "reacts very 
sensitively to slight deviations of the deposit 
enrichment value from the true value."/6/. 
Since in reality the deposit enrichment is not 
known and could vary over time with changes 
in gas enrichment levels, this method would 
not reliably discriminate between 5% and 20% 
gas enrichment. 
The Two-Geometry Technique 
The two-geometry technique was devised 
to determine the fraction of total measured 
U-235 that is in the gas, with no assumption 
on enrichment of the deposit. The diagram 
below (Figure 1) illustrates the measurement 
set-up for this technique, which utilizes two 
different collimators for obtaining two 
distinct counts of 185.7 keV gamma rays from 
U-235 in the pipes. The two-geometry 
technique is used successfully when the U-235 
deposit-to-gas ratio is low or moderately low, 
but (contrary to initial hopes) it fails when the 
U-235 deposit-to-gas ratio is high, because of 
excessive measurement errors. 
The X-Ray Fluorescence Technique for Total 
Uranium in the Gas 
An X-ray fluorescence measurement 
determines the amount of total uranium gas in 
the pipe, which allows conversion of the U-235 
gas measurement to percent U-235 enrichment. 
The X-ray fluorescence measurement utilizes a 
Co-57 source to excite the uranium K-shell 
with 122 keV photons; with careful positioning 
and collimation of both the Co-57 source 
and the germanium detector, the uranium K 
X-rays from only the gas are "directly" 
detected, (although detected K X-ray emissions 
from the uranium deposit induced by Compton 
coli!-
First Geometry 
... , 
Second Geometry 
Figure 1. In the two-geometry technique, 
two collimators having different relative 
efficiencies for detecting U-235 in the gas vs 
in the deposit are used separately for obtaining 
two distinct measurements on cascade-to-
header product pipes. (Source: reference 2.) 
c 
scale 1:2 
c 
c 
A 57co source 
n detector 
C lend coll!Jnotor 
lJ shielding 
pipe 
oleposit 
scattering Al 
0 scattering Angle 
Figure 2: The set up for X-ray fluorescence 
measurements to determine the total uranium 
in the gas. The bottom diagram illustrates the 
possibility of detection of uranium K X-rays 
emitted from the deposit following 
stimulation by Compton scattered photons of 
high enough energy. (Source: reference 7.) 
scattered Co-57 photons contribute to the 
count). In principle the measurement is 
proportional to the total uranium in the gas. 
The X-ray fluorescence measurement set-up is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
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The Impact of Deposits on Measurement Errors 
High U-235 deposit-to-gas ratios magnify 
the distortion effect on calculated gas 
enrichment of any error in the ratio of 
collimator deposit efficiencies. Indeed, the 
error magnification is proportional to the 
deposit, as shown in equation (A3) in the 
appendix. In practice, at the URENCO facility in 
the Netherlands, with actual gas enrichment of 
about 4% U-235, even careful selection and 
positioning of collimators for application of 
the two-geometry method has resulted in 
relative errors of :!.:200-300% in calculated gas 
enrichment, for pipes having high uranium 
deposit-to-gas ratio /8/. This corresponds to 
an error in calculated gas enrichment of about 
:t8-12% U-235. With the same deposit, if the 
uranium gas were highly enriched rather low 
enriched, the systematic error in calculated 
gas enrichment would likewise be at least :t 
8-12% U-235, (as indicated in the appendix). 
The presence of systematic errors that are 
typically of roughly this magnitude obviously 
renders discrimination between ~5% and 20% 
enriched uranium hexafluoride gas extremely 
unreliable. 
For situations where the expected 
magnitude of relative systematic error is less 
than about 100%, further analysis is required. 
The calculated gas enrichment can be 
expressed in the form 
Calc Gas Enr = c1R1 - c2.R1_ (1) 
where R1 and R2 are the measured 185.7 keV 
count rates for the two geometries and the 
coefficients c1 and c2 are constants obtained 
by dividing formula (A2) in the appendix by 
an overall coefficient for total uranium 
determination with the X-ray fluorescence 
measurement. As shown in formula (A2), the 
coefficients are derived from estimated 
collimator efficiencies and efficiency ratios. 
Estimated efficiencies rather than true 
efficiencies are utilized for go/no go 
measurements, because true efficiencies are 
not independently known by the IAEA, and 
because (for small-diameter pipes) values of 
true efficiencies for an actual measurement 
are sensitive to even slight imprecisions in 
placement of the measurement apparatus with 
respect to the pipe I 9/. 
Let us now summarize the effects of three 
principal sources of error in two-geometry 
measurements for small-diameter pipes: 
(A) Error in the ratio of collimator deposit 
efficiencies causes a calibration error 
(which is reflected in the coefficients c, 
and c,. in equation 1 ). lt results primarily 
in a systematic shift of the calculated 
enrichment from the true enrichment. The 
magnitude of this shift is proportional to 
the U-235 deposit, and for moderate 
or high deposits is relatively many times 
as great as the magnitude of the input 
error. 
(B) Error in the X-ray fluorescence 
measurement for total uranium causes a 
calibration error which affects both count 
rates equally. If "f" denotes the relative 
fluorescence error then the relative error 
in each of the coefficients c, and c2. is 
-f/(1+f). This error results both in a 
systematic shift by the factor -f/(1 +f) of 
the calculated enrichment from the true 
enrichment, and in a multiplicative effect 
on the statistical error in calculated gas 
enrichment by the factor 1/(1+f). 
Uncertainties of up to 30% for 
small-diameter high-deposit pipes are 
indicated in research results /10/. The 
practical effect on go/no go measurements 
is an increase in the necessary 
measurement time. 
(C) Statistical errors in count rates are 
transformed by equation (1) into 
statistical errors in calculated gas 
enrichment. For small-diameter Almelo 
pipes having a deposit-to-gas ratio of 10, 
and gas enrichment of 5%, the statistical 
standard deviation is about 6% enrichment 
for a 6-hour measurement /H/. 
For low-deposit pipes statistical error is 
much lower, especially if only one 
measurement (one collimator) can be used. 
The statistical effect of high deposits is 
to provide a high background and, through 
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equation 1, to make it necessary to 
subtract out more than half the gas signal 
obtained with the first collimator. 
Consequently, for high-deposit pipes the 
measurement time must be many times as 
long to achieve a particular statistical 
standard deviation as for low-deposit 
pipes. 
lt is recognized (and can be simply 
demonstrated) that statistical standard 
deviations of ~6% enrichment do not permit 
reliable discrimination between :5:5% and >20% 
gas /12/. Moreover, it is recognized that 
measurement times much longer than 6-8 
hours might not even be effective at detecting 
HEU gas if HEU production ceases when 
inspectors arrive. Indeed, as K. van der Meer 
states, "Due to short equilibrium time of a 
centrifuge cascade, an enrichment verification 
measurement which intends to detect a 
previous production of HEU must be started 
within a few hours after the change to normal 
conditions. A second verification (e.g. a 
follow-up measurement after the first 
verification indicated HEU) must also be 
performed within the equilibrium time." /H /. 
Consequently, go/no go measurements 
for very high-deposit pipes could be ''reliabiEf 
only if systematic errors are essentially 
non-existent and measurements times are at 
least 8 hours. This requirement ·an systematic 
errors is unrealistic. Accordingly, an 
alternative approach is needed. 
4. Proposed Solution 
The problem could be solved by a plumbing 
bypass modification comprising, at 
measurement points, the following two 
features: 
(1) Emplacement of a short removable 
section of pipe (for measurements) 
in parallel with the existing pipe, 
and 
(2) A system of double valves to 
securely direct the flow of gas 
through one pipe or the other. 
With this bypass modification (Figure 3), 
measurements would be made on pipe sections 
having no or very little uranium deposit. 
Between measurements, the gas would flow 
through the normal pipe. If necessary, bypass 
pipes could be ocassionally removed to be 
stripped of deposit, to assure that they remain 
low-deposit pipes. 
i 
measurement 
point 
Figure 3. Schematic view of proposed 
bypass plumbing modification for 
cascade-to-header product pipes; this 
modification would greatly reduce calibration 
and statistical errors, because the bypass pipe 
would include very little uranium deposit. 
lt is logical to consider whether a bypass 
modification for one cascade-to-header 
product pipe could be used to obtain accurate 
calibrations for all identical 
cascade-to-header pipes. This problem is 
described in the appendix. An essential issue 
is that the literature indicates substantial 
uncertainty on the question of whether correct 
calibration for actual cascade-to-header 
product pipes is substantially independent of 
possible nonuniformities in actual uranium 
deposit. Very limited experiments have 
produced conflicting indications /11-t./. Many 
measurements on actual cascade pipes would 
be needed to investigate the issue of whether 
initially "identical" pipes are really identical 
for calibration purposes. Further, it would be 
necessary to demonstrate that the declared 
collimator gas efficiencies ratio is quite 
accurate--to within 3%. This might pose a 
problem, because in the past discrepancies of 
7% and 14% were found between gas 
efficiencies at Almelo and at the IAEA 
Seibersdorf Test Loop/lf.'ln addition, in order to 
calibrate normal pipes "identical" to the 
bypass pipe, it would be necessary for the 
length of the measurements to be very long, in 
order to reduce statistical errors to very low 
levels. A relevant question is this: To what 
extent would the !AEA observe these 
verifications and calibrations? 
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As outlined earlier, without bypass 
constructions, even if systematic errors in the 
U-235 measurements were practically 
eliminated, a large proportion of 
measurements would take so long (more than 
six or eight hours) that the capability of such 
measurements to detect rapidly disappearing 
evidence of HEU production would be dubious. 
There is now no assurance that even diligent 
larger-scale research would result in near 
elimination of systematic U-235 measurement 
errors, even with the use of several bypass 
constructions for calibrations. Moreover, the 
requisite research (having uncertain results) 
would take a long time, perhaps years. 
Effective go/no go enrichment 
measurements are rendered especially vital by 
the protection pipe deposits would afford in 
concealing production of HEU. Indeed, if a plant 
operator starts HEU production in a cascade 
with pipes that already have a moderately 
heavy deposit of low enriched uranium, the 
rate of increase of U-235 in the deposit is 
slow, because the rate of new deposition is 
very slow (roughly a few per cent per year) 
/16/. Eventually when the deposit contains 
enough U-235 that inspection measurements 
might reveal the enrichment of the deposit to 
be suspiciously high, the operator can move his 
HEU production from that cascade to another 
cascade having lower deposit enrichment, and 
he can clean out the pipes of the p·revious HEU 
cascade. Thus, in the absence of definitive gas 
enrichment measurements on randomly 
selected cascade-to header product pipes, pipe 
deposits would serve to prevent detection of 
HEU production. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper identifies a practical and highly 
effective solution to the lingering important 
problem of excessive errors and consequent 
indeterminate results in enrichment 
measurements on high-deposit small-diameter 
cascade-to-header product pipes in gas 
centrifuge enrichment plants. The proposed 
solution involves a simple bypass plumbing 
construction for every cascade-to-header 
product pipe. This method would promote the 
most effective and efficient international 
inspections, because it would minimize the 
magnitude of errors and the number of 
necessary measurements. Moreover, because 
the technology is well developed, this approach 
could be implemented quickly and immediately, 
with no need for time-consuming and uncertain 
research. Thus, the Hexapartite Safeguards 
Agreement could be fully implemented quickly 
in a manner to provide high credibility of 
safeguards effectiveness. 
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7. Appendix: Some Aspects of Two-Geometry 
Measurements 
With the two-geometry technique, for each 
pipe subjected to measurements, two counts of 
185.7 keV gamma rays are obtained, one for 
each of the two geometries. Specifically, one 
count utilizes one collimator alone, while the 
second count utilizes the other collimator 
alone. (See Figure 1.) If there were no errors 
from counting statistics, then the following 
equations would apply: 
R1 = e1,p + e1~G 
R1. = e1,tD + e'Xp 
(A1) 
R1 , R2 are the counting rates in the two 
separate geometries, assuming no 
counting statistics errors 
eid., e1? for i=1 ,2, are the true efficiencies for 
the two collimators for detection of 
185.7 keV gamma rays from U-235 in 
the deposit and in the gas 
G is the actual U-235 gas activity 
D is the actual U-235 deposit activity 
The actual U-235 gas activity is then 
represented by the following formula: 
G 
R1 - (e,ci"~)R2 
e,~- (eJJf~)e2~ 
(A2) 
For go/no go measurements, this formula is 
used to calculate the U-235 gas activity from 
measured count rates and estimated 
efficiencjes. 
The following equation expresses the 
systematic error in calculated U-235 gas 
activity as a function of the relative error in 
the ratio of collimator deposit efficiencies 
(assuming no other errors): 
a 
Ga-G= k D--
1+ca 
(A3) 
G 
calculated U-235 gas activity assuming 
error in ratio of collimator deposit 
efficiencies but no other errors in 
calibration or measurement 
actual U-235 gas activity 
D actual U-235 deposit activity 
a relative error in ratio of collimator 
deposit efficiencies 
k, c are constants for a particular cascade 
pipe (or category of identical pipes) and 
pair of collimators. These constants 
depend on actual collimator 
efficiencies, or efficiency ratios. For 
example, for some pipes at the URENCO 
plant in the Netherlands, k=-1.6 and 
c=1.3, as calculated from reference 2, 
tables 2 & 3. 
When error in the estimated collimator 
deposit efficiencies is large, it would 
typically cause most of the systematic error in 
calculated gas enrichment. In such cases 
equation (A3) implies that the systematic 
error in calculated gas enrichment. as 
percent U-235, is approximately directly 
proportional to the amount of U-235 
deposit. Equivalently, the relative error in 
calculated gas enrichment is directly 
proportional to the deposit-to-gas ratio. (In 
reality, the uranium deposit builds up very 
slowly.) As a realistic example, suppose that 
the U-235 deposit-to-gas ratio DIG were 10 if 
the actual gas enrichment were 4%, that a= 
±15% and represents the only measurement 
error, that k=-1.6 and c=1.3; then 
for a fixed U-235 deposit, the error in 
calculated gas enrichment would be ±8-12% 
U-235, independent of the actual gas 
enrichment. 
If it were demonstrated that in practice 
inaccuracies in estimated collimator gas 
efficiencies are indeed nearly always small 
enough so as not to cause substantial errors in 
calculated gas enrichment, then whenever the 
gas enrichment is known for a pipe of high or 
moderately high U-235 deposit-to-gas ratio, 
equations (A 1) could be used for calibration. 
Specifically, if the estimated gas efficiencies 
e1e and e1f} are known to be reasonably accurate, 
then knowledge of G would yield a reasonably 
accurate value for the calibration coefficient 
e1Jie1..J , the ratio of deposit efficiencies. 
Indeed, 
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(A4) 
where we assume that, by means of very long 
measurement times, the count rates R1 and R2 
do not include significant statistical errors. 
Let us estimate the magnitude of the 
relative error in (A4), assuming first that 
there are no errors in either R 1 or R2 • Let 6e 
be the relative error in e 1 ~ /e2~ and let 6& be 
the relative error in G. Assume both errors are 
fairly small, so that we can omit their product 
in estimating the error in (A4). Then the 
magnitude of the relative error in (A4) lies 
approximately between the magnitudes of the 
two values of (6e +6G )(ez~G)/(Rt-et@ G) for 
i= 1,2. We have e1gle1d = 1.5 and e~e;J ""· 82 for 
some high-deposit pipes at Almelo I 17 I. In this 
case, substituting Rt "" el.dD + ee:~G, we find that 
the magnitude of the relative error in (A4) is 
very roughly the absolute value of 
1.1 (6e+%)(G/D). For example, if 6e = 6 6 =.03, 
errors in (A4) are small: for a U-235 
deposit-to-gas ratio DIG of 10, the relative 
error magnitude is only about .007, while for 
DIG = 5 the relative error magnitude is still 
only about .013. 
But in reality, especially for 
small-diameter pipes, there could be 
significant systematic errors in the count 
rates if the measurement equipment is 
positioned just slightly differently for the 
calibration determination than for actual go/no 
go measurements. The resulting relative 
error in (A4) would be greater than the sum of 
the magnitudes of the relative errors in R 1 and 
R2 if the two count rate errors have opposite 
signs. For example, if the relative errors in R1 
and R2 are .01 and -.01, the corresponding error 
in (A4) would have magnitude more than .02. 
When combined with a relative error magnitude 
of .01 attributable to deviations in the 
calibration inputs e, 9 , e1.9 , and in G, the 
magnitude of the resulting relative error in 
(A4) could be more than .03. 

CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF VARIATIONS IN THE 235u ENRICHMENT OF URANIUM 
IN THE HEADER PIPEWORK OF A CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANT 
T. W. Packer 
AEA Technology Harwell, England 
Abstract 
Non-destructive assay equipment, based on 
gamma-ray spectrometry and X-ray fluorescence 
analysis has previously been developed for 
confirming the presence of low enriched 
uranium in the header pipework of UF6 gas 
centrifuge enrichment plants. However 
inspections can only be carr1ed out 
occasionally on a limited number of pipes. 
With the development of centrifuge 
enrichment technology it has been suggested 
that more frequent, or ideally, continuous 
measurements should be made in order to 
improve safeguards assurance between 
inspections. 
For this purpose we have developed non-
destructive assay equipment based on 
continuous gamma-ray spectrometry and X-ray 
transmission measurements. This equipment is 
suitable for detecting significant changes in 
the 235u enrichment of uranium in the header 
pipework of new centrifuge enrichment plants. 
Results are given in this paper of 
continuous measurements made in the laboratory 
and also on header pipework of a centrifuge 
enrichment plant at Capenhurst. 
1. Introduction 
Since the establishment of the 
Hexapartite Safeguards Project in November 
1980, research has been conducted in several 
countries, including the UK, to develop 
techniques that could be incorporated into a 
non-destructive assay instrument that was 
capable of confirming the presence of low 
enriched uranium (LEU) in cascade header 
pipework of a UF6 gas centrifuge enrichment 
plant on a rapid 'Go/No-Go', basis. The 
techniques reported are based on gamma-ray 
spectroscopy and X-ray fluorescence analysis 
/1/2/. The development has been complicated by 
the presence of comparatively large masses of 
uranium deposited on the pipework, especially 
on some of the earlier centrifuges. 
With the development of centrifuge 
enrichment technology it has been suggested 
that on new plant the main header pipework 
should be continuously monitored to improve 
safeguards assurance between inspections. 
Although this type of equipment would be more 
expensive to install than the transportable 
system already developed, it would require 
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less effort by both Operators and Inspectors 
to carry out the necessary inspections. 
2. Comparison of off-line and on-line 
techniques 
Where possible the techniques developed 
for the off-line NDA 235u enrichment monitor, 
which is used for safeguard1ng centrifuge 
enrichment plants at Capenhurst, have been 
incorporated in the on-line instrument. Both 
instruments check that the enrichment of the 
UF6 gas in the pipe being safeguarded is 
consistent with being LEU (less than 20%), by 
measuring the number of 185.72 keV gamma-rays 
emitted from the UF6 gas, which is 
proportional to its enrichment and pressure. 
As 185.72 keV gamma-rays are also emitted 
from any uranium that may be deposited on the 
pipework, it is necessary when inspecting some 
pipes, especially those on older enrichment 
plants which may have comparatively large 
masses of deposited uran1um on them, to 
establish the number of gamma-rays emitted 
only by the UF6 gas/2/. A method, known as 
the "two geometry technique", developed for 
separating gamma-rays emitted from the UF6 gas 
from those emitted from any deposited uranium, 
has been shown to be suitable for use in both 
off-line and on-line instruments/1/3/. It was 
combined with an X-ray fluorescence UF6 gas 
pressure measurement 1n the off-line gauge to 
confirm that the enrichment of the UF6 gas in 
product pipes in the centrifuge enrichment 
plant at Capenhurst was cons1stent with being 
LEU/1/2/. As the on-line instrument 
incorporates low resolution scintillation 
counters, rather than the more expensive high 
resolution liquid nitrogen cooled germanium 
detector used in the off-line instrument, it 
is not possible to use the x-ray fluorescence 
technique to measure the UF6 gas pressure. 
Therefore an X-ray transmission technique has 
been developed, which is capable of detecting 
changes in UF6 gas pressure of less than 1 
torr in the header pipework in centrifuges at 
Capenhurst/3/. This is combined with the 
gamma-ray measurement to check continuously 
for any changes in the 235u content, and hence 
the enrichment of the UF6 gas in product, 
feed, waste and dump header p1pes at 
Capenhurst. 
3. The electronic detection system 
The electronic system, which was 
originally developed at Harwell for use in the 
mineral industry, uses standard ECE-bus 
microprocessors and peripherals in conjunction 
with a specially designed nuclear pulse ADC 
(256 channels per detector)/4/. Gain 
stabilisation of the Nai(Tl) scintillation 
counters, based on the measurement of the 88 
keV gamma-rays which are emitted by a 109cd 
source, is maintained by the microprocessor in 
the slave units, each of which may control up 
to six detectors. The master computer 
controls the acquisition of data and the 
setting up of appropriate regions of interest 
for each of the four detectors. It also 
calculates the results and compares the 
measurements with previous values which are 
kept in an appropriate constants file. 
Normally two hourly measurements are made 
and daily averages calculated. The results 
are printed out and can also be displayed on 
the monitor of the computer. A photograph of 
the four detector assemblies, special 
electronic system, master computer and printer 
being used in the service corridor at 
Capenhurst is shown in Fig 1 . 
4. Choice of detectors 
It was considered both expensive and 
impractical to install permanently several 
high resolution liquid nitrogen cooled semi-
conductor detectors on even all header product 
pipes. As it is suggested that for some 
centrifuge plants it may even be necessary to 
monitor also, feed, waste and dump pipes, it 
was agreed that only low resolution 
scintillation detectors would be acceptable 
for continuous monitoring. 
Laboratory measurements showed that 
scintillation detectors fitted with Nai(Tl) 
crystals 75mm in diameter and 25mm thick were 
sufficiently sensitive and could be adequately 
shielded and permanently installed 1-1i thout 
C.J.using undue interference to the Opcru.tors. 
Initially three detectors were mounted on 
a product header pipe. One detector measured 
transmitted X and gamma-rays from a 109cd 
source, the other two measured 185.72 keV 
gamma-rays. One detector was uncollimated and 
the other was collimated, in order to 
investigate the possibility of using the "two 
geometry technique" to separate gamma-rays 
Fig 1 The monitor installed on an enrichment 
plant at Capenhurst 
emitted from 235u in the UF6 gas from those 
emitted from any deposited uranium/1/. 
These trials showed that there was 
relatively little deposit on the header pipes 
in the latest design of centrifuge for which 
this development is aimed. Interest has 
therefore been concentrated on investigating 
ways of reducing the overall cost of the 
equipment while maintaining acceptable 
performance. 
Therefore later measurements have used a 
single detector fitted with a 50mm diameter 
crystal to measure both 185.72 keV gamma-rays 
for determining the mass of 235u in the pipe 
and the transmitted X and gamma-rays to detect 
changes in UF6 gas pressure. 
5 . Choice of source for the trans'mission 
gauge 
Header pipes in the Capenhurst centrifuge 
enrichment plants are made of aluminium, the 
product, waste and dump pipes have internal 
diameters of 110mm with 5mm thick walls, while 
the feed pipe has a 4mm thick wall but is only 
72mm in diameter. Therefore any X or gamma-
ray used for the transmission gauge must be 
able to penetrate 10mm of aluminium while 
being relatively highly absorbed by a few 
mg/cm2 of uranium. (Path of UF6 gas across 
110mm pipe at pressure of 10 torr 1.1 
mg/cm2 ). Table 1 gives the energy of gamma-
rays emitted by radio-isotope sources that 
Table 1 Choice of source for transmission gauge 
Source Half Gamma-ray Mass Absorption Fraction 
Life Energy Abun- Coefficient Transmitted(%) Absorbed(%) 
yrs keV dance cm2/g by Al Pipe by 1 torr UF6 Gas 
u Al with wall pipe diameter(mm ) 
4mm 5mm 55 75 110 
57 co 0.74 122 0.855 3.5 0. 1 5 72 67 0.02 0.03 0.04 
241Am 433 59.6 0.852 6.4 0.27 56 48 0.04 0.05 0.08 
109cd 1. 26 88 0.038 3.3 0.20 65 58 0.02 0.03 0.04 
109cd 1. 26 25 0.17 74.0 2.0 1. 5 .50 0.40 0.55 0.80 
109cd 1. 26 22 1. 00 96.0 2.8 .24 .05 0.50 0.70 1. 00 
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were considered for this application and their 
relative abundance and the mass absorption 
coefficients for aluminium and uranium for the 
X and gamma-rays emitted. It also gives the 
relative intensities of radiation transmitted 
through aluminium pipes with 4 and 5mm thick 
walls and also the percentage absorbed by UF5 
gas at a pressure of 1 torr. It is seen that 
109cd is the optimum source as it emits AgK X-
rays whose energies 22 and 25 keV are just 
above the Ul absorption edges. It is seen 
that a change in UF5 gas pressure of 1 torr in 
the largest diameter pipe (110mm i.d.) will 
reduce the transmitted intensity of AgK x-rays 
by approximately 1%, in addition approximately 
0.1% of them will be transmitted through an 
aluminium pipe with walls 5mm thick. Table 2 
gives the calculated and measured intensities 
of x and gamma-rays emitted by 109cd that are 
transmitted through pipes of different size, 
where it is seen that there is relatively good 
agreement between the two values. The 
advantage of using a thinner walled pipe 
should be noted, although at Capenhurst this 
advantage is accompanied by a lower 
sensitivity due to the smaller UF5 path length 
across the pipe. A graph of the channel 
countrates obtained from X and gamma-rays 
emitted from 109cd that have been transmitted 
through an aluminium pipe with 5mm thick walls 
is given in Fig 2. It is seen that although 
the intensity of transmitted 88 kev gamma-rays 
is much higher than the AgK X-rays, it is 
still possible to separate them using low 
resolution detectors. 
6. Results 
6.1 With a multi-detector system 
These measurements were made with three 
scintillation detectors, two f~tted with 75mm 
diameter Nai(Tl) crystals detecting 185.72 keV 
gamma-rays, one being uncollimated the other 
fitted with a 30mm wide collimator. This 
allowed for the investigation of the "two 
geometry technique", which separates 185-72 
keV gamma-rays emitted from 235u in the UF5 
gas from those emitted from any deposited 
uranium. The third detector was fitted with a 
50mm diameter Nai(Tl) crystal and detected 
transmitted AgK X-rays and 88 keV gamma-rays 
which were emitted from a 109cd source with an 
activity of 22MBq. 
As there were no suitable sources of UF5 
Table 2 Comparison of the relative 
transmitted intensities of 
radiation emitted from 109cd. 
Transmitted 
Radiation 
22 keV X-rays 
25 kev-x-rays 
88 keV-gamma-rays 
88/22+25 
Relative Transmitted Intensity 
Calculated Measured 
Aluminium Wall Thickness (mm) 
4 5 4 5 
.08 .02 .11 .05 
.08 .03 
1.1 1 .0 1.1 1.0 
7.0 20 10 20 
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Transmission spectrum obtained when 
measuring aluminium pipes with 5mm 
thick walls 
available at 
spectrometers were 
using samples of 
Harwell, the gamma-ray 
approximately calibrated 
uranium that had been 
filter papers. The deposited onto 
transmission gauge 
aluminium filters. 
was calibrated using 
The assembly was mounted on a header 
product pipe at Capenhurst and two hourly 
measurements made between September 1989 and 
January 1990/3/. The results obtained during 
two periods when the UF5 gas was temporarily 
removed from the pipe are shown in Fig 3. It 
is seen that when the UF5 gas was present, the 
net countrates obtained with the uncollimated 
and collimated detectors in the 185.72 keV 
gamma-ray channel were approximately 3.0 and 
0.6c/s respectively. The errors due to 
counting statistics (95%c.l.) were 
approximately 0.1c/s for both detectors when 
using a 7200 second measurement time. Both 
countrates reduced to approximately zero when 
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Results of plant measurements made with 
the multi-detector system during two 
periods when the UF5 gas was 
temporarily removed 
the UF5 gas was temporarily removed from the 
pipe, showing that there was only a relatively 
small mass of uranium deposited on the pipes. 
At the same time that the UF5 gas was removed 
from the pipe the density gauge reading 
increased by approximately 3% relative. 
However if the increase in the density 
reading, reduction in UF6 gas pressure, had 
been accompanied by the gamma-ray countrate 
either being unaltered, or even increased, 
then an increase in the enrichment of the UF5 
gas would have been suspected and further 
investigation may have been needed to resolve 
the anomaly. 
During this period of continuous 
measurement only three significant increases 
in the density readings occurred, indicating a 
reduction in UF5 gas pressure. They were all 
accompanied by a large reduction(over 95%) in 
the gamma-ray counts confirming the loss of 
UF5 gas. There were no significant increases 
in the gamma-ray measurements during the same 
period so that it was possible to confirm that 
this centrifuge was only producing LEU gas 
during this period. 
6.2. With a single detector system 
The mass of uranium deposits on the pipes 
of the latest design of centrifuge have been 
shown to be comparatively small/3/. It was 
therefore decided that there was no necess1ty 
to make gamma-ray measurements with a 
collimated detector in order to separate 
gamma-rays that were emitted from the UF5 gas 
from those emitted from the deposited uranium. 
Furthermore, if it was found to be possible to 
make the uncollimated gamma-ray and 
transmission measurement with the same 
detector, it would result in a considerable 
reduction in the capital cost of the system. 
The original reason for not using a 
single detector was the possibility of 'double 
peaks' produced from the relatively high 
number of transmitted 88 keV gamma-rays from 
the 109cd source not being resolved from the 
185.72 keV gamma-rays emitted from 235u. The 
magnitude of this interference 1s shown in Fig 
4, where the spectra obtained from a pipe,110 
mm in diameter, containing 0.5mg/cm2 of 3% 
enriched uranium, equivalent to a UF5 gas 
pressure of approximately 13 torr, is shown 
when measured without a 109cd source. Also 
shown are the spectra obtained with two 109cd 
sources of different activity measured without 
uranium. As the pulse doubling effect is a 
function of the square of the 88 keV countrate 
the interference is much greater for the 
higher activity source (30MBq). The error 
introduced using the smaller source (10MBq), 
an acceptable activity for this application, 
is comparatively small (equivalent to the 
counts obtained from UF5 gas at a pressure of 
approximately 2 tcrr of 3% enriched uF6 gas). 
This error can be allowed for by subtract1ng a 
fraction of the number of detected 88 keV 
gamma-ray counts from the 185.72 keV reading. 
Sources of 109cd with activ1ties of 
approximately 5MBq were installed in the two 
detector systems that were to be used on the 
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Fig 4 Interference in the 235u 185.72 keV 
gamma-ray channels(163-192) due to 88 
keV gamma-ray "double peaks" from 109cd 
sources with different activities 
product and waste pipes and sources 
activities of 10MBq in the feed and dump 
systems. 
with 
pipe 
Measurements were made on empty pipes at 
Harwell when the net countrates obtained in 
the 185.72 keV gamma-ray peaks were· corrected 
by subtracting approximately 6 x 10-8 times 
the square of the 88 keV gamma-ray count-
rates. The results of two hourly measurements 
of corrected 185.72 keV gamma and relative AgK 
X-ray counts made in the laboratory over a 
period of 5 days for the 4 detectors are shown 
in Fig 5. The errors due to counting 
statistics (95% c.l.) were approximately 0.08 
c/s for the 185.72 keV gamma-ray measurements 
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Fig 5 Results obtained in the laboratory 
when measuring empty pipes 
and between 0.3 and 0.12% relative for the 
AgK x-ray measurements depending on the 
activity of the 109cd source that was 
incorporated. It is seen that the percentage 
variations in the density readings are 
generally within ± 0.5%. 
The equipment was then installed on 
header pipework at Capenhurst, two hourly 
measurements made and daily averages 
calculated. Corrections for dead time losses, 
the decay of the 109cd source and for 
unresolved 88 keV 'double peaks' on the gamma-
ray measurement were made. A plot of 
variations in the transmission density and 
uranium gamma-ray measurements during two 
periods when the UF5 gas was temporarily 
removed from the pipes is shown in Fig 6. It 
is seen that when the UF5 gas was removed the 
transmission density gauge readings on the 
product, waste and dump pipes increased by 
approximately 3% relative. The corresponding 
increase in the smaller diameter, thinner 
walled, feed pipe was slightly smaller. There 
was a corresponding reduction ~n the gamma-ray 
reading on the product pipe of approximately 
1c/s, one third of that obtained on the 
original gauge. This is due to the smaller 
diameter detectors used, 50mm in diameter 
instead of 75mm, in order to reduce the cost 
and also the weight of the lead shielding 
required. There were corresponding smaller 
reductions in the gamma-ray counts obtained 
with the other detectors, being consistent 
with that expected according to their pipe 
diameters, pressures and enrichments. The 
daily average readings of both density and 
(A) DINSITY 
{8) URANIUM 
Fig 6 On-line two hourly results obtained 
during the time that the UF5 gas was 
temporarily removed from the pipes. 
Periods identified by high transmitted 
counts (low dens~ty) and low 235u 
counts 
uranium over the period 6/12/90 to 10/3/91 for 
the product pipe are given in Fig 7. The 
periods when the UF5 gas was temporarily 
removed from the pipe are clearly identified 
by increases in the transmitted countrates, 
indicating a reduction in UF5 gas pressure and 
a reduction in the number of detected uranium 
gamma-rays. The times when the enrichment of 
the UF5 gas in the product pipe was 
temporarily increased, and then decreased, by 
Table 3 Print of time when UF5 gas was temporarily removed from the p~pes. 
Run started at 9.40 6/12/90 Run time = 7200s 
FEED DUMP WASTE PRODUCT 
s D u s D u s D u s D u 
0.6 -0.08 -0.08 0.9 -0.33 0.06 0.8 -0.06 0.00 0.8 -0.08 -0.02 
0.4 0.02 0. 01 -0.4 -0.21 0.02 -1.6 -0. 12 -0.00 1. 5 -0.04 0.03 
2.2 2.33 -0.15 1.5 2.34 -0. 15 4.3 2.36 -0.09 1. 5 2.30 -0.76 
3.6 2.59 -0.12 1.4 2.99 -0.20 4.3 3.39 -0.05 1 .2 3. 14 -0.98 
3.2 0.35 -0.00 1. 3 0.32 -0.07 -0.8 0.40 0.00 1. 3 -0.00 -0.58 
1.0 0. 10 -0.03 0.3 0.07 -0.05 -1.1 0.14 -0.08 0.2 -0.01 -0.09 
2.7 0.03 -0.02 -0.9 -0.37 -0.02 -1.6 0.20 0.01 2.0 -0.04 -0.01 
1. 6 0.08 -0.04 1. 2 -0.26 0.03 -2.2 -0.01 0.01 1. 2 0.16 0.02 
2.1 0.01 -0.01 1. 2 -0.03 0.00 -1.3 -0. 13 0.07 1.5 -0.24 0.04 
2.4 0.07 -0.04 -0.1 -0.06 0.06 -1.9 0. 16 -0.07 0.4 -0.08 -0.01 
1. 3 0.01 0.05 -0.5 -0. 11 0.00 -2.2 -0. 14 -0.01 2.0 0.00 0.02 
1.8 0.13 0.01 0.1 -0.07 0.03 -2.4 -0.05 0.02 1. 3 0.01 -0.08 
Averages: 
1.9 0.47 -0.04 0.5 0.36 -0.02 -0.5 0.50 -0.02 1.2 0.43 -0.20 
S, D and u are the differences between the measured and constant 
file values of standard, relative density (%) and 235u respect~vely. 
N.B. All daily average density readings are positive and all uranium 
readings are negative with respect to the constant file values 
observed during normal operation. This confirms that UF6 gas had 
been removed during these measurements. 
(The times that the gas was removed can be obtained from the 
individual two hourly values.) 
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20% relative without significant change in the 
UF6 gas pressures, are also clearly visible. 
There were small systematic var1ations in 
the density readings {up to 0.8%) during the 3 
months of measurements, possibly due to 
instrumental drift or to small errors in the 
decay correction used for the 109cd source due 
to small impurities in the sources. Therefore 
an alternative method of correcting the 
density gauge measurements was used, namely by 
taking the ratio of detected AgK x-ray to 88 
keV gamma-ray intensities. This automatically 
corrects for the decay of the 109cd source as 
well as for dead time losses. This method was 
found to give small systematic errors as can 
be seen in Fig 7. As there are no significant 
systematic errors on the 235u determination, 
it appears that the correction used for 
correcting the 185.72 keV gamma-ray readings 
for 88 keV gamma-ray interference is adequate 
for this application. 
6.3 Presentation of results 
The results obtained are compared with 
previous values kept 1n an appropriate 
constants file. Variations from these values 
are at present saved as f1les on a two hourly 
and daily average basis and printed out as 
shown in Table 3. They can also be displayed 
across the screen of the PC. The chosen one 
of the four density or uranium readings is 
selected from the keyboard. Provided that an 
Inspector was conhdent that the equipment was 
working satisfactorily, {by checking the 
relative counts 1n the standard channels), he 
need only be concerned if the pressure of the 
UF6 gas in the pipes decreased significantly, 
{by at least a factor of 2), while at the 
same time the uranium counts remained the same 
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Fig 7 Daily average on-line results obtained 
from product pipe. Periods when UF6 
gas was removed for less than a day 
identified by high transmitted counts 
(low density) and low 235u counts. 
Periods of 20% higher and 20% lower 
235u enrichments identified by 
corresponding changes in 235u counts 
without significant change in the 
transmission density measurement 
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or increased. These rare occasions are 
probably the only time that the results need 
to be printed out from the data files. This 
approach will be more relevant if one PC and 
printer is used to measure continuously the 
four pipes on several cascades. Alternatively 
the files could be printed out on demand 
during routine inspections. 
7. Conclusions 
Continuous monitoring of at least one 
header pipe of a cascade at Capenhurst has 
been carried out in two periods between 
September 1989 and January 1990 and between 
December 1990 and March 1991. During these 
periods the UF6 gas pressure measurement has 
been significantly reduced on less than 10 
occasions. On each occasion the uranium 
countrate also reduced, almost to zero, 
confirming the Operators' records that the UF6 
gas had been temporarily removed. 
If an inspector had access to these 
results, it would have been possible for him 
to have monitored this centrifuge, 24 hours a 
day, for the period of six months for which 
these measurements were made. Although the 
initial capital cost of this type of automated 
monitoring equipment is comparatively high, it 
is suggested that the cost would soon be 
recovered by the sav1ng of Operator and 
Inspector time. 
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Abstract 
A set of small-size solid slate and 
activation detectors was used for monitoring 
transuranium and fission product contents in 
spent fuel assemblies of a WWER-440 type PWR in 
Paks, Hungary. Neutrons and gamma-radiation were 
detected inside and on the top of the fuel 
assemblies by means of track etch and bubble 
damage detectors for fast neutrons, indium 
activation detector for thermal neutrons and hard 
gamma-rays as well as semiconductor Si diodes as 
gross gamma-detectors. 
1. Introduction 
At the previous ESARDA Symposium, 1989, a 
report was given on preliminary st.udiPs 
concerning the in-field application of novel 
solid state and activation detPctors as possihle 
attribute test methods for NDA of spent fuel 
assemblies. rndium activation (neutron and 
gamma), track etch and bubble damage neutron 
detectors as well as sPmiconductor silicon rl iorles 
as gross gamma detectors were applied on the top 
of and inside spent fuel assPmblies of a WWER-440 
type PWR in Paks, Hungary /1/. The small siZe and 
ease of application make the use of these 
detectors attractive, allowing free access to 
inner part. of assemblies. In arldition, usine; fast. 
neutron sensitive track etch and bubble detectors 
the cross-talk from neighbouring assemb liPs can 
be minimized, facilitating verification without 
fuel movement. 
2. Exoeriments at NPP Paks 
Assemblies of three different burnup rane;es 
(about 10, 20 and 30 MWd/kgU), three initial 
enrichments (1.6, 2.4 and 3.6 %) and cooling 
times in the range of 1. 5 month to 3 y were 
assayed. The assemblies were arranged vertically 
either stacked in storage rack or separated from 
neighbours on si dew all of the pond. P" (proton 
sensing) CR-39 track etch detectors type MA-ND 
made of organic polymer by MOM, Budapest, and/or 
metallic indium foils in stainless steel capsules 
were inserted for irradiation into the B. 9 mm 
diam. central dosimetric channel of the 
assemblies with the help of a 13 m long special 
guide tube used also earlier/1/. Boron loaded and 
polyethylene radiators were applied on :l mm w1de 
stripes of the CR-39 material. Exposure time 
varied from 10 mint to 2 h. Indium samples of 2 
cm diam. by 0.5 mm thick (folded up in the 
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capsule) werP exposed for 1 to 10 h. After 
irradiation the In foils were unfolded and placed 
in contact with a 35 cm3 Ge detector for 10000 s 
mPasurement of :l3ti keV and 417 keV peaks of 
115min and 116min, respectively. 
I l was recognized that the high gamma-
background may cause heavy damage and a drastic 
change in the bulk etch rate and in the detection 
sensitivity of the CR-3~ material/2/. In order to 
avoid overexposure, irradiation tiows were 
established with the help of a Si diode 1nserted 
precedin~ly lllto the central channel of 
assemblies for measurin~ the ~amma-dose-rate 
inside. The sensitivity of the diode was 22 
nA/kGy/h. In th1s way the track etch detectors 
were prevented from receivinll; doses over 2 kGy. 
The diode was at the same time used for 
scanning gross gamma-profile of the assemblies, 
as well as higg;er (more sensitive) diodes were 
also used lowering down to the assembly heads. 
The diode response was confirmed by Al 2o3 
thermoluminescence dosemeter pills of 6.4 mm 
diam. '!'he pills were cut half to go in the 
capsules when axial scamun~ was performed. 
l!:xposures were not allowed to exceed 1 kGy for 
TLD. Rubble dama~e detectors and In foils 
surrounded by a Be photoneutron converter were 
also irradiated on the top of assemblies in steel 
or plastic containers. 
The Be converter was the same as described 
earl ier/1/. 
The influence of the e;amma-backll;round is 
much less in the case of bubble detectors/3/. The 
effect of radiation dama~e can be neglected for 
exposure times rPlevant to irradiations by spent 
fuel, but it seemed necessary to use some kind of 
thermal insulator because of the strong 
temperature dependence of the response. Zero 
energy threshold type BD-100R detectors of Bubble 
Technology Industries, Canada/4/ were used, the 
performance of which was tested both under 
laboratory and in-field conditions in a power and 
a research reactor /I, 5/. 
3. Results and interPretation 
Axial neutron and gamma-profiles of two 
assemblies of about 30 MWd/kgU burnup, taken by 
In activation, are given in Figs.1 and 2, 
respectively. The neutron profiles follow thermal 
neutron distribution Inside assemblies. Neutrons 
are mainly due to 242cm (half-life: 163 d) 
content. Thermal neutron fluxes deduced from 
saturated count rates of 417 keV gamma-peaks were 
estimated in the order of 104 cm- 2s-1. The ~amma­
profiles follow mainly 140Ba content, i.e. 
reactor power distribution before shutdown/6, 7 I. 
In Fig. 3 the results of bulk etch rate 
measurements on CR-39 material are also plotted. 
The ratio of bulk etch rates before to after 
irradiations can be used as a measure of tho> 
gamma-dose received/2/. 
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Fig.1. Axial distribution of thermal neutrons 
inside assemblies of 30 MWd/kgU burnup taken by 
417 keV (116mrn) gamma-ray counting. 'fh<> profile 
follows 242cm distribution 
Fig.3 shows the axial distribution of 
thermal and fast neutron inside two fue I 
assemblies measured by CR-39 track etch 
detectors/2/. Although there are minor 
discrepancies, the possibility of neutron flux 
measurements in readily demonstrated. 
Correlation between track density and 
burnup was studied for eight assemblies with 
various burn up, initial enrichment and cooling 
time. Mean track densities were assigned to mean 
burnup values of each assemblies according to the 
empirical formula 
( 1) 
giving neutron response N as a function of burnup 
BU. Burnups values were calculated for each 
assemblies by the staff of Reactor Physics 
Department of NPP Paks usmg the In-Core Fuel 
Management Code "C-Porca" /8/. The evaluat10n of 
the results is in progress. 
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Fig. 2. Axial distribution of gamma-radiation 
inside assemblies of 30 MWd/kgU burnup. Values 
given by error bars (90% confidence level) were 
obtained by 33G keV gamma-ray intensity ( 115mrn) 
measurements. This profile follows the 
distribution of 140Ba content, i.e. power 
distribution before shutdown. Circles represent 
CR-39 bulk etch rate ratio measurements (ratio of 
rates before to after irradiation) 
The results of the bubble detector 
irradiations performed on the top of the 
assemblies showed similar results as earlier/1/. 
Although the detectors were carefully prevented 
from getting warm, thermal insulation was not 
qu1te perfect and results of considerable spread 
were obtained. Typical exposure time was 10 min. 
The production rate of bubbles was 4-5 min-1 at 
about one year cooling time. We are going to 
apply a new insulation upon the next run. 
Studies were performed with measured data 
provided by the Si diodes. Fig.4 shows axial 
gross gamma-profiles taken by a diode inside 
three assemblies, stored among neighbours and 
separately. The profiles exhibit a near-neighbour 
effect of about 15 % or less, dependinl( on the 
assemblies' environment. A comparison with 
results of TLD measurements shows a reasonable 
agreement. 
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Fig.3. Axial distribution of thermal and fast 
neutrons inside two fuel assemblies (cooling 
time: 475 d) measured by CR-39 track etch 
detectors 
The correlation between the diode-yielded dose 
rate data and calculated burnup values provides a 
verification possibility for the cooling time on 
the basis of the empirical formula 
G = 75BU/T , (2) 
where the gamma response G is converted to Gy/h 
and cooling time T is given in years. Hesults of 
the axial scans of individual assemblies with and 
without neighbours around are also taken into 
consideration if Fig.5, where GT values are 
plotted versus burnup. A straight line can be 
fitted to the data with a standard deviation of 
15 % including also near-neighbour effect. 
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Fig.4. Gross gamma-profiles taken by Si diode 
inside three assemblies stored among neighbours 
and separately. Comparison is given with results 
of Al2o3 TLD measurements 
4. Conclusions 
Indium activation is a rather reliable 
method, allowing instant reading of the results. 
Near-neighbour effect is, however, large because 
of its sensitivity to long-range thermal neutrons 
and hard gammas in water. 
Bubble detectors seem to be prom1s1ng 
because of promptly readable results with short 
exposure time, but some improvement (thermal 
insulation) is needed for a routine field 
application. 
Track etch detectors are almost insensitive 
to high gamma background. They give reliable 
results in a reasonable exposure time, but the 
results are not immediately available on the 
site. 
Si diodes provide fast, reliable results 
with a prompt reading. Three of the methods (use 
of indium activation, track etch and bubble 
detectors) are spent-fuel specific. 
'The study of near-neighbour effect by Si 
diodes yielded favourable results; the method 
seem to be suitable for performing attribute test 
in verification without fuel movement. 
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Abstract 
A spent BWR reference fuel assembly of the TVO KPA-
STORE in Finland was cross calibrated for bumup using 
spent fuel of a similar design in an other country, namely 
the CLAB in Sweden. The reference assembly is used by the 
IAEA for inspection purposes. The verification was 
performed by passive neutron detection using GRAND I and 
a fork detector. High resolution gamma spectrometry was 
used to give complementary information. Normalization 
between different measurement geometries was performed 
using sealed neutron and gamma calibration sources. 
Based on the results of passive neutron detection, 
consistency between the declared bumup data of the 
reference assembly and the selected assemblies used for the 
calibration curve is better than 1 %. 
1. Introduction 
Non-destructive assay (NDA) of spent fuel is an 
essential part of the verification methods used by the IAEA 
in the international safeguards. Due to the limited 
application of reprocessing, more and more spent LWR fuel 
will accumulate in separate storage facilities. It is known 
that the strategic value of spent fuel increases with the 
increasing of cooling time. For verification of ageing spent 
LWR fuel, a quantitative method called GBUV /11 has been 
developed for use by the IAEA. This method is based on 
high resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS) and it allows 
consistency checking of the declared burn up data. The linear 
dependance of the measured average Cs-137 activity (662 
keV) on the bumup is used for verification. If combined 
with passive neutron assay (PNA), partial defect verification 
of LWR fuel can be performed according to the present 
safeguards criteria of the IAEA. 
GBUV is directly applicable at the AFR facilities of 
Sweden (CLAB) and Finland (fVO KPA-STORE) where a 
similar type of BWR fuel will be stored for several decades. 
It is a general practice in analytical work to use 
certified standards for quantitative measurements. Following 
this analogy, a spent fuel reference assembly has been 
selected and separately sealed by the IAEA at the TVO 
KPA-STORE in Finland /2/. Using the reference assembly, 
measurements performed at different times and by different 
equipment can be normalized with each other. Measurement 
of the reference assembly is also a part of the authentication 
measures of the GBUV method. 
• Present address: Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety, Helsinki, Finland 
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The verification level of the GBUV method can be 
raised by getting more information of the reference 
assembly. Because separate fuel assemblies cannot be moved 
in practice from country to country, cross calibration with 
spent fuel of a similar design at an other country has to be 
arranged by transporting the instruments and the calibration 
sources. It was felt that two independent methods would give 
a much higher degree of confidence than just one method. 
The methods selected, the PNA and HRGS, can be easily 
used at the facilities where these measurements were 
performed. 
This report gives an overview of the calibration 
activities. 
2. Measurement Techniques 
The two independent methods used give information 
of completely different parameters. In the PNA, neutron 
emission of transuraniums is detected. These isotopes are 
produced mainly from the fertile U-238 under neutron 
irradiation. The main method used, GRAND I and a fork 
detector, is well known and widely used e.g. by the 
EURATOM for the verification of spent LWR fuel /3/. In 
the other method used, the gamma emission of fission 
products is detected. These isotopes are produced mainly 
from fissile isotopes, e.g. U-235 and Pu-239. The HRGS 
techniques were used according to the principles of the 
GBUV method /1,4/. 
Calibration was performed by first measuring the 
spent fuel assemblies and calibration sources at the CLAB. 
After this the sources and the measurement instruments were 
sent to the TVO, where the reference assembly and the 
sources were measured. Use of the calibration sources was 
an essential part of the calibration procedure. 
2.1 PNA Equipment and Method 
The basic principles of the GRAND I and the fork 
detector are the same as originally designed at the LANL for 
the IAEA /51. The new BWR fork detector of the IAEA is, 
however, optimized for the dimensions of the BWR fuel 
measured. It makes use of an AMPTEK 
preamplifier/discriminator among other changes. 
For transport, the detection head can be bent 90 
degrees and it fits into a flat transport case. The detection 
head was attached to a 10 m long steel pipe assembled from 
2.4 m long standard pipe sections with connecting flanges 
151. The detection system was assembled on the floor of the 
storage hall and lifted into the storage pool by a crane. At 
the CLAB the fork detector system was attached to the pool 
railing with a mounting bracket. At the KPA-STORE an 
instrument stand used by the operator was used to hold the 
pipe system. The GRAND I electronics package was used to 
control the measurements. 
A Cf-252 neutron source (about 1.8 x 104 n/s), 
designed for spent fuel verification measurements, was used 
for normalization. The source, constructed inside a piece of 
a real BWR fuel channel, was easy to manipulate manually 
under water. It was repositioned inside the fork detector and 
remeasured every morning and every evening to find out the 
precision of the normalization measurement and also to 
monitor the proper functioning of the whole measurement 
chain. 200 sec measurement time yielded about 10 000 
counts in each of the two neutron channels of the fork 
detector. Before the measurements at the CLAB, the source 
was sealed by an IAEA metal seal. It was kept in place until 
all the measurements at the CLAB and at the KPA-STORE 
had been finalized. 
2.2 PNA Measurements 
The fork detector is designed for point wise 
measurements. Vertical coordinates of the fuel were fixed 
using a dummy assembly. The assemblies were hanging 
from the fuel handling machine during measurement. All 
assemblies were measured in the middle of six odd 
numbered nodes 11 - 21 (the active fuel length, 3680 cm, is 
divided into 25 nodes). After rotation of 90 degrees, the 
measurements were repeated. The selection of the 
measurement mode was based on the results of the 
preliminary measurements of the burnup profile. 
The measurement time per point varied between 15 
and 150 seconds depending on the burnup and the cooling 
time. At least 10 000 neutron counts were collected. 
The assemblies measured were selected to have an 
enrichment close to 2. 7 % and a cooling time more than 
three years (see Table 1). Due to long cooling time and high 
burnup, the dominating neutron activity is Cm-244. This is 
why the measured count rates of the cadmium wrapped 
fission chambers used were corrected only for decay of Cm-
244. The count rate of the reference assembly was also 
normalized with the Cf-252 source. The average activity of 
the 12 points measured of each assembly was used. A 
Symphony spreadsheet was used for data handling. 
The fitting of the calibration curve was performed by 
the Deming curve fitting code 161. The statistical uncertainty 
of the neutron count rate and the 2.5 % uncertainty of the 
declared mean burnup were used for weighting the data 
points. Weighting factor is the reciprocal of the square of 
the uncertainty. 
2.3 HEGS Equipment and Method 
Both facilities have a gamma scanning arrangement 
consisting of a horizontal collimator installed in the wall of 
one of the fuel handling pools and a specially designed 
elevator, "gamma wagon", which holds the assemblies 
during scanning 12,41. 
The measurements were performed with a Ge 
spectrometer 17 I, viewing the corners of the assemblies 
through a collimator slit. The measurement geometry of the 
detector was kept constant during each campaign. 
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Each corner was scanned over the full fuel length and 
the arithmetic mean of all the four scans was used as a 
measure of the burnup. By averaging over the four corners, 
effects ofburnup gradients as well as possible bending of the 
assemblies will be canceled to first order. 
For normalization between the two facilities, a Cs-
137 reference source was used 14,81. The source consists of 
a pellet of about 1 Ci of Cs-137 which can be mounted in 
the same position as the fuel assemblies. It can be oscillated 
vertically with a constant speed and a maximum amplitude 
of about 10 cm. As seen by the detector, the reference 
source thus represents a vertically extended line source. 
The time averaged rate, R(rel), of the cesium peak 
in the detector when measuring the reference source may be 
written: 
R(ref) = '!TOe (1) 
where '1 is the number of quanta per second and unit solid 
angle from the surface of the source towards the detector. T 
is the transmission of the radiation through the absorbing 
media (mainly water) between the fuel assembly and the 
collimator. 0 is the solid angle covered by the part of the 
detector that can be seen through the collimator by the 
source. e is the intrinsic efficiency of the detector for the 
662 keY radiation. 
A corresponding expression can be written for the 
count rate R(fuel), when measuring a fuel assembly. In this 
case, however, R and '1 are average values for the whole 
fuel assembly. Furthermore, the simple product of eq. 1 is 
replaced by an integral over the projected area of the fuel 
assembly that contributes to the radiation hitting the detector 
at a given moment of time. In principle, the three quantities, 
'~• T and 0, then vary over the radiation area. However, 
with an essentially one dimensional slit, it can be shown that 
the double integral that should replace. eq. 1 can be 
approximated with an expression similar to eq. 1 with 
sufficient accuracy 191. 
The factors '1, T and 0 then stand for values averaged 
over the radiating area. In comparing fuel assemblies of 
identical mechanical dimensions and composition, it is 
assumed that '1 is proportional to the burnup of the 
assembly. An analysis 191 of the double ratio: 
R1(fuel) R2(fuel) 
K = R1(ref) 1 R2(ref) (2) 
where the indices denote measurements made at different 
facilities, shows that this can be simplified to : 
'71(fuel) 
K=--
'!2(fuel) 
Necessary conditions for this are: 
(3) 
(1) The positioning of the reference source relative 
to the fuel assembly must be identical in the two 
measurements. Since the reference source is confined in a 
standard ABB-Atom fuel channel and is mounted in a holder 
in the gamma wagon, this is true within an uncertainty of± 
1 mm at both facilities. This uncertainty corresponds to an 
error of less than 1 % in the gamma intensities. 
(2) The acceptance solid angle 0 of the collimator-
detector system for a point source can be different for the 
two measurements (different slit heights) but must not vary 
with the position of the point source along a line 
perpendicular to the collimator axis in the horizontal 
symmetry plane of the collimator. 
2.4 HRGS Measurements 
At the CLAB, the gamma spectrometer was set up in 
a standard way /1,4,7/. A weak Zn-65 source emitting 1115 
kev radiation was attached to the detector in order to provide 
a check on the stability of the measuring conditions. 
Th(! collimator slit height was 5 mm. The speed of 
the gamma wagon was adjusted and checked to be constant 
within 1 %. The angular position of the assembly was 
adjusted with an precision of about 3 degrees. 
The total scanning time per corner was about 200 
sec. During the scan, 70 separate spectra were recorded, 
each representing a fuel length of about 6 cm. 
The reference source was measured several times at 
CLAB. Each time the source was oscillated 20 times with an 
amplitude of ± 30 mm. The positioning of the source was 
measured to contribute less than 1 % to the error. 
The measurements at the TVO were performed in a 
similar way as at the CLAB. The same spectrometer was 
used with identical settings of electronics. The main 
difference was the slit height that was 3 mm high at TVO. 
Each partial spectrum at the TVO was measured for 
5.5 seconds while it was 3 seconds at the CLAB. The longer 
measurement time was motivated by the difference in the slit 
height. In this way approximately the same statistical 
precision was obtained during both campaigns. 
The calibration source was measured also at the TVO 
in the same way as described above. No cesium background 
was observed during either of the two campaigns. 
2.5 Other Measures 
The seals used were verified later to guarantee the 
quality of the calibration information. Supporting data for 
neutron measurements was achieved by analyzing the water 
samples taken from the pools where measurements were 
performed. A small difference in the amount of neutron 
absorbers (boron) was detected in these samples analyzed in 
the IAEA. It is understood that the neutron calibration 
source takes these changes properly into account. 
The gauge of the fuel handling machine of each of 
the two facilities was used to measure the consistency of the 
gross weight of the assemblies measured. This served as an 
extra check against errors caused e.g. by the measuring of 
assemblies with or without the fuel channel. 
3. Measured Assemblies 
Table I lists those assemblies selected for 
measurement. All assemblies, except the 1405, had a fuel 
channel. • 
The BWR reference assembly is made by ABB-
Atom, Sweden, and it is of the 8x8-1 design. It has an initial 
U-235 enrichment of 2.748 %. This assembly has been 
irradiated during four successive cycles between June 1980 
and June 1984. It is stored with a standard fuel channel. 
Table I lists also the average neutron and gamma count rates 
corrected for cooling time. The values for the TVO 
assemblies have been normalized to the CLAB data. 
Table I. Characteristics of the BWR assemblies measured. Assemblies nos 1-15 are 
from CLAB and nos 16-18 from TVO. R =reference· assembly. 
No. ID lE BU CT Corrected Corrected 
(%/ (MWd/ (days) Cs-137 CR Cm-244 
U-235) kgU) (cps) CR (cps) 
1 5711 2.745 34.89 1879 1914 ± 38 777 ± 16 
2 5769 2.756 32.62 1176 1672 33 553 11 
3 1196 2.644 34.17 1880 - 745 15 
4 4922 2.683 32.24 1880 1672 33 539 11 
5 4921 2.685 32.24 1880 1653 33 539 11 
6 1179 2.642 33.68 1880 - 661 13 
7 5808 2.754 35.99 1177 1903 38 907 18 
8 5762 2.746 33.19 1881 1774 35 643 13 
9 5717 2.747 34.59 1881 
- 758 15 
10 4855 2.788 23.89 2766 1274 25 158 3 
11 4854 2.789 24.82 2766 1294 26 155 3 
12 4857 2.788 24.16 2262 - 120 2 
13 5721 2.750 34.75 1883 
- 764 15 
14 4858 2.787 25.44 2767 - 208 4 
15 1405 2.210 19.83 3020 1035 21 
-
16 R 6782 2.748 31.28 2340 1602 30 485 10 
17 4538 1.941 18.03 2340 901 18 -
18 7501 2.817 33.06 1980 1662 33 -
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4. Results 
4.1 PNA calibration 
Figure 1 shows the results of the PNA 
measurements. The corrected fast neutron rates, detected by 
Cd-wrapped detectors, are shown versus declared bumup. 
Similar curves were established also for the thermal flux 
detected by bare fission chambers. The calibration curve 
CR =a* BU b (4) 
has been fitted to the CLAB data using the Deming code. 
The fitting parameters have the following values, a = (7 .1 
± 3.5) * w-s and b = (4.57 ± 0.14). The 95 % Miller 
confidence intervals are also shown /6/. As can be seen, the 
measured data seem to follow the exponential law very well. 
The difference between the declared bum up of the reference 
assembly 6782 of the TVO, (31.280 ± 0.78) MWd/kgU and 
that interpolated from the calibration curve using the 
Deming code, (31.40 ± 0.63) MWd/kgU, is- 0.4 %. The 
difference obtained with the bare fission chambers is even 
smaller. 
4.2 HRGS calibration 
Figure 2 shows the results of the gamma calibration. 
Corrected and normalized average Cs-137 intensities with 
the total error for all measured assemblies (Table I) are 
plotted versus declared bumup. The calibration line 
CR =a* BU (5) 
was fitted to the data set of the CLAB. The fitting parameter 
was calculated using the Deming code to be a = (52.5 ± 
0.4). From this figure it is obvious that the Cs-137 activity 
has a linear dependence, within the error bars, on the 
bumup. The difference between the declared bumup of the 
reference assembly 6782, (31.28 ± 0.78) MWd/kgU, and 
the bumup interpolated from the calibration line using the 
Deming code, (30.49 ± 1.34) MWd/kgU, is 2.6 %. 
The Zn-65 activity was stable within the statistical 
errors during the measurements. 
Figure 2 also shows the three assemblies measured at 
the TVO. For the reference assembly 6782, the measured 
value of the bumup agrees within the errors with the 
declared value. For the other two a slightly larger deviation 
is observed. A separate study after the completion of the 
measurements showed that this deviation is due to small 
irregularities in the transmission function of the TVO KPA-
STORE collimator. 
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Figure 1. Corrected neutron rate of the 14 CLAB measured assemblies used for the calibration 
curve. The count rate of the reference assembly is plotted versus its declared bum up. 
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5. Conclusions 
The PNA, used as the main method of calibration, 
made use of the 21 repeated calibration source measurements 
at the CLAB, and 14 at the TVO, respectively. After decay 
correction of the Cf-252, the reproducibility of the Cf-252 
measurements at the two facilities using the same detection 
system is better than 1 % . 
Taking into account all the complementary measures, 
the neutron measurements are considered to be very reliable. 
The high degree of consistency between the PNA data of the 
reference assembly at the TVO and those measured at the 
CLAB, is understood to be based partly on the way the 
measurements were performed. First, an average of 12 
points of each assembly in the plateau burnup region was 
used. These measurements were also used to check that the 
bumup profiles were normal. Measurements at six different 
vertical positions smooth out the effect of local bumup 
changes which have a strong influence to the detected 
neutron rate. 
Because the initial enrichments were selected to 
match with each other, cooling times were selected long 
enough (for Cm-242 to decay) and the burnups were high 
enough, the influence of the irradiation history to the 
measured neutron rates was minimized. 
Based on the PNA measurements it is concluded that 
the consistency between the bumup of the TVO reference 
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assembly 6782 and the burnups of the .CLAB measured 
assemblies is beller than 2.5 %, which is the accuracy of the 
declared mean bumup. 
It is known from earlier HRGS measurements with 
this type of fuel that the operator declared burnup data are 
of high quality. Internal consistency of the bum up of the 
order of 1 % has been detected /2/. These measurements 
show, however, that a consistency of the order of the 
accuracy of the declared mean burnup exists also between 
two countries. 
The HRGS measurements support the results obtained 
with the PNA within the combined errors of the 
measurements and the declared bumup values. 
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A MUL TIFONCTION RADIOACTIVE WASTE MONITORING SYSTEM 
J.C. Edeline, G. Libs 
CEN-Saclay, France 
Abstract 
The monitoring of unknown radioactive transuranic 
wastes mixed with fission products (FP) needs several 
measuring technics : passive and active neutron methods, 
gamma rays spectrometry and, sometimes, emission 
tomography to localize the "hot points" in the waste 
packages. 
The goal is to achieve a whole system from the most up-
dated electronics sub-assemblies to provide these 
characterizaton measurement at the lowest cost and in the 
simplest manner. 
The control of the different measurements is made by 
only one computer and an unusual way of using the gamma 
spectrometry A.D.C. and multichannal analyser makes 
possible to control the neutron analogic electronics : 
neutron counter high-voltage supplies, amplifiers and 
discriminators; many of the gamma spectrometry sub-
assemblies are also used for the gamma emission 
tomography. The different measurements are automated 
and different programms offer the possibility to choice the 
proper measurement methods for each item. 
The waste package handling apparatus is not included in 
the system but the control of such handling might be 
perfored by the micro-computer. We describe the main 
parts and features of the system. 
1. Introduction 
The multifunction station described below consists of 
high performance equipment and combines different non-
destructive methods of monitoring radioactive 
wastes (fig.l). 
Fig.l Overall view of the multifunction station 
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1.1 Measurement and Identification 
- of the mass of plutonium by counting the number of 
neutrons emitted with spontaneous fission of the even 
isotopes of plutonium, 
-of the mass of fissile isotopes (235U and 239Pu) by the 
active neutronic method, using a 14 MeV neutron 
generator, 
- the isotopic composition of plutonium by gamma 
spectrometry, · 
-the fission products by gamma spectrometry. 
With the additional capabilities, by studying multiplicity, 
of: 
- reducing cosmic ray background noise, 
- detecting the possible presence of curium and 
californium. 
1.2 Why a multifunction station? 
The combining on a single platform of a maximum 
number of electronic subsystems provides the user with the 
necessary hardware to run different processing programs. 
It also makes it possible to: 
-considerably reduce the cost of the electronics, 
- centralize control of the different functions, 
- simplify checking and adjustment of the analog 
processing channels, 
- more easily automate the handling of the containers and 
execution of the measurement cycle. 
2. Description of the Measuring Station 
2.1 Measuring device 
This consists of : 
- a chamber enabling thermalization and detection of 
neutrons by an array of six sets of three proportional 
helium-3 counters, 
- preamplifiers and discriminators (one module per 
detector set), with integral gamma neutron threshold 
adjustment (SADN), 
- a power amplifier (SADP) which transmits, at low 
impedance, pulses to the processing modules installed in 
the two NIM racks. 
To simplify and limit the number of leads, thus 
considerably reducing the cost of installation, the SADN 
components are interconnected for the transmission of 
neutrons pulses and high and low voltages. These modules 
were designed by CEA-LETI/DEIN and are marketed by 
the company Novelec (Figure 2). 
2.2 Passive neutronic measurement 
When the neutronic activity in the container is sufficient, 
the mass of plutonium can be determined by measuring the 
number of spontaneous fissions of the even isotopes of 
plutonium (238Pu, ::!40Pu and ::!42Pu). The equipment with 
which this measurement is made consists of a counting and 
signal processing system which establishes temporal 
correlations between the neutrons detected amid 
background noise due to the presence of (a, n) neutrons 
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Fig. 2 Passive and Active Neutron Counting Head Electronics 
(Simplified scheme) 
and allowing to correct the multiplication effects of the 
nuclear material examined. Two measurement techniques 
are used depending on the count rate: 
- a shift register coincidence type counting module 
(SCRD) is used for count rates exceeding 5000 per second, 
corresponding to a quantity of plutonium between a few 
grams and a few kilogrammes. The operating principle 
consists in accumulating in two separate counters the 
neutrons presence in two shift registers, one of which is 
triggered on detection of a neutron (presence of 
coincidences) and the other after a long delay relative to the 
neutrons originating from the same fission). !he. difference 
in the counts between the two channels, wh1ch IS equal to 
the number of true coincidences, is proportional to the 
number of spontaneous fissions, and hence to the quantity 
of plutonium present /1/. The coincidence windows, which 
have a maximum size of 128 J...LS, are shift registers 
activated by a clock operating at 4 MHz. The pre-delay, 
which is adjustable up to 8 J...LS, ensures proper operation of 
the system with regard to the dead time of the measuring 
analogies. 
- a counting module of the STMV type for small 
quantities of plutonium, between around 0.1 and 20 
grammes, using the dead time correction. rel~tionship, 
whose properties, in the case where the distnbutwn of the 
pulses is not Poissonian, make it possible to deduce the 
mass of plutonium present in the container measured /2/. 
The duration of the dead time window can vary up to 
300 J..lS. 
- a module of the SDMN type, which decodes. the 
neutronic multiplicity in the temporal windows to the mnth 
order /3/, makes it possible to: 
- correct for the influence of multiplication effects 
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on the calculation of the mass of plutonium, 
-reduce the background noise due to cosmic rays, 
- detect the possible presence of any curium and 
californium. 
The modules intercommunicate via a parallel bus specific 
to the data exchanged and also linked to the central 
computer by a serial interface module (ISCN2). 
Acquisition of the data is controlled automatically by the 
central computer running a measurement program (CEA-
LETIIDEIN), or by the operator from the keyboard. 
Similarly, a number of data-processing algorithms can be 
chosen and implemented on the computer. An analog 
multiplexer makes it possible to benefit from an analog-
digital encoder (necessary for gamma spectrometry), to 
check the proper operation of the neutronic acquisition 
analog channel and to accurately adjust the neutron/gamma 
discrimination threshold. 
2.3 Active neutronic measurement 
The "fast neutron" method, using a 14 MeV neutron 
generator to bombard the object examined, is used when 
the activity of the container is low. This can be used to 
measure the masses of fissile isotopes under effect of 
thermal neutrons, i.e. mainly 235U and 239Pu. 
Fast and thermal neutron flux decay is recorded with a 
many inputs time-based encoder connected to the computer 
via a digital multiplexer, which make it possible to plot 
curves for these neutron fluxes (monitor signal and signal 
representing induced fissions) as a function of the time 
elapsed since the last burst of neutrons from the generator. 
As in the case of passive neutronic measurement : 
- acquisition and processing of the data is controlled 
automatically by a special program in the computer memory 
or by the operator from the keyboard, 
- there are means of checking the proper operation of the 
analog neutron data acquisition channels and adjusting the 
neutron/gamma discrimination thresholds. 
2.4 Gamma Energy Spectrometry 
Either one or two complete analog channels can be 
connected to the computer via the analog selector. Two 
spectrum collation programs managed automatically or by 
the operator make it possible to: 
- measure the quantities of fission products contained in 
the waste using special software marketed by Canberra, 
- determine the isotopic composition of the plutonium 
with a program developed by CEA-DTA/DAMRI. 
2.5 Checking a proper operation 
The credibility of the readings obtained depends on 
rigourous checking of the detection channels in service. 
The power supplies from the NIM racks comprising 
gamma and neutron instrumentation modules are checked 
systematically at the start and end of each measurement 
cycle. The absence of any of the voltages cancels the 
measurement cycle and a message is output on the printer to 
warn the operator. 
The following operations are also carried out : 
- automatic calibration of the measurement channel using 
a reference gamma source, 
- verification of the channel energy resolution, 
- automatic transfer of the calibration parameters to the 
fission products identification program. This can then re-
calibrate itself automatically in the event of slow drift in 
analog channel. The possibility offered by the Canberra 
soft~.Cl!e of concatenating control procedures makes it 
possible to m1mm1ze operator intervention in gamma 
measurement. This program which checks proper 
operation was developed by CEA-LETIJDEIN. 
3. The programs 
3.1 Options 
The multifunction station has no built-in neutronic 
measurement channel processing software, software is 
selected and stored by the user. Different combinations and 
sequences of measurement and processing programs can be 
obtained and the final configuration will depend on what is 
chosen: For example, the following are possible : 
1) gamma spectrometry 
2) gamma spectrometry and passive measurement 
3) gamma spectrometry and active measurement 
4) gamma spectrometry and active and passive 
measurement 
5) passive measurement 
6) passive and active measurement 
7) active measurement 
8) passive neutronic measurement channel adjustment 
9) active neutronic measurement channel adjustment 
10) gamma spectrometry channel adjustment 
3.2 Automation of package handling and 
measurement process 
After the methods of measurement have been selected by 
the operator or by instructions resident in the central 
computer memory, the latter manages the measurement 
process via a SMC 600-slave PLC essentially concerned 
with automation of handling and surveillance of the safety 
devices. 
t 
fromSADP 
(Passive 
Neutrons) 
lromSADP 
(Active 
Neutrons) 
fromSADP 
(Neutron 
Monitors) 
(~-__. 
( A 1-----,;~u 
JL 
(To) from neutron generalor 
The first seven progra1~s can be invoked by an operator 
or automatically; they require the actual presence of a 
package and only truly begin after authorization by the 
SMC after it has checked proper operation of the 
installation and that the initial conditions of functioning are 
fulfilled: installation in safety position, presence of a waste 
container etc. These programs are terminated after the 
installation has been made safe to the exterior by an "end of 
program run" signal. 
Programs 8, 9 and 10 are controlled by the operator, 
they can only be run if the installation is in the initial safety 
position and if the neutron generator is shut down. There 
is no provision for automatic container handling in these 
last programs, but all control functions are available to the 
operator. 
The acquisition parameters can only be modified if it is 
the operator who invokes a program. 
At the present time, the settings of the neutron generator 
(maximum output, duration of bursts, frequency of 
repetition etc.) cannot be changed by the central computer. 
It is only start up and shut down which are controlled by 
the slave SMC, to ensure maximum safety. Management 
of drum movement is not presently provided, and may be 
introduced using the SMC PLC connected to the computer, 
depending on user requirements. 
4. General information on interconnection of the 
different multifunction station modules 
The diagram in Figure 3 shows the general arrangement 
of the different parts of the measurement station. The task 
of the central computer is to manage the acquisition of data 
arriving from the three measurement channels and to 
process the results; it also handles dialogue with : 
- the operator, by means of the keyboard, screen and 
printer, 
Internal Bus 
Data and 
Adress Bus 
NIM Power 
Test Module 
Printer 
Fig.3 Multifonction Radioactive Waste Monitoring System 
Bloc Diagramm G. LIBS 
DEIN/SAI 
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- an SMC 600 slave PLC, which handles control and 
monitoring of the safety devices, the handling mechanisms 
and the neutron generator. The link with the computer is 
via a serial interface in the computer, 
- possibly a second computer from which it receives 
commands and to which it supplies reports on execution of 
its tasks. 
The three measurement channels (passive and active 
neutron measurement and gamma spectrometry) form 
independent units with all their parts grouped in two NIM 
racks. The SCRD, SDMN and STMV modules process the 
pulses originating from the passive channel and are 
interconnected by a special data bus. All these parts are 
controlled from the central computer via the ISCN2 
interface serial port. 
The active neutron channel includes a 8000 channel 
multi-scale module, data from which is fed by a digital 
multiplexer to the computer encoder interface card. 
The gamma spectrometry channel consists of a high 
resolution preamplifier, an amplifier with conventional 
shaping and an amplitude encoder (ADC). The data from 
the latter are fed by the digital multiplexer to the encoder 
interface card installed in the computer. 
One of the main advantages of this arrangement is that it 
makes it possible to benefit from the gamma acquisition 
chain for displaying the energy spectrum of the neutrons 
from the neutron channels to accurately adjust the 
preamplifier neutron/gamma discrimination threshold. This 
arrangement is obtained by the multi-input analog channel 
selector, development work by CEA-LETI/DEIN on which 
mainly related to preserving high linearity in the 
measurement channel. 
5. Conclusion 
Checking of unknown radioactive waste containing 
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transuranic elements mixed with fission products 
necessitates different measurement techniques: active and 
passive neutronic methods, gamma spectrometry and, on 
occasions, emission tomography to localize "hot spots". 
Our intention is to propose a complete system using the 
latest electronic techniques to obtain a cheaper and simpler 
measurement station. 
The different measurements are checked by a single 
computer and, as is nut normally the case, the components 
of the gamma channel (ADC and multi-channel analyzer) 
are used to check the neutron measurement analog 
electronics: adjustment of the neutron counter high-voltage 
supply and the amplifier/discriminator thresholds. Some of 
the modules of the spectrometry chain will also be used for 
gamma emission tomography. The different measurements 
are automatically concatenated and many programs offer the 
possibility of selecting the methods of measurement 
appropriate for a particular application from a range of 
options. 
The container handling device is not included in the 
system but handling can be controlled from the 
microcomputer. 
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Abstract 
The different passive neutron 
coincidence measurement techniques 
used by the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate are reviewed. The 
inventory of non-destructive assay 
(NDA) instrumentation is presented, as 
are their different material and 
instrument specific calibrations. The 
principle of unique material specific 
calibrations for a given instrument 
type is described. A series of assay 
results using one specific High Level 
Neutron coincidence Counter (HLNC-II) 
is shown and discussed in detail. A 
systematic analysis of the different 
sources of error in performing passive 
neutron coincidence measurements is 
presented. 
1. Introduction 
Passive neutron coincidence counters 
are appropriate for the determination 
of plutonium in many types of samples. 
They are relatively simple devices 
which have been developed into 
reliable portable instruments. As a 
result, a large fraction of NDA 
measurements made by the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate (DCS) used 
examples of these counters. over a 
period of several years, the use of 
DCS instruments has produced a large 
body of passive neutron data. This 
paper describes the DCS collection of 
passive neutron NDA systems and their 
calibration for different types of 
material and the performance which is 
achieved. It then goes on to discuss 
the sources of uncertainty on the 
measurements and summarises the 
implications of moving to unattended 
monitoring systems. 
2. NDA Equipment Inventory 
A list of passive neutron measuring 
equipment currently operated by DCS is 
shown in table 1. All the equipment is 
fitted with Amptek 
amplifier/discriminators and is used 
with Jomar JSR-11 shift register 
electronics. 
These detectors are well-known and no 
attempt is made here to describe them. 
References are given in table 1. All 
this equipment is transportable and 
can be used at numerous different 
Number Measurement Typical 
Detector in use Campaigns Items Referenc 
per year 
HLNC 11 131 Pu02 powder 1 
Pu metal 
MOX powder 
MOX solids 
NCC 7 35 MOX !.Wil rual nssombl~ 2 
Boxes of fuel pins 
MOX FBR fuel assembl~ 
UFBR 4 52 MOX FBR fuel assembly 3 
Pu02 powder 
INVS 4 46 Pu02 powder 4 
MOX powder 
110X solids 
Cerceuil 4 46 MOX fuel rods 5 
Ion-fork l - MOX assemblies (unde 6 (mod) water) 
Table l Euratom passive neutron measuring equipment 
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installations. 
reliability of 
achieved. 
Despite this, 
the systems has 
3. Calibration 
good 
been 
The calibration of each detector type 
for a certain material is based on a 
single calibration curve for one 
particular detector. The curve is 
established by measurements of known 
amounts of material. The difference 
between the individual models of a 
particular type of detector is 
determined by measuring a particular 
neutron source in each one. The 
neutron source measurements allow the 
establishment of a cross-calibration 
constant for each detector which is 
used to correct the acquired data to 
make the single calibration curve 
applicable in each case. This method 
is described in reference 7. The 
method is used both because it 
provides a logical structure for 
calibration data which is easy to 
maintain and also because the effort 
involved in calibrating a family of 
detectors is greatly reduced. The 
calibration of each detector is made 
using non-multiplication corrected 
data and multiplication corrected (ref 
8) data. A quadratic equation is used 
to fit the non-multiplication 
corrected calibration curve whereas a 
linear fit is used for the 
multiplication corrected curve. The 
values of the calibration constants 
currently used are shown in table 2. 
e 
rho multiplication not 
zero corrected corrected 
al*x + a2 bl*X*X +b2*X +b3 
The sources of error have been divided 
into two types: those related to the 
use of the detector and those related 
to the properties of the sample. In 
the former category the errors are 
under the direct control of the user. 
Frequent normalisation and background 
checks, together with the use of the 
correct analysis parameters can reduce 
the error from all of these sources to 
very small values. There are three 
further possible sources of error in 
the second category which are also 
under the user's control: use of the 
appropriate calibration curve, correct 
isotopic values and correct reference 
date of the isotopic analysis. Errors 
from these sources should also be very 
small. The most important sources of 
error are related to the properties of 
the sample itself. One property which 
causes very large effects on the non-
multiplication corrected results is 
the sample density. In the case of 
powders this can vary by considerable 
amounts (1.5 - 2.5 gjcm3) depending on 
how the sample has been treated. 
Fortunately the multiplication 
correction procedure reduces this 
effect to insignificant levels. The 
remaining sources of error determine, 
to a large extent, the performance of 
the measurement technique: (i) the 
presence of other materials (including 
impurities) (ii) the container and 
(iii) sample positioning. The 
magnitude of these errors depends on 
the extent to which the material can 
be classified into sets suitable for a 
specific calibration. Such sets would 
be, for example, MOX fuel assemblies 
UFBR: x=240Pueff: 
UFBR-II powder . 0499 3.8683 -511 • 1.39e-3 -.198 9.88e3 
UFBR mod powder .0591 4. 7272 -32.3 5.78e-4 5.33 -5.77e2 
UFBR FBR assembly .05009 3.886 0 9.55e-4 5.963 0 
NCC: x=240Pueff/cm: 
NCC(No Cd)LWR assy .0814 647.94 0 64.6 219.6 0 
NCC(No Cd)Pin boxes .0814 673.81 -44.6 51.7 590.4 0 
NCC(No Cd)FBR assy .0814 627 0 9.95 853 0 
NCC(Cd) FBR assy .0814 572 0 9.65 574 0 
HLNCC: x=240Pueff: 
HLNCC Pu02 .103 18.665 -0.1 -2.27e-1 23.71 1. 87e-2 
HLNCC Pu metal .103 18.354 -0.1 -2. Jle-2 24.08 1. 45e-1 
HLNCC MOX solid .103 18.443 -0.1 -2.55e-1 26.47 3.81e-2 
HLNCC MOX plates .103 18.18 -0.17 -2.77e-1 28.76 5.5oe-2 
HLNCC MOX powders .103 19.198 -0.1! 1.68e-2 27.87 0. 
INVS: x=240Pueff: 
INVS Pu02/MOX - - 0.983 58.24 o. 
INVS Nitrate - - 4.193 59.27 o. 
Table 2. Currently used passive neutron calibration constants 
4. Performance 
Figure 1 shows the operator-inspector 
differences for a range of several 
hundred measurements made with an 
HLNC2. The average operator-inspector 
difference is 2.2% compared to an 
average uncertainty on each 
measurement of 1.1%. 
25 ~--------------------------------------, 
20 
15 
10 ,, 
·5 
·10 
EFFECT SIZE EFFECT ON IMPROVEMENT COMMENTS 
·15 Pu MASS IN AUTO 
% % MODE? 
·20 
A. Detector Rela ed 
·25 J,....-""1""'-..,....~.....,...-....,...,_.....,.._....,..~.....,.,~......,.,~.....,... 
99.20 471.10 559.5 641.60 676.00 71030 731.90 767.60 821.00 002.69 Background 10% 1.5 - 7% Yes 
PU-MASS DECLARED Normalisation 5% 1% Yes 
Malfunction 100% 100% No time 
rho-zero 
Figure 1 Operator Inspector Differences vs. mass 5% 6% Yes deadtime 10% O.l%for 5oo, Yes 
gate length factor 2 10% Yes 
5. Sources of Uncertainty 
Table 3 shows the sources of 
systematic error associated with 
passive neutron coincidence counter 
measurements. The values are estimates 
of the relative standard deviation in 
each case. The uncertainty due to 
counting statistics varies with the 
time of data acquisition, but can 
usually be made much less than 1%. The 
table has been compiled for the case 
of the plutonium mass obtained from 
the multiplication corrected 
calibration curve, for which the alpha 
value (the ratio of (alpha,n) neutrons 
to spontaneous fission neutrons) is 
required as an input parameter. 
pre-de1ay 20% 5% Yes 
B. Sample Relatec 
Density 25% small Batch 
Wrong Calibration 10% Yes 
Wrong Isotopics No 
Wrong date 1 year 2 - 4 % NO 
Other materials (including impurities) 
- other fissile small Batch 
- neutron poisons Batch 
- (a,n) material Batch 
- moderator small Batch 
Container Batch 
Positioning Yes 
* = user may be supplied with, or enter, incorrect analysis 
parameters 
Batch = greater uniformity for samples within one batch 
Table 3 Sources of uncertainty in coincidence counter 
measurements 
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* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
delay 
of a particular design, or well 
characterized powder samples. In these 
circumstances measurements show 
systematic uncertainties of 1 - 2%. In 
order to achieve this performance it 
is essential that the samples used for 
calibration are representative of the 
overall population of samples to be 
measured, including the effects of 
containers. These values are similar 
to those given by other authors 
(reference 9). 
6. Example MOX Powder samples 
Some MOX sample measurements were re-
analyzed in detail to investigate the 
sensitivity of the results to various 
parameters. In field measurements, the 
background, normalisation and isotopic 
composition (including date) are 
potential sources of error. These are 
considered in turn. 
6.1 Background 
~igure 2 shows the percentage change 
1.n the multiplication corrected reals 
as a function of the percentage change 
in background for three MOX samples 
with masses of 250, 540 and 900g. The 
change in the background rate (between 
2000 and 20000 cps) was chosen because 
this range has been observed in 
measurements at a fixed location in a 
particular installation. The figure 
shows that, in this case, a relatively 
small error (10%) in background 
determination can lead to errors of 
6%, 2%, and 1.3% for masses 250, 540, 
and 900g respectively. 
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Figure 2 Rmc vs. Background 
6.2 Normalisation 
In general, experience shows that 
normalisation measurements are 
performed well. However it is possible 
in installations where several 
detectors are used that the reference 
source from the wrong detector is 
used. Very often this type of error is 
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detected immediately because of the 
large change in the normalisation 
constant, but for small changes the 
new value may be accepted. Figure 3 
shows the effect of a change in the 
normalisation constant on both the 
non-multiplication corrected and the 
multiplication corrected reals. The 
non-multiplication corrected reals 
change in direct proportion to the 
normalisation constant. The 
multiplication corrected reals are 
less sensitive, and change by about 
one third of the percentage change in 
the normalisation constant. 
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Figure 3 Reals vs Normalisation 
6.3 Date of Isotopics 
An incorrect reference date of 
isotopic analysis affects the 
multiplication corrected reals by 
affecting the updating of the 
isotopics before the calculation of 
the alpha value. In practice incorrect 
dates are an unusual occurrence, but 
the result of a variation of the date 
by up to five years is shown in figure 
4. This gives an indication of the 
accuracy required in entering the 
information. An error of one year 
causes the multiplication corrected 
reals to change by about 2%. 
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Figure 4 Rmc vs isotopic date 
7. Automated Measurements 
A new phase of safeguards 
instrumentation has recently begun 
with the installation into large 
facilities of fixed measuring 
equipment which can operate 
c.-:mtinuously in an unattended mode. 
This has lead to the need to develop 
specialised software in order to 
realise the full potential of these 
devices. In general, it is to be 
expected that the error associated 
with measurements carried out by such 
automated equipment would be smaller 
than that from manual equipment for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, with a 
fixed detector system the opportunity 
for damage during transport between 
installations is removed. Secondly, 
automated systems remove many of the 
user errors which can occur in normal 
systems, for example the choice of a 
wrong calibration curve. Thirdly, 
automated systems are usually applied 
to places in a plant where the type of 
material and the container used is 
very well determined. This means that 
the measurement system can be 1 tuned 1 
to give optimum performance for a 
particular sample type. In table 3 
which shows the sources of error in 
passive neutron measurements, the 
column headed 1 Improvement in Auto 
Mode' denotes this latter point as 
1 batch 1 , which indicates that certain 
properties of the samples will be 
common to all the material measured 
with a particular detector and should 
also be common to the calibration. 
Thus the error contribution is 
removed. A good example would be that 
the container of all the samples is 
likely to be the same. In addition, 
product which is being produced by a 
certain plant is likely to have a very 
much smaller variation in, for 
example, impurity or moisture levels 
than material of different or1g1n 
which has been stored for different 
periods of time. For the latter, any 
calibration will be much less 
representative of the complete 
ensemble of material. 
However automated systems, unless they 
are carefully designed, have also the 
potential to make much worse 
measurements than manually operated 
ones, mainly because no user is 
present to correct faults as they 
arise. If a manually operated system 
gives an unexpected result, then it is 
possible to check the equipment and 
make a re-measurement while the sample 
is still available. In automated 
systems this option may not exist, 
therefore a number of features should 
be included in order to minimise 
errors due to malfunctions. Firstly, 
the use of duplicate electronic chains 
can give extra security of data 
acquisition. Tests on the acquired 
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data such as the comparison of the 
calculated and measured accidental 
coincidence rate allow the state of 
the detector and electronics to be 
determined. Secondly, a permanently 
installed small neutron source allows 
the efficiency of the detector to be 
checked continually between 
measurements of samples. This not only 
enables a warning to be given of 
efficiency changes, but should also 
allow analysis of the data collected 
during the period of altered 
efficiency, excluding of course the 
case of complete failure. 
Another test which can be useful in 
automated mode, is to compare the 
value of the Reals to Totals ratio 
with a reference value. In general, 
the R/T value for a multiplying sample 
is given by: 
R eF v(v-1) 
T 2 M (l+a) vs 
where 
e = detection efficiency 
F fraction of coincidence in the 
shift register gate 
v(v-1) = 2nd factorial moment 
including the effect of multiplication 
M = multiplication 
a = alpha (ratio of (alpha,n) neutrons 
to spontaneous fission neutrons 
vs= mean number of neutrons·per 
spontaneous fission. 
This ratio con~ains all of the 
information on the effect of 
multiplication in the sample and is 
the basis of the well-known Ensslin 
multiplication correction technique 
(ref 8). This ratio depends on the 
mass, shape, density and alpha value 
of the sample. It does not contain any 
~ore information than is normally used 
in the complete analysis of the 
measurement, but the interest in the 
case of automated measurements arises 
because of two conditions: firstly 
because of the uniformity of material 
type referred to above, the R/T value 
depends in a simple way on the mass of 
the sample, and secondly the ratio is 
very simple and quick to calculate. 
Figure 5 shows a plot of the R/T value 
for some particular sets of data from 
MOX and Pu02 samples as a function of 
sample mass. It can be seen that the 
R/T value is relatively independent of 
mass over quite a wide range, but that 
differences exist between the two 
sets. This presents a potential check 
on the quality of the measurement (or 
a change in sample type) which could 
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Figure 5 R/T vs mass for different materials 
be carried out as data is collected by 
the automated system. The usefulness 
of this test will be very installation 
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dependent and will require the 
compilation of suitable representative 
data. 
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Abstract 
The isotopic composition of Plutonium 242 can not be 
measured by gamma spectroscopy. For this reason the 
gamma and passive neutron assay technique has been 
historically combined with the isotopic correlation to obtain 
the Plutonium 242 weight percentage. In this report 
experimental data from high resolution gamma spectroscopy, 
passive neutron assay and calorimetry were used to 
determine the weight of Plutonium, the respective weight 
percentages and the Americium 241 content without resorting 
to correlations. 
Data are presented for the plutonium oxide PERLA 
standards in the weight range of 100 g - 2500 g. The data 
were collected in the JRC -P ERLA facility and the results are 
compared to nominal values. The accuracy is always better 
than 0.5% on the total Plutonium mass for the 14 samples in 
this evaluation. 
1.1ntroduction 
Historically the assay of a Plutonium sample has been 
done with the use of a High Level Neutron Coincidence 
Counter (HLNCC) together with a gamma ray isotopic 
determination. This technique may introduce errors 
depending on the method used to estimate the Plutonium 242 
content. 
The use of another measurement such as the thermal 
power of the Plutonium sample measured with a calorimeter 
gives another relation which links the unknown weights of 
the isotopes of plutonium and of the americium 241 to a 
measured quantity. 
This report describes a method to evaluate the 
isotopic composition of Plutonium, in particular the isotope 
Plutonium 242, which gives a better estimation of the total 
plutonium mass, the isotopic ratios, and the Americium 241 
fraction. The method uses the measurement results from the 
MGA gamma technique, the HLNCC and the calorimeter. 
The programme for the evaluation of these quantities 
has been implemented with Mathematica of Wolfram 
Research. This programme is designed for general use. The 
instrument availability, time available for this activity, plant 
constraints and reliability of the sample data all affect the 
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user needs. The user may chose one of the following 
possibilities: 
I) If the isotopic composition of Plutonium and 
Americium content is well known a measurement 
with the HLNCC or calorimeter is enough to measure 
the mass of Plutonium; 
II) If an isotopic correlation is used for Plutonium 
242 determination, the gamma spectroscopy can be 
combined with either HLNCC or calorimetry; 
Ill) If only the chemical form of the material is 
known the three techniques together permit the 
evaluation of the isotopic ratios, the Americium 241 
fraction, and the mass of Plutonium. 
2.Method 
The gamma ray technique is used to measure the ratio 
between the isotopes of plutonium : · Pu238/Pu239, 
Pu240/Pu239, Am241/Pu239 /5,6/. 
The neutron technique (HLNCC) is used to measure 
a quantity "Real coincidence counts" corrected for 
background and for dead time, which is proportional to the 
Pu2A0 eff, which is the sum of the weights of the plutonium 
238, 240, 242 each one multiplied by a known constant /1 ,2/. 
The assay of a plutonium sample is impossible 
without another relation which links together the weights of 
the 242 isotope of plutonium and to the other quantities. 
The calorimeter measures the thermal power of a 
plutonium sample. This quantity is proportional to the sum 
of the weights of the plutonium isotopes plus the weight of 
americium 241, each one multiplied by a known constant 
/3,4/. This measure can be used as another relation for the 
assay of the total weight of a plutonium sample. 
The four linear equations of the gamma ray technique 
together with the two equations respectively of the neutron 
and heat power measurements gives six linear equations in 
the six unknown isotopes. These six linear equations can be 
solved easily in the six unknowns Pu238, ••• , Pu2A2 and Am2A1• 
The variance matrix of the result is computed exactly as 
A.VI.AT where VI is the variance matrix of the input 
variables and A is the transformation matrix defining outputs 
as function of inputs. 
3.Instrumentation 
The measurements were carried out using : 
High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter 
(HLNCC) model 2 as designed by Los Alamos 
National Laboratory with the Amptek A-111 
electronics chain and with a Jomar JSR-11 Shift 
Register. 
Gamma spectroscopy which uses a High 
Resolution Gamma Spectrometer System suitable for 
high counting rates, the MGA evaluation code, 
developed at LLNL (Lawrertce Livermore National 
Laboratory). 
Water twin bridge calorimeter developed at 
Monsanto Research Corporation suitable for 
measuring heat power up to 45 W. 
4.Results 
The technique has been applied to 14 plutonium oxide 
samples with plutonium weight in the range 100-2500 grams. 
Three Burn-ups were represented; 71.0%, 61.0%, 58.1% of 
Pu239• The percentage of Pu242 is 0.98%, 4.83%, and 5.64%, 
respectively. 
The Fig.l shows the percent error on the total 
Plutonium mass assayed with the technique of 
HLNCC+MGA, as used up to now, relative to the real mass. 
The average error of the absolute values is 1.75% with a 
standard deviation of 1.18%. 
The Fig.2 shows the percent error on the total 
Plutonium mass assayed with the technique of 
CALORIMETER+MGA, relative to the real mass. The 
average error of the absolute values is 1.62% with a standard 
deviation of 1.12%. 
The Fig.3 shows the percent error on the total 
Plutonium mass assayed with the technique of 
HLNCC+MGA+CALORIMETER, relative to the real mass. 
The average error of the absolute values is 0.206% with 
standard deviation of 0.139%. 
The Fig.4,5 show the error on the Plutonium 242 
abundance assayed with the techniques of 
HLNCC+MGA+CALORIMETER and HLNCC+MGA or 
CALORIMETER+MGA, relative to the real Plutonium mass, 
respectively. The average error of the absolute values is 
0.23% with a standard deviation of 0.19% for the proposed 
technique and 1.47% with S.D. of 0.98% for the old 
techniques. 
The techniques of HLNCC+MGA and 
CALORIMETER+MGA give good accuracy only when they 
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measure Plutonium samples of low burn-up. This is due to 
the fact that the Plutonium 242 content is evaluated with an 
isotopic composition correlation which gives high errors for 
high and medium burn-up. 
Our proposed technique gives an alternate estimation 
of the Plutonium 242 content. It has less bias between the 
different burnups. 
5.Conclusions 
The proposed technique gives an accurate 
determination of the Plutonium weight without prior 
knowledge of the Plutonium 242 content. The samples 
assayed give. an average absolute error on the plutonium 
mass of 0.216% and a standard deviation of 0.139%. This is 
much better than what can be achieved with HLNCC+MGA 
(Mean 1.75%, S.D. 1.18%) or with 
CALORIMETER+MGA (Mean = 1.62%, S.D. = 1.12%). 
Unfortunately the calorimeter needs a very long time 
to make measurements. When the available time is too short 
to perform the precise measurement, some time can be used 
to check each batch for the abundance of the Plutonium 242. 
We will evaluate in the future the use of this method 
to get an estimation of the alpha factor (a-n reaction rate) or 
of the multiplication factor in the case of samples with 
known abundance of Plutonium 242. 
1 -
2-
3 -
4-
5 -
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USE OF AN IMPROVED SIGNAL PROCESSING TO IDENTIFY A NEUTRON. 
SOURCE FROM THE MEASURES OBTAINED WITH A SHIFT REGISTER SYSTEM 
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B.Thaurel - CEA FAR - BP6 92260 FONTENAY AUX ROSES 
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Abstract 
Once known the composition of a Pu, 
a way for verifying the content of a 
sample is the detection of multiplici-
ties on neutronic coincidences obtained 
with a shift register system (SCRD). 
Such a system provides two laws of 
coincidences probability for neutrons 
detected within two gates triggered in-
dependently and by neutron themselves. 
After a brief presentation of the 
mathematical madel of the detection 
system, the paper describes sorne expe-
riences in which the SCRD system produ-
ced an assessment for fission neutrons 
and for (a,n) neutrons emitted by a 
source, without any other information 
except countings. For instance, this 
madel shows how to separate a Pu240 
source from a Cf2s2 source whereas a 
classical calculation, based on total 
counting and real coincidences, does not 
allow discrimination. 
The calculation shows that usual 
statistics (lOB eps) are sufficient to 
take the multiplicative affects into 
account. 
La reconnaissance des sources 
neutroniques: une utilisation 
spécifique du S.C.R.D. 
Introduction 
Le système de coïncidences à regis-
tre à décalage (SCRD) associé à un en-
semble de comptage neutronique donne 
accès d'une part aux comptages obtenus 
dans des fenêtres déclenchées aléatoire-
ment et par les neutrons détectés eux-
même (résultats A 8 et (R + A) 8 fournis par 
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l'appareil original de BOEHNEL1), et 
d '!j,utre part aux comptages A(!) et 
(R +A)(/) dont la normalisation fournit 
les histogrammes de fréquence représen-
tatifs des probabilités a(/) et (r+a)(/) 
des coïncidences d'ordre 1 dans chaque 
mode, pour_/ variant de 0 à 7. Chaque 
histogramme a donc 9 positions, la go 
étant occupée par le comptage cumulé de 
toutes les coïncidences d'ordre supéri-
eur à 7. Après un bref rappel des types 
de mesures pour lesquels cet appareil 
est ou pourrait être utilisé on détaille 
sur des expériences une utilisation 
inaccessible au dépouillement classique. 
1. Hypothèses utilisées dans la 
modélisation 
1.1 Les effets de temps mort sont 
négligés 
1.2 Réponse impulsionnelle de 
l'ensemble de comptage 
La réponse impulsionnelle pour 
les neutrons de fission (probabilité 
P(t)dt de détecter à l'instant t un 
neutron émis à l'instant 0) se termine 
par une décroissance exponentielle. Plus 
précisément on a: 
P(t)- P 1r(t) pour t <a 
P(t)- ea.a·•t pour t >a 
Le terme transitoire P~ n'est pris en 
compte que par son intégrale. La modéli-
sation fait donc intervenir 4 paramè-
tres: 
e1 - f~P(t)dt : efficacité totale de 
détection pour les neutrons de fission 
a , E et a déjà définis. 
1.3 Conséquence pour les neutrons 
détectés dans des fenêtres déclenchées 
avec un retard suffisant. 
Le SCRD, perfectionnement de l'appareil 
original décrit par BOEHNEL, examine la 
répartition des neutrons détectés dans 
des fenêtres ouvertes avec un certain 
retard aprês détection d'un neutron. 
Considérons les neutrons détectés dans 
une telle fenêtre et corrélés avec l'ou-
verture de cette fenêtre. Les renseigne-
ments connus sur ces neutrons sont les 
suivants: 
-ils appartiennent à une cascade 
de fission émise antérieurement à la dé-
tection du neutron qui a ouvert la fenê-
tre. 
-la probabilité de détecter à 
l'instant t un neutron émis à l'instant 
0 est P(t)dt 
par conséquent, si t est supérieur à 
a , ce qui est toujours réalisé lorsque 
le retard est supérieur à a , ces neu-
trons sont détectés avec la probabilité 
ea.ll-•1dt et rien ne distingue ces détec-
tions de celles qui se seraient produi-
tes si la réponse P(t) était purement 
exponentielle. Or dans ce cas nous 
savons calculer la répartition de ces 
neutrons2. 3 
Dans toute la suite a désigne le 
retard avec lequel les fenêtres corré-
lées sont ouvertes après détection d'un 
neutron. Il est au moins égal à la durée 
du transitoire. 
1.4 Récapitulation 
Le SCRD compte les coïncidences 
d'ordre 1 suivant 2 modes: 
- accidentelles 
cidences d'ordre 1 
A(!) coïn-
- réelles + accidentelles: (R+A)(I) 
coïncidences d'ordre 1 
Ces comptages permettent d'estimer les 
probabilités correspondantes a.(/) et 
(r +a.)(/) 
Les probabilités de coïncidences 
réelles r(l) sont liées aux probabilités 
évaluées par la mesure par: 
1 
(r+a)(l)= L a(i).r(l-i) ( l) 
t•O 
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La modélisation nous permet de 
passer des probabilités p(v) d'émission 
de v neutrons à la source aux probabili-
tés r(/) , et inversement. 
La modélisation ne nous permet pas 
de passer des caractéristiques de la 
source (les p(v) et l'intensitéS casca-
des/s) aux quantités directement mesu-
rées. ( Sauf dans le cas d'une source 
poissonienne: p(J)•l , où on a r(O)•l et 
où a et (r+a) suivent la loi de POISSON 
de paramètre e1 S quelle que soit la 
forme de P(t) ) 
2. Utilisations 
Méthode générale 
On utilise systématiquement une 
reconnaissance de forme pour identifier 
la nature de la source: en effet lors-
qu'une source a été reconnue le compta-
ge total est· suffisant pour déterminer 
la quantité de matériau émetteur. 
La reconnaissance de forme utilise la 
distance de 2 histogrammes H • et Hz à 9 
positions définie par d(H •. Hz)•2sln(,/2) 
, où + est l'angle associé à la norme 
euclidienne: si H 1(i) et Hz(i) sont les 
nombres d'observations égales à i dans 
les 2 histogrammes, 
B L H 1 (i)H z(i) 
t•O cos~--,~8 ======~8~==== L H 1 (i)z L H z(i)z 
1•0 1•0 
Une distance sur les histogrammes de 
dimension 9 ayant ainsi été définie, on 
peut définir sur l'ensemble des histo-
grammes H 1 résultats d ·une série dt: n 
mesures, et donc de nature aléatoire, 
des quantités justiciables d'un traite-
ment analogue à celui effectué pour les 
variables aléatoires à valeurs réelles. 
Parmi ces notions nous utilisons seule-
ment: 
-étendue d'une série de mesures: 
maximum de la distance d(H" H 1) de 2 
histogrammes appartenant à la série 
-histogramme moyen: défini par 
R 
H(I)- L Hl(/) 
1•1 
Remarque: Il est tentant de prendre 
comme définition de l'histogramme moyen 
l'histogramme des valeurs moyennes, 
c'est à dire de diviser par n le second 
membre de la formule précédente. Mais 
cela ferait perdre de vue le fait que 
les histogrammes expérimentaux sont 
constitués de valeurs numériques entiè-
res et que le nombre total N d · événe-
ments contenus dans un tel histogramme 
joue un rôle très important. La formule 
"intuitive" est vraie pour les histo-
grammes de fréquence associés aux 2 
membres. 
-dispersion expérimentale: 
- } R ( ) d·-Id ii,H, 
n,.J 
La notion de convergence d'une suite 
infinie d'histogrammes à k valeurs asso-
ciée à la distance d: 
"La suite H,. tend vers H si 
d(H "' H) tend vers 0" 
est liée à la convergence vers la loi de 
probabilité h des histogrammes expéri-
mentaux H N comportant N événements 
indépendants tirés sur cette loi par la 
formule4: 
k( 1-~Y -1 
N 
(2) 
avec d 0 • d(h,h 0 ) , où h 0 est la réparti-
tion plate h 0 (/) • 1 . Pour préciser 
quantitativement le "peu différent de" 
dans la formule (2) nous avons calculé 
la moyenne et la variance de la variable 
aléatoire (d(H N,h)) 2 associée à cette 
suite. On obtient, pour la loi dont les 
probabilités sont p,: 
E(dz). LPf- LP~ 
N(LPt) 2 
Var(dz). 2(LP~)z- 4 2>~ LP~ + 2(LP~)~ 
N2(LP~)4 
La formule (2) avait été obtenue dans 
la référence 4 comme extrapolation à 
partir de certains cas p·articuliers. On 
constate qu'elle est équivalente à l'ap-
proximation toujours dangereuse en l'ab-
sence de cal cu 1: X • ~ E(X 2 ) On cons ta te 
que, l'écart type de d2 étant du même 
ordre (1/N) que sa moyenne, cette 
approximation est correcte mais ne per-
met pas un calcul précis. Elle est 
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suffisante pour évaluer à un facteur 4 
près la durée nécessaire à une mesure, 
et nous n'en faisons pas d'autre usage. 
L'important est de noter que, comme 
l'indique la formule (2), les valeurs de 
d correspondant à un risque de première 
espèce donné dépendent de la forme de la 
fonction h . Il est donc nécessaire pour 
en avoir une évaluation d'étalonner 
l'appareil dans une zone voisine des 
atilisations prévues. Nous en donnerons 
~n exemple complet. 
Cette reconnaissance de forme, pour 
être interprétable, doit donc être 
effectuée sur les résultats expérimen-
taux eux-même, mais la manière de procé-
jer dépend de ce que l'on sait ou croit 
savoir sur la source avant la mesure, 
~omme dans tout problème de probabili-
'és. Pratiquement on peut distinguer 4 
~randes classes de problèmes: 
2.1 Contrôle de qualité en fin de 
fabrication (Exemple: assemblages neufs 
de réacteurs) 
Les dispositions géométriques, 
compositions isotopiques, et réparti-
tions volontaires ou non des impuretés 
sont a priori identiques. On doit donc 
s'attendre à des distributions identi-
ques et il faut vérifier les corréla-
tions au niveau de l'un des histogrammes 
A ou (R +A) . (Chaque histogramme 
contient en effet l'information com-
plète, ce qui est à l'origine d'appro-
ches différentes de celle de BOEHNEL. Un 
accord obtenu sur l'une des répartitions 
sans être obtenu sur l'autre est l'in-
dice d'un dysfonctionnement de l'appa-
reil de mesure, comme le serait 
l'obtention de répartitions A et (R+A) 
identiques sans être poissoniennes). Une 
telle exploration systématique n'a pas 
été mise en oeuvre à notre connaissance 
avec le SCRD. Il est certain que l'exa-
men détaillé des histogrammes expérimen-
taux permettrait de retrouver des 
variations très fines (reconnaissance, 
dans des éléments MDX, de ceux issus 
d'un même lot de fabrication, ... ). Une 
telle reconnaissance de forme n'implique 
nullement une modélisation mathématique 
capable d'expliquer cette forme. 
2.2 Suivi d'une masse de plutonium 
fissile lors de transformations physico-
chimiques. (assemblages n~n multiplica-
tifs) 
Lors de ces transformations la 
composition isotopique du plutonium ne 
varie pas. L'émission de neutrons par 
fission spontanée reste donc constante. 
Par contre l'émission de neutrons de 
réaction (a ,n) varie suivant la pré-
sence et la répartition des autres 
éléments, d'une facon importante et peu 
reproductible, même lorsque le Pu est le 
seul émetteur a présent. Par conséquent 
dans la répartition p(v) de l'émission 
des neutrons à la source, seul p(l) 
varie, les autres probabilités restant 
proportionnelles à des nombres fixes. 
Dans ces conditions il suffit de mesurer 
un paramètre pour caractériser complète-
ment la source et remonter à la masse de 
Pu. C'est ce que permet l'appareil 
initial. Par contre ce mode opératoire 
ne permet pas de détecter une substitu-
tion accidentelle d'une partie de 
matière fissile par une autre. 
L'utilisation spécifique du SCRD 
que nous présentons se situe dans ce 
cadre et tient compte de ces éléments. 
La partie 3 détaille cette utilisation. 
2.3 Reconnaissance du caractère 
multiplicatif d'un échantillon fissile 
Une étude récente5 de la 
répartition des neutrons de fuite d'une 
cascade de fission montre que la proba-
bilité de détecter plus de 8 neutrons 
d'une même cascade devient accessible à 
la mesure même pour des amplifications 
inférieures à 2. Il est donc possible de 
reconnaître sans aucune hypothèse le 
caractère multiplicatif d'une source. La 
modélisation en l'absence de temps mort 
permet de traiter ce cas jusqu'à la 
caractérisation complète d'une source 
multiplicatives, mais l'importancé des 
détections multiples de rang élevé nous 
conduit à penser que les effets de temos 
mort sont considérables et ce point sera 
examiné après reprise complète de 
l'étude. 
2.4 Reconnaissance des matériaux 
fissiles dans les déchets (prospectif) 
Les utilisations précédentes 
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consistent a vér1f1er la nature d'une 
source lorsque cette nature est annon-
cée. Une utilisation plus fine consiste-
rait à reconnaître une source dont la 
nature n'est pas annoncée a priori. 
D'après les données actuelles, les sour-
ces existantes sont assez différentes 
les unes des autres pour que cette 
reconnaissance soit envisageable. Une 
condition nécessaire de cette utilisa-
tion est le réalisme du modèle de 
l'ensemble ralentisseur. 
3. Détajl d'une 
utiljsatjon spécjfjgue: contrôle de la 
na~ure et de la masse d'un échantjllon 
de Pu <échantillon transparent aux neu-
trons) 
3.1 Principe (l'organigramme figure 
1 résume ce paragraphe) 
VERIFYING A SAMPLE (ls that Pu?) 
CONTROL results 
ANNOUNCED 
data 
using SCRD 
i.---~ 
T.C. :Total 
counting 
WRONG 
DATA 
experimental dispersions histograms 
experimental ta modifled histogram distances 
Figure 1 
Les données à contrôler 
concernant le Pu réputé présent dans 
l'échantillon sont affichées. Ces don-
nées fournissent: 
-le nombre Sr. de fissions 
spontanées par seconde 
-les probabilités p,.(v) d'émission 
de v neutrons lors d'une fission 
La taux da comptage dû aux neutrons 
de fission émis par le Pu est alors 
cl',.-sl' .. ve 1 coupsls 
Le premier résultat de mesure 
utilisé est le taux de comptage total. 
Il suffit, s'il est inférieur à la 
valeur attribuée aux neutrons de fission 
du Pu, pour refuser l'affirmation sur 
la source. 
La différence CP entre le taux de 
comptage total et la valeur attribuée 
aux neutrons de fission du Pu est ,~­
attribuée, si elle est positive, à un 
comptage de neutrons (a ,n). Ce signal 
parasite, qui est poissonien, peut être 
considéré comme la réponse du système à 
une source parasite poissonienne d'in-
tensité s,.-c,.le pour laquelle le système 
de détection aurait la réponse P(t)•eŒe-•• 
L'ensemble "valeurs affichées + taux 
de comptage total" peut être remplacé 
par l'affirmation: 
L'échantillon contient une source 
neutronique d ·intensité S l'a+ S,. cascades 
par seconde. 
La probabilité d'avoir v 
neutrons émis dans une cascade est: 
S PuPPu(v) 
p(v) == S + S Pu p 
SPuPPu(l)+Sp 
p(l)= S +S 
PU p 
pour v=Fl 
La modélisation fournit les r(/) 
correspondant aux p(v) 
On utilise maintenant les 
résultats fournis par le SCRD et non 
accessibles à l'appareil initial: ces 
résultats sont 2 histogrammes A et (R +A) 
comportant N coups et tirés sur les 
lois inconnues a et (r+a). Ces lois 
vérifient le système (1). Le système 
(R+A)*(I)• t A*(l).r(l-l) (l*) 
1•0 
doit donc être vérifié par des quantités 
différant au plus de quelques écarts 
types des comptages obtenus. 
Le comptage A(/) suit la loi 
binomiale de moyenne N.a(l) et d'écart-
type a 11 (1)-~N.a(l)(l-a(l)). Ces valeurs 
peuvent être estimées en prenant 
a(I)•A(I)IN 
De même pour le comptage (R +A)(/) et 
la loi (r+a) 
On modifie symétriquement les valeurs 
de A(O) et (R + A)(O) de k écarts types de 
facon à restituer la première équation 
du système (1*): k est défini par 
A(O)+ka 11(0) 
r(O) • (R + A)(O)- ka CII•IIJ(O) 
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Les modifications: 
A ·co>- A(O)+ ka 11 (0) 
(R +A)" (0) • (R + A)(O)- ka,11 • 111(0) 
sont effectuées si elles ne conduisent 
pas à des valeurs négatives (dans le cas 
contraire il y a impression d'un message 
et abandon du fichier en cours) 
Ces modifications étant faites on 
modifie de même les A(l) et (R+A)(l) 
pour vérifier l'équation suivante. 
En fin de traitement le programme 
affiche pour chaque histogramme: 
-la valeur de k de plus 
grande valeur absolue utilisée, et la 
valeur de 1 pour laquelle elle a été 
utilisée. 
-la dispersion expérimentale 
de chaque histogramme et la distance 
entre un histogramme traité et l"histo-
gramme modifié correspondant. 
3.2 Résultats expérimentaux 
3.2.1. Ensemble de détection 
utilisé. Réalisme du modèle. 
La figure 2 schématise l'ensemble de 
detection à 18 compteurs sur lequel nous 
avons effectué les mesures. 
Cd 
Fig 2 Ensemble de comptage 
Pour cet ensemble de comptage nous 
avons pu effectuer une mesure directe de 
P(t) en utilisant une source de Cf2a2 
très mince et de très faible intensité: 
les fissions sont caractérisées par la 
détection d'un fragment de fission et on 
note 
3 ms 
IJS). 
la détection des neutrons dans les 
gui suivent une fission (pas de 1 
La figure 3 présente l'histogramme 
obtenu. 
Figure 3 
Pour cet ensemble de détection très 
hétérogène, il n'y a pas de décroissance 
exponentielle pure: ceci est assez net 
pour être visible avec un simple 
dépouillement graphique sur la courbe 
tracée en semi-log (Fig 4): le maximum 
est atteint 4 1JS après le début du 
signal. On a ensuite une pseudo-pèriode 
de 42 1JS pendant 27 IJS, puis une 
pseudo-pèriode de 105 1JS pendant 200 IJS. 
Dans ces conditions on ne peut pas 
espérer du modèle autre chose qu'un 
accord dans une certaine zone après 
calage expérimental des paramètres non 
réalistes e et a. Ce procédé est 
détaillé sur le premier exemple. 
Figure 4 
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L'efficacité de détection pour les 
neutrons de fission est e1 = 0.0725 
coup/neutron 
Pour chaque largeur T de fenêtre les 
valeurs initiales des paramètres de 
calage sont obtenues par lissage numéri-
que de la forme PU)•eaQ-~ sur la portion 
de courbe centrée à 68 IJS ( point médian 
de la répartition ) et de même largeur 
que la fenêtre. Ces valeurs sont: 
T•60.561J.s e•0.067 l/a•71.21J.S 
T • 121.61J.S e- 0.067 
3.2.2 Description d'une 
série de mesures 
On a effectué avec une source de 
Cf2s2 et une source Am/B beaucoup plus 
intense une série de mesures consistant 
à placer la source Cf au centre de 
l'ensemble de comptage et la source Am 
plus ou moins loin à l'extérieur. Chaque 
mesure comporte 5 comptages de 100 s. Le 
tableau suivant donne les réglages uti-
lisés: seul le retard varie. Dans chaque 
groupe de mesures on a la source Cf 
seule, puis 3 comptages avec des posi-
tions différentes de la source Am. On 
indique d'une part le comptage total et 
le comptage R4 -(R+A) 4 -II 4 du dépouille-
ment classique de BOEHNEL, et d'autre 
part la valeur R(O) • (R + A)(O)I A(O), 
évaluation expérimentale de r(O), qui 
est utilisée pour le calage du paramètre 
E 
RECAPITULATIF FICHIERS HESURES 
Durh=500 s Tcoïn=121.6 IJS 
FICHIER e (IJS > TOTAL R, 
88CF 7.15 1 357 273 
R(O) 
119 782 0.91582 88CF20 7.15 1 894 017 117 228 0.93452 88CF50 7.15 2 706 379 118 140 0.95962 88CFAH 7.15 3 702 987 114 531 0.97097 
78CF 6.20 1 342 836 117 639 0.91691 78CF20 6.20 1 894 833 118 594 0.93368 76CF50 6.20 2 709 026 117 147 0.95966 78CFAH 8.20 3 704 354 118 016 0.96978 
68CF 5.25 1 344 140 119 791 0.91494 68CF20 5.25 1 697 172 118 760 0.93334 68CF50 5.25 2 707 409 117 013 0.95945 68CFAH 5.25 3 701 750 111 305 0. 97222 
Remarque préliminaiz·e sur la 
qualité de ces mesures: 
La source Cf étant la même, les 
comptages TOTAUX devz·aient êt1·e identi-
ques lorsque la source Cf est seule. Or 
les comptages TOTAUX de BBCF et 78CF 
sont 1 357 273 et 1 342 836 
La différence 14 437 est 12.4 fois la 
racine du plus grand nombre. 
Le dépouillement de chaque série est 
effectué indépendamment, sans tenir 
compte de cette remarque qui n'aurait 
pas pu être faite dans le cas opération-
nel d'une seule série de mesure. Ce 
dépouillement suit le schéma classique 
auquel on est obligé de se plier lorsque 
l'on utilise des paramètres d'un modèle 
non réaliste, et/ou un ensemble de 
comptage mobile assez petit pour risquer 
d'avoir une réponse variable avec l'en-
vironnement: 
a) On effectue une mesure sur 
une source bien connue, de préférence de 
même nature que les sources à contrôler 
b) On ajuste le ou les 
paramètres du modèle pour obtenir le 
meilleur accord expérience-calcul 
c) On regarde si le résultat 
théorique ainsi obtenu est à l'intérieur 
du domaine de la dispersion expérimen-
tale. SI NON on déclare que la méthode 
testée ne peut pas être employée dans 
cet environnement. 
d) SI OUI on utilise les 
paramètres obtenus par calage pour cher-
cher les caractéristiques des sources à 
contrôler. 
Pour l'ajustement à 2 paramètres uti-
lisé ici nous avions constaté sur une 
mesure ancienne que l'on obtenait une 
plage étendue de couples (e,a) donnant un 
accord de même qualité (C'est ce fait 
qui nous avait amenés â penser que le 
modèle exponentiel, universellement 
admis, est irréaliste pour cet ensemble 
de comptage, comme l'a confirmé la 
mesure directe) Dans le calage effectué 
ici on a donc conservé le a obtenu par 
lissage et ajusté seulement E , ce qui 
conduit à des calculs plus courts. 
DEPOUILLEMENT DE LA SERIE "88CF" 
a,b,c) Calage sur le fichier 
88CF: le bruit de fond étant négligeable 
dans cette série de mesures on considère 
que le comptage total est dG au Cf seul. 
On connait la valeur du paramètre 
e1 • 0.0725 
On en tire la masse de Cf de 1.621 
10-8 g 
On choisit la valeur de a obtenue 
par lissage de la réponse impulsion-
ne lle: 1/ a.- 63 .4~s 
On détermine la valeur de e en 
restituant, dans le calcul des r(I), la 
.valeur expérimentale R(O): on a obtenu 
e•O.l36 (Cette valeur étant très diffé-
rente de la valeur 0.067 obtenue lors du 
lissage le couple (a,e) est dépourvu de 
signification physique) La comparaison 
des dispersions expérimentales des 
histogrammes du fichier et de la dis-
tance entre les histogrammes expérimen-
taux et modifiés (voir premières lignes 
du tableau suivant) montre que les r(/) 
obtenus par le modèle sont compatibles 
avec les expériences à la précision où 
elles ont été effectuées. 
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d) Utilisation du modèle avec 
ces valeurs de paramètres 
On effectue sur chaque fichier le 
traitement décrit figure 1: un fichier 
?ontient toutes les données, on a rentré 
l'isotope (Cf2e2), et il ne reste plus 
qu'à indiquer la masse m. On a obtenu 
les résultati suivants (Oisp= dispersion 
expérimentale de l'histogramme consi-
déré; Dist= distance entre l'histogramme 
expérimental et l'histogramme obtenu 
après calcul) 
FICHIER 88CF: Disp (R+A) = .00091 Disp A = .00061 
m(g)*10B kmax Imax Dist(R+A) Dist(A) 
1.4 -2.5 0 .00479 .00407 
1.6 +2.2 1 .00091 .00076 
1. 621 +2.1 1 .00067 .00054 
1.8 +6.0 0 .00317 .00264 
FICHIER 88CF20: Disp (R+A) .00148 Disp A = .00150 
m(g)*10B kmax !max Dist(R+A) Dist(A) 
1.2 -7.0 0 .00392 .00353 
1.4 +0.7 1 .00030 .00027 
1.8 +6.1 0 .00324 .00290 
FICHIER 88CF50: Disp ( R+A) = .00148 Disp A = .00150 
m(S)*10" km a x !max Dist(R+A) Dist(A) 
1.0 -5.5 0 .00263 .00255 
1.2 +1.5 6 .00032 .00030 
1.4 +4.4 0 .00232 .00224 
FICHIER 88CFAH: Disp ( R+A) .00126 Disp A = .00163 
m(g)*10" kmax !max Dist(R+A) Dist(A) 
1.0 -2.5 0 .00132 .00130 
1.2 +1.1 0 .00061 .00060 
1.4 +4.8 0 .00222 .00219 
On constate que pour les 3 derniers 
fichiers on obtient une valeur de m per-
mettant de restituer les r(/) calculés à 
l'aide de modifications des histogrammes 
nettement à l'intérieur de leur disper-
sion expérimentale. Ces masses sont plus 
faibles que celle choisie, mais on avait 
remarqué au départ que le comptage total 
du fichier 88CF était anormalement élevé 
Le fait que l'accord pour cette mesure 
principale nécessite une distorsion des 
histogrammes voisine de la dispersion 
expérimentale affichée, alors que pour 
les autres fichiers on obtient moins de 
la moitié, pourra sans doute être utili-
sé comme un signal d"alarme lorsque nous 
disposerons d"une habitude suffisante de 
ce type de dépouillement. Nous allons 
maintenant examiner sur ce cas peu favo-
rable la possibilité de discrimination 
de source que nous proposons: 
PEUT-ON PRENDRE CETTE SOURCE Cf POUR UNE 
SOURCE Pu240? 
BBCF NON: R(O) est supérieur à 
0.955, pour une source de Pu240, avec 
ces valeurs de paramètres. 
88CF20 NON: même motif 
88CF50 OUI: en annonçant 68g de Pu240 
on obtient: kmax=-2.8, Imax=1, 
Dist(R+A)=.00086, Dist(A)=.00082 
en annonçant 70g de Pu240 
on obtient: kmax=-2.7, Imax=1, 
Dist(R+A)=.00095, Dist(A)=.00091 
BBCFAM OUI: en annonçant 60g de Pu240 
on obtient: kmax=-1.4, Imax=1, 
Dist(R+A)=.00063, Dist(A)=.00062 
On constate qu"à la précision de ces 
mesures !"examen des A(I) et (R+A)(I) 
pour I > 0 n"apporte pas de renseigne-
ments supplémentaires. Nous avons évalué 
la statistique nécessaire à la discrimi-
nation dans le cas du fichier BBCFAM, 
qui est évidemment le plus défavorable, 
de la façon suivante: 
-on prend la répartition 
expérimentale A(I) obtenue lors du pre-
mier comptage 
-on calcule les répartitions: 
1 
(R +A)(!) • L r(i)A(I- i) 
1•0 
obtenues en prenant les r(I) calculés 
pour le Pu et le Cf 
-on calcule la distance d entre 
ces 2 répartitions. On a obtenu d=1.03 
10-3 
-on évalue par la formule (2) la 
distance d à attendre entre la réparti-
tion (R+A) obtenue pour le Cf et la 
vraie répartition (r+a) correspondante. 
On a obtenu d = 1.69 10-3 pour la 
statistique utilisée de 739 349 coups. 
(Cette valeur est bien compatible avec 
la valeur expérimentale). 
410 
Il suffirait donc d"une statistique 
16 fois plus forte que le fichier 
élémentaire, soit à peine 3 fois plus 
forte que celle du fichier somme, pour 
effectuer cette discrimination. On peut 
penser qu"à ce niveau on ne se heurte-
rait pas encore à !"insuffisance du 
modèle. 
Dans le cas d"échantillons 
multiplicatifs les r(I) correspondant à 
la même valeur moyenne de I(I-1) sont 
très éloignés de ceux obtenus ici. 
DEPOUILLEMENT DE LA SERIE "78CF" 
a,b,c) Calage sur le fichier 
78CF: 
Le comptage total donne une masse de 
Cf de 1.604 10-6 g 
Le calage donne E • 0.132 
d) Utilisation de ces paramè-
tres. On a obtenu les résultats suivants 
FICHIER 76CF: Disp (R+A) .00157 Disp A = .00120 
m(g)*lOB km a x Imax Dist(R+A) Dist(A) 
1.4 -7.3 0 .00444 .00376 
1.6 +1. 1 1 .00045 .00037 
1.604 +1.1 1 .00039 . 00032 
1.6 +6.3 0 .00352 .00295 
FICHIER 76CF20: Disp (R+A) . 00081 Disp A .00119 
m(g)*lOB km a x Imax Oist(R+A) Dist(A) 
1.4 -2.4 0 .00139 .00154 
1.5 +1.1 1 .00052 .00045 
1.6 +3.9 0 .00202 .00120 
FICHIER 76CF50: Disp (R+A) .00118 Disp A .00174 
m(g)*10B km a x Imax Dist(R+A) Dist(A) 
1.3 +0.9 0 .00055 .00053 
1.4 +3.3 0 .00171 .00165 
1.5 +5.6 0 .00286 .00276 
FICHIER 78CFAH: Disp (R+A) .00049 Disp A .00113 
m(g)*10B km a x Imax Dist(R+A) Dist(A) 
1.3 -1.3 4 .00062 .00061 
1.4 +2.9 0 .00142 .00138 
DEPOUILLEMENT DE LA SERIE "68CF" 
a,b,c) Calage sur le fichier 
68CF: 
Le comptage total donne une masse de 
Cf de 1.605 10-6 g 
Le calage donne e•O.l32 
d) Utilisation de ces paramè-
tres. On a obtenu les résultats suivants 
FICHIER 68CF: Disp (R+A) = .00163 Disp A = . 00115 
m(g)*10 8 km a x Imax Dist(R+A) Dist(A) 
1.4 -7.6 0 .00501 .00425 
1.6 +2.9 1 . 00115 .00085 
1. 605 +2.9 1 .00109 .00069 
1.8 +6.2 0 . 00327 .00271 
FICHIER 66CF20: Disp (R+A) = .00102 Disp A .00147 
m(g)*10B kmax !max Oist(R+A) Oist(A) 1.4 +1.6 1 . 00111 .00100 1.5 +1.9 0 .00090 .00079 
1.6 +5.0 0 .00227 .00254 
FICHIER 66CFSO: Disp (R+A) .00121 Disp A .00202 
m(g)*10B km a x !max Dist(R+A) Dist(A) 1.2 +1.5 3 .00053 .00049 1.3 +1.7 0 .00092 .00090 1.4 +4.1 0 .00207 .00201 
FICHIER 68CFAH: Disp (R+A) 
.00136 Disp A = .00140 
m(g)*10B kmax !max Oist(R+A) Oist(A) 
1.1 +1.3 3 .00062 .00061 
1.2 +2.0 0 .00107 .00106 
1.3 +3.8 0 .00164 .00182 
On constate que pour ces valeurs de 
calage on a souvent un accord bien 
meilleur. Des comptages réalisés plus 
tard dans les mêmes conditions ont 
permis de vérifier que le comptage total 
du fichier 88CF est anormalement élevé. 
Cette aberration n'est pas d'un type qui 
aurait pu être détecté dans une mesure 
de routine. 
En se basant sur les qualités d'accord 
obtenues dans les autres mesures on 
pourrait dire que la statistique utili-
sée est suffisante pour refuser l'hypo-
thèse d'une source de Pu. Nous pensons 
que ce point qui reste notre objectif à 
court terme demande des expériences plus 
précises. Un point important est de voir 
comment varient les paramètres de cala-
ge si celui ci est effectué à l'aide 
d'une source de Pu ou d'une source de 
Cf. 
Conclusion 
La première série d'expériences 
destinée à tester sur une source connue 
la qualité de la modélisation du SCRD 
avant d'utiliser cette modélisation pour 
caractériser des échantillons multipli-
catifs, est nettement insuffisante et 
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devra être reprise. 
Par contre la mesure de la 
réponse impulsionnelle, qui fera l'objet 
d'une description détaillée, est précise 
et montre que le modèle exponentiel 
n'est pas réaliste pour l'ensemble de 
détection utilisé, même sous la forme 
élaborée que nous utilisons (prise en 
compte d'un transitoire avant la phase 
exponentielle). La prise en compte de ce 
fait peut a priori être envisagée de 3 
façons: 
a) Développement du modèle pour 
une réponse quelconque: tout à fait hors 
de question avec nos moyens actuels. 
b) Réalisation d'un ensemble de 
comptage à réponse plus proche du modèle 
On sait que le modèle est réaliste pour 
un ensemble infini homogène. On peut 
donc s'en rapprocher en augmentant la 
taille du ralentisseur et en modifiant 
le nombre et. la répartition des comp-
teurs. Cette solution ne peut être en-
visagée que pour une installation fixe. 
c) Utilisation de l'ensemble de 
comptage et de la modélisation actuels, 
en notant bien que toute série de mesu-
res nécessite alors un calage et en pré-
voyant les sources calibrées nécessaires 
à ce calage. 
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Abstract 
Enriched uranium fuel assemblies were measured 
with an Active Well Coincidence Counter (A WCC) at the 
Beloyarskaya Nuclear Power Plant. Special A WCC inserts, 
electronics, and software were used. Stationary and 
scanning measurements were performed to establish 
calibrations and performance specifications for the assay of 
235U and 235U/cm for BN600 fuel. 
1. Introduction 
A measurement exercise was conducted at the BN600 
reactor facility at the Beloyarskaya Nuclear Power Plant to 
evaluate the Active Well Coincidence Counter (A WCC) Ill 
for the nuclear safeguards verification of enriched uranium 
fuel assemblies. The normal A WCC technique is to induce 
fissions in the fuel with neutrons from americium-lithium 
(AmLi) isotopic neutron sources and to count the 
coincident neutrons from the fissions with coincidence 
circuitry. Once a calibration is established, the coincidence 
count rate determines the 235U content of the fuel. 
However, because the enriched region of the fuel 
assemblies is much longer than the irradiation region of the 
A WCC, a sin~le, stationary measurement of the fuel 
determines the 35U mass per unit length; the length of the 
enriched region (the active length) must be measured 
separately to determine the total 235u mass of the fuel. 
One method for measuring the active length of the 
fuel is to manually scan the fuel assembly with a collimated 
gamma-ray detector. The disadvantage of the method for 
nuclear safeguards is that the gamma-ray measurement only 
determines the active length of the surface of the fuel. The 
operational disadvantages are that the safeguards inspector 
must handle measurement equipment close to the fuel 
assembly along its active length and must have a means for 
marking and measuring the distance along the assembly. 
Another method of measuring the active length is to 
scan the fuel assembly with the A WCC. In this method the 
fuel assembly is lowered by crane through the A WCC and 
the total neutron count rate is measured in short counting 
intervals. The advantages of the method are that the fuel 
assembly does not need a wrapper for protection and for 
marking, inspectors and hand-held equipment do not need 
to be close to the assembly, and the measurement and 
analysis are largely automatic. The disadvantage is that the 
crane speed must be known or measured. 
*Los Alamos National Laboratory effort supported by the 
International Safeguards Project Office. 
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Instead of using a stationary measurement plus a scan 
for the verification of fuel assemblies, a single scan can 
suffice if it is slow enough that the error from counting 
statistics is as low as required for the type of verification 
being done. The active len~th is then not needed for the 
verification of the total 35U content. (The scan, 
nevertheless, automatically provides the length as part of 
the analysis.) As before, the crane speed must be known or 
measured. 
In this exercise both stationary and scanning 
measurements were evaluated. A more detailed report on 
this exercise will soon be available /2/. 
2. Material and Methods 
Facility and Fuel 
The BN600 facility /3/ is a 600 MWe fast breeder 
reactor near the city of Sverdlovsk, USSR. The enriched 
uranium fuel assemblies have enrichments of 17%, 21%, or 
26%. The enriched assemblies used for this exercise have 
100-cm active lengths with adjacent 30-cm depleted 
regions at each end. A simplified drawing of a fuel 
assembly is shown in Fig. 1. 
The assemblies have an hexagonal cross section with 
9.6 cm across the flats. The outer cladding is stainless steel 
0.2 cm thick. The enriched assemblies contain 127 U02 
fuel pins with an outer diameter of 6.9 mm; the fuel-pin 
cladding is stainless steel 0.4 mm thick. Figure 2 shows the 
cross section of an enriched fuel assembly. 
The 235U masses of the assemblies vary from 
approximately 4700 g to approximately 7200 g. 
Detector 
The detector is a standard A WCC modified for use at 
the BN600 facility. The normal end plugs, nickel reflector, 
and cadmium liner were removed and replaced with a 
custom insert for the BN600 fuel. A 15-cm diam 
irradiation channel at one side of the polyethylene insert is 
for the fuel assembly. A 4.2-cm diam hole in the 
polyethylene insert is for the AmLi sources; 1.0 cm of 
polyethylene separates the AmLi sources from the 15-cm 
diam irradiation channel. Figure 3 shows vertical and 
horizontal cross sections of the modified A WCC. 
The 15-cm diam hole is lined with cadmium 0.4 mm 
thick to prevent thermal neutrons from escaping the 
polyethylene and inducing fissions in the fuel assembly; 
i.e., the A WCC is operated in the fast mode. Because the 
235U mass in the fuel assemblies is high, the thermal mode 
Fig. 4. BN600 fuel assembly being positioned for lowering 
into the AWCC. 
measurements, the raw data from an SR4 circuit are almost 
the same as those from a JSR-11. 
The SR4 was set to a predelay of 3 ~s and a gate 
length of 64 ~s. 
A custom data collection and analysis program for 
IBM Pes was written to perform the stationary and 
scanning measurements. The SR4 coincidence module has 
no manual controls; it is operated from the computer via a 
9600 baud RS-232-e serial port. Because the data transfer 
time is short, the raw data from the SR4 can be displayed 
on the computer display in near real time. 
For stationary measurements, the counting rates, 
results, and errors are updated and displayed about onc.e a 
second as the measurement proceeds; for scannmg 
measurements, the total count rate is plotted on the 
computer display as the scan proceeds. 
Experimental Fuel Handling 
Two cranes were used for the scanning measure-
ments; each crane had a fast and a slow speed. The small 
crane (5-tonne capacity) is the normal fuel-handling crane 
and has a downward slow speed of 3.6 cm/s. The large 
crane (30-tonne capacity) has a downward slow speed of 
0.23 cm/s. The fast speeds of the cranes are about an order 
of magnitude faster than the slow speeds. 
All scanning measurements were made using the slow 
crane speeds while the fuel was being lowered through the 
A wee. For this exercise the A wee was positioned over a 
fuel-transfer hole in the floor of the room. The 100-cm 
enriched region of an assembly passes through the center of 
the A wee in about 30 s with the fast crane and in about 
7 min with the slow crane. 
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Stationary Measurements 
Two fuel assemblies of each enrichment were 
centered in the A WeC and measured in the stationary 
position. Most measurements were 1000 s long. A 1000 s 
measurement produces a coincidence-count-rate standard 
deviation from counting statistics of 2.0% for a 17%-
enriched assembly and 1.5% for a 26%-enriched assembly. 
The six calibration data points were fit by least 
squares using the Deming code /6/ and a calibration 
equation of the form 
R = __jJJJ1_ 
1 +bm ' 
where R is the coincidence rate, m is the 235U mass/em, and 
the calibration constants are a and b. The calibration curve 
is plotted with the data points in Fig. 5. 
Slow Scans 
For the slow scanning measurements, the fuel 
assemblies were lowered through the A Wee with the slow 
crane at a speed of 0.23 cm/s. The SR4 coincidence circuit 
was cycled with a 3-s measurement time and the raw data 
were stored for each cycle. During the scan the totals count 
rate was plotted vs time on the computer display, so the 
progress of the scan could be observed. The totals count 
rate distribution for a slow scan of a 26%-enriched 
assembly is shown in Fig. 6; the totals rates are averaged 
over three cycles to smooth the distributions. 
Eight slow scans were done with six different 
assemblies; all three enrichments were used. 
The totals rate is not used directly to assay the 235U 
mass of the fuel because the totals rate depends strongly on 
the scattering and absorption effects of the fuel on the 
AmLi source neutrons as well as on the 235U induced 
fission rate. The totals rate scan, however, easily identifies 
the enriched region of the fuel and determines the active 
length; the coincidence counts obtained in the active region 
can then be used to assay the total 235U ma~s of the fuel. 
The enriched region of the fuel assembly is indicated 
in Fig. 6. The lower count rate above and below the 
enriched region is caused by neutron scattering and 
absorption in the depleted uranium, which does not 
contribute a significant number of induced fission neutrons. 
The complex distribution above the depleted region is 
caused by scattering and absorption effects from the end of 
the fuel assembly and the fuel-handling hardware. 
Figure 7 shows the coincidence counts measured for 
the same scan; there are statistically significant coincidence 
counts only from the enriched region of the fuel assembly. 
The integral of the coincidence counts determines the total 
235U mass; an effective coincidence rate is calculated for 
the scan and the mass is obtained from the stationary 
calibration curve. 
The shape of the curve of the totals rate vs time 
during the transitions between the enriched and depleted 
regions of the fuel is determined by the AWeC inadiation 
characteristics and the crane speed; the average absolute 
slope of the totals rate curve in the transition regions is used 
to calculate the crane speed. The width of the totals rate 
distribution, calculated as the distance between half-height 
positions in the transition regions, determines the active 
length. 
Fast Scans 
The short measurement time for fast scans (about 30 s 
for the active region) produces large measurement errors, 
but the fast scans can still be useful for verifying the active 
f 
FUEL 
REGION 
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Fig. 1. Simplified drawing of a BN600 fuel assembly. 
~-----11.3 em----~ 
Fig . 2. Cross section of a BN600 fuel assembly with 
enriched uranium fuel. 
is not satisfactory because of the poor thermal-neutron 
penetration into the fuel. 
Cadmium is not used as a liner around most of the 
polyethylene insert so that the detection efficiency of the 
A WCC for induced-fission neutrons is high; however, a 
small rectangle of cadmium (about 10 em wide by 20 em 
long) is glued to the outside of the insert next to the AmLi 
sources to reduce the counr rate from rhe AmLi sources. 
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SOURCE HOLE ACTIVE REGION 
CADMIUM 
Fig. 3. Diagram ofvertical and horizontal cross sections 
of the modified A WCC. 
The AmLi neutrons do not produce real coincidence counts, 
but increase the error of the real coincidence counts by 
increasing the random neutron count rate. 
A photograph of the modified AWCC in use at the 
BN600 facility is shown in Fig. 4; a fuel assembly is being 
positioned for a scanning measurement. 
Two AmLi neutron sources are used to induce 
fissions in the fuel; each has a yield of about 50 000 
neutrons per second. The two sources are placed in a 
custom, polyethylene source rod that slides into the source 
hole shown in Fig. 3. 
Electronics and Software 
The AWCC has AMPTEK /4/ preamplifiers in its 
junction box, so the A WCC requires +5 V to power the 
preamplifiers and + 1680 V for the 3He proportional 
counters; the output is standard TTL logic signals, 
consisting of neutron pulses 50 ns wide. 
The standard JSR-11 * coincidence counting circuit /5/ 
was not used for this exercise because short measurement 
and readout times were needed for the scanning 
measurements; the shortest measurement time is 1.0 s for 
the JSR-11 and the readout time is about 2 s. 
Instead of the JSR -11, a new Los Alamos prototype 
NIM coincidence circuit, designated the SR4 (Shift 
Register; 4 MHz), was used because it has a minimum 
measurement time of 0.1 s and a readout time of 22 ms. 
The SR4 circuit will be described in a future publication, 
but the operating principle is the same as that for the 
J SR -11. At low count rates, such as obtained from A WCC 
• Jomar SysTems, Los Alamos, NM, USA, 87544 
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Fig. 6. Plot of the totals count rate for a slow scan of a 26%-enrichedfuel assembly. 
The totals rate is plotted vs the cycle number; each cycle is a 3 -s 
measurement. 
lengths in connection with stationary measurements or for 
performing gross defect measurements. In general, the 
measurement and analysis of fast scans is the same as that 
for slow scans. The main differences are that the crane 
speed is 3.6 crn/s instead of 0.23 crn/s and the measurement 
time per cycle is 0.5 s instead of 3 s. 
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Seventeen fast scans were performed, ten of which 
were consecutive repetitions on a single 21 %-enriched 
assembly. 
The average active length initially measured from the 
17 scans was 96.8 ± 1.2 cm, so the half-height to half-
height analysis of the totals distribution underestimates the 
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Fig. 7 Plot of the coincidence count rate vs the cycle number for the same scan as 
shown in Fig. 6 for the totals count rate. 
active length by about 3% for fast scans. A correction 
factor of 1.033 was introduced to account for this bias. 
3. Results 
Stationary Measurements 
Calibration constants were established for the 
stationary assay of enriched uranium BN600 assemblies. 
The standard deviation of the assay mass for a 1000-s 
measurement is 2.8% for a 17%-enriched assembly, 2.5% 
for a 21 %-enriched assembly, and 2.4% for a 26%-enriched 
assembly. 
Slow Scans 
The mass, active length, and crane speed results for 
the eight slow scans are shown in Table I. 
The standard deviations for the mass measurements 
are 3.9% for 26%-enriched fuel, 4.2% for 21 %-enriched 
fuel and 4.6% for 17%-enriched fuel. The average absolute 
mass difference between the measured and accepted values 
is 3.9% and the average mass difference is -0.9%. 
The average absolute active length difference between 
measured and accepted values is 1.1% and the average 
active length difference is 0.6%. The sample standard 
deviation of the active length measurements is 1.4%. 
The eight slow scans were used to calibrate the crane 
speed measurements for slow scans, so the average crane 
speed in Table I is approximately the reference value of 
0.23 crn/s. The sample standard deviation of the crane 
speed measurements is 6.4%. 
Fast Scans 
The standard deviation of the mass measurements is 
22% for 26%-enriched fuel, 24% for 21 %-enriched fuel and 
26% for 17%-enriched fuel. The average absolute mass 
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difference between measured and accepted values is 14.9% 
and the average mass difference is -0.4%. The sample 
standard deviation of the active length measurements is 
5.1% and the sample standard deviation for the crane speed 
is 13%. 
Summary 
Table 11 summarizes the final results by giving the 
standard deviation in percent for the measurement of mass, 
active length, and crane speed for the three measurement 
types: stationary, slow scan, and fast scan. For stationary 
measurements, the mass refers to the 235U mass per unit 
length of fuel, whereas for the scanning measurements the 
mass refers to the total 235U mass in the assembly. The 
mass standard deviations are given for the three 
enrichments: 17%, 21%, and 26%. 
If the crane speed is known, a ~artial defect 
measurement of the fuel assemblies for total 35U mass can 
be done either by making a single slow scan for the total 
235U mass or by making a stationary measurement for the 
235U mass per unit length of fuel and a fast scan for the 
active len~th. 
In either case the measurement of the crane speed 
from a single scan is not accurate enough for a partial 
defect measurement. If there is a possibility of crane speed 
variations, the crane speed can be checked with a stop 
watch during the scan. 
More accurate measure nents can be performed by 
combining a stationary measUI ~ment with a slow scan. 
A single, fast scan can be used for a gross defect 
measurement. 
Similar, but passive, scanning measurements could be 
used for the assay of MOX fuel assemblies. Because of the 
higher count rates, the precision of the measurements 
would be better than those for enriched uranium 
assemblies. 
Table I. Slow Scan Results 
Active Crane 
Sample Enrichment Length Speed 
(%) (cm) (cm/s) 
1 26 100.3 0.216 
2 17 99.5 0.238 
3 21 98.9 0.245 
4 26 103.2 0.237 
5 21 101.0 0.223 
6 17 100.3 0.216 
7 21 101.7 0.216 
8 21 99.6 0.254 
a 
D.m = measured 235U - accepted 235 U mass 
accepted 235 U mass 
X 100 
Table II. Standard Deviation Summary 
Relative Standard Deviation(%) 
[Quantity Method 
Stationary Slow Scan Fast Scan 
(1000 s) (-600 s) (-60s) 
Mass (Ea-17%) 2.8 4.6 26 
Mass (E = 21 %) 2.5 4.2 24 
Mass (E - 26%) 2.4 3.9 22 
Active length --- 1.4 5.1 
Crane Speed 
--- 6.4 13 
a E = Enrichment 
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ANALYSIS OF 'rnK VDC RKSULTS IN 'l'H.K PASSlVK NK!rfRON ASSAY_ 
A.K.Gorobets, D.V.Tokarev 
Research Institute of Atomic Reactors, Dimitrovgrad, USSR 
Abstract 
Analysis of the variable dead-time logic for 
neutron coincidence counting has been performed. 
An analytical expression for the coincidence rate 
was derived that defines its relationship with 
the fission rate, variable dead time counter 
characteristics and neutron multiplicity 
distribution taking into account induced 
fissions. Usefulness of results correction for 
methodical error was tested at count rates up to 
about 30 kHz. 
Application of the known formalism was 
examined for multiplication correction using the 
ratio of coincidence rate to the total count 
rate. The proposed assay algorithm was used for 
plutonium measurements in oxide fuel samples 
containing up to 100 g plutonium. 
1 Introduction 
For non-destrictive assay of nuclear 
materials by passive neutron counting various 
techniques and instruments have been developed 
which allow fission neutrons to be distinguished 
from neutrons arising from other processes using 
the time-correlated nature of fission neutrons. 
One of the simple instruments used for such 
purpose is a thermal neutron detector with a 
variable dead-time circuit (VDC) of neutron 
coincidence counting. The principle of neutron 
coincidence selection by the VDC-technique 
consists in counting of pulses from the neutron 
detector in two counting channels simultaneously: 
in the fast channel with a small dead time and in 
the slow one with the present dead time which 
value is higher than the neutron lifetime in the 
detector. The method is based on the assumption 
that several of simultaneously emitted neutrons 
in the fission event can be counted in the fast 
channel and only one of them in the slow one. 
Thus, the counting losses in the slow channel 
include a component depending on fission rate. 
Because of the limitation in allowable 
counting rates this method has not been widely 
adopted in practice in comparison with the shift 
register coincidence technique. But the 
simplicity of hardware design justifies its 
application for measuring of small amotmts of 
spontaneously fissioning materials. 
2 Analysls of the VDG results 
In the passive counting of fission neutrons 
using the VDC logic the neutron coincidence rate 
is defined by the following expression 
(1) 
where NT and NT are the count rates of neutron 
detector pulses in the fast counting channel (by 
fast scaler) with small dead time T and in the 
slow channel (by slow scaler) with preset dead 
time T, correspondingly. In accordance with the 
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terminology of the neutron coincidence techniques 
this quantity can be defined as a real 
coincidence cotmt rate (reals). 
Let us consider the dependence of the 
observed reals on the characteristics of counting 
system. Let us assume that Q neutrons of the 
background and (a,n)-reaction and fLmB(m) fission 
m 
neutrons are detected per time unit when there is 
no dead time counting losses. Where f is fission 
rate, B(m) is probability for detection of m 
neutrons per fission event. The count rate of 
fission neutrons can be presented as two 
components: fLB(m) and fL(m-1)B(m). 
m m 
Let us believe that in case when a fission 
event is followed by detection of several 
neutrons the first of them will be referred to 
the first component and all the rest to the 
second one. As spontaneous fissions as well as 
(a,n)-reactions represent the Poisson"s event 
flow, the dead-time losses in the slow counting 
channel are defined as 
L = [fLB(m)+QJTNT+[fL(m-1)B(m)J g(T), 
m m 
where g(T) - probability of losses for the second 
component of the fission neutron count rate. From 
the evident relations 
m 
there follows 
m 
where G = [g(T)-TNT]/(1-TNT). 
The probability to detect m neutrons per 
fission event is defined as 
B(m) = Lq(v)Cmvem(1-e)v-m, 
V 
where q(v) - probability that v neutrons are 
emitted per fission event, 
Cmv - binomial coefficient m over v, 
E - detector efficiency. 
Using an expansion of the ( 1-E )v-m complex in a 
power series in E one can obtain 
L(m-1)B(m)=Lq(v)[v(v-l)E2j2!-v(v-l)(v-2)e3j3!+ .. ] 
m 
It is sui table to 
obtained series via 
As a result of this 
transformed to 
express the terms of the 
the factorial moments of v. 
expression (2) for reals is 
F = fG L [(-1).1W_.,e.1/j!], (3) 
.:1=2 
where w.., is the j-th factorial moment of fission 
neutron multiplicity distribution. 
An asstmption that not more then one neutron 
from the fission event is cotmted in slow scaler 
is the basis of the VDC-technuque. This 
assumption is valid for condition g(T)=l, which 
is satisfied if the lifetime of fission neutrons 
in the detector does not exceed the preset dead 
time T. In this case a factor G=1 and reals are 
proportional to the fission rate. 
In the detecting system formed from the 
thermal neutron counters embedded into a 
moderator the probability for a neutron to 
survive after a fission event to time t is 
proportional to exp(-t/0), where 0 is the 
detector die-away time. The probability to count 
more than one neutron per fission event in slow 
scaler can be neglected if preset dead time T>>0. 
Implementation of this condition in practice is 
usually unsuccessful due to a sharp decrease of 
permissible count rates with dead time 
increasing. It leads to a disturbance of 
proportionality between observed reals and 
fission rate and causes a methodical error of 
measurements. 
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Fig. 1. Probability of detecting within dead-time 
intervals for neutrons of the same fission event. 
For estimation of factor G let us consider 
the probability g(T) for pulses caused by 
fission neutrons to get into the dead time 
intervals. Let us set the beginning of the time 
scale at the beginning of one of such intervals 
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Fig. 2. The correcting factor G as a function of 
(TNT) and (T/0) parameters. 
and denote the initial moments for the next 
intervals as: t2 - for the second, t3 - for the 
third and so on (Fig .1). Let the first neutron 
of a fission be detected at the time moment h. 
The detection probability for the rest neutrons 
of this fission is approximately described in 
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time by a function U(t)=(1/0)exp[-(t-tl)/0]. The 
probability for detection moments to get into the 
dead time intervals is 
T t1+T 
V(t1) =I U(t)dt +1~2 I U(t)dt = 1-D exp(t1/0), 
h t1 
-T/0 -T/0 -t1/0 
where D = e - (1-e ) 2: e 
1=2 
From the analysis of the time interval 
distribution between the pulses counted in the 
slow scaler it follows that the values for items 
of the last sum are represented by the terms of 
the decreasing geometrical progression. Its sum 
is determined by the expression 
- t1/0 -T/0 -T/0 
L e = 02e [1+02(1-e )], 
1 
where 2 = NT/(1-TNT). 
The first detected fission neutron with 
probability (1-TNT) is counted in the slow 
scaler. In this case the detection moment 
coincides with the beginning of the time scale 
and then V(t1=0) = 1-D. If the moment t1 is 
within the interval (O,T), then the average 
probability 
V(t1=0) = (1/T) V(T1)dt1 = 1-D0(e 1)/T. I T/0 
0 
Thus, the probability g(T) can be presented 
as 
g(T) = (1-TNT)(1-D) + TNT[1-DO(e - 1)T]. 
After substitution of g(T) the expression 
for factor G takes the form of 
-T/0 -T/0 
G = (1-e )/[1+02(1-e )]. (4) 
Fig. 2 shows a dependence of G on the (TNT) 
parameter at different values of (T/0)-ratio. We 
would note that the obtained expression for 
factor G seems to be preferable in comparison 
with the correction given in ref. [1] which is 
valid only in the range of low (TNT) values and 
with increase it transfers into the negative 
values region. 
3 Implementation of tbe method 
The experimental examination of the 
VDC-technique was performed at the facility 
designed for measurement of plutonium in the 
mixed dioxide fuel samples. Four identical 
detector units situated around a vessel for 
sample location were used for neutron detection. 
Each of these units comprises five 3He-counter 
tubes embedded into moderator. The pulse signals 
from the detector units are mixed and come to the 
digital one-shot multivibrator. Its dead time 
can be set from the value sequence of 8, 16, 32 
and so on to 512 I..IS. 'l'he output pulses from the 
mixer and one-shot multivibrator are counted in 
the corresponding scalers. The data from scalers 
are periodically transferred to the computer 
memory for proper processing. 
The dead time of neutron counting in the 
fast channel (from mixer output) was determined 
by the known two-sources method. Its value is 
0.43 !-IS. Actual values of the preset dead time in 
the slow cotmting channel were defined more 
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Fig. 3. Standard deviation of measurement results 
after correction for methodical error as a 
function of 0 value. 
precisely by direct measurement of the duration 
of pulses from the one-shot multivibrator with an 
accuracy of about 0.02 1-1s. The efficiency of the 
detection system for fission neutrons is about 
18%. 
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Fig. 4. Dependence of reals on background count 
rate before and after correction for methodical 
error. 
A set of 252Cf fission neutron sources and 
Pu-Be (a,n)-sources have been used in 
measurements. The proportionality of the observed 
response to fission rate and its independence of 
(a,n)-neutron count rate are the obvious 
requirements that the method has to meet. The 
reals defined in a.ccordance with eXPression (1) 
satisfy these requirements only in the region of 
low counting rates (up to about 103 s-1). 
Expression (4) reveals the methodical error of 
meast~ements that rises with count rate increase. 
In order to estimate the correction factor G 
one should know the value of the parameter 0. 
Proceeding from the functional sense of 
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correction, the optimtm value is 0 that m1n1m1zes 
the variation of corrected reals Fo=F/G at 
different values of the preset dead time and the 
background count rate. Fig. 3 shows the relative 
standard deviation of corrected reals as a 
function of 0 value in measurements t.~i th 252Cf 
neutron source when the preset dead time was 
changed from 32 to 256 l-IS and (a,n)-neutron 
sources were used for generation of backgrmmd 
count rates up to about 2·104s-1. 
The reals change before and after correction 
depending on background 
count rate is shown in Fig. 4. 
4 Multiplication effect correction 
Correction for induced fission caused by 
primary neutrons presents the main difficulty in 
the interpretation of measurement results. 
Estimation of the induced fission effect on reals 
is connected with definition of factorial moments 
for neutron multiplicity distribution taking into 
account the neutron multiplication. The solution 
of this problem is described in ref./2/, based on 
the use of probability generating functions for 
the number of neutrons emitted in fission events. 
In a single-group energy assumption the 
factorial moments in eXPression ( 3) are defined 
via the factorial moments for spontaneous and 
induced fissions by the following relations: 
W4 = M4[Zs+6XWzinZz+XZ1(4Wsin+15W221n)] 
etc., 
where ZJ = WcJ+l)sp+X(1+a)WlapW<J+l)1n, 
X= (M-1)/(Wlin-1), 
M - neutron multiplication factor, 
(5) 
a - ratio of the (a,n)-neutron to 
spontaneous neutron yields, 
WJsp and WJin - the j-th factorial moments 
of neutron multiplicity distribution for 
spontaneous and induced fissions correspondingly. 
When M values are close to 1 simplification 
of awkward eXPressions for factorial moments of a 
high order is possible. Their analysis shows that 
if the terms with X parameter to the power of 2 
and higher are neglected we obtain: 
j 
WJ =MJ[WJap+aXWlapWJin+X r CkJWkinW<J-k+l)ep) (6) 
k=:G 
for all j>=2. 
The known formalism /3/ is usually applied 
in practice for multiplication correction in 
measurements by the shift register coincidence 
technique. The ratio of reals to the total count 
rate serves as an informative parameter of 
multiplication. A similar approach was used for 
correction of measurement results by the VDC 
technique. 
The correction factor K for reals can be 
presented in the following form: 
K = Fo/Fcor = Fo( 1+a)M/( rNo), (7) 
where Fo=F/G - the reals value corrected for the 
methodical error of measuring, 
No=NT/(1-TNT) - the total count rate 
corrected for the dead time losses, 
Fcor - the unknown value of reals 
corrected for neutron multiplication, 
r - an auxiliary parameter that 
represents the ratio of reals to total count rate 
in the absence of multiplication at a=O and G=1. 
Using expression ( 6) obtained for W.J, a 
dependence of the ratio Fo/Foor on the 
multiplication factor M was analyzed by 
calculation modeling performed for different 
fissile nuclides. The analysis shows that in the 
limited range of efficiency values at M values 
approaching 1 an approximation of the 
multiplication factor M can be obtained as a 
solution of the following quadratic equation 
A(M-1)2 + B(M-1) + C = 0, (8) 
where _ _ _ 
A= [(1+a)/Vep-r(2-r)/(Vep-1))v1n2/(Vin-1), 
C = 1-Fo(1+a)/(rNo), 
Vap=WJ.ap and V1n=W11n are the average numbers of 
neutrons emitted in the spontaneous and induced 
fission acts, correspondingly. 
Numerical calculation has been performed in 
order to estimate an error of M definition in 
this way. The reals calculation was done 
according to expression(3) at preset e, a and M 
values with determination of factorial moments 
(5) to the sixth inclusive. The calculated reals 
and totals values were further applied for 
estimation of the multiplication factor from 
equation ( 8). 
At the efficiency values up to 20% the 
discrepancy between the obtained and input values 
of M ranging from 1 to 1.1 did not exceed 0.01. 
10 30 30 
240-Pu •ff.ctlv• ~•••· g 
Fig. 5. Dependence of coincidence count rate on 
240Pu effective mass before and after correction 
for methodical Rrror and multiplication. 
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Fig.5 shows the measurement results for the 
samples before and after multiplication 
correction as a ftmction of 240Ptl effective mass 
(mer) 
The proposed algorithm was used for 
multiplication correction in measurements of fuel 
samples containing up to 100 g of plutonium. A 
set of five samples with the known data on mass 
and plutonium isotopic composition was applied 
for calibration of the detector. Two of them 
contain about 50 g of Pu02 powder with different 
isotopic composition; three others contain 300 g, 
400 g and 500 g of electrodeposi ted mixture of 
plutonium and natural uranium dioxides (25% of 
Pu02). 
calculated from plutonium isotopic data. It can 
be seen that the measured reals F and the reals 
Fo corrected for methodical error have a 
nonlinear dependences on mer. After 
multiplication correction a calibration function 
Foor(mef) for detector response is a straight 
line. 
5 Conclusions 
In summary, it should be noted that in spite 
of the simplicity of the VDC logic the 
interpretation of measurement results by this 
technique is rather complicated. With increase of 
the detector count rate the methodical error of 
measurements rises that distorts the correlation 
of detector response to fission rate. The 
proposed correction for the methodical error 
allows the proportional correlation to be 
ensured in the range of cotmt rate up to about 
3·104 s-l.. The multiplication correction can be 
implemented to obtain a linear calibration 
ftmction for the detector response. 
However, the VDC-technique demonstrates its 
value for assay of small amounts of spontaneously 
fissioning materials only. 
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Abstract 
The high accuracy and precision required in 
nuclear safeguards measurements can be achieved 
by an improved neutron activation technique based 
on multiple delayed fission neutron counting 
under various experimental conditions. For the 
necessary ultrahigh counting statistics required, 
cyclic activation of multiple subsamples has been 
apolied. The home-made automated flexible 
analytical system with neutron flux and spectrum 
differentiation by irradiation position adjust-
ment and cadmium screening, permits the non-
destructive determination of the U-235 abundance 
and the total U element concentration needed in 
nuclear safeguards sample analysis, with a high 
throughput and a low ooerational cost. Careful 
exPerimental optimization led to considerable 
improvement of the results. 
1. Introduction 
Several more or less sophisticated methods 
have been developed for nuclear safeguards and 
reference material analysis in order to meet the 
high specifications required in this type of 
measurements. The conventional delayed fission 
neutron technique has been applied successfully 
with sufficient accuracy and precision to the 
determination of natural uranium not only in 
geological but also in nuclear safeguards and 
reference material samples covering a wide con-
centration range, by calibrating the analytical 
system with certified natural uranium standards 
(1-3). 
Since however in nuclear safeguards and 
reference material applications not only the 
uranium element concentration but also the U-235 
isotopic abundance is required, multiple measure-
ments under different experimental conditions 
were necessary in order to determine the two un-
known values as well as the correction factors 
due to neutron flux depression and other inter-
ferences. 
2. Method description 
The method is based on reactor neutron acti-
vation of uranium or other fissile material 
samples of various isotope abundances and the 
measurement of the delayed neutrons from the 
fission products. The uranium element concentra-
tion and the U-235 isotope abundance were deter-
mined by performing two measurements differen-
tiating the neutron flux spectrum and the irradia-
tion position at the nuclear reactor. The neutron 
flux spectrum was modified by cadmium screening 
resulting in thermal neutron flux depression. 
Initially separate closed or partially open small 
cadmium containers around each sample were used 
423 
for variable neutron flux spectrum differentia-
tion. This however necessitated the preparation 
of two samples, one bare and one cadmium covered, 
besides the difficulty of proper cadmium container 
preparation and the probability of capsule damage 
at the irradiation and counting position stops of 
the capsule transfer system, with subsequent 
sample leakage, resulting in possible pneumatic 
transfer tube contamination. Therefore a per-
manent cadmium sleeve was installed around one of 
the two pneumatic tube irradiation tenninals. The 
flexible terminals were positioned at different 
distances from the reactor core of the 5 MW swim-
ming pool reactor of N.C.S.R. Demokritos, to com-
pensate for the difference between the thermal and 
epithermal neutron flux and the fission cross-
section of the uranium isotopes U-235 and U-238, 
in order to optimize the counting rates during the 
measurements (4-6). 
Initially the simple uranium fission balance 
expression was used: 
aU5+su8 = C 
or aU5+S(U-U5) = C 
or (a-S)U5+SU = C 
or BU0 +1 C 
u 
where 
u5 U-235 concentration 
u8 U-238 concentration 
U = total U element concentration 
~=~ U-235 abundance 
u 
C = neutroncounting rate per mass unit 
B,l =coefficients 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
APplying equ.(4) for the bare and cadmium 
covered cases respectively, the following system 
is obtained 
BU0 +1 = ~ 
Cl B'U0 +1'= u-
(6) 
where the coefficients B,I,B' ,r· can be determined 
by using two standards of different elem~nt con-
centration U1,U2 and isotope abundance UJ,U~, 
from which 
B (7) 
r = h - 8Ua 1 
ua = r · c-rC' 
8C'-8'C 
8C'-8'C u = -=-=-~-=-
8r · -8 T 
(8) 
(9) 
( 10) 
However if the thermal neutron flux depres-
sion is taken into account, which can be approxi-
mated by the percentage expression 
d = 1-i5Ua , 
then equ. (4) becomes 
8Ua(1-i5Ua)+f = f 
u 
and for the cadmium covered case: 
z C' A'Ua +8'Ua+f' =-
u 
(11) 
( 12) 
(13) 
(14) 
The coefficients A,8,f,A' ,8' ,r· can be deter-
mined by using three standards of different 
element concen~ration U1 ,U 2 ,U 3 and isotope 
abundance u?,U 2 ,U~. and thus from equ. (13) 
(15) 
8 (16) 
( 17) 
For A' ,8' ,r· similar equations hold. The system 
of equ. (13),(14) can also be solved in the 
normal matrix way for A,B,r,A' ,B' ,r·. 
Then from equ. (13) ,(14) 
(A- f. A')ua\(8- f 8')Ua+(r- f r') o (18) 
C' C' C' 
a 2 .. or A"U +8"U +f" = 0 ( 19) 
from which 
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-8"+1B" 2-4A"r" ua = 
2A" 
and from (13) 
(20) 
(21) 
In order to improve the counting statistics, 
because of the short-lived nature of the delayed 
neutron emitting fission products, cyclic acti-
vation has been applied combined with timed in-
termediate sample storage to avoid radiation 
build-up and dead-time losses for counting rate 
optimization. Cyclic activation reduces also 
timing and sample position uncertainties during 
irradiation. 
A programmable logic controller is being 
installed for automatic system operation while 
a special compute software program facilitates 
data evaluation. 
5. Results 
Intercomparisons of nuclear safeguards 
uranium samples from the Safeguards Analytical 
Laboratory of the International Atomic Energy 
Commission gave the following results. 
Using two standards with 
8 a ,y •1 a • u1 = 4.76% u1 = 2.38,ro,U2 = 87.361~u2 =0.21" 
the following counting rates were obtained for 
the standards and the unknown sample x, with the 
cadmium covered terminal closer to the reactor 
core than the bare one: 
c1=9433 c/mg, c2=1097 c/mg, Cx=2301 c/mg 
Ci=5865 c/mg, C2=1955 c/mg, C'=2193 X c/mg 
Inserting these values into equ. (7) 
we got 
8 = 46.34, r = 1, 8'= 21.97, r·= 16.89 
and from equ. (9) and (10): 
u~ = 0.718fo',ux = 67.14% 
Using three standards with 
u1 84.76% ua = 1 2.38% 
u2 86.79% ua = 2 0. 711;4 
u3 = 87.36% ua = 3 0.25.% 
we got 
and (8) 
cl 9433 c/mg, c2 2919 c/mg, c3 
c· 1 5865 c/mg, c· 2 2792 c/mg, 
c. 3 
ex 2301 c/mg, C' X 2193 cjmg 
and from equ. ( 15) to ( 17) 
A= 0.3917, B 45.32, r = 1.2187 
A' = 0.4545, B' = 20.784, r· = 17.16 
and from equ. (18) to (21): 
u~ = 0.7157/o1Ux = 67.957~ 
1097 c/mg 
1977 c/mg 
which compare quite well with the true values 
6. Discussion 
Variouscombinations of bare and cadmium 
covered samples have been tried to optimize the 
experimental conditions. Thus bare samples at 
the bare tube and up and down cadmium covered 
samples at the cadmium covered tube gave the 
following similar results for various standard 
combinations: 
66.78%, U = 66.78%, Uv = 66.83% 
Xz "3 
0.7184%, U0 = 0.7185%, U0 = 0.7179% Xz X3 
with a small descrepancy of the total uranium 
element concentration compared to the true value 
u = 68.306%, u0 = 0.711% X X 
Another measurement gave: 
68.87%, u Xz 68.86%, Ux 3 =66.49% 
Ux0
1 
0.6958%, U0 = 0.6958%, U0 = 0.7240%. Xz X3 
Approaching the tube terminals closer to 
the reactor core for counting statistics improve-
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ment and trying various bare(B) and cadmium(C) 
covered sample(S) and tube(T) combinations at 
different distances(DD) from the reactor core, 
the following results were obtained: 
BS in BT, BS in CT: u 69.19%, ua : 0.7098% 
BS in BT at DD: u 68.96%, ua = 0.6982% 
BS in CT, CS in BT: u 68.59%, ua = 0.7033% 
BS in BT, CS in CT: u 69.03%, uct = 0.7015% 
compared to the IAEA values: U=68.306%,U0 =0.711% 
7. Conclusion 
It can be concluded that most results are 
quite close to the true values giving an error of 
less than 1%, with poor counting statistics. It 
is expected that careful sample preparation, re-
peatable experimental conditions and mainly high 
counting statistics will improve the results con-
siderably. 
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Abstract 
The paper describes the calibration 
of the neutron coincidence collar using 
fresh, low enriched uranium oxide and 
mixed (U/Pu) oxide mock-up Light Water 
Reactor (LWR) type fuel assemblies. The 
paper also summarises studies on the 
sensitivity of the neutron coincidence 
collar to measurements on LWR fuel 
assemblies after the 
removal or substitution of fuel pins and 
the addition of various types of neutron 
poisons. Finally monte carlo 
calculations used to simulate some of 
the observed experimental results are 
discussed along with a relationship for 
applying the results to full scale 
production LWR fuel assemblies. 
1. Introduction. 
The neutron coincidence collar 
(NCC) is a non-destructive assay (NDA) 
instrument designed by the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL) , Los Alamos, 
USA for either the measurement of the 
235u or the 240 Pu eff. mass loading 
(gjcm) of fresh LWR fuel assemblies 
( 1, 2, 3) . The instrument is a member of 
.the high-level neutron coincidence 
counter (HLNCC) family [4]. An 
additional problem in the assay of LWR 
fuel assemblies is the presence of 
thermal neutron poisons in the fuel 
assembly. Poisons may be present in 
various forms in a fuel assembly. A 
detailed study has already been 
performed by the LANL and the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate into improving 
the calibration of the NCC for the 
measurement of low enriched uranium 
(LEU) type LWR fuel assemblies 
containing burnable thermal neutron 
poisons such as Gd2o3 (5). In 
pressurized water reactors, for example 
the type designed by FragemajFramatom, 
various poison materials may also be 
present in the form of clusters of rods 
which are completely separate from the 
fuel pins and are inserted into the open 
guide channels of the fuel assembly as 
opposed to the burnable poisons such as 
Gd2o3 which are homogeneously mixed with 
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the LEU fuel material. The types of 
materials typically used are stainless 
steel, alloys of silver indium and 
cadmium, boron carbide and silicon 
oxides. Measurements have been performed 
by Euratom NCC detector systems using 
LWR reference mock-up fuel assemblies of 
fissile material originating and present 
outside and within the European 
Community. This paper concentrates on 
studies performed for these second type 
of poisons for both LEU and MOX type LWR 
fuel assemblies. The paper also reports 
on the sensitivity of the NCC to the 
assay of fresh LWR MOX type fuel 
assemblies for various diversion 
scenarios by the removal or substitution 
of fuel pins and goes on to demonstrate 
the practical application of MCNP [6] 
techniques to supplement the 
experimental measurements and the 
creation of correction factors for 
establishing the relationship between 
the mock-up and full size LWR MOX fuel 
assemblies. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Measurement Technique. 
NCC for LEU LWR fuel 
The NCC is configured as an active 
interrogation device equipped with an 
Am-Li (241Am-7Li) source and an array of 
18 3He thermal neutron detectors 
embedded in high density polyethylene. 
The 18 detector tubes are positioned in 
sets of 6 in 3 panels of a rectangular 
arrangement with the 4th panel being 
used to hold the interrogation source. 
The polyethylene panels provide for the 
moderation of the source neutrons, the 
moderation of the induced fission 
neutrons deriving from the fissile 
content of the fuel and the structural 
support. 
The assay technique is essentially 
a two step measurement operation. The 
measurement response of the NCC is a net 
coincidence (Reals) count rate Ri (net), 
being the result of two separate 
measurements on the same fuel assembly. 
The first measurement is the passive 
measurement (without interrogation 
source) and the second the active 
measurement (with interrogation source 
inserted in the 4th panel). The net 
Reals count rate is thus, 
Ri(net) = Ri - Ri (active) (passive) 
The.best calibration algorithm which has 
been shown to represent the measurement 
technique is, 
K.Ri(net) ___gJ1 
1 + bM 
where M = 235u (gjcm) and 
a and b are the calibration coefficients 
for the type of fuel assembly and K is a 
combination of correction factors which 
account for various differences between 
the measurement conditions at the time 
of the calibration and the application 
to field measurement conditions [5]. 
oooooooooooooooo 
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K = KO * K1 * K2 * K3 * K4 * K5 and 
KO represents changes in the AmLi source 
strength 
K1 accounts 
drift 
for possible electronic 
K2 corrects for detector efficiency 
K3 corrects for thermal neutron poisons. 
K4 corrects for differences in the heavy 
metal loading 
K5 can account for 
such as extra 
(plastic, cardboard, 
other small 
assembly 
etc.) 
NCC for LWR MOX type fuel. 
effects 
wrapping 
The NCC used for the measurement of 
fresh LWR MOX fuel assemblies is similar 
to that used for the LEU type fuel 
except that the 4th panel which holds 
the interrogation source is replaced by 
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another polyethylene panel with 6 3He 
tubes. The application of the NCC in 
this configuration is analogous with the 
HLNCC-II for the measurement of any 
plutonium based item. The NCC has 
previously been demonstrated for the 
assay of Fast Reactor MOX sub-assemblies 
[7,8]. For the assay of LWR MOX fuel 
assemblies the cadmium liners are not 
used due to dimensional restrictions. 
The basic equations used for data 
reduction and evaluation have been 
described elsewhere but are summarised 
below: 
240 
a. Pu eff"(gjcm) where 
240Pu 
eff. 2.49.f238 +f240 +1.57.f242 
and fi is the weight percent fraction of 
the appropriate plutonium isotope. 
Rmc is the multiplication corrected 
Reals counting rate and is calculated 
us'ing the following expressions: 
R/CF CF = M.r 
r [ (R/T)/p
0
). (1+0<.) 
Po = (R/T) 0 • {l+IX) =0.0814 
M [-B+(B2-4AC) 1/ 2 )/2A 
A 2. 074 (1+0<) 
B -(2.0740(+1.0174) C= -r 
0( = .!..lllQQ!ll.D.tlL..l..f:ll2±.l.tl..t:llQ±L.llll1 ±.il~~lllAml 
1020(2.54f238+f240+1.69f242) 
where p0 is for a non multiplying sample 
and 0( is the ratio of (t><, n) neutrons to 
spontaneous fission neutrons. 
2.2. Description of Reference Material. 
Various types of fuel pins were 
available for creation of the LWR mock-
up fuel assemblies. The fuel pins are 
all of the same length with small 
variations in the diameter of the fuel 
pellets and thickness of the cladding. 
The fuel cladding is a stainless steel 
alloy for all of the reference materials 
except for the 235 U (3. 3%) fuel which 
is zircalloy. The 3.3% material was only 
used for 
the experiments concerning the LEU 
calibration whereas all the other 
reference materials were used in the LWR 
MOX experiments. The characteristics of 
the VENUS LWR mock-up fuel are given 
below: 
Characteristics of the VENUS LWR mock-up fuel 
TYPE 
3.3/0 
Chemical 
Composition 
(W/W)% uo2 100 
PU02 
Isotopic 
Composition (15.11.1966) 
(w/w)% 234u 
2350 
2360 
2380 
238PU 
239Pu 
240Pu 
241Pu 
242PU 
241Am 
Mass loading 
(gjcm) Pu tot 
235 u 
Fuel 
diameter (cm) 
0.029 
3.311 
0.017 
96.644 
0.1570 
0.819 
50.0 
Zr-4 
0.950 
LEU 
4.0/0 
100 
0.022 
3.971 
0.030 
95.977 
-
-
0.2234 
0.890 
50.0 
SS304 
0.978 
MOX 
2/2.7 1.7/3.2 0.7/5.1 
97.3 96.82 94.95 
2.7 3.18 5.05 
0.016 0.011 
2.002 1.785 0.72 
0.013 0.010 
97.970 98.194 99.28 
0.068 Idem Idem 
79.247 
17.197 
3.044 
0.445 
0.075 
0. 14 24 0.1795 0.2881 
0.1026 0.0976 0.0390 
0.902 0.897 
50.0 50.0 
SS304 SS304 
0.978 0.978 
length (cm) 
cladding type 
diameter (cm) 
thickness (cm) 0.057 0.038 0.038 0.038 
0.896 
50.0 
SS304 
0.978 
0.038 
2.3. Poison Materials. 
Four types of rods which are 
typically used with LWR reactor fuel 
assemblies for the purpose of 
criticality control and fine adjustment 
to the operation of the reactor have 
been used for the experiments. The rods 
used have similar dimensions to the 
mock-up fuel and their characteristics 
are given below: 
Type Pyrex AginCd In ox B4C 
form (Sio2;s2o 2 ) % (80/15/5) SS304 compressed 
pipe solid alloy solid compound 
diameter 0.905 (ext) 0.903 0.978 0.902 
(cm) 0.605 (int) 
length 50 50 50 50 
(cm) 
cladding type all stainless steel SS304 
diameter 0.978 0.978 0.978 
thickness 0.038 0.038 0.038 
2.4. Experimental set-up. 
The VENUS mock-up assembly array is 
designed to simulate as close as 
possible a typical 17 by 17 LWR fuel 
assembly structure. The array consists 
of 264 positions for insertion of fuel 
rods and 25 open positions. The central 
position is always left open but the 
remaining 24 open positions are 
available for insertion of the various 
rods of thermal neutron poison 
materials. The external dimensions of 
the grid are 21.42 cm by 21.42 cm and 
the fuel pin spacing is 1. 26 cm. The 
fuel pins are slightly more densely pact 
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together than is the case for full size 
fuel assemblies. The NCC was placed 
around the mock-up so that the fuel 
stack was centrally positioned relative 
to the axial linear counting response oi 
the detector during all experiments. The 
detectors were supported by a metal and 
thin wooden plate for that purpose. 
Euratom detector systems EUR 3 and EUR 5 
were used for the studies. The 
performance of both the instruments were 
monitored regularly in order to be able 
to compare and supplement calibration 
work carried out by them at the LANL, 
USA [5]. 
2.5. Case Studies. 
2.5.1. Addition of clusters. 
Tests were performed to 
investigate the influence of adding 
various number and combinations of the 
different poison material rods to the 
measured counting response. The 
combinations chosen followed as closely 
as possible typical loading deployed in 
full scale fuel assemblies. Due to 
restricted availability of the fuel pins 
and time for performing the experiments 
not all possible combinations were fully 
explored. The studies were however 
selective enough to be able to optimise 
the results required to draw conclusions 
from the tests. Clusters of poison rods 
were introduced to both a LEU mock-up 
(264 fuel pins at 3.3 % 235 U) and a MOX 
mock-up {264 fuel pins 2/2.7 % 235u;Pu). 
Detector EUR 3 was used for the 
experiments on the LEU mock-up and 
detector EUR 5 was used · for the 
experiments on the MOX mock-up. A 
sectional view of the mock-up assembly 
is given below. 
17 x 17 VENUS mock-up assembly 
n Open guide channels 
for i nsert.P)n of poif.on rods 
~ Central holtJ left tlmpty 
0 264 Fu~l pms 
00000000000000000 
00000000000000000 
00000100200300000 
00040000000005000 
00000000000000000 
00 6 00 7 00 g uo ~J 001000 
00000000000000000 
00000000000000000 
0011001200®001?001400 
00000000000000000 
00000000000000000 
001500160 0170 018001900 
00000000000000000 
00020000 00000021000 
0 0 0 0 0220 ()2:'0 '::J ~"K') <) 0 0 0 
00000000000000000 
00000000000000000 
Fig.2. 
The numbers associated with the 
open guide holes are shown for reference 
to indicate the positions of the poison 
rods for the various cluster 
combinations. For the measurements using 
the AmLi source the face with the guide 
holes 6,11 and 15 was always closest to 
the source panel of the NCC. For 
measurements on MOX the face with guide 
holes 1,2,3 was always closest to the 
door panel of the NCC. The combinations 
tested were as follows: 
Low Enriched Uranium mock-up. 
Material Number of Positions in cluster 
Type rods 
AginCd 
In ox 
Pyrex 
Mix 1 
AginCd 
In ox 
Mix 2 
Agincd 
In ox 
Pyrex 
4 
8 
12 
16 
20 
8 
16 
24 
3 
8 
9 
9 
12 
16 
8 
16 
8 
8 
8 
4,5,20,21 
1,3,6,10,15,19,22,24 
1,3,6,8,10,12,13,15,17,19,22,24 
1,3,4,5,6,8,10,12,13,15,17,19,20,21,22,24 
1 to 24 less 7,9,16,18 
1,3,6,10,15,19,22,24 
1,3,4,5,6,8,10,12,13,15,17,19,20,21,22,24 
1 to 24 
5,8,13 
1,3,6,10,15,19,22,24 
1,2,3,4,6,8,11,12,15 
1,2,3,5,8,10,13,14,19 
1,3,4,5,6,10,15,19,20,21,23,24 
1,3,4,5,6,8,10,12,13,15,17,19,20,21,22,24 
2,4,5,11,14,20,21,23 
1,3,6-10,12,13,15-19,22,24 
1,3,6,10,15,19,22,24 
4,5,8,12,13,17,20,21 
2,7,9,11,14,16,18,23 
Mixed oxide fuel mock-up. 
Material Number of Positions in cluster 
Types Rods 
[ B4 C 4,5,20,21 
AginCd 
In ox 
Pyrex 
8 2,4,5,11,14,20,21,23 
AginCd 
Inox ] 
Pyrex 
12 1,3,4,5,6,10,15,19,20,21,22,24 
16 1,3,4,5,6,8,10,12,13,15,17,19,20,21,22,24 
19 
20 
24 
8,12,13,17 
1,3,4,5,6-10,12,13,15,16,18,19,20-22,24 
1,3,4-10,12,13,15-22,24 
1-24 
13,17,21 
1-3,5,8,10,13,14,19 
Inox 1 
Mix 1 
In ox 
AginCd 
16 
8 
1,3,6-10,12,13,15-19,22,24 
2,4,5,11,14,20,21,23 
2.5.2. Fuel pin removal and 
substitution. 
The fabrication of LWR MOX type 
fuel assemblies is increasing more and 
more as a result of fuel cycle 
management policies within the European 
Community. From a nuclear safeguards 
stand point the measurement of this. new 
generation of LWR fuel assembly is very 
important considering a typical assembly 
contains around 22 Kg of plutonium. 
Tests have been performed to investigate 
the sensitivity of the NCC measurement 
technique to scenarios of diversion of 
material by ei-ther removal of fuel pins, 
the substitution of fuel pins with Inox 
rods which are normally used in the 
clucters mentioned previously and the 
substitution of MOX type fuel pins with 
LEU type fuel pins in an attempt to 
maintain the heavy metal loading of the 
assembly constant. In addition the 
removal and substitution of fuel pins 
with Inox rods was carried out at in 
areas corresponding to an inner and. 
outer zone of the fuel assembly. The 
number of pins ranged between 2 and 2 0. 
The 25 open guide holes were free of any 
other neutron poison rods for the 
purpose of the tests thus simulating a 
standard LWR MOX fuel assembly with 264 
fuel pins of 2/2.7 % UjPu type fuel. The 
locations of the zones where fuel pins 
were either removed or substituted are 
indicated in the following diagram. 
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2.5.3. MOX Calibration. 
Combinations of the various types 
of reference MOX fuel pins were selected 
in order to create several mass loading 
for the 264 fuel pin mock-up. The 25 
guide holes were always left open 
without insertion of thermal neutron 
poison rods. Five combinations were 
configured by replacing up to 120 of the 
2/2.7 % type fuel pins with up to 64 of 
the 1. 7/3.2 % and 56 of the o. 7/5.1 % 
type fuel pins. The range in the Pu mass 
loading was 38.81 to 4 7.12 (gjcm) . The 
measurement data accumulated during some 
of the experiments for fuel pin removal 
were also used to extend the lower range 
of the calibration down to 34.0 (g/cm). 
The position of missing fuel pins or the 
distribution of fuel pins of different 
plutonium mass is not expected to affect 
the measurement results. The evaluation 
of measurement results described in the 
next chapter and MCNP calculations ( 9) 
confirm this theory. 
2.5.4. MCNP Calculations. 
A limited number of the experiments 
on the VENUS LWR MOX mock-up were also 
simulated using an adapted version of 
the Monte Carlo Code for neutron 
transport set up at A.E.A., Harwell. The 
model previously set up [ 9, 10] was 
changed to allow for the VENUS mock-up 
fuel and poison rod characteristics. The 
calculations were able to provide the 
following data: 
A correction to 
uncorrected Reals and 
corrected Reals response 
of the fuel height. 
the Totals, 
multiplication 
as a function 
A correction for the difference 
between stainless steel and zircalloy 
fuel pin cladding. 
- The theoretical effects to the Totals 
and Reals measurement response for the 
insertion of increasing numbers of B 4 c 
rods in the open guide channels. 
- The theoretical effects to the Totals 
and Reals measurement response for the 
insertion of various different clusters 
of 16 poison rods. 
2.5.5. Cadmium Ratio Measurement. 
A limited number of measurements 
for long counting times were carried out 
using the NCC in the active mode before 
and after deploying cadmium liners 
between the assembly and the detector 
panels. The measurements were made on 
the 17 by 17 LWR LEU mock-up before and 
after the insertion of Pyrex poison 
rods. Measurements were also performed 
on a 15 by 15 LWR LEU configuration for 
comparison between the VENUS and the 
LANL reference mock-up assemblies. The 
ratio of the measured Reals counting 
rate with and without the use of cadmium 
liners has been used to independently 
verify the number of poison rods present 
in LWR LEU fuel assemblies (5]. 
3.Resu1ts. 
3.1. Addition of Clusters. 
The relative net Reals counting 
response for the addition of the various 
combinations of poison rods in clusters 
previously outlined in point 2. 5 .1. are 
graphically displayed in fig.4. It 
should be noted that there is a 
considerable perturbation for the 
addition of the Pyrex rods. The results 
show that the relative location of the 
poison rods with respect to the position 
of the interrogation source to be very 
significant. The results for the 
combinations of poison rods which are 
more symmetrically distributed are more 
consistent. 
431 
1.1 
1.05 
a> 
UJ 
c 
0 
Q. 0.95 UJ 
~ 
0.9 
"' 0 0.1!5 4) 
0:: 
...... 0.8 
IU 
c 
~.75 
al 
> 
·.;:. Q,T 
Cl 
Q) 0.65 0:: 
O.ll 
Effe.;:-t. of V<Jriow> p<)isons 
LWR L£U Mock--up 3.3 ::.<: 264 pir.s 
• 1\q lnCd • ln•?X / Pyre:< 
1 8 Agl nCd + 16 In ox '' 8 Agl nCd + 81nox +· 8 Pyrex 
:~- ->(" - - - - - - --Q... - - - - - - .... - - - - _<')_ - - - - - -
·....,_ X ----- ~ 
·,, 
·~·,, )' 
'· ·,., ,{ 
·,, 
. ............. 
-
.,-----,---,---,-r--.-r- --r~•"----r--r--1 
0 4 a l? 1h 20 2-1 
Nu m bcr- of rods in cl us{er 
Fig.4. 
A comparison between theoretical 
and experimental results for the LWR MOX 
mock-up with addition of B4C rods case 
is shown graphically in fig. 5. The 
results are in good agreement 
considering the errors associated with 
the MCNP calculation. A comparison 
between the theoretical and experimental 
results for the addition of poisons in 
clusters of 16 rods for the different 
poison types is given in the table 
below. The computer processing run times 
for the MCNP calculations were in the 
order of 1000 minutes for each data 
point. 
Poison Type Tmcnp (sT) Texp (sT) Rmcnp (sR) Rexp (sR) 
B4C 
AginCd 
Pyrex 
In ox 
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Considering that the resulting 
multiplication corrected Reals rates 
(Rmc) are strongly dependent on the 
corresponding Totals rates the overall 
effect on the multiplication corrected 
Reals is small. The poison type which 
influences the measured response the 
most was the B4c rods which caused a 
reduction of 0. 11 % per rod. The 
position of the poison rod in the 
assembly is not as important as with the 
technique for the assay of LEU due to 
the absence of perturbations caused by 
source sample coupling. A correction 
algorithm for the presence of poison 
rods in clusters is suggested. 
K(Thp) = Ri (no poison) 
Ri (poison) 
for LEU 
MOX 
K(Thp) = 
Ri = Rnet 
R. = R 
1 me 
a.n + b 
where n is number of rods and a and b 
are the correction coefficients. 
The correction coefficients for all 
cases are given in the table below. 
,_ 1.. 
Poison a b era o-'b covab 
Type 10-8 ) (10-6 ) (10-7 ) 
LEU AginCd 0.0278 0.998 66.9 66.2 -48.0 
In ox 0.0016 0.998 4. 3 8.7 - 4.8 
Pyrex 0.0129 1. 001 6.2 6.1 - 4.8 
(10-4 ) 
MOX B4c 10.0338 1. 001 1. 09 1. 73 -1.05 
AglnCd 6.9046 0.999 l. 71 2.16 -1.52 
In ox -4.3026 1.000 3.22 2.68 -2.05 
Pyrex 0.5924 1.000 0.68 l. 09 -6.82 
The correction factor K(Thp) corresponds 
to the factor K4 used in the general 
correction algorithm outlined in 2.1. 
and [ 5] . It has also been proven that 
multiples of the correction factors can 
be used to account for cases where the 
cluster comprises of several different 
types of thermal neutron poison. For 
example a cluster inserted into a LWR 
LEU fuel assembly which contains 8 
AginCd rods, 8 Inox rods and 8 Pyrex 
rods would require a correction to the 
measurement response corresponding to K4 
where K4 is calculated as follows. 
K4 K AginCd · K Inox · K Pyrex 
K K and K are the AginCd' Inox Pyrex 
correction factors for the number of 
pins of each poison type present. 
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3.2. Fuel Pin Removal and Substitution. 
The relative multiplication 
corrected Reals measurement responses 
for the removal and substitution of MOX 
fuel pins are shown graphically in 
fig.6. 
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The results show that the removal or 
substitution of fuel pins with stainless 
steel (Inox) rods have virtually the 
same effect whereas the substitution of 
MOX fuel pins with uo2 fuel pins gives 
rise to lower reduction in the measured 
response. This effect is most probably 
due to the increase in the 2 ~5u loading 
while also maintaining the heavy metal 
ratio in the assembly. The reduction in 
the measured Rmc rates for the various 
diversion scenarios are as follows: 
U02 pin Substitution 
MOX pin Removal 
Inox rod Substitution 
0.36 % 1 pin. 
0.41 % 1 pin. 
o. 43 % 1 pin. 
The reduction in the measurement 
response for removal or substitution of 
fuel pins from the inner or the outer 
zones of the fuel assembly is equal. The 
ratio of reduction in response between 
zones is 0.998 +1- 0.002. Considering 
the overall effect on the measured 240Pu 
mass loading for the various diversion 
scenarios it shows that for a typical 
counting period of 600 seconds the 
accuracy of the NCC is not better than 3 
to 4 fuel pins (1.5 %). It should 
however be noted that the measured 
Totals rates greatly influences the 
correction to the Reals and if the 
uncorrected REALS alone could be used 
for the calibration and subsequent assay 
of the assemblies the accuracy could be 
improved to 1 to 2 fuel pins (0.8%). 
3.3. MOX Calibration. 
The measurement results relative to 
the combinations of several fuel pin 
types described in 2. 5. 3. are used to 
establish a calibration for LWR MOX fuel 
assemblies. Before the calibration 
established for the VENUS mock-up can be 
used for the assay of full size fuel 
assemblies it is necessary to normalise 
for differences in their physical 
characteristics. The main differences 
between the VENUS mock-up and typical 
full size assemblies are listed as 
follows: 
Characteristic 
Fuel length 
Pin diameter 
Cladding type 
Cladding thickness 
Pitch (fuel pin) 
Heavy metal loading 
VENUS mock-up Full size Assembly 
50 cm 
0.90 cm 
In ox 
0.38 cm 
1. 26 cm 
1622 gjcm 
366 cm 
0.82 cm 
Zr-4 
0.57 cm 
1. 26 cm 
1260 gjcm 
MCNP calculations have been performed to 
investigate the importance of the 
different characteristics relevant to 
the NCC performance specifications and 
some correction factors have been 
established. It is estimated that the 
overall effect to the multiplication 
corrected Reals for the difference in 
Zr-4 and Inox fuel cladding types is not 
greater 1. 5 %. The effect of the fuel 
length is shown in fig.7. The errors 
associated with the calculated data 
points are of the order of 1 % for a 
1000 minute run time per data point. 
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The results show that the Totals and 
Reals response increases relative to the 
increase in the fuel length until the 
fuel is more than 100 cm. Once again the 
influence of the measured Totals 
response to the multiplication corrected 
Reals is apparent. The overall 
correction to the multiplication 
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corrected Reals for normalisat1on of 
measurements on the VENUS mock-up to 
full size fuel assemblies is estimated 
to be 13.5 %. The overall effect of the 
differences in fuel length and cladding 
is estimated as 12 %. The measurement 
results used for the VENUS calibration 
have been normalised to a selection of 
results for measurements on full size 
fuel assemblies using the same NCC 
detector after application of the 
corrections for fuel cladding and 
length. The results are shown 
graphically in fig.8. 
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The calibration coefficient for the LWR 
MOX, established using measurements on 
full size fuel assemblies [ 11] was 
647.9. The corresponding coefficient for 
the VENUS reference calibration is 601.4 
+j- 0. 5 which is 7. 2 % smaller. It is 
interesting to note that a recent 
calibration established for Fast Reactor 
fuel sub-assemblies using the NCC in a 
thermal mode (without cadmium liners) 
produced a coefficient of 624 +j- 5 [8]. 
The reduction in the measured response 
is thought to be related to the heavy 
metal loading of the VENUS reference 
assembly. The linear heavy metal load 
.ing should be corrected for in much the 
same way the linear U loading is 
corrected for in the NCC technique for 
the assay of LWR LEU fuel assemblies 
[5]. MCNP calculations have not been 
carried out to estimate the perturbation 
caused by the heavy metal loading but a 
factor will be established in the near 
future. The VENUS calibration was used 
to re-evaluate the measurement results 
to estimate the expected operator-
inspector differences. The results were 
as follows: 
Average 
Operator-Inspector 
Diff's. 
Signed Absolute 
-0.05(0.39) 0.32(0.37) 
3.4. Cadmium ratio method. 
Before discussing the results of 
the measurements carried out 
on the LEU mock-up with and without 
using cadmium liners it is useful to 
note the absolute relationship between 
the reference material used for the 
calibration experiments at LANL, USA and 
the material used at VENUS, Mol, 
Belgium. After application of the 
relevant normalisation factors (5] to 
the NCC(EUR 3), which was used for both 
calibration exercises, the expected 
measured net Reals for the 15 by 15 (204 
fuel pin) LWR LEU mock-up at VENUS was 
156.2 cjs. The actual measured net Reals 
was 154.8 +/- 0.8 c;s. The 1 % reduction 
in the measurement response is due to a 
small loss of detection efficiency (end 
effects) for the shorter active length 
of the fuel pins. The measurement 
results for the insertion of clusters of 
Pyrex rods with (R0 d) and without (Rno-
cd) using cadmium sheets to line the 
inner faces of the NCC detector panels 
are shown graphically in fig.9. 
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The ratio R d/R d for the 17 by 17 c no-c 
VENUS mock-up before insertion of the 
poison rods agrees well with the ratio 
established for the 15 by 15 LANL mock-
up (5) the values being 0.0731 and 
0.0742 respectively. The cadmium ratio 
for the 15 by 15 VENUS mock-up was 
0.0736. A calibration function is 
proposed for the purpose of 
of 
the 
independently verifying the number 
Pyrex poison rods present in 
cluster. The linear relationship 
represented by the equation 
is 
R ( cdjncd) a. n + b where n is the 
number of poison rods and a and b are 
the calibration coefficients. When no 
poison rods are present the cadmium 
ratio is equal to b. The coefficients 
with their associated errors are given 
below. The cadmium measurement results 
were established using long counting 
times of 10 times 5000 seconds for each 
poison loading. 
a= 0.000671 +/- 0.000058 
b = 0.0732 +/- 0.0006 
Cov ab = - 2.8.10-8 
The fuel material and time was not 
available to make calibrations for all 
types of poison material during the 
exercises but either future experimental 
work or MCNP calculations could be 
performed to obtain the necessary 
coefficients. 
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4. Conclusions. 
Euratom NCC' s have been calibrated 
for the assay of LWR LEU and MOX fuel 
type assemblies and correction factors 
have been established for the presence 
of several types of thermal neutron 
poisons. 
The measurement results have shown 
that although the NCC is not sensitive 
to the position of poison rods within 
the LWR MOX assembly a certain amount of 
perturbation in the measurement response 
can arise with NCC LEU assembly due to 
the AmLi source to sample poison rod 
coupling. 
A calibration function has been 
proposed for the independent 
verification of the presence of thermal 
neutron poisons in the form of Pyrex 
rods using the cadmium ratio method 
established at LANL, USA. 
The agreement between MCNP 
calculations and experimental data 
indicates that future calibration work 
can be reduced and in some cases 
replaced by mathematical modelling 
alone, especially when only relative 
effects are being investigated. 
The NCC is not sensitive 
removal or substitution of less 
LWR MOX fuel pins from a 17 
assembly for counting periods 
than 600 seconds. 
to the 
than 4 
by 17 
shorter 
More mathematical modelling and 
experimental measurements are 
recommended in the future to investigate 
the requirements for a correction factor 
for the heavy metal loading of LWR MOX 
assemblies in order avoid possible bias 
effects. 
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CALIBRATION OF UFBC COUNTERS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE IN THE ASSAY OF 
LARGE MASS PLUTONIUM SAMPLES. 
G.P.D.Verrecchia B.G.R.Smith R.Cranston 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg. 
Abstract. 
The paper reports on the cross-
calibration of four Universal Fast 
Breeder reactor assembly coincidence 
(UFBC) counters using multi-can 
containers of Plutonium oxide powders 
with masses between 2 and 12 Kg. of 
plutonium and a parametric study on the 
sensitivity of the detector response to 
the positioning or removal and 
substitution of the material with empty 
cans. The paper also reports on the 
performance of the UFBC for routine 
measurements on large mass, multi-can 
containers of plutonium oxide powders 
and compares the results to experience 
previously obtained in the measurement 
of fast reactor type fuel assemblies in 
the mass range 2 to 16 Kg.of plutonium. 
l.Introduction. 
The UFBC counter is a member of the 
HLNCC family of passive neutron counting 
systems ( 1] and was originally designed 
specifically for the assay of Fast 
Breeder Reactor type fuel assemblies. 
The present paper reports on the 
application and the performance of the 
UFBC for the assay of large, multi -can 
containers of plutonium oxide powders. 
Four Euratom UFBC counters, three of the 
standard design and one of a modified 
larger design, have been cross-
calibrated using a multi-can container 
of reference plutonium oxide powders 
similar to those produced at the output 
stage {Puo2 product) of spent fuel 
reprocessing plants and recieved at the 
input of plutonium fuel fabrication 
plants. Measurements have been performed 
using one UFBC as the reference counter 
for calibration purposes and to study 
the effect on the measurement response 
after changing the position of the cans 
of plutonium powders within the multi• 
can container, characterising it's 
sensitivity to the removal or 
substitution of plutonium material. The 
purpose of the study is to monitor the 
UFBC's sensitivity to various diversion 
scenarios associated with empty or part-
filled cans or by introduction of 
spacers in the container packing. A 
selected set of cans of reference 
materials and californium-252 
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spontaneous fission neutron sources was 
measured by all four UFBC counters to 
establish their relative detector 
efficiencies. The paper goes on to 
report on the performance of the UFBC 
for routine measurements on multi-can 
containers of plutonium oxide under in-
field conditions and compares the 
results with experience of measurements 
on various types of plutonium and mixed 
(U/Pu) oxide fast reactor type fuel 
assemblies. 
2. Materials and Methpds. 
2.1. Measurement Technique. 
The UFBC is a non destructive assay 
(NDA) instrument designed by the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los 
Alamos, USA. The instrument resembles 
the HLNCC (2] in that it uses similar 
digital electronics and detects the 
coincidence neutrons from the 
spontaneous fission of the 240 Pu eff. 
mass. It is however designed to operate 
for much taller samples and for much 
higher counting rates. The maximum 
sample diameter for the standard version 
is 17 cm and 23.2 cm for the modified 
version. The uniform counting (flat 
response) region in the detector is 
around 105 cm. The original instrument 
design and performance characteristics 
have been reported in detail elsewhere 
(3] but a sectional drawing and table of 
spepifications summarising the basic 
features of both versions of the UFBC 
are given in fig.1. and table.1. 
respectively. 
Table.l. 
Dimensions (cm) 
Version A B C D E F G H I 
UFBC II 141 31 17 9 17.5 15 -
UFBC IImod 137 38 23 15 17 9 17.5 15 3 
The differences in operating 
characteristics between the 4 Euratom 
UFBC instruments are summarised in 
table.2. 
The UFBC is calibrated in the same way 
as any other HLNCC-II based mea~urement 
system through the use of a ser1es 
240 
reference samples of differing Pueff 
mass. The calibration function takes the 
form 
240 2 240 
R =a.( Pueff.l +b. Pueff. 
for the uncorrected Reals response and 
240 Rmc = a. Pueff. 
for the multiplication corrected Reals 
response. 
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Table.2. 
EUROl EUR02 
1680 1680 
0.62 0.775 
0.20 0.250 
0.4992 0.4992 
95.0 95.0 
64 64 
22 22 
l 1.186 
l 1.250 
EUR03 EUR04 
1680 1680 
o. 726 0.62 
0.234 0.20 
0.4992 o. 0591 
95.0 100.0 
64 64 
22 25 
1.188 1.119 
1.280 1.140 
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2.2. Reference material. 
A series of plutonium oxide 
reference powders was available to fill 
the multi-can containers for the purpose 
of creating a set of samples for 
calibration of the UFBC. The containers 
were typical of containers used in the 
nuclear fuel cycle. The cans are 
constructed of stainless steel, 34 cm in 
height and 12 cm diameter with a wall 
thickness of 0. 3 cm. Up to five cans 
could be placed one after the other in 
the container which is also constructed 
from steel and has a diameter of 14 cm 
with a wall thickness of 0. 3 cm. The 
results outlined in this p~per 
concentrate on measurements on a max~mum 
of 3 fuel cans placed in the container. 
The characteristics of the reference 
material selected for the studies are 
given in table.3. 
Table.3. 
Isotopic Composition (6th Feb.l989) 
(wt;wt % Pu) 
Can Pu mass(g) 238Pu 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 242Pu 241Am 
A 2199.6 l.ll 70.07 18.36 7.93 2.53 0.6437 
B 2467.4 idem. 
c 2301.2 idem. 
F 1852.4 l. 76 56.48 25.07 10.51 6.17 0.6256 
H 1892.7 0.60 65.02 23.10 8.11 3.17 l. 0986 
I 1819.5 1.04 70.72 18.90 6.76 2.58 0.5378 
J 2190.5 1.30 59.85 24.02 9.97 4.85 l. 7539 
K 1852.4 l. 76 56.48 25.07 10.51 6.17 0.6256 
2.3. Measurement set-up. 
The UFBC was placed on a metal 
table f?Upport which has a hole bored in 
it's centre to permit the container to 
pass through it. In this way the 
relative position of the cans of 
plutonium with respect to the linear 
counting zone of the UFBC could be 
appropriately adjusted. For the purpose 
of the results described in this paper 
the container was permanently positioned 
with 5 cans as shown in fig.2. 
The cans of plutonium oxide were changed 
within the container to vary the 
plutonium mass. The cans of plutonium 
were always placed in positions 2, 3 or 
4 to assure that the material lay within 
the linear counting zone of the UFBC. In 
some cases positions 2,3 and 4 were also 
occupied by either 5 or 10 cm aluminium 
spacers or multiples thereof. The 
relative positions of the cans of 
reference material for calibration 
measurements are listed in table. 4. The 
position numbers correspond to those 
indicated in fig.2. "X" indicates an 
empty can. 
r 
34 
l 
r 
21 
.... 
Measurement 
i.d. 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
XI 
XII 
Fig.2. 
Table 4 . . 
Position; can 
1 2 3 4 
X X X A 
X X A X 
X A X X 
X X B A 
X B A X 
X c B A 
X H I F 
X I H X 
X X F X 
X X I X 
X X K X 
X K H I 
3. Results. 
f 
20 
:L 
1 
f.C.1 
l 
f 
40 
~ 
i.d 
5 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
3.1. Calibration Measurements. 
. 
The Euratom UFBC 01 was used 
the calibration measurements. 
results are summarised in table.5. 
Table.5. 
Measurement 240Pueff alpha R sR i).c 
i.d. (g) 
I 551.9 0.844 3482.6 39.0 1961.1 
II 551.9 0.844 3179.5 36.0 1849.0 
III 551.9 0.844 3236.7 37.7 1906.0 
IV 1170.9 0.844 7173.7 90.0 3996.0 
V 1170.9 0.844 7140.1 82.4 3966.5 
VI 1748.3 0.844 10788.0 129.4 5997.0 
VII 1749.6 0. 700 9643.9 117.7 6066.0 
VIII 1043.2 0.659 5653.8 62.6 3458.0 
IX 725.1 0.762 3750.5 45.6 2439.3 
X 464.6 0.786 2532.5 29.4 1555.9 
XI 329.5 0.844 1671.8 21.3 1116.0 
XII 1353.9 0.702 7542.8 87.9 4634.6 
for 
The 
sRmc 
21.1 
20.9 
22.2 
50.6 
45.8 
71.9 
74.0 
38.3 
29.7 
18.1 
14.2 
54.0 
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A calibration for plutonium oxides in 
large multi-can containers in the mass 
range from 330 to 1750 grams of 
240Pu has been established using 
eff. 
this data. The calibration coefficients 
corresponding to the measured Reals 
response before and after neutron 
multiplication corrections are as 
follows: 
Uncorrected Corrected 
a 0.00022679 3.4047 
b 5.4573 
va 0.00000006 0.0004 
Vb 0.0675 
covab =-0.0000581 
where Va, Vb and Covab are the variances 
and eo-variance of a and b respectively. 
Using the calibration functions to 
evaluate the measurement results 
produces the following comparison 
between declared and measured plutonium 
masses for the large mass samples. 
Uncorrected Reals calibration 
Average 
Declared-Measured 
Diff's. 
Signed Absolute 
-0.63(6.4) 5.8(6.5) 
Corrected Reals calibration. 
Average 
Declared-Measured 
Diff's. 
Signed Absolute 
-0.05(0.3) 1.5(1.8) 
Measurements were performed on the 
container for cans A and B positioned in 
various locations inside the linear 
response zone in order to investigate 
any perturbation of the measurement 
results related to the de-coupling of 
the samples. The relative results for 
measurements on cans A and B with 5 and 
10 cm aluminium spacers and empty cans 
used to separate the fuel cans are 
compared in table.6. 
Combinat~on 
XABXX 
XXABX 
X35ABX 
X30A5BX 
X25AlOBX 
X20A15BX 
X15A20BX 
Table. G. 
Relative Response 
1.000 +/- 0.016 
0.995 +/- 0.015 
0.988 +!- 0.016 
1.009 +/- 0.015 
0.987 +/- 0.016 
0.985 +/- 0.015 
0.992 +/- 0.014 
The results do not indicate that the de-
coupling of the plutonium masses effects 
the measurement response providing that 
the total mass of the sample lies within 
the linear response zone of the UFBC. 
3.2. In-Field Measurements. 
Measurements on large single cans 
of plutonium oxide and small fast 
reactor and zero energy reactor type 
fuel assemblies have been evaluated 
using the above calibration for the 
multi-can containers of plutonium oxide. 
The average operator-inspector 
differences are given for comparison in 
table.?. 
Table.?. 
Sample Type Avg. Diff. % 
Puo2 
Multi-can ref. -0.05 (0.4) 
Single can -0.89 (1. 7) 
MOX Fast Reactor 
Type 1 -1.16 (0.7) 
Type 2 -3.21 (1. 0) 
The type of multi-can containers that 
are used in the nuclear fuel cycle at 
the present time comprise of 4 cans that 
are smaller in height than those used 
during the calibration exercise. The 
cans are also contained in sets of two 
in an intermediate container. The two 
intermediate containers are welded 
together to form one large .container 
which is in turn encapsulated 1n another 
outer container made from stainless 
steel. The individual cans are 
approximately 24. 0 ern in height c:nd t~e 
overall length of the outer conta1ner 1s 
112 cm. The layout of the cans is shown 
graphically in fig.3. 
Container 
Cartridge 
Pu02 powder 
f---1 
lOOm m 
60mm 
480mm 
Fig.3. 
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Euratom have already carried out in-
field measurements on a number of multi-
can containers of large plutonium masses 
using both the standard and modified 
UFBC counters. The measurement results 
have been normalised for small 
differences between detector 
efficiencies and the value of Rho 0 used 
in the neutron multiplication correction 
algorithrn.The results are compared to 
the calibration measurements on the 3 
large can containers. The results are 
shown graphically in fig.4. 
• ., 
c 
MEASUf~EMENfS ON U\f~:Ct: Pu02 SNv1PLES 
MUL Ti-O.N CONT ... INERS 
~ --------·-----· 
18 -
16 
14 
" 
o-1--~ 
0 
Q 
... 
• 
·' 
• DATA SET 1 
+- DATA SET 2 
o Cv\TA SET .'3 
--r---- --,-------y---r----
2 4 fi 
Pu240 (E'ff.} q 
( JliOUSOIIdo) 
Fig.4. 
The calibration used for in-field 
measurements is similar to the 
calibration established for the 3 large 
can containers. The coefficient a for 
the multiplication corrected Reals 
response has been established as 3. 7626 
+!- 0. 0036 The increase in the slope 
of the calibration is accounted for by 
the increased mass range of the samples 
which are effectively compressed into 
the same counting geometry (more dense) 
coupled with the slightly longer linear 
counting region of the Totals and Reals 
for the UFBC with respect to the 
position of the sample Evaluation of 
the measurement results for various data 
sets using data set 1 as the origin for 
the in-field calibration of large 
plutonium oxide samples are compared in 
table.S. 
Table.8. 
Avg. 
Sample Type Operator-Inspector 
Diff. % 
Puo2 Powders 
Data set 1 -0.28 (0.58) 
Data set 2 0.02 (0.70) 
Data set 3 4.95 (1. 44) 
MOX Fast Reactor 
Fuel Assemblies. 
Data set 4 
Data set 5 
3.85 (0.93) 
1.90 (0.95) 
Data set 1 and 2 represent results of 
measurements on 17 and 54 of the 4 can 
multi-can type containers respectively. 
Data set 3 represents the results of the 
measurements on the 12 larger can type 
containers. Data sets 4 and 5 correspond 
to measurements on 5 and 15 different 
fast ~eactor type fuel assemblies. 
4. conclusions. 
Four universal fast breeder 
coincidence (UFBC) counters have been 
calibrated for the measurement of 
plutonium oxide powders in multi-can 
containers up to 13 Kg. of plutonium 
metal content. 
The correction 
detector efficiency 
is dependent on the 
to be assayed due 
totals efficiency at 
the detectors. 
for differences in 
between instruments 
size of the sample 
to the increased 
the extremities of 
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The measurement response is not 
effected by the de-coupling of fuel cans 
within the container provided that the 
total mass of plutonium lies within the 
flat counting region of the UFBC. 
The slope of the multiplication 
corrected Reals calibration for 
plutonium oxide is similar to that 
calculated for fast reactor type fuel 
assemblies. The value being 3.76 for 
and 3. 7 0 for MOX fuel assemblies 
The performance of the UFBC can be 
characterised by the average operator-
inspector differences for in-field 
measurements on large quanti ties of 
plutonium oxide powders. The overall 
average mass residual was 0. 072 % +/-
0.63 %. The measurement precision for 
300 second counting times is 1 %. 
s. References. 
[1] H.O.Menlove, "Standardisation of 
Portable Instrumentation" 
Proc. 6th ESARDA Symp. on Safeguards and 
Nuclear Material Management, Venice, 
1984. 
[2) M.S.Krick and H.O.Menlove, 11 The High 
Level Neutron Coincidence Counter 
(HLNCC): Users Manual" 
Los Alamos Report, LA-7779-M, 1979 
[3] H.O.Menlove, et. al., "Universal Fast 
Breeder Reactor Subassembly Counter 
Manual" 
Los Alamos Report, LA-10226-M, 1984 
[4] J .E.Stewart et al. "Calibration 
Parameters From Monte Carlo Simulations 
For Neutron Coincidence Assay of Mox 
Fuel Elements: A Substitute For 
Standards ?" 
Proc. 11th ESARDA Symp. 
and Nuclear Material 
Luxembourg, 1989. 
on Safeguards 
Management, 

UNAlTENDED MODE MONITORING OF PASSIVE NEUTRON COINCIDENCE 
DETECTOR SYSTEMS USING A COMMERCIAL DATA LOGGER 
B.G.R.Smith 1, J.D.Outram2, M.Storey2 
1. Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg 
2. Outram Research Ltd. United Kingdom 
Abstract 
A commercial Data Logger for unattended 
passive neutron coincidence data acquisition is 
described. This consists of an inexpensive commercial 
Data Logging equipment attached to a neutron 
coincidence electronics and a software package for 
data review. The Data Logger permits both the flexible 
configuration of a passive neutron coincidence 
measurement system for unattended mode monitoring 
and the storage of the measured Totals and Reals 
count rates. 
An additional feature of the Data Logger is a 
custom software package providing for the complete 
analysis of the stored data and yielding an assay of 
each item passing through the measurement cavity. 
The analys1s includes an input for different isotopic 
compositions, the calculation of the multiplication 
corrected Reals rates, the inclusion of a calibration 
functions, and the determination of 240Pueff. masses. 
The software package for data review displays 
the Totals and Reals count rates logged by the Data 
Logger as a function of time. In addition the custom 
software provides input files to the data review package 
to display the multiplication corrected Reals count rates 
and the measured 240Pueff. masses as a function of 
time. 
Information on the Data Logger is presented 
along with the monitoring mode specifications. The 
analysis functions implemented are described as is the 
data review software. Results are presented for a 
specific application. 
1. Introduction 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate is being 
increasingly called upon to develop and install non-
destructive assay (NDA) systems for unattended 
operation in new large scale nuclear facilities in the 
European Communities. The introduction of neutron 
coincidence detectors and acquisition electronics for 
unattended operation becomes obligatory: 
- when nuclear material is handled automatically in 
remote controlled nuclear facilities 
where nuclear material is inaccessible for 
measurement or sampling by inspectors in the normal 
way 
- to reduce the radiation dose to operator staff and 
inspectors caused by the increased number of 
measurement needed on large quantities of plutonium, 
i.e. higher throughputs and larger quantities in a single 
item 
- when the investment in new measurement systems for 
unattended operation becomes cost effective due to the 
considerable increase in manpower overheads 
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associated with the use of conventional attendee 
measurement systems in new nuclear facilities. 
The first substantial effort to design safeguards 
specific neutron coincidence detector systems for 
unattended operation was initiated in the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL) for the PFPF project/1/. 
LANL thus laid down the fundamental guide-lines for 
future development of unattended safeguards 
measurement systems. These principles can be 
summarised as such: 
- redundancy in neutron coincidence electronics and 
computers 
- continuous collection with short measurement times, 
e.g. 1 minute . 
- infrequent data review, e.g. 1 per month 
- sealed cabinets 
- continuous cable runs 
- software self-diagnostics 
- data collection in electronics cabinets near to the 
detectors. 
These principles were translated by LANL in to a 
functioning system consisting of: 
-local data·acquisition, i.e. the "COLLECT' in the LANL 
applications, based upon a continuous collection of raw 
data for short acquisition times and the recording of 
that raw data after "marking" according to the type of 
data acquired 
-off-line graphing of data, i.e. the "REVIEW" in the LANL 
applications, based upon a custom written software 
package 
- preparation of data for subsequent evaluation using a 
separate additional software package to obtain an 
assay result. 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate took these 
guide-lines and investigated the possibility to add the 
following additional principles: 
- integrated data evaluation including assay results 
- use of commercial electronics and improved graphing 
software 
- reduce size and weight of data acquisition hardware 
- improve reliability by using battery backed-up RAM 
and not a hard disk 
- reduction of the data to be stored through some form 
nf "front-end data processing" involving: 
- storage of the Totals and Reals rates and not the 
raw data registers, t, T, R +A, and A, from the 
neutron coincidence electronics package 
- user definable thresholds on both the Totals and 
Reals rates to detect data of interest and to 
eliminate background recording 
- user definable frequency for the recording of the 
background. 
Once these principles were established the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate decided to invest in 
the modification of a commercial data logger system 
which was already being evaluated for the unattended 
data logging of tank volumes. The selected data logger 
Input Signals 
11 
Communications Slot 
Data Pack, etc. 
,, 
Input Module Slots 
~ i ! I 
___ !_l ___ j __ __j __ _ 
Programming Keys I LC Display I 
30cm (L) 
19cm CNl 
5cm (H) 
--o o 
Main baHery 
\ 
Weight 1kg L--------+-' 
I 
Configuration Slot 
& 
\ 
Computer with 
Application Software 
and PRONTO for 
Graphs, Listing, etc. 
Fig. 1 The RANGER Data Logger System 
is called the RANGER and comes complete with an 
applications software called PRONTO. 
The RANGER* (Model: Rustrak Ranger 11) is an 
advanced microprocessor-based data collection 
system permitting recording, analyzing, and reporting 
of physical and electrical information on an unattended 
basis. The basic components of the system include the 
data logger, input signal conditioning modules, 
communication modules, configuration modules and 
the PRONTO application software program. 
The data logger functions as a paperless 
recorder storing data in memory at a rate and length of 
time specified by the user. Once the recording process 
has been completed, the data can be transferred to a 
computer. The PRONTO application program provides 
all the tools necessary to graph, review, analyze and 
report the data without the necessity for any 
programming on the part of the user. . 
Fig. 1 shows the RANGER data logger, 1ts 
essential components, and the applications software 
PRONTO running on a separate computer. Fig. 2 
shows the functions of the application software 
PRONTO. 
Input Signals 
RANGER 
Communication by: 
·serial link 
·data pack 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate considers 
that the selection of the RANGER-PRONTO 
combination has the following advantages: 
-small size (30cm (L), 19cm 0/11}, 5cm (H)) 
- light weight (approx. 1 kg) 
- easy to use and to configure 
- no moving parts (data stored in battery backed-up 
RAM) 
- high resistance to temperature, humidity, shock and 
vibration 
- high flexibility with different input signal modules, etc. 
- battery back-up system set-up 
- software provides a common user interface for 
different logging applications 
- flexible commercial graphing package 
- professional user descriptions/manuals 
- low cost for purchase and maintenance 
- flexible, reasonably prices, development engine for 
safeguards applications. 
The complete project, see Fig. 3, thus involved 
Fig. 2 Schematic of Link Between the RANGER and PRONTO 
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Fig. 3 Data Acquisition and Processing System 
the following: 
- a detector system based upon standard neutron 
coincidence detector designs/2/ 
- a modified RANGER data logger with both a serial 
input signal conditioning module and a custom built 
configuration module · 
- neutron coincidence data analysis algorithms/3/, in a 
custom written program called "PUMASS", integrated in 
to the data loggers application software "PRONTO". 
2. The Data Logger 
The RANGER data logger (see Fig. 1) consists of 
4 separate slots for input signal conditioning modules 
(single or dual), a communications slot for a 
communications module or data pack for data storage, 
and a configuration slot for configuration modules. 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate 
commissioned the design of a special EURATOM 
configuration module which when coupled with an 
appropriate input signal conditioning module and data 
pack provides an autonomous data logger for 
connection to a neutron coincidence electronics 
package JSR-11 **. 
The RANGER data logger itself has the following 
basic features:-
A two button programming system in conjunction with a 
two line, 16 character/line LCD provides a clear and 
quick set-up and recording sequence. 
Menus that are dependent on specific modules, e.g. 
communication or configuration modules, etc., or 
functions that are dependent upon certain set-up 
conditions only appear when those devices and/or 
functions are present. 
Intelligent self-identifying input modules allow automatic 
configuration for the number of channels in use and the 
type of signals to be measured. Thus a one key startup 
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procedure is available. In addition a set-up mode allows 
the user to define: 
- scales and engineering units 
- calibration values 
- alarm levels 
- recording methods 
- mathematical operations 
- communications. 
Five different modes for storing data, adaptive store, 
point store, enhanced point store, store on alarm, and 
manual store. The implementation described here is 
"store on alarm" conditioned by a new custom built 
configuration pack. 
Data logger memory that is battery backed up to insure 
against loss of valuable data or set-up information for 
up to 2 weeks. During that time all programming, data 
storage information, system set-up parameters, and 
data in memory are maintained. 
Several optional modules are available to further 
enhance the data logger's capabilities. They include 
configuration modules, data packs, and other types of 
communication modules. 
Input Modules 
Input modules are required in order to condition 
incoming signals to be compatible with the data logger. 
Four types of input modules are available, isolated 
single input (some types of isolated dual input modules 
also exist) and non-isolated single and dual input. Up to 
4 different types of input modules can be installed in a 
RANGER at one time. 
A 25 pin RS-232 serial interface module is used 
to provide the link between the neutron coincidence 
electronics package (type: JSR-11 from Jomar 
Systems) and the RANGER. The neutron coincidence 
electronics, JSR-11, is set to recycle and the front panel 
commands set to the correct gate width and 
measurement time. 
There also exists an Alarm Output Module which 
provides for 8 sets of outputs based upon alarm levels 
programmed on any channel on the RANGER. This 
functions as an electronic switch when an alarm level is 
reached. 
Communication Modules 
Communication modules permit the RANGER to 
transmit data from internal memory or a Data Pack 
directly to a computer printer as well as over phone 
lines v1a modem. 
Data Pack 
Data Packs are transportable memory devices 
designed to permit retrieval of data from the RANGER's 
internal memory. A Data Pack option allows for 
transportation of the data from the collection site to the 
computer while leaving the data logger in place to 
continue recording data. The Data Pack is battery 
backed up for a minimum of 10 years under normal 
conditions (minimum 2.5 years under adverse 
conditions). An AutoWrite feature allows the RANGER 
to transfer data to the Data Pack automatically. 
Configuration Modules 
Configuration modules expand the versatility of 
the RANGER by adding additional capability to the 
'system. Additional storage capacity and additional math 
channel capabilities can be added. Custom dedicated 
applications can also be implemented. 
The EURATOM Configuration Module 
A specific EURATOM configuration module has 
been developed which implements the following 
specific features: 
- receipt of data from the JSR-11, the neutron 
coincidence electronics package 
- determination of the Totals and Reals rates from the 
raw data, t, T, R+A, and A 
-user definable rescaling ofTotals rate by 1, 10, or 100 
so as to contain figure in integer range 0-59999 
- user definable rescaling of Reals rate by 1, or 10 so as 
to contain figure in integer range 0-59999 
- user definable selection of data units, kTs for the 
Totals rates, and kRs for the Reals rates 
- user definable thresholds for both the Totals and 
Reals rates determine if the raw data is to be stored for 
further analysis, i.e. if either of the Totals or Reals rate 
thresholds are exceeded the RANGER goes in to an 
"alarm" condition and stores both the Totals and Reals 
rates until the "alarm" condition is removed by both the 
Totals and Reals rates dropping below their respective 
thresholds 
- user definable frequency for sampling of the data input 
traffic in the RANGER internal memory, the RANGER 
internal memory is updated independently through the 
serial link with the neutron coincidence electronics 
package 
- user definable frequency for sampling and recording 
the "background" data, i.e. the data is sampled and 
recorded at a user definable frequency irrespective of 
the Totals and Reals rate thresholds thus providing an 
indication that the whole monitoring and logging system 
is working correctly 
- implementation of three diagnostic alarms, i.e. neutron 
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detector failure, JSR-11 neutron electronics failure, and 
serial input module failure 
- storage of alarm conditions, both diagnostic and 
threshold alarms, only upon occurrence 
- sleep function with the logger being programmed to 
start at some user definable time in the future. 
The set-up of the EURATOM configuration 
module can be checked against a review function in the 
data logger once the set-up has been completed. Upon 
removal of EURATOM configuration module the 
RANGER reverts to its normal configuration and can be 
used for other applications such as tank monitoring, 
etc .. 
Storage potential of the RANGER is a function of: 
- storage capacity for the total and Reals rates, normally 
2 bytes each 
- frequency of sampling uf the input neutron 
coincidence signal 
- number of samples per "event" 
- frequency of "events", number of items passing 
through the measurement cavity 
- frequency of background sampling 
-total storage capacity of the data logger, 57 k bytes for 
a basic logger. 
The storage capacity of the RANGER is thus a 
function of a number of variables. Three examples are 
described below to show the potential storage 
capacity:-
Examp/eA: 
-a sampling frequency of 10s 
-an event lasting 10 minutes, i.e. 600s 
-a background frequency of 15 minutes, i.e. 900s 
- a storage capacity of 57k bytes plus a data pack of 
256k bytes, equals 313k bytes 
- 10 items per day 
- with approx. 3k bytes/day storage the storage 
capacity of the RANGER would be > 100 days 
ExampleB: 
- a sampling frequency of 1 Os 
- an event lasting 5 minutes, i.e. 300s 
- a background frequency of 60 minutes, i.~. 3600s 
- a storage capacity of 57k bytes plus a data pack of 
256k bytes, equals 313k bytes 
- 100 items per day 
- with approx. 12k bytes/day storage the storage 
capacity of the RANGER would be near 25 days 
Example C: 
- a sampling frequency of 1 minute, i.e. 60s 
-an event lasting 10 minutes, i.e. 600s 
- a background frequency of 1 minutes, i.e. 60s 
- a storage capacity of 57k bytes plus a data pack of 
256k bytes, equals 313k bytes 
- 20 items per day 
- with approx. 5k bytes/day storage the storage 
capacity of the RANGER would be about 60 days. 
The RANGER Menu 
The RANGER main menu is as follows: 
-LOG for 
-PLAYBACK 
-DISPLAY 
-SET-UP 
-REVIEW 
-POWER. 
The "LOG for" is a mode where the RANGER 
functions as a paperless recorder for a user definable 
period. The "LOG for" can be changed to a "LOG every" 
depending upon the type of storage mode selected. A 
delayed start recording option also exists as does a 
feature incorporating auto synchronization which 
automatically aligns the sample and storage process for 
multiple data loggers. 
The "PLA V BACK" mode controls the transfer of 
d~ta between the RANGER and external computer, 
pnnters, etc. The "PLA V BACK" to a computer, printer, 
and Data Pack, are implemented as in Data Pack to 
computer, and via modem. 
The "DISPLAY" mode shows the input signals on 
the LCD. 
The "SET-UP" mode controls the RANGER 
configuration. The "SET-UP" includes setting of time 
and date, programming of high and low alarms, setting 
of print-out intervals, programming the delayed start 
time, etc .. In addition "SET-UP" provides access to the 
specific set-up parameters in the EURATOM 
configuration module. 
The "REVIEW' mode permits the user to rapidly 
check the set-up parameters, and to inspect some 
summary information about each input channel. The 
LCD builtin to the RANGER is used to display the 
average, maximum and minimum values for each active 
channel along with the start time and recording 
duration. This is very useful for in-field system set-up. 
The "POWER" mode allows the user to switch off 
the RANGER. 
In addition to the main menu the RANGER has 
also a fully implemented error message system. Error 
messages cover battery conditions, input module 
stability, memory conditions, configuration module 
instability, invalid set-up conditions, etc. 
The RANGER Technical Specification 
Below are listed the technical specifications for 
the RANGER:-
Inputs: 12 channels with 8 analog, or D digital, 8-D 
analog D = < 4, via input modules, and 4 builtin math 
channels 
Analog Conversion: 16 bits 
Analog Accuracy: + /-0.05% of full scale 
Resolution: 0.1 mVdc 
Linearity: + /-0.03% of full scale 
Crosstalk: -80db typical channel to channel 
Digital Accuracy: + /-0.001% of full scale 
Clock Accuracy: max. error 30 seconds/month 
Environmental Conditions: 
Temperature: -1ooc to +600C 
Relative Humidity: 5% to 90% (non-condensing) 
Shock and Vibration: MIL-STD 810 Method 514.2 
Battery Charge: min. 32 hours (nominal 48 hours) from 
full discharge to 100% 
Memory Back-up: min. 30 days memory protection after 
main batteries fully discharged 
User Interface: 2 button membrane with panel and 2 
line 16 character /line LCD 
Externa/Interface: RS-232 port 300 baud to 19.3 kbaud 
RAM Storage: 64k, expandable to 256k 
Enclosure: G.E. Polycarbonate (Lexan) 
Dimensions: 30.18 cm (L), 19.3 cm 0N), 4.76 cm (H) 
Weight: 1.13 kg 
Approvals: 
FCC Compliance - Class A, paragraph 15 
subpart J 
UL, CSA, Factory Mutual 
Input Modules (examples): 
General Purpose DC Voltage and Current: 0-
100mV, 0-100mAdc, + /-1Vdc, etc. 
Process DC: 1-5 Vdc, isolated and non-isolated 
4-20mA 
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AC Voltage and Current: 0-30Vac, 0-360Vac, 0-
1 OOOAac, etc. 
Temperature/Thermocouple: -200 to + 7600C, 
0-15oooc, etc. 
Dual Channel: non-isolated 4-20mA, etc. 
Pulse Counting: 0-800kHz, 0-59999 counts, etc. 
Configuration Modules (examples): 
Additional Storage Modes 
Additional Math Functions 
User Configuration Pack 
Communication Modules (examples): 
Serial Interface Cable (25 and 9 pin) 
Modem Controller Module 
Data Pack: 64k, 128k, and 256k 
3. The Software 
Software can be divided in to two separate 
sections, the first being "PUMASS" the custom software 
that takes measured Totals and Reals rates and 
produces corrected count rates and plutonium assay 
results, the second being "PRONTO" the applications 
software for the RANGER that provides graphs, listings, 
data archival, etc. 
The Analysis Module PUMASS 
As has been described above the RANGER 
records the Totals and Reals rates as calculated from 
the output of the JSR-11 neutron coincidence electronic 
package. The files of the Totals and Reals rates can be 
read by the applications package PRONTO, and in 
addition they can be analysed using a special custom 
written program called PUMASS. The program 
PUMASS takes the raw Totals and Reals rates and 
produces an additional series of files which can also be 
read by the applications package PRONTO. These 
additional files consist of time varying values of: 
- background and normalization corrected Totals and 
Reals rates 
- 240pueff. and Pu mass, the uncertainty, and the 
difference between declared and measured values, 
before the multiplication correction 
background, normalization, and multiplication 
corrected Reals rates 
- 240pueff. and Pu mass, the uncertainty, and the 
difference between declared and measured values, 
after the multiplication correction. 
Once these new files are created they are stored 
and can be accessed by the applications package 
PRONTO for graphing, listing, data archival etc. Fig. 4 
shows the assay mass calculation data flow according 
to the standard procedure for data analysis/3/. 
Input files to the program PUMASS include (i) a 
file containing neutron detector constants and 
calibration constants, and (ii) a file containing 
measurement variables specific to each item. 
The first file contains fields for the following 
detector constants: 
- neutron detector dead times 
- gate width of the neutron coincidence electronics 
package 
- K constant relating the moments of the induced and 
spontaneous fission neutron multiplicity distributions 
- p0 relating the Totals and Reals for a non-multiplying 
sample 
- calibration constants before and after multiplication 
correction 
DTA Input Files 
Totals and Reals Rat~ 
from PRONTO 
Constant Data 
· ·· ·· · ········· ······ · Dead Time Constants 
········· 
.. ······ 
········· 
... . · · Multiplication Constants 
_...:.·Calibration Functions 
.. ····_ .......... 
... ········· 
··corrected 
Normalised 
.... ···· 
Totals and Reals 
Date/Time 
Declared Pu Mass 
Declared lsotopics 
wnh dates 
(multiplication 
corrected) 
Calculated 
240 
Pu0 " and Pu Masses 
PRONTO 
I 
DTA Output Files 
Corrected Reals and Totals 
Multiplication Corrected Reals 
240 Pu.n and Pu Masses 
with and without 
mu~iplicat1on correction 
andL'I and 0' 
Totals and Reals 
background 
Fig. 4 Assay Mass Calculation Data Flow Diagram 
- associated variances and covariances. 
The second file contains fields for the following 
variables, item by item: 
- date and time of entrance of item in detector taken 
from either the raw data review or/and from other 
information such as a review of surveillance films, etc. 
- a normalization factor and uncertainty taken from an 
initial of the review of the raw data 
- a Totals and Reals background taken from an initial 
raw data review 
- the Pu mass taken from operator declarations 
- the Pu isotopic composition and valid date taken 
either from operator declarations or independent 
safeguards measurements 
- the 241 Am (ppm) and valid date taken either from 
operator declarations or independent safeguards 
measurements. 
The Graphics Package PRONTO 
The PRONTO application software is uniquely 
configured to match the data format of the RANGER. 
The software PRONTO provides the user with a 
complete set of tools for plotting, annotating, analysing, 
and printing reports on the data collected by the 
RANGER. 
PRONTO implements the following functions: 
- transfer and save remotely collected data 
- create, name, and describe data files 
- convert data to graphs 
- plot graphs from raw or processed data 
- compare data from up to 12 graphs on the same 
screen 
- change graphics in format, size, and position 
- analyse points and areas of graphs 
-annotate graphs with labels;text 
- window in and amplify sections of a graph 
- print out graphs or lists for reports 
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- create compatible files for output to spreadsheets, e.g. 
Lotus 1-2-3. 
The PRONTO display is laid out in the form of a 
menu bar with pull down sub-menus activated by hot 
keys. The PRONTO application software can display 
graphs in four formats: line plot, max.jmin. plot, 
average plot, and cumulative plot. Help and error 
massages are also implemented. 
The software PRONTO comes with a separate 
installation program, for example, a full IBM VGA screen 
driver is available with 640x400 colour resolution, and 
an auto detect option is also available. 
The PRONTO Menu 
The PRONTO main menu is as follows: 
-HELP 
-DATA FILE 
-PLOT 
-ANALYZE 
- PRINTSCRN 
-SET-UP 
-ESCAPE. 
The "HELP" will provide context sensitive help to 
the user. 
The "DATA FILE" permits the user to retrieve 
data, file data, select data for subsequent analyse and 
review, and save processed data. 
The "PLOT" provides a screen plot of user 
selected files. Up to 12 traces may be shown on the 
screen simultaneously. 
The "ANAL YZE" function provides the following 
additional features: 
-zoom 
- text annotation in graph 
- statistical analysis 
- change size and location of graph 
- remove, or duplicate graph 
- different presentation options 
- notebook option. 
The "PRINTSCRN" sends the screen layout to 
the printer. 
The "SET-UP" function provides access the 
default configuration for the disc drives, serial ports, etc. 
The "ESCAPE" function provides a exit route 
from any given instruction and permits access to DOS 
commands. 
The two most important commands from the 
point of view of data presentation and analysis are 
"DATA FILE" and "ANALYZE". The first, "DATA FILE" 
has a quick plot mode under the file selection command 
which permits the user to quickly review, analyze, and 
print without searching through historical data. The 
"ANALYZE" function provides a complete suite of 
commands for the presentation of graphs, e.g. zoom 
on a user definable region or window, modification of 
graph layout, combination of several traces in one 
graph, determination of maximum, minimum, mean, 
and integral values over a user definable set of data, 
etc. 
The PRONTO Technical Specifications 
PRONTO requires a standard IBM-PC, or 100% 
compatible, with preferably a good video board, i.e. 
VGA. Below are listed the technical requirements and 
specifications for PRONTO. 
Computers (examples): 
IBM PC, XT, AT and 100% compatibles 
IBM PS/2 models 30, 50 ,70 
Toshiba 1000, 1100, 1600, 3100, 5200 laptops 
RAM Memory: 512k 
DOS: 2. 11 or later 
Video Board: graphics interface needed, Hercules, 
CGA, EGA, VGA or 100% compatibles 
PRONTO Program Size: > 300k 
Graph: 
days 
Maximum Number ofTraces on Screen: 12 
Maximum Time from Left to Right Axis: 1500 
Range of Values on Graph: -99999 to +99999 
Time Resolution: 
Minimum Time Span Across Graph: 1 second 
Resolution of Left and Right Axis: 1 second 
Resolution of Division on Time Axis: 0.1 second 
Printers (examples): 
Epson FX, MX, RX series 
HP Laser Jet series 11 
HP Paint Jet 
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Mouse (examples): 
Microsoft mouse 
Logitech mouse 
4. An Implementation 
The overall performance of the RANGER-
PRONTO configuration can best be described through 
some examples of the hardware operating in an 
unattended mode. The first involves the connection of a 
pair of RANGER's to a pair of neutron coincidence 
electronic packages (JSR-11's) which are connected to 
a neutron detector with the objective to detect the rapid 
passage of a item through the detector even when part 
of the electronics chain fails (monitor mode). The 
second is the detection a number of plutonium items in 
an unattended mode and the subsequent analysis of 
the data to obtain assay results (assay mode). 
Monitor Mode 
The monitor mode requires that each plutonium 
item passing through the detector is detected and 
logged, and that the chain from the neutron detector 
through the coincidence electronics to the data logger 
has a high level of redundancy. The hardware 
configuration consisted of the following: 
- one set of 3He thermal neutron detectors embedded 
in polyethylene 
- use of the Amptek A-111 amplifier I discriminators 
- half the neutron detectors receiving the high voltage 
from one neutron coincidence electronics package, the 
other half from a second package 
- half the Amptek A-111 receiving the + 5V from one 
neutron coincidence electronics package, the other half 
from a second package 
- the two partial signals from each group of detectors 
and Ampteks added and duplicated for two separate 
neutron coincidence electronic packages 
- connection of one RANGER data logger to each of the 
neutron coincidence electronic packages. 
The neutron coincidence electronics package was set 
to recycle with a 5s measurement time. The existing 
model of the neutron coincidence electronics package 
used, i.e. JSR-11, requires about Ss to transfer data 
before resetting the counting cycle so the RANGER 
sample time was set to 1 s thus producing a series of 
small measurement "plateau" each about 15s long. 
Fig. 5 shows the tests performed: 
- arrival and positioning of an item in the detector cavity 
at 10:36 
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- failure of power supplies (high voltage and + 5V) of 
first neutron coincidence electronics package at 10:43 
-re-establishment of power supplies at 10:52 
- failure of power supplies of second neutron 
coincidence electronics package at 10:54 
- removal of item from detector cavity at 11 :02 
- rapid passage in both directions of item through the 
detector cavity with a power failure of one or other of 
the neutron coincidence electronics packages. 
lt can be clearly seen that the combination of 
neutron detector and coincidence electronics is 
sufficiently sensitive to the rapid passage of an item 
through the detector cavity and has a high level of 
redundancy. In addition the combination RANGER-
PRONTO can be seen to be able to log and present the 
data in a practical and easy to interpret format. 
Assay Mode 
The assay mode is an addition to the monitor 
mode in that first data must be acquired in the monitor 
mode then an assay result must obtained off-line by the 
user with PUMASS. The assay mode thus requires that 
each plutonium item passing through the detector is 
detected and logged, and that the item remains in a 
correct and fixed position for a sufficient time to provide 
data for a complete assay. There are situations where 
the monitor and assay modes are combined to produce 
an assay system with monitoring functions included. 
The hardware configuration consisted of the a set of 
3He thermal neutron detectors embedded in 
polyethylene, Amptek A-111 amplifier I discriminators, 
and a neutron coincidence electronics package. The 
RANGER data logger is connected to the neutron 
coincidence electronic package. 
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the Totals and Reals rates 
acquired for a series of 5 different Pu02 powder 
samples ranging in mass between 502 g and 2454 g 
Pu. These Totals and Reals rates are already a product 
of the PUMASS analysis since they have already been 
corrected for the dead time, normalization (k = 1), and 
background. The data logger was set to sample every 
1 s and the JSR-11 was set to recycle every 1 Os. The 5 
different items can be clearly distinguished as can a 
series of tests with Am-Li and 252cf sources performed 
between 10:30 and 10:44. In addition with Item 2 a 
small perturbation can be seen in the plateau of the 
Totals rates corresponding to the passage of an 
addition plutonium item in the vicinity of the neutron 
coincidence counter. Another interest1ng feature is the 
perturbation noted between Item 3 and Item 4 
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corresponding to the introduction of both items in to the 
measurement cavity before Item 3 was removed. 
Fig. 8 shows the multiplication corrected Reals 
rates corresponding to same time period as shown in 
the previous graphs. Fig. 9 shows the total plutonium 
mass again for the same time period. Again the 
PUMASS analysis program has been used to obtain the 
multiplication corrected Reals rates and, using existing 
calibration parC!meters for the neutron coincidence 
counter, the total plutonium mass. In Fig. 9 is clearly 
shown the declared plutonium mass and that obtain by 
using the standard averaging function in the analysis 
option of PRONTO. 
Fig. 10 shows a zoom of a small portion of Fig. 9 
where the addition of Items 3 and 4 can be clearly seen. 
lt is possible even to perform an approximate assay 
during the 20-30s that the two items remained together 
in the measurement cavity. The presence of a "fictitious" 
plutonium mass for the Am-Li and 252cf is due simply 
to the allocation of a declared mass and isotopics to 
that particular period. lt is however important in a future 
version of the PUMASS program to introduce a test of 
the ratio R/T in order to distinguish between different 
neutron emitters/1 j. 
5. Discussions 
The RANGER-PRONTO combination coupled 
with the EURATOM configuration module and special 
software PUMASS provides both monitoring and assay 
functions for neutron coincidence data. The position of 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate is that this solution 
provides one approach to the problem of unattended 
neutron coincidence data acquisition and subsequent 
off-line data analysis. The Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate views this solution as being particularly 
effective when: 
- unattended neutron coincidence data acquisition is 
required 
- either or both monitoring and assay functions are 
needed 
- when immediate data analysis is not required, i.e. 
when the inspector only expects to service the data 
acquisition system every week or every month 
- when simple neutron coincidence detector systems 
are installed, i.e. when no combined neutron and 
gamma-ray system is employed 
- where a high level of redundancy is required, i.e. 
relatively low cost solution, battery backed-up 
components, etc. 
- when subsequent off-line data analysis is acceptable, 
i.e. when there are only a limited number of items 
passing through the detector cavity. 
Areas where the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate is concentrating its future developments for 
unattended measurement systems are: 
- unattended operation of combined neutron and 
gamma-ray measurement systems 
- networking data acquisitions systems to provide rapid 
data analysis and failure detection 
- automatic recognition and analysis of events of 
safeguards importance. 
Future areas of development for the RANGER-
PRONTO configuration are as follows: 
- improved user interface to PUMASS 
- a new configuration module for the new computer 
controllable neutron coincidence electronics JSR-12 
- use of R/T ratio to help automatically identify the 
different types of items being monitored 
- use of T2g to help automatically identity the 
measurement plateau for assay 
- introduction of graphs for R/T, measurement 
statistics, and declared-measured differences 
- completion of a detailed user manual for the specific 
application 
- testing the connection of the data logger to a 
communications network. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper describes a simple, inexpensive, and flexible 
solution to the unattended mode acquisition of passive 
neutron coincidence measurement and monitoring 
data. 
The solution consists of a dedicated commercial Data 
Logger connected to a commercial neutron 
coincidence electronics package. 
Raw data from the Data Pack is automatically loaded in 
to a custom written software package and processed 
with time-specific data on the isotopic compositions to 
yield multiplication corrected Reals count rates for all 
items passing through the measurement cavity. The 
uncorrected and multiplication corrected Reals count 
rates are then interpreted, through user specified 
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l"b t" f . 240 ea 1 ra 10n unct1ons, as Pu ff and Put t masses. e . o. 
Both the raw data and the results from the Recovery 
Software, i.e. 240Pueff.' Putot. etc., can be examined in 
detail •. as a f~~ction of time, .t~rough comprehensive 
graphiCs fac1ht1es thus prov1d1ng a basis for the 
monitoring mode review. 
One particular application was discussed where the 
Data Logger was installed for unattended mode 
monitorin~ on a passive neutron coincidence counter. 
The solut1on of the Data Log!;ler for the unattended 
mC?d~ acquisition and analys1s of passive neutron 
co1nc1dence measurements and the acquisition of the 
same type of data for monitoring purposes has proved 
to be a very versatile, low cost, user friendly solution. 
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1. ABSTRACT 
The newest model of the PHONID series of 
nondestructive assay instruments is described. 
The measurement technique is active interrogation 
of the sample by a photoneutron source. The 
measured signal is the induced fission neutrons. 
The measurement samples are product materials from 
the nuclear fuel cycle such as uranium or 
plutonium oxide. Results from an evaluation using 
the PERLA calibration materials at the JRC-Ispra 
demonstrate that straight line calibration 
functions are adequate for most users. Long term 
stability of 0.2% was achieved in laboratory 
conditions. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
The PHONID series of photoneutron-based 
active-interrogation instruments have been used 
for inspections of low enriched uranium facilities 
in Europe. Previous work has documented 2-3% 
measurement uncertainties in field 
conditions/1,2/. Statistical analyses have 
indicated that these uncertainties are larger than 
those predicted by counting statistics/3/. The 
present work had two objectives. We reviewed the 
measurement procedures and the instrument 
components with the objective of reducing the 
measurement uncertainties. We also continued the 
evaluation/4/ of applying this technique to other 
isotopes. 
3. INSTRUMENT 
PHONID 3b is the most recent model of a family 
of nondestructive assay instruments designed and 
built by the Joint Research Cent er, Ispra, 
Italy/5,1,2,6/. PHONID 3b uses active 
interrogation of the sample with photoneutrons 
from an Sb(Be) source to induce fissions in 
fertile material. High energy fission neutrons 
are the assay response. The interrogating neutron 
spectrum has an average energy of 12keV and a 
narrow bandwidth. In particular, the neutron 
energies are below the fission barriers of the 
even-mass uranium and plutonium isotopes and they 
are above the large thermal cross-sections of the 
odd-mass isotopes. The fast-neutron detectors are 
Scm diameter, cylindrical 'He proportional 
counters. Energy discrimination is used to block 
the source (neutron and gamma-ray) components in 
the measured signal. The sample chamber contains 
no hydrogenous materials, consequently the neutron 
energy spectrum is not thermalized. 
A new transfer container is used to transport 
the Sb sources separately from the rest of the 
hardware. It is a 540kg lead shield with 
interlocks that is ruggedized for transport. 
Figure 1 shows the transfer container on top of 
the PHONID 3b in the source loading position. The 
drawer underneath the PHONID 3b is part of the 
source unloading mechanism. During the source 
transfer activity, the transport container and 
PHONID 3b shield prevent any exposure to radiation 
from the Sb source. 
4. SAMPLES 
The PERLA calibration materials cover a wide 
range of properties of interest in NDA 
measurements/?/. The uranium samples of interest 
for this work are U02 powder in 4mm thick aluminum 
containers. The sample diameter is 87mm. The 
containers are 90, 150, or 300mm high as required 
by the different quantities of oxide. A minimum 
of 5 samples spanning a wide mass range (0.1- 1.5 
kg elemental uranium) from each of four different 
enrichments (20, 35, 60, & 92% 235U) were measured. 
Three uranium metal samples and two UF4 samples 
were also measured. 
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Figure 1 The PHONID 3b with the Sb source transfer 
container in the source loading position. 
The plutonium oxide samples chosen for this 
evaluation are doubly contained in steel 
containers with a plastic bag between the two 
containers. Characteristics of the containers for 
the different mass ranges are given in table I. 
The smallest possible container is used for each 
quantity of oxide, except for a few special cases. 
These special cases use the large diameter 
containers for the small masses of plutonium. 
They are for the study of multiplication effects. 
Table I P 0 container characteristics UJ, 
largest sample container combined 
mass diameter height wall 
(g Pu) (mm) (mm) thickness 
(mm) 
200 34.8 124 2.6 
1000 58.3 204 4.1 
2500 82.8 238 5.0 
The elemental mass range of the plutonium samples 
was 0. 5 - 2. 5 kg. Three different burnups are 
represented (58, 60, & 70% "'Pu). 
5. DATA ANALYSIS - DETERMINATION OF MASS 
The data reduction procedure is the same for 
all samples. This makes the PHONID 3b simple to 
use. The raw data consists of two count rates: 
the passive has the sample in the counting chamber 
but the photoneutron source is off, and the active 
has the sample in the chamber with the 
photoneutron source on. 
1. A simple deadtime correction is made to all 
count rates. This correction is less than 4% for 
the largest samples of high burnup plutonium. 
2. A background subtraction is performed to 
remove the passive response from the active 
measurement of the sample. This correction is 
negligible for most uranium samples. 
3. A correction is made for the decay of the 
Sb in the photoneutron source. 124 Sb decays 1.16% 
per day. 
4. Other corrections to the data may then be 
applied. This is an active area of research/8/ 
whose status will be summarized below. Our 
present recommendation is to use representative 
standards with respect to sample geometry and 
enrichment (no correction) . 
5. The corrected net active response is then 
related to the effective sample mass with a 
calibration function. A linear function is used 
whenever possible. The advantages of the linear 
function include easier application of corrections 
and cross calibration. The effective sample mass 
is computed from knowledge of the isotopic 
composition: 
+ 
235e!fect>ve = 1.000 235U + .197 238 Pu + .957 239Pu 
. 018 '"Pu + 1.614 " 1Pu + .003 "'Pu + 
. 013 " 1Am + . 028 Cm 
The coefficients in this formula are based on MCNP 
calculations/9, 10/. 235.,1f••cllv•· is andlogous to the 
240ottective defined for the thermal neutron counter 
assay of plutonium/11/. 
6. DATA REDUCTION of the PASSIVE SIGNAL 
If we make the same assumptions typically used 
for the analysis of thermal neutron coincidence 
counters/12/, the passive count rate can be 
expressed in the same way for the PHONID: 
passive count 
(l+alpha) E 
rate 
where 
1032 = spontaneous 
m240 = mass of 240 Pu 
M multiplication 
a (a,n) reaction 
(1032 n/s/g240) 
fission rate of 240 Pu 
(effective) 
rate I spontaneous fission 
E average detection efficiency 
7. MEASUREMENT RESULTS 
First we present stability results, then we 
discuss the calibration data. The long term 
stability of the PHONID 3b is now better 
understood. A 252Cf source was measured for 14 days 
in a series of passive counts each with 0.2% 
precision. The standard deviation of the =38 9 
measurements was 0.2%. Repeated active 
measurements of three large mass 92% enriched U02 
samples during 1 month agreed to better than 1%. 
The temperature variation of the PHONID 3b 
response is less than 0.1% per •c. However, we 
note that some applications have experienced more 
than 5"C daily variation. 
The variation in the PHONID 3b response was 
measured along the sample axis with small sources 
in 2.5cm steps. The data were normalized by the 
maximum value and averaged from a height of 7.5 to 
42.5cm above the floor of the sample chamber. The 
passive response was 0.954 ± 0.038 (measured with 
a small 252 Cf source), while the active response was 
0.926 ± 0.065 (measured with a small Pu source). 
The effect of a 2cm radial offset for a lkg U~ 
sample was less than 1% in the active response. 
However, density effects can be at least 5%. 
Table II lists the results of a measurement 
sequence during which the density of the sample 
contents was intentionally altered. We recommend 
that all users tap the sample containers on a hard 
surface before measurement if they would like to 
reduce this effect. 
Figure 2 plots the corrected net active 
response as a function of elemental mass for all of 
the samples measured in this campaign. Results 
from uranium oxide, metal and fluoride are shown as 
well as results from plutonium oxide samples. 
These data were taken with an Sb source intensity 
of =2Ci. The measurements were performed over a 4 
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Table II. Density and Position Effects in the 
.. 
~ 
.. 
a. 
• .. 
~ 
.. 
a: 
il 
¥ 
0 
0 
PH ON ID (lkq UO, sample) 
posJ.tion date/time net active rate (s-I) 
remove from store 5-mar 9:15 107.91 ± 
put into PHONID 
turn upside down 5-mar 9:34 110.91 ± 
turn upriqht 5-mar 9:48 111.14 + 
radial offset 2cm 5-mar 10:00 110.50 ± 
tamp sample 5-mar 10:11 105.63 ± 
(increase 
density) 
radial offset 2 
cm 
center sample 5-mar 10:21 106.72 ± 
300r-------------------------------, 
200 
100 
+ 
+ •• 
•• .~~ a a 
• I 
.. 
f 
p"' 
0 ·~--·-------,-----------~----------4 
0 1001) ?000 3000 
0.46 
0.63 
0.63 
0.63 
0.63 
0. 61 
• 92~t- UF4 
• 92cy., U02 
• 80~., U02 
M 35o/-. U02 
" 20o/l U02 
a HBPu 
• MBPu 
lB Pu 
1: ;ure 2 The corrected net actJ.ve response per 
second of the PHONID 3b as a function of special 
nuclear material mass. Data from four different 
uranium enrichments and three different plutonium 
enrichments are shown. 
month period. \-le draw your attention to the linear 
behaviour of each material type (except the uranium 
metal) . Geometry variations caused additional 
effects in the metal samples. Typical counting 
precision in the corrected net active response was 
0.7% for the uranium samples but increased to 3% 
for the plutonium samples as a consequence of the 
passive background. A stronger Sb source (10 Ci 
,has been traditional) or longer count times would 
yield improved counting precision. 
Table III lists the uranium measurement data. 
For the 92% enriched uranium, samples 10-16 are 
oxide, 21 & 22 are fluoride, and 22-24 are metal. 
Samples 30-34 are 60% enriched U02 , samples 40-45 
are 35% enriched U02 , and samples 50-58 are 20% 
enriched U02 • Note that samples 14, 15 and 16 were 
measured twice, =1 month apart. After the decay 
correction is made, the results agree to better 
than 1% for these three samples. 
One possibility for the calibration of this 
instrument is a straight line fit to the data as a 
function of 235U mass. Figure 3 shows the results 
for the lowest enrichment, 20% U02 • Table IV lists 
the coefficients for weighted, least squares, 
straight line fits to the four sets of U02 samples 
in this evaluation. The small samples not included 
in the linear fitting procedure are indicated in 
column five. 
A second possibility for the calibration of 
this instrument is under study/8/. Figure 4 shows 
the corrected net active response as a function of 
the uranium mass times the enrichment raised to the 
0.8 power. All of the data from four enrichments 
Table III. PHONID 3b Measurement Data for U02 Samples 
ID u mass 235U mass time of 
(g) (g) measurement 
10 55.57 51.4 16-jan 9:42 
11 111.16 102.7 16-jan 10:08 
12 222.28 205.4 6-mar 11:09 
13 333.41 308.1 8-mar 10:04 
14 555.67 513.6 6-mar 10:45 
14 555.67 513.6 9-apr 9:49 
15 1111.37 1027.1 !J-rnur 10:21 
15 1111.37 1027.1 9-apr 10:10 
16 1667.03 1540.7 6-mar 10:27 
16 1667.03 1540.7 18-mar 10:43 
20 2183.33 2017 0 8 18-mar 10:21 
21 1152.14 1064.8 18-mar 9:54 
22 1849. 1722 0 18-mar 11:01 
23 1544. 1438. 18-mar 11:52 
24 1622. 1510. 18-mar 16:01 
30 1662.58 998.6 4-mar 14:34 
31 831.29 499.3 4-mar 14:56 
32 415.76 249.7 4-mar 15:37 
33 166.50 100.0 0-mar 11:09 
34 03.27 50.0 0-mar 11:45 
40 1710.89 598.8 4-mar 9:36 
41 1147.00 401.5 4-mar 10:20 
42 573.41 200.7 4-mar 11:35 
43 235.90 82.6 5-mar 10:40 
44 286.70 100.4 8-mar 11:28 
45 143.50 50.2 6-mar 15:27 
50 1751.51 348.2 8-mar 9:31 
51 1501.02 298.2 28-feb 11:14 
52 1251.11 248.7 8-mar 9:48 
53 1193.53 237.3 8-mar 10:52 
54 500.46 99.4 28-feb 12:42 
55 500.49 99.5 5-mar 13:55 
56 400.65 79.7 5-mar 11:25 
57 250.19 49.7 6-mar 12:01 
58 125.08 24.9 5-mar 12:00 
is within 5% of a cubic fit in this attempt to 
correct for the self shielding. We note that this 
correction should also depend on the oxide density 
and the sample diameter. 
Tables V & VI list the plutonium oxide 
measurement data and results, respectively. The 3 
burnups are each fit with a straight line. This 
fit was not weighted least squares to all the data 
points. However this preliminary evaluation 
indicates that the measurements are consistent with 
a straight line calibration. We will continue this 
evaluation with a larger sample set and 
measurements with better precision. 
For this presentation, we used the passive 
data from the plutonium samples to solve for the 
detection efficiency. The values for a are 
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passive rate active rate 
(s-1) (s-1) 
1. 30 ± 0.05 9.05 ± 0.08 
1. 35 ± 0.05 16.32 ± 0.13 
1.18 ± 0.11 15.61 + 0.07 
1.12 ± 0.11 21.34 ± 0.10 
1.19 + 0.11 33.32 + 0.16 
1.23 ± 0.07 23.14 ± 0.17 
1. 20 ± 0.11 62.10 I 0.35 
1.25 ± 0.07 42.32 + 0.23 
1. 51 ± 0.12 89.06 ± 0.33 
1. 50 + 0.12 78.31 + 0.31 
21.25 ± 0.21 139.12 ± 0.42 
11.10 ± 0.15 71.11 ± 0. 29 
1.10 ± 0.10 64.82 ± 0.28 
0.86 ± 0.09 58.92 ± 0.27 
1.29 + 0.11 55.83 + 0 0 26 
1. 40 ± 0.08 67.21 ± 0.25 
1.17 + 0.11 35.65 + 0.13 
1.15 ± 0.08 19.66 ± 0.09 
0.93 ± 0.10 9.05 ± 0.11 
1. 03 + 0.10 5.63 ± 0.00 
1.23 + 0.06 49.95 + 0.16 
1.28 ± 0.07 34.07 ± 0.12 
1.19 ± 0.11 17.91 ± 0.13 
1. 09 ± 0.07 8 0 29 + 0.06 
0.93 ± 0.10 9.51 + 0.11 
1.05 ± 0.07 5.67 ± 0.04 
1.2 9 ± 0.11 29.98 ± 0.19 
1.11 + 0.10 28.31 ± 0.08 
1.14 ± 0.11 21.50 ± 0.16 
1. 34 ± 0.11 20.53 ± 0.16 
1.11 + 0.10 10.57 + 0.03 
0.95 + 0.07 9.03 i 0.06 
0.93 + 0.07 8.25 + 0.06 
1.10 ± 0.10 5. 72 ± 0.03 
0.94 ± 0.07 3.60 ± 0.02 
calculated for pure oxide and the multiplication 
values are from thermal counter measurements made 
a year earlier. Perhaps the assumptions used to 
derive the formula are not satisfied sufficiently. 
8. SUGGESTED DATA ACQUISITION PROCEDURE 
Our measurement experience with the PHONID 3b 
has led us to propose a different treatment of the 
data than that currently in use by inspectors. In 
addition to the analysis discussed above, we 
suggest the following for consideration. The 
normalization that has been traditionally used adds 
a component of uncertainty to the result. With a 
stable instrument, verification of the response 
without performing a correction will yield a result 
with a smaller measurement uncertainty. We propose 
that the normalization required when the source is 
Table IV. Linear Calibration Coefficients for U02 
Corrected Response =A+ B(mass 235 ) 
Enrichment A ± !!.A B ± !J.B Reduced Fit 
Chi square range 
92.42 7.52 + 0.26 0.09669 ± 0.00039 2.7 > 300g 
60.06 4.81 ± 0.32 0.10992 ± 0.00066 0. 9 > 200g 
34.98 1.26 + 0.12 0.13880 + 0.00050 0.7 > 49g 
19.87 1. 035 ± 0.099 0.14653 ± 0.00070 1.9 > 23g 
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Figure 3 The corrected net active response per 
second as a function of the 23 'U mass for the 20% 
enriched samples. The solid line is a least 
squares fit to the data. 
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Figure 4 The corrected net active response per 
second as a function of the uranium mass times the 
enrichment raised to the 0.8 power. Data from four 
different enrichments fall on one line. 
Table V. PHONID 3b Measurement Data for Pu02 Samples 
ID tag mass tag mass time of passive rate active rate 
235~fff>r:t VI'! 240rffPr't1VI" measurement (s-'l (s-') 
1 1431.0 g 958.4 g 12-mar 
2 839.5 562.2 13-mar 
3 582.2 389.8 14-mar 
4 582.5 390.1 14-mar 
5 1501.8 895.0 13-mar 
6 604.7 360.4 13-mar 
7 1524.5 671.4 11-mar 
8 1220.5 537.5 11-mar 
9 916.2 403.5 12-mar 
10 613.7 270.28 12-mar 
11 609.3 268.35 13-mar 
12 305.9 134.73 11-mar 
13 306.1 134.78 14-mar 
changed be considered separately from the 
instrument stability check. 
When a new 12'Sb source is installed, the 
instrument must either be recalibrated or a 
normalization measurement can be used to relate the 
new response to the previous calibration. A 
demonstration of the validity of the normalization 
measurement has yet to be performed. 
11:00 5301.8 + 1.9 5414.1 ± 1.9 
10:22 2962.7 + 1.2 3028.1 + 1.2 
9:40 2076.9 ± 1.2 2123.8 ± 1.2 
10:50 1987.8 + 1.2 2033.0 + 1.0 
14:33 4946.7 + 1.8 5064.4 + 1.6 
16:00 1919.6 + 1.1 1970.7 + 1. 0 
11:13 2766.2 + 1.2 2866.6 + 1.2 
15:50 2170.9 + 0. 9 2254.0 + 1.0 
9:57 1590.0 ± 0.9 1651.2 + 0. 9 
11:53 1026.0 ± 0.5 1067.6 ± 0.4 
12:00 1066.0 ± 0.7 1112.2 ± 0.4 
14:12 508.4 + 0.2 531.7 + 0.4 
10:00 489.9 + 0.4 512.7 + 0.3 
After the instrument with a new source has 
been calibrated, we suggest the following 
procedures. Our proposal is an instrument control 
procedure that was evaluated previously/13/. 
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1. Perform a normalization check monthly or 
before and after each inspection. For example, if 
the average and standard deviation of fifteen 1000s 
measurements agree with the expected values, then 
Table VI. PHONID 3b Results for Pu02 Samples 
ID 1 + a• M(a,R,T)b measured mass measured to efficiency 
2 3 Secrective tag ratio: 
2 3 Serrective 
1 1. 915 1.168 1431.0 + 34. g 1. 000 .00247 
2 1.915 1.129 839.5 ± 22. 1. 000 .00240 
3 1.915 1.109 611.5 ± 22. 1. 050 .00246 
4 1.915 1.12 589.0 ± 22. 1.012 .00233 
5 l. 905 1.166 1501.8 ± 31. 1. 000 .00248 
6 1.905 1.106 604.7 ± 18. 1. 000 .00248 
7 l. 470 1.182 1507.6 ± 25. 0.989 .00234 
8 l. 470 1.175 1240.6 ± 20. 1.016 .00230 
9 1.470 1.165 912.5 ± 19. 0.996 .00225 
10 1. 470 1.136 607.8 ± 9. 0. 990 .00222 
],1 1. 470 1.129 688.0 ± 12. 1.129 .00233 
12 1. 470 1.102 323.7 ± 7. 1.058 .00226 
13 l. 470 1. 099 326.7 ± 7. 1. 067 .00219 
a) ca.Lculated for pure ox~de from ~sotop~cs or Mar-::~ 
b) from Neutron Coincidence Counter measurements made 29-Nov-89 
assume the instrument is functioning correctly. If 
they do not agree, repair the instrument. 
2. Perform two daily background counts 
(perhaps lOOs each) with the photoneutron source on 
and off. Compare with historical values. 
3. Perform a daily bias check. Perhaps an 
assay of a "known" item for 300s. In this 
situation "known" means stable but not necessarily 
traceable to something else. 
4. Tap the sample to be measured firmly on a 
hard surface to remove excess air, if it is a 
powder. Otherwise you can expect erratic error 
behaviour of the order of 0-5%. 
5. Perform a passive count of the sample (for 
a lOOs count, 1 sigma is ~0.1c/s) 
6. Perform an active count of the sample 
(choose a count time long enough for 1 sigma to be 
•=0 .ls) 
A further proposal for consideration is that 
while the instrument is idle, perhaps the computer 
could monitor the background. If it exceeds a user 
specified value, print the result and the time. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
Previous work/2/ reported on the short term 
stability, these results show long term stability. 
The stability of the PHONID 3b response is shown to 
vary <0.2% in the pre-PERLA reactor building. Two 
parameters have been identified as causing some of 
the past "stability" effects in the field. A 
temperature dependant response and density 
variations in the assay samples both could have 
caused >1% effects. These factors should be 
controlled in future in-field use. 
The preliminary efforts to reduce the number 
of required calibration materials look very 
interesting. Straight line calibration functions 
for the mass ranges of interest provide a solid 
basis for the study of correction factors. 
Successful cross calibration of four instruments 
and an enrichment correction could have a 
significant impact in how this instrument would be 
utilized for inspections. 
We plan to explore the possibility of 
combining the PHONID measurement results with NCC 
results from the same sample. Independent 
measurement of the fissile and fertile components 
of Pu samples would be a powerful inspection tool 
that might reduce the need for DA. 
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SOME RESULTS IN THE MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OF PHONID-3B 
W. Matthes, P. Schillebeekx, J. Sprinkle 
J.R.C. Ispra (V A), Italy 
Abstract 
The Monte Carlo Code MCNP from Los Almnos (Ref. I) is 
used for the analysis of the physical petformance of the 
PHONID-38 instrument. The main problems for this 
purpose were the nonnalization of calculated count-rules 
on measurements and the need for too long calculation 
times for statistically reliable results. We present solutions 
to these problems and describe eventually the result of a 
parameter study on PHONID. 
Summary 
I. Normalization Problem 
The problem of normalizing MCNP-calculated count-rules 
on PHONID-measured count-rates is due to the fact that 
PHONID uses He-4 filled counting tubes and electronic 
pulse height discrimination. A neutron of energy E[MeV] 
leads to a count if in an elastic scattering with a 4He atom 
the energy T[MeY] tnmsfened to the He is sufficient for 
the production of an ionization pulse of a height H[Yolt] 
larger than the level D[Yolt] set by the discriminator. 
We construct a procedure for simulating this counting 
mechanism which provides us with a link (via "Least 
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Square Fit" of some free parameters) between calculated 
count-rules (based on the energetics of elastic scatterings) 
and measured count-rates (as functions of the discriminator 
level). 
2. Reduction of computer time 
To obtain statistically reliable results for the calculated 
count-rules (which are eventually to be compared to the 
measured count-rates) we need a large number of (neutron) 
histories of the order of 1Q5 to 106 (stmting from the Sb-Be 
Source) which takes about 2 to 3 hours on our AMDAHL-
mainframe computer. 
To reduce this forbiddingly large calculation time to make 
parumeter studies or routine calculations feasible we use the 
option of the "SUJface Source" offered by the MCNP-Code. 
We surround the sample region in the inadiation chamber 
of PHONID by a large enough cylind1ical surface F, start 
for example 300.000 Histories from the SB-Be source and 
write on a "Surface File" the positional data of all those 
neutrons crossing F from the outside. For all further 
calculations neutrons are then started from F by reading the 
"slllrting data" from the "Surt'ace File". In this way the 
computation time comes down to 5-10 minutes and makes 
routine work feasible . 
3. Applications 
As applications of MCNP we describe 
-the production of the Be-neutrons due to the Gamma-
flux(in the Be-cylinder) generated by the Sb-capsules. 
-normalization of calculated countrates on experimental 
data,and 
-the results of a parameter study performed on PHONID 
giving the countrate as a function of sample-radius, 
-height, and -enrichment. 
A) Evaluation of the (Sb,Be)-(y ,n) Neutron Source 
The (Sb,Be)-neutron source Q of PHONID (see Fig. I) is 
made of a Be-cylinder containing two small Sb-capsules. 
~~ 
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Fig. I: Horizontal cross-section of PHONID-3B. 
The Be-cylinder was divided by a set of horizontal planes 
in I 0 equal (cylindrical) volume-elements !J. Vi(i= 1, ... ,10). 
Gummas were then started from the two Sb-capsules (with 
equal probability). The number of neutrons t.Ni (per decay 
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of Sb-nucleus) produced in !J. Vi is then obtained by evalu-
ating the integral (tally F4 modified by a dose-function): 
t.Ni = f dv f dE<Jly<E)I:1.iE) (I) 
V 
I 
where 
~(E) is the energy dependent gamma flux in !J. Vi• and 
r1,11 (E) is the macroscopic ( y,n) cross section of Be. 
Fig. 2 gives !J.Ni as a function of i. The total number of 
neutrons produced in the BE-cylinder per decay of one Sb-
nucleus turned out to be 1.113* 104 neutrons which means 
that an 
-Sb-activity of I Curie corTesponds to a neutron Source of 
4.118"' I 06 (neutrons/sec). 
~0 
' 41-f.. ',1(0 
Afi 
JO 
s 
Fig. 2: !J.Ni is the number of (y,n)-source neutrons produced 
by the Sb-gammas in volume element !J. Vi of the BE-
cylinder (i= 1,2 .... 10). 
B) Use of surface sources 
a) Direct Monte Carlo run 
The general situation is shown in Fig. I. Neutrons start from 
the Be-Source Q into the irradiation chamber, enter the 
sample S under investigation (to produce fissions) and 
eventually produce counts in the detector region D. 11 
turned out that to avoid too large fluctuations in the quanti-
ties of interest (e.g. total number of fissions in the sumple, 
counts produced in D etc.) a very large number of neutrons 
has to be started from the Be-source Q: one such run for 
3* 10E+05 source neutrons takes roughly 100 minutes (on 
the Amdahlmain frame). 
This computation time is obviously too long to do any 
parameter study or routine calculations. 
b) Generation of first surface source 
To reduce the long computation time we use the MCNP-
option of the surface source: 
- the sample region is enclosed within a cylinder Fl of a 
!urge enough radius (see Fig. 1) 
- n (3.0* IOE+05) neutrons are started from the Be-source 
Q. All source neutrons crossing F1 for the first time from 
the outside are stopped and their positional data (position, 
velocity, weight ... ) are stored on a (surface-) file SF I. 
This step needs about 80 minutes. Roughly 4.0* IOE+04 
histolies cross Fl (only 13% of all the source neutrons enter 
the region within F1). 
- this surface file SFI is then used for each following cal-
culation as a neutron source by scanning the complete file 
SFl and starting the stored neutrons from Fl into the in-
telior of F I. 
Each MCNP-run using these 4.0* 10E+04 surface neutrons 
as a neutron source takes about 15 to 20 minutes. 
Note that each of these (surt'ace source) calculations 
cOITesponds in reality to taking 3.0* IOE+05 source neu-
trons from the Be-source. 
c) Generation of the second surface source 
The enclosing cylinder Fl is chosen such, that all possible 
contuiner-configurations fit within Fl. For small samples S 
this results again in too many neutrons from Fl missing S 
and only a fraction of all Fl source neutrons will enter the 
sample. 
For this reason we introduce a second cylinder F2 sur-
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rounding S closely. Now we create a second surface file 
SF2 by starting the neutrons from SF I and storing the 
positional data of all those neutrons crossing F2 for the first 
time from the outside. 
Of the 4.0"' I OE+04 neutrons from F I about 17000 cross F2. 
The generation of SF2 from SF I takes about I 0 minutes 
and the successive calculations using SF2 as a neutron 
source need about 7 minutes. Eventually we have achieved 
that a computer run for 300.000 source neutrons is done in 
7 minutes. 
We repeat the relevant data: 
- less than 10% of all Be-source neutrons enter the sample 
-the generation of the first surface file SF1 from Q takes 80 
min. (300.000 source neutrons from Q give 40.000 neutrons 
crossing Fl) 
- the generation of the second surface file SF2 from SF I 
takes 15 min. (40.000 neutrons from SF I give 17.000 
neutrons crossing F2) 
- a MCNP-production run from SF2 takes 5 minutes and 
co1Tesponds to a real case of 300.000 01iginal source 
neutrons. 
q Simulation of the "Discriminator threshold" in MCNP-
Calculations. 
The discriminator level Do (measured in Volt) serves to 
suppress (count-)pulses with a pulse height H smaller than 
Do. All pulses with H >Do are counted. 
The following argument transforms this mechanism into an 
MCNP recipe: 
-the pulse height H of a (count-)pulse is proportional to the 
amount of ionization I produced by a recoil a-nucleus in an 
elastic neutron-scattering event 
- this amount of ionization I is proportional to the recoil 
energy T given to the a-particle in the (elastic-)scattering. 
- The pulse height H is therefore proportional to T; and to 
the pulse height level Do (discriminator threshold) con·e-
sponds a certain recoil energy threshold To 
- Therefore: Counts are produced by only those elastic 
scatterings in which the recoil energy T is larger than To. 
Consider a neutron of energy E making an elastic scattering 
with a He-nucleus. We denote by P(E-tT)dT the proba-
bility that the recoil energy T (transfetTed to the a-particle 
in this elastic scatteting) is in the interval dT around T. 
The probability that this elastic scattering event will lead to 
a count is then given by (according to the above mentioned 
constraint): 
P(E{fo) =J P(E-tT)dT (2) 
To 
The totnl countrate C is then obviously to be evalunted by 
C(To) = f dE «j>(E) !.s(E) P(E(fo) (3) 
<I>( E) is the total neutron flux at energy E averaged over the 
total counter volume 
l:;(E) is the macroscopic elastic scattering cross section of 
the totnl counter volume. 
Note thnt the integral in C(To) can be directly evaluated in 
an MCNP-run if P(E{fo) (as a dose function modifying 
tally F4) is given. 
To construct P(E-tT) we recall that the recoil energy T in 
the Laboratory-system is given by 
(I -a) 
T = E · - 2- · (I- cosq>) (4) 
where 
ell is the scattering angle of the neutron in the CM-System 
and 
2 
a=(M-m) 
M+m M:mass of target nucleus m:mass of neutron 
The distribution for cos q> = ~ of the scattered neutron (in 
the CM.-system) is usually given in the form: 
(5) 
crs(E) P(E-t~) (6) 
Then we have: 
P(E-tT)dT = P(E-t~)d~ (7) 
and, using (3): 
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2 
P(E-tT) = P(E-t~) E(l _a) 
Combining (I) and (4) eventually gives us 
P(E{fo) = 0 
(8) 
if To> Tmax(E) 
if To<Tmax(E) 
(lJ) 
Tmax = Tmax (E) = E( 1-a ) is the maximal energy transfer 
(recoilenergy) in an elastic scattering. 
This relation says that all neutrons with an energy E smaller 
thnn 
E0 =To/(l-a) (10) 
are not able to transfer at least the recoil energy To and, 
therefore, will never lead to n count. 
Relation (8) therefore implies, that 
- neutrons with an energy E below Eo do not produce any 
counts 
- if <I>(E)l:,(E) .:lE is the total number of elastic scatterings 
by neutrons with an energy in dE, then P(E/Eo) is that 
fraction of these scatterings which produce a count. 
P(E/Eo) is tabulated as a function of E and Eo and used as 
the dose function modifying tally F4 in expression (2). (We 
use P(E/Eo) instead of P(E{fo) in (2)). 
For a practical application of (8) the relevant data for f1 (E) 
in (2) were taken from ENDFB/Vl. 
A simple method to normalize MCNP Calculations on 
measurements 
To use MCNP Calculations for predictive purposes (e.g. 
generation of calibration curves) we have first to 
"normalize" the calculations on con-esponding mensure-
ments. 
We stw·t from a fixed experimental configuration (given 
neutron source, high voltage etc.) and measure the counting 
rate CEx as a function of the discriminator threshold D: 
( 11) 
Fig. 3. shows an actually performed experiment using a CF-
point source of unknown strength. Note that due to several 
reasons the measurements are meaningful only within a 
certain intetval l D0, D 1 I and cannot be extrapolated into 
the range of very small thresholds D - 0. 
so 
0 Do-4 1,>- ··~ () +' '.S lo~ l,r Ool 
!) [v} 
Fig. 3: Counting rate as a function of the dis1..Timinator 
threshold for a CF-point source in the center of the irradia-
tion chamber. 
MCNP calculations of the counting rate CcA are then made 
for the same experimental configuration as a function of the 
energy-threshold E (for the same source-configuration but 
for a unit source strength: one source neutron emitted per 
sec.) 
(12) 
Fig. 4 shows the result of such a calculation for the experi-
ment corresponding to Fig. 3. Note that the calculations 
may be performed down to zero-threshold and up to an 
upper level where all neutrons are cutoff. 
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2. 
Fig. 4 : Calculated countrate as a function of the energy 
threshold E for the experimental setup of Fig. 3. 
The "normalization" of CcA on CEX consists now in the 
problem to find 
- an intetval (E.,, E1 I and 
- panuneters a, p such that (see Fig.5) 
the following coincidences are "as good as possible": 
D.,= aE0 (13) 
and 
(15) 
(16) 
])[v} 
Fig. 5: Principle of normalizing MCNP-calculations on 
experimental values. 
The condition "as good as possible" is formulated mathe-
matically in terms of "Least Squares" and takes the form: 
Find the minimum of 
Q(a,j}) =(a E.,-D.,)2 +(a Et-Dt)2 + (!} C0 -X.,>2 + 
(j}Ct-X 1)2 (17) 
with respect to a and 1}. 
As on the other hand we should have 
a= (EoD0 + E 1D 1)/(E0E0 + E 1E1) = a(E0.E 1) ( 18) 
we transform (7) into a minimum problem with respect to 
IE.,,E1): 
Q(E11.E1) =(a E0 -D0 ) 2 +(a E1-D 1)2 + (j} C.,-X,,>2 + 
(j} C1-X 1)2 (20) 
The actual "normalization " procedure therefore consists in 
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checking all possible pairs I E.,. E 1 ) and to find that pair 
I E" *, E 1 * I which makes Q to a minimum. 
a* and !}*are then given by (8) and (9). 
This procedure applied to the situation given in Fig.3 and 4 
resulted in Eu* = 0.19, E1 * = 2.38 and gave eventually: 
a* = 0.41, !}* = 26.3 coJTesponding to a source strength of 
SE.x = 0.26.105 (n/s). 
Fig. 6 shows the agreement between the fitted calculated 
countrate and the experimentally measured countrate . 
so 
0 0, 2.. 
.:. C4L..C· 
o EXP. 
0. If 
Fig. 6 : Result of normalizing the calculated values of 
Fig. 4 on the measurements of Fig. 3. 
For a detailed investigation of the physical pe1i'ormance of 
PHONLD-38 an extended data base was created by MCNP-
calculations of vwious quantities in function of sample 
height H, sample-radius R and U235-enrichment E (for 
cylindrical samples containing uo2 of density p = 2.0 [gr/ 
cm3]). 
Some results are shown in the Figures (7) to (11). 
CCJvNrS 
3. AO-~ +--------------------------
0 
0 H[-.j so.o 
Fig. 7: gives the mean number of counts (per BE-source 
neutron) as a function of the sample height H. 
(Sample radius R as parameter; U235-enrichment E=90%) 
CovNTS 
.?.. •1 0 -If+--------------------, 
0 
0 ...zo.o 
Fig. 8: gives the same data as in Fig. I (mean number of 
counts per BE-source neutron) now as function of the 
quantity P = P(R,H)= const. R 1.6 H. 
Note the surplising effect, that all the cUJves fall on one line 
(for this one enrichment value E=90%). 
-<.o.o 
Fig. 9: shows again the mean number of counts (per BE-
source neutron) as a function of the quantity 
Q = Q(R,H,E) = const. *R L6*H*E0·8 for different sample 
radii R and enrichment values E. 
The very interesting effect is again the falling together of 
all the individual curves (almost) on one line. 
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In general we may try to fit the response in the form 
C- Ra E~ HY (a, p, y = const.) 
There might be better values for the exponents of R, E and 
H to b1ing the individual curves closer together. The 
essential point however is just the fact that they can be 
brought together on one (calibration-) curve which then 
holds for a wide range of values for R,H and E. 
-· 
.·· ,. 
• 20'11. ,. 
.. 
Fig.IO: Experimental Counter response as function of 
Q=const. *H*Ell 8 for a fixed sample Radius R. 
-· 
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Fig. II: shows the change of the mean number of counts 
when compressing the sample from a density of 1.6 to 2.6 
for various initial heights (ut a fixed sample radius R=9.0 
[cm]) at E=35%. 
Note that for 110t too large sample heights (H < 20.0 cm) 
there is almost no change of the number of counts (NO 
density dependence of the counting rate). 
A further interesting aspect of PHONID is the following. 
As in general the discriminator threshold in set such, that 
no count is produced by Be-source neutrons, the actual 
counts are due only to fission neutrons. 
So we may concentrate our considerations on fission 
neutrons only. 
This suggest to separate the physical perform;.nce of 
PHONID into two steps: 
Step A: production of (induced-)fission neutrons by the 
original Be-source neutrons entering the U02-sample, and 
Step B: evaluation of the effect of these (virgin-) fission 
neutrons on the He-detectors(production of counts due to 
these fission neutrons). 
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The calculations for step B were done by starting fission 
neutrons homogeneously distributed over the sample 
material and isotropically and show the very surprising 
effect that g. the mean number of counts per starting fission 
neutron is almost constant (independent of R.H and E: 
g :::: 0.0045 in our case). 
The response (of PHONID) separates therefore in 
C::::g*M (21) 
where M is the mean number of (virgin) fission neutrons 
produced in the sample per BE-source neutron as evaluated 
in Step A (Source multiplication). 
References: 
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Abstract 
For the assay of Pu in radioactive waste with low 
beta and gamma contamination the spontaneous fission 
rate of the Pu isotopes with even mass numbers are used 
as fingerprints. For the elimination of neutron 
multiplication effects and the unknown positioning of the 
Pu debris in the waste the performance of pair and triple 
neutron correlation techniques are tested. For this purpose 
a set of waste drums was measured in the JRC waste 
barrel monitor together with well characterized Pu samples 
exposed in various radial and axial positions. The 
essential formulas required for the interpretation of the 
measured data are given along with the assay data. 
1. Introduction 
Pu02 present in radioactive waste generates neutrons 
coming from spontaneous fission events, from (a,n) 
reactions and induced fissions events caused by primary 
neutrons. 
Neutron pair correlation /1/ provides the necessary tools to 
determine the spontaneous fission rate Fs of the Pu. This 
is true if the isotopic composition of the Pu in the waste is 
known. Then the ratio formed by the (a,n) reaction rate 
Sa and the spontaneous fission neutron emission rate v,<1>Fs 
can be calculated. If neutron multiplication is neglected, 
then the detection probability E can be eliminated, which 
depends on the global self shielding of the Pu02 debris in 
the waste matrix. The experimental information required 
are the effective number of neutron singlets R1 and the 
effective number of correlated doublets R2• Both quantities 
can be obtained from the shift register /2,5/, the reduced 
variance meter /6/ and in approximation from the variable 
dead time counter n;. 
With the triple neutron correlation technique three 
quantities are available as experimental data the effective 
number of singlets, doublets and triplets. This permits to 
determine three unknowns of Pu contaminated waste i.e. 
either the spontaneous fission rate Fs the (a,n) reaction rate 
Sa and the detection probability E of the unknown Pu 
distribution in the waste barrel or knowing the isotopic 
composition Fs, E and the neutron multiplication factor M. 
Pair and triple correlation measurements can be performed 
contemporarily with the Euratom Time Correlation 
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Analyzer (TCA) /8/ according to two different methods and 
analyzed with a special software based on the theory of 
/9,10,11/. The paper summarizes the necessary expressions 
for the data acquisition and interpretation. It gives a short 
description of the waste barrel monitor presents results 
confirming the used point model for the stochastic process 
and gives assay data for the most important waste barrels 
and matrices. 
2. Theory 
The Euratom Time Correlation Analyser measures 
the number of signals existing inside fixed time intervals 
t. These intervals are opened either randomly or by each 
neutron signal of the pulse train. The quantities obtained 
are the frequency distributions B,(t) and N,(t) of the 
signals inside randomly and signal triggered observation 
intervals, respectively. 
B,(t) = number of events with x signals inside k 
randomly triggered intervals of duration t. 
N,(t) = number of events with x signals inside 
intervals of duration t in which each signal 
of the pulse train opens such an interval. 
The frequencies b:(t) and n:(t) are obtained normalizing 
on the number of random interval triggers k and on the 
number of signals NT collected during the measurement 
time T w respectively. 
b' (t) = B, (t) 
' k 
(1) 
(2) 
b,(t) and n,(t) are the probability counterparts to the 
measured frequencies b:(t) and n:(t). For the factorial 
moments of the probability distributions b,(t) and n,(t) of 
order 1.1 
(3) 
mn(Jll:;: f(~)n.(t)"' f(~)n:(t) (4) 
&=Jl J.=fl 
ratlrc:r simple recurrence formulas are obtained /9,10,11/. 
~ 
mn(Jl) = L.m:(q) mb(~-q) 
q;O 
with mb!Ol :;: 1 and m.coJ = m:coJ = 1 
(5) 
(6) 
The quantities m:C,.l and m~l are simple analytical 
expressions of the neutron physical characteristics of the 
spontaneous fission sample, the moderator detector 
assembly and the settings of the Time Correlation Analyser 
(TCA). 
For the mathematical description of m:U.l and m:(Jll 
following assumptions are introduced. 
1. The test sample has point geomeny. 
2. There is only fast neutron multiplication in the test 
sample. 
3. Primary neutron emission and the following neutron 
multiplication chain occur contemporarily. 
4. The time response function of the neutron detection 
is a pure exponential with decay time 1/)... 
5. Primary neutron energy has no int1uence on the 
neutron detection probability. 
6. There are no dead time losses of signals. 
It is then: 
m:<~l = Tt R~ W(Jl) 
M 
(7) 
(8) 
~-1 ( 1) k 1- e -•• 
with w(Jl):;: L ~: (-1) --
t;O A.tk 
and f =e-l.T(l-e-l.') 
and with the following expressions for R1, R2 and R3 
R :;:£2R T M2 [v +(M-1) V•<llv'12l (1+a)] (10) 2 s M •<2l VwJ-1 
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{ 
V V 
R - 3 F T M3 V + 2(M -1) s!2l 1!2l + 3 - E s M •(3) V _ 1 
1(1) ( 11) 
(l+<l)(M-1) v,<~ [v113> +2(M-1) v:~~~J} 
VI(!) 1 VI(!) 
The symbols used are: 
Sa (a,n) neutron emission rate of test item. 
Fs Spontaneous fission rate of test item. 
p Probability that a neutron generates an induced 
fission event. 
e Probability for detection of a neutron. 
t Observation interval. 
T Delay between trigger signal and start of 
observation interval t. 
T M = Measurement time. 
A. = Fundamental mode decay constant of moderator-
detector assembly. 
Piv(p)= Probability for the emission of v fast neutrons per 
prompt fission caused by a primary neutron 
generated by reaction j G=l when induced fission, 
j=s for spontaneous fission) /12,13/. 
v11~>(p)= Jlth factorial moment of the P1v(P} distribution. 
VJ(~)(p) = L(~) PJY(p) 
V=JL 
The symbol M given by 
M= 1-p 
1-pv10l 
is used for the fast neutron multiplication factor. 
(12) 
(13) 
In many practical applications the isotopic composition of 
the fissile material is known. From this information the 
so-called a-ratio is derived 
(14) 
The experimentally determined factorial moments of the 
two signal frequency distributions (Eqs. 5 and 6) serve to 
obtain the expressions m:U.l and m:(JlJ· These two quantities 
are proportional to the Jl-tuplets of order Jl and Jl+ 1 
respectively. Having determined R1, R2 and R3 the 
unknowns of a waste barrel assay can be determined. 
Following 4 analysis procedures can be applied: 
Case 1. Unknown F, e, M Code routine FEM 
Used for fuel fabrication waste with well known 
isotopic composition of fuel debris but unknown 
matrix. of the waste and debris distribution. 
Case 2. Unknown Sa, Fs, M Code routine SAFM 
Used for homogeneous waste or small waste 
packages with calibrated neutron detection 
probability E. 
Case 3. Unknown F, E, Sa Code routine FESA 
Used for completely unknown waste. 
Case 4. Unknown F,E Code routine FE 
Used in cases when triple correlation fails due to 
a too small detection probability (E < 0.035). 
3. The Waste Barrel Monitor and Samples 
The Waste Barrel Monitor consists of three different 
elements the detector head, the electronic chains and the 
time correlation analyser for the data acquisition. The 
detector head has a cylindrical cavity housing a waste 
barrel up to 220 litre. The 60 He3 neutron detectors are 
arranged in a 47t geometry inside 20 Polyethylene and 
Cadmium lined modules. A set of 4 He3 neutron detectors 
is connected via an amplifier and discriminator directly to 
the TCA. The TCA is fed with 15 such signal inputs. The 
TCA processes the signal pulse tT'din contemporarily for the 
two observation interval opening methods i.e. the randomly 
opened and the signal triggered intervals. The pulse train 
is automatically analysed in both methods for 16 
observation intervals each of different duration in contrast 
to the present existing shift registers having only one 
observation interval. Thus each method gives 16 analysis 
results one for each interval size. This feature permits a 
check of the reliability of the obtained results. The 
adjustable interval range is such that the dead time and 
decay constant can be measured as well with high 
precision. 
The stored frequency distributions of the two methods each 
with 16 time intervals are transferred after each 
measurement to a personal computer for analysis with the 
theory outlined above. 
The statistical model of the neutron signal pulse train 
simplifies considerably as indicated in the equations listed 
above if the neutron response function of the detector head 
is a pure exponential with a decay constant A.. For this 
reason the detector modules were designed with a high 
neutron leakage and with an under moderation of the 
neutron spectrum optimised for the measurement of Pu in 
the g range. This leads for the same number of detector 
Sample Pu-wgt Pu-238 
Number Comp [g] [%wt] 
2 Pu02 1.997 0.072 
20 Pu02 4.983 0.072 
21 Pu02 9.967 0.072 
22 Pu02 19.919 0.072 
30 metal 20.566 0.104 
tubes to a lower neutron detection probability but gives a 
very good exponential decay of the neutron response 
function. It was found experimentally that the decay 
constant becomes this way independent of the waste size, 
its matrix and the position of the Pu debris in the matrix. 
Cosmic radiation neutrons and Pu fission neutrons give 
within the error limits the same values for A. with any type 
of matrix. 
The present set of experiments explore the potential of the 
multiplet analysis applied to the assay of fuel fabrication 
waste incorporated in various matrices. The parameters of 
investigation are: 
1. Waste barrel size (20 I, 32 I, 60 I, 220 1). 
2. Waste matrices. 
3. Source arrangements. 
4. Performance of the two statistical methods. 
The waste barrels have axial re-entrant tubes for the 
accommodation of the Pu02 samples. These tubes are 
arranged in two perpendicular axes. 
The Pu02 samples have a diameter of about 10 mm. The 
weight and isotopic composition of the samples are 
collected in Table I /14/. 
4. Assay Results 
One of the major problems measuring Pu in a 
waste barrel is the unknown spatial distribution of Pu in an 
unknown heterogeneous waste matrix and the size of the 
individual Pu debris. For this reason it is necessary to 
consider the average detection probability of the neutrons 
originating from the Pu debris as an unknown in the used 
point model. Fig. I shows the variation of the neutron 
detection probability for various waste barrels ranging from 
20 litre to 220 litre. The Pu02 and Cf-252 neutron sources 
were placed for this purpose in the centre of the concrete 
waste barrels. The detection probability of the detector 
head decreases from 0.108 for a 20 litre and 0.0384 for a 
220 litre concrete barrel. The detection probability is 
slightly smaller for a Cf-252 neutron source indicating that 
the detector modules of the detector head are under 
moderated. Fig. 2 shows the radial dependence of E as 
function of the radius in a waste barrel of 220 litre with a 
concrete matrix. The lowest value is about 0.0304 and 
Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 Am-241 
[% wt] [%wt] [% wt] [%wt] [ppm] 
85.151 13.157 1.353 0.267 4860 
85.151 13.157 1.353 0.267 4830 
85.151 13.157 1.353 0.267 4830 
85.151 13.157 1.353 0.267 4830 
69.286 26.303 2.879 1.428 27510 
Table I. Weight and Isotopic Composition of the Pu Samples Used. 
• Refers to 30.07.1982 
469 
increases with increasing radius to 0.086. 
Detection Probability (%) 
1a I 
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Fig. 1 Detection Probability as Function of Barrel Size. 
Concrete Matrix; Source in Central Position. 
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Fig. 2 Detection Probability as Function of Radial 
Source Position. 
220 Litre Concrete Barrel. 
The best assay results are obtained with a waste 
matrix of lowest hydrogen density. Table 11 summarizes 
the results of an empty 60 litre waste drum placing the 
Triple Pair 
Correlation Correlation 
Radial Trigger M240cq Error M240cq Error 
Pos. [cm] Method [g] [%] [g] [%] 
Random 2.676 -2.5 2.249 -18.0 
0.0 
Signal 2.638 -3.8 2.245 -18.2 
Random 2.671 -2.7 2.255 -17.8 
5.0 
Signal 2.626 -4.3 2.244 -18.2 
Random 2.651 -3.4 2.278 -17.0 
10.0 
Signal 2.642 -3.7 2.256 -17.8 
Random 2.638 -3.9 2.275 -17.1 
15.0 
Signal 2.627 -4.3 2.249 -18.0 
Table 11. Assay Results of 60 litre Waste Barrel with 
Void Matrix for Various Radial Source 
Positions. 
Pu-240 Mass equivalent M240 ... = 2.744 g. 
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Pu02 sample at various radii. Best results are achieved 
with the triple correlation method opening the observation 
intervals randomly. The signal triggered version leads to 
slightly higher errors but all assay results are below a 4.5 
% systematic error limit. 
With both pair correlation methods the M240.q 
value is underestimated by about 17-18 %. A systematic 
trend of the assay data as function of radius does not exist. 
The assay results of a 60 litre waste barrel with a 
concrete waste matrix shows that the triple and pair 
correlation lead to about the same systematic errors. Again 
the best results are achieved with the triple correlation 
method giving for the Pu02 sample at the barrel centre a 
4.5 % underestimation and at the outer periphery of the 
barrel a 5.3 % overestimation of the M240eq. The triple 
correlation method with signal triggered observation 
intervals overestimates the mass with the Pu02 sample at 
the centre by 8 % and decreases to 0.6 % with the sample 
at the periphery. The pair correlation method 
underestimates systematically the M240eq and gives the 
~:.rreatest errors with the sample at the periphery (Table Ill). 
Triple Pair 
Correlation Correlation 
Radial Trigger M240cq Error M240cq Error 
Pos. [cm] Method [g] [%] [g] [%] 
Random 2.627 -4.3 2.663 -3.0 
0.0 
Signal 2.963 8.0 2.572 -6.3 
Random 2.766 0.8 2.664 -2.9 
5.0 
Signal 3.003 9.4 2.554 -6.9 
Random 2.822 2.8 2.557 -6.8 
10.0 
Signal 2.914 6.2 2.443 -10.9 
Random 2.890 5.3 2.440 -11.1 
15.0 
Signal 2.768 0.6 2.353 -14.2 
Table Ill. Assay Results of 60 litre Waste Barrel with 
Concrete Matrix for Various Radial Source 
Positions. 
Pu-240 Mass equivalent M240,q= 2.744 g. 
Waste barrels of 220 litre with a concrete matrix 
lead with both triple correlation methods to rdther large 
errors for a Pu02 sample placed at its centre (Table IV). 
The errors decrease with increasing radial position of the 
Pu02 sample and reach at the periphery a value of about 2-
5 %. Nearly in all radial sample positions the M240eq is 
overestimated. Much better assay results are obtained with 
the pair correlation. Here the smallest systematic error of 
about 1 % occurs with the Pu02 sample in the centre and 
increases with the radius of the sample position to about 10 
%. In most cases the pair correlation leads here to an 
underestimation of the M240.q. Assuming a homogeneous 
distribution of the Pu02 debris the expected systematic 
error would be in the order of 5.7 % applying triple 
correlation and would be 10 % with pair correlation. 
Triple Pair 
Correlation Correlation 
Radial Trigger M240cq Error M240cq Error 
Pos. [cm] Method [g] [%] [g] [%] 
Random 3.999 45.7 2.783 1.4 
0.0 
Signal 3.769 37.4 2.708 -1.3 
Random 3.595 31.0 2.778 1.2 
5.0 
Signal 3.429 25.0 2.710 -1.2 
Random 3.375 23.0 2.725 -0.6 
10.0 
Signal 3.170 15.5 2.640 -3.8 
Random 3.250 18.4 2.634 -4.2 
15.0 
Signal 2.995 9.1 2.544 -7.3 
Random 3.048 11.0 2.533 -7.7 
20.0 
Signal 2.872 4.7 2.441 -11.0 
Random 2.847 3.7 2.440 -11.0 
25.0 
Signal 2.678 -2.4 2.354 -14.2 
Table IV. Assay Result of 220 litre Waste Barrel with 
Concrete Matrix for Various Radial Source 
Positions 
Table V gives the assay results using two Pu02 
samples, one sample of M240eq = 1.373 g remained during 
all experiments in the centre of the 220 litre concrete waste 
barrel. The other sample of M240eq = 2.744 g was moved 
after each experiment to a different radial position. With 
both samples at the centre the triple correlation method 
with signal triggered observation intervals 't gives an error 
Triple Pair 
Correlation Correlation 
Radial Trigger M240cq Error M240cq Error 
Pos. [cm] Method [g] [%] [g] [%] 
Random 5.937 44.2 4.789 16.3 
0.0 
Signal 4.396 6.8 4.086 -0.7 
Random 4.782 16.1 4.745 15.3 
5.0 
Signal 3.715 -9.7 4.049 -1.6 
Random 5.318 29.0 4.564 10.8 
10.0 
Signal 4.211 2.3 3.903 -5.2 
Random 4.857 18.0 4.284 4.1 
15.0 
Signal 3.804 -7.6 3.695 -10.2 
Random 4.503 9.4 3.915 -4.9 
20.0 
Signal 3.551 -13.7 3.383 -17.8 
Random 4.072 1.1 3.589 -12.8 
25.0 
Signal 3.306 -19.7 3.124 -24.1 
Table V. Assay Results of 220 litre Waste Barrel with 
Two PuOz Sources in Concrete Matrix. 
Source 1: Fixed in centre; M240.,.= 1.373g 
Source 2: Various Positions; M240,~= 2.744g 
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of about 6 %. With the second sample in the outermost 
position the error increased to 19.7 %. The other triple 
correlation method gives worse results for both samples in 
the centre position and a smaller error with the second 
sample in the outer most position. With pair correlation 
the randomly opened observation interval method leads to 
a 16% error with both samples in the centre and to 12% 
with the large sample at the outer most position. A similar 
range of errors is observed for the signal triggered 
observation interval method only with 0.7 %error for both 
samples at the barrel centre. 
Table VI summarizes results measuring Pu02 
samples of different M240eq in the centre of the 220 litre 
waste barrel. Triple correlation can only be applied with 
the present detector modules to samples with a M240.q 
larger than 2 g. This is mainly due to the low detection 
probability at the central position of the 220 litre concrete 
waste barrel and the cosmic neutron radiation background 
which is not a constant in time. Pair correlation gives still 
R2 values which are well above the variation of the R2 
component of the cosmic radiation background. 
Triple Pair 
Correlation Correlation 
M240cq Trigger M240cq Error M240cq Error 
[mg] Method [g] [%] [g] [%] 
Random - 330.9 20.0 
275.1 
Signal - 295.6 7.5 
Random - 802.0 16.8 
686.5 
Signal 749.0 -9.1 715.3 4.0 
Random - 1402 2.1 
1373 
Signal - 1379 0.4 
Random 3.999 45.7 2788 1.4 
2744 
Si~c,>nal 3.769 37.3 2708 -1.3 
Table VI. Assay Results of Various Sample Sizes with 
220 litre concrete Waste Barrel. 
Samples in Centre Position. 
5. Conclusions 
1. The measurement of low hydrogen density 
waste can easily be accomplished with triple 
neutron correlation. 
2. Concrete waste barrels of 60 litre can be 
monitored with systematic errors in the limits 
of 5 to 10 %. Both pair and triple correlation 
can be applied. 
3. Concrete waste barrels of 220 litres lead to 
average systematic errors of 6.7 % and 10 % 
for triple and pair correlation respectively. 
Both with rather large errors for Pu debris 
located close to the barrel centre. 
4. The application limits for triple correlation in 
a 220 litre waste barrel is about 2 g of M240eq 
for the central position. For pair correlation it 
is at least ten times smaller. Shielding against 
cosmic radiation and a more refined treatment 
of the pulse train along with detector head 
modules designed specifically for low Pu mass 
detection reduces these limits considerably. 
5. The detection of M240eq limit for a 'signal to 
background ratio' of one of a 220 litre 
concrete waste barrel using only single counts 
is 35 mg ± 17 mg. In case the cosmic 
radiation background is measured before and 
after any barrel measurement for one hour the 
absolute limit for the detection is M240eq = 1.8 
m g. 
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Abstract 
The Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL) 
is used by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) to verify the Uranium-235 and Uranium-238 
content in light-water reactor (LWR) fuel assemblies. The 
IAEA uses also the Active Neutron Coincidence Counter 
(A WCC) for the verification of the Uranium-235 content 
in uranium samples and MTR fuel assemblies. This paper 
describes the Active Neutron Counting System (ANCS). 
The application software is considered to be user-friendly 
and can lead inspectors through the measurement steps 
and provide final evaluation in the field and at the IAEA. 
The software is based on the functional specification 
prepared by the IAEA and reviewed by the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL), USA. The algorithms were 
provided by the IAEA in consultation with LANL. 
1. Introduction 
Earlier existing software for Active Neutron 
Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) with A WCC/UNCL was 
designed for the first generation of personal computers 
which had limited calculating power, smaller memory, no 
mass storage (hard disk), and limited software capability. 
Recently, advanced portable computers have become 
available which are suitable for field use by the inspectors. 
In addition the procedures of performing these kinds of 
measurements and calibration have been established 
/1,2,3/. 
The IAEA's safeguards inspectors are required to 
efficiently verify Uranium content of nuclear material in 
various member states within strict time limits in an 
uniform and reliable way. All this has necessitated the 
development of ANCS. 
The ANCS has been developed to assist IAEA 
safeguards inspectors to perform Active Neutron NDA 
with the A WCC/UNCL in the field. The system is used to 
collect, maintain, analyse and evaluate inspection data at 
facilities and the IAEA. 
2. Material and Methods 
Software Engineering 
The development of ANCS is based on the 
experience gained with the High-level Neutron 
Coincidence Counting System for Plutonium assay, which 
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was developed by Pham T.P., M.S. Krick and K. Javorzky 
in 1987. ANCS conforms to the IAEA's software 
standards. The software uses a modular library developed 
by the IAEA. 
A structured method of software engineering is used 
through the whole software development cycle. An 
overview of ANCS within the inspection environment is 
summarized with the context diagram shown in Fig. 1. 
Sample 
Details 
AWCC/UNCL 
JSR-11 
(HEC-100) 
Fig. 1 - Context Diagram of ANCS 
The system accepts Intrument Data from either the 
A WCC or UNCL through a shift-register electronics such 
as HEC-100 or JSR-11. These sets of measurement data 
are associated with Samples Details provided to the 
IAEA's inspector by the operator of the facility where the 
inspection is occuring. Sample Details for those samples 
to be measured with A WCC consist of: 
1 - Sample Identification; 
2 - Stratum Identification; 
3 - Sample Length in centimeters; 
4 - Uranium-235 content in grams. 
In the case of the UNCL, the following additional 
information is required: 
5- Uranium-238 weight in grams; 
6 - Total number of fuel rods; 
7 - Number of burnable poison rods; 
8 - Type of burnable poison; 
9- Weight percentage of burnable poison. 
The software has to be setup before the inspection 
by the NDA specialist or the Instrument Officer at the 
IAEA This involves specification of Detectors 
Parameters, Source Details, Cal.Jbration Parameters, and 
Acceptance Criteria. 
The Inspector is the main user of the ANCS. The 
inspector specifies information specific to the actual 
inspection environment - Inspection Configuration, and 
Measurement requirements. The inspector performs 
Evaluation of Data. The inspector has the responsibility to 
make a Backup disk of the system's data and to extract 
measurement data - a Transfer disk to take back to the 
IAEA's headquarters. The system has the capability to 
accept instrument data through keyboard - Manual Data 
in case of communication failure. 
ANCS is menu-driven. Its menu hierarchy is partly 
shown on Fig.2. The menu option "System Maintenance" 
is us'!d mainly by active-NDA's specialists at the IAEA to 
;; NULL/91001 - Active Neutron CCMIIting System 1.1 
,. 91.04.15 
.. 
f 
,;; 
., 
,. 
~· 
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D 
A 
-<< 
R 
s 
u 
F 
Main Action Menu 
• • Measurements 
.. S""1'le Details 
• • Analysis/Recalculation 
. • Reports 
. . System Maintenance 
.. Utilities 
.. Facility 
Q .. Quit to DOS 
Please select your option 
~ ~ u ~ ' 
~.~···'' .... ·.. ··-: ... .... .. .. . ...... .. .. ... .. . 
System Maintenance 
E .. Establish A Facility 
A .. Acceptance Criteria Data Entry 
D .. Detector Parameters Data Entry 
F .. Configuration Data Entry 
C • • Calibration Parameters Data Entry 
U .. Update Initial Data Directory 
P .. Produce Initial Data Diskette 
Q .. Quit to Main Action Menu 
'----> Measurements 
B .. Background 
N .. Normalization 
V .. Verification 
s • • Set Measurement Parameters 
Q .. Quit to Main Menu 
Fig. 2 - Menu Hierarchy of ANCS 
17:07:29 ·~· 
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setup the system as mentioned above. This option is not 
needed in the field during normal inspections. Normally, 
the option "Measurements" is used extensively by 
inspectors in the field, which allows them to make 
background, normalization and verification measurements. 
Software's Algorithm 
The IAEA's procedures for NDA measurements 
with the A WCC/UNCL using the latest calibration and 
evaluation methods as described in /2,3/ are fully 
implemented in ANCS. 
Determination of Uranium-235 is based on active 
measurements. A WCC: The coincidence rate obtained 
with the A WCC in active mode is corrected for 
background and normalized with a constant 
(1) 
where Ko corrects for relative AmLi source strengths, K1 
corrects for electronic drift and geometric variations. 
UNCL: The normalized active-minus-passive coincidence 
rate in No-Cd mode is the basis for UNCL measurement 
of 235U. ANCS takes into account 6 components of the 
normalization constant for UNCL assay: 
(2) 
where Ko and K1 are identical to those of (1), K2 corrects 
for relative detector efficiencies and source yield, K3 - for 
presence of poisons, K4 - for Uranium mass loading, K5 -
for other sample variations. 
Calculation of Uranium mass can be done with one 
from 4 types of calibration curves: 
1 - Cubic polynomial: 
R=a+bm+cm 2 +dm 3; 
2- Power: 
3 - Exponential: 
4 - Saturating: 
R=a(l-ebm); 
R=_!!!!!_, 
l+bm 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
where R is the corrected coincidence net rate, m - 235U 
weight, and a,b,c,d - curve's constants. Even though the 
system is designed to measure 235U with UNCL in the 
aective thermal mode without Cadmium liners, fast active 
measurements of 235U with Cadmium liners installed in the 
UNCL can be made with ANCS. 
Uranium-238 determination is based on passive 
measurements with UNCL. ANCS corrects the passive 
coincidence rate measured with UNCL for background, 
room-background-induced fissions, and 2350 fissions 
according to the equation: 
r: b+cECal 
Rc0"=[rRmea.s -0.0014(yrT-a)] , (7) b+cEMea.s 
where Reorr is corrected net coincidence rate, RMea• -
measured coincidence rate, T- measured totals rate, Eea1 -
enrichment of reference fuel assembly, EMc.t•- enrichment 
of measured fuel assembly, and r,a,b,c - constants. 
Calculation of 2380 is performed with the power function 
type ( 4) of calibration curve. 
Confirmation of Declared Poison. Since the ratio of 
net (active-passive) coincidence or total rates with and 
without Cadmium liners is proportional to the declared 
burnable-poison-correction factor K3, ANCS uses four sets 
of measurements: passive and active without Cadmium 
liners and passice and active with Cadmium liners, to 
confirm the declared burnable poison in the fuel assembly. 
The empirical value ofburnable-poinson-correction factor 
K3 participating in equation (2) above is determined 
according to the following equation: 
(8) 
where Red and RNoCd are the net (active-passive) 
coincidence rates with and without Cadmium liners, and 
a,b - constants. Similiarly, the capability of deriving K3 
from the totals rates ratio is also provided by the software: 
(9) 
where TCd and TNoCd are the net (active-passive) total 
rates with and without Cadmium liners, and c,d -
constants. 
5. Results 
Accepting measurement data from the A WCC, 
ANCS verifies the 235U content of samples based on active 
measurements. In the UNCL mode the safeguards 
inspector measures the 2350 and 238U content of L WR 
fuel assemblies and the burnable-poison-correction factor. 
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The system reports immediately any significant difference 
between measured and declared values. The relative 
standard deviation for a group of samples identified with 
the same stratum identification and measured within a 
specified range of dates can be calculated by the software. 
All measured and evaluated data are available for 
transmitting from the field to the headquarters of the 
!AEA for archiving, analysing, and evaluating purposes. 
With the capability to accept measurement data 
through keyboard entry, to review them and to 
re-calculate results, ANCS can also serve as an analytical 
tool to re-evaluate measurements and check measurement 
consistency. 
6. Conclusion 
Implementation of the cross-calibration concepts for 
the whole family of active NDA detectors (A WCC/ 
UNCL), and implementation of multiple correction terms, 
especially for the UNCL, required complicated designing 
and programming, but the result significantly simplifies the 
calibration and measurement procedures in the field. 
Evaluation feedback is achieved not only at the IAEA but 
on site to guarantee the reliability of the measurements. 
Measurements can be made in an automated, uniform and 
reliable way. Therefore, the overall and on-site time of an 
inspection is to be reduced. 
ANCS has been fully developed since October, 1990, 
and is undergoing extensive testing. The results of field 
tests in Canada, Sweden and USA are satisfactory. ANCS 
is now available and approved for inspection use by the 
IAEA's inspectors. 
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Abstract 
The programme P.E.C.C. (Passive Euratom 
Coincidence Counters), Ill has been developed at the Joint 
Research Center, lspra by the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate, Luxembourg and the Safety Tech1wlogy Institute, 
lspra for the acquisition, evaluation, management and 
storage of measurement data originating from passive 
neutron assay of plutonium bearing materials. The software 
accommodates the implementation of the NDA (Non 
Destructive Assay) procedures for all types of passive 
neutron coincidence deployed by the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate, Luxembourg. 
Overview of the system 
The Programme was developed to satisfy Euratom's 
requirements for a software package capable of evaluating, 
managing and storing measurement data acquired by the 
High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNCC) family 
of detectors, /2,3,5/. The programme complies with 
Euratom's philosophy of standardisation for Non Destructive 
Analysis (NDA) techniques and optimisation of the 
calibration activity for a series of nominal identical detector 
systems. 
PECC (Fig. 1) belongs to a family of NDA 
instruments, /4/ that has been designed according to a general 
framework for a Safeguards integrated data evaluation 
system. PECC is an example of the state of the art in the 
NDA workstation field. This generation of NDA instruments 
was designed and developed by the JRC Ispra in synergy 
with the EC Safeguards Directorate to cover the functions an 
inspector performs during the field activities. In the frame of 
this cooperation, the PECC workstation was constructed with 
the following design guidelines: 
• Inspection summary 
- Inspection procedure support 
- Data post-processing 
• Intelligent assistance 
• Minimize user input 
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An Inspection (Fig. 2), from the user point of view, 
is the set of the declared and measured data collected during 
an inspection campaign. The system internally handles the 
files concerning with the background, the performance check 
and the sample measurements, and correlates them in order 
to achieve the final results. The internal software structure is 
hidden from the user, thus avoiding a need to remember 
names and parameters during the phases of data post 
processing or down loading to a headquarters station. The 
macro-operations the user is concerned with are related to the 
inspection; the system will expand them into more primitive 
functions that get advantage from the powerful software 
architecture. All data that make up an inspection can be 
handled as one item. For instance to back-up or to restore 
an inspection from a diskette takes a single command, /6/. 
Inspection procedure support means that the user 
(i.e. the inspector) is guided along the activities being 
performed in an inspection: set up of the detector chain being 
used; selection of the proper normalization source and 
material type; performance of background and performance 
check measurements; and finally, the description and 
measurement of samples. 
Data post-processing (Head quarter analysis) 
provides the tools to retrieve data from an old inspection and 
to process them. The user may verify the results or test the 
effect produced by changing an input parameter. The system 
allows the user to change any input parameter without 
affecting the primary data files. 
Intelligent assistance means that the instrument 
provides powerful on line help that contains all the 
information the user may need during his inspection activity. 
Minimize user input means that a great amount of 
input data can be provided to the measurement system with 
a minimum number of selections r<lther then be repeatedly 
entered via keyboard. The characterization parameters of the 
specific shift register device, detector head and normalization 
source used during an inspection are constant, and can be 
identified with names. 
PECC provides a library containing the description of 
these objects, plus the material types and their associated 
calibration curves, /1/. Data selection is guided by the system 
that shows only objects compatible with the previously 
selected ones. In this way input data acquisition is simple, 
fast and safe, data are always consistent and clerical errors 
are avoided. Libraries are made up with standard ASCII files 
and therefore can be handled off line, i.e. adding an object to 
the library requires no changes to the program. 
The programme is structured in such a way as to 
provide the user with a define library of instrument types 
such as the HLNCC, ISCC, UFBC and PNCC, /5/. 
Calibration data is available for various categories of 
plutonium bearing materials such as cans of Pu02 powders or 
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel elements. 
The operating characteristics for all detectors are 
stored as ASCII files in data libraries together with 
appropriate factors used to describe the relationship between 
detectors of the same instrument type. The programme can 
thus manage and evaluate measurement data acquired by 
registered Euratom detector using a universal calibration 
established for a given material category and instrument type. 
The operating performance of any detector can be 
monitort>.rl using one from a library of registered Cf252 sources 
or a plutonium reference sample. The measurement daL.t 
acquired during subsequent inspection activities can always 
be normalised if the operating performance or conditions of 
the detector vary significantly from the time of calibration. 
The pro1,rramme incorpomtes several test procedures to assure 
that the instrument is functioning correctly and that no 
erroneous data is registered for subsequent evaluation. The 
criteria for the tests can be set by the superuser. 
The programme manages and updates for decay 
operator declarations of plutonium mass and isotopic 
composition (Fig. 3). The isotopic composition can either be 
introduced via the keyboard or retrieved from magnetic 
storage devices using an appropriate fuel batch designation. 
The measurement data is evaluated before and after the use 
of the classical neutron self multiplication correction 
algorithms. 
The programme provides a printed report, (Fig. 4) 
including the raw measurement results, the operators 
declaration, and the data evaluation. It can also store the 
information in data files for archive purposes. 
To assure proper maintenance and consistency in its 
application two level of access to the programme are 
permitted. Apart from routine access and execution by the 
user (Inspector), the Supervisor (Head quarters) can also 
modify parameter and data files to update the contents of the 
libraries of calibrations or detectors and perform reevaluation 
of archive data if required. 
PECC provides a powerful on-line help which the 
inspector can access from any point of the program. Help 
automatically shows the operation the inspector was 
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performing. An on demand help index is shown, and the 
inspector can navigate on-line help himself. The on-line help 
function may be used either as a user procedure or as a guide 
to recovering from errors. The software has a series of built 
in error trapping procedures ensuring consistency in it's 
execution. 
PECC provides the inspector with some utilities that 
simplify operations correlated with inspection activity. The 
most important are: 
View File. Allows the user to select and 
display any file belonging either to the library or to 
an inspection, the displayed file can be sent to the 
printer. 
Make Batch File I Delete Batch File. These 
two utilities allow a user to introduce (or delete) the 
isotopic composition of a new batch. During sample 
analysis the inspector needs only to select the name 
of the batch the sample belongs to. 
Copy Inspection. These utilities allow a user 
to copy from Hard Disk to Floppy Disk (and vice 
versa) all files related to an inspection. After a copy 
to Floppy Disk the inspection can be emsed from 
Hard Disk to free disk space. 
Hardware environment 
The system is built for different types of elaboration 
and acquisition hardware (Jomar-11, SCRD) either connected 
through RS232 or AT/PS2 bus link. In fact the hardware 
drivers are loaded during system set up according to the user 
requirements. This approach allows a user to add new drivers 
and therefore to handle new data acquisition instruments with 
very few software modifications. 
PECC and its family of NDA instrument has been 
designed to use the PC hardware technology. This PC 
hardware technology offers a modular and highly 
standardized platform of interfaces and periphemls, which 
can be easily tailored to user requirements. On the other 
hand, the PC high computing power at low cost and space 
requirements makes the past generation of dedicated systems 
completely obsolete. 
Software environment 
The software is written in the programming language 
"C" by Microsoft version 5.1. The Windows Development 
Tools version 2 has been implemented to provide an 
enhanced user-friendly interface, that is becoming world-wide 
a standard (Fig. 5,6). The porting to Windows 3 is scheduled 
for completion the end of this year. The programme runs 
under the operating system MS-DOS version 3.3 with the 
microprocessor INTEL 80286 or 80386 with math 
coprocessor. The user dialogue is controlled either via the 
keyboard or by a mouse pointing device or by trackball. The 
dialogue is menu driven allowing the user to easily select any 
required feature of the programme. 
The Microsoft Windows environment meets our needs 
of an event driven, modeless and graphic user interface. 
Event driven means that the user generates events that the 
program captures, interprets and responds to; this is in 
contrast with the conventional interface where the program 
asks the user for some actions. Modeless means that the user 
is not trapped into a fixed sequence of events, but can freely 
roam from one procedure to another. Graphic means that the 
user, during his interaction with the program, manipulates 
pictures which are descriptive of the actions associated with 
them. In this environment data input can be handled either by 
mouse, trackball, or via keyboard. When a selection is 
needed the system shows the list of items available in the 
current environment; the user has only to select the desired 
item. 
·overview of the inspection procedure 
An inspector using PECC during his inspection 
campaign has to deal with the following operations: 
I) open and define the new inspection. The user 
is asked to insert the inspection parameters; the 
inspection name, the location and the inspector name. 
This new inspection is the working inspection until 
another one will be opened. 
11) set up the environment. The user is asked to 
select the shift register device, the detector head and 
the normalization source he is going to use. 
Environment set up can change during the inspection. 
If it happens the user is required to perform a new 
background and a new efficiency check measurement. 
The system allows the user to handle different types 
of acquisition hardware either connected through 
RS232 or AT/PS2 bus link. 
Ill) perform background measurements. The user 
is asked to introduce the counting time and the 
number of measurements to be performed. Computed 
background value is valid until a new background 
measurement is performed. 
IV) perform performance measurements. The user 
supplies the counting time and the number of 
repetitions of the sample measurement. Data coming 
from the shift register are checked for consistency, 
outlier data are rejected. The computed efficiency 
correction factor value is used until a new 
performance check measurement is performed. 
V) perform cycles of sample verification 
measurements. For each sample measurement the user 
is asked to introduce a few parameters describing the 
sample, to select its isotopic composition and to enter 
the counting time and the number of repetitions of the 
measurement. As for the performance check, 
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measurement outlier and inconsistent data are 
automatically rejected and substituted with new 
repetitions. The verification results are displayed and 
stored on the hard disk, and an exhaustive report on 
the verification measurement is printed out. 
Conclusions 
We predict that further evolution in NDA 
instrumentation technology will take place especially in the 
directions of multitasking, networking and intelligent 
assistance. The planned porting to Windows 3 will give us 
the appropriate environment to meet all these requirements. 
PECC and its family of NDA instrument has been 
designed: 
to use the PC hardware technology, because 
PC hardware technology offers a modular and highly 
standardized platform of interfaces and peripherals, 
which can be easily tailored to our requirements. On 
the other hand, the PC high computing power at low 
cost and space requirements makes the past 
generation of dedicated systems completely obsolete. 
to support a multi-instrument type, multi-
detector and multi-material category environment. 
to comply with Euratom's philosophy of 
standardisation of NDA techniques and optimisation 
of the calibration activity for a series of nominally 
identical detector systems. 
to be open to use a new librarv for nuclear 
data, detector heads, analog electronic chains, shift 
registers, reference sources (Cf252, Pu), nuclear 
material type, and statistical parameters. 
to be ported to Windows 3 and OS/2 to allow 
multi-tasking use. Multi-tasking is the possibility to 
create multiple virtual machines executing 
concurrently several jobs, for instance together with 
MGA for High Resolution Gamma Spectroscopy or 
Calorimetry or other applications that research will 
suggest. This is still possible in the Windows 3 
environment if the appropriate hardware is used. An 
interesting improvement introduced by multitasking in 
the NDA field is the possibility to run different NDA 
programs at the same time. We plan a 
Gamma/Neutrons NDA workstation where PECC can 
use the isotopic composition files produced by 
PuMeter. PuMeter is an instrument for the plutonium 
isotopic composition evaluation based on gamma 
spectrometry. PECC can evaluate the Pu content of a 
sample, previously measured by PuMeter, while the 
PuMeter itself is measuring another one. 
In the end it should be pointed-out that porting 
of the PECC software package to the much more 
powerful OS/2 operating system will involve very 
little software effort. 
1 -
2-
I' 
to store measurement files on hard disk, which 
constitutes, a complete set of data useful for funher 
analysis with a Relational Database Management 
System. 
to connect the NDA .trument to its 
headquaners in a network · td to down load 
inspection data in a sr and easy way. Headquaners 
will be used for aata evaluation and statistical 
analysis of many inspections. 
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INSPECTION UTILITIES HELP 
- Ins~ectlon Setup. - VIew File UlbrBr1 Inspection>. - On-line Help. 
- ConflgurBtlon Setup. - Make and Delete sotoplc Com8osltlon Batch File. -Topics. 
- BBckground MeBsurement. - BBckup Bnd Restore Isotopic omposltlon BBtch File. 
- Performance Check. - BBckup Bnd Restore Inspection. 
- Ve· · -:Btlon MeBsurement. 
'----
Figure I - Flow scheme of the programme 
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I INSPECTION I 
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INSPECTION SET UP .::---, 
- Define Inspection Parameters. 
LIBRARY I / CONFIGURATION SET UP -Shift Register Twe. 
: !J:l:~~~ Tclfn~lflcatlon. 
- Normalization Source tcf252 or Plutonluml 
- Material T UPS· 
I 
I I I 
BACKGROUND MEASUREMENT PERFORMANCE CHECK VERIFICATION MEASUREMENT 
- Update Normalisation Source. - Sample Descrlrctlon. 
- Meesure Normalisation Source. - Update Isotop c Composition. 
- Validate lnpt.!ts. - Meesure Semple. 
- Correct for Beckgr'OJ!'Id and Deed Time. - Validate Input. 
- Compute Efficiency Correction Value. - Correction for Background end Dead Time. 
- Correction for Multiplication. 
-Assay. 
Figure 2 - Flow scheme of the "Inspection procedure" 
I MEASURE l 
I c' > 
MEASURE SET UP LIBRARY 
- S~le Description. !.C. Semple 
- !so oplc Composition Selection. 
- Measure Parameters. 
I 
MEASURE 
-Instrument Check lAccldantel/Total Testl 
- Statistical Check 
I 
CORRECTIONS 
!"-._.-" 
- Dead Time. 
- Back~OUld 
- Elec ronlc Drift. 
- Detector Hood Cross Reference. 
-Others (Container -l 
LIBRARY 
- Isotopic Composition Updating. 
- Mul tlpllcatlon Correction. 
I 
ASSAY 
- Using Coincidence C01.nts Corrected for Mult~lcatlon Factor. 
- Using Coincidence Counts not Corrected for ltlpllcetlon Factor. 
Figure 3- Aow scheme of the "Verification procedure" 
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EURA-RESCTR I CTED C I RCULA Tl ON 
Passive neutron Interrogation Procedure 
PECC Ver 1.1 (30/04/1991) 
DIRECTORATE OF EURATOH SAFEGUARDS 
DCS (LUXmOURG) I JRC ( ISPRA) 
INSTAllATION 
INSPECTOR 
DETECTOR HEAD N. 
:IIONAHE 
:HAUCD 
:ECC2 
HBA aba INSPECTION N. :2H11-111-JOH 
HETHOD OF DATA INPUT :FILE I HSTRUHEHT TYPE : HlHCC _I I 
HATERIAl TYPE :PU02 lnspechon datE :21/03/1991 
INSTRUHENT OPERATING PARAHETERS 
H.V. :1700 V Predelay (TD) : 4.500000 s S.R. Gate (TG) :64 s 
Dead Tiae Coefhc1ents: a = 6 .200000e-007 s b = 2.000000e-013 s 
BACKGROUND COUNTING (lnstruaent: HLNCC_II Date: 30/04/1991) 
Counting tiae :100 (s) 
Heasured counhng rates 
Nuaber of repeh hons :10 
Total : 121.141000 +- 0.3481 (1/s) 
Reals :-0.001000 +- 0.0439 (1/s) 
INSTRUHENT PERFORMANCE CHECK USING 252Cf SOURCE S-240 !lnstruaent: HlNCC_II Date: 30/04/1991) 
Counting tiae :100 (s) 
Reference Reals Rate (updated) 
Heasured Reals Rate 
Normallsation Factor 
Huaber of repel! hons 
: 3464.917151 +- 0.0281 (1/s) 
: 3583.063972 +- 7.1325 (1/s) 
: 0.967026 +- 0.0019 (1/s) 
:10 
VERIFICATION HEASUREHENT: [xxy006.000] (lnstrumt: HUlCC_II Date: 30/04/1991) 
Saaple ldenti hcation 
Active I enght 
Fuel Batch Naae 
:xxy006 
:1 
:BATCH_2.BCH 
Haterial Descnphon: puo2 
OPERATOR DECLARED ISOTOPIC COHPOSITION AND HASS OF PLUTONIUH 
Isotopic coapos1hon date :01/11/1987 Aa241/Pu coapos1hon datE : 01111/1987 
Pu weight date :01/1111987 
H(Pu) (g) 1Pu238 (l) 1Pu(239) (1) 1Pu(240l (l) 1Pu(241) (4) 1Pu(242) Ill ' 1Aa241/Pu (ppil 
OlD V~lUES: 747.70000 1. 72060 58.09570 24.76810 9. 77070 5.o4460 
UPDATED VAl: 735.98716 1. 70041 59.01451 25.15304 8.39763 5. 73441 
alpha: 0. 91844 ii(24U)Eq: 282.54605 
Counting T ue: 100 I sl Nuaber of repehhon: 5 
T R+A To Rp SIQ(Rp) 
10695189 74034609 732043~3 106951.89 8302. n 121.34 
10696249 74039302 n229043 106962.49 8102.59 1::1.35 
10702559 74145156 73303081 1070Z5.59 94~0. 75 1~1.43 
10104199 74177863 73325677 107041.99 8521. Bb 1~1.45 
10703~16 74139914 73310160 107032.16 9297.54 1~1.43 
53501611 370536844 36o372Z94 107003.2~ 83Z9.10 
BACKGROUND, HDR"AliSATIDN AND DEAD mE CORRECTED 
:B11U57773 +- 6~.4518 (1/s) Totals Rate :103714.748419 +- Z24.3lb5 (1/sJ 
HUl TIPLICATION CORRECTED VALUES 
R;;al s Rate :5127.464233 +- 40.0871 (1/SI :1.095992 
Before t1ul t. Corr. 
~Iter Mult. Corr. 
DATA EVALUTATION 
m(240)eq (g) m(Pul• (g) 1-0 
~ao.339440 +- 3.9156 no.2:ms +- 10.1995 -5.747863 
274.719576 +- 2.4921 715.o00455 +- 6.4915 -20.386707 
Acr;;pted result (YES/NO): NO 
Co~•Ents 
Figure 4 - Printed repon of the Verification 
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(I-0)/0 
-0.790973 
-2.769981 
14241.00000 
29673.05806 
Slgr(Rp) 
N of Sig 
-0.56:546 
-3.140546 
1.46 
1.50 
1.44 
1.43 
1. 46 
0.65 
Date: 13:49 
Material TYr------------------4 K(Ke~~tKc): 
~iew File Bgk: 
Make Batch File Rates lOut. 
Totals Totals Real 
Copy !nsp.HD->FD 
Copy iNsp.FD->HD 
Copy Hatch HD->FD 
Copy bAtch FD->HD 
Figure 5 - User interface : Utilities 
!la , , J.R.C. lspra- Euratom Safeguards' Directorate Luxeinbui'{)'<PECC' 2.0' ',' · 111111 
[n s p 1: ctitm !ltilities (~Oil .tlelp 
Pl.UIOHIUM 
Date: 03/05/1991 Tiae: 13:40 
Material Type: PU02 K(Ke~~tKc): 
Menu Bgk: 
Method Data Input: JSR-11 I' Method List I 
Instruaent Type: Hl.HCC_ 11 1- '!Ype List ,' I 
Detector Head Huaber: DEI6 1-', Head List, ,, I 
Horaalisation Source: G-240 1- Cf252 , List -, I L- __ - PU List ,,J 
Material Type: PU02 l,:a_!terial List I 
lfJiatk9tliuni:t ::.teas~ 
' ' <;.. ' ' I L< ep~·,t'Qt~lmj;(~:- cth~(:k: 1 IY..t·.ril:.tt~j.ir:~~,ti:, ~~~~l~·-·1 
l:cQnt'r9J:,_ cl:mt:~:r, 1 
Figure 6 - User interface : Menu 
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Abstract 
The programme A.E.C.C. (Active Euratom 
Coincidence Counters) has been developed at the Joint 
Research Center, Jspra by the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate, Luxembourg and the Safety Technology Institute, 
Jspra for the acquisition, evaluation, management and 
storage of measurement data originating from active neutron 
interrogation of H.E.U. and L.E.U. fuel materials. The 
software accommodates the implementation of the NDA (Non 
Destructive Assay) procedures for the Active Well 
Coincidence Counters and Active Neutron Coincidence 
Counters deployed by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, 
Luxembourg. 
Overview of the system 
The Programme AE.C.C., /1,2,3/, was developed to 
satisfy Euratom's requirements for a software package 
capable of evaluating, managing and storing measurement 
data acquired by the Neutron Coincidence Counter (NCC) 
family of detectors, /8/. The programme therefore complies 
with Euratom's philosophy of standardisation for Non 
Destructive Analysis (NDA) techniques and optimisation of 
the calibration activity for a series of nominal identical 
detector systems. 
AECC (Fig. 1) belongs to a family of NDA 
instruments, nl that has been designed according to a general 
framework for a Safeguards integrated data evaluation 
system. AECC is an example of the state of the art in the 
NDA workstation field. This generation of NDA instruments 
was designed and developed by the JRC Ispra in synergy 
with the EC Safeguards Directorate to cover the functions an 
inspector performs during the field activities, /5/. In the 
frame of this cooperation, the AECC workstation was 
constructed with the following design guidelines: 
- Inspection summary 
- Inspection procedure support 
- Data post-processing 
- Intelligent assistance 
- Minimize user input 
An Inspection, from the user point of view, is the set 
of the declared and measured data collected during an 
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inspection campaign. The system internally handles the files 
concerning with the background, the performance check and 
the sample measurements, active and passive configuration 
(with and without the inten·ogation source/s, respectively), 
fast and thermal configuration (with and without the Cd-
liner) and correlates them to achieve the final results (Fig. 1), 
/6,9/. The internal software structure is hidden from the user, 
thus avoiding a need to remember names and parameters 
during the phases of data post processing or down loading to 
a headquarters station. The macro-operations the user is 
concerned with are related to the inspection; the system will 
expand them into more primitive functions that get advantage 
from the powerful software architecture. All data that make 
up an inspection can be handled as one item. For instance 
to back-up or to restore an inspection from a diskette 
takes a single command, /10/. 
Inspection procedure support means that the user 
(i.e. the inspector) is guided along the activities being 
performed in an inspection: set up of the detector chain 
being used; selection of the proper normalization source and 
material type; performance of background and performance 
check measurements; and finally, the description and 
measurement of samples. 
Data post-processing (Head quarter analysis) 
provides the tools to retrieve data from an old inspection and 
to process them. The user may verify the results or test the 
effect produced by changing an input parameter. The system 
allows the user to change any input par.uneter without 
affecting the primary data files. 
Intelligent assistance means that the instrument 
provides powerful on line help that contains all the 
information the user may need during his inspection activity. 
Minimize user input means that a great amount of 
input data can be provided to the measurement system with 
a minimum number of selections rather then be repeatedly 
entered via keyboard. The characterization parameters of the 
specific shift register device, detector head and normalization 
source used during an inspection are constant, and can be 
identified with names. 
AECC provides a library containing the description of 
these objects, the material types and their associated 
calibration curves, /4,5,9/. Data selection is guided by the 
system that shows only objects compatible with the 
previously selected ones. In this way input data acquisition 
is simple, fast and safe, data are always consistent and 
clerical errors are avoided. Libraries are made up with 
standard ASCll files (Fig. 2) and therefore can be handled 
off line, i.e. adding an object to the library requires no 
changes to the program. 
The programme is structured in such a way as to 
provide the user with a define library of instrument types 
such as the A WCC, and ANCC, /1 ,2/. Calibration data is 
available for various categories of high enriched uranium 
such as HEU metal, U02 powders or material test reactor 
(MTR), fuel elements and low enriched uranium Light Water 
Reactor (LWR) fuel assemblies, /4,5,8,9/. 
The operating characteristics for all detectors are 
stored as ASCII files in data libraries together with 
appropriate factors used to describe the relationship between 
detectors of the same instrument type. The programme can 
thus manage and evaluate measurement data acquired by a 
registered Euratom detector using a universal calibration 
established for a given material category and instrument type. 
The operating performance of any detector can be 
monitored using one from a library of registered Cf252 sources 
or associated Am-Li sources, /8/. The measurement data 
acquired during subsequent inspection activities can always 
be normalised if the operating performance or conditions of 
the detector vary significantly from the time of calibration. 
The programme incorporates several test procedures to assure 
that the instrument is functioning correctly and that no 
erroneous data is registered for subsequent evaluation. The 
criteria for the tests can be set by the superuser, /1,2/. 
The programme also allows for the correction of 
measurement data on materials which contain thermal 
neutron poison following elaborate techniques established 
either as a part of the measurement procedure or using 
archive data. 
The programme provides a printed report, (Fig. 3) 
including the raw measurement results, the operators 
declaration, and the data evaluation. It can also store the 
information in data files for archive purposes. 
To assure proper maintenance and consistency in its 
application two level of access to the programme are 
permitted. Apart from routine access and execution by the 
user (Inspector), the Supervisor (Head quarters) can also 
modify parameter and data files to update the contents of the 
libraries of calibrations or detectors and perform reevaluation 
of archive data if required. 
AECC provides a powerful on-line help which the 
inspector can access from any point of the program. Help 
automatically shows the operation the inspector was 
performing. An on demand help index is shown, and the 
inspector can navigate on-line help himself. The on-line help 
function may be used either as a user procedure or as a guide 
to recovering from errors. The software has a series of built 
in error trapping procedures (Fig. 4) ensuring consistency 
in it's execution. 
AECC provides the inspector with some utilities that 
simplify operations correlated with inspection activity. The 
most important are: 
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View File. Allows the user to select and 
display any file belonging either to the library or to 
an inspection, the displayed file can be sent to the 
printer. 
Make Batch File I Delete Batch File. These 
two utilities allow a user to introduce (or delete) the 
isotopic composition of a new batch. During sample 
analysis the inspector needs only to select the name 
of the batch the sample belongs to. 
Copy Inspection. These utilities allow a user 
to copy from Hard Disk to Floppy Disk (and vice 
versa) all files related to an inspection. After a copy 
to Floppy Disk the inspection can be erased from 
Hard Disk to free disk space. 
Hardware environment 
The system is built for different types of elaboration 
and acquisition hardware (Jomar-11, SCRD) either connected 
through RS232 or AT/PS2 bus link. In fact the hardware 
drivers are loaded during system set up according to the user 
requirements. This approach allows a user to add new drivers 
and therefore to handle new data acquisition instruments with 
very few software modifications. 
PECC and its family of NDA instrument has been 
designed to use the PC hardware technology. This PC 
hardware technology offers a modular and highly 
standardized platform of interfaces and peripherals, which 
can be easily tailored to user requirements. On the other 
hand, the PC high computing power at low cost and space 
requirements makes the past generation of dedicated systems 
completely obsolete. 
Software environment 
The software is written in the programming language 
"C" by Microsoft version 5.1. The Windows Development 
Tools version 2 has been implemented to provide an 
enhanced user-friendly interface, that is becoming world-wide 
a standard. The parting to Windows 3 is scheduled for 
completion the end of this year. The programme runs under 
the operating system MS-DOS version 3.3 with the 
microprocessor INTEL 80286 or 80386 with math 
coprocessor. The user dialogue is controlled either via the 
keyboard or by a mouse pointing device or by trackball. The 
dialogue is menu driven allowing the user to easily select any 
required feature of the programme. 
The Microsoft Windows environment meets our needs 
of an event driven, modeless and graphic user interface. 
Event driven means that the user generates events that the 
program captures, interprets and responds to; this is in 
contrast with the conventional interface where the program 
asks the user for some actions. Modeless means that the user 
is not trapped into a fixed sequence of events, but can freely 
roam from one procedure to another. Graphic means that the 
user, during his interaction with the program, manipulates 
pictures which are descriptive of the actions associated with 
them. In this environment data input can be handled either by 
mouse, trackball, or via keyboard. When a selection is 
needed the system shows the list of items available in the 
current environment; the user has only to select the desired 
item. 
Overview of the inspection procedure 
An inspector using AECC during his inspection 
campaign has to deal with the following operations: 
I) open and define the new inspection. The user 
is asked to insert the inspection parameters; the 
inspection name, the location and the inspector name. 
This new inspection is the working inspection until 
another one will be opened. 
11) set up the environment. The user is asked to 
select the shift register device, the detector head and 
the normalization source he is going to use. 
Environment set up can change during the inspection. 
If it happens the user is required to perform a new 
background and a new efficiency check measurement. 
The system allows the user to handle different types 
of acquisition hardware either connected through 
RS232 or AT/PS2 bus link. 
liD perform background measurements. The user 
is asked to introduce the counting time and the 
number of measurements to be performed. Computed 
background value is valid until a new background 
measurement is performed. 
IV) perform performance measurements. The user 
supplies the counting time and the number of 
repetitions of the sample measurement. Data coming 
from the shift register are checked for consistency, 
outlier data are rejected. The computed efficiency 
correction factor value is used until a new 
performance check measurement is performed. 
V) perform cycles of sample verification 
measurements. For each sample measurement the user 
is asked to introduce a few parameters describing the 
sample, to select its isotopic composition and to enter 
the counting time and the number of repetitions of the 
measurement. As for the performance check, 
measurement outlier and inconsistent data are 
automatically rejected and substituted with new 
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repetitions. The verification results are displayed and 
stored on the hard disk, and an exhaustive report on 
the verification measurement is printed out. 
Conclusions 
We predict that further evolution in NDA 
instrumentation technology will take place especially in the 
directions of multitasking, networking and intelligent 
assistance. The planned porting to Windows 3 will give us 
the appropriate environment to meet all these requirements. 
AECC and its family of NDA instrument has 
been designed : 
to use the PC hardware technology, because 
PC hardware technology offers a modular and highly 
standardized platform of interfaces and peripherals, 
which can be easily tailored to our requirements. On 
the other hand, the PC high computing power at low 
cost and space requirements makes the past 
generation of dedicated systems completely obsolete. 
to support a multi-instrument type, multi-
detector and multi-material category environment. 
to comply with Euratom's philosophy of 
standardisation of NDA techniques and optimisation 
of the calibration activity for a series of nominally 
identical detector systems. 
to be open to use a new library for nuclear 
data, detector heads, analog electronic chains, shift 
registers, reference sources (Cf252, AmLi), nuclear 
material type, and statistical parameters. 
to be ported to Windows 3 and OS/2 to allow 
multi-tasking use. Multi-tasking is the possibility to 
create multiple virtual machines executing 
concurrently several jobs, that research will suggest. 
This is still possible in the Windows 3 environment 
if the appropriate hardware is used. An interesting 
improvement introduced by multitasking in the NDA 
field is the possibility to run different NDA programs 
at the same time. In the end it should be pointed-out 
that porting of the AECC software package to the 
much more powerful OS/2 operating system will 
involve very little software effort. 
to store measurement files on hard disk, which 
constitutes, a complete set of data useful for further 
analysis with a Relational Database Management 
System. 
to connect the NDA instrument to its 
headquarters in a network and to down load 
inspection data in a safe and easy way. Headquarters 
will be used for data evaluation and statistical 
analysis of many inspections. 
1 -
2 -
3 -
4-
5 -
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B A T C H F I L E 
BATCH FILE NAME: 
IPU238: 
IPU239: 
IPU240: 
IPU241: 
IPU242: 
IAM241: 
IS COMP DATE: 
IAM_24()ATE: 
PU_DATE: 
batch 1. bch 
.1993-
70.9554 
24.5829 
3.2876 
.9752 
10207 
01/H/1987 
01/11/1987 
01/11/1987 
Figure 2 - Typical ASCII file of the programme 
EURA-RESCTRICTED CIRCULATION 
Passive neutron interrogation Procedure 
me ver 1.00 103/05/19911 
DIRECTORATE OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS 
DCS !LUXEMBOURG) I JRC IISPRA) 
INSTALLATION 
INSPECTOR 
DETECTOR HEAD N. 
:prova 
:nnnn 
:EURO! 
MBA :aba 
:KEYBOARD 
:U02 I 35\1 
INSPECTION N. :5-11-111-esa 
METHOD OF DATA INPUT 
MATERIAL TYPE Date 
INSTRUMENT TYPE :mRKAL_2 
:03/05/1991 
INSTRUMENT OPERATING PARAMETERS 
H.V. :1100 V Predelay ITDI : 1.500000 s S.R. Gate ITG) :6! s 
Dead Tiae Coefficients: a = : 6.800000e-007 s b = :2.200000e-013 s 
BACKGROUND COUNTING !Instrument: THERMAL_2 Date: 03/05/19911 
Counting tiae :100 Is) 
Measured counting rates 
Nuaber of repetitions :1 
Total : 35.580000 1- 0.5965 11/s) 
Reals : 0.020000 1- 0.0424 11/sl 
INSTRUMENT PERFORMANCE CHECK USING Aa-Li SOURCE 
llnstrumt: THERMAL) Date: 031051!991) 
Counting tiae :100 Is) Nuaber of repetit1ons :1 
Reference Totals Rate !updated) : 17166.705703 1- 0.0000 11/sl 
Measured Totals Rate : 17J15.659807 1- 13.2446 111sl 
Ke I electronic) : 0.982869 1- 0.0015 11/s) 
VERIFICATION MEASUREMENT: 
!Instrument: THERMAL) Date: 03105119911 
[SAMPLE5.000J 
Sa!ple Identification :SAKm5 Material Description: U02 
Declared Enrichment 1235UI :35.0000 \ Declared 235U lql: 100.0000 
Declared Poison [J :0.0000 ppa Declared Concentration lppa of 235UI: 0.0000 
Active Jenght :0 cm 
Counting Time: 1000 lsl Nuaber of repetition: 
T R+A A Tp Rp sig IRpl 
2980556 983958 568558 2980.56 415.40 1.25 
2980556 983958 568558 2980.56 415.40 I. 25 
BACKGROUND, NORMALISATION AND DEAD TIME CORRECTED 
Totals Rate :2921.14156! 1- 2.8781 11/sl Rea!s Rate :40U9J450 •- 1.3782 11/sl 
Normalisation Factor IK = Ke • Kc • Kcc • Kp I : 0.982869 1- 0.0015 11/sl 
Kc I cross reference I : 1.000000 +- 0.0000 Ills) 
Kcc I container cor.) : 1.000000 1- 0.0000 11/sl 
Kp I poison cor.) : 1.000000 +- 0.0000 11/sl 
DATA EVALUTATION 
Declared mass 235U 101 :100.000000 
Measured mm 2JIU Ill :97.953523 •- 0.0000 Ill Error on ms. mass 235U l\1 :0.000000 
I I - 0 I lgl :-2.046477121 
I I - 0 I I 0 1\1 :-0.000205 
N. of Sigm 121 I Ill :-0.020892 
Accepted result IYESINO): YES 
Conents 
Figure 3 - Printed repon of the Verification 
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s1gr IRpl 
0.30 
0. JO 
= J.R.C. lspra Euratom Safeguards Directorate Luxemburg PECC 2.0 
Date: 
Haterial Type: 
Qate: 
0 WARHIHG:Background Data Hissing 
14:51 
Installation=l~i_s_p_r_a ________ ~ ins~ection H.: 11-11-111-accj 
!!_BA: itlspector Id: Ll•_a_u_r_o ________ ~ 
Figure 4 - User interface : error trapping 
490 
Help 
llmiDI..OOY IF Sf.AHDARD (Eli'IFICATHII ~ CALIBRATI(II 
IF NEUTIDi 001~1~ OOUNTERS 
V. F. Kos1tsyn, A. E. Konyaev, S. A. Kozhukhovskaya 
A.A.Bochvar's All-Union Scientific Research 
Institute of Inorganic Materials, Moscow, 
USSR 
Abstract 
The paper presents the methodology 
of standart certification for 
calibration of 
counters. The 
neutron 
developed 
coinc1dence 
approach 
assun~es the cert1f1cation of standards 
by the magnitude of quantity of 
neutron flux and spontaneous fission 
activity 2 " 0 Pu. In this case the 
number of needed physical standards is 
significantly reduced, Metrologic 
characteristics are given for n~etal 
specimens SP-1 and SP-2 used as 
prin~y standards of a neutron flux 
and spontaneous fission activity 2 ~0 Pu 
that belong to the standard complexes 
SRS 1D-5-88 and SRS 6-18-88. 
Introduction 
Non-destructive n~ethods of 
detection of special nuclear materials 
contain1ng plutonium by the 
passive neutron assay (espec1ally 
neutron co1ncidence methods) are 
widely used in nuclear technology both 
to control the processes of spent 
nuclear fuel regeneration and with 
analyt1cal purposes as well as to 
provide safeguards 1n the inspection 
act1vities of !AEA. Large families of 
instruments of different types and 
uniformity of neutron measuren~ents are 
not poss1ble without metrological 
support wh1ch is based on the 
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procurement and verification of 
phys1cal standards and cal1bration 
procedures. 
The widely employed n~ethod of 
instrUDient calibrat1on us1ng physical 
standards certified by different 
methods for the nuclear material 
content, 1sotop1C and chem1cal 
compos1tions has son~e 
disadvantages. 
First, with a growing variety of 
samples and items analyzed by neutron 
methods the system of physical 
standards needed will be highly 
cumbersome and expensive. Second, 
calibration curves that establish the 
relat1onsh1P between the 1nstrUD1ent 
response and the nuclear materials 
content in an 1tem analyzed are 
substant1ally non-linear. And, third, 
even 1nsignificant variations between 
the isotopic and chemical 
compositions, shape, mass, density and 
structure of an item analyzed and a 
standard can significantly influence 
the response of an instrument and it 
is quite difficult to correct in th1s 
approach unaccount1ng for the physical 
processes of a response format10~ 
In this connection from our 
viewpo1nt the system of a n~etrolog1c 
support of pass1ve neutron n~ethods 
nust be based on standards certified 
for the magnitude of a physical 
quantity directly rreasured in an 
exper1ment i.e. a neutron flux and 
activity of a spontaneous fission of 
one of most characteristic nuclides 
11. 2/. Data on the isotopic and 
chemical compositions, mass, shape, 
density and structure of those 
standards must be considered to be 
reference ones. 
Then, the uniformity of neutron 
measuren~nts based on a procurement 
scheme. The rnagni tude of a unit of a 
standardized physical quantity 
istransferred from primary standards 
to secondary and working ones by the 
established methods. 
To certify primary standards, high 
accuracy ones, methods (both 
destructive and non-destructive) must 
be used that ensure the minimal error 
in the results of measurements. The 
methods of certification of secondary 
and working standards or instruments 
are specified by the procuren~nt 
scheme alOT\i With the guarantee errors 
at the selected confidence level for 
each level of the scheme. 
This paper 
methodology of 
standards of a 
describes 
certification 
neutron flux 
the 
of 
and 
activity of transactinium nuclide 
spontaneous f1ssion as well as the 
results of the inplementation of such 
an approach using, as an example, 
specimens of plutonium metal 
containing - 90% 240 Pu and minimum 
impurit1es certified as primary 
standards of a neutron flux and 2..1.ro Pu 
spontaneous f1ssion activity and 
included in the conplexes of standards 
of a neutron flux SRS 10-5-88 /31 and 
activity of radionuclide spontaneous 
fission SRS 6-16-88 /41. It soould be 
pointed out that the primary standards 
of a spontaneous fiss1on activity 2~0Pu 
were developed and certified for the 
first time in the measuring practice. 
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Methodology cl Procure.ent 
and Certification cl 
Standards cl Neutron Flux 
and Spcntaneaus Fission 
Activity 
240 Pu, 2 lf 4 Cm and 252 Cf are oost 
suitable nuclides for the production 
of standards. Pu is most preferable 
since its neutron energy spectrum and 
multiplicity distribution are 
characteristic of actually analyzed 
items. Besides, as conpared to 244 Cm 
and H 2 Cf, 2 "' 0 Pu has a much larger 
half-life /5/, which makes it 
unnecessary to introduce corrections 
for the radioactive decay of the major 
nuclide 1n a standard specimen. 
Plutonium metal spec1mens SP-1 and 
SP-2 were prepared containing - 90% 
mass 240 Pu and less than o, 3% mass 
impurities. After longterm 
mvestigations the specimens SP-1 and 
SP-2 were certif1ed by us and 
D. I. ~ndeleev's Institute of 
~trology for the first time in the 
measuring practice as a primary 
standard of 240 Pu spontaneous fiss1on 
activity. 
The primary Standard of a Unit of 
Radionuclide Spontaneous Fission 
Activity SRS 6-16-88 is a complex of 
primary standards that serve to 
preserve and transfer a size of a 
radionuclide activity unit GET 6-84 to 
secondary and working reference 
standards to increase the accuracy and 
provide the uniformity of radionucl1de 
spontaneous fission activity 
measurements. The following means of 
measurements form the conplex: 
- primary standards of radionuclide 
spontaneous fission activity 240 Pu 
base - SP-1 and SP-2 sources of the 
known isotopic composition, 
- comparator - neutron coincidence 
counter UNS-1 /41 serves to transfer 
the size of a spontaneous fission 
activity unit to the secondary and 
working standards of a radionuclide 
spontaneous fission activity. 
The primary standards of a 
spontaneous fission activ1ty (SP-1 and 
SP-2 sources) serve to preserve and 
transfer the s1ze of a spontaneous 
fission activ1ty unit from the pr1mary 
standard with the neutron co1ncidence 
counter UNS-1 to the secondary and 
working standards of a spontaneous 
fiss1on activity in the range from 20 
to 2•10 6 Bg and to the secondary 
neutron co1ncidence counters to 
measure the spontaneous f1Ssion 
activity within 20 - 2 •10 6 Bg by 
d1rect measurements. 
The method error 1n the neutron 
coinc1dence counter UNS-1 transfer of 
the activ1ty unit s1ze varies w1th1n 
0.5-1.5% at the confidence level of 
0.95 depend1ng on the nucl1de 
composition, shape and mass of sources 
ver1fied. The relative error 1n the 
certification of the secondary and 
work1ng standards of a spontaneous 
fiss1on activity varies in the range 
of 4.0-8.0% at the confidence level of 
0.95 and that for the neutron 
comc1dence counters varies from o. 5 
to 2. Ot. 
The secondary standards of a 
spontaneous fission activity are used 
to ver1fy the working standards as 
well as to certify commercial products 
w1th h1gh accuracy. The working 
standards and instruments are used for 
a technological control as well as for 
an analys1s of the content of 
spontaneous fiss1on nucl1des in items 
and commercial products. 
The neutron co1ncidence counter 
UNS-1 used as a comparator comprises: 
- a well type neutron detector 
incorporating a three-c1rcle assembly 
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of slow neutron counters with six, 
twelve and e1ghteen counters in the 
f1rst second and third circles, 
respectively, that are located in a 
polyethylene moderator around the 
central well as well as prearnplifiers, 
- units of high voltage power 
supply, pulse arnpllfication, shaping, 
dlscrimination, selection and 
registration that prov1de both the 
integral count1ng of all and 
individual groups of counters and 
select1on of time correlated 
spontaneous fission neutron in the 
CAMAC standard on-line with the LSI-11 
computer. The un1t of select1on uses 
shift-reg1ster logic and allow the 
analyses of double, triple and more 
coincidence. 
The rates of neutron counting and 
co1nc1dence w1th the source in the 
central well are proport1onal to the 
spontaneous f1ssion act1vity 
specified range ta1<1ng account 
in the 
of the 
nucl1de compos1tion, corrections for 
dead time, rad1ation background and 
self-multiplicatlon effect which 
determines the oomparision propert1es 
of the neutron co1ncidence counter 
UNS-1 when comparing between the 
activities of a verified source and 
the primary standard. 
The invest1gat1on of the 
metrolog1c characteristics of the 
pr1mary standard cons1sted in the 
1nvest1gation of the properties and 
the cert1fication of a primary set of 
2~0 Pu base spontaneous fiss1on sources 
SP-1 and SP-2 on a calorimeter UEA-5M 
and in the determ1nation of 
standardized characteristics of the 
neutron coinc1dence counter UNS-1 used 
as a comparator. 
The radionucl1de activity value of 
the source 1S determined from the 
results of measurements of the energy 
of the radiation em1tted by the source 
and the value of the energy emitted by 
a rad1onuclide per one event of a 
radioactive transforrnat ion. 
To reproduce the spontaneous 
fission activity quantity a 
differential double calorimeter was 
used having the high sensitiv1ty. 
The procedure is based on 
measuring the activ1ty of 2.4toPu 
radionuclide in sources rna1nly through 
the -decay and determination of the 
mass fraction of 2 " 0 Pu rad1onuclide on 
the basis of the results of those 
measurements. Knowing the mass 
fraction of HoPu and the ratio of the 
half-lifes through the spontaneous 
fission and ~ -decay one finds the 
value of the activity A sF of~l' 0 Pu 
spontaneous fission in the source from 
the formula 
(1) 
where A <:A is the o( -activity of a 
radionuclide in a source, To( is a 
half-life through d.. - particle 
emission, TsF is a spontaneous fiss1on 
half-life. 
For2~ 0 Pu T~ = 6563 ± 7 years /5/, 
11 T5F= (1.15 + 0.03)•10 years /6/ were 
chosen. 
For 2 ~ 0 Pu the ratio of the specific 
heat fluxes W ~ - through the o( -decay 
and W s F - through the spontan~cus 
fission iS 
(2) 
'Wo~,. At~. E"' T&FEol.. 5 
= =5•10 , 
W SF A~FE SF Tt~. E SF 
where E<:A and E SF are average energies 
released on the d.. -decay and 
spontaneous fission, respectively. 
Thus the heat flux of the 2 4 0 Pu 
spontaneous fission can be neglected. 
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Tak1ng account of the fact that SP-1 
and SP-2 sources have other 
radionuclide impurit1es the 
corresponding corrections are 
introduced into the results of 240 Pu 
spontaneous fission activ1ty 
measurements. The content of 241 Am 
accumulated as a result of the 
ol.. -decay of~'t 1 Pu (T,12 = 14.64 years ( /5/) was taken into account by 
calculation assum1ng the absence of 
Am from plutonium at the moment of 
a source preparation and agrees w1th 
the results of the r-spectrometric 
determination (table 1). 
Table 1. 
Metrologic Characteristics of 
Priavy Standards of 24 0 Pu 
Spontaneous Fission Activity 
(~1 and ~2 sources) 
Source SP-1 
M9ss, g 82.93 
Dens1ty, g/cm : 17.10 
: M9ss fraction 1.3 
:of 241 Am,% 
I 2'10 A J3q 
I SF , : 3. 640..-E4 
: (calorimetric 
:method), p .. o. 991 
:Neutron flux, 18.775..-E4 
: s _,, P=O. 95 ( 1. 4%) 
I 
I 
I 2lfOA Rn 
I Sff"'"'t 
:(neutron 
: method) , P=O. 951 
: M.lltiplication: 
:coefficient 
3.64..-E4 
(2. 0%) 
1.124 
(0. 3%) 
SP-2 
41.46 
17.10 
1.3 
1. 828..-E4 
4.290..-E4 
(1. 5%) 
1. 83..-E4 
(2. 0%) 
1. 095 
(0. 2%) 
a4to 
In June 1987 and May 1984 the Pu 
spontaneous fiss1on activ1ty 1n Sp-1 
and SP-2 sources was measured, the 
results of the measurement random 
error that does not exceed 0.2% (table 
1); this points to the stability of 
the fission activity values of the 
primary standards under study and the 
absence of the unaccounted for 
radionuclide impurities from the 
sources. The systematic error is 4.0% 
and makes a decisive contribution to 
the total error of the certification 
of the primary standards through the 
SWIVIIing Up the errors 1n the 
determination of E"' - 0.1% that of 
T"' - 1. 0% and T !OF - 3. 0%. 
The results of the calorimetric 
measurements of the 240 Pu spontaneous 
fission activity in sources are in 
good agreement with the data 
determined by the method based on 
measuring a neutron flux from sources 
/6/ taking account of the average 
neutron multiplicity ~ = 2.156 /5/, 
the contribution made by neutrons of 
spontaneous fission of other 
transactinium nuclides taking place in 
source, neutrons of the (ci, n) -reaction 
on light impurity elements and the 
effect of neutron self-multiplication 
(table 1). 
Along with the primary standards 
to certify means of measurements of 
the radionuclide spontaneous fission 
activity we use secondary standards of 
2 52 er spontaneous fission act 1 Vi ty 
based on californium sources of a SNC-
type 171. Their metrologic 
characteristics are listed in table 2. 
The systematic error of the 
cert1fication is not more than 2.0% 
while the random one is 0.6%. 
The systemat1c component of the 
method error in the neutron 
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Table 2 (a. b) 
Metrolagic ~ristics ot 
Secondary Standards ot 2 52 er 
~ Fission Activity 
(as Of 01. 04. 8'1) 
a) 
Calorimetric method 
Source 
number 
A, Bq (P = 0.95) 
3-6/07 1. 162'11<E6 
1-06/04 1. 394'11<E5 
b) 
Neutron method 
Source 
number : Neutron flux, : 
-1 
: s , (P=O. 95) 
3-6/07 
:1-06/04 : 
4.40'11<E6 
( 1. 4%) 
5.12'11<E5 
(2. 0%) 
A, Bq, 
(P=O. 95) 
1. 17'11<E6 
( 1. 7%) 
1. 36'11<E5 
(2. 2%) 
coincidence counter UNS-1 transfer of 
the magnitude of the spontaneous 
fiss1on activity quantity was 
calculated according to GOST 8.207-76 
tak1ng account of the following: 
8,= 0.5%- the systematic error 
due to the uncertain values of the 
self-multiplication coefficients of 
neutrons in the sources 161. 
02= 0.1%- the systemat1c error 
due to the uncertainty in the dead 
time of neutron coincidences. 
e~= 0.2%- the systematic error 
due to the nonlinearity or the neutron 
coincidence counter UNS-1 in the 
verification range. 
The instability or the UNS-1 
operation does not exceed 0.13% for 8 
hours. 
Thus, the method error in the 
neutron coincidence counter UNS-1 
transfer or the magnitude or the 
spontaneous fission activity quantity 
is 0. 5-1.5% at confidence level 0. 95 
depending on the nuclide composition, 
shape and mass or sources cert1fied. 
~lusicns 
The metroloiiC characterist1cs or 
the available primary standards or a 
neutron flux and 2 4c 0 Pu spontaneous 
fission activity show that in 
principle it is posssible to use them 
for the high accuracy calibration or 
neutron coincidence counters. 
Besides it is anticipated that 
cal1brat1on procedures may be 
developed for neutron coincidence 
counters using the standards or the 
Pu spontaneous fission activity 
as well as the certif1cation method 
w1dely used be the IAEA for measurin~I 
californium sources (of CR-5 type) by 
the effictive spontaneous fiss1on 
activity or 240 Pu. Neutron detectors 
or the efficiency m:>re than 45% and 
neutron coincidence selectors are to 
be used for this purpose. 
To increase the accuracy or the 
californium source certification using 
the primary standards or 12..1foPu 
spontaneous fission activity the real 
neutron leakage multiplicity 
distribution calculations are to be 
performed for tne latter by the M:>nte-
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Carlo method 1n 
approximation. 
the 
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IEIERIIIHATIC»> (F 240 PU SIUITANBD3 
FISSION HALF-LIFE 
s. A. Kozhukhovskaya, A. E. Konyaev, V. F. Kositsyn 
A.A.Bochvar•s All-Un1on Scientific Research 
Institute of Inorgan1c Materials 
~scow, USSR 
The improvement of accuracy of 
nuclear physics data of transactinium 
nuclides, namely half-llves 
determination, is of vital importance 
for the development of nuclear physics 
assay and monitoring methods and 
ensuring their reliabllity. The 
half-life of~_40 Pu due to J.-radiation 
has been determined to be 6563+7 
years. 
The value of l'to Pu half-life due 
to spontaneous fission has not been 
precisely determined until recently. 
It varied from 1. 15•10 ·H to 1. 47•10 11 
years. 
The value of 2"'0 Pu spontaneous 
fission half-life was obtained using 
results of precision neutron flux 
measurements from two spherical metal 
plutonium samples with 2.L,o Pu content 
of about 90% and impurities less then 
0. 3%. 
The effect of self-rnultipllcation, 
specif1c neutron fluxes of ( ~ ,n)-
reactions and spontaneous fission of 
23€ Pu and 2 '~:2. Pu were taken into 
account. 
The obtained value of 240 Pu 
spontaneous fission half-life consists 
( 1. 15+0. 02) •10 H years. 
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1. Intraductic:m 
The improvement of accuracy of 
nuclear physics data of transact1n1um 
nuclides, namely half-lives 
determ1nation, is of vital importance 
for the developn~nt of nuclear physics 
assay and monitoring methods and 
ensuring their reliability. The 
half-life of 2 't0 Pu due to o( -radiation 
has been determ1ned to be 6563+7 
years 111. 
The value of 2 t,·o Pu half-llfe due 
to spontaneous fiss1on has not been 
precisely determined until recently. 
It varied from 1.15•10 11/11-12/ to 
1. 4 7•10 -tt years /8/. 
Integrated development of 
reference standard base carried out in 
A.A.Bochvar All-Union Scientific 
Research Institute of 
Materials jointly with 
D. I.Mendeleev All-Union 
Research Institute of 
Inorganic 
the NPO 
Scientific 
Metrology, 
introduction of working reference 
standards of the neutron flux unit SRS 
1D-5-88 and radionuclide spontaneous 
fiss1on activity SRS 6-16-88 besides 
ensuring the accuracy and unity of 
neutron flux and radionuclide activity 
measurements, contributed to a great 
extend to the refinement of the value 
of 2~0Pu spontaneous fission half-life. 
The value of T~~o = (1.15 + 0. 03)•10 11 
years was obtained earlier /12/ with 
account of the data of precision 
measurements of the neutron flux of Pu 
specimens having hiih J!.itO Pu content 
and the nultiplication effect in the 
specimen neutron intrinsic field, the 
contribution of neutrons of the 
Gi,n)-reaction on li~rht impurity 
elements and spontaneous fission of 
other transactinium nuclides present 
in the specimens, as well as the value 
of nultiplicity of neutrons, emitted 
during a single event of 240 Pu 
spontaneous fission, that equals 
(2.154 + 0.025) /141. The value of 
T 2 lt0 = ( 1. 160 + 0. 025) •10 11 years is Sf: 
currently recommended elsewhere in 
literature /1,2/. 
The determination of the ratio of 
Pu half-1 i ves due to cl. -decay and 
spontaneous fission, i.e. the indirect 
verification of T ~~0 obtained earlier, 
is within the scope of this paper. 
2. Materials and Etbad 
SP-1 and SP-2 specimens are (used 
included in SRS 6-16-88) as .24-0Pu 
spontaneous fission activity 
standards. These specimens having a 
spherical shape are manufactured from 
metal plutonium containing .- 90% of 
2.4o Pu and o. 3 mass % of impurities. 
Plutonium isotopic composition of 
SP-1 and SP-2 specimens is shown in 
Table 1. 
The specimens contained notable 
arounts of 2 ~ 1 Am accumulated due to 
Zl(f p -decay of Pu (T 1;~ = 14.35 + 0.10) 
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Table 1. 
Plutonium isotopic composition 
Isotope mass-fraction, % 
Pu-238 10"1cf-4 
Pu-239 7.71+0.01 
Pu-240 89.33+0.01 
Pu-241 2.79+0.01 
Pu-242 0.17+0.01 
years 111. Mass fraction of 2.'tf Am 
determined by the 'Y -spectrometric 
method was 1.1%. This value is well 
matched with the data calculated with 
account of the assumption that the 
spec1mens contained no 241 Am as 
manufactured. 
Certification of SP-1 and SP-2 
activity standards was carried out on 
the UEA-5M unit included in the 
radionuclide activity state primary 
standard. This unit implements the 
calorimetric method of activity 
measurements that proved to be the 
most uni versa! one. The reference 
standard certification technique is 
based on 24° Pu activity measurements 
in the sources, mainly due to o(-decay 
and subsequent determination of z~to Pu 
mass fraction. The value of 
spontaneous fission activity A s F- was 
determined With account of z~to Pu mass 
fraction and the ratio of half-lives 
due to spontaneous fission and 
d.. -decay, according to the following 
formula: 
where 
To<. 
A SF = Ao~-­
T<.:.F 
(1) 
Ac~., - -activity of24-0 Pu in a source, 
T o< - half-1 ife due to d.. -decay, 
T Sf - half-life due to spontaneous 
fission. 
The ratio of specific neutron 
fluxes W .x - due to d.. -decay and W 5 F-
due to spontaneous fission for E4-o Pu 
is calculated as follows 
(2) 
w~ AJ.Ec{ TSFE <><. ~ 
= = 
,...., 5*10, ,....,. 
'isF ASFE SI= T~ E SF 
where 
E <>< and E s F- - mean values of energy, 
released due to d. -decay and 
spontaneous fission, respectively. 
Thus, the value of 2.40 Pu spontaneous 
fission thermal flux may be considered 
negligible. As the material used for 
~1 and SP-2 sources contained other 
radionuclide impurities, certain 
corrections were introduced to the 
results of spontaneous fission 
act i Vl ty measurements. 
Simultaneously, SP-1 and SP-2 
sources were certified as neutron flux 
reference 1st grade standards included 
in the neutron flux working standard 
SRS 1D-5-88, permission of the 
custodian of the radionuclide activity 
working standard provided /141. The 
results of measurements of SP-1 and SP 
-2 metrologic characteristics are 
shown in Table 2. 
The results of Qi,O Pu spontaneous 
fission activity measurements in the 
sources /15/ obtained by the 
calorimetric method, are in accordance 
with the data, obtained using the 
method, based on measurements of 
neutron fluxes from the sources /12/ 
with account of the mean multiplicity 
of spontaneous fission neutrons 
v240 = 2.156 + 0.012, the contribution 
of neutrons of the (d.. ,n)-reaction on 
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light impurity elements and 
spontaneous fission of other 
transactinium nuclides as well as the 
neutron multiplication effect in the 
source intrinsic field (see Table 2). 
The measured neutron flux from the 
sources equals 
where 
N~~- spontaneous fission activity, 
N i;:; neutron flux due to ( J.. , n)-
reaction, 
(3) 
- spontaneous neutron multiplicity, 
MsF and Mo<l'\- multiplication factors 
in neutron intrinsic 
field due to spontaneous 
fission and the (o{ ,n)-
reaction, respectively. 
3. Results 
Table 2. 
Metrologic characterictics of the SP-1 
and SP-2 reference standards at the 
time of measurements 
Source 
characterist icsl 
mass, g 
density, g/cm 
mass-fraction 
of Am-241, r. 
alfa-activity 
of Pu-240 A.~,, Bq 
relative error 
,for Ac~,,r. 
I (P=D.99) 
SP-1 SP-2 
82.93+0.01141.46+0.011 
17.10+0.03'17.10+0.031 
1.1 1.1 
6.41*E+11 3.22*E+11 
0.1 0.2 
SF-aotivity of 3.6~+4 11.828.e+4 I 
Pu-240 Asr-• Bq 
(calorimetric 
method) 
random error 
for Asr-• % 
(P=O. 99) 
systematic 
error for AsF-•%• 
(P=O. 99) 
0.1 0.2 
4.0 4.0 
SF-activity of 3.648.e+4 1.~+4 
I 
Pu-240 ASF , 8q 
(neutron meth. ) 
random error 
I for AsF, % 
(P=-0. 95) 
systematic 
I 
error for A5F,% 
(P=O. 95) 
0.3 0. 3 
1. 7 1,9 
neutron flux Y, 8.655.e+4 4.2~+4 1 
s-i 
random error 
for Y, % 
(P=D. 95) 
systematic 
error for Y, % 
(P=O. 95) 
lllll t iplicat ion 
factor M 
random error 
for M, % 
(P=O. 95) 
I systematic 
lerror for M, % 
I (P=O. 95) 
0.3 0.3 
1.2 1.4 
1.124 1.095 
0.3 0. 2 
0.2 0.2 
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The value of N..<., equalled 10. 0+1. 0 
/12/. As No~n was less than U from N sF 
and the total spectrum of neutrons of 
the (o( ,n)-reaotion on light impurity 
elements differed insignific&ltly from 
the fission spectrum, it was assumed 
that 
M = M s r- = M o1... ( 4) 
The value of 240 Pu spontaneous 
fission activity in the sources was 
calculated from Eg.(3) using the 
neutron method (see Table 2). 
The ratio of spontaneous fission 
and d. -decay half-lives was derived 
from Eg.(1) 
' A SF 
= (5) 
TsF Ad.. 
The ratio equalled (5.6890.11)*10- 8 
that corresponds to the value of 
T s F = ( 1. 16+0. 02) *10 11 years at 
T c1.. = 6563+7 years 111. 
4.. llmclusian 
The obtained value of R 8 iS in 
accordance with the value of (5. 7+0.1) 
-8 
*10 , recommended in /1/. 
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LASCO: A PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING LABORATORY 
FOR CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUES 
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Joint Research Canter 
lspra, Italy 
Abstract 
The use of Containment and Surveillance 
(C/S) techniques for the implementation of 
nuclear safeguards has increased substantially 
in recent years. 
Sealing and identification systems are 
used on a large scale and video surveillance is 
replacing gradually film camera systems. 
Furthermore many C/S systems are operated in 
an unattended mode. 
In order to evaluate the performances and 
assurance which can be obtained from C/S 
systems, JRC has installed a laboratory, called 
LaSCo, for testing C/S components and 
systems, simulating, where possible, field 
conditions. 
This laboratory includes facilities for 
training inspectors, for instance for reviewing 
aid of video pictures, use of integrated 
multisensor systems, evaluation of ultrasonic 
sealing methods. 
Several years ago, JRC installed a 
performance laboratory for NDA, called PERLA, 
which is now extensively used. LaSCo is 
expected to play the same role as PERLA but in 
the field of Containment and Surveillance and 
by extension to non nuclear measurements (e.g. 
weighing, volume determinations). 
The newly built facilities and the first 
experimental lay-out of LaSCo are described. 
lt is expected that industry and inspectors 
will make extensive use of LaSCo. 
1. Introduction 
Physical verification activities performed 
by safeguards inspectors are presently largely 
based on the assay of nuclear materials by 
measurements. These measurements are 
traditionally subdivided in non destructive 
assay. techniques (NDA) and on sampling of 
mate~1al followed by destructive assay 
techmques (DA) for the determination of the 
chemical and isotopic composition of the 
nuclear materials. 
Sealing and surveillance techniques are 
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also applied extensively with the objective to 
assure the continuity of knowledge, after 
measurements have been performed, and to 
reduce in this way the re-verification 
frequency by assay methods. 
Depending on the part of the fuel cycle 
considered, the frequency of the application of 
material accountancy measurements and 
containment and surveillance (C/S) may be very 
different. As an example, C/S is used 
extensively in reactors and limited application 
is made of NDA. In bulk handling facilities (e.g. 
where the fabrication or reprocessing of 
nuclear fuel is performed) accountancy (assay) 
measures are largely applied and the frequency 
of the use of C/S is much more reduced, except 
in the storage areas. 
Important changes are taken place at 
present in the EC nuclear fuel cycle, in 
particular at the back end of the fuel cycle. 
They may be summarised as follows: 
a) The annual discharge of spent fuel 
assemblies is steadily increasing as new 
reactors are being installed. 
b) Two major reprocessing plants will be 
put into operation in the 1991-94 period, 
increasing the potential throughput by a factor 
of 7 to 8 in respect to the present situation. 
c) The throughput of MOX fuel fabrication 
for LWR is expected to increase by a factor 3, 
when the three or four new facilities will 
become operational. 
The direct consequences of these changes 
in the fuel cycle will be that not only the flow 
of nuclear materials but also the spent fuel and 
separated Pu on store will increase in an 
important manner. 
Furthermore, the reprocessing and MOX fuel 
fabrication plants are passing from pilot and 
prototype size to large industrial scale bulk 
handling facilities. This change in throughput 
brings with it an increased level of automation 
in the handling and processing of nuclear 
materials and, consequently, a greater 
difficulty of accessing this material. 
This new industrial development calls for 
techniques integrated in the process/storage 
areas and more specifically a more intensive 
use of C/S often to be operated in an 
unattended way. lt is, for this reason, urgent to 
draw more attention to the efficient and 
effective use of C/S systems. 
The safeguards technical features of the 
changes in the fuel cycle have been analysed by 
ESARDA during the Karlsruhe specialist 
meeting in 1988 (1) (2). 
2 Pedormance Assessment of Safeguards 
Measures 
DA and NDA techniques have been applied 
for more than two decades for nuclear 
materials management and verification 
activities. A large effort has and continues to 
be dedicated worldwide to establish the 
performances of these techniques for the 
different applications in the nuclear fuel cycle. 
Furthermore, many training courses are 
organised to familiarise and instruct 
inspectors in the use of NDA techniques. One 
may state that by enlarge well established 
procedures exist for the application of DA and 
NDA techniques and that for the existing fuel 
cycle a high standard of pedormance has been 
reached for applying these techniques 
satisfactorily. lt is important to maintain and 
continuously improve this standard of quality 
and this requires important resources from R 
and D and support organisations. Many papers 
have been presented in past years on the 
subject of performance assessment and more 
particularly on the methodologies applied to 
define them and on target or performance 
values (3) (4). 
If one considers the area of C/S the 
situation is very different. Seals and 
surveillance cameras have been used also for 
more than two decades. The performance of 
these techniques have not been evaluated in a 
systematic way. 
In fact, no clear approach or methodology 
has been designed in the field of safeguards to 
express the performance/assurance of a C/S 
device or a C/S system. 
Several attempts have been made to 
elaborate such a methodology (5) (6) and the 
IAEA has called for an expert meeting in 1989 
to better formulate the problem of 
characterising the performance of C/S devices 
and systems (7). 
From the existing studies, one can extract 
some elements which are directly related to 
the definition of the objectives of a 
pedormance assessment laboratory for C/S. 
Several technical characteristics 
define the performances of a C/S device 
(performance profile). This performance profile 
has to be compared or matched with the tasks 
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the C/S device is expected to fulfil! in a 
particular situation (task profile). 
Some of the technical performance 
characteristics can be expressed in numerical 
terms, even in some cases on an arbitrary scale 
(e.g. image resolution, illumination range and 
reliability). Other technical performance 
characteristics are very difficult to quantify 
numerically, such as tamper resistance, ease of 
application or verification of seal, and a figure 
of merit has to be assigned. 
The combination of the two types of 
performance characteristics is still an open 
question which should be addressed. 
This has as a consequence that there is no 
objective way of comparing the assay 
techniques with C/S and one has difficulties to 
define clear guidelines for applying in the most 
efficient way these different but powerful 
verification techniques. 
3. Objectives of LaSCo 
The JRC has taken an initiative to 
contribute to the difficult problem of 
characterising the performance and the proper 
use of C/S. A special laboratory called "LaSCo" 
(laboratory for Surveillance and Containment) 
has been established and the following 
objectives have been defined: 
a) performance assessment of C/S 
devices/systems 
b) demonstration and development of 
effective procedures for proper use of C/S in 
specific applications 
c) training of users for the application of 
different C/S techniques 
Figure 1 presents a general schema for 
these objectives. 
a) The assessment of performances will 
be made on C/S devices/systems or certain 
components, developed by JRC, other R/D 
laboratories and industry. Based on some 
experience gained at JRC with tests on fiber 
optic and ultrasonic sealing systems and at the 
EURATOM Safeguards Directorate on film 
camera systems, an analysis is now being made 
to develop a well defined schema and standard 
procedure for the systematic examination and 
testing of C/S devices under conditions 
representative of its final application. In other 
terms, one tries to define the technical 
performance characteristics and to establish 
performance profiles. 
b) Remonstration of proper use of C/S. One 
has to define the tasks or functions C/S is 
supposed to perform in a particular situation 
and select a device which has the appropriate 
performance profile (match performance 
profile and task profile). This will be done, for 
instance, by preparing mock-ups of containers 
or some storage areas and demonstrating the 
specific applications of different types of C/S 
devices. An important additional step is to 
describe in well defined procedures the proper 
use of the C/S in the particular application 
considered. 
c) Trajnjng of inspectors is obviously 
oriented to the practical applications of 
specific C/S techniques, including installation 
of sensors, signal processing, data evaluation 
and management. 
One may expect that after a proper 
assessment of performances has been made and 
training for the use of C/S devices/systems 
has been delivered with appropriate procedures, 
test in nuclear facilities is to be performed 
before final implementation is decided by the 
inspectors. 
As mentioned earlier, LaSCo, intends to 
contribute to a more efficient and effective use 
of C/S and in this sense to bridge the gap 
between laboratory developments and thejr 
application jn an jndustrjal environment. 
This same approach is applied since four 
years in PERLA for the implementation of NDA 
techniques and EURATOM and IAEA 
inspectorates are making extensive use of this 
facility. 
4. Lay-out of LaSCo 
The general lay-out of the LaSCo facility, 
constituted of a large hall, is presented in 
Figure 2. 
The hall (260 m2 ) is subdivided in 
different parts: 
training room which can accommodate 
up to 12 persons for general presentations or 
exercises; 
advanced storage area. A mock-up is 
assembled corresponding to horizontal and 
vertical storage cells of, for instance, Pu02 
cans or assemblies. This mock-up is being 
equipped with different C/S devices and remote 
handling equipment; 
control room for multisensor C/S 
systems of LaSCo and for the advanced storage 
area; 
general purpose laboratory; 
demonstration area for different 
sealing/identification and optical surveillance 
systems now being developed or applied, with 
display of instruments and explanatory posters. 
The laboratory, as illustrated above, has 
been completed in January 1991 and the 
experimental set-up are now being installed. 
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5. Planned Activities 
The activities planned for LaSCo have been 
defined in cooperation with C/S developers and 
Safeguards lnspectorates and are now briefly 
illustrated. 
a) In the advanced storage area, eight real 
size storage "cells" are being mounted and 
equipped with different types of seals (fiber 
optic, ultrasonic) and means of identification 
(bar codes ..... ). 
The containers in the cells will also be 
uniquely identifiable and sealed. 
Remote handling of cans will be tested 
using a computer aided teleoperation vehicle 
equipped with cameras for navigation and 
visual items identification. An arm is mounted 
on the vehicle for the extraction of samples 
(e.g. cans) out of a cell and simulating its 
positioning in front of a detector. A description 
of the characteristics (hard and software) of 
the teleoperated vehicle and its potential use 
has been made earlier (8) (9). 
Another subject in this context is the 
continuous and automatic verification both of 
the storage area and of the specific items. Two 
devices are being installed for this purpose. 
They are the multi ultrasonic sealing system 
(called VALSEUR) applied on each cell and/or 
container and a multi video camera system. 
They will be both integrated in a modular 
multisensor system still to be developed. 
The experimental lay-out of the 
advanced storage area will provide in general 
the opportunity to study C/S systems based on 
different combinations of new and traditional 
C/S devices and to perform long term test of 
these single devices. 
b) A multi sensor system is being 
assembled within the LaSCo hall for the 
surveillance of areas defined as "strategic". 
This system is similar to CAVIS (computer 
aided video system), now being used by 
EURATOM Safeguards Inspectors. lt will serve 
the purpose of demonstrating its capabilities, 
to perform long term testing, to provide 
training to inspectors and to test some 
components when upgrading is required. 
The recently developed laser beam 
surveillance system will also be installed for 
long term testing. 
c) A study is being made to compare 
different general purpose fiber optic seals 
under development or already in use. The 
performances will be tested systematically 
under different environmental conditions 
defined in a standard procedure. Furthermore, 
the procedures for the application of the 
different seals, including the data evaluation, 
will also be compared. 
d) Long term tests of the TITUS ultrasonic 
general purpose seal are being started and the 
identification/re-identification procedures are 
under preparation. 
e) The bulk measurement laboratory 
operated by IAEA at Vienna Headquarters for 
several years, has now been transferred to JRC, 
lspra. This laboratory is intended to test 
measurement techniques for the determination 
of masses of liquids in tanks. The measurement 
techniques considered are scales and meters 
for the determination of flow, levels and 
density, humidity and temperature. Training of 
inspectors and test of measurements 
procedures is the main purpose of this 
laboratory. The experimental set-up is 
temporarily installed in LaSCo and not directly 
related to C/S, but it offers a good opportunity 
to reflect on authentication of this type of 
measurement techniques, using for instance a 
surveillance system. 
Other initiatives are being studied for 
LaSCo: 
Reviewing of surveillance tapes is 
becoming of great interest, particularly in view 
of its potential to reduce manpower to perform 
this type of activity. An attempt is made to 
collect tapes with representative scenes of 
industrial operations which are of safeguards 
relevance. These tapes will be used as the basic 
material for the training of inspectors. 
6, Conclusions 
The use of C/S for verification activities 
is steadily increasing and the important 
changes at the back end of the nuclear fuel 
cycle will influence, to a large extent, future 
development and application of identification 
and surveillance techniques. 
lt is important to characterise the 
performance and the assurance which can be 
gained from C/S systems and from the 
combination of assay methods (DA/NDA) with 
C/S. 
The JRC, lspra has established a 
laboratory, operational since January 1991, 
which has the intention to contribute to the 
assessment of the performances of C/S, to 
demonstrate the effective and efficient use of 
these techniques and to provide training to 
inspectors. 
The present lay-out of the laboratory 
permits to study specifically the application of 
C/S in storage areas and to perform tests on a 
variety of general purpose seals. 
A second group of experiments are being 
made on volume/weight measurements in tanks 
and are provisionally installed in LaSCo. 
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Contacts are being established with 
safeguards inspectorates and potential users of 
industry to develop a comprehensive programme 
for future years. 
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ABSTRACT 
The transition from film camera to video surveillance 
systems, in particular the implementation of high-capacity 
multi-camera video systems, results in a large increase in 
the amount of recorded scenes. Consequently, there is a 
substantial increase in the manpower requirements for 
review. Moreover, modern microprocessor controlled 
equipment facilitates the collection of additional data 
associated with each scene. Both the scene and the 
annotated information have to be evaluated by the 
inspector. The design of video surveillance systems for 
safeguards necessarily has to account for both appropriate 
recording and reviewing techniques. An aspect of 
principal importance is that the video information is 
stored on tape. Under the German Support Programme 
to the Agency a technical concept has been developed 
which aims at optimizing the capabilities of a multi-
camera optical surveillance (MOS) system including the 
reviewing technique. This concept is presented in the 
following paper including a discussion of reviewing and 
reliability. 
1. Introduction 
The development and implementation of video systems 
has led the safeguards authorities to the revision of their 
requirements for optical surveillance systems. They can 
be briefly described as follows: 
Many applications suggest the use of more than one 
video camera in one nuclear facility, i.e. the video surveil-
lance system should have many cameras. 
509 
Secondly, the video tape should have a high capacity 
to enable the recording of many scenes per camera in 
order to facilitate long surveillance periods. 
The recording unit for the video scenes from all 
cameras should be located in one safeguards control 
room. 
The multi-camera system should have a very high 
reliability taking into account its unattended operation. 
The video signals should be authenticated. 
The operation of the system should be standardized 
and user-friendly including the retrieval of the video data 
and other safeguards relevant information. 
Under the German Support Programme to the Agency a 
technical concept has been developed which aims at 
optimizing the capabilities of a multi-camera optical 
surveillance system including the reviewing technique. 
This concept is presented in the following paper including 
a discussion of reviewing and reliability. 
2. System Description 
2.1 General 
The Multi-Camera Optical Surveillance (MOS) System 
excluding the cameras is designed to be installed in a 
safeguards control room of a nuclear facility with access 
restricted to inspectors, whereas the cameras are 
mounted in different locations of the plant and connected 
to the MOS System by standard transmission lines, e.g. 
coaxial or fibre optic cables which can be accessible to 
anyone. The MOS System shall provide long term unat-
tended video surveillance. The number of camera 
channels is 8 but can be expanded to 16. The basic 
features are summarized as follows : 
Authentication of video signals of each camera 
channel using the Tamper Resistant TV-Link 
Ill 
Individual timing of recording of each camera 
channel 
External triggering e.g. using video motion 
detection 
Immediate storage of a detected i.e. externally 
triggered scene or of a programmable 
sequence of scenes at a different timing 
interval 
Interfacing of the V ACOSS-S electronic 
safeguards seal /2/ 
User definable text insertion for externally 
triggered scenes 
Electronic notebook for relevant inspection-
period data 
Testing capability for a video motion detector 
Review station. 
2.2 The Modules of MOS 
MOS has a modular design which enables flexibility in 
configuration and maintenance and allows for the 
introduction of improved technology as it appears on the 
market. MOS complies with the European monochrome 
TV-standard CCIR and is adaptable to the US 
monochrome TV-standard EIA. The mechanical standard 
for the console meets the international 19" rack-mount 
requirements. Electrical and safety standards are met 
according to the requirements of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The basic components of MOS are 
Tamper Resistant TV-Link (TRTL) 
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Buffer memory for video scenes 
Recording Unit, remotely controllable Super-
VHS video recorder 
Review Station 
System Application Architecture software 
platform. 
For immediate checking of the MOS performance the 
built-in recording unit can be used at the expense of loss 
of surveillance during review, i.e. for inspection purposes 
a separate review station is necessary. 
In spite of its modular design the MOS System appears to 
be a well integrated, complete video surveillance system .. 
2.3 The Authentication of Video Images 
The basis of the MOS System is the Tamper Resistant 
TV-Link (TRTL) which is designed to authenticate video 
signals. In order to authenticate electronic data, in 
particular video signals, two conditions have to be 
fulfilled: 
Time authenticity, i.e. data recorded in the 
past are not valid. 
Authenticity of the image, i.e. the data 
recorded must be an exact mate of the camera 
data (TV-signal). 
To the end of ensuring the time correctness of a video 
signal, there has to be a timer and a transmitter unit 
(MOS-TRU) on the camera side, i.e. the camera and the 
MOS-TRU including the timer must be housed together 
in one sealed enclosure. The MOS-TRU feeds the 
'camera time' together with the video signal into the 
transmission line. At the receiving end of the transmission 
line there is a timer in a receiver unit (MOS-RU). The 
MOS-RU compares the 'camera time' with its own 
generated time, the 'receiver time'. The timers of MOS-
TRU and MOS-RU an! ;ynchronized. 
To ensure that the recorded video signal was originally 
generated by the video camera, the MOS-TRU measures 
the amplitude of the camera video signal within a defined 
Video In o--,.....--1 >--;==t~+--~-------( + 1------o Video Out 
Digital 
Shift Register 
CPU-813C535 
SRAM 32Kx8 
1------t------l Serial Interface for Set-Up 
..._ __ _. Watch 
~-----------------~ 
Fig. I: Block Diagram of the Transmitter Unit 
segment of the picture, encrypts this information and 
transmits it to the MOS-RU together with the video 
signal itself. For decryption the MOS-RU applies the 
same algorithm to the image data and compares the two 
data sets. Of course, the processed picture segment varies 
in position on a random basis. For encryption the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) Algorithm is applied. A more 
detailed description of the authentication method can be 
found in references /1/. 
3. Description of the Components 
3.1 Transmitter Unit (MOS-TRU) 
Fig. 1 shows a schematic block diagram of the MOS-
TRU. The camera video signal is fed through the buffer 
amplifier and to the input of a timing device, which 
controls the electronic switch and the digital circuitry 
(CPU-80C535, digital shift register, etc.). Depending 
upon the position of the electronic switch, the MOS-TRU 
feeds either the video signal or constant grey levels into 
the video cable, which is connected to the video output. 
The constant grey levels are necessary to calibrate all 
analog amplifiers in the system, i.e. to compensate for 
varying transmission parameters of the analog circuitry. 
This automatically includes the compensation of different 
cable lengths between MOS-TRU and MOS-RU pairs. 
like the authentication signal itself, these grey levels are 
part of the video image but are normally invisible. With 
the analog-to-digital converter the micro processor mea-
sures the amplitude of small segments of the video image, 
encodes this information with the time, the x-y position of 
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the segment etc., and stores the results in the digital shift 
register. 
The present MOS-TRU is designed as a package of three 
printed circuit boards in surface mount technology. These 
boards are enclosed in a small aluminium box, which can 
be inserted into a sealed camera housing with a mounting 
bracket. A complete MOS-TRU (dimension of 64.7mm 
(width) x 42.3rnm (height) x 99rnm (depth)) with the 
shockproof shipping container is displayed in Fig. 2. 
Apart from the authentication electronics, a power supply 
for a CCD-camera (12 VDC nominal) is integrated into 
the MOS-TRU module. The module itself is powered 
with 15 to 40 Volt DC. 
In addition to the video-in, video-out, power-in and 
power-out connectors, there is also a connection for a 
'tamper switch'. The MOS-RU monitors the position of a 
connected micro switch inside the camera housing (open/ 
closed). 
The DES Algorithm requires an encryption key to be 
available both in the MOS-TRU and MOS-RU. For 
reasons of tamper resistance the key is changed after 24 
hours. A Transmitter-Receiver pair is loaded with 
identical keysets for the encryption and decryption of the 
transmitted authenticating information. The downloading 
procedure of the keyset into MOS-TRU and MOS-RU is 
performed by direct interconnection of both units. 
The most important principle of the authentication 
electronics is that the reliability of the MOS-TRU is not 
Fig.2: Photo of the Transmitter Unit in its Shipping Box 
affected at any time. For this purpose an extensive use of 
electronic monitoring is an essential part of the system. If 
the authentication electronics fails or even the power 
supply for the MOS-TRU, the video signal is transmitted 
to the MOS-RU without authentication, assuming the 
CCD camera is powered separately. The same principle 
applies to the MOS-RU. 
3.2 Receiver Unit (MOS-RU) 
The MOS-RU is the functional counterpart of the MOS-
TRU and hence has a very similar authentication 
circuitry. 
The MOS-RU printed circuit board provides space for a 
plug-in cable correction amplifier, if the MOS-TRU is in-
stalled at distances longer than 50 m from the MOS-RU. 
The inspector is interested in events such as missing data 
or a tamper attack, detected during an inspection period 
of typically 1 to 3 months. For this purpose the MOS-RU 
inserts relevant text into the video image for evaluation 
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during review, i.e. the video monitor is a sufficient output 
device. 
The MOS-RU is a bus-oriented device operating on two 
video buses. One video bus can be connected to the 
recording device (image memory MOS-IVS, VCR) and 
the other one can be connected to a monitor for easy 
inspection of picture quality (one button operation). In a 
multi-channel system no video sWitcher is reqmred. Up to 
16 MOS-RUs can share one video bus. This means that a 
multi-channel authentication system is a multi-channel 
surveillance system at the same time. If the multiplexing 
capabilities of the system are not required, it is possible to 
use an additional constantly active video output of each 
MOS-RU module. 
3.3 Network Controller (MOS-NET) 
A multi-channel system is a network of 'intelligent' 
devices. They communicate with each other via a party-
line. The master device is the Network Controller (MOS-
NET). 
The MOS-NET is designed to distribute information to a 
communication network (party-line) and to interface a 
PC to the system. Furthermore, the Network Controller 
reports all event data of one inspection period using an 
electronic notebook with a battery backed-up RAM. For 
reasons of redundancy the electronic notebook records 
the same event data which are inserted into the video 
images and recorded on tape. 
The Network Controller also supports the MOS-RUs 
with real random numbers (based on white noise) for the 
key download procedures. The system time is also gen-
erated on the MOS-NET board and communicated 
through the party-line to all units. Also the power supply 
for the complete unit is integrated into the Network 
Controller. 
3.4 MOS Recording Modules 
Contrary to other multi-channel video systems the MOS 
System employs a 'normal' video recorder rather than a 
time lapse recorder. The Panasonic AG7330 Super-VHS 
VCR has been chosen _for reasons of high resolution. In 
addition, this VCR has the advantage of being fully 
remotely controllable which implies that the user of the 
MOS System will only touch the tape cassettes but not the 
function keys of the VCR. 
In conclusion, the user does not work with single 
components or modules but rather with a system as a 
_whole. This has also an impact on future design changes 
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or improvements of the system. For instance, the VCR 
can be replaced by digital recording media as they 
become available without the user being affected at all. 
There will be no need for the inspector to go through a 
new training programme. 
The combination of S-VHS recorder and digital buffer 
image memory MOS-IVS32 allows individual timing of 
each camera channel; i.e. scenes from camera #1 can be 
recorded at one-minute intervals and scenes from camera 
#2 at 30-minute intervals. In addition, there may be indi-
vidual changes of the recording sequences due to external 
conditions such as high gamma counting rates. The inter-
action between the VCR and the MOS-IVS32 can be 
described as follows: 
The MOS-IVS32 memory stores up to 32 scenes. A MOS-
RU transmits a storing command and a corresponding 
video signal via the video bus to the MOS-IVS32 memory. 
Associated with each scene the MOS-IVS32 stores the 
camera-channel and a scene number. When the MOS-
IVS32 has stored 32 scenes it starts the VCR and dumps 
all the scenes onto video tape including channel numbers 
and scene numbers. In other words, the scenes are en-
coded and stored on tape. The code is displayed in the 
first unused lines of each video image. 
Without special measures such a procedure results in a 
great waste of tape, because gaps come up between the 
dumps. A tape full of gaps could hardly be reviewed and 
evaluated, since the noisy gaps would affect the 
I Dump X Header-Fields + 32 Dump-Fields + Y Footer-Fields 
Fig.3: Schematic of a Dump 
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synchronization of the monitor. Therefore, a so-called 
backspace editing has been introduced, in order to 
efficiently utilize the tape and to avoid gaps. 
Each dump, i.e. sequence of 32 scenes stored in the MOS-
IVS32, is supplemented with footers and headers, i.e. the 
first and the last scenes of a dump are copied several 
times and encoded (see Fig. 3). 
The header and footer fields carry a special code and a 
dump number. Before a sequence of 32 scenes is stored 
resp. dumped on tape, the MOS-IVS32 traces the end of 
the last dump. 
In the reliability test, this method of indicated dumps 
turned out to be very safe. No dumps are lost due to 
overwriting. There are no gaps on the tape, and the waste 
of tape can be controlled by the number of header and 
footer scenes as well as the storage capacity of the MOS-
IVS32. 
4. System Operation 
The MOS System is largely computer-oriented. 
Installation and set-up of the system are completely 
realized by means of a PC. The inspector can use his own 
laptop computer. During the surveillance period of the 
MOS System there is no need for a PC, i.e. the PC is not 
hooked on. 
4.1 Set-up of the M OS-System 
To set up a complete system, a PC has to be connected to 
the Network Controller (MOS-NET). With a menu-
driven installation software running on the PC, all re-
quired data can be transferred to the communication 
network via the Network Controller (MOS-NET). The 
system data consist of: 
Cable correction amplifier set-up (length 
and type of cable) 
Dedicated text for insertion into each MOS-
RU 
Position, width and height of text within the 
video image 
Position of inserted time and date within the 
video image 
Multiplex time for each individual channel. 
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Although this data set may be different for each MOS-
RU, each MOS-RU stores the system data of the whole 
system, i.e. also the system data of its neighbouring MOS-
RU. The set-up data of each device is stored in a 
dedicated nonvolatile memory and in the RAM with 
battery back-up of the M OS-NET. 
If a device has to be replaced due to failure, the new 
device will automatically receive system data for its own 
set-up once it has been plugged in. In case of a system 
breakdown, only one MOS-RU needs to survive to 
guarantee system data communication to the new 
modules. 
The authentication signal is encrypted in the camera's 
MOS-TRU and decrypted in the MOS-RU using the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES), patented by IBM. This 
algorithm requires a 64 bit key which is changed every 24 
hours in both the MOS-TRU and MOS-RU. Upon set-up 
keys are loaded into a MOS-TRU/MOS-RU pair for an 
operating period of at least 5 years. These keys are 
generated by the Network Controller (MOS-NET) with a 
real random generator (noise generator). To download a 
5 year keyset, a MOS-TRU/MOS-RU pair is 
interconnected. This direct connection must be 
performed before startup of a surveillance period. This 
can be done at Agency Headquarters, but then the MOS-
TRU/MOS-RU pair has to be clearly labelled and sealed. 
A complete installation of the system data can be done 
within one minute. The downloading of the keyset takes 
one minute per MOS-TRU/MOS-RU pair. 
4.2 Start of a New Surveillance Period 
The inspector has a great deal of information at his 
disposal by connecting a PC to the Network Controller of 
the system. Within seconds he can retrieve all information 
stored in the electronic notebook giving him an overview 
of all events which have occurred during the unattended 
surveillance period. He furthermore has the information 
that a camera or a power supply may have failed. In 
addition, these data are automatically stored on a 
standard floppy disk for further evaluation at Agency 
Headquarters or in a regional office. A typical printout of 
a notebook is shown in Fig. 4. 
Furthermore, the system application programme asks the 
inspector if a tape change should be done. On request the 
system automatically ejects the tape(s) and prints out if a 
proper tape change was performed. 
Multicamera Optical Surveillance System Report 
Facility Code: 
hanau field test 
Surveillance Start: 
Date: 28.Mar.91 Time: 10:11:51 
Tape Change Start: 
09:40:16 
Tape Change End: 
09:41:14 
Inspector's Name: 
b.heaysman 
Inspector's Comment: 
summer time set after 
File: 
A:\M9101210.R33 
NOTEBOOK: 
Channel 1 Channel 
Date 12345678 Scene 12345678 
28.Mar.91 1590 
29.Mar.91 4352 
30.Mar.91 7114 
31.Mar.91 9876 
l.Apr. 91 12604 
2.Apr.91 15306 
3.Apr.91 18008 
4.Apr.91 20709 
5.Apr.91 23414 
6.Apr.91 26116 
7 .Apr. 91 28818 
8.Apr.91 31522 
9.Apr.91 34228 
10.Apr.91 36947 
ll.Apr.91 39709 
12.Apr.91 40822 
END 
2 Channel 3 
Scene 12345678 Scene 
795 398 
2176 1089 
3557 1779 
4938 2470 
6313 3160 
7695 3851 
9076 4541 
10457 5232 
11838 5922 
13025 6613 
14406 7303 
15787 7995 
17168 8685 
18549 9376 
19714 10067 
20271 10345 
Channel 4 
12345678 Scene 
160 
436 
712 
988 
1265 
1541 
1817 
2094 
2371 
2647 
2923 
3199 
3475 
3753 
4029 
4140 
!:Video 2:Data 3:Time 4:SWT 5:SAMP 6:ReRU 7:ReTRU 8:AUT? 
I:Flag :Ok -: Not Available 
page: 1 
Fig.4: Printout of the Electronic Notebook 
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5. Review ofMOS Surveillance Data 
5.1 Review with the Recording System 
The MOS System stores the scenes from all camera-
channels on one video tape as they occur. To the end of 
facilitating the review of the tape, measures for channel 
sorting have to be taken. 
A crucial component is the MOS-IVS32 digital memory. 
It has an operating mode which switches the VCR 
automatically to playing while only scenes of a prese-
lected camera-channel will be stored in the MOS-IVS32 
buffer memory and displayed on the monitor. The user 
has the possibility to operate the MOS-IVS32 in the 
following way: If he detects an interesting scene, he can 
stop the recorder by pushing a button. Then he can 
retrieve the 31 scenes immediately preceding the scene of 
interest which are stored in the MOS-IVS32 buffer. 
Pushing the button once more, the interrupt is cancelled 
and the review of the preselected camera-channel 
resumed. 
In conclusion, the MOS-IVS32 functions as a buffer store 
both during recording and reviewing. This possibility of 
review exists in each configuration of a MOS System. 
However, it should be mentioned that if the recording 
unit is used for reviewing, the MOS System will not 
record new surveillance data. 
5.2 MOS Enhanced Review Station 
The review of tapes of a multi-channel surveillance 
system is most time consuming and requires a large 
inspection effort. To the end of facilitating the review, an 
Enhanced Review Station has been constructed which has 
the following components: 
1 digital buffer memory MOS-IVS32 
1 screen splitter 
1 video recorder 
2 TV-monitors 
1 PC including a dedicated system application 
software. 
The inspector is able to select scenes according to time, 
date, and channel number by a simple mouse-click. The 
functions of the digital buffer memory MOS-IVS32 as 
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described in section 5.1, are realized in the PC's 
dedicated system application software. 
By means of the screen splitter scenes from 4 different 
camera channels can be simultaneously displayed on the 
monitor. The use of this capability depends on the set-up 
resp. views of the different cameras. 
Moreover, the Enhanced Review Station can be used to 
perform an automatic analysis of a tape. The analysis 
consists of comparing the actually recorded scene id-
number with the expected scene id-number, performing a 
tape statistics and counting the number of dumps. 
6. Reliability 
A test programme was agreed upon which focused on 
both the reliability of the authentication electronics of the 
MOS System and failure-free recording of scenes. 
According to the MOS specifications a failure is defined 
as 
the nnssmg of two consecutive scenes on any 
channel of the MOS System. A recorded scene is 
accepted only if it is authenticated. This implicates 
MOS as a whole, i.e. the cause of a missing scene is 
immaterial. 
According to the agreed functional and technical 
specifications of the MOS System the reliability statement 
prescribes a reliability of 96.8% for 200,000 scenes 
recorded by one MOS unit with eight cameras. In this 
statement the time span is expressed in terms of the 
number of scenes. Based on statistical considerations, the 
plan for the reliability test was designed in a way to 
confirm 96.8% reliability with 70% confidence. According 
to this plan, 252,000 dumps equivalent to 8,064,000 scenes 
were to be recorded without a failure. 
6.1 Hardware Layout 
The hardware layout depended on the total number of 
scenes to be recorded as well as the available testing time. 
The test period was agreed to be not more than 100 days. 
Six MOS Systems with four camera-channels each were 
installed in two cabinets, i.e. altogether 24 camera-
channels were used (see Fig. 5). Four cameras were 
focused on a clock and their video signals led 
independently via four distribution amplifiers to three 
MOS Systems, covering 12 camera-channels. Camera #1 
Fig. 5: View of the Testing Set-up 
served channel #1 of all three MOS Systems, camera #2 
served channel #2 of all three MOS Systems, etc. . The 
video signals of a fifth camera were branched through all 
12 channels of MOS Systems # 4 through 6. 
6.2 Test Results 
The programme started on September 10, 1990. It took us 
nearly two complete runs of 8 million scenes with a lot of 
software changes and enhancements in the MOS-IVS32, 
to come u·p with a dump procedure (see section 3.4) 
which fulfilled the reliability requirements. In the first test 
phase, we introduced a total of 100 tamper attacks into 
one channel of one system at different times of the day 
during 10 days altogether. The success rate for the 
detection of all types of tamper attacks was 100%. 
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During the whole test period of September 10, 1990, and 
January 16, 1991, no false alarm was recorded in any 
channel. 
The last phase of the test yielded 42 video tapes (S-VHS 
180min), i.e. seven tapes for each MOS System, within 23 
days. This was an accelerated test which put more stress 
on the VCR's than under usual surveillance conditions in 
a facility. The dumping rate was about 1 minute per dump 
which currently is the limit of the MOS System. 
Altogether 262,420 dumps were recorded during this last 
phase, exceeding the required number by 10,420 dumps 
equivalent to 333,440 scenes. Careful evaluation of the 
tapes yielded no MOS failure. 
Another result is that the capacity of the used 180-minute 
video tape is at least 200,000 scenes. 
Finally, attention is drawn to the fact that the 
authentication function of the MOS System, known as the 
Tamper Resistant TV-link, was successfully field-tested 
in a nuclear facility. The results of this test are presented 
in reference /3/. At present, a field test of a four-channel 
MOS System with redundant recording is being carried 
out in a German facility. 
7. Summary 
The Multi-camera Optical Surveillance System (MOS) 
has a lot of features that enable the Inspectorates to 
reduce inspection efforts without loss of credibility. The 
system has been designed to collect a maximum of 
information on a high reliability level and to facilitate 
retrieval as well as evaluation of the data. 
The recorded video information is credible 
because it is authenticated. 
MOS has a number of self-diagnostic features. 
The results are retrievable for evaluation. 
Front end data reduction can be implemented 
by the use of external triggering, e.g. video 
motion detection (VMD). The proper 
functioning of the VMD is checked by a built-
in self-testing device. 
Video signals are coded in the invisible part of 
the frame. The code has binary format and 
precedes the video information. The channel 
number is assigned to each frame at the 
highest level of reliability. The coding also 
facilitates image processing. 
Both MOS and its review station are PC-
controlled using a System Application 
Architecture software surface making 
operation very user-friendly. 
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Ill 
The review station is capable of channel 
sorting as well as detection of missing scenes. 
MOS complies with the relevant technical 
standards. 
MOS passed a reliability test successfully. 
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EURATOM MULTI-CAMERA OPTICAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (EMOSS) 
A DIGITAL SOLUTION 
B.Taillade, HYMATOM, Montpellier-Castries 
C.De Pryck, OPTEC, Luxembourg 
P.Otto,H.G.Wagner, Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg 
Abstract 
In 1989 the Euratom Safeguards Directorate of the 
Commission of the European Communities drew up 
functional and draft technical specifications for a new 
fully digital multi-camera optical surveillance system. 
HYMATOM of Castries des1gned and built a prototype 
unit for laboratory and field tests. This paper reports 
and system design and first test results. 
1. Introduction 
Over the past five year there has been a marked 
increase in the number of video systems installed for 
safeguards surveillance. During that time attention 
was focussed mainly on improving the reliability and 
functionality of the video recording system, and less 
importance was attached to the fact that optical 
information stored by any safeguards video system 
must ultimately be reviewed by inspectors and that the 
reliability and ergonomy of this review procedure is 
crucial. An analysis of reviewing problems reported by 
inspectors and tests by staff from the Euratom 
Safeguards video group showed that the main 
problem was the difficulty of accessing individual 
scenes in single or slow-step mode without noise 
bars, decoding instabilities and lengthy searches 
involving repeated forward and rewind scans of the 
video tape. 1t was decided that this problem could best 
be resolved by changing to digital image storage given 
that most commerciar video multiplexers already 
digitise images internally. Following requests from 
inspectors for video systems which allow easier 
review with frame-accurate access to events, and 
based on several years experience with different video 
surveillance systems, the Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate (DCS) drew up functional and draft 
technical specifications for a fully digital multi-camera 
video system in 1989. The French company 
HYMATOM, selected after a call for tender, designed 
and built a prototype unit which has been subjected to 
laboratory tests. The design includes digital image 
recording on erasable optical disks, three different 
storage modes involving change detection and a 
mouse-driven graphical user interface. 
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2. User Requirements - Functional Specifications 
The user requirements were translated into functional 
specifications as follows. Images from one to four 
cameras are to be multiplexed and subsequently 
digitised to at most 512 by 512 pixels with up to 8 b1t 
grey level resolution. A string of images should be 
buffered in video RAM, reduced and compressed and 
then recorded on optical disk On digital form). The 
frequency at which images are recorded on the optical 
disk should be selectable between 1 0 seconds and 30 
minutes for each camera. The system should give the 
choice between simple time lapse recording (images 
are written to disk at a fixed preselected frequency 
which may be different for each camera), and 
recording on change detection only (images are 
written to disk only if they represent a change in grey 
levels exceeding a preset threshold over more than a 
certain preset sub-area of a window within the full 
image. The system should recognize mains power 
failure and automatically switch to power-down mode 
where cameras are sw1tched on in single shot mode 
and the disk is switched on and written to only when 
the video RAM is full. The image storage capacity 
should be sufficient for at least 25 000 images. Critical 
components such as the optical disk and possibly the 
video RAM should be duplicated for back-up in case 
of malfunction. The system should have a number of 
alarm contact and sensor switches which indicate 
possible tampering, opening of the cabinet door and 
environmental sensors (shock, temperature, humidity, 
etc). The date and time of sensor events should be 
superimposed on the recorded image together with a 
flag indicating the nature of the event. If the video 
cable is broken or the camera is changed this must 
also be indicated and recorded. An option for 
encrypted status and/or image transmission via 
modem and telephone lines should be included. The 
complete system should fit into a cabinet suitable for 
wall mounting or a suitcase and system weight and 
size should be as small as possible. The external 
surfaces of the housing should be tamper evident. The 
system should be cacable of operating in a 
temperature range of -5 C to 45°C and a humidity 
range of 1 0%-90%. 
A detailed and amended set of functional 
specifications based on the above draft specifications 
was drawn up by HYMA TOM and agreed by DCS in 
March 1990. 
EURATOM MULTI-CAMERA OPTICAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM - EMOSS 
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Figure 1: EMOSS Block Diagram 
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3. Technical Specifications 
General system descri~tion: HYMATOM designed 
hardware and softWare or the EMOSS during 1990 
utilising the simultaneous development of a 
commercial product called "MEMOBANK". The main 
printed circuit board is the same for both devices. 
Figure 1 shows a simplified block diagram of the 
EMOSS. The system IS controlled by a Motorola 
68020 microprocessor, a second processor also 
present (Motorola 68000) is not shown. Analogue 
CCIR images from up to four cameras are 
multiplexed, converted to digital images in a dedicated 
chip and stored in 1 to 8 MB Video RAM which is 
organised as FIFO (first in first out) cyclic storage for 
each camera. The amount of RAM and hence the 
number of images to be held in FIFO for each camera 
can be selected during system set-up. Images are 
reduced by comparing subsequent frames and 
calculating differences and by hardware comrression 
in a dedicated unit known as "C Cube which 
implements the latest JPEG standards. Images are 
sent for recording to one erasable optical disk (Sony 
2x300 MB) through a SCSI interface. Thanks to the 
standard interface, additional or alternative storage 
devices can be connected. The optical disk cartridges 
can be removed and inserted into a separate review 
station yet to be built. 
Access to Video RAM is through a DMA controller 
saving valuable /rocessor time. Display of video 
images is effecte through a video controller unit and 
they can also be output as CCIR analogue video 
signals through the digital to analogue convertor. In 
view of the price and the reliability of optical disk 
drives it was decided not to duplicate the disk drive 
and the video RAM but to install a second EMOSS in 
parallel where deemed necessary. A printer and a 
modem can be connected to the system to produce 
listings of tamper, environmental and change events 
and to transfer system status, listings and also images 
(encrypted) through telephone lines to an appropriate, 
receiving station. The system also has an alarm , 
interface for up to 8 external sensors. · 
Principal software functions: The main functions are: 
- acqUisition of v1deo 1mages of 1 to 4 cameras 
- visualisation of images on monitor 
- digitisation and storage of images 
- review of (event annotated) images 
- review or print-out of event lists and further 
processing of images 
Graphical user interface: The user interacts with the 
system through a mouse driven graphical user 
interface by clicking on icons and clicking and 
dragging windows. 
0! 
D 
FR 
Figure 2a: Main Menu 
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Main menu: This menu consists of nine icons of 
which two are reserved for future applications (modem 
comms/ card access). The seven active icons 
correspond to the following sub-menus: 
.-system timer for automatic activation/de-activation 
of EMOSS 
- system parameters; this is only accessible if an 
external contact is closed 
- display mode; controls the way in which the camera 
images are displayed on the system monitor 
- system activation; switches recording to disk on or 
off 
- review submenu; gives access to images archived 
on disk 
- language choice; currently the language of the user 
interface can be selected from French, English, 
Spanish, Italian, Dutch and German 
-Print menu; starts print-out of event listings 
The most important submenus are described in more 
detail below. 
Display mode: This menu is accessible 
irrespective of whether the EMOSS is in recording 
mode or not. The submenu allows the following 
options each represented by an icon or a group of 
icons: 
- choice between full screen image for the camera 
selected and a four-way split where images from 
all four cameras are displayed in the four screen 
quadrants 
- Electronic zoom of regions of the full image or quad 
screen. The area to be zoomed is selected by 
drawing a box around it with the mouse 
- Freezing of images in quad screen mode 
- Non-linear grey level correction for images with too 
much contrast, or with strong light sources making 
areas of interest in the shade appear too dark to 
recognize details, or for objects which appear dark 
and featureless against bright light(s) shining 
directly into the camera. This is a very important 
feature because neither camera positions nor 
lighting conditions are necessarily always 
satisfactory for safeguards cameras. The grey level 
correction can either be carried out automatically 
by a special algorithm (not yet implemented) or 
manually by clicking and dragging the source grey 
level vs display grey level line 
System timer: Storage of images to the disk can 
be started and stopped in three ways, 
- by clicking on disk icon in main menu 
- by closing an external contact 
- by setting a system timer 
~~ 
(~~) 
I0~~4AI4/U 1714;114211 
I 
Figure 2b: Parameter Menu 
System parameters: Before system set up through 
parameter tables can be explained it is necessary to 
comment on the different recording modes possible. 
Image storage proceeds in two steps. The images 
from each camera are read into a cyclic FIFO storage 
in ':Jideo. HAM. From. there. they are transferred to 
opt1cal d1sk when a tngger 1s received ( mode 1) or 
when the change detector senses a relative grey level 
cha~~e greater than a predefined threshold in a 
suff1c1entl( large sub-area of the total image or of a 
window modes 2&3). After an alarm has been 
detected. the system continues acquisition into Video 
RAM unt1l the FIFO buffer for the camera for which the 
alar'!' was triggered c~ntains 2 images before and the 
max1mum number of 1mages after the trigger within 
the size of the buffer. Then the contents of the FIFO 
buffer are transferred to the disk in the correct order. 
This is an important feature which permits the 
reviewer to check the events leading up to the change 
detection alarm. 
In mode 1 storage to disk is triggered by external 
contacts C1 to C4 and G1 to G4. In modes 2 and 3 
images are stored only if gray level changes are 
detected between subsequent time lapsed images as 
already described above. Mode 2 is normally selected 
for cameras trained on high activity areas while mode 
3 is chosen for low activity areas. The difference 
b~twee~ m~de 2 and 3 is the way in which the event 
h~story 1s wntten to a separate event logging file on the 
d1sk. 
The parameter submenu consists of four icons not 
counting the "return to main menu" icon which is of 
course available in all submenus (Figure 2). 
- camera recording parameters, see tables 1 a & 1 b. 
acq(uisition) selects a camera for storage to RAM 
and disk 
frequency defines the frequency at which images 
are acquired for each camera 
grey level switches between 64 and 256 grey 
levels 
res(olution) toggles 256 or 512 pixel resolution 
grey (level) change sets threshold for relative 
changes in grey level between consecutive 
camera images in percent. 
number (of) frames fixes the consecutive number 
of frames to be held in the FIFO buffer in Video 
RAM 
total/partial describes whether the full image or 
only a window is stored 
% memory lists the proportion of total Video RAM 
required for the buffer storage for each camera 
with the parameters chosen 
store mode selects way in which images are 
recorded on disk as described previously. 
- alarm contact parameters define which contacts 
are activated for which camera and to what part 
of the optical <;Jisk the corresponding event 
messages are wntten 
There are three types or external contacts 
available, C1 to C4 can be activated for cameras 
1 to 4 respectively, G1 and G2 can trigger all 
cameras but only if they appear simultaneously 
with the camera specific triggers C1-C4, and G3 
and G4 which can trigger all cameras 
independent of the status of the camera specific 
triggers. 
- disk parameters selects the relative distribution 
between the two logical disk areas 
- system time sets system time and date 
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grey grey 
camt:ra acq frequency I evt! Is r•s change 
0 - 0 + - 0 + - 256 + - 512 + - 2 + 
0 - 0 0 + - 256 + - 512 + - 2 + 
0 - 0 + - 0 256 + - 512 + - 2 + 
4 0 - 0 .. - 0 256 + - 512 .. - 2 + 
Table 1a: acquisition and comparison parameters 
number tota I • z rE:~c.ord 
camera framt:s partial window memory sur fac~ modt: 
1 - 10 + p 4 - ]0 + 1 
2 - 10 + p 1 - b + 2 
J - 20 + p 1 - 10 .. 3 
4 - 2 .. T J3 - 1 + I 
Table 1b: storage parameters 
. Image review: This submenu gives access to 
Images. stored on the optical disk. The different icons 
(see F1gure 3) represent the choice of internal or 
external disk drive, the disk area chosen, the camera 
number(s) to be reviewed, a starting date and time for 
the revie~. a routine to copy the disk files to an 
external d1sk and the actual start of the reviewing 
procedure after the parameters listed previously have 
been set. During image review a horizontal submenu 
bar appears at the bottom of the monitor (Figure 4) 
which allows forward, backward, and fast forward 
review of im~ges, zoom of images and non-linear grey 
level correction. 
Alarms: There are three types of alarms which 
can part1ally or completely stop the system if not 
acknowledged and corrected for. The first is a "disk 
full" alarm which is first raised when 90% of disk 
capacity of area 11 has been exceeded. The others are 
"camera masked" or "camera fault". When disk area 11 
is compl~tely .full. the system !s stopped until a 
message 1con 1s chcked after wh1ch new images are 
recorded over the first images stored on area 11 of the 
disk. Cameras for which the system detects a "camera 
fault" condition are ignored until a user re-activates 
the camera. The first time a "camera masked" 
condition appears for a particular camera the 
~essage is. recorded in the alarm log. No further 
1mages of th1s camera are recorded until the "camera 
masked" condition is no longer valid. 
Event log: Significant changes detected in grey 
levels of 1mages and/or windows and camera fault 
messages are stored as event records in the event 
logging file. Alarms caused by closure of external 
contacts are stored as a different type of event in the 
same log. Events may be listed on screen or printed 
out. The event log review submenu allows the 
selection by type of event, camera number and date 
and time. 
Affichage <Jate et 
heure d'enregistrement 
Affichage n ° camera 
Affichage n ° de zone 
Lecture im e recedente 
Retour im e courente 
Retour menu 
gestion disque 
selection modification LOT ~e 
sortie 
Zoom de l'image 
Lecture rapide des images 
Lecture im e suiwnte 
Figure 4: Review Control Menu 
EJ 1~:1> ,a. za> .~;p 
Figure 3: Image Archive Menu 
4. First test results 
The EMOSS prototype was delivered to DCS in 
December 1990. Laboratory tests started in January 
1991. The test showed that the system worked as 
specified but that especially at the high resolution 
setting reduction and compression of images by 
software was insufficient for high activity areas. Some 
minor faults were identified in the system software. 
Since then new versions of system software and 
hardware were installed including the C Cube image 
compression board which can compress images by a 
factor of 20. lt was found that the upgraded EMOSS 
stored as many as 270 000 images for low activity 
areas. The upgraded EMOSS will enter field testing in 
June 1991. 
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5. Further developments 
Following successful conclusion of the field tests of 
the upgraded protoptype, three production units and a 
matching review unit will be used for system reliability 
tests. lt is expected that EMOSS can enter routine 
inspection use in 1992. In parallel new options will be 
implemented such as the superposition on the images 
of radiation sensor data Qoint project CEA-DCS-
HYMATOM), alternative image compression 
hardware, mixed storage modes ( front-end video 
motion detection) and larger storage media. 
6. Conclusions: 
Under a contract and on the basis of specifications 
defined by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate the 
first fully digital video system for safeguards 
applications has been designed and built by 
HYMATOM. The system has substantial advantages 
over analogue recording devices such as superior 
image quality, easy and fast frame accurate access to 
images by date and time or by event number, image 
related event logging and event listing, and easier 
post processing of images. 

PROGRESS SINCE 1990 WITH THE JRC ULTRASONIC 
SEALING-BOLTS TECllNOLOGY 
B.C. d'Agraives, C. Korn, A. Linge, E. Mascetti, J. Toornvliet 
Commission of the European Communities 
Institute for Systems Engineering and Informatics 
Joint Research Centre 
21020 Ispra (V a) - Italy 
The last Sellafield demonstration in June 1990 on a 
dummy MultiElement Bottle in a non-active pond and the 
fust two exercises of a "50 MEBs field-test" in a transfer 
bay , in November 1990 and April 1991, are presented. 
The demonstration m the non-active pond led to 
the selection for implementation of the JRC Ispra MK3r 
Sealing Bolt, to be sealed in the New Transfer Bay and 
reverified later on, m THORP. The first scaling exercise 
was organized in November 1990, very soon after the 
decision to start implementmg the technique. It has been 
possible to complete a first step in this field-test pro-
gramme, using transitional tools and reading/processing 
equipment. Operations were globally successful, indicating 
progress still to be accomplished before providing site and 
inspectorate with reliable sets of equipment and good 
understanding and support from the local staff. 
I. Introduction 
From beginning 1986 to end 1987, a long term 
experiment has been carried out by JRC-Ispra in the open 
air storage pond D27, at the BNFL plant in Sellaficld. It 
was aimed at the evaluation of an Ultrasonic Scaling 
System (denved from the VAK-III technique) for the 
sealing of MultiElement Bottles (MED) transport/storage 
nuclear containers. This technique and its progress have 
been reported in several publications [1,2,3]. 
In 1989, a discussion took place among Euratom, 
BNFL, and IAEA on the potential interest of that techni-
que and Ispra was asked to prepare for a field-test on 50 
MEBs to be sealed in the New Transfer Day, prior to 
shipping to THORP, and reverified some months later in 
THORP Inlet Bay or Main Pond. It was agreed upon to 
organize beforehand a "real scale" demonstration on a 
dummy MED in an inactive pond. 
That demonstration led to the selection by the 
interested parties of a "ready-to-use" MK3r Scaling-Dolt 
(SD) as a candidate for the 50 MEBs test. The first sealing 
exercise was organized in November 1990, very soon after 
the decision to start implementing the technique and a 
very short time was allowed to manufacture a first series 
of MK4r (modified MK3r) SBs and to provide DNFL with 
the documentation on their fabrication. Transitional tools 
and electronic equipments were used. 
We report on that demonstration and on the first 
two exercises, in November 1990 and April 1991, during 
which 4, then 6, MEDs could be sealed in real conditions. 
2. Inactive Pond DemonstratiOn 
This was a two-days test aimed at presenting the 
technique to BNFL, Euratom and IAEA representatives. In 
particular, to BNFL staff, it was essential to show our 
ability to remove normal DNFL bolts from the MED 
without any mechanical problem. 
An empty 1166 MED had been prepared bv BNFL 
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in the mactivc pond, for the 19th of June. Its lid was 
closed but 7 bolts out of 19 had been removed in advance 
in order to free sites for JRC Seahng-Bolts. 
Dunng the first day, a BNFL normal bolt was 
removed, reinstalled and retightened. A second DNFL bolt 
was installed in a free location as well. Then, one MK3r, 
one MK3 and three MK2r Sealing-Bolts were installed 
accordmg to the scheme in Table I. The location for one 
MK3 (0119) appeared to be too close to a lid's rib, cau-
sing difficulty in screwing operations. Also, some resistan-
ce was found to screw in MK3 nb 0151 and apply the 
correct torque. In order to simplify shipping, a unique 
series of extension tubes was sent and used to constitute: 
either a "Grasping Tool" used for installing or removing 
both BNFL and JRC bolts (without applying more than 
hand torque); either a "Readmg Tool", with a "Readmg 
Bead", to read the integrity and the identity at once (in 
the case of MK3r) or 1n two sequences (in the cases of 
MK2r and MK3) but without taking the tool out of water. 
The third tool was the normal BNFL spanner tube wh1ch 
allows tightening the bolts to the nominal torque of 74 
Nxm with a dynamometric wrench. 
After the tool transformation, we could read and 
verify the installed seals with our reading equipment 
consisting at that time (Generation 11) of a SONIC ultraso-
nic instrument, connected to the transducer which "reads" 
the seal signature, and providing an analog output to a 
BMC/SHARP set which A/D converts the signal and 
processes the data (the BMC digital voltmeter being 
monitored by the SHARP 1500 micro-computer). For the 
first time we also used a TOSHIBA 1600 laptop computer 
to visualize the results given by the SHARP computer and 
perform in parallel the correlation calculations (fig.l). A 
portable DICONIX printer was used as well. The coeffi-
cients of correlation obtained between phase 0 (Ispra) and 
phase 4 (Scllafield) on SDs 112, 113, 115 and 039 arc given 
in Table I under the SBs numbers. 
X X X 0 0 o X o 0 X 0 0 X 
nb: 112 113 115 119 151 039 041 
core .942.976.957 (.912) .987 
type: MK2r MK3 MK3r 
use: (ready) (transformable) (ready) 
trsd: two two one 
TABLE I 
The second day, we have tried unsuccessfully to 
restore our SONIC instrument after a network breakdown 
the previous evening. An attempt to use a PANAMETRICS 
instrument found in Scllaficld just allowed to remeasure 
the MK3 119 scaling-head out of the pond. The correla-
tion Ispra(SONIC)/Sellafield(PANAMETRICS) obtained 
was 0. 912. W c also could break and check the broken 
integrity of MK2r nb 115. Then we installed MK3r nb 
041 after removing a BNFL bolt and we transformed the 
MK3 nb 151 into a seal by clamping its sealing-head. 
Since we could not perform a verification in the presence 
of observers, we agreed with them to break and remove 
MK3r nb 039 and to remeasure it later on m La Hague, 
with another set of instruments. This was done within two 
days and a correlation factor of 0.925 was obtained. 
After the demonstration in June, the inactive pond 
was emptied and we could come back in July to check and 
remove the SBs installed previously. Confirmation was 
given that on this kind of MEB, some locations near the 
lid's ribs or weldings are improper for putting Slls. There-
fore MK2r nb 112 and MK3 nb 151 were found in bad 
conditions. The presence of a gasket 7mm thick was con-
firmed as well. We also checked the depth of all threaded 
holes in the MEB's body. Even using handy wrenches (not 
exerting flexion torques like the long tube spanners) some 
SB was found very hard to loosen, some easy. Th1s indica-
ted that in case of corrosion or thread damage high 
torques, near to the nominal 70 Nxm, might be necessary 
to apply while screwing in a bolt or a SB, before it comes 
into contact with the lid and starts pressing it. One SB was 
found improperly assembled due to too narrow tolerances 
in that batch fabricatiion. Nevertheless the MK3r nb 41 
broke properly as did the MK3r nb 39. 
3. lrst Exercise in the New Transfer Bay 
Several weeks after the June demonstration, BNFL, 
Euratom, and IAEA confirmed the 50 MEBs field-test for 
which Ispra had to prepare in a very short time all the 
necessary equipment and the 50 SBs. It was decided to 
organise a first exercise in November 1990, in the New 
Transfer Bay (NTB) with a fmt batch of SBs, aimed at 
the sealing of 6 MEBs within a week. We had enough 
material to manufacture the seals and perform DA and QA 
tests in our laboratory. The handling and reading tools 
would have been same as in June, except that the alumi-
nium multisection tube was kept for the "grasping tool" 
and a one-piece stainless steel tube was prepared by DNFL 
with Ispra end fittings in order to accomodatc the lspra 
reading-head. 
Withm November we could obtain and supply 
BNFL with the certification documentation on the material 
used in SB's manufacturing. We had a series of "new" 
MK4r SB manufactured, assembled and measured. 
The lrst day (13/11/90) was dedicated to the 
preparation of the tools and equipment and to the measu-
rement of two SDs nb 009 and 010. 
On the 2nd day (14/11/90) two SDs were installed 
and reverified on two 1176 MEBs brought into the NTD 
on a double bogy. One seal was withdrawn because it gave 
indication (bad correlation) of a possible incorrect moun-
ting at the manufacturing stage. It was replaced and no 
other problem was encountered. 
On the 3rd day (15 I 11 /90) two other SDs were 
installed and reverified on two other 1176 ME!ls. 
The reading equipment used to perform the verifi-
cation/correlation process was same as above (see 2.) for 
the 2nd day (Generation II without the TOSHIBA 1600). 
On the 3rd day, we used for the first time an active 
connection between the SHARP /BMC and the TOSHII3A 
and a new software (SLFD 90.4 LOCAL/ REMOTE) , 
offering the possibility to work either from one computer 
or the other (Generation Ill). Table II gives the data and 
correlation factors pertinent to this exercise. 
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date inst: 14/11 14/11 15/11 15/11 
MEB type: 1176 1176 1176 1176 
MEB nb: 491 463 772 607 
SB type: MK4r MK4r MK4r MK4r 
SB nb: 008 007 009 010 
corr(A*3): .952 .967 .979 .986 
trsd: L09; reading-head: RH4/AD4; 5sec/rev 
TABLE II 
4 2nd ExerCISe In the New Trasfcr nay 
The second exercise in the New Transfer Day was 
scheduled for week 17 (23 and 24/4/91). Between Novem-
ber 90 and April 91 we were able to eventually produce 
and acquire the signatures (phase 0 and phase 1) of 60 
MK4r Sealing-Bolts. We eventually managed to have the 
mechanical parts (fig.2) manufactured in due time. 
The acquisition of the signature was made with the 
reading ultrasonic/electromc equipment shown in fig.3. 
This time, a new ultrasomc KRAUTKRAMER mstru-
ment, fully monitored from the TOSHIBA Japtop compu-
ter, has been used along with a TOSHII3A expansion box 
containing a new A/C converter board. In fact, for the 
first time since 1986, we have abandonned the use of the 
complex SONIC + SI IARP 1500 + UMC. Th1s new equip-
ment (Generation IV) along w1th a senes of SBs could be 
sent in due time through the Safeguards Directorate of 
Luxembourg. 
The first day (23/04/91 ), we could install and 
reverify two MK4r SBs on two MEDs already in position, 
before 2 p.m. 
llNFL managed to swap the two sealed MEBs w1th 
two others from the deep section in less than half an hour. 
We were said that these ones had their bolts already re-
tightened beforehand, which saved time. These two ME13s 
were sealed and the SBs reverified by 4 p.m. Sec Table m 
for the data and correlation factors obtained. 
date inst: 23/4 23/4 23/4 23/4 24/4 24/4 
MEB type: 1176 1176 1176 1176 1176 1176 
MEB nb: 531 459>~ 220 131 455* 395 
SB type: MK4r MK4r MK4r MK4r MK4r MK4r 
SB nb: 011 012 013 014 015 016 
corr(A*O): .968 .974 .961 .970 
trsd: L09; reading-head: RH4/AD4; 5sec/rev 
(*) number readable on the MEB's lid 
TABLE III 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
JRC-Ispra has started studying a Sealing System 
for spent fuel containers like BNFL MultiElement Bottles 
since 1985. With the agreement of BNFL, Ispra has carried 
out in 1986 and 1987 a long-term experiment in the open-
air storage pond of Sellafield. In several occasions SBs 
were installed and/or reverified on site and the results 
periodically reported. By the way, the seals, the handling 
tools and reading equipment were improved. 
These results eventually bro.ught the Inspectorates 
to considering this technique as a possible alternative to 
NDA measurements for the safeguarding of MEB spent 
fuel containers. In order to assess the whole system, a real 
scale test in actual conditions, aimed at the sealing of 50 
MEBs leaving the storage pond, was contemplated in 1989 
and planned to start in 1990. 
We have presented the last demonstration in June, 
carried out in a non active bay, which has shown the 
feasibility of the system and in particular its practicability 
regarding the handling operation and the reverification of 
the Sealing Bolts on site. It also determined the choice of 
the MK3r SB as the best candidate among other types 
studied by Ispra. 
After that demonstration the 50 MEBs test could 
start "as soon as possible". We have presented the two first 
exercises, each one consisting normally in the sealing of 6 
MEBs during a two-days period. 
The exercise in November was not fully satisfacto-
ry since some mechanical difficulties were encountered 
with two SBs. But the verification technique worked 
properly and we could demonstrate progress concerning 
the data acquisition and processing. 
Next exercise was set up in April in order to let 
enough time to Ispra to prepare 50 SBs. Unfortunately, it 
was not posstble to complete the exercise on 2 of the 6 
MEBs scheduled for sealing. Neither was it possible to 
proceed, the second day, to the breakage and verification 
of one SB. We were happy with the safe transportation of 
our equipment from Ispra and could use for the first time 
a new set of ultrasonic/electronic instruments, on our way 
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to simplify and automatize the veriftcauon procedure and 
reducing the equipment size. 
BNFL indicated a fixed schedule for these exerci-
ses, planned to occur every second week, possibly within 
two days. Therefore we are preparing for the exercise in 
week nb 19, in which 6 SBs will be applied without on-
site reverification. This decision was taken in order to 
keep with the BNFL schedule. 
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Fig . 2 : Mechanical parts of a Sealing Bolt MK4r 
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Abstract 
Under the French Support Programme to the !AEA the 
containment and surveillance system for the facility complex 
at Cap de la Hague (CONSULHA) was developed, while 
under the German Support Programme a method for 
authentication of video signals was developed. France, 
Germany, and the !AEA agreed to cooperate in the per-
formance of a field test of the Tamper Resistant TV-Link 
(TRTL) at the TO-facility. Euratom was invited to partic-
ipate. The TRTL was connected to CONSULHA on Octo-
ber 13, 1989, and worked until June 13, 1990. During this 
period, the CONSULHA system was in tests and corrunis-
sioning. Disturbances like video linearity problems, power 
failures, loss of video signal, interferences etc. were recorded 
by the TRTL. The test results of the TR TL have been used 
to enhance the performance of the TRTL. The paper de-
scribes the field test and results. 
l. Introduction 
In November 1988, representatives from France, 
Germany, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
convened at KFA JUlich and discussed the possibilities for 
cooperation regarding the implementation of the Tamper 
Resistant TV-Link (TRTL) into the French CONSULIIA 
containment and surveillance system. The French side was 
interested in proposing the utilization of the TRTL for 
authentication of video signals. 
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It was agreed to plan and perform a joint field test of the 
TRTL in the TO-facility at Cap de la !!ague, provided that 
the technical demonstration of the TRTL to Euratom and 
!AEA at the Saclay Nuclear Research Centre in January 
1989 was successful and the TRTL was acceptable to the 
Agency. It was envisaged to test a TRTL with two camera 
channels. The Agency was to provide the necessary TRTL 
hardware induding a Multiplex TV-System (M UX) with 
time lapse recorders. 
The IAEA representative stated that the existing TRTL 
was not yet a production type, in particular as regards the 
miniaturit.ation of the transmitter unit. The Frem:h side 
supported the view that for general applications the existing 
transmitter unit was too big. This initiated the development 
of the nuniaturired transmitter unit. 
It was mutually agreed to install the TRTL at the 
TO-facility with a field test period of three months. The 
Agency confirmed provision of the TRTL equipment and a 
technician for the setup. Under the German Support 
Progranm1e, the developer was prepared to travel to Cap de 
la llague for the setup of the TRTL and subsequently for 
support during the test period. A preparatory meeting was 
held at K r A in June 1989 with the participation of the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate to discuss the technical 
details regarding the installation of the TRTL. Euratom 
confirmed participation in the TRTL field test on the con-
ceptual and technical levels. The participants confirmed 
that the planned TRTL field test had to be seen in the con-
text of the overall safeguards system for Cap de la I I ague, 
the TRTL being only one feature of the French 
CONSULHA system. 
The goals of the field test were as follows: 
• to prove the functional performance and reliability of 
the TRTL under real facility conditions; 
• to collect practical experience in a plant with regard to 
the appropriateness of the system design; 
• to enhance the system performance by introducing im-
provements on the basis of the test results. 
From the results certain conclusions were drawn as re-
gards the further development and practical application of 
the TRTL. The details of the test arc given in reference /If. 
2. Organisation or the Field Test 
The IAEA, Euratom, and the French and German Sup-
port Programmes shared the responsibilities for the field test 
in the following way: 
• The French Support Programme was to provide the 
technical infrastructure. 
• The German Support J>rogramme was to provide the 
installation and maintenance of the TRTL system and 
the evaluation of the results. 
• The IAEA was to provide the TRTL hardware including 
a MUX System with time lapse recorders. 
• IAEA and Euratom were to provide their joint team 
control room. 
3. Setup of the System 
The TRTL developer specified the technical require-
ments for the field conunissioning of the TRTL in the 
TO-facility: 
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I. Control room 
• Space for a 19"j36U cabinet, depth 600 mm; 
front and rear of the cabinet should be accessible. 
• All cables to enter at the rear or bottom of the 
cabinet. 
• Specification of signal requirements: 
video signals: I V j75R with BNC plug pp 
Two TTL signals and ground connected to 
screw terminals in the cabinet. 
The TTL signals (for high radiation back-
ground) should be active low. 
Power in- 220 VAC/250 W, 'euro' plug in the 
cabinet. 
2. Access corridor of hot cell 
• 
• 
Space for a 19"f3U module frame, depth 310 mm 
The connections to be at the rear of the module 
frame. 
• Specification of signal requirements: 
video signals: I V ,'75R with B:'\/C plug pp 
One TTL signal active high for the 'door open' 
and ground 
Power in - 220 VAC/40 W, 'euro' plug in the 
module frame. 
Regarding installation and test requirements of the 
TRTL, the !AEA confirmed the following provisions: 
I. Transmitter Unit 
• The location of installation would be inside a scaled 
19" rack made available by the facility operator. 
• The operating voltage range without powering the 
CCD camera would be 9 - 40 VDC or 
VAC/approx. 4 W per channel. 
• The operating voltage range to power the CCD 
camera would be 15 - 40 VDC or VAC/approx. 
8 W including CCD camera. 
2. Receiver Unit 
• The receiver unit would be plugged into the 19" 
TRTL-mainframe of 6U height, which would be in-
stalled inside the tamper proof 19·· -rack of the 
Agency-owned Multiplex TV Surveillance System 
(MUX). 
• The 19"' TRTL-mainframe would be powered by 
110 or 220 VAC, each receiver unit requiring 5 \V. 
3. TRTL Performance 
The TRTL generated its own date and time and inserted 
it into the video signal (the position could be pro-
grammed). It further recorded four dillcrent types of 
'events', i.e. video signal tampering (partial or total re-
placement of the camera video signal), any dillcrence 
of time or date between the transmitter and receiver 
units, and abnormal operating temperatures inside the 
camera housing. Plain text for these events was inserted 
into the video signal and thus recorded on video tape. 
As a backup measure, the number of events and the 
time and date of their occurrence were also stored in a 
memory notebook. A PC could be used to retrieve these 
data from the memory notebook through a serial inter-
face and to store them on a lloppy disk for further 
evaluation. 
With an external request from the gamma and neutron 
detectors installed at TO, the receiver unit also generated 
a user definable plain text, e.g. 'high gamma' or 'high 
neutron' and inserted this text into the video image. 
The triggering of the external devices, e.g. video record-
er, was not part of the TRTL. 
figure I shows a schematic setup of the TRTL system, 
cameras, fibre optics system, and video system. The TRTL 
was installed as a component of the Agency-owned Multi-
plc:\. TV Surveillance System (M UX) at the TO-facility at 
Cap de la !I ague. Two cameras faced the interior of the un-
loading cell for spent fuel transport casks. The 
TRTL-transmitter units were mounted in a rack in the ac-
cess corridor of the hot cell. The TRTL-receiver units were 
mounted in the M UX-rack on a different lloor of the plant. 
The camera signals were processed by the TRTL-transmitter 
unit and then convert~:d into optical signals. These ~ignals 
passed through optical fibre cabks connecting the hot cell 
facility with the saf~:guards control room which housed the 
recording units and the auth~:nticating dcctronics. 
~ Poweraupply 
IT] Optical tranotnlllet 
IIKJ Optical receiver 
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Fi~. I. Sdll'malic Sl'lul• of a TRTL S)sll'm, Caml·r:c., Fibre 
O(llk-, S)~lcm, and i\IFX 
The technical specifications of the liber optics system w~:r~: 
as follows: 
Optical fibre 
mat~:rial 
diameter of fibre 
diameter of cable 
linear attenuation 
linear attenuation 
operating temperature 
tensile strength 
Transmitter 
transmission band 
power 
input impedance 
input pow~:r 
wave length usual 
signal,'noise 
transmission power 
Receiver 
features 
reception threshold 
differential gain 
differential phase 
Connectors 
GOLD 50 125 
glass 
50/125 J.Ull 
I mm 
at 850 nm <3 dB/km 
at 1300 nm < 1.8 dB,'km 
- 50, + 125 ·c 
20 K 
ETI-09 M 
- 3dB, 30 llz to 9 M llz 
± 12 Vj30 rrv\ 
75 Ohm 
I V peak-to-peak 
850 nm 
45 dB 
- 22 dBm 
RTI-09 M 
sec Transmitter 
- 32 dBm 
10% 
10 dcg 
SOCAPEX 906 505 5007 
The !AEA had specified a 1 % non-linearity for the fibre 
optic system. 
·1. Performance of the Field Test 
The installation of the TRTL and start up of the field test 
took place on 12/13 October, I 989. Two camera channels 
were a\ailable for the test. A subsequent visit to Cap de la 
I I ague was scheduled by the French and German Support 
Programmes for 7 November, 1989. At that time the :YI UX 
system at Cap de la Ilague was not fully operational. It was 
not used for inspection purposes yet and therefore unseakd. 
The Agenc) further stated that it had not been the in-
tention to incorporate the TRTL into the CONSU Ll lA 
system prior to completion of a successful field test and a 
comprehensive qualification programme. Only at a time 
when the TRTL had the status of'inspection use', would the 
Agency discuss with Euratom whether the TRTL should be 
part of the mutually agreed surveillance system at Cap de la 
Ilague. 
The meeting of 7 :'\ovember, 19S9, was attended by 
representatives of the French and German Support 
Programmes and the Agency. It )1cldcd the following re-
sults. 
The three-month field test of the TRTL started on Oc-
tober 13, 1989. Two camer.ts in the dry cell (basket and 
ca~k) were connected to the TRTL. 
These two cameras would not be used for safeguards 
purposes as the CO:\SULIIA acceptance te~ts were sched-
uled for January 1990. 
The French side offered to collect the data from the 
TRTL system during the test period of the TRTL until 
ll1!d-January and send the diskettes to the developer in 
Germany. 
The German side provided a technical note on the 
Tamper Resistant TV-Link 121. 
The test data proved the reliable performance of the 
TRTL which registered several types of event data. 
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One of the two cameras had to he removed for upgrad-
ing the mech,mic,ll t.unper resistance. A first adjustment of 
the linearity of the optical link was carried out but not 
completed. Further work on the fibre optic cables was 
planned to reduce the attenuation. 
The developer sta)ed at Cap de la Ilague in February, 
1990, for performance monitoring and maintenance of the 
TRTL. I le stated that the TRTL had operated over the 
whole test period, showing that the video signal could not 
be authenticated due to non-linearity of the video signal 
transmission in the fibre optic hnk. Linearity problems with 
the libn: optic link were still present. 
A hnear dependence between the signal trammitted from 
the camera side and the signal received at the recorder side 
~~ an md1spensahle cond1t1on for successful authentication. 
The TRTL had recorded the following events: 
• The DATA flag h.td occurred because the receiver unit 
had not been able to authenticate the data from the 
transmitter unit due to the above mentioned non-
linearity problems. 
• There had been a camera failure of three days. 
• There had been a frequent loss of v1deo signals. 
A power failure in the PC had introduced a false 
date,'time into the TRTL. 
The field test of the TRTL was completed at Cap de la 
Ilague on 13 June, I 990. 
5. Results and Consequences 
The field test had been extremely valuable, as the devel-
oper had had the opportunity to become acquainted with 
real operating conditions in an indw.trial plant. The lessons 
learnt were: 
I. Safeguards equipment should be delivered to a plant in 
a fully operational state, i.e. completely cabled and 
tested. 
2. !'nor to installation, the quality or the available video 
signal should be verified for conformity with interna-
tiOnal video stand.1rds. 
In particular, the followmg problems were laced at La 
!!ague: 
I. Overloading caused by the video signal; 
The level of the video signal was not within the limits 
of international standards (white level > 0.7 V ). 
pp 
Transmitter Unit and Rece1ver Unit were alfected. 
2. Spikes in the video signal (Electromagnetic I nterfer-
ence); 
Transmitter Unit and Rece1ver Unit were alfected. 
3. Non-linearity of the transmission line; 
Receiver Unit was allected. 
4. Longterm loss of the video signal due to camera servic-
ing by the operator's subcontractor; 
Transmitter Unit and Receiver Unit were alfected. 
5. Practical problems with the downloading of the en-
cryption key. 
The following actions were taken as a result of the La 
llague test: 
1. Uesign of a TV-Pattern Generator (TPG) to feed 
standard grey areas into the video transmission line 
(CCIR, EIA standards). The TRTL can be used to 
monitor the linearity of the transmission line. For in-
stallation of the TRTL, the technician should be able to 
utilize the TPG. 
2. Further development of the TRTL software and hard-
ware. 
The major eflorts of the design enhancements were as-
sociated with the new software rather than the hardware. 
The hardware design was frozen, whereas the software was 
subjected to further improvement of the performance of the 
system. ill the meantime, discussions on a complete optical 
surveillance S) stem which induded the TRTL led to the de-
velopment of the :\lulti-Camera Optical Surveillance (M OS) 
System. 
6. Summary 
At the Cap de la !!ague TO facility the Tamper Resistant 
TV-Link (TRTL) was connected to the COl\SULII:\ Sys-
tem on Octob.:r 13, 1989, and operated until June 13, 1990. 
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During tlus period, the CO:\Slj LI lA System was m the 
commissiomng and field test. 
Two camera channels were available for the TRTL field 
test. The fac1lity operator recorded the system event J . .tta 
on computer Ji~kettes which were conveyed to the developer 
of the TRTL. From time to time the developer travelled to 
Cap de la I I ague for maintenance of the TRTL and re\ iew 
of the data in the electronic notebook. 
The TRTL operated throughout the te~t period. bent 
fl.tgs were properly registered nearly every Jay. The te~t 
conditions were mfluenced by the fact that the cameras were 
frequently scrnced which resulted in loss of video signals. 
The TRTL indicated lineanty problems associated With the 
optical links. The quahty of the video signals as well as m-
terferences also posed problems. Therefore, the question 
arose of how to measure the quality of a video transmission 
line with regard to the requirements imposed by the TRTL. 
Dunng the field test, 1t was not always possible to reliably 
verily the authenticity of the signals. The developer tned to 
cope With the non-hnearity of the fibre optic trammis~ion. 
The threshold was ~et from.')",~ to 15%. But 'till, the TRTL 
gave tamper llags. This ind1cated that the non-lineanty c:>..-
ceeded 15%, which was conlirmed in a non-lineanty test 
(result was approx. 25% ). 
The vtdeo inlormation was n.:cordcd on the \H!X Sy~­
tem. The video tape ,md the records of Febn1ar) to June 
1990 were given to the Agency for evaluatiOn in order to 
make a corrcl.ttion bet11een the data ston.:J in the TRTL 
notebook and on video t.tpe. 
The test rewlts of the TRTL have been used to enhance 
Its performance. 
The TRTL authenuc,tttOn ~ystem is now a maJOr com-
ponent of the :VIulti-Camcra Optical Survctllance S) stem 
( :\1 OS) developed under the German Support Progr.tmrne 
to the lAb\. Many of the practical problems faced in the 
TRTL field test at Cap de la llague were taken into account. 
MOS mea~ures and reports on all analog values as,ociatcd 
with the transmission lme. A commercial pattern generator 
can be u~cd to as se'~ the quality or the transmission line. 
Another feature introduced into the authentication method 
i~ the ~ecuring and reporting in case of power interrupttons. 
The system will be much more tolerant with regard to video 
interference. 
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VERIFICATION OF THE BURN-UP OF SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLIES BY 
MEANS OF THE CONSULHA CONTAINMENT/SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 
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Abstract 
CONSULHA is a containment/ surveillance 
system which has been developed as part of the 
French Support Programme for the !AEA 
Safeguards in cooperation with EURATOM and was 
designed to meet the !AEA EURATOM 
requirements for the verification of nuclear 
materials. This system will make it possible to count 
movements and verify irradiation of spent fuel 
assemblies in industrial facilitities such as 
reprocessing plants and nuclear reactors. 
1. Principles and Particularities of CONSULHA 
CONSULHA is a system of original design 
associating video surveillance with the measuring 
of neutron and gamma activity levels. This 
technique makes it possible to ascertain that a fuel 
assembly is visible, and enables it to be tagged to 
prove that it actually is a spent fuel assembly./1/ /2/ 
2. Results Obtained in Service 
CONSULHA was installed at the COGEMA 
plant at La Hague in September 1989. During the 
1989-1990 campaigns, it enabled inspection of the 
movement of 1962 PWR and BWR fuel assemblies 
unloaded in workshop TO. In this unloading 
station, it was necessary to adapt the system to the 
existing installation. Despite this constraint, it was 
confirmed that it was possible to verify the burn up 
of the fuel assemblies. The semi-quantitative results 
obtained make it possible to propose a burn up 
verification system. 
The operating software was created in 
collaboration with the !AEA and EURATOM 
Inspectors, on the basis of an actual verification 
situation. The inspectors normally have video 
recordings obtained with cameras which are 
sequentially saved on a magnetic tape, nuclear 
readings and data which are supplied by the 
operating organization and which have to be 
checked. 
Using the readings obtained with the fuel 
assemblies unloaded at TO, the relationship between 
the burn up announced by the operating 
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organization and the results of neutron and gamma 
activity measurement were determined. A first 
series of curves, without correction for cooling time, 
made it possible to verify the burn up with an 
accuracy of the order of 20% despite the different 
cooling times. If the raw values are corrected to 
allow for the cooling time, determined by only gross 
gamma activity measurements, accuracy is 
improved. 
3. Criticism of Results 
The results obtained with CONSULHA 
installed at TO were used in the knowledge that they 
would not be obtained under the best conditions, for 
the following reasons: 
It was impossible to optimize the positioning 
of the detectors due to operating constraints. 
This resulted in low neutron detection 
effectiveness and poor statistical accuracy. 
The distance between the fuel assemblies and 
the detectors is not constant because of the 
different positions of the assemblies in the 
storage basket. 
Gamma activity measurement was carried out 
using a detector measuring total gamma 
radiation. 
4. Conclusion 
Verification of the burn up of spent fuel 
assemblies involves problems at a number of levels 
where there is a place for cheap, unsophisticated 
equipment easy to use. It is for this reason that an 
improvement programme has been set up in order 
to simplify the equipment, particularly the 
detectors. 
In veiw of the particularly encouraging results 
obtained at TO, it can be considered that the basic 
industrial elements are already available for 
creating a burn up verification device. 
Certain improvements were envisaged from the 
start of the project: 
optimizing detector installation, 
improving gamma activity detector 
performance, 
adding gamma activity detector performance, 
adding software to utilize the results for 
safeguards purposes, 
associating the results with video review. 
These four points will be considered in detail 
during this presentation in the light of the work in 
progress. 
5. Present Approach 
In association with the IAEA and EURATOM 
safeguards authorities, French and German 
universities and laboratories (the PHASE Laboratory 
of INP2 Strasbourg and the Laboratory of the 
Univerisity of Dresden), and industrial partners 
(Intertechnique, Quartz et Silice and Dialectica), 
three techniques have been tested: 
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measurement of burn up using neutron 
detectors and gamma detectors with energy 
selection, 
measurement of burn up using a single 
neutron and gamma activity detector by means 
of a single detector using a doped scintillation 
glass enabling neutron/ gamma discrimination 
by energy selection, 
verification of burn up by measurement of the 
photoelectric peaks of the gamma radiation of 
caesium-134 and caesium-137 using a CdTe 
detector operating at room temperature. 
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Abstract 
The application of new video surveillance electronics 
to safeguards has introduced an urgent need to 
formulate and adopt video standards that will ensure 
the highest possible video quality and the orderly 
introduction of data insertion. Standards will provide 
guidance in the application of image processing and 
digital techniques. 
Realistic and practical standards are a benefit to the 
IAEA Member States, Support Programme equipment 
deveiopers and facility operators, as they assist in the 
efficient utilization of available resources. Moreover, 
standards shall provide a clear path for orderly 
introduction of newer technologies, whilst ensuring 
authentication and verification of the original image 
through the video process. 
Standards emerging from IAEA are an outcome of 
experience based on current knowledge, both within 
the safeguards arena and the video parent industry 
which comprises commercial and professional 
television. This paper provides a brief synopsis of 
recent developments which have highlighted the need 
for a surveillance based video standard together with 
a brief outline of these standards. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, optical surveillance has become 
increasingly important as a means of maint~i~ing 
nuclear material accountancy by the IAEA. IOitially, 
image surveillance was accomplished with 
photographic film cameras. However, _recent 
difficulties in film procurement, together w1th an 
upsurge in technical developments in television and a 
general reduction in the relative costs of video 
components, have culminated in making today's video 
technology indispensable to the Agency. 
The electronic processing of images is very different to 
that employed in the older mechanical and chemica~ 
systems associated with film technology. Therefore, 1t 
is reasonable to assume that procedures and 
strategies adopted for the newer technology will also 
be different. This is especially evident with the 
amalgamation of analogue and digital electronics for 
processing images where these techniques are now 
commonplace. Video technology, of a kind which is 
unique to the safeguards arena, is being developed by 
the IAEA and Member States through Support 
Programme activities. Therefore, equipment must 
satisfy the requirement of the users, in this case the 
Inspectorate. Features must be provided which will aid 
the inspector's work efficiency and maintain the 
Agency's credibility. 
• Cosl Free ConsuHanl under lhe AUstralian Safeguards AssiSianee Programme 
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Through the development activities of member states 
assistance programmes, the Agency has begun to 
evaluate and introduce new technology into optical 
surveillance safeguards equipment with the dual aims 
of credibility and efficiency. 
lt is from this background that a need for optical 
surveillance video standards has now emerged. This 
need has been recognized for some time within the 
Development Division of the Department of 
Safeguards of the IAEA. In May 1990, the Australian 
Safeguards Assistance Programme provided a Cost 
Free Consultant to the Agency for the specific six 
month task of establishing optical surveillance videc 
standards and recommendations for implementation 
in safeguards. 
2. The Need for Standards 
Standards guide governments, agencies, 
manufacturers, consumers and the general public 
alike and facilitate the orderly conduct of these 
enterprises. A common direction or purpose for each 
endeavour is thus assured. In consequence, video 
standards are of benefit to the Agency, Member 
States, independent equipment developers and facility 
operators as they assist in the utilization of the 
available resources by unifying equipment and 
procedures that aid installation and maintenance as 
well as lower costs. 
A standard does not preclude anyone working outside 
its jurisdiction or bounds. However, its very existence 
requires that one be aware of it together with its limits 
and scope, and possibly more importantly, be 
cognizant of the reasons for its existence or 
development. In many instances, standards are 
mandatory where information is interchanged or 
hardware merged, Similarly, this will be the case for 
IAEA safeguards equipment. Of course, standards are 
subject to periodic review as technology or 
procedures change and are revised or withdrawn. 
Optical surveillance, like any other branch of 
engineering, requires standards to be a 
comprehensive and established activity. Until recently, 
it had not been necessary for IAEA development to 
apply any special video standards, primarily because 
the application of video technology to the safeguards 
area was comparatively small compared to the total 
television industry. Moreover, application of television 
systems was considered a fairly straight forward 
procedure. 
This philosophy has 
realized that there is 
efficient introduction 
surveillance framework. 
now changed. lt has been 
a necessity for orderly and 
of standards into optical 
The first aim is the formulation and adoption of basic 
video standards that will ensure the highest possible 
video quality at an acceptable level of equipment cost. 
The maintenance of better video quality means 
consistent, high quality surveillance data for the 
Inspectorate. 
The second aim is the orderly introduction of 
electronic data insertion into the video signal. There 
are considerable potential benefits for the Agency to 
fully utilize electronic data insertion. lt would be 
possible to electronically append the following 
information to the video signal: 
* Scene time and date; 
* Facility sensorjcamera location 
* Authentication data 
* Temperature /humidity data 
* Tamper indicators 
* Other data from containment and 
surveillance devices 
Once appended, the data is recorded with the video 
for subsequent retrieval during the review process. 
Because the data is in an electronic form, it can be 
easily read by a computer system. This would greatly 
facilitate all future review systems which use computer 
techniques or image processing. 
Until now, no unified television standards existed 
within the safeguards community; nor do they appear 
to be in common use throughout the surveillance 
community in general. Furthermore, standards in the 
broader television community cannot be directly 
applied to IAEA optical surveillance without 
modification, as they are not directly applicable; nor 
do they reflect the developments or changes that are 
being tailored to the specific requirements of video 
quality and data insertion for safeguards applications. 
Standards need to flow on to ensure the orderly 
introduction of these newer technologies whilst 
ensuring authentication and verification of the original 
image through the video process. The planned use of 
back-end and front-end image processing techniques 
and the incorporation of sophisticated authentication 
systems have applied additional motivation for the 
immediate establishment of video standards 
specifically devised for the IAEA's optical surveillance 
systems but based, where possible, on standards 
already in use by the television industry. Such a 
procedure will minimize re-engineering. 
Wherever possible, the proposed IAEA standards 
shall recommend the use of current national and 
international standards as its basis. This procedure 
was adopted to ensure a consistency and to maximize 
compatibility with locally available hardware. By being 
compatible, the Agency's equipment will be 
automatically compliant with much of the commercially 
available video equipment. This methodology is 
essential if the manufacture of specialized items of 
plant is to be minimized. 
3. The Problems of Multiple Television Systems 
There are many different television systems operating 
in world. As safeguards is an international and 
cooperative effort, careful attention must be paid to 
wavs of amelioratino the effects of this non-
standardization in any system developed for optical 
surveillance. To do this we must examine the existing 
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systems so that we can extract the maximum 
compatibility for the proposed standards. 
The International Radio Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), has considered some of the different television 
systems in Report 624-3 /1/. The systems in more 
common use are considered in the following table: 
Table 1 Television systems in common usage 
SYSTEM LINES/ 
FRAME 
M 525 
N 625 
B,G 625 
H 625 
625 
O,K 625 
K1 625 
625 
Roe. 472 625 
NB' BW • Ban<lwkllh 
FIELD 
FREQ (HZ) 
60 (5994) 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
Agures b8SeO oo CCIR Oata 
LINE 
FREQ (Hz) 
15,734.264 
+/-00003% 
15,625 
+/-000014% 
15,625 
+/-00001% 
15,625 
+/-00001% 
15,625 
+/-000002% 
15,625 
+/-0.0001% 
15,625 
+/-00001% 
15,625 
+/-0.0001% 
15,625 
BW 
(MHZ) 
4.2 
4.2 
50 
5.0 
55 
60 
60 
6.0 
50/ 
+/-00001% 55/ 
60 
Needless to say, the establishment of video standards 
for the Agency's optical surveillance will require close 
liaison between developers and users, similar to the 
consultative process adopted by the CCIR, the 
International Electrical Commission (IEC) and other 
standards setting organizations. 
Existing safeguards surveillance systems use many 
devices whose systems and electrical standards vary 
widely at present. In general terms, performance of 
these devices can be classified into the distinct 
categories shown in Table 2. 
Although a survey has not been undertaken of 
inspectorate establishments worldwide, there is solid 
evidence to assume that classes of equipment range 
from high quality industrial through to domestic grade. 
In practice, much of the present Agency surveillance 
equipment is classifiable between industrial and 
commercial CCTV grade. 
A requirement of the Video Standards Task is to 
adopt, as far as possible, a small but appropriate 
number of standards. These standards shall have as 
many compatible threads running through them and 
each being applicable to that part of the world where 
the Agency wishes to implement safeguards. The aim 
is to permit the various parts of a surveillance system, 
Table 2 Categories of performance 
A Full broadcast quality 
- Used in television broadcast stations 
B Industrial 
-High quality, high resolution 
- Medium to high fidelity 
- Resolution: ~ 400 lines, S/N 28 - 40 dB 
c Commercial 
- Used for domestic and property surveillance 
- Medium fidelity 
- Resolution: 240 - 400 lines, S/N 28 - 40 dB 
D Domestic 
- VHS, Beta and home video cameras 
- Low fidelity 
- Resolution: < 300 lines, S/N 28 - 40 dB 
developed by different organizations, to be 
interconnected with a minimum of incompatibilities. A 
unified set of video standards will also help to 
coordinate and arbitrate on the introduction of new 
data insertion methods and video authentication. 
To this end, it is proposed that two major strands be 
adopted: namely, one based on the American NTSC 
525 line, 60 Hz standard for use in countries where 60 
Hz mains is used for power and lighting, and the 
European PAL 625 line, 50 Hz system in countries 
where 50 Hz predominates. Both of these general 
standards will require adaption or modification for use 
in safeguards work as there are features that are now 
required by safeguards video that simply don't exist in 
the normal television arena. 
lt is recognized that due to the specific requirements 
of IAEA surveillance, some IAEA video equipment is 
breaking new ground, thus generating an urgent need 
for a standard approach. This approach is not exactly 
the same as the broadcast, industrial or domestic 
television industries. Furthermore, it must be 
appreciated that image processing is one of the most 
rapidly developing areas of surveillance video and 
therefore must be given considerable room to 
develop. 
4. What Needs Standardizing? 
Any optical surveillance standard adopted by the 
Agency must be consistent with, and an integral part 
of, th~ methodologies used by the IAEA for 
safeguards work. In addition, the standard must 
maintain or enhance confidence factors for 
safeguards surveillance. However, it should not be 
tighter than is necessary if it is to be readily accepted 
and implemented. lt is understood that any standard 
has to be realistic to be workable. Adherence to it by 
all parties involved should present as few problems as 
possible. At the same time, it must be able to evolve 
as technology evolves and as techniques improve. lt 
must also minimize installation expenditure, equipment 
replacement, maintenance and staff retraining. 
lt is envisaged that the IAEA video standards and 
recommendations shall be an 'umbrella' document 
and combine IAEA specific methodologies with the 
relevant IEC and CCIR or, where necessary, other 
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references /2/. By way of a defined methodology, it 
shall provide for revisions so that when any change 
occurs in the 'reference standard", applicable 
revisions to the IAEA document shall take place. 
For the time being, the proposed mandatory 
standards will be limited to that section of the video 
chain, loosely referred to as the transport, which refers 
to the synchronizing or timing, amplitude, linearity and 
transmission bandwidth parameters. Fortunately, this 
is the kernel of any television system and therefore the 
most relevant part. A reasonable approach is to 
breakdown the standard into its constituent parts 
appropriate to that required for optical surveillance. A 
proposed system is shown in Table 3. 
The standard has been sectioned into major and 
minor categories. Whilst this method might not be 
ideal, it delineates the sections that have to be defined 
in the first iteration of the standard. lt is anticipated that 
the minor items will be expanded as time permits. 
Table 3 Video standard -Sectional parts 
MAJOR SECTIONS: 
1. System *PAL 
* NTSC 
* Other (MAC, HDTV?) 
2. Transport * Synchronizing pulses 
* Synchronizing timing 
* Amplitude and linearity 
* System bandwidth 
* Colorimetry (PAL & NTSC 
systems) 
* Unear line and terminal 
equipment 
3. Type of * Quality (broadcast, industrial, 
performance etc.) 
MINOR SECTIONS: 
4. Peripheral *Cameras 
equipment * VCRs 
performance * Digital storage systems 
*etc. 
5. Processing * Image processing 
* Non-linear correction 
* Special effects (matting, etc.) 
* Mixing (linear and non-linear) 
6. Test *Test and measurement 
Procedures methods 
* Calibration 
Major subsets within the standard will be applicable to 
a specific environment or country, or type of standard 
(low resolution, colour, PAL, NTSC, etc.) and, 
Minor subsets will define the component sections of 
such a standard (for example camera video and video 
authentication links may have more than one set of 
definitions). 
Whilst there is a diversity of opinion as to the required 
fidelity for optical surveillance, it is widely agreed that 
the industrial grade, defined in Table 2, will provide a 
level of performance acceptable for the majority of 
surveillance work. Overall broad performance, from 
the camera lens and imaging device, through to the 
display device viewed by the inspector, can also be 
defined in terms of resolution and signal to noise ratio. 
Minor items (listed by subsystem) need to be 
considered in the next and subsequent iterations of 
the standard. However, Table 4 is a brief list of some 
items which will be mentioned in the forthcoming 
Standards and Recommendations document /2/. 
Table 4 Peripheral equipment performance 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Facility lighting 
Field of view 
Camera filter 
Camera lens 
Camera (monochrome and colour) 
Video cable (baseband use) 
Fibre optic (transmitter, receiver and cable) 
Video authentication link 
Video distribution amplifier 
Clamping (processing) amplifier 
Video tape recorder (12.65mm Beta) 
Video tape recorder (12.65mm VHS) 
Video tape recorder (12.65mm S-VHS) 
Video tape recorder (12.65mm VHS time lapse) 
Video tape recorder (8mm) 
Video optical (laser) disk recorder (digital) 
Digital video image processing and storage 
Electronic data insertion 
Testing methods 
Frequency of tests 
Calibration Equipment (Laboratory) 
5. Vertical Interval Planning 
Broadcast services use the blanking interval for many 
purposes: vertical interval test signals, Teletex, cuing 
and other timing processes. Optical surveillance also 
uses this area for data and authentication signals with 
the result that the vertical interval blanking region has 
become so congested that some of the active video, 
or picture region, is used for switching by multiplexer 
and VCRs. 
Much consideration is being given to how best to 
balance the requirements of existing industrial video 
systems with those required for surveillance data and 
authentication. However, resolution of the differences 
in vertical interval use by optical surveillance systems, 
such as MIVS /3/, COSMOS /4/, MUX-11 /5/, TRTL 
/6/, MOS /71 and other image processing systems 
/8,9/ remains to be fully resolved. 
6. Evaluation of the Video Standard 
Following Agency in-house review, evaluation 
procedures shall be adopted which will seek comment 
from Member State experts. Where necessary, the 
standard shall be revised before becoming an active 
document. Further iterations of the standard will be 
made as circumstances warrant. 
7. Immediate and Interim Video Standards 
lt is important to note that newer technologies must 
not be introduced for their own sake, but rather for the 
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practical reasons such as the limitations of existing 
equipment. Many other examples can be cited, such 
as the increasing amount of surveillance material for 
review, limited inspection resources, inefficient review 
techniques and other ergonomic and economic 
reasons. 
What can be done immediately? Options have to be 
available, prior to the standards being introduced, to 
continue to operate already installed systems, which 
may be outside the standard, until they can be totally 
replaced by new generation equipment falling within 
the standards. Such actions are considered necessary 
for practical reasons such as equipment budget 
forecasts and planning. The proposed standards will 
undoubtedly increase pressure to upgrade some 
surveillance systems. However, buying equipment that 
is obviously outside the standard should be avoided. 
8. Conclusion 
Many aspects which affect the setting of the Video 
Surveillance Standards and Recommendations are 
already under consideration by the Agency. A key 
issue is the introduction of video authentication 
systems. The successful introduction of optical 
surveillance data reduction systems will depend on 
both data insertion and video quality aspects. Avoiding 
delays in implementation will result in appropriate 
equipment specifications for the Agency's present and 
future optical surveillance systems. 
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EURATO~ EXPERIENCE WITH VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 
SINGLE C~ERA AND OTHER NON-~ULTIPLEXED 
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H.G. Wagner, P. Chare 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate Luxembourg 
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Abstract 
The Euratom Safeguards Directorate CESD) 
has been using a number of single camera video 
systems (~lnlstar, ~IVS, DCS) and non-
multiplexed multi-camera systems (Diglquad) 
for routine safeguards survel I lance 
applications during the last four years. This 
paper descrIbes aspects of system desIgn and 
considerations relevant for installation. lt 
reports on system reliability and performance 
and presents suggestions on future 
Improvements. 
1. Introduction 
In nuclear power statIons and nuclear 
reprocessing plants, surveillance units 
equipped with a twin ~INOLTA camera unit using 
Kodak MFX film are used to maintain the 
continuity of knowledge of material which has 
been Independent I y verIfIed at some previous 
point In time. These surveillance units are 
periodical Jy exchanged and brought back to 
LUXE~BOURG for processing and subsequent film 
review. 
The MFX Super 8 Kodak film Is no longer 
commercially avai Jab le and therefore the 
~lnolta camera units need to be replaced by 
other surveillance systems based on video 
technology within the next few years. 
The use of ~OX fuel elements In LWR 
reactors has led to additional needs for video 
surve 11 I ance. 
2. Equipment 
Twin ~lnolta unit 
The present EURATO~ film camera 
surveillance system consists of a camera, 
timer, tamper-resistant sealable enclosure and 
mounting brackets that allow the proper 
positioning of the cameras. In practice each 
enclosure contains two cameras each with their 
own power supply and timer, viewing and same 
area. Two cameras are used for Increased 
system reliability. 
Each camera is triggered by individual 
external timers that activate the cameras to 
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expose one frame of film on a preselected 
interval. 
The cameras, and timing units are placed 
in an environmentally tight enclosure 
containing dessicant to control the humidity 
in the interior of the enclosure. The cameras 
are modifIed ~I NOL TA mode I XL-401 or XL-601 
Super 8 clne camera. The interval electronics 
have been modified so that single frame 
operation Is the fixed mode of use and 1t is 
initiated only by an external timer. 
EURATO~ has approximately 12 years of 
experience in the use of film camera 
survel 1 lance. The first units were deployed 1n 
1979. The original film cartridge (Kodak MFX) 
has a capacity of 7200 frames. 
~inlstar 
The ~INISTAR (~IN I Sur ve I I I ance 
Television And Recording) system was designed 
by SANDIA National Laboratories, Albuquerque, 
New ~exlco, USA for applications requiring a 
smal I economical and portable video 
survei I lance system. 
The MINISTAR consists of three separate 
sub-systems 
a camera housing containing a 
sol id state camera with lens 
a Video Recording Assembly 
an external battery 
charger/accessories case. 
The three-component system allows for a 
distributed Instal latlon. AI I three components 
may be located separately from each other. 
The V Ideo RecordIng Assemb I y (VRA) 
contains a SONY SL-2000 video recorder, a 
Control Electronics ~odule (CE~) and 12V 
features. The VRA also Incorporates several 
tamper protection features. Power 
Interruptions, loss of video signal and cable 
disconnection are detected and recorded. A 
tamper switch activates each time the case is 
opened, triggering a recording with Inserted 
numbers in the video. The system can operate 
up to 4 hours on batteries during mains power 
failures. 
Modular integrated video system (MIVS) 
The Modular Integrated Video System 
(MIVS) was developed by Sandla National 
Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA 
under the u.s. support programme to the IAEA. 
lt was developed to produce a simple, highly 
reliable closed circuit television (CCTV) 
system to replace the ageing XL-401 Twin 
Minolta Film Camera System. lt was to replace 
the Minoltas in faclllt les where main plant 
power was readily available and In situations 
where it was desirable to have the CCTV camera 
separated from the CCTV recording console. 
The specifications for the MIVS were 
approved In 1986; the operational modules were 
developed in 1987; and the field evaluation of 
the system began in 1988. 
The MIVS design specifications required 
it to have a simple user Interface, be easy to 
maintain, have high tamper resistance, have 
minimum facility Impact, and achieve the same 
level of rellabl llty as the Mlnolta for long-
term, unattended surveillance. The system 
rellabi llty of the Mlnolta Is 0.98 with a 90 
percent confidence level while recording 7 200 
scenes over a 90 day Inspect Ion Interval. In 
contrast, the MIVS has the capacity to record 
26 000 scenes. This greater number allows the 
Interval between scenes to be reduced and thus 
increases the survell lance coverage. The MIVS 
uses two video tape recorders CVTRs) operating 
In parallel. 
The MIVS consists of small, unobtrusive 
houslngs, has very low power consumption, Is 
simple to Install, and In general has a very 
low faci I lty Impact. The equipment conelsts of 
modules plugged into a base plate, thereby 
facilitating maintenance In the field. Field 
maIntenance I nvo Ives sI mp I y rep I ac i ng one of 
the four basic modules and returning the used 
module to the central maintenance facility for 
repair and reconditioning. No special tools 
are required for the field maintenance. lt Is 
expected that the recorder modules will be 
replaced on a routine basis, perhaps about 
once every two years or after approxImate I y 
180 000 scene recordings. 
The MIVS user Interface has been "human 
engineered" to ensure that it Is as simple, 
understandable, and fault-proof as possible. 
The human interface Involves pressing one of 
four "soft keys" at the command of the menu on 
an 8-1 ine by 40-column screen. Even If 
surve I I I ance settIngs are not comp I ete, when 
the case is closed the MIVS will commence 
survei I lance In the "forced start" mode. 
Finally, a significant amount of 
attention has been given to making the MIVS 
tamper resistant. A unique and sophisticated 
line authentication system Is used to verify 
the Integrity of the cable between the camera 
and the recorder. The MIVS case Itself Is 
constructed of anodized aluminium that would 
be difficult to damage and repair without 
being detected. Seal wire guides are Installed 
to assist In sealing the M IVS cover, and the 
mating surface Is constructed to prevent entry 
without opening the case. 
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When a mains power failure occurs the 
MIVS wi 11 continue to operate on back-up 
battery power for approximately 3 hours Cat 5 
minute scene Intervals). 
Digiquad-System 
The EURATOM video survei I lance system 
DIGIQUAD is a modular video system based on 
commercially available components, mounted in 
a 19 inch cabinet. 
Figure 1 shows a schematic overview over the 
system. The DIGIQUAD-system consists of 4 CCD-
cameras, 2 monitors, 2 GYYR-time lapse 
recorders in para I le I, one recorder being used 
UIDEO SURUEILLANCE SYSTEM 
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Figure 
for back-up, 1 DIGIQUAD processing unit, 
power supply with battery back-up. 
The two outputs from the DIGIQUAD unit, output 
1 for single pictures and output 2 for the 
quad pictures (the Images of up to four 
cameras are combined Into one Image In a four-
way split screen) are recorded on video tapes. 
The recording Interval of the time lapse 
recorder can be set between 2.5 min and 0.02 
sec. between fields or groups of fields. 
The power supp I y has a back-up battery for 
approximately 12 hours back-up time. 
A closed dual circuit cool lng system has been 
1 nsta I I ed on the rear door to ensure 
sufficient cooling while avoiding the Intake 
of air Into the cabinet. 
3. Operational experience 
General 
The traditionally used twin Ulnolta 
units are very tamper resistant but the 
1 imlted frame capacity and radiation level 
restricts their appl lcatlon. This situation Is 
clearly Improved by today's availability of 
CCTV systems. 
The advantages of the video systems over 
the old twin Ulnolta units are : 
the Quality of the frames which 
give much better detail with the 
CCD cameras 
the transport of the tapes for the 
video system Is easier than 
transporting the suitcase 
containing a twin Ulnolta unit 
(approximately 20 Kg) 
no time spent for preparation and 
opening of the units before 
Installation and after removal 
because on I y two sma 11 V Ideo 
cassettes are exchanged 
no time spent for the processing 
of the UFX films of the twin 
Ulnolta camera 
possibll ity of on-site reviewing 
with video systems. 
the separatIon of camera and 
system unit means that the 
inspector does not have to access 
cameras In difficult locations. 
On the other hand, all video systems 
currently used require mains power and wi 11 
only operate between 2 hours (Minlstar), 4 
hours (MIVS) and 12 hours (Digiquad) on back-
up batteries. The ,Installation of video 
systems Involves not only the fixing of a 
camera in a sealed camera housing but also the 
laying of cables In cable trays, possibly 
through wall penetratlons to a conveniently 
placed central system cabinet which may take 
the form of a suitcase, a wall-mounted case or 
a 19" industry standard lnstrumentat ion rack. 
The facility must supply mains power 
preferably from a non-lntreruptible power 
supply. If possible an alarm signal should be 
relayed to the control room If a loss of mains 
power is detected on the line supplying the 
video system. The cable connect Ions Into the 
system cabinet must be protected against 
accidental or deliberate disconnection. 
As mains-powered equipment, video 
systems must comply with national regulations 
on electrical safety. 
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Re I i ab i I I t y 
Table 1 shows 1990 reliability figures 
for the four single camera and non-multiplexed 
multi-camera systems In use during that year. 
lt lists the number of systems Installed in 
the field, the recording capacity and the 
tot a I number of operatIng hours (approxImate 
figures) for each type of device. The 
reliability figures are also shown In Figure 
2. The rei iabllity parameters were calculated 
as the relative number of surveallance 
failures caused by Intrinsic system faults. 
All Intrinsic failures observed for the 
Minolta systems were caused by simultaneous 
failures of both cameras (Table 2). The 
Uinlstar failures were brought on by 
malfunction of the single recorder, both 
Intrinsic MIVS failures were caused by faults 
In the central module. 
Of the four survel I lance fa I lures 
observed for Dlgiquad systems during 1990, 
three were triggered by power failures 
followed by a malfunction of the DC power 
back-up system. The fourth loss of 
survel I lance was very probably caused by 
camera failure. 
Review 
New review tables for Uinolta films and 
dedicated review stations are used for review. 
Even though In-field review is technically 
possible with video systems, it is the policy 
of the Euratom Safeguards Directorate that al I 
video cassettes should come back to 
headquarters for safeguards review or at least 
for random technical reviews. 
The review of a Minolta film typically 
takes one hour. Reviewing video tapes from 
systems set at the same recording Interval as 
a Ulnol ta system will normally take longer 
because several fields are recorded per scene 
whereas only one Image is taken per scene by 
the Minolta camera. 
This can be partially alleviated by 
reviewing the video cassette at higher tape 
speed. The Quad picture recording of the 
Dlglquad systems allows fast simultaneous 
review of four cameras. Review speeds have to 
be reduced, however, or recorded seQuences 
have to be reviewed several times if there are 
relevant activities visible on more than one 
of the four pictures of the spilt screen. 
Review of a Dlglquad tape takes between 
~hour (static situation) to 6 hours (dynamic 
situation e.g. loading of LWR UOX). 
Figure 3 shows the 1990 reviewing 
effort. 
Type 
Twin Wlnolta 
Wlnistar 
loll VS 
DIGIQUAO 
Type 
Twin Wino Ita 
.,.lnlstar 
loll VS 
OIGIQUAD 
EQUIPMENT DATA FOR 1990 
Number Type Total ot F 1 rat Current Reliability 
system• capacIty oporat hours used status 1990 
88 7200 775 ~~0 1979 End 1996 99.2 
frames 
7 21000 21 600 198~ End 1992 93.~ 
scenes 
~ 26000 3~ 9~~ 1989 25 to be 97.5 
scones lnsta lied 
10 270000 87 360 1989 versIon 2 98.5 
frames Installed 
\RELIABILITY 19'JG - SlltGI.£ CAIIERA AIID OTHER "OIH!ULTIPLEXED SYSTE~I 
FAILURE TABLE FOR EURATOM EQU I PloiENT 
Ex torna I 
Power L lght lng I rradl human camera 
loss toss failure error failure 
0 9 1 2 3 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 1 
100 
~~.z 
Figure 2 
FOR 1990 
lntorna I 
module total number 
failure rev lows 
0 3 360 
2 2 30 
2 2 80 
3 ~ 230 
[ilfui~WS 1~~0 - SIIIGLE CIVIERA AIID OTHERS "UIHIJLTIPLEXED SYST~M~i~ 
51.00'/ 
1 001. 
Figure 3 
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4. Further Developments 
A new version (version 2.0) of the 
DIg I quad system has been deve I oped in wh I eh 
the problems with the DC power back-up were 
eliminated and a much higher degree of 
redundancy was built In. First tests at 
headquarters have demonstrated more than 17 
hours of battery operation and two such 
systems have been Installed In the field. In a 
further upgrade step al I Dlglquad systems wl 11 
be fitted with special data loggers (Rustrack 
Rangers) which wl I I record key system 
parameters such as mains voltage, current 
load, DC voltages, temperature, shock and 
humidity in battery buffered RAM. Rather like 
a flight recorder this device will normally 
only be read out If a system crash has 
occured. 
A new automatic PC-based review station 
for M I VS tapes has been developed by Aqu I 1 a 
and will be delivered soon. Another review 
station based on neural network technology Is 
being tested by the IAEA and Euratom. This 
station was developed by Sandla and the 
University of New Mexico. 
After it has been "trained" this station 
can automatically recognize Items of 
safeguards Interest. For both stations the 
Idea Is to Image-process tapes In unattended 
mode and restrict human review to those Images 
where the review system has detected the 
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presence of particular i terns or the movement 
of sufficiently large items. 
Following suggestions from Aquila, 
discussions have started on a stepwlse upgrade 
of the MIVS system to a digital video system. 
The transfer of video system status 
through telephone modems is currently being 
tested at headquarters In Luxembourg. 
5. Conclusions 
Over the last five years the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate has tested, installed 
and put into rout I ne use a number of single 
camera video systems and non-multlplexed 
multi-cameras video systems. The rei iabll ity 
of these systems has not yet reached that of 
the twin-Minolta units but improvements in 
system redundancy and module rei iabll ity 
should make it possible to attain this goal 
during 1991/1992 at least for the most recent 
devices. The main reasons for survel I lance 
failures dur lng 1990 were I ight lng and power 
failures followed by module failures. 
Safeguard video systems must be shown to 
comply with regulations on mechanical and 
electrical safety. Mains power from a non-
interruptible supply must be assured. lt is 
expected that some form of automated review or 
pre-review will be Introduced on a test basis 
during 1991/1992. 
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Abstract 
A tele-operated system Is being developed to reduce the amount of human intervention In 
a nuclear material pilot storage facility. The system consist of two major components: a 
remotely guided vehicle carrying a manipulating arm, and a central graphical workstat1on to 
be used as the system's operator console. This paper describes the work that has already 
been done In terms of navigation of the vehicle. Special attention was given to the 
interface between the operator and the computer. lt provides in each moment all the 
Information needed, such that the operator may consider himself Inside the storage area. 
Range Information and TV Images Will be used for navigation, accurate position 
determination, and to authenticate the vehicle's location. Safety considerations that are 
part of the design, are also discussed. 
1. Introduction 
Developments In computing and electronic technologies 
have widened the options on how to design fissile material 
storage facilities. Storage access, Inventory and 
surveillance philosophy, must be reassessed taking Into 
account new available technologies. 
The SAOV project (Advanced Storage of Valuable Objects) 
/1,2/ alms to build a pilot storage facility for nuclear 
materials, Integrating a remotely operated manipulating 
system, with the following operational objectives: 
- remote Inventory 
- remote handling and transport 
- high security 
- provide adequate data for high level material management 
An overall view of the project has been presented 
elsewhere /3/. This paper details some aspects related to 
the navigation of the vehicle, namely, the man-machine 
Interface, safety and security. Before actually proceeding 
to the topic, there Is a short section describing the 
system's architecture and the equipment available. 
2. System's Architecture 
The system Is divided In two major blocks (Figure 1 ): the 
remotely operated vehicle carrying on board a manipulating 
arm and associated equipment, and the system's operator 
console. This division emphasizes the design of a proper 
man-machine Interface, granting the operator access to all 
the necessary Information to guide and control the vehicle 
and equipment. 
The remote handling system Is composed of the following 
functional modules: 
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* System's Operator Console: 
- Colour Graphical Workstatlon (UniX, NFS, X 11, Motif); 
* Vehicle: 
- 2 motorized wheels, 68020 VME computer, optical 
encoders; 
* Manipulating Arm: 
- 6 degrees of freedom, 68020 VME computer, optical 
encoders; 
* Vision System: 
- TV camera, computer controlled pan-and-tilt, zoom 
and focus, Image frame grabber; 
* Range System: 
- Laser range finder With RS232 Interface, pan-and-
tilt; 
* Ultrasonic Obstacle Detection System 
- (under consideration); 
Figure 1: Computer Controlled Remote Handling. 
The architecture of the system Is represented In Figure 2. 
Commands are transmitted via an RS232C serial link to the 
computer on-board of the vehicle. This computer sorts out 
the commands and redirects them to the proper 
destination, I.e., to one of the real-time tasks that control 
vehicle's movements (speed and position), or to a second 
computer controlling the manipulator arm. Other tasks are 
associated to two pan-and-tilt units (TV camera and laser 
range finder), to focusing and zooming, etc ... 
Vehicle's Computer Mani pulator"s Computer 
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Figure 2: System's Architecture. 
3. NavigatiOn 
Three navigation development phases have been devised. 
These phases correspond to Increasing levels of 
complexity, each one being based on the developments of 
Its predecessor. 
I - Manual: the system's operator controls the movements 
of the vehicle directly, I.e., he/she Interactively Instructs 
the computer which commands are to be sent to the 
vehicle. 
11 - Semi-Automated: the operator sets some Intermediate 
objectives to the computer, e.g., "Go to the end of the 
corridor". The host computer will then Instruct the vehicle 
which actions to take and which sensorial feedback Is 
needed. 
Ill - Automatic: this mode will be objective driven In 
essence. The operator sets one objective, such as, "Go 
to locker G3". This mode Includes a strategy planning 
module as well as a navigation one. 
Navigation of a remotely operated vehicle must be seen In 
a broad sense. In fact, lt consists of all those low level 
modules that are necessary for vehicle motion control 
(e.g., Move or Stop), and a set of middle and high level 
tools to help both the operator when guiding the vehicle, 
and the system when operating In a semi or fully 
automated mode. Trajectory planning and path finding, will 
not be considered In this paper. 
3.1 Posltlonal Feedback 
Some considerations on the vehicle, posltlonal feedback 
and equipment available, are necessary before proceeding 
Into the description of the navigation tools. 
The vehicle has two Independently motor driven wheels (at 
the back) and two free wheels (at front) and uses 
differential steering. The on board computer with a real-
time operating system, manages communications, and 
controls vehicle's movements, I.e., Its speed and position. 
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Motion feedback Is achieved by means of two odometers, 
each one equipped with an Incremental optical encoder 
(accuracy of 1 mm). Information from the odometers Is 
read by a multi axis controller board. The DC wheel motors 
are driven by pulse width modulation (PWM) servo amplifiers. 
A major difficulty with this type of posltlonal feedback 
exists when, by any reason, the wheels slip or lose 
contact with the ground. This happens on Irregular 
surfaces, or when the vehicle Is subject to sudden 
movements. The Information read from the odometers no 
longer corresponds to reality, and other sources of 
posltlonal Information must be found. 
lt Is possible to say that within this application, the 
environment Is well structured. Indeed, room dimensions, as 
well as object (e.g., file cabinets or boxes) dimensions and 
locallzatlons can be well known In advance. lt Is thus 
possible to have a 30 volumetric representation (30 model) 
of the room and Its contents. The laser range finder CLRF) 
Is expected to play a major role In position calibration. 
Since the LRF provides direct distance measurement, lt is 
possible to make a 360 degrees horizontal range scan 
(Figure 3). From the analysis of these data, precise 
position calibration (±25 mm for a range of 20 m) may be 
obtained. This Is sufficient for navigation purposes. 
laser ~ ir~;'{{~~!!t~" 
Figure 3: Scanning with a Laser Range Finder. 
3.2 Navigation Tools 
Different types of navigation tools are envisaged. First, 
one must consider the man-machine Interface used to 
control the vehicle. Next, are those graphical tools that 
help the system's operator to manoeuvre the vehicle {and 
manipulator) and provide a feeling of being Inside the 
storage area (tete-presence), e.g., plan maps, or 3D 
representations of the environment. Finally, come those 
tools (Watch-dogs) that assist the operator In avoiding or 
detecting emergency situations, such as collision 
detection. Each type of tools Is detailed below. Tools for 
Safeguard purposes and safety considerations are 
referred separately. 
4. User Interface Modules 
The Interface between the system's operator and the 
computer Is paramount to the success of the project. 
Ease of use, security and safety are also dependent on 
the quality of the Interface. Indeed, all commands to the 
remote system {vehicle and manipulator) are Issued via the 
computer. In the same line, It Is up to the computer to 
display all the Information acquired by the on-board 
sensors, e.g., TV Images, range Information, etc .. 
It Is our goal to Integrate all the Information that Is 
relevant to the operator In a single multi window screen. In 
order not to become overloaded, It is up to the operator 
to select at any moment the information that Is going to 
be displayed on the screen. Some moments later, other 
information may be selected, and the previous one 
lconlzed. 
4.1 Vehicle Steering and Manoeuvring 
At present, the mouse Is used as an Interactive device, 
and three vehicle control Interfaces have been developed. 
All modes have an on-line help facility. 
a) 
b) 
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* Arrow mode: Four motion arrows (North, South, East and 
West) and a Stop area are displayed, as indicated In Figure 
4a. It Is up to the operator to click onto those arrows. 
The number of clicks and the arrows pressed are Input to 
a finite state machine that will set the speed for each of 
the wheels. Two speed Indicators display the speed on 
each wheel. 
* Sense Mode: This mode emulates digitally a "joy-stick". 
The neighbourhood of the central STOP button Is "paved" 
with a set of small buttons, as seen In Figure 4b. To each 
button corresponds a combination of speeds In the two 
wheels. This combination Is then output to the vehicle, 
determining Its speed and direction. 
* Drag mode: This mode uses the three mouse keys to 
control both the vehicle speed and direction. The central 
key must be always pressed to enable motion, whereas the 
two lateral keys are associated to direction changes. The 
vehicle starts moving forward by sliding the mouse forward, 
and backwards when sliding the mouse backwards. Speed 
and acceleration can be controlled by Interpreting In 
software the movements of the mouse. 
From our experience, It can be said that the Sense mode 
Is better suited for manoeuvring, whereas the two other 
modes are more Indicated to straight motion. The Drag 
mode has the advantage that the user can control the 
vehicle without moving his/her eyes out of the room 
window. 
In a near future, the use of a six degree of freedom 
space ball will be Investigated for vehicle control. 
4.2 Navigation Tools 
Two types of tools are considered: Visual and Graphical. 
Visual tools display the Images acquired by the TV cameras 
on board of the vehicle. Two cameras are planned. The 
first one, situated on the rear of the vehicle has a wide 
angle lens. The second camera will be Installed on a 
computer controlled pan and tilt unit, and has a zoom lens 
for detailed perception. Both zoom and focus can be 
adjusted by the computer. 
At present, a PC386 computer acquires Images from the 
two cameras and sends the image data via the Ethernet 
network to the operator's console. It Is expected that In a 
near future hardware to display live video on the 
workstation console becomes available. 
An Important tool Is the environment plan viewer. The plan 
displays the room, Its objects and the position of the 
vehicle. The vehicle control program sends to this program 
a constant data stream specifying the vehicle's location 
and orientation. The plan viewer accepts this data and 
updates the vehicle's position. This provides the user with 
the necessary visual feedback (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Environment Plan Viewer. 
Another tool that will prove to be important for navigation 
purposes, as well as for protection (see below) Is a 3 
dimensional graphical (volumetric) representation of the 
environment, Including the vehicle. Since the viewpoint Is 
selectable, It will be possible for the operator to display a 
perspective of the environment as seen from the vehicle, 
or of the vehicle as seen from an imaginary point (e.g., 
ahead of the vehicle and looking backwards), as indicated 
In Figure 6. This tool uses the PHIGS library to represent 
30 graphical Information /4,5/. 
Figure 6: Environment 30 Viewer. 
4.3 Computer Aided Protection 
A major concern In tela-operation Is the safety of the 
vehicle and Instrumentation. It Is Important to provide the 
means for their protection. A major cause for accidents 
stands from collisions, involving either the vehicle or the 
manipulator. Considering that the volumetric 
representations of the environment, vehicle and 
manipulator are known, It Is possible to extrapolate 
current movements, predict possible collisions, and alert 
the operator. This Is mostly Important when displacing the 
manipulator. When moving the vehicle, It Is possible to 
display distances to surrounding walls. This will be useful 
Information for the operator. 
5. Safeguard Implications 
Safeguard philosophy relies strongly on data verification 
and authentication. This Is normally achieved by means of 
feedback, and by cross certifying data originated with 
different sources. One of the objectives of this project Is 
to test the feasibility of computer aided tele-operatlon 
techniques for operations such as storage, retrieval and 
Inventory of fissile materials. Safeguards considerations 
have Influenced some design Issues, namely the possibility 
for environment validation, and some aspects concerning 
security and safety. 
5.1 Environment Validation 
A major application of the laser range finder Is the 
calibration of the vehicle's position. It Is possible, however, 
to use the LRF to build range Images. These images are 
acquired by scanning the LRF Inside a solid angle, which will 
determine the Image spatial resolution. Each pixel in a 
range Image represents the distance from the LRF to an 
object. Objects In a range image can be Identified by 
means of their surface edges, which correspond to 
discontinuities In the distance from the object to the LRF. 
From a technical point of view, there are Indications that 
for these particular applications, edge detection In range 
Images Is more reliable and direct than with tonal (grey 
level) Images. Some preliminary results are rather 
encouraging In what concerns Image segmentation, edge 
detection and surface extraction /5/. Figure 7 shows a 
synthetic range Image, to which noise has been added, 
o-1.5, and the processed contours. 
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It is then possible to try to match the range image from 
the environment, with its 30 model. indeed, if the computer 
"knows" where the vehicle stands, it can create a 
synthetic range image of the environment as perceived by 
the laser range finder. This image will be used as a 
reference when comparing with the actual range image 
acquired with the LRF. A match between the two Images will 
corroborate the vehicle's position. This facility may prove 
to be of Interest for validation purposes. 
a) 
b) 
Figure 7: Range Images: a) Synthetic Range Image; 
b) Processed Contours. 
5.2 Security and Safety 
As mentioned above, mechanisms must exist to assure the 
vehicle's Integrity. The existence of tools helping the 
operator can Improve his/her ability driving the vehicle and 
manipulator. However, the design of the system must 
incorporate features enhancing the overall security and 
safety. The following topics have been considered: 
* Convnunlcatlons Loss: Background tasks must exist both 
In the host and In the vehicle, to monitor the 
communications between the vehicle and the host. If there 
is a communication loss (e.g., due to cable breakdown), the 
vehicle must stop immediately its own activities and enter a 
standby state. 
* Vehicle Self-Parking Capability: The vehicle must always 
keep track of its own moves, in order to be able to 
return by its own means, I.e., without host instructions and 
assistance, to a predefined parking place. This capability 
should be triggered whenever an Irreversible problem Is 
detected, e.g., loss of communications. 
* Emergency Colmlands Bypass: One of the tasks of the 
computer In the vehicle Is to manage communications and 
redirect commands Issued by the host to some of the 
running tasks. Part of this function must take Into 
account security features, namely the existence of 
emergency commands. These commands must bypass all the 
command queues, In order that their execution start as 
soon as possible. This concern applies both to the Input 
command server In the vehicle, and to the host command 
dlspa tcher. 
* Ultra-Sound Obstacle Detection: It Is possible to Install a 
belt of ultra-sound sensors around the vehicle to detect 
possible collisions. A real-time task should analyse ultra-
sound data and detect objects that are In the way of the 
vehicle. Though ultra sound sensors do not provide 
Information with good spatial resolution, their usage Is 
important for the simple task of obstacle detection. 
6. Final Considerations 
Some of the work described Is still In progress. There Is 
still a lot of research and development to be made before 
some conclusive Ideas can be extracted. Therefore, It Is 
difficult at this stage to have precise conclusions, and to 
know on the Impact on Safeguards. Furthermore, since the 
project alms to Investigate new technologies and concepts 
In a particular area of application, feedback from the final 
users will be of utmost Importance. Some basic ideas 
seemed to have been well accepted and successful on Its 
Implementation, namely, the case for an Integrated 
presentation of relevant data Into a single screen as 
shown In Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Integrated View of Relevant Information: TV 
Images, Plan View, Vehicle Control, Clock, etc ... 
In case of a combined use of such system by an operator 
and Safeguards authorities, the laser range finder with the 
associated software assures the necessary authentication 
of the vehicle's position. 
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In spite of the early stages of the project, some findings 
can already be mentioned, such as: 
* It Is Important that at the end of the manipulator, there 
Is a telescopic section, In order to reach the deeper 
parts of a locker, or file cabinet; 
* For the same reasons, there Is a need for the 
manipulating arm to have an elevating section, probably 
near Its base, to reach upper shelves. 
• In terms of the vehicle, there Is the need to synchronize 
navigation commands with the vehicle's · response . At 
the moment this Is done In a slow manner. This problem 
Is caused by the existing command Interpreter In the 
vehicle, which should be considerably improved, In 
order to stand to Safeguards requirements. 
* There Is also the need to develop a specific mult i-task 
manager to control the tasks assigned to the on-
board computers (see Figure 2). 
* The presentation of direct live video Into the 
workstation screen, rather than transmitting video from 
a PC, would certainly Improve the visual feedback to 
the system's operator, and hence, the ease of 
navigation. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents Thermal Fluxmetry as an 
aid to Near Real Time Monitoring of Plutonium 
storages.The deviee used (multi task in real time), 
- collects continuously data with disk saving 
during aquisition and control, 
- compares the consistency of the Thermal Flux 
measured on each container with the one calculated 
from the data given by the inventory book, 
- displays quantitativily the result of the above 
comparison in the barchart mode, 
- on request, displays the past thermal 
evolution of one or several containers. 
This system was tested in a real plutonium storage 
at the Cadarache center. 
1.- Introduction 
Un stockage est constitué d'un ensemble 
d'emplacements dans lesquels se trouvent des 
emballages de transport de plutonium ou un 
ensemble d'alvéoles verticales ou horizontales dans 
lesquelles se trouvent des emballages de plutonium 
agréés pour le stockage. 
Il existe deux types de stockage: 
* les stockages où la matière arrive à 
l'issue de son élaboration puis est expédiée dans un 
autre établissement au bout d'un temps plus ou 
moins long, 
* les stockages où la matière, arrive pour 
être mise en oeuvre. Ce type de stockage est 
associé à des chaînes de fabrication et permet 
d'entreposer aussi bien le produit à mettre en 
oeuvre, le produit fini ainsi que tous les produits 
intermédiaires (produits en cours d'élaboration, 
rebuts, ... ). 
Quel que soit le type de stockage, le temps de 
présence des agents dans les stockages de 
plutonium, doit être réduit autant que faire se peut, 
d'où l'automatisation fréquente des opérations de 
transfert et de stockage. 
Dans le cas où les conteneurs de plutonium en 
stockage sont équipés de capteurs thermiques, il 
est possible de suivre le combustible nucléaire en 
temps quasi-réel. 
En effet, toute perturbation de la structure 
thermique du conteneur (par addition ou 
soustraction de tout ou partie de la matière 
calogène) entraîne des modifications des gradients 
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thermiques et par suite, des signaux enregistrés. Il 
existe ainsi une relation permanente caractéristique 
entre le signal et l'intégrité thermique du conteneur. 
11.- Principe 
11.1.- Fluxmètrie thermique 
Nous considérons le cas de la détermination 
expérimentale de la puissance thermique émise de 
façon quasi constante par un objet calogène dont le 
volume ne peut être considéré comme petit. Cette 
puissance thermique est évacuée par la surface 
externe d'aire et de géométrie invariable de l'objet. 
Il s'établit un flux thermique sortant de l'objet 
calogène. 
Tout flux thermique F qui traverse une paroi de 
conductance K provoque entre la face d'entrée et 
la face de sortie une différence de température DT : 
F = K * DT. Une telle paroi constituera un 
fluxmètre si la différence de température DT peut 
être évaluée, K étant connue ou, au moins, 
constante pour une paroi donnée. 
Si le fluxmètre entoure complètement l'objet 
calogène il constitue un calorimètre/1//4//11/. Les 
faces d'entrée et de sortie sont le plus souvent 
concentriques, de ce fait, on parle respectivement 
des enceintes (faces) interne et externe. Souvent, la 
face de sortie est en contact avec un puits de 
chaleur maintenu à température constante. 
D'une manière générale, la conductance K est 
fixée une fois pour toutes lors de la construction du 
fluxmètre et comme il est très difficile de calculer la 
valeur exacte de K, le fluxmètre est étalonné avec 
des flux connus. En conséquence, pour un flux 
donné issu d'un objet calogène de géométrie 
donnée, un système fluxmétrique est caractérisé 
par: 
- la valeur de K puisqu'elle fixe la hauteur de DT 
- le type des capteurs qui transforment DT en 
signal électrique, 
- le type d'enregistreur qui dépend de la hauteur 
du signal électrique, 
la jonction fluxmètre-enregistreur, liée 
également à la hauteur du signal électrique. 
Il n'est donc pas possible de réaliser un appareil 
universel et très performant, travaillant dans un 
domaine très étendu de puissance thermique avec 
des échantillons de toute taille dans n'importe quel 
.environnement. L'appareil devra être adapté au type 
de mesure envisagé/2//3/. 
Alors que dans un calorimètre on prévoit une 
construction qui permet de négliger le flux 
thermique qui ne passe pas par le fluxmètre 
détecteur/1/, dans ce que nous avons appelé 
"FLUXMETRE", le rapport: (flux détecté) 
(flux total émis) 
est par principe très faible. 
Ce principe est le suivant: si nous décomposons 
le flux thermique total émis par l'objet calogène en 
un grand nombre de flux unitaires, nous pouvons en 
sélectionner quelques uns pour modéliser le flux 
total: * cette modélisation ne sera réaliste que 
pour des objets calogènes de même géométrie et de 
puissance calorifique du même ordre, 
* cette modélisation nécessite une étude 
thermique préalable de l'objet calogène et de son 
environnement. 
Si donc on a pu modéliser le régime de fuite 
thermique de l'objet calogène au moyen de 
quelques flux unitaires seulement et si les capteurs 
thermiques sont de faible surface, la mise en place 
des fluxmètres sur l'objet à mesurer ne perturbe pas 
l'équilibre thermique aussi bien interne qu'externe 
de celui-ci, alors la mesure des différences de 
température est rapidement significative et 
exploitable. 
Dans ce type de réalisation il n'y a plus de 
chambre de mesure donc il n'existe plus à 
proprement parler de faces d'entrée et de sortie "du 
fluxmètre détecteur" ; la face externe de l'objet 
calogène représente la face d'entrée d'un fluxmètre 
détecteur fictif somme de quelques petits 
fluxmètres unitaires. La face de sortie peut ne pas 
exister; dans ce cas, des structures, de préférence 
métalliques, environnant l'objet calogène vont 
permettre de reconstituer une face de sortie fictive. 
11.2.- Fluxmètrie thermique et stockage de 
plutonium: 
Pour équiper un stockage de capteurs 
thermiques permettant d'effectuer des mesures 
quantitatives de l'énergie calorifique dissipée par 
chaque conten~ur, il faut tout d'abord connaître les 
diverses fluctuations thermiques s'y produisant 
habituellement au cours du temps, afin de pouvoir 
choisir et afficher les seuils d'alarme permettant de 
détecter les anomalies de gestion de façon sûre et 
sans générer de fausses alarmes. 
Lorsqu'un conteneur va être placé dans une 
alvéole de stockage, il est caractérisé, et ses 
caractéristiques sont indiquées sur le bon de 
mouvement interne qui est émis avant le transfert. 
Ces caractéristiques sont, en particulier, la quantité 
et la qualité du plutonium, ainsi que le numéro de 
l'alvéole où ce conteneur va être placé. L'ordinateur 
qui prend en compte le transfert peut calculer la 
puissance calorifique théorique dégagée par ce 
conteneur. En effet cette puissance est fonction de 
:la masse de plutonium et de sa composition 
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isotopique, paramètres connus. L'ordinateur peut 
ainsi afficher la puissance que devra dissiper le 
conteneur, en face du numéro de l'alvéole. 
Une fois que l'équilibre thermique du conteneur 
dans l'ambiance de l'alvéole a été atteint, il y a 
affichage sur l'écran de l'ordinateur de la puissance 
calorifique mesurée à l'aide des capteurs et 
comparaison de cette puissance avec celle 
attendue. Il est alors possible de déceler, en 
quelques minutes, une erreur d'adresse (le 
conteneur n'a pas été placé dans la bonne alvéole) 
et en quelques heures, une différence significative 
(par exemple 6%) entre la puissance mesurée et la 
puissance attendue. 
Cette différence peut aussi provenir d'une erreur 
sur la masse de plutonium ou d'une erreur sur la 
composition isotopique annoncées. Il y a dès lors 
automatiquement demande de vérifications. 
Si aucune anomalie n'est détectée, la puissance 
calorifique dégagée est suivie au cours du temps. 
Dans la pratique, les enregistrements des signaux 
fournis par les capteurs "Mesure" et les capteurs 
"Référence" équipant un conteneur en stockage, 
montrent que la valeur de "DT" (T 0 mesure -
T 0 référencel reste pratiquement constante quelle 
que soit l'amplitude des variations thermiques lentes 
qui se produisent dans les stockages rencontrés. 
S'il y a une variation brusque de la valeur de 
cette puissance, une alarme se déclenche. Cela veut 
dire que toute intrusion non programmée dans 
l'alvéole déclenche un signal d'alarme. Par intrusion 
on entend ICI non seulement l'ouverture ou 
l'enlèvement du conteneur, mais aussi une simple 
ouverture de la porte ou de l'opercule de l'alvéole. 
Ill.- La transmission des données. 
Deux types de transmission des données ont 
été expérimentées : la transmission par fils et celle 
par radio. 
111.1.- La transmission par fils. 
Nous rappelons que chaque conteneur 
instrumenté est relié par un câble comportant au 
moins trois conducteurs à un ensemble 
électronique. Cet ensemble comprend : 
- un scrutateur de voies permettant 
d'interroger tel ou tel conteneur de manière 
séquentielle ou aléatoire, 
- un multimètre permettant de connaître 
les valeurs ohmiques des capteurs de référence et 
mesure, 
- un ordinateur qu1 va calculer les 
différences de température et gérer le système de 
gestion des informations .. 
Cette transmission par fils présente 
l'inconvénient, en version mobile d'étaler un 
écheveau de fils sur le sol du lieu d'implantation et 
en version fixe dans un stockage, d'avoir à 
effectuer des travaux importants lorsque le stockage 
n'a pas été précâblé à la construction, ce qui est le 
cas général. Nous avons donc été amenés à 
concevoir et faire réaliser une transmission par 
radio: 
111.2.- La transmission par radio: 
Chaque conteneur est équipé d'un dispositif de 
faible volume, que nous appellerons "BALISE" 
permettant d'une part de mesurer les valeurs 
ohmiques des thermistances (Référence et Mesure) 
et, d'autre part, d'émettre des signaux. Trois 
versions avec des applications distinctes ont été 
développées : 
111.2.1.- Transmission continue: 
Les thermistances "Mesure", "Référence" et une 
résistance "Etalon" interne à la balise, sont 
interrogées par un scrutateur à trois voies et les 
valeurs ohmiques sont transmises de façon continue 
par la balise, après codage, au calculateur qui, après 
réception et décodage, évalue la puissance 
thermique émise par le conteneur. 
Chaque conteneur est donc équipé, pour la 
durée de la mesure d'un ensemble de capteurs et 
d'une balise qui fonctionne sur un canal hertzien 
propre. Le nombre maximum de conteneurs, qui 
peuvent être équipés dans une même salle de 
stockage, est alors limité par le nombre de canaux 
hertziens disponibles soit de l'ordre de quelques 
dizaines. L'émission de chaque balise étant 
continue, la scrutation de chaque conteneur, en 
particulier pendant les périodes riches en 
mouvements de matière nucléaire, pourra se faire à 
la fréquence désirée. 
L'autonomie électrique d'un émetteur alimenté 
par batterie est supérieure à 8 heures d'émission 
continue (en l'absence de recharge permanente par 
élément photovoltaïque) et la portée utile est de 50 
mètres. 
L'existence de l'étalon interne affranchit la 
transmission de toute dérive éventuelle des codeurs, 
décodeurs, émetteurs ou récepteurs quelle qu'en 
soit la cause et permet d'effectuer une mesure dont 
la précision n'est limitée que par la technique de 
codage. 
La balise a pour dimensions H . 1 . p : 1 0 x 6 x 
5 cm dans sa version préindustrielle. Ce type de 
balise est plus particulièrement adapté aux contrôles 
périodique d'inventaire (par exemple annuel). 
111.2.2.- Transmission périodique ou d'alarme: 
Les fluxmètres thermiques se comportent et 
sont gérés comme des "Scellés thermiques" dans 
l'application "Confinement-Surveillance" de 
stockages longue durée de préférence. 
Dans ce dispositif, chaque "balise" sonde 
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pendant un temps très bref les ensembles de 
thermistances "Mesure" et "Référence". Elle calcule 
la différence de température et la compare à une 
valeur de consigne, spécifique du conteneur suivi et 
de son contenu, valeur qui est introduite dans la 
balise à la mise en surveillance du conteneur. 
En cas de valeur anormale, une deuxième puis 
une troisième mesure sont effectuées pour 
vérification. En cas de confirmation de l'anomalie, 
un signal d'alarme est émis avec transmission sur 
une fréquence (commune à tous les émetteurs qui 
dépendent d'un même récepteur de 
surveillance,appelé "Centrale") de la nature de 
l'alarme (signal pas conforme ou tension 
d'alimentation faible) et du n° de l'émetteur en 
alarme. 
Les différentes périodicités (temporisation à la 
mise en route de la surveillance, durée d'une 
mesure, intervalle de temps entre deux mesures 
d'un groupe de trois, intervalle de temps entre 
groupes de trois mesures ... ) sont toutes adaptables 
aux cas particuliers. 
Pour une interrogation toutes les deux minutes 
et en l'absence d'émission du signal d'alerte, la 
durée de vie de la batterie est de deux ans environ 
(en l'absence de recharge photovoltaïque). Dans la 
version de présérie que nous avons expérimentée, 
les dimensions de la balise sont: L x 1 x h: 1 5 x 9 x 
3 cm et la centrale permet de gérer quelques 
centaines de balises simultanément. 
111.2.3.- Transmission sequentielle ou aléatoire: 
C'est le type de transmission qui a été choisi 
pour la "Gestion en temps quasi-réel d'un stockage 
de plutonium" objet de la présente communication. 
Chaque balise est interrogée dans l'ordre et à la 
fréquence choisis par l'ordinateur de gestion; ainsi 
les valeurs des différentes périodicités ne sont pas 
figées à la construction de la "Balise" en fonction 
des spécificités du stockage et des conteneurs 
gérés. Cette souplesse d'utilisation est mise à profit 
pour changer le rythme des interrogations de 
"Balises", par exemple, en fonction des périodes 
d'activité et d'inactivité du stockage. 
Une "Balise" sonde les chaînes de 
thermistances "Mesure" et "Référence" ainsi que sa 
propre tension d'alimentation, code ces trois valeurs 
et les transmet sur demançle à l'ordinateur de 
gestion. 
En l'absence de recharge photovoltaïque, 
chaque balise de la version non industrialisée, que 
nous avons expérimentée, peut être interrogée 
quelques milliers de fois. Le nombre de balises 
gérées par un même ordinateur n'est pas limité et 
les dimensions (réductibles) de chaque balise sont 
provisoirement de L x 1 x h : 15 x 9 x 3 cm. 
IV.- Présentation des données: 
Les données de température "Mesure" et 
"Référence" ayant été archivées dans l'ordinateur 
de gestion, sont traitées et, au choix, affichées en 
temps réel ou rappelées pour analyse d'un 
évènement. 
IV.1- Visualisation en temps réel: 
La copie d'écran de la figure 1 présente l'aspect 
habituel de l'écran de contrôle lors d'un mouvement 
de matière nucléaire. 
Les cages 5 et 7 sont en alarme, car une heure 
et demie aprés leur chargement le DT mesuré est 
déjà supérieur au DT calculé à partir de la fiche 
d'inventaire. 
La cage 8 est en alarme depuis deux heures et 
pour encore quelques minutes car elle a subit une 
suppression de matière caloactive, opération qu'il 
convient de justifier. 
La cage 6 est en attente d'équilibre car quatre 
heures après son chargement elle n'a pas encore 
exactement atteint le palier de DT attendu. 
On peut noter que dans notre cas où seulement 
neuf cages centrées sont en surveillance, les barre-
graphes sont inutilement détaillés et sur l'actuelle 
présentation en noir et plane les informations non 
chiffrées sont difficilement exploitables. En fait 
cette présentation a été développée pour des 
matrices de 6x9 à 8x8 avec la légende latérale ou 
4x 1 2 à 6x 12 avec une légende sur trois lignes 
horizontales. 
Si le nombre de conteneurs à surveiller est 
supérieur aux possibilités des matrices disponibles, 
l'écran de visualisation peut représenter, 
sequentiellement, autant de matrices que 
nécessaire; il semble toutefois préférable de choisir 
un nombre et une disposition d'écrans de 
visualisation qui permettent une représentation 
spatiale semblable à la disposition spatiale des 
conteneurs . 
IV.2.- Visualisation pour étude d'une situation: 
En fonction des connaissances acquises sur le 
comportement thermique des conteneurs et/ou celui 
de la salle de stockage, les valeurs de consigne, de 
DT et de ses limites acceptables { ± 6%) sont 
affichées dans les cases de la Figure 1 . En situation 
d'alarme, il est nécessaire, dans un but d'analyse, 
de pouvoir visualiser l' "Historique" des 
comportements thermiques des conteneurs pendant 
une période choisie. Sans interrompre 
l'enregistrement de la surveillance, il est possible de 
faire s'afficher différents historiques comportant des 
effets de ZOOM sur la variable "température" ou sur 
la variable "temps". On peut choisir de tracer 
l'historique d'un conteneur ou l'historique de 
plusieurs conteneurs contigus. 
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Ce dernier mode de représentation est en 
général plus explicite, car de la comparaison des 
différents enregistrements plus d'enseignements 
peuvent être tirés. 
Il est à noter que si les capteurs "Référence" 
sont, comme ici, directement dans l'air ambiant leur 
grande sensibilité aux fluctuations de température 
de l'ambiance (qui les rend aptes à servir de 
détécteur d'intrusion) entraîne une instabilité 
permanente du signal DT. Si, en revanche, on désire 
une meilleure précision dans le contrôle quantitatif il 
suffit de positionner les capteurs "Référence" sur 
une structure métallique, proche des conteneurs, 
dont la température est représentative de 
l'environnement de ceux-ci. 
V.- Mise en oeuvre expérimentale 
V .1.- Installation technique: 
Le magasin de matières fissiles du Centre de 
Cadarache équipé des cages centrées FS52 (utilisé 
pour les démonstrations du système) est typique 
des stockages longue durée évoqués en 111.2.2. Il 
n'est pas prévu d'y ouvrir les cages centrées de 
transport pour en modifier le contenu, enfin les 
séjours répétés de personnels n'y sont pas 
recommandés. 
Figure 4': Chaque cage centrées est occupée par 
un conteneur en acier inox tel celui du premier plan. 
Les alimentations stabilisées alimentent les 
résistances "effet joule" qui simulent le plutonium. 
Cage OK : 
-Fond =<noir> 
-Cons igne Oet· t. 
- Mesure : ver· t 
-Li"ite : Blanc 
Cage en A lar"e : 
-Fond 
-Cons igne : \.l e r- t 
-Mesure : ~:~:t.:- t .:c-;~1:: 
Cage en Attente 
d' rqui 1 i bre : 
- Fond ..... 
-Consigne vert 
Figure 1: L'écran dans le mode swvr en temps réel. La présentation comporte, dans la 
version réelle, un code couleur qui est explicité dans la légende . 
• • '!':"J••••u 
;;;;:;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;.:;;;;;;;;; :;;;;:;;;;;:.::.:; 
Zoo•" ·. ··· · 
······················ ....................... .................... ... 
LEGENDE 
-Lil'li te 
- Consigne 
-11esure 
Il :l<l / <1 . -'l.S'H Il 
Il ~. 4.: aa = <) Il 
Figure 2: Rappel des DT précédant la situation décrite par l'écran de la Figure 1. 
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Figure 3: ZOOM" des deux heures qui ont précédé la situation de la Figure 1, cage 7. 
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Figure 5: Différence de température entre la 
surface du fût des cages centrées et l'air ambiant 
pour différentes puissances thermiques produites 
dans les cages 
Parameter: Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: !-Value: 
INTERCEPT .179 
SL..OPE .183 .003 .994 72.025 
Confidence lntervals Table 
lower: 
Aussi ce stockage, s'il se prête bien à la 
présentation du système de Gestion, ne peut être 
un lieu d'expérimentation. 
Pour la mise au point du système de "Gestion 
en temps quasi-réel des stockages industriels de 
plutonium" nous opérons dans un stockage 
modélisé en laboratoire. Ce lieu expérimental est 
constitué d'une salle dont la climatisation peut être 
modulée à volonté. la puissance installée (en 
chauffage, réfrigération, et ventilation) associée à la 
possibilité de régulation fine de la température (à 
0,1 °C près si nécessaire) permet d'y simuler les 
comportements climatiques des stockages dont on 
considère l'équipement comme possible. 
Dans cette salle d'expérimentation nous avons 
disposé, à titre d'exemple, des cages centrées en 
acier peint, de type DV21, présentées sur la 
photographie de la figure 4 dans une des 
dispositions envisageables. On peut noter que la 
simulation du plutonium est obtenue avec des 
éléments chauffants par effet Joule noyés dans du 
sable dans des conteneurs inox dont on voit un 
exemplaire sur la même figure. 
Afin que le système que nous developpons 
puisse fonctionner, il est indispensable que 
l'ensemble constitué par les conteneurs de 
1plutonium en place dans les casiers de stockage ou, 
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lower: 
ici, les cages centrées instrumentées de capteurs 
thermiques se comporte comme des fluxmètres. 
la figure 5 ci-dessus montre que le DT mesuré 
sur le fût central des cages centrées est bien 
proportionnel à la puissance calorifique comprise 
entre 0 et 20 Watts à ± 6% dans des conteneurs 
en acier inoxydables prévus pour recevoir jusqu'à 
trois kilogrammes de combustible sous forme 
d'oxyde. l'emplacement et la construction des 
capteurs thermiques sont spécifiques du type de 
stockage. 
V.- Conclusions 
Dans l'état actuel de développement de notre 
système d'aide à la "Gestion en temps quasi-réel de 
stockages de Plutonium" les problèmes d'ordre 
strictement technique (équipement informatique, 
équipement électronique de mesure et de 
transmission de celles-ci, logiciel de gestion de 
l'intallation électronique) ont reçu une solution. le 
logiciel a été conçu de façon modulaire afin de 
permettre souplesse et portabilité. Il conviendrait 
maintenant d'adapter le logiciel à un stockage réel 
siège de fréquents mouvements de matière 
caloactive afin qu'il puisse faire la preuve de son 
utilité. 
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EVALUATION D'UNE PREMIERE SERIE DE SCEAUX TITUS l PRODUITS INDUSTRIELLEMENT 
Chr.KORN-B.C. d'AGRAIVES- C.C.R. ISPRA-ISEI/CMF/STI-21020-ISPRA-ITALIE 
ABSTRACT 
The Titus l seal is an on-site verifiable 
ultrasonic multipurpose seal which has been de-
velopped in JRC-Ispra in the 80'. it can be di-
rectly and automatically verified by means of 
the ASTUS* portable equipment. 
On a first production of 75 seals, manufactured 
in 1990 by the French company ELCA, the Seals 
and Identification Techniques laboratory of the 
Institute for System Engineering and Informatics 
of the JRC-Ispra has carried out an evaluation 
study, in particular regarding: the unicity and 
the stability of the signatures; the behaviour 
at extreme temperatures, under thermal cycles, 
and under mechanical shocks. 
The points where the production is satis factory 
and those where the quality should be improved 
are discussed. 
!)INTRODUCTION 
Le sceau Titus 1, issu d'études communes 
CEA-CCR Ispra (Brevet 14278}, est destiné à être 
soumis à des conditions climatiques variées ain-
si qu'à subir des chocs mécaniques durant son 
utilisation.Cet article a pour objet de présenter 
le comportement d'un tel sceau dans de telles 
conditions d'utilisation. 
2)MATERIEL ET TYPE D'ESSAIS (Ref.l): 
L'obtention du signal électrique de signature 
des sceaux Titus 1 est réalisé par l'excitation 
périodique, au niveau du scellé,d'un transducteur 
céramique,collé contre la partie interne supéri-
eure du sceau, émettant un train d'ultrasons,qui 
après de multiples réflexions dans la partie mé-
tallique du sceau, sertissage compris, crée en 
retour sa caractéristique ultrasonore. La signa-
ture définitive du sceau Titus n'est obtenue qu' 
apres sertissage de celui-ci. 
75 de ces sceaux (Figure 1) nous ont été four-
nis par la société Francaise Elca; sceaux qui, 
dans cette étude, ont été lus par un système 
analyseur de signal "Data 6000". (Ref.2) 
Avant sertissage, nous avons étudié l'unicité 
de chacune des identités à une température de 20°. 
. e 
BNC 
Figure 1: Sceau Titus 1 ech. 2/J 
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Parmi ces 75 sceaux, nous en avons choisi arbl-
trairement 10 qui ont été scellés et étudiés 
plus en détail dans leur comportement lorsqu'ils 
sont soumis à 4 cyclages therm1ques allant de -10 
a +50 degrés (Figure 2), en comparant leur signa-
ture relevée après chaque cycle thermique avec 
leur même signature mais prise à 20 degrés avant 
toute sollicitation de ce genre. 
Nous avons également étudié la possibilité de 
vérifier de tels sceaux (identification de leur 
signature) à des températures extrêmes telles que 
-10 et +50 degrés. Ces différents essais ont été 
réalisés a l'aide d'un four à résistance et d'une 
enceinte frigorifique nous permettant des tempé-
ratures de -20 a +200 degrés. Afln de vérifier à 
tout moment la température des sceaux, chacun 
d'eux a été instrumenté avec un thermocouple 
de type chromel-alumel placé en surface et relié 
à un thermomètre digital. 
Durant son emploi, le sceau Titus 1 peut être 
soumis à des chocs mécaniques; afin d'étudier sa 
sensibilité à de telles contraintes, nous avons 
effectué les essais suivants,avec les sceaux pré-
cédemment cités: 
-Chaque sceau a été soumis à quatre séquences de 
25 chutes libres avec réception sur une plaque 
d'acier; les deux premières séquences ont été 
réalisées avec une hauteur de départ de chute de 
28 cm., soit une énergie potentielle de 0.042 J, 
(la masse moyenne d'un sceau étant de 15.4 g); 
les deux séquences suivantes avec une énergie 
potentielle de 0.130 J (H= 86 cm.). Après chaque 
sequence de 25 chutes, la signature de chaque 
sceau a été relevée et comparée à elle même,mais 
prise à 20 degrés avant toute chute. 
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Figure 2: Cycle Thermique Appliqué 
-20 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 
Temps (h) 
5)RESULTATS: 
5-l)Unicité des identités avant sertissage 
En effectuant les cross-corrélations, suivant la 
méthode de Bravais-Pearson, des 75 signatures 
relevées A 2o•c, soient 2730 calculs,il apparait 
que le coefficient de corrélation obtenu (Kcorr) 
est compris entre -0.3 et 0.9; la majorité des 
coefficients étant située entre 0.1 et 0.75. 
(Figure 3). De plus, en relevant deux fois la 
signature d'un même sceau,le coefficient est su-
périeur A 0.96. Il semble donc que l'unicité des 
75 sceaux Titus 1 soit satisfaisante A 20 degrés. 
5-2)Comparaison avant-après sertissage 
En comparant les signatures des 10 sceaux sertis 
avec elles mêmes, mais relevées avant sertissage 
nous obtenons des coefficients de corrélation 
variant de 0.645 A 0.910 avec une large majorité 
sous la barre des 0.9.Il est donc très difficile 
de reconnaître un sceau après sertissage en com-
parant sa signature avec celle obtenue avant 
cette opération; ceci étant dQ au fait que le 
sertissage engendre une déformation de la partie 
supérieure du sceau dont le retour de l'onde 
caractéristique de signature dépend. Ce phéno-
mène constitue une sécurité importante qui in-
terdit pratiquement toute reproduction du sceau, 
celui-ci ne possédant son identité définitive 
qu'une fois installé. 
5-3)Tenue aux cyclages thermiques 
En comparant les signatures des 10 sceaux sertis 
obtenues après chacun des quatres cycles thermi-
ques présentés Figure 2, avec leur homologue re-
levée avant ces essais, nous obtenons des coef-
ficients de corrélation tous supérieurs A 0.960; 
les cross-corrélations effectuées entre les dix 
sceaux étant toujours inférieures A 0.796. 
Les sceaux Titus 1 supportent bien des varia-
tions de température de -10 A +5o•c pour autant 
que l'identification soit faite A température 
ambiante. 
5-4)Comportement aux températures extrêmes 
A 5o•c, il est aisé de reconnaître la signature 
d'un sceau Titus en la comparant avec elle même 
mais prise A l'ambiante;par contre, A -10 degrés 
{Figure 4),cette vérification est devenue impos-
sible, la signature ayant trop changé. 
Des essais complémentaires ont permis de préci-
ser la gamme de températures dans laquelle les 
sceaux Titus 1 peuvent être vérifiés (peu de 
changements dans leurs identités):soit 0 A +50 C 
5-5)Sensibilité aux chocs mécaniques 
Parmi les dix sceaux sertis ayant été soumis aux 
5~ 
séquences de chutes libres, deux d'entre eux ne 
possedaient plus de signal de retour (signature) 
après les 25 premières chutes d'une hauteur de 
86 cm., et un troisième était dans le même état 
A l'issue de la seconde séquence. Les 7 restants 
présentent de legères altérations de leur iden-
tité qui n'empêchent pas leur vérification. 
6)CONCLUSION 
Sur une population de 75 sceaux Titus non sertis 
produits industriellement: 
-L'unicité des identités est satisafaisante à 20• 
-La reconnaissance des signatures est aisée. 
sur un échantillon de 10 sceaux Titus 1 sertis, 
nous avons vérifié que: 
-Aucune défaillance n'a été relevée entre avant 
et après sertissage. 
-Les signatures sont stables dans le temps A tem-
pérature de 20 degrés. 
-Le sceau Titus 1 ne possède son identité défini-
tive qu'une fois serti, ce qui est un important 
facteur de sécurité. 
-Il semble que le sceau Titus 1 supporte bien les 
variations de température dans une gamme de -10 
à +50 Degrés , aucune défaillance n'ayant été 
relevée.L'identification, après de telles varia-
tions thermiques, se fait aisément, à condition 
de relever signature A température ambiante. 
-La vérification d'un sceau Titus 1 A -10 degrés 
n'est pratiquement pas possible;la gamme de tem-
pératures admises étant de 0 A +50 degrés. 
-Le sceau Titus 1 présente une fragilité certaine 
aux chocs mécaniques. 
Si la fragilité mécanique des sceaux Titus 1 
était amoindrie,soit par un progrès technologique 
soit par une protection extérieure (caoutchouc), 
et si l'on réussissait A réduire ou compenser les 
modifications de signatures A basses températures 
(ex: amélioration du collage du transducteur), le 
sceau Titus 1, tel que produit actuellement de 
façon industrielle, vue sa grande simplicite d'u-
tilisation,pourrait être utilisé conformément aux 
espoirs des concepteurs{Sceau tous usages).Sinon, 
on devra limiter son utilisation dans des domai-
nes où les conditions sont mo1ns contraignantes. 
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SYSTEME ASTUS DE VERIFICATION DE SCEAUX 
TRANSPORT TITUS 1 
G.D. Destain 
Sté ELCA-TOULOUSE 
Barillaux, D. Monteil 
CEA - Centre de Bruyères-le-Chatel 
Abstract 
ASTUS, a system for acquisition and 
processing ultrasonic signatures of TITUS 1 
seals has been developed. TITUS seals are used 
to verify the integrity of the fissile 
material's container sealing after transport. 
An autonomous portable reading case permit 
to take seals signatures at the starting point 
and to transmit these reference signatures to a 
central safeguards computer by phonie modem. 
Then, at the terminal point with a similar 
reading case, an authority takes again the 
signature of seals and immediately transmit 
these signature to the central safeguards 
computer. The central computer processes the 
data in real time by autocorrelation and return 
its verdict to the terminal point. 
1. Introduction 
Le système ASTUS (Acquisition de Sceaux de 
transports Ultra Sonores) a pour but d'assurer 
la non-violabilité de la fermeture de conteneurs 
lors d'un transport. A cet effet, la 
caractérisation, ou signature, ultrasonore d'un 
scellé placé sur le conteneur est relevée sous 
forme électrique avant puis après transport, 
dans le but de décider après comparaison, de 
l'intégrité du sceau. 
Au lieu de départ, une phase d'acquisition à 
l'aide d'une valise portable et autonome permet 
la prise en compte de plusieurs signatures. 
Ensuite, une phase de transmission est effectuée 
par voie téléphonique vers le Poste Central de 
Sécurité. Ce dernier stocke chaque signature 
horodatée constituant un fichier de référence. 
Au point d'arrivée du transport, ou en cours 
de route, il est possible à l'aide d'une autre 
valise de même nature, de prélever de nouvelles 
signatures et de les transmettre vers le Poste 
Central via une ligne téléphonique. Un logiciel 
de traitement en temps réel par corrélation 
détermine alors l'intégrité du scellement par 
rapport aux signatures de références. 
2. ·Principe du système 
Les sceaux ultrasonores sont de type TITUS 1 
issus d'études communes CEA-CRR ISPRA (Brevet 
n• 14278 en 1984). L'obtention du signal 
électrique est réalisée par l'excitation 
périodique, au niveau du scellé, d'un 
transducteur céramique émettant un train 
d'ultrasons, qui après de multiples réflexions 
dans la partie métallique du sceau, sertissage 
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compris, crée en retour sa caractéristique 
ultrasonore. 
Les valises sont constituées d'un PC 
portable, THOSHIBA T 1600, équipé d'une carte 
modem. Elles possèdent un petit interface 
permettant l'excitation des scellés et 
l'échantillonnage des signatures sur 1024 points 
avec une dynamique de 8 bits. L'autonomie de 
plusieurs heures permet l'acquisition et la 
transmission d'une centaine de signatures. 
Les transmissions téléphoniques se font soit 
en mode acoustique, soit en mode électr1que à 
1200 bauds avec compression de données. La durée 
d'un transfert est de l'ordre de 30 secondes par 
signature. 
Le Poste Central est l'organe de décision 
sur l'intégrité d'un scellement. Il est 
constitué d'un PC Compacq 386 équipé d'un d1sque 
dur de 84 Moctets. Le traitement tient compte 
des différences de mesures, biais et facteur 
d'échelle, retard, dues aux chaînes 
d'acquisition de chaque valise. L'influence de 
la température est aussi compensée dans la gamme 
d'utilisation o·c à so·c. Le traitement par 
couple de signatures, référence et test, élabore 
le taux d'autocorrélation qui est comparé à un 
seuil préalablement déterminé par études 
statistiques. 
La Société ELCA (électronique du Capitole, 
TOULOUSE) a mené a bien la fabrication 
industrielle des scellés et développé avec le 
CEA les modules d'acquisition et de transmission 
des signatures ainsi que les logiciels de 
traitement des données. Le système présenté est 
une première version qui est en phase 
d'évaluation opérationnelle sur des transports 
représentatifs dont les premiers résultats 
seront présentés. Il sera possible d'effectuer 
des démonstrations (acquisition de signatures et 
vérification de celles-ci entre AVIGNON et 
PARIS). 
3. Description de l'ensemble 
Le systeme d'acquisition et de contrôle des 
sceaux TITUS 1 est constitué de deux 
sous-ensembles 
Un ensemble portable. 
Un poste central de contrôle. 
3.1. Ensemble portable 
L'ensemble portable est constitué des 
sous-ensembles suivants : 
Un générateur ELCA. 
Un PC autonome TOSHIBA T 1600. 
L'ensemble portable réalise l'acquisition 
des signatures ultrasonores analogiques des 
sceaux TITUS I et la transmission des signatures 
vers le post central par liaison téléphonique. 
Générateur ELCA 
Il réal ise : 
l'acquisition des signatures ultrasonores 
analogiques des sceaux TITUS I 
Echantillonnage 
Nombre de points 
Plage d'échantillonnage 
50 MHz 
1024 
4 s à 24 s 
la transmission des signatures par liaison 
série RS 232 vers le PC autonome 
9600 bauds Vitesse de transfert 
Format 8 bits de données 
2 bits de stop pas de 
parité 
Le générateur est alimenté à partir de la 
barrerie du TOSHIBA T 1600. 
PC autonome TOSHIBA T 1600 
Le portable autonome TOSHIBA T 1600 réalise 
deux fonctions : 
l'acquisition des signatures. Il pilote le 
générateur ELCA par liaison série, 
la transmission de ces signatures vers le 
poste central par liaison téléphonique ou 
série. 
Caractéristiques du TOSHIBA T 1600 : 
- Microprocesseur 80 C 286 (16 bits) 12 MHz, 
1 Mo de mémoire RAM, 
. Fonctionnement : 5 à 35°C 
1,4 Mo de disque souple 3" 1/2, 
. Poids : 5,2 kg 
- 20 Mo de disque dur, 
- Coprocesseur arithmétique 80 C 287, 8 MHz, 
- Autonomie 2 à 5 heures. 
Modem électrique/acoustique 
{
commandes HAYES 
1200 - 2400 bauds correcteur d'erreur MNP4 
compression de données MNPS 
Durée d'acquisition d'une signature 
Transmission d'une signature vers 
le poste central 
Test en auto-corrélation 
Acquisition des signatures 
10 s 
30 s 
15 s 
Le portable autonome TOSHIBA T 1600 utilise 
le port série repéré SER-A pour dialoguer avec 
le générateur, en vue d'acquérir les signatures 
des sceaux. 
Les signatures sont ensuite normalisées et 
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stockées dans un fichier sur disque dur. 
Les informations contenues dans le fichier 
sont les suivantes : 
- nom du sceau, 
- date de l'acquisition, 
température, 
1024 points normalisés, 
- checksum des 1024 points. 
Transmission des signatures vers poste central 
La transmission peut s'effectuer soit par 
liaison série soit par liaison téléphonique. 
Liaison série : 
La transmission par liaison série ne peut 
s'effectuer que si le T 1600 est proche du 
poste central. Dans cette configuration, le 
T 1600 dialogue à 9600 bauds avec le port 
série du poste central. 
Liaison téléphonique : 
La transmission par liaison téléphonique 
s'effectue lorsque le T 1600 est éloigné du 
poste central. Dans cette configuration, le 
T I600 utilise son modem interne pour 
dialoguer à la vitesse de 1200 bauds. 
Lors de la demande de transmission, le 
T 1600 va chercher dans le répertoire SIGNAl le 
fichier correspondant à la demande avec 
l'extention ".CTL". Si celui-ci n'existe pas, il 
va transmettre le fichier avec l'extention 
".REF". Si aucun des deux fichiers n'existe, 
alors aucun fichier ne sera transmis. 
Après la transmission du ou des fichiers 
(maximum 8), le T 1600 passe en attente des 
résultats provenant du poste central. 
Tous les résultats issus du poste central 
sont visualisés sur l'écran. 
Le poste central de contrôle mémorise sur 
disque dur les signatures reçues et les analyse 
pour délivrer les messages suivants 
"SCEAU INTACT" 
ou 
"SCEAU SUSPECT" 
3.2. le poste central 
le poste central a été réalisé autour d'un 
PC COMPACQ Deskpro 386 S fonctionnant à 16 MHz. 
Equipé d'un coprocesseur arithmétique, il 
offre une puissance de calcul satisfaisante pour 
effectuer le contrôle des signatures des sceaux. 
Une imprimante à aiguilles permet d'écrire 
les résultats provenant des tests. 
Un modem externe relié par liaison ser1e 
permet de recevoir par liaison téléphonique les 
signatures et de transmettre les résultats du 
contrôle à l'ensemble portable. 
Caractéristiques du poste central : 
Microprocesseur 386 SX, 16 MHz, 
2 Mo de mémoire RAM, 
1,2 Mo de disque souple 5" 1/4, 
84 Mo de disque dur, 
Coprocesseur arithmétique 387 SX, 16 MHz. 
Méthode retenue pour les calculs des taux 
d'auto-corrélation 
C'est la méthode de calcul mise au point par 
ISPRA qui a été retenue. 
Les signatures haute fréquence (1024 points) 
issues du sous-ensemble portable sont filtrées 
(convolution triangle). 
Lors de ce filtrage, seuls les 512 premiers 
points sont pris en compte, ceci afin d'éviter 
les problèmes dus aux variations de température 
(étirement de la signature avec la température). 
Les enveloppes du taux de corrélation obtenu 
après la compensation en température doit être 
supérieur à x % pour déclarer le scellé INTACT ; 
dans le cas contraire, le scellé est déclaré 
SUSPECT. 
La durée nécessaire à l'acquisition des 
signatures et à son contrôle est inférieure à 
1 minute. 
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IMPROVING IMAGE REVIEWING WITH A NEW SYSTEM 
(EMOSS, MEMOBANK AND MOVICOM DEVICES) 
P. Gourlez, CEA IPSN, 
J. Regnier, Cogema SG, 
B. Taillade, Hymatom 
G. Wagner, P. Otto, Euratom Safeguards Directorate 
Abstract 
The need is obvious for selecting the relevant 
images and/ or items of information from among the 
overwhelming amount produced by C/S systems, 
mainly video cameras. Image reviewing in-field 
provides timeliness while image reviewing at 
headquarters is used for confirming the validity of the 
conclusions drawn. There is also, in many cases, a need 
to improve the quality of the images. 
The Emoss and Memobank devices developed by 
Hymatom could be the core of this new system, with its 
optimized digital storage which greatly improves image 
quality. 
These devices, which are compatible with existing 
systems such as MIVS and MUX, have the following 
advantages: 
- comprehensive storage of scenes is comparable 
to the video tape recording, 
- intelligent digital storage facilitates in-field 
reviewing, 
- recoverable disc storage makes it possible to 
carry out the review at Headquarters, 
- printing of the events helps reviewing. 
The Emoss and Memobank can be triggered by 
external information from other systems. 
1. Introduction 
At the present time, film cameras are being 
progressively replaced by video cameras. In spite of this, 
the increased number of optical devices associated with 
the extension and increased complexity of new nuclear 
facilities makes reviewing many video tapes an 
increasingly time consuming task for the inspectors, both 
on-site and at Headquarters. Also, it has been proved 
by scientific experiments that the optimum time for 
carrying out a review with the necessary accuracy is 
approximately 40 minutes and that, after one hour and 
a half, reviewing becomes ineffective and the inspectors 
can then miss important events due to fatigue. 
It is therefore urgent to avoid this waste of human 
resources, especially as the inspectors have other 
important tasks to perform. 
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2. Possible recording improvements 
The equipment must be capable of storing as many 
pictures as are now stored on video tape. Information 
such as the date, time and location of the camera as well 
as external events such as video detection, detection of 
radioactivity, detection of the breaking of a seal etc. must 
be stored in parallel and it must be possible to use them 
to locate the picture. This system must also be easy to 
use and the necessary training must not last too long. 
The false alarm rate must be sufficiently low to 
ensure that the effectiveness of the system is not 
adversely affected. 
The linking of the events and the information as 
described above, as well as the pictures recorded, should 
considerably reduce inspector reviewing time. 
The fact that all pictures would be recorded would 
also make it possible to carry out a random reviewing of 
certain scenes on site and to supplement the reviewing 
scenes with external events. It also makes it possible to 
cover certain failures (e.g. another camera which records 
a zone of activity whose field of vision partially overlaps 
that of the first camera). 
Complete sequential recording also offers freedom 
from any failures of associated systems which trigger 
recording, for example video detection, nuclear 
detection, seals etc. Under these conditions, reviewing 
will be total. 
3. Proposed equipment for video reviewing 
Recent progress in digital techniques make it 
possible to envisage a new form of organization for 
optical containment/surveillance systems. The 
equipment is available and many hundreds of units 
have been installed, some for surveillance in nuclear 
installations. 
The Emoss or Memobank devices could form the 
core of this new system as it offers optimized digital 
storage and higher picture quality. 
The Emoss system, originating from the 
Memobank, has been developed by Hymatom for the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate. 
These devices are compatible with the systems 
currently used by the IAEA to make video recordings, 
such as MUX and MIVS. 
Storage of all the scenes required for the inspectors 
is comparable to the system used in a video recorder. 
Intelligent digital storage facilitates on-site reviewing. 
The removable storage disk makes it possible to transfer 
data to Headquarters. The printing out of the different 
items of information or events considerably expedites 
the location of the picture, and hence the reviewing 
process. 
The system also reacts to external information and 
can be connected: 
- to a video detection system of the Movicom type, 
- to another measurement system whose results 
can be overlaid on the video picture or shown on another 
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display screen, in order to avoid excessively 
complicating the original picture. 
The external events associated with the video 
recorder considerably reduce the number of pictures that 
need to be reviewed by the inspectors on site, and 
possibly at Headquarters. 
The equipment is now on the market and can be 
used as it is. Movicom has been in routine use by 
Euratom inspectors since the end of 1989, and has proved 
to be extremely effective and to have an extremely low 
false alarm rate. 
Within the framework of the French Support 
Programme for IAEA Safeguards, the Memobank with 
Movicom equipment is planned to be installed at the Cap 
de La Hague reprocessing plant, possibly in parallel with 
the IAEA MUX system already in place. 
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ABSTRACT 
The I.C.T. Benchmark exercice made 
within the R.I.V. working group of 
ESARDA on reprocessing data supplied 
by COGEMA for 53 routines reproces-
sing input batches made of 110 irra-
diated fuel assemblies from K.W.O. 
Nuclear Power Plant was finally 
evaluated. 
The conclusion are : 
- all seven differents I.C.T. methods 
applied verified the operator data on 
Plutonium within about one percent, 
- anomalies intentionally introduced 
to the operator data were detected in 
90 % of the cases, 
- the nature of the introduced anoma-
lies, which were unknown to the par-
ticipants. was completely resolved 
for the Safeguards relevant cases, 
- the false alarm rate was in a few 
percent range. 
The I.C.T. Benchmark results shows 
that this technique is capable of 
detecting and resolving anomalies in 
the reprocessing input data to the 
order of a percent. 
1 - INTRODUCTION 
Dans le cadre du groupe de travail 
R. I. V. ( Reprocessing Input V érifi-
cation) de l'ESARDA, le CEA a orga-
nisé, à l'aide de deux jeux de don-
nées de dissolution de référence un 
573 
exercice d'intercomparaison de per-
formances des différentes techniques 
existantes utilisant les corrélations 
isotopiques pour la vérification des 
inventaires d'entrées d'une instal-
lation de retraitement de combus-
tibles irradiés. 
Les résultats des analyses chimiques 
de dissolution des combustibles 
ret rai tés à l'usine de LA HAGUE ont 
été fournis par la COGEMA (compo-
sition isotopique de l'Uranium et du 
Plutonium et rapport Pu/U du combus-
tible dissous présent dans le dis-
sol veur). 
Les caractéristiques physiques des 
combustibles irradiés dans le réac-
teur électrogène d · OBRIGHEIM ont été 
fournies par K.W.O. (masse initiale 
et composition isotopique de l'Ura-
nium avant irradiation et taux de 
combustion atteint à la date du 
dernier déchargement). 
Le premier jeu de données, noté 
jeu A. a permis d'évaluer les pré ci-
siens atteintes lors de l'établis-
sement de l'inventaire d'entrée à 
l'aide des techniques de corrélation 
isotopique spécifique à chacun des 
sept laboratoires participant à l'ex-
ercice d'intercomparaison. Les résul-
tats détaillés ont été publiés lors 
du Symposium ESARDA de Venise. 
Le deuxième jeu de données, noté 
jeu B. devait permettre d'estimer les 
capacités de chacune des techniques 
utilisées. à détecter et à diagnos-
tiquer la présence d'anomalies volon-
tairement introduites dans le jeu 
originel, et dont la présence 
pouvait avoir un impact variable sur 
la précision ou la fiabilité de 
l'inventaire d'entrée établi à l'aide 
de la méthode di te du "bilan gravi-
métrique". 
Nous présentons dans ce papier les 
résultats obtenus pour ce jeu B 
"perturbé" ainsi que les conclusions 
finales déductibles de la synthèse 
des résultats obtenus sur 1' ensemble 
de l'exercice dit "ICT-Benchmark". 
2 - RAPPELS 
Nous présentons dans ce chapitre un 
ensemble de brefs rappels synthé-
tiques concernant les objectifs 
visés, les différentes techniques 
évaluées, et les méthodes d'inter-
comparaison utilisées. 
2.1 - Description des objectifs visés 
Le premier objectif v~se est 
l'estimation des précisions atteintes 
par chaque laboratoire lors de l'éta-
blissement, par ses soins, d'un 
inventaire d'entrée utilisant sa pro-
pre technique de corrélation iso-
topique, appliquée à un jeu de don-
nées de dissolution commun. 
Pour cet objectif la grandeur la plus 
significative est la masse de Pluto-
nium obtenue par chaque participant. 
(Le même travail a été effectué pour 
les masses d'Uranium, mais les résul-
tats sur les masses de Plutonium sont 
plus intéressants à expliciter). 
Il a été convenu que les valeurs des 
masses servant de référence à 
l'exercice d'intercomparaison sont 
celles qui ont été obtenues lors du 
retraitement des combustibles du 
jeu A par le Service Laboratoire de 
LA HAGUE, à l'aide de sa méthode 
d'établissement d'inventaire gravimé-
trique d'entrée. 
Le deuxième objectif visé est 
d'estimer la capacité et la sensi-
bilité que chaque laboratoire peut 
déployer dans la détection "d'ano-
malies" éventuellement présentes à 
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l'intérieur de données de disso-
lution. 
Dans cet esprit, un ensemble 
d'anomalies types de toute nature a 
été volontairement glissé à l'inté-
rieur des données de dissolution 
constituant le jeu B. 
Le but essentiel est de détecter, 
avec le minimum de fausse alarme, le 
maximum d'anomalies introduites qui 
induisent des perturbations signifi-
catives sur les estimations des 
masses d'inventaire d'entrée. Les 
effets engendrés par ces anomalies 
peuvent être assez différents selon 
les types de corrélations isotopiques 
utilisées. 
2.2 - Contribution des différents 
laboratoires 
Huit 
bon 
laboratoires 
déroulement 
ont contribué au 
de cet exercice 
d'intercomparaison sur les corré-
lations isotopiques. 
Nous présentons sur le tableau n° l 
les différents laboratoires partici-
pant à l'exercice. 
Tableau n° l 
No l JAERI (Japan) 
No 2 MOL (Belgique) 
No 3 JRC CEE Karlsruhe 
No 4 CEN- CADARACHE CEA (France) 
No 5 ARGONNE DOE (USA) 
No 6 AIEA AIEA Vienna 
No 7 EURATOM CEG Safeguards 
No 8 LA HAGUE COGEMA (France) 
Le Service laboratoire de l'usine de 
LA HAGUE a fourni les données analy-
tiques de référence. 
Sept laboratoires ont participé à 
l'exercice sur le jeu A, et six sur 
le jeu B. 
De plus le CEA s'est chargé de la 
coordination de l'exercice et du 
développement des méthodes statis-
tiques nécessaires à son dépouil-
lement. 
2.3 - Principes fondamentaux des 
corrélations isotopiques 
Une corrélation isotopique est une 
fonction liant plusieurs grandeurs 
caractéristiques d'un combustible ir-
radié (composition isotopique, Pu/U, 
taux de combustion, etc ... ) pré-
sentant une invariance maximum aux 
variations de l'historique d'irra-
diation du combustible (effet de 
spectre neutronique, temps de refroi-
dissement, puissance spécifique 
d'irradiation ... ). Elle permet d'éva-
luer des grandeurs peu accessibles ou 
que l'on désire recouper avec des 
valeurs obtenues par ailleurs. 
2.4 - Description des Techniques 
I.C.T. des différents 
Laboratoires 
Les corrélations isotopiques se 
caractérisent principalement par le 
choix des fonctions de corrélation 
utilisées (p. ex. (Pu/U)/(DU235)) et 
par le choix de la banque de données 
de génération de ses coefficients de 
corrélations (banque d'origine empi-
rique ou théorique). 
Il existe, en effet, 
familles de techniques 
lations isotopiques. 
deux 
de 
grandes 
corré-
La famille des corrélations isoto-
piques empiriques, qui recherche à 
l'aide d'outils statistiques des cor-
rélations fortes dans un ensemble de 
données toutes d'origines exp en-
mentales, et regroupées en banque de 
données plus ou moins hétérogènes. 
Ces banques sont constituées de 
résultats d'analyse chimique sur dif-
férents combustibles irradiés re-
traités. 
L'efficacité de ces corrélations est 
très fortement liée à la qualité et à 
1 'ampleur du domaine couvert par sa 
banque de données analytiques. 
La famille des corrélations isoto-
piques calculées, où la sélection des 
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fonctions de corrélation a été effec-
tuée en tenant compte des lois d'évo-
lution du combustible sous irra-
diation. 
L'optimalisation de l'invariance de 
ces fonctions a été effectuée, à 
1 'aide des codes de calculs neutro-
niques en usage dans le domaine de la 
physique des réacteurs nucléaires. 
Les banques de données utilisées pour 
generer les coefficients de corré-
lations ont été créés spécifiquement 
par type de combustible différents et 
sont en général très bien qualifiées 
dans le domaine usuel de conditions 
de combustion du combustible dans les 
réacteurs électrogènes de puissance. 
La bonne qua li té de ces corrélations 
réside dans la qualification des 
outils de calcul neutronique uti-
lisés. 
2.5 - Description des Données 
Communes Utilisées 
L'exercice a ·porté sur un total de 
110 assemblages de combustible ir ra-
diés déchargés du réacteur d'OBRI-
GHEIM et retraités par la COGEMA en 
son usine de LA HAGUE. 
Le jeu A, intégralement d'origine, se 
compose de 24 dissolutions effectuées 
à l'usine de LA HAGUE en 1981. 
Le combustible a été déchargé en 1977 
et en 1978 du réacteur d'OBRIGHEIM, 
après avoir atteint des taux de com-
bustion compris entre 25000 et 
35000 MWj/tm (0). 
Le jeu B, intentionnellement per-
turbé, se compose de 29 disso-lutions 
effectuées à 1 ·usine de LA HAGUE en 
1980. 
Le combustible a été déchargé en 1974 
et en 197 5 du réacteur d' OBRIGHEIM, 
après avoir atteint des taux de com-
bustion de même ordre que pour le 
jeu A. 
No 
3b 
6b 
8b 
12b 
14b 
17b 
18b 
21b 
26b 
27b 
Tableau n° 2 
DESCRIPTION OF ANOMALIES INTRODUCED 
IN SET B 
(11 batches have been changed) 
Type of Original data 
modification of dissolution 
1 assembly has no 215 instead 
been exchanged of n° 196 => 
modify <Er> of bat ch 
Isotopie 0,018 1.008 % 
anal y sis of U 234U 235 u 
0,0386 98,588 
236 u 238U 
1 assembly has no 196 instead 
been exchanged of n° 215 => 
modify <Er> of bat ch 
Isotopie 1.340 61.223 
analysis of Pu 23,215 
239Pu 
10,064 1,158 % 
242Pu 
Burn-up of n° 159 B.U. 
1 asembly de ela red = Pu/U 
modified Pu/U measured measured = 8.372e-3 
Isotopie 0,017 1,051 % 
analysis of U 235U 
0,376 98,556 
238U 
Isotopie 1,454 60,646 
anal y sis of Pu 238Pu 239Pu 
23,492 10,106 
240Pu 241Pu 
4,302 
242Pu 
1 assembly has n° 1'13 instcad of 
been exchanged n° 313 => modify 
<C. T., B.U., Er> 
Burn-up of n° 278 B.U. 
2 assemblies declared = 
modif. n° 279 B.U. 
declared = 
Isotopie 1,300 60,412 
anal y sis of Pu 23,089 10,925 
Pu/U 4,274 % 
8.3le-03 
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2.6 - Description des Méthodes 
Statistiques d'Intercomparaison 
Le modèle utilisé. appelé Grubb-
Neuilly. a été décrit en détail lors 
de la présentation des résultats 
obtenus pour le jeu A [1]. 
De plus un article spécifique a été 
publié dans le bulletin de l' ESARDA 
[ 2] . 
La caractéristique principale de ce 
modèle d'analyse statistique, plus 
général que le modèle de Grubb. est 
de permettre la séparation de la par-
tie indépendante de l'erreur aléa-
toire de la partie corrélée, lors de 
l'estimation de la variance de chaque 
laboratoire. 
3 - RESULTATS OBTENUS 
Après un bref rappel des conclusions 
déduites précédemment. examinons les 
résultats obtenus globalement sur les 
deux jeux A et B pour chacun des 
objectifs visés. 
3.1 - Description des anomalies 
intentionnelles 
Les altérations des données origi-
nales ont été choisies de manière à 
simuler. aussi bien par leur nature. 
que par leur intensité, les diverses 
erreurs pouvant éventuellement et 
naturellement se glisser dans des 
données de dissolutions. 
Le tableau n° 2 présente 
les caractéristiques des 
introduites. Celles-ci 
onze dissolutions du jeu B. 
en détail 
anomalies 
concernent 
Elles consistent en particulier en 
des interversions d'assemblages de 
combustibles irradiés ayant des 
caractéristiques différentes. par 
exemple pour les dissolutions 3b, 8b, 
14b et 21b, (taux de combustion, date 
de déchargement, teneur isotopique en 
Uranium initial historique d'irra-
diation), ou en des modifications des 
analyses des compositions isotopiques 
de 1 'Uranium ou/ et du Plutonium par 
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spectrométrie de masse, par exemple 
pour les dissolutions 6b, 12b, 17b et 
18b, ou de modification des résultats-
de double dilution isotopique du 
Pu/U, pour les dissolutions 14b et 
27b. 
NB. : 
- Tous les assemblages ont une teneur 
initiale en 236U (entre 150 et 
250 ppm). Cette donnée. qui n'a pas 
été donnée par le fabricant. n'est 
pas une anomalie introduite. Cet 
effet a été détecté par plusieurs 
laboratoires et corrigé. 
- L'assemblage n° 139 du lot n° 15b 
était manquant dans les données de 
dissolution distribuées. 
Les anomalies introduites peuvent se 
classer en deux catégories assez 
distinctes : 
- les anomalies qui ont une influence 
sensible et directe sur des grandeurs 
significatives au sens du Contrôle 
des Garanties, comme la masse de Plu-
tonium par exemple. Huit anomalies 
sur les onze introduites appartien-
nent à cette catégorie ( 3. 6. 8. 14. 
17. 21. 27 et 29) (nous noterons par 
la suite ce type d'anoma-
lie 11 significative 11 ). 
- les anomalies qui n'ont qu'une 
influence sur les contrôles de cohé-
renee interne spécifique à chaque 
technique de corrélation isotopique 
et/ ou qui ne sont pas significatives 
pour le Contrôle des Garanties. Trois 
anomalies appartiennent à cette caté-
gorie (12, 18 et 26) (nous noterons 
ce type d'anomalie : 11 non signifi-
cative 11 ). 
Dans le tableau suivant n° 3, nous 
présentons l'évaluation quantitative 
approximative des effets induits sur 
les masses d'Uranium et de Plutonium 
de l'inventaire d'entrée par les 
diverses anomalies qui ont été inten-
tionnellement introduites. (Seules 
significatives dans le cadre du 
contrôle de garanties). 
Table n° 4 Table n° 5 Table n° 6 
Laboratories Set A 24 Set B 18 Set B 26 
dissol. dissol. dissol. 
JAERI 0.8 0.9 1.2 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0 
MOL 1.6 0.9 1.8 1.2 0.7 1.4 1.3 0.7 1.5 
JRC 1.5 1.1 1.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.1 
CADARACHE 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.2 1.2 1.2 
ARGONNE 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.7 1.5 1.6 1.1 0.2 1.1 
IAEA [ *] 1.3 0.9 1.6 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.8 1.7 1.9 
EURATOM 1.5 1.2 1.9 
Kind of error c r T c r T c r T 
c = correlated r = random T = total 
(*) AIEA T 1.2 (reevaluation of results) 
Intervalle de Confiance de 95 % par loi de Xhi2 
contenant la valeur VRAIE de la VARIANCE 
concernant la masse de PU donne par les 
laboratoires 
Table n° 7 Table n° 8 
Laboratories Set A 24 dissol. Set B 26 dissol. 
JAERI 0.93 1. 68 0.78 1. 38 
MOL 1. 40 2.52 1.18 2.07 
JRC 1.40 2.52 0.86 1. 52 
CADARACHE 0.54 0.98 0.94 1. 66 
ARGONNE 0.85 1. 54 0.86 1. 52 
IAEA 1. 24 2.24 0.94 1. 66 
EURATOM 1.48 2.66 
Confidence interval of 95 % calculated bv Xhi2 
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Tableau n° 3 
Set B Fissile Variations 
No of material of masses 
bat ch involved in g. 
03 U235 ( 0) 720. 
06 U235 final 300. 
08 U235 ( 0) 720. 
12 no effect * 
14 Plutonium 120. 
17 U235 final 270. 
18 no effect * 
21 U235 ( 0) 240. 
+ Pu 241 30. 
26 no effect * 
27 Plutonium 170. 
29 U235 ( 0) 240. 
+ Pu241 40. 
(*) Internal consistensy check only. 
(+) Double effect onU and Pu masses. 
3.2 - Performances des estimations 
des masses de Plutonium 
Il a été convenu dès le début de 
l'exercice, d'examiner l'ensemble des 
résultats obtenus par tous les parti-
cipants, par rapport aux résultats 
obtenus par le laboratoire de 
LA HAGUE pris comme référence (Lab. 
n° 8 tableau 1). 
L'estimation de la variance, des 
erreurs aléatoires de chaque labora-
toire (n° 1 à 7), à l'aide de la 
méthode statistique Grubb- Neuilly. a 
été calculée pour les deux jeux A et 
B. 
Nous présentons ces estimations de 
variance dans les tableaux n° 4, pour 
les 24 dissolutions du jeu A et, dans 
le tableau n° 5 pour les 18 disso-
lutions non perturbées intention-
nellement du jeu B. 
Nous présentons dans le tableau n° 6 
les résultats pour les 26 dissolu-
tions du jeu B tel qu'il a été 
fourni. 
Les dissolutions 3, 8 et 21 ont été 
enlevées, car certains laboratoires, 
n'ont pu fournir de résultats, faute 
d'avoir alors, une banque de données 
suffisamment étendue. 
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Cette présentation explicite la 
décomposition des variances estimées 
en leur partie purement aléatoire et 
leur partie corrélée. 
A 1 'examen des tableaux 4 et 5, on 
peut observer la sensible diminution 
de la partie corrélée de l'erreur es-
timée de la variance, entre le jeu A 
et le jeu B. 
Lors de l'analyse des résultats du 
jeu A on avait attribué 1' origine de 
l'importance de la partie corrélée de 
1 'erreur estimée sur la variance 
(pour certains laboratoires), à 
l'utilisation d'une ou plusieurs 
fonctions de corrélation présentant 
une particulière sensibilité à des 
perturbations spécifiques ayant af-
fecté certains des assemblages lors 
de leur combustion, ainsi qu'à l'uti-
lisation de banques de données empi-
riques présentant pour certaines 
caractéristiques physiques des com-
bustibles la composant de trop fortes 
hétérogénéités. 
Ces perturbations, affectant quelques 
assemblages composant le jeu A, ont 
été dues à des séjours épisodiques de 
ces assemblages combustible. lors de 
leurs chargements dans le coeur du 
réacteur, dans un voisinage de com-
bustible de type U02- Pu02 fortement 
perturbant sur le plan du spectre 
neutronique pour certaines fonctions 
de corrélations. Ces résultats été 
confirmés par des calculs de neutro-
nique. 
Ainsi, nous pouvons constater à 
l'examen des résultats obtenus sur le 
jeu B une diminution significative de 
la partie corrélée de 1' erreur esti-
mée sur la variance. 
Il semblerait que les conclusions, 
dégagées lors de l'analyse des résul-
tats du jeu A, aient permis l'amé-
lioration des banques de données 
empJ.rJ.ques utilisées, en extrayant 
les données singulières ou en optima-
lisant le jeu de fonctions de corré-
lations utilisées. 
Nous présentons dans les tableaux 
n° 7 et 8, les intervalles de 
confiance contenant pour 95 % des cas 
la valeur vraie de la variance. 
Table n° 8 Table n° 9 
Laboratories TRUE ALARMS FALSE ALARMS 
JAERI 7 3 0 0 0 
MOL 6 1 5 1 4 
JRC 8 3 1 1 0 
CADARACHE 8 3 2 1 1 
ARGONNE 7 3 2 1 1 
IAEA 7 0 0 0 0 
EURATOM 0. 0 0 •••• 0. 0 •• • • • 0. 0 •••••• 
nb.& kind of 8 3 0 0 0 
anomalies s ns f 
introduced 
Nb. batches 29 29 1 28 
s = safeguards significant 
f = first dissolution batch 
ns = internal consistency check 
Conclusion MEAN 7. 2 True TOTAL 6 False 
on ALARMS 
detection => 90 % of anomalies with 3 % 
of false alarm 
Table no 10 Table no 11 
Laboratories Bat ch no 12 Bat ch no 18 
JAERI Error on Pu242 Isotopie of Pu 
MOL 0 0 •••• 0 0 ••••• 0 No detection 
JRC Isotopie of Pu Isotopie of Pu 
CADARACHE Isotopie of Pu or Isotopie of Pu or 
Cooling time Pu/U 
ARGONNE Pu242/Pu241 Pu analysis 
IAEA No detection No detection 
REAL ANOMALIE 242Pu/239Pu Change Plutonium 
introduced Change Isotopie 
in dissol. 18 g of Pu239 into Composition 
data 18 g of Pu241 
Total diagno. 4 <1> 4 <2> 
TRUE 4 4 
FALSE 0 0 
<1> 1 not answer and 1 not detected 
<2> 2 not detected 
<3> 3 not detected 
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Table no 12 
Bat ch no 26 
No detection 
No detection 
Burn-up 
Burn-up or U236 (0) 
U235 or Pu/U 
No detection 
Change 
Predicted 
Burn up of fuel 
bundles 
3 <3> 
2 
1 
Il est certain qu'à ce stade, 
l'ensemble des laboratoires, parti-
cipant a la totalité de 1' exercice, 
atteint une variance globale pour le 
Plutonium de l'ORDRE DU POUR CENT. 
3.3 - Performances des détections 
d'anomalies introduites 
Nous présentons dans les tableaux 
n° 8 et 9, les taux des vraies et 
fausses alarmes comptabilisées lors 
de l'analyse des résultats fournis 
par les sept laboratoires parti-
cipants. 
Pour chaque laboratoire nous indi-
quons le nombre d'alarmes vraies, 
(c'est-à-dire c_oncernant une disso-
lution où une anomalie a bien été 
intentionnellement glissée), et le 
taux de fausses alarmes, (c'est-à-
dire concernant des dissolutions sur 
lesquelles aucune modification de 
données ou de résultats n'a été 
effectuée). 
On considère donc, par définition, 
qu'il n'existe pas d'anomalie dans 
les données examinées hormis celles 
qui y ont été délibérément 
introduites. 
Nous avons décomposé les anomalies 
dans les deux catégories explicitées 
précédemment. 
Il existe huit anomalies de type 
11 Contrôle des Garanties 11 et trois de 
type 11 contrôle de cohérence interne 11 . 
On considère que la convergence des 
résultats de la majorité des labora-
toires vers une détection d'anomalie 
dans les données de dissolution du 
batch n° 1, ajouté à la particularité 
de ce dernier d'être le premier du 
lot, nous permet d'envisager 
l'existence d'une perturbation réelle 
en son sein, qui pourrait fausser nos 
calculs statistiques. 
Ainsi, d'un commun accord, nous avons 
retiré cette dissolution de 
1' ensemble examiné pour les calculs 
du taux de fausses alarmes. 
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En conclusion on note que 90 % des 
anomalies ont été détectées par 80 % 
des participants avec un taux de 
fausses alarmes inférieur a quatre 
pour cent. 
De plus toutes les anomalies 
11 significatives 11 ont été détectées. 
Enfin, 70 % des anomalies 11 non signi-
ficatives11 ont été détectées par 80 % 
des participants. 
3.4 - Performances des diagnostics 
d'anomalies de contrôle de 
cohérence 
Pour les anomalies de type 
11 significatif 11 , il apparait de 
l'analyse des résultats que, si une 
détection d'anomalie intervient de la 
part d'un laboratoire, et que celle-
ci est fondée (vraie alarme), son 
diagnostic a toujours été correct. 
Il est important de noter qu'un dia-
gnostic a été considéré comme correct 
à partir du moment où la source à 
l'origine de l'anomalie fait bien 
partie des sources putatives expli-
citées par les participants. 
En ce qui concerne les anomalies de 
type 11 non significatives 11 , leur 
nombre restreint (3) ne permet pas 
une synthèse statistique des résul-
tats obtenus. 
Ainsi nous présentons dans les 
tableaux n° 10, 11 et 12, les résul-
tats détaillés obtenus par tous les 
participants sur les dissolutions 
n° 12, 18 et 26, qui contiennent ce 
type d'anomalie. 
Il est intéressant de noter les 
alternatives liées, proposées par 
certains, comme sources possibles de 
l'anomalie. 
En effet, il apparait assez difficile 
de dissocier une erreur légère sur la 
teneur en Pu241, qui se serait pro-
duite lors de la spectrométrie de 
masse, d'une inexactitude sur 
l'évaluation du temps de refroidis-
sement du combustible (portant essen-
tiellement sur le Pu241). 
4 - CONCLUSIONS 
Malgré 1 'existence de différentes 
approches de la technique des corré-
lations isotopiques.. qui peut être 
aussi bien entièrement empirique ou 
faire appel plus ou moins fortement à 
la physique des réacteurs, il est 
remarquable de noter la COHERENCE des 
résultats obtenus par les SEPT labo-
ratoires participant à cet exercice 
d'intercomparaison. 
De plus les données de dissolution 
utilisées comme jeux de référence 
pour cet exercice proviennent d'une 
installation de retraitement indus-
triel (UP-2 à LA HAGUE) et ont été 
acquises dans un contexte d'exp loi-
tation de production normale. 
Les deux objectifs fixés, la vérifi-
cation de l'inventaire d'entrée. 
ainsi que la détection et le diag-
nostic des anomalies volontairement 
introduites, ont été atteints. 
En effet, l'écart global obtenu entre 
l'inventaire d'entrée en Plutonium 
obtenu avec les données de l'exp loi-
tant de 1 'usine UP- 2, et les in ven-
taires en masse du Pu calculées par 
les sept différentes méthodes des 
participants à l'exercice est à peu 
près de UN pour CENT. 
Les anomalies qui ont été introduites 
intentionnellement ont un ordre de 
grandeur de quelque pour cent. 
Nous avons noté que celles-ci ont été 
détectées dans 90 % des cas. 
De plus. 1' ensemble des participants 
a réussi à les détecter dans la même 
propo-rtion. 
Les anomalies de nature à avoir, soit 
par leur spécificité, soit par leur 
intensité, un effet significatif au 
sens du contrôle de garanties sur la 
détermination de masses de matières 
fissiles, ont été détectées dans 90 % 
des cas avec un taux de fausses 
alarmes d'environ un pour cent. 
D'autre part, 
significatives 
les anomalies 
sur le plan 
non 
des 
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matières fissiles mais présentant un 
intérêt pour contrôler la bonne cohé-
rence des données de dissolution uti-
lisées. ont été détectées dans envi-
ron 70 % des cas avec un taux de 
fausse alarme de quelques pour cent. 
Enfin, les diagnostics effectués sur 
les alarmes réelles ont été corrects 
dans 99 %des cas. 
5 - PERSPECTIVES 
A l'examen de ces résultats, il appa-
raît techniquement possible d'envi-
sager l'utilisation des techniques de 
corrélations isotopiques. dans le 
cadre de la vérification d'inven-
taires d'entrée d'installations de 
retraitement de combustibles irra-
diés, dans trois secteurs d'appli-
cation suivants : 
1) Les autorités chargées du Contrôle 
de Garanties (EURATOM Safeguards 
ou/ et IAEA) sont amenées à remesurer 
des échantillons de solution de dis-
solution. Dans le cas éventuel ou une 
différence puisse apparaître entre 
les résultats des exploitants de 
1' installation et 1 'organisme chargé 
des vérifications, plutôt que de se 
livrer à des répétitions de mesures, 
il pourrait être judicieux d'utiliser 
les résultats obtenus grâce à la 
technique des corrélations isoto-
piques. 
En effet. celles- ci permettraient 
soit de remonter à la source de la 
différence, soit de servir éventuel-
lement de "umpire détermination''. 
De fait, les corrélations isotopiques 
sont fortement liées à des grandeurs 
mesurées et contrôlables comme les 
teneurs initiales en U235, les masses 
initiales de combustible, les taux de 
combustions, etc ... 
2) Certains types d'anomalies ne sont 
pas actuellement directement détec-
tables par des mesures de type des-
tructives effectuées sur le combus-
tible irradié dissous. 
En particulier, les interversions 
d'assemblages, entraînant un impact 
sur les temps de refroidissement pré-
sumés du combustible à dissoudre, 
pourraient être détectées par les 
corrélations isotopiques. 
3) Enfin, 1 'application de la tech-
nique des corrélations isotopiques 
sur les combustibles AVANT dissolu-
tion pourraient permettre de détecter 
préventivement certains types d'er-
reurs comme les interversions d'as-
semblages combustibles. 
Ces vérifications, nommées pré-
campagnes, porteraient uniquement sur 
les données fournies avec les assem-
blages de combustibles à retraiter 
(en particulier leur composition iso-
topique estimée). 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE ICT BENCHMARK 
EXERCISE 
Despite the different approachies of 
ICT (empirical sometimes supplemented 
by reactor physics). The re sul ts of 
its application are consistent. The 
ICT methodes were applied to opera-
tional data of two reprocessing cam-
paign of UP-2 plant at LA HAGUE. 
The method was implemented wi th two 
objectives : to verify the material 
balance at the input point and to 
detect and explain anomalies, which 
were intentionally introduced. 
The overall agreement for the pluto-
nium material balance between the 
operators data and the seven methods 
applied by the participants was about 
one percent (see table 1). 
This agreement was 
consistent for the 
without intentional 
set B with intentional 
found to be 
set A data, 
anomalies and 
anomalies. The 
intentional anomalies introduced were 
in the range of a few percent and 
were uncovered in 90 % of the cases. 
and the causes were identified by all 
of the techniques as shown in 
table 2. The analysis demonstrated 
that the intentional anomalies were 
detected wi th a 90 % probabili ty and 
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that the source of the anomalies were 
established. 
The anomalies introduced were of two 
types. In the first type. the magni-
tude of the anomalies affected the 
material input balance, whereas in 
the second type there was no effect 
on the balance. The results showed 
that the anomalies of the firts type 
were detected in 90 % of the cases. 
and that the anomalies of the second 
type were found in about 70 % the 
cases. Referring to table 3. The 
range of the false alarm rate was 
found to be within a few percent. The 
interpretation of the true alarms 
were correctly identified in about 
99 % of the cases. 
There are three possible applications 
to present practice of reprocessing 
input verification : 
1) EURATOM Safeguards and IAEA remea-
sure samples of the reprocessing 
input. In case differences between 
the operators analyses and the Safe-
guards' laboratory are in the percent 
range which cannet be re sol ved by a 
repetition of the measurement. !CT 
could be used to detect a possible 
cause of the difference. Since ICT 
baes partially on historical data 
(initial enrichment, fuel weight, 
burn up. etc ... ) i t could act as an 
umpire determination. 
2) As shown above ICT has the poten-
tial to discover errors not to be 
seen from a direct (destructive) ana-
lysis of the dissolved spent fuel 
such as exchange of fuel assemblies. 
misreadings of cooling time, fuel 
weight, burn up etc ... 
Therefore a check of operator and 
Safeguard laboratory data by ICT 
could reveal inconsistencies which 
otherwise might be not discovered. 
However this again applies to devia-
tions about the percent range. 
3) Since ICT can be applied to the 
shipper data (when isotopie data are 
supplied) prior to fuel dissolution, 
a so called precampaign analysis 
could focus the verification analysis 
to the detection of the anomalies; 
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THE ROLE OF NDA IN SAFEGUARDING A PILOT CONDITIONING PLANT 
E. Leitner, R. Weh 
GNS Gesellschaft fUr Nuklear-Service 
Hannover, Germany 
Abstract 
The pilot conditioning plant (PKA) planned 
in Gorleben will, among other tasks, demonstrate 
that technical facilities for the disassembly 
and packing of spent fuel for final disposal 
have reached a standard suitable for industrial-
scale operation. As a multi-purpose plant of a 
pilot nature, it is also intended for the optimi-
zation of safeguards measures. 
On the way of a fuel assembly from the reac-
tor via long-term intermediate storage to the 
conditioning plant and eventually to a geologi-
cal repository, the last possibility of a direct 
measurement of the nuclear material exists in 
the conditioning plant. This fact leads to the 
assumption that a measurement of the final dispo-
sal package content should be considered to re-
present the input measurement of the final repo-
sitory. The nature of the conditioning process 
permits a non-destructive assay only. Such a mea-
surement should be performed on bins or canis-
ters which contain the fuel rods of several dis-
assembled fuel assemblies without their structu-
ral parts. Preliminary investigations show that 
passive neutron counting in combination with a 
gamma measurement is promising. 
Apart from the high demands made on a mea-
surement system, complementary C/S methods are 
to be selected which permit a correlation of con-
ditioned fuel rods with the supplied fuel as-
semblies. 
1. Introduction 
In January 1990, a first partial license was 
granted for the construction of a pilot conditio-
ning facilitiy for spent nuclear fuel and diffe-
rent types of waste at Gorleben. The site has 
been prepared and construction work has begun re-
cently. 
With respect 
sures have been 
veral years with 
raised by such 
preach suggested 
to safeguards, suitable mea-
discussed among experts for se-
a view to the peculiar problems 
a facility. Any safeguards ap-
will have to fit into overall 
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safeguards considerations, beginning at the reac-
tor and ending with the direct disposal of spent 
fuel /1/. 
The multi-purpose nature of the facility may 
complicate the definition of an effective safe-
guards concept because of the variety of diffe-
rent operations. On the other hand, this will 
also offer an opportunity to find a practicable 
safeguards solution for an industrial scale con-
ditioning facility by conducting tests with se-
lected and adjusted safeguards equipment /2/. 
For spent fuel assemblies shipped to and en-
tering the conditioning facilitiy, item accoun-
ting may be applied as a relatively simple and 
adequate safeguards technique. This situation 
will, however, change once the integrity as well 
as the identity of the fuel assemblies are des-
troyed for the purpose of conditioning, and new 
items are formed suitable for final disposal. 
As the nuclear material content of a final 
disposal cask will be newly defined in the loa-
ding cell of the conditioning facility, it seems 
reasonable to verify the amount of nuclear mate-
rial, which has thus far only been calculated, 
at this point by a measurement. Of course, ta-
king into account the nature of the conditioning 
process, this will have to be a non-destructive 
assay (NDA) measurement. 
The measurement of the final storage package 
content does not only constitute the actual out-
put measurement for the conditioning facility. 
Due to the inaccessibility of the material after 
closing the package, it represents also the in-
put measurement of subsequent facilities, i.e. 
the final repository. 
After the disassembly of fuel elements the 
fuel rods are either put into bins as a whole, 
or are chopped to pieces and put into canisters. 
Just before the filled bins and canisters are in-
serted into final disposal containers, they have 
to pass through the NDA measurement position. 
Using complementary C/S, it can be assured that 
all nuclear material leaving the facility is re-
corded quantitatively. 
2. The Role of NDA 
As can be inferred from the layout of the fa-
cility and its mode of operation, the primary 
purpose of the PKA is the conditioning of high 
active material, only to be handled under heavy 
shielding. The safety design of the facility al-
lows to dispense with measurements of the fis-
sile material altogether. This is also true for 
process control. Thus, operational measurement, 
or sampling, locations are not planned. 
Strictly speaking, safeguards requirements 
are met once suitable methods have established 
that all material which has entered the PKA for 
the purpose of conditioning has fully left the 
facility, even if in a different shape. 
In a geological repository, fuel assemblies 
are, according to the German reference approach, 
emplaced in tunnels in hermetically sealed, hea-
vily shielded packages of the 'POLLUX' type. 
Knowledge of the current inventory of the final 
repository will certainly be required, but the 
relevant input measurement would present major 
technical problems, as a meaningful quantative 
measurement of consolidated fuel assemblies 
through heavy shielding will not be satisfacto-
ry, according to current experience. The simp-
lest, and also the most sensible, solution would 
be to carry out the measurement required in the 
place where the material subject to safeguards 
is loaded into the final disposal package. This 
opportunity will present itself for the last 
time in the conditioning facility. By providing 
and operating such a measurement point, the PKA 
is, in fact, carrying out the input measurement 
for the final repository. It thus assumes a vi-
tal safeguards function for the subsequent faci-
lity. 
The data calculated by the reactor operator 
will form the basis of material accountancy; 
these will not have been changed during interim 
storage in an away-from-reactor store. If a new 
item 'final disposal package' is formed, it will 
not make sense to retain the old shipper data, 
which has most probably changed during long pe-
riods of storage. The only reliable method will 
be to bring the figures up to date by way of cal-
culation. Thus, NDA is automatically assigned 
the task of verifying the fissile material, de-
termined by calculation, of the fuel rods conso-
lidated in canisters immediately prior to them 
being put into shielding. Verification measure-
ments do not automatically satisfy the high stan-
dards of an accountancy measurement. The achiev-
able accuracies estimated for NDA at this point 
will entirely suffice to meet safeguards require-
ments. 
NDA equipment will serve safeguards purposes 
at a number of locations within the PKA. Such 
equipment will probably be combined with camera 
systems to follow container movements and to al-
locate accountancy batches. In this case, NDA 
will be used to carry out C/S functions, which 
will not be alluded to here. 
3. The NDA Measurement Techniques 
There are several possibilities for a prac-
ticable NDA measurement, and the most promising 
has to be selected considering the form of nu-
clear material, interference with facility opera-
tion, reliability, robustness, authentication, 
etc. In principle, active and passive neutron de-
tection or gamma measurement systems appear to 
be adequate for this task. Experience shows that 
only simple and compact measurement systems can 
be handled in the hot cell area. For this reason 
the application of an active measurement method 
appears questionable. The advantages and defici-
encies of the different measurement techniques 
will be discussed in detail. 
In the past, experience has been gained with 
characterizing spent fuel elements by NDA mea-
surement under water in the spent fuel pond. The 
measurement of spent fuel elements or configura-
tions of fuel pins in dry conditions present new 
application fields. For this case it has to be 
checked which boundary conditions are relevant 
and these have to be considered in selecting an 
adequate measurement method. A feasibility study 
on this subject has been carried out by an indus-
trial company. 
The basic requirements for this task are: 
The method should provide a high transparen-
cy, i.e. it has to comprise and penetrate 
the major part of the spent fuel configura-
tion. 
The measurement result should characterize 
the spent fuel configuration. 
The measurement 
determination of 
tent. 
should allow a quantitative 
the nuclear material con-
The applicability of a gamma measurement to 
a dense configuration of fuel pins has been stu-
died. After a cooling time of several years the 
most prominent lines in the gamma spectrum origi-
nate from the decay products Cs-134, Cs-137, 
Ce-144 and the activation product Co-60. The gam-
ma radiation is strongly absorbed by the surroun-
ding fuel pins. The consequence of this effect 
is that only the outer parts or layers of the 
fuel pins contribute to the detectable gamma sig-
nal. Therefore the transparency of the gamma mea-
surement is very limited and this measurement me-
thod alone is not adequate for a quantitative de-
termination of the nuclear material content. 
The application of an active neutron interro-
gation method faces similar problems. The inter-
rogating neutrons have to be thermalized for ge-
nerating induced fissions. These neutrons are ab-
sorbed in the outer layers of the fuel pins. 
Thus the multiplication by thermal neutrons is 
constant beyond a certain thickness of the fuel 
pin configuration and therefore independent of 
the nuclear material content. For this reason 
the active neutron measurement is not capable of 
solving the task. 
The passive neutron detection method has 
been identified showing the highest transparency 
of all analyzed measurement techniques consi-
dered here. The neutrons are mainly originating 
from the spontaneous fissions of Cm-244 and the 
even Pu isotopes Pu-238, Pu-240, Pu-242. They 
are emitted with high energy and therefore pene-
trate the fuel pin configuration. The detection 
probability for neutrons produced in the centre 
of the fuel pin package is about half of that of 
neutrons produced in the outer layers. Neverthe-
less, the passive neutron measurement appears to 
be the most promising method to measure spent nu-
clear fuel pins packed in bins or canisters for 
final storage. 
4. Determination of the Nuclear Material 
Content 
The evaluation of passive neutron and pas-
sive gamma measurement data requires additional 
information on the enrichment, burn-up and coo-
ling time of fuel elements to estimate the 
amount of nuclear material quantitatively. These 
data are normally provided by the reactor opera-
tors on the basis of calculations. They may be 
confirmed by additional NDA measurements of each 
individual fuel element before disassembly. This 
could be done by a simple passive neutron and/or 
gamma detector device. It should, however, be 
mentioned that NDA of spent fuel in dry condi-
tions is not state of the art. 
There is hence a need to correlate data gene-
rated by NDA of the consolidated rods of several 
assemblies in one bin or canister of the final 
disposal package. Here, a combination of C/S mea-
sures with the NDA systems under consideration 
will contribute significantly to the effective-
ness of the safeguards system in the pilot condi-
tioning plant. 
587 
5. Conclusions 
Is has been recognized that an NDA measure-
ment of spent fuel in a pilot conditioning plant 
may represent an important component in a safe-
guards regime for the direct disposal of LWR 
spent fuel assemblies. The applicability of dif-
ferent measurement techniques, such as gamma mea-
surement, active and passive neutron detection 
has been studied. The most promising measurement 
method appears to be the passive neutron detec-
tion, possibly supported by gamma measurement. 
In any case, additional information on enrich-
ment, burn-up and cooling time has to be provi-
ded to estimate the nuclear material content 
quantitatively. Considerable development work 
will have to be carried out to confirm the the-
oretical considerations and to assure that a 
practicable measurement device will be available 
in time. 
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ANWENDUNG VON PASE ZUR ANALYSE VONABZWEIGUNGSPFADEN 
BEI DER DIREKTEN ENDLAGERUNG AUSGEDIENTER 
BRENNELEMENTE 
A. Rezniczek, UBA Unternehmensberatung GmbH, Aachen 
B. Richter und G. Stein, Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, KFA, Jülich 
Abstract 
Direct final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in per-
manent geological repositories is a novel problern for 
international safeguards. 
In order to allow for the development of an effective 
safeguards system and to evaluate alternative safeguards 
approaches, a comprehensive analysis of possible diver-
sion paths is required together with an assessment to 
what extent the relevant paths can be covered by the 
safeguards measures under consideration. 
The PASE (Probabilistic Analysis of Safeguards 
Effectiveness) method is currently being developed and 
investigated in the IAEA to provide a standard procedure 
to conduct diversion path analysis. Initial experience 
using P ASE to analyze diversion paths for the presently 
planned Gorleben repository is presented. 
Einleitung 
In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist vorgesehen, 
ausgediente Brennelemente aus Kernkraftwerken, auf 
deren Wiederaufarbeitung definitiv verzichtet wird, in 
einem Salzstock endzulagern. Die Direkte Endlagerung 
von ausgedienten Brennelementen stellt neuartige Anfor-
derungen an die internationale Kernmaterialüberwachung 
und erfordert, da hierfür noch kein Modell-Verfahren 
existiert, die Entwicklung eines neuen Safeguardssy-
stems. 
Entsprechend ihrer Safeguardszielsetzung geht die 
IAEO bei der Entwicklung von Safeguardssystcmcn von 
der Arbeitshypothese aus, daß eine gewisse, wenn auch 
geringe, Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür besteht, daß vom 
Setreiberstaat einer kerntechnischen Anlage ein 
Abzweigungs- oder Mißbrauchsversuch unternommen 
wird. Eine Voraussetzung für den Entwurf eines Safe-
guardssystems für eine kerntechnische Anlage ist daher 
eine systematische Analyse möglicher Abzweigungspfade 
in dieser Anlage. 
Die IAEO versucht seit einer Reihe von Jahren, die 
Vorgehensweise bei der Analyse von Abzweigungspfaden 
und bei der Bewertung alternativer Safeguardskonzepte in 
der Entwurfsphase zu standardisieren und zu formalisie-
ren. Derzeit wird hierfür das PASE-Verfahren 
(Probabilistic Analysis of Safeguards Effectivness) 
erprobt. 
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Methodik des FASE-Verfahrens 
PASE stellt den Versuch dar, Arbeitsmethoden, die 
sich bei der probabilistischen Sicherheitsanalyse bewährt 
haben, analog auf Sicherungsprobleme zu übertragen. Im 
Jahr 1986 wurde in der IAEO eine Arbeitsgruppe einge-
richtet, die mit Unterstützung externer Experten die 
Anwendbarkeit solcher Methoden für Safeguards unter-
suchte. Als Ergebnis dieser Arbeiten wurden ein Verfah-
ren und eine Reihe von Computerprogrammen ent-
wickelt, die als "PASE" bezeichnet werden. 
Bei P ASE wird versucht, den methodischen Ansatz 
der Fehlerbaumanalyse auf die Analyse auf Abzweigung-
szenarios anzuwenden. Die Fehlerbaumanalyse ist eine 
deduktive Methode, die für Zuverlässigkeits- und Sicher-
heitsbetrachtungen von technischen Systemen angewendet 
wird. Dabei wird ein unerwünschter Systemzustand 
(TOP-Ereignis) vorgegeben. Die Fragestellung lautet 
dann: "Welche Ursachen können zu diesem unerwünsch-
ten Systemzustand führen?". Die Ursachen werden 
schrittweise durch fortgesetzte Detaillierung der dedukti-
ven Fragestellung weiter aufgeschlüsselt. Dabei werden 
alle Kombinationen von Komponenten- oder Teilsystem-
ausfällen, die zu dem vorgegebenen unerwünschten 
Ereignis führen können, und ihre logischen Verknüpfun-
gen zusammengestellt. Diese Zusammenstellung ergibt 
den sogenannten Fehlerbaum. 
Voraussetzung für die Erstellung eines Fehlerbaumes 
ist die genaue Kenntnis des zu beurteilendes Systems. 
Vor der Durchführung einer Fehlerbaumanalyse muß das 
System qualitativ so analysiert werden, daß neben dem 
Verständnis des Verfahrensablaufes detaillierte Kennt-
nisse über die Funktionsweise der Komponenten- und 
Teilsysteme gewonnen werden. 
P ASE übernimmt den Ansatz und die logische 
Strukturdarstellung des Fehlerbaumverfahrens. Hier ist 
der unerwünschte Systemzustand (das TOP-Ereignis) die 
Abzweigung von Kernmaterial aus der betrachteten 
Anlage. Durch schrittweise Detaillierung der Fragestel-
lung: "Wie kann Kernmaterial aus der Anlage abge-
zweigt werden?" sollen alle denkbaren Abzweigungs-
möglichkeiten systematisch ermittelt werden. 
Dabei gelten für PASE die gleichen Voraussetzun-
gen wie auch für die Erstellung von Fehlerbäumen. 
Grundlage ist zunächst eine genaue Analyse der Anlage. 
Sie sollte die räumliche und technische Auslegung der 
Anlage, Art und Form des Materials, daß in der Anlage 
gehandhabt wird, die Inventare und Bewegungen des 
Materials und die Prozesse, die am Material ausgeführt 
werden, umfassen. 
P ASE bietet, ebenso wie die Fehlerbaumanalyse, 
zunächst eine strukturierte und systematische Vorgehens-
weise. Durch die schrittweise Detaillierung soll sicherge-
stellt werden, daß keine relevanten Abzweigungspfade 
übersehen werden. Ein eindeutiger Nachweis, daß alle 
Abzweigungspfade vollständig erfaßt sind, ist hiermit 
jedoch nicht möglich. 
Ein wesentlicher Unterschied zwischen der Fehler-
baumanalyse und PASE besteht darin, daß das Objekt der 
Analyse nicht ein technisches System, sondern der Hand-
lungsspielraum eines potentiellen Abzweigers ist. Ein 
technisches System hat in der Regel fest vorgegebene 
Komponenten, Struktur und Grenzen. Dies trifft auf den 
Handlungsspielraum eines Staates, dem man Mißbrauchs-
absicht unterstellt, nur in eingeschränkter Weise zu. 
Damit müssen für als Voraussetzung für die Anwendung 
von PASE neben den technischen Fakten auch ein Rah-
men für die zu betrachtenden Abzweigungsszenarien vor-
gegeben werden. 
PASE ist als 2-stufiges Verfahren ausgelegt. In der 
ersten Stufe werden anhand der logischen Strukturdarstel-
lung die möglichen Abzweigungspfade identifiziert. In 
einer zweiten Stufe wird betrachtet, wie ein gegebenes 
Safeguardssystem auf einen vorgegebenen Abzweigungs-
pfad reagiert. Dabei wird untersucht, welche Ereignisse 
eintreten bzw. welche Komponenten des Safeguardssy-
stems versagen müssen, damit eine Abzweigung über 
diesen Pfad unentdeckt bleibt. Diese zweite Stufe ent-
spricht dadurch wesentlich eher einer klassischen Anwen-
dung der Fehlerbaumanalyse. 
Erstellung der Aktionsbäume 
Dem unerwünschten Systemzustand im Fehlerbaum 
entspricht bei PASE die durchgeführte Abzweigung. Den 
möglichen Fehlerursachen entsprechen die möglichen 
Aktionen des Abzweigers. Der Fehlerbaum wird bei 
PASE damit zu einem Aktionsbaum. 
Die Elemente des Baumes sind alle Aktionen, die ein 
potentieller Abzweiger zur physischen Entwendung des 
Materials, zur Manipulation seiner Buchhaltung, zur 
Manipulation von Überwachungseinrichtungen und zur 
sonstigen Verschleierung einer Abzweigung durchführen 
könnte. Die einzelnen Elemente werden durch binäre 
logische Funktionen (UND- oder ODER-Verknüpfungen) 
miteinander verbunden. Der Entwurf des Baumes erfolgt 
dabei von oben nach unten (top down). Diese Beschrei-
bung der Abzweigungsmöglichkeiten soll ohne Berück-
sichtigung dessen, ob sie erfolgreich gangbar wären oder 
nicht und unabhängig von einem konkreten Safeguards-
konzept für die Anlage erfolgen. 
Da die Erfassung aller möglichen Abzweigungsalter-
nativen in einem Aktionsbaum zu aufwendig ist, wird die 
unterstellte Abzweigung in ein grobes Ablaufschema 
unterteilt, deren einzelne Stufen isoliert betrachtet wer-
den können. Solche Stufen können z. B. für eine 
Abzweigung aus dem Endlager sein: 
- physische Entwendung von Endlagergebinden oder 
Material aus Endlagergebinden 
- Rücktransport des Materials nach über Tage oder aus 
der Anlage hinaus 
590 
- Substitution von entwendeten Endlagergebinden 
- Manipulation von CIS-Geräten 
- Aktivitäten hinsichtlich der Buchführung (Records) 
- Aktivitäten hinsichtlich der Berichte (Reports) 
Alle denkbaren Aktionen in diesen Stufen werden 
jeweils in einem Aktionsbaum entwickelt und diese Teil-
bäume später durch eine logische UND-Verknüpfung 
wieder zu einem Gesamtbaum verbunden. 
Wichtige Kenngrößen eines Fehlerbaumes, die seine 
logische Struktur beschreiben, sind die Minimalschnitte. 
Dabei wird unter einem Minimalschnitt die minimale 
Gruppierung von Komponenten verstanden, deren gleich-
zeitig vorliegender Ausfall den Systemausfall bewirkt. 
Minimalschnitte bei den Aktionsbäumen von P ASE 
sind die minimalen Gruppierungen von Elementaraktio-
nen, die zusammen zum TOP-Ereignis führen. Bei einfa-
chen Bäumen, wie sie bei der Anwendung vonPASEin 
der Regel vorliegen sollten, können die Minimalschnitte 
leicht von Hand ermittelt werden. Für komplexe Fehler-
bäume existieren rechnergestützte Verfahren zur Ermitt-
lung der Minimalschnitte. Diese basieren in der Regel 
auf dem logischen Ausmultiplizieren des Baumes von 
oben nach unten. 
Als Beispiel für einen Aktionsbaum ist in Abb. 1 der 
Teilbaum für die Freilegung bereits eingelagerter und 
versetzter Gebinden aus dem Endlager mit ihren Mini-
malschnitten dargestellt. 
PASE kombiniert jeden Minimalschnitt eines Teil-
baumes mit jedem Minimalschnitt der anderen Teil-
bäume. Jede dieser Kombinationen stellt dann einen theo-
retischen Abzweigungspfad dar. Bei komplexeren Model-
len führt dies bald zu einer kombinatorischen Explosion 
bei der Anzahl der theoretischen Abzweigungspfade, 
z.B. ergeben sich bei 5 Teilbäumen mit je 10 Minimal-
schnitten bereits 10*10*10*10*10 = 100 000 verschie-
dene Kombinationen. 
Festlegung des Statusvektors und der Indikatoren 
Dadurch, daß die einzelnen möglichen Stufen einer 
Abzweigung in den einzelnen Aktionsbäumen völlig los-
gelöst voneinander betrachtet werden, hat die Anzahl der 
möglichen Kombinationen noch keinen praktischen Aus-
sagewert. In der Regel stellt nur ein Bruchteil der Kom-
bination für einen Abzweiger einen sinnvollen Pfad dar. 
So ist z. B. nicht sinnvoll, CIS zu manipulieren, wenn 
die Abzweigung nicht von diesem CIS-Gerät registriert 
werden konnte, etc .. Es stellt sich damit das Problem, 
die Anzahl der theoretisch möglichen Pfade auf "ratio-
nale" Abzweigungspfade zu reduzieren. Dies erfordert 
eine Bewertung der einzelnen Pfade. 
Dazu wird in P ASE das Konzept des Statusvektors 
und der Indikatoren eingeführt. Der Statusvektor ist eine 
Menge von verschiedenen Parametern, die das System 
beschreiben sollen und durch die einzelnen Aktionen des 
Abzweigers verändert werden. Als Parameter sind nur 
Zählgrößen zugelassen. Diese Zählgrößen können bei-
spielsweise die Materialverteilung in der Anlage, d. h. 
die Anzahl von Items an den verschiedenen Orten, den 
Zustand der Anlage, z. B. die Anzahl der zerstörten 
Streckenabschlußbauwerke, und sonsti_ge Erei_gnisse, z. 
r--------------------------------------- ---- --- -----------, 
Abzweigung von bereits eingelagerten 
und versetzten POLLUX-Gebinden 
Al 
llinillallchnitte: Al Al 
A2 Al 
A4 
Gebinde freilegen und 
abtransportieren 
---------- ------:=l 
aus nicht verachlouenen Strec~ 
Gebinde freilegen und 
abtransportieren 
A4 
Abbildung 1 : Aktionsbaum für die Freilegung des Kernmaterials 
B. Kamera-Records, Siegelverletzungen, etc. beschrei-
ben. Der Benutzer von PASE muß festlegen, welche 
Parameter für sein Modell von Bedeutung sind. 
Für jede in den Aktionsbäumen aufgeführte Elemen-
taraktion wird spezifiziert, wie sie welche Statusparame-
ter verändert. So erhöht z. B. die Freilegung eines 
Gebindes in einer bereits verschlossenen Strecke den 
Zähler für zerstörte bzw. umgangene Streckenabschluß-
bauwerke und den Zähler für freigelegte Gebinde. 
Anschließend muß der Benutzer Indikatoren festle-
gen, die Unstimmigkeiten im System anzeigen sollen. Sie 
sind als logische Daten mit den Zustandswerten "Wahr" 
und "Falsch" definiert und können gebildet werden durch 
einen Vergleich verschiedener Elemente des Statusvek-
tors und ihrer Veränderungen. Diese Indikatoren sollen 
ohne Rücksicht darauf festgelegt werden, ob sie durch 
eine bestimmte Safeguardsmaßnahme entdeckt werden 
können oder nicht. 
Das Konzept des Statusvektors und der Indikatoren 
erlaubt es nun, die einzelnen Pfade zu bewerten und Kri-
terien zu definieren, nach denen "irrationale" Abzwei-
gungspfade aus der Menge der theoretisch möglichen 
Pfade eliminiert werden (Screening process). Ausgeson-
dert werden z. B. alle Pfade 
- die nur zusätzliche Indikatoren erzeugen, ohne andere 
zu verdecken, 
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- die keine Abzweigung darstellen, 
- die nicht bestimmten, vom Benutzer definierten 
Bedingungen genügen (z. B. Pfade, die negative 
Bestände erzeugen) 
- die die gleichen Statusparameterwerte aufweisen wie 
ein bereits berücksichtigter Pfad, 
- die die gleichen Indikatoren erzeugen wie ein bereits 
berücksichtigter Pfad. 
Das Ergebnis von P ASE ist zunächst eine Liste der 
Pfade, die nach diesem Filterprozeß übrigbleiben. Diese 
Pfade können in einem weiteren Schritt noch gruppiert 
werden nach der Anzahl der Indikatoren, die sie erzeu-
gen. Dabei werden die Pfade, die die wenigsten Indikato-
ren erzeugen als "hardest to detect" eingestuft. 
Erfahrungen bei der Anwendung von PASE auf das 
Endlager 
Die uns zur Verfügung stehenden Unterlagen zu 
PASE umfassen eine Darstellung des Verfahrens, meh-
rere PC Programme und drei Anwendungsbeispiele. Die 
Programmunterstützung setzt bei P ASE erst in einer rela-
tiv späten Phase ein. Die Strukturierung des Problems, 
die Erarbeitung der Aktionsbäume, die Ermittlung der 
Minimalschnitte, die Festlegung des Statusvektors, die 
Festlegung des Indikatorvektors und teilweise die Defini-
tion der Filterkriterien müssen vorab manuell erfolgen. 
PASE erwartet als Inputdateien den Statusvektor, den 
Vektor der Indikatoren, die Filterkriterien und für jeden 
Aktionsbaum eine Liste der Elementaraktionen und der 
Minimalschnitte. Diese Eingabedaten müssen in 
FORTRAN-Syntax erstellt werden. Sie werden von 
P ASE nach einer formalen syntaktischen Prüfung in ein 
als Gerüst vorhandenes FORTRAN-Quellprogramm ein-
gebaut. Das FORTRAN-Programm wird anschließend 
kompiliert und gebunden und berechnet dann die Kombi-
nationen der Minimalschnitte. PASE arbeitet in diesem 
Bereich als reines Batchverarbeitungsprogramm. Eine 
interaktive Unterstützung für die Erzeugung der Eingabe-
dateien steht nicht zur Verfügung. 
Der Output des Programmes ist eine Liste der Pfade, 
die nach dem Filterprozeß als relevante Pfade übrig blei-
ben und Listen von Pfaden, die bei der Filterung elimi-
niert wurden. Diese Listen werden in einem internen 
Format als Dateien abgespeichert und können mit weite-
ren PASE-Programmen gelesen und nach bestimmten 
Kriterien sortiert werden. 
Entsprechend der Verfahrensdarstellung soll im 
ersten Schritt der Analyse die Anlage beschrieben und 
der Umfang der Analyse festgelegt werden. Die 
Beschreibung der Anlage umfaßt dabei: 
- die räumlich und technische Auslegung der Anlage, 
- die Beschreibung des Materials, daß in der Anlage 
gehandhabt wird, 
- Inventare und Bewegungen des Materials, 
- eine Beschreibung der Prozesse, die am Material aus-
geführt werden. 
Das Mischkonzept für die Endlagerung sieht vor, 
daß ausgediente HTR- und LWR-Brennelemente und 
wärmeentwicklende radioaktive Abfälle sowie auch rela-
tiv schwach radioaktive Abfälle im gleichen Endlager-
bergwerk eingelagert werden. Für die Einlagerung dieser 
Materialien werden verschiedene Konzepte untersucht, 
die teilweise weder eine zeitliche noch eine räumliche 
Trennung von überwachungspflichtigem und nicht über-
wachungspflichtigem Material im Einlagerungsablauf 
vorsehen. Wir müssen uns hier bei der Beschreibung der 
Anlage und des Modells notwendigerweise auf eine grobe 
Skizze beschränken. Für unsere ersten Anwendungen von 
PASE wurde ein vereinfachtes Modell zugrunde gelegt. 
Darin wird zunächst nur die Streckenlagerung von LWR-
BE in POLLUX-Behältern während der Betriebsphase 
des Lagers betrachtet. 
Gebindehandhabung im Endlager 
Für die Gebindehandhabung wird von folgendem 
Ablauf ausgegangen (vergl. Abb. 2): 
Der An- und Abtrausport der POLLUX-Behälter 
erfolgt wahlweise über LKW oder Bahn über einen 
durchgehenden Fahrweg für beide Transportmittel. Nach 
der Eingangskontrolle werden die Fahrzeuge in die Ent-
ladeposition gefahren und die POLLUX-Behälter auf 
einen vorher bereitgestellten Plateauwagen in der Umla-
dehalle umgesetzt. Bei einer Störung des Einlagerungsbe-
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triebes werden die POLLUX-Behälter mit dem Kran in 
die Pufferhalle gesetzt und nach der Behebung der Stö-
rung auf den Plateauwagen geladen. 
Vom Beladegleis werden die Plateauwagen zum 
Schachtbeschickungsgleis transportiert und auf den För-
derkorb geschoben. Dann erfolgt der Transport nach 
Untertage bis auf die Einlagerungssohle. 
Im Füllort werden die Plateauwagen durch eine Auf-
zieh- und Abschiebevorrichtung aus dem Förderkorb ver-
fahren und auf das Bereitstellungsgleis gebracht. Mit 
einer Grubenlokomotive werden sie dann in den Einlage-
rungsbereich gezogen und auf dem Ausweichgleis für 
beladene Plateauwagen abgestellt. Hier werden sie von 
einer Rangierlokomotive übernommen, die jeweils einen 
beladenen Plateauwagen in die Einlagerungsstrecke 
schiebt. 
Dort wird der Plateauwagen unter die Einlagerungs-
vorrichtung positioniert und der Behälter angehoben. Der 
Plateauwagen wird vorgezogen und der Behälter auf dem 
Gleis abgelegt. Um den Behälter versetzen zu können, 
muß zunächst die Einlagerungsvorrichtung aus der 
Strecke geholt werden. Dazu fährt sie zunächst mit ihrem 
Fahrwerk in eine Ablegeposition vor und wird dort auf 
der entladenen Plateauwagen aufgesetzt. Die Raugierlok 
transportiert die Einlagerungsvorrichtung in die benach-
barte Einlagerungsstrecke, wo sie erneut aufgestellt und 
eingerichtet wird. Bevor die Versatzfahrzeuge den 
Streckenabschnitt versetzen können, sind die vorhande-
nen Einbauten und Einrichtungen, z.B. für die Bewette-
rung, zurückzusetzen. 
Ist eine Einlagerungsstrecke vollständig mit Gebin-
den belegt, so werden die maschinellen Einrichtungen in 
die folgende Einlagerungsstrecke umgesetzt. Die 
geräumte Strecke wird vollständig mit Versatzgut ver-
füllt. Als Verschluß wird ein Abschlußbauwerk errichtet, 
daß als Abgrenzung des nicht mehr in Betrieb befindli-
chen Bereiches dient und als weitere Barriere gegen eine 
Nuklidausbreitung wirkt. 
Betrachtete Abzweigungszenarien 
Im Modell werden folgende Abzweigungszenarien 
betrachtet (vgl. Abbildung 2): 
- Abzweigung nach dem Eingang in die Entladestation, 
- Abzweigung aus dem Pufferlager und 
- Abzweigung nach der Umladung auf dem Plateauwa-
gen auf dem Weg zum Schacht. 
Die Abzweigung kann dabei alternativ folgende 
Aktionen umfassen: 
1. Wegnahme des Behälters, 
2. Wegnahme des Behälters und Ersatz durch einen 
Dummy, 
3. Wegnahme des Behälters, Öffnen des Behälters in 
einer heißen Zelle, Entnahme von Kernmaterial, Ver-
schließen des Behälters und dessen Rücktransport 
(Entnahme von Kernmaterial). 
Untertage werden folgende Abzweigungszenarien 
berücksichtigt: 
Weg des Materials 
[L-_-.-E_~_· _n_g_a_n_g _ E_n_t_l_a_d_e_s_t_a_t_~_· o_n _ ___j;'~ : 
I Pufferlager ·J~1 : L---~----------~~: 
Abzweigungsszenario 
... 
... . 7. Wegnahme Behälter 
•, ,•,1 
oder 
o.. ·. · .. - Wegnahme Behälter 
, ,------•• ~ ,--------------~ ... · ' '··:': .. .'Ersatz durch Dummy 
\ 
' •' ... "".. . tl !, -'· E~t~~~e von KM 
Umladen auf Plateauwagen V ~--··..,~· . : 'ilua· Behälter· 
~~r-------------------------_v ... ,,., .. 
~~--.-'~_z_~u_·~_;_~_ .. ~-·-~-~-~n_··_"_~_~_m_·_··_·~_,:_h_~_·~-·~-· t_._. _ __v~: 
. Über Tage 
-·-----------------------------------------:-----------------------------•------
.,, 
I Einlagern und Versetzen ~~ ! 
L---~--------------------------Y 
I 
,, 
;:'V"'··~··· 
I Verschließen des Endlagers 
,, 
' . a~~au... lr•ll.otoll . t-
~ ~•Deportieren 
Unter Tage 
o SChacht. 2 
o nicht. &ak.lu:iart.a Gru!Mo.bau• 
oder 
- Jebllt•r öffnen und M!lt•ria.l , 
umpacken, RUcktran•port · ilber 
'',I 
a &cbacbt 1 
o achacht 2 
o n1oht d.klu·l•rt.• Orn"nb•'u• 
L-----------------~ 
Abbildung 2: Gebindefluß und betrachtete Abzweigungsszenarien 
Abzweigung während des Transportes im Grubenge-
bäude zum Einlagerungsort, 
Abzweigung nach dem Einlagern und Versetzen des 
Behälters und 
Abzweigung nach dem Verschließen der Strecke. 
593 
Die beiden letzten Möglichkeiten erfordern das Frei-
legen des Behälters und seinen Abtransport. Bei einer 
Abzweigung Untertage muß das Material nach Übertage 
zurücktransportiert werden. Für den Rücktransport wer-
den folgende Möglichkeiten berücksichtigt: 
1. Rücktransport vollständiger Behälter über: 
- Schacht 2 
- nicht deklarierte Grubenbaue, 
2. Das Öffnen des Behälters, das Umpacken des Materi-
als und Rücktransport über: 
- Schacht 1 
- Schacht 2 
- nicht deklarierte Grubenbaue. 
Erfahrungen beim Aufbau des Modelles 
Die Aktionsbäume für die betrachteten Abzwei-
gungsaktivitäten konnten ohne große Schwierigkeiten 
erstellt werden. Probleme ergaben sich dann jedoch bei 
der Definition des Statusvektors, und zwar bei der Frage, 
wie die zeitlichen Abläufe, d.h. der Gebindefluß, im 
Modell effizient abgebildet werden können. 
Für PASE gibt es kein Tutorial und die Verfahrens-
beschreibung ist in diesen Punkten relativ allgemein 
gehalten. Konkrete Regeln, wie in welchen Fällen vorzu-
gehen ist, sind in der Dokumentation nicht aufgeführt. 
Bei den zur Verfügung stehenden Beispielen wurden 
der Statusvektor und die Indikatoren im Prinzip aus der 
Detaillierung der Materialbilanzgleichung und den Maß-
nahmen zur Überprüfung des realen Bestandes abgeleitet. 
Es wird ausgegangen von einem statischen bzw. stationä-
ren Zustand, der durch die Aktionen des Abzweigers ver-
ändert wird und nach der Aktion überprüft werden kann. 
Die Indikatoren werden im wesentlichen gewonnen durch 
den Vergleich des Ausgangszustandes mit dem Zustand 
nach der Abzweigungsaktion. 
In Endlager muß jedoch auch der Fluß der Gebinde 
über mehrere Stationen betrachtet werden. Das System 
kann dabei eine Vielzahl verschiedener Zustände anneh-
men, je nachdem wo und wie die Abzweigung erfolgt 
(Wegnahme eines Gebindes ohne Ersatz, Ersatz durch 
Dummy, Öffnen des Gebindes und Entnahme des Materi-
als, etc.) und und dieser Zustand ändert sich mit jedem 
Weitertransport des Gebindes (von Station A an Station B 
wird ein reguläres Gebinde weitergegeben, es wird kein 
Gebinde weitergeben, es wird ein Dummy weitergeben, 
es wird ein leeres Gebinde weitergegeben, etc.). Um alle 
diese verschiedenen Zustände in einem Modell zu erfas-
sen, ist die Aufstellung eines relativ komplexen Status-
vektors erforderlich, da der Statusvektor nur Zählgrößen 
enthalten darf. 
Wegen des Fehlens von konkreten Verfahrensregeln 
ist der Benutzer von P ASE auf eigene Experimente ange-
wiesen. Diese werden jedoch vonPASEin keiner Weise 
unterstützt: 
Der Benutzer erhält erst in einem relativ späten Sta-
dium, nachdem er sein Modell konstruiert und die 
Eingabedateien zusammengestellt hat, eine Rück-
kopplung vom Programm. Er muß im Vorlaufbereich 
schon sehr viel Aufwand erbringen, ohne zu wissen, 
ob er sich in die richtige Richtung bewegt. 
Die Fehlermeldungen und die vorhandenen Möglich-
keiten, die Arbeitsweise des Programmes nachvoll-
ziehen zu können, sind sehr dürftig. Bei den ersten 
Läufen wurden z. B. alle Abzweigungspfade als irra-
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tional verworfen, die Ergebnisliste enthielt keine 
Pfade mehr. Zur Fehlersuche sahen wir uns gezwun-
gen, den FüRTRAN-Quellcode zu ergänzen, um 
auch Zwischenergebnisse anzeigen zu lassen. 
Erstellung und Änderungen der Eingabedaten sind 
extrem aufwendig und fehleranfällig. Die Statuspara-
meter und die Indikatoren müssen in FORTRAN-
Syntax als Elemente von Feldern mit fortlaufendem 
Index angegeben werden. Statusparameter und Indi-
katoren haben dabei z. B. die Form S(l7) und 1(58). 
Entfällt ein Parameter oder wird einer hinzugefügt, 
so müssen alle nachfolgenden Indizes entsprechend 
geändert werden. Da bei der Definition der Indikato-
ren und der Beschreibung der Aktionen auf die Sta-
tusparameter zugegriffen wird, müssen auch diese 
Referenzen entsprechend angepaßt werden. Dies muß 
alles manuell in einem Editor ohne jegliche Pro-
grammunterstützungdurch PASE erfolgen. 
Bei komplexeren Modellen steigen aufgrund der 
kombinatorischen Explosion der zu betrachtenden 
Anzahl von Pfaden die Programmlaufzeiten erheblich 
an. Sie betragen teilweise mehrere Stunden, auch auf 
einem leistungsfähigen 386-PC. Dies ist für den 
Benutzer kaum zumutbar. 
Der Output von PASE sind Listen von Minimal-
schnitt-Kombinationen, die nur mit den dafür angebote-
nen Programmen analysiert werden können. Dabei kann 
für diese Abzweigungspfade eine Rangordnung erstellt 
werden. Diese Rangordnung basiert auf die Anzahl der 
Indikatoren, die auf dem einzelnen Pfad erzeugt werden. 
Die Indikatoren werden dabei nur anzahlmäßig und nicht 
qualitativ betrachtet. So wird z. B. die Wegnahme eines 
Gebindes aus dem Pufferlager ohne weitere Verschleie-
rungsaktionen als "hardest to detect" eingestuft, da hier 
nur ein Indikator erzeugt wird, der eine Unstimmigkeit 
zwischen Buchbestand und realem Bestand im Pufferla-
ger anzeigt. 
In einer weiteren Option der Analyse können die 
Abzweigungspfade einem Safeguardssystem gegenüber-
gestellt werden. Dies erfolgt dadurch, daß für das Safe-
guardssystem angegeben wird, welche der Indikatoren 
vom ihm erfaßt werden können. Dann erfolgt die Grup-
pierung im Hinblick auf die Entdeckungsfähigkeit des 
Safeguardssystems, d. h. nach der Anzahl der Indikato-
ren, die vom Safeguardssystem erkannt werden können. 
Zusammenfassung und Empfehlungen 
Gegenüber der konventionellen Vorgehensweise bei 
der Analyse von Abzweigungspfaden bietet P ASE 
zunächst den Vorteil eines strukturierten und systemati-
schen Ansatzes. Dadurch, daß alle möglichen Stadien 
von Abzweigungsaktionen unabhängig voneinander bis 
ins Detail aufgeschlüsselt und dann per Programm kom-
biniert werden, ergibt sich eine gewisse Gewähr dafür, 
daß keine relevanten Abzweigungsmöglichkeiten überse-
hen werden. 
Der Einsatz von PASE erscheint lohnenswert insbe-
sondere für die Untersuchung von komplexen Zusam-
menhängen, die manuell kaum noch überschaubar sind, 
und für die Analyse von alternativen Safeguardsmodel-
len. Bei einem gegebenen Satz von Abzweigungspfaden 
können mit P ASE Safeguardsmodelle leicht daraufhin 
überprüft werden, inwieweit sie diese Abzweigungspfade 
erfassen. 
PASE kann auch als ein Hilfsmittel eingesetzt wer-
den, um Abzweigungspfade in einer standardisierten 
Form verbal zu beschreiben und graphisch darzustellen. 
Eine übersichtliche Darstellung erleichtert das Verständ-
nis und die Kommunikation. 
Der Umgang mit PASE erfordert allerdings einen 
hohen Lernaufwand vom Benutzer. Die PC-Programme 
sind zu starr und nicht benutzerfreundlich. Es ist zwar zu 
berücksichtigen, daß PASE noch ein sehr junges Verfah-
ren ist und sich noch in der Entwicklung befindet, jedoch 
entspricht die Handhabung nicht heutigen Maßstäben. 
Die Arbeit mit PASE ist derzeit zu vergleichen mit der 
Programmentwicklung mit einem Compiler ohne eine 
Entwicklungsumgebung und mit nur minimalen 
Debugging-Möglichkeiten. 
Für PASE sollte ein Tutorial erarbeitet werden, das 
den Anwender bei der Erstellung des Modells unterstützt. 
Insbesondere ist eine Hilfestellung für die Abbildung von 
Prozessen, z. B. von Materialflüssen, erforderlich. Die-
ses Tutorial könnte auch zur Standardisierung des 
Modellentwurfes beitragen. 
Im Bereich der Dateneingabe für P ASE sind unbe-
dingt Verbesserungen erforderlich. Die derzeitige Form 
entspricht nicht dem Stand der Technik. Hier sollte eine 
Modell-Entwicklungsumgebung erarbeitet werden, die 
den Benutzer bei der Erstellung, Änderung und Konsi-
stenzprüfung des Modelles unterstützt. Der Output von 
PASE sollte in einem Format zur Verfügung gestellt wer-
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den, das dem Anwender eine eigene Weiterverarbeitung 
über den von PASE angebotenen Rahmen hinaus ermög-
licht. 
Die Programmlaufzeiten sind auf PC-Maschinen 
unzumutbar lang. Wenn nicht softwarcscitig, z. B. durch 
eine Optimierung der Berechnungsalgorithmen, eine 
erhebliche Verringerung erzielt werden kann, ist eine 
Portierung auf leistungsfähigere Hardware erforderlich. 
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Abstract 
One of the essential aims of the CALDEX project [1] 
is the comparative evaluation of the conventional tank 
calibration procedure using an incremental addition of 
liquor and of the calibration with a continuous liquid 
feed. 
The three calibration exercises performed with wa-
ter in continuous mode have been evaluated. Esti-
mates of volume determination uncertainty are given 
for all manometers which can be compared with the 
evaluations from other calibration procedures. 
1 Introduction 
The CALDEX project [1] the experimental part of 
which was carried out and concluded during the year 
1989 was aimed for comparing various calibration me-
thods for accountancy tanks. Apart from a compa-
rison of measurement devices which were tested si-
multaneously and from an investigation of influencing 
factors which occur during plant operation, particular 
emphasis was placed on the analysis of a calibration 
procedure with a continuous liquid feed. It was to be 
determined wether continuous calibration- which re-
duces the time needed by the factor 6 compared to the 
conventional procedure - meets the requirements as 
to precision and to reproducibility. 
A first examination of data did not yield any re-
liable result on the comparison between conventional, 
i.e. incremental; and continuous calibration. There-
fore a detailed investigation of the continuous calibra-
tion procedure was carried out. 
2 Experimental setup 
In the TEKO facility (Karlsruhe) a 12500l annular 
vessel has been equipped to allow studies on the de-
•nuw al: CEC, EURATOI\1 safeguards Dirccluralc 
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gree of accuracy of measurements achievable in con-
ditions of operation. 
The whole setup consists of three main components: 
the accountancy tank including instruments, the do-
sing station and storage tanks (see fig. 1). 
For the continuous calibration experiments the ca-
libration liquid was pumped from the storage tanks 
into the overflow feed tank and passed, over the rotary 
piston meter, into the accountancy tank continuously. 
Calibration data have been recorded with the follo-
wing instruments: 
• Volume measurements 
- Rotary piston meter 
• Level measurements 
Crouzet electro-mechanical gauge 
Rw1ka electro-mechanical gauge 
Wallace & Tiernan electro-mechanical 
gauge, type Diptron 3 
Hartmann & Braun standard pressure trans-
mitter (RUF) 
Capacitive level measurement probe 
- Sonic ranger {UKAEA IIarwell) 
• Tank weight 
- ASEA weighing system (load cells) 
3 Screening of measurement data 
Measurement data have been stored in two datasets 
for each calibration run. A high speed recording da-
taset contains all readings from level instruments and 
the rotary piston meter. The time resolution between 
readings is 2 seconds. The second dataset with a 30 se-
cond recording interval contains data about the envi-
ronmental conditions of the calibration: Temperature 
off gas system compressed air 
88025 
~------, 
I Dosing 1 
station 1 
ASEA-Ioad cells 
CW402 
Position 2 I 
Figure 1: CALDEX setup 
2000,_--------~--------L-------~--------~ 
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198·1 
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Figure 2: Constancy of air flow rate 
BOO 
readings within the feed and calibration tanks and the 
air flow rates in the dip-tube system. 
The constancy of the air flow rate was within two 
steps of the resolution of measurement(0.01l/ h; see 
fig. 2). The temperature within the tank was sta-
ble within ±0.1 OC (resolution of measurement) after 
the thermo cell location was flooded with water (see 
fig. 3). Therefore no correction within one calibration 
run is necessary. Unfortunately all temperature mea-
surements for the last calibration run failed, there are 
constant readings in the dataset over the whole pe-
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Figure 3: Temperature measured at the bottom of the 
accountancy tank (run 1) 
riod of time including the starting phase where none 
of the thermo cells was in contact with the calibration 
liquid. This lack of information precludes a tempera-
ture correction for this calibration run- all the follo-
wing evaluation has been made under the assumption 
that the temperature for all these calibration runs was 
identical but unknown. 
Time correlation of measurements Volume 
measurement with the rotary piston meter and the 
corresponding liquid level measurement are done at 
different times, because the rotary piston meter is lo-
cated atop of the accountancy tank and the water 
needs a little time to pour down into the tank. The 
filling line was vented before each calibration run; it 
is running down to the bottom of the tank. During 
the calibration run water is flowing at a nearly con-
stant speed. For this setup the time correlation is 
only a constant bias [2], which can be determined at 
the starting time of the calibration from the delay of 
the weight measurements of the whole tank against 
the first none-zero recording from the rotary piston 
meter. The start of differential pressure readings is 
not suitable for this purpose because the level of li-
quid is below the outlet of the lower dip tube at the 
beginning of the calibration run. 
This kind of time correlation requires no within-run 
corrections and has no influence for the estimation of 
volume determination uncertainty. 
Detection of outliers A first graphical analysis 
of the measurement data showed two kinds of outliers: 
• The differential pressure measurement failed for 
some times because the dip tubes have been ven-
ted. 
• there are a number of constant readings -
usually on all data lines - so that the next cou-
ple of data is only a replicate of the former one 
and no true data. 
A data averaging program handed over together with 
the original data did not take account for these out-
liers and could therefore not be applied. 
The latter kind of outliers was easily removed from 
the data by searching for constant readings in pairs 
of data. About one third of all data have been rejec-
ted this way. The other outliers required individual 
identification by picking them interactively from the 
residual plots. 
Correction of zero readings At the beginning 
and the end of each calibration run zero readings have 
been taken from all level recording instruments. The 
rotary piston meter is a counting device which is reset 
to zero at the beginning of each calibration run. 
The zero readings for each instrument have been 
averaged separately for the starting and the ending 
phase. Differences between these both averages have 
been equally distributed over the time range of cali-
bration. 
Evaluation of diagnostic plots Profile plots of 
the reduced calibration data are used for diagnostics. 
A profile plot is a plot of the residuals obtained by 
fitting a linear function to the calibration data. The 
profile plots shown here (figure 4 to 6) are constructed 
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Figure 5: profile plots Diptron 
from all runs. A profile plot shows graphically the 
change in the cross-sectional area of the tank. Abrupt 
changes in the tank's profile help to identify transition 
regions. 
Looking at the profile plots the instruments can 
be separated into two distinct groups: all differential 
pressure recording instruments are one group, the so-
nic ranger, capacitive probe and the load cells are the 
other one. For the differential pressure instruments 
the profiles from run 1 and run 2 match very well, 
the profile of run 3 is significantly different. The in-
creasing difference to the other profiles assumedly is a 
scaling error - there are no valid temperature mea-
surements for run 3 - or a malfunction of the data 
transmission equipment. Under these circumstances 
it is at least doubtful if one should include the data 
from run 3 into the data evaluation. We decided to 
reject the whole calibration run. 
With only two calibration runs it is not useful to 
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Figure 6: profile plots Hartmann fJ Brau.n 
compare different error models; this should be done 
later including the results of future calibration runs 
performed with the CALDEX setup at lspra. 
For the second group of instruments the profiles of 
the three calibration runs differ widely in slope. These 
instruments should not be used for accounting purpo-
ses. 
4 A measure for comparison of calibra-
tion procedures 
The purpose of tank calibration is to determine the 
liquid contained within the tank as precise as possi-
ble. Comparative evaluation of different calibration 
procedures should therefore give an estimation about 
the uncertainty of volume determination. Such uncer-
tainties can be derived from variance estimates of the 
liquid level measurements. 
The variance estimates should include a component 
for run-to-run variances. Using high-precision in-
struments for volume and liquid height measurements 
the within-run measurement errors are smaller than 
the run-to-run differences resulting presumably from 
uncontrolled calibration conditions. 
These two variance estimates - within-run vari-
ance O"Af (related to the calibration function) and run-
to-run variance O"H - depend on the regression mo-
del which is adequate to the calibration data - a 
single function describing all calibration runs, paral-
lel functions or individual functions for each run. A 
detailed description of the component variances for 
the three possible regression models (restricted to the 
linear case) is given in Liebetrau et al. (3]. 
The adequacy of a regression model can be deter-
mined by the significance of the model's lack-of-fit 
against the next more individual model: the single 
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function against parallel functions and the parallel 
functions against individual functions. A lack-of-fit 
test for the individual functions cannot be done, be-
cause due to the design of the calibration experiment 
there are no repeated measurements at exactly the 
same volumes to determine the pure error of measu-
rement. 
From the variance estimates confidence intervals 
can be derived to show where the true curve may lie 
relative to the fitted curve within a specified confi-
dence ( 1 - a). For this purpose Scheffe-type confi-
dence intervals are used.[4] 
W(Y)scheffe = ±V2F~~2u (YIX) (1) 
In the classical tank calibration procedure the res-
ponse variable Y is the liquid level height, u(YIX) 
is the variance of liquid level measurement at a given 
volume X. The parameters of the F-distribution are 
the number of parameters of the regression function 
- 2 for linear functions -- and the degrees of freedom 
of the overall variance of liquid height measurement. 
The procedure of volume uncertainty depends on 
the selection of the response variable. Choosing the 
liquid level as the response variable, the regression 
function must be inverted for volume determinations. 
Liebetrau et al. [3] developed a procedure to obtain 
uncertainty estimates for volume determination. Pre-
diction intervals that hold simultaneously with spe-
cified propability for an indeterminate number of vo-
lume determinations can be calculated by combining 
the confidence intervals for the calibration functions 
with the tolerance interval for liquid level measure-
ments (see fig. 7). If liquid level measurements for 
u,. 
.g, y• 
• :I: 
L,. 
Lv.IXI x•,. 1 ., (Y•) 
Volume 
Figure 7: Determination of discrimination intervals 
input accounting are done the same way as calibration 
measurements, the variance of these measurements 
could be estimated from the calibration data by using 
Crouzet 
confidence tolerance 
interval interval volume 
region for the for level uncertainty 
cal. fct. measurement 
[mm] [mm] [l] 
1 3.70 32.60 87.90 
2 0.35 0.67 3.23 
3 0.16 0.65 2.56 
4 0.17 1.12 3.98 
5 0.29 0.66 3.03 
6 0.32 0.59 2.89 
7 0:26 0.68 2.98 
8 0.53 1.00 4.83 
Rusk.a 
confidence tolerance 
interval interval volume 
region for the for level uncertainty 
cal. fct. measurement 
[mm] [mm] [l] 
1 3.40 32.40 84.6 
2 0.98 0.87 5.9 
3 0.76 0.88 5.2 
4 0.58 1.06 5.1 
5 0.54 0.84 4.4 
6 0.36 0.85 3.9 
7 0.32 1.02 4.2 
8 0.88 2.03 9.2 
the within-run variations. This does not work for con-
tinuous calibrations. On the other hand the varian-
ces of the repeated reading's at each increment during 
the classical incremental calibration runs - which is 
comparable to accountancy measurements - are not 
known to the authors. Therefore we use the within-
run variances of the continuous calibration runs as an 
upper estimate for the tolerance intervals of liquid le-
vel measurement. During accountancy measurement 
there are no disturbances from liquid streaming into 
the tank - measurement variances will be smaller. 
5 Results 
Evaluation of the continuous calibration exercise has 
been restricted to the first two runs, because the runs 
environmental conditions are unknown due to a data 
recording failure. 
The volume uncertainty estimates for the differen-
tial pressure measuring instruments are shown in the 
tables above. The selection of calibration regions can 
be seen exemplarily for the Crouzet manometer in fi-
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Diptron 
confidence tolerance 
interval interval volume 
region for the for level uncertainty 
cal. fct. measurement 
[bar] [bar] [l] 
1 0.380 2.97 78.5 
2 0.010 0.11 3.9 
3 0.022 0.12 4.4 
4 0.021 0.14 4.9 
5 0.018 0.12 4.4 
6 0.032 0.12 4.6 
7 0.093 0.13 7.0 
8 0.110 0.23 10.6 
RUF 
confidence tolerance 
interval interval volume 
region for the for level uncertainty 
cal. fct. measurement 
[bar] [bar] [l] 
1 0.410 3.24 84.5 
2 0.031 0.21 7.8 
3 0.034 0.22 8.1 
4 0.035 0.25 8.6 
5 0.010 0.24 7.9 
6 0.034 0.25 9.0 
7 0.150 0.31 14.6 
gure 8. From the results it can easily be seen that the 
first region cannot be fitted sufficiently with a linear 
regression function. For all other regions the volume 
determination uncertainties are in the range from 3l 
to 15l with the smaller intervals for the Crouzet and 
Ru$/ca instruments. These volume determination un-
certainties are about 0.1% or less of the tanks nominal 
volume ( 12.5 m:1 ). 
As stated above the tolerance intervals for level 
measurements have been estimated from the conti-
nuous calibrations within-run variations. The vari-
ance of accountancy measurements using repeated in-
strument readings at constant volume might be sig-
nificantly smaller. This would also reduce the uncer-
tainty of the volume determination. 
During run 2 and run 3 the readings from the Ruska 
showed periodic variations of about 2 mm with a pe-
riodicity of 75 seconds approximately. Therefore the 
volume uncertainties obtained for the Ru$/ca are not 
as good as one would expect of the instruments pre-
CiSIOn. 
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 
Volume 
Figure 8: Calibration regions Crouzet 
6 Concluding remarks 
• The complete failure of the third calibration run 
shows the necessity of preliminary evaluation of 
the data recorded simultaneously with the cali-
bration exercise. Even for a relatively fast cali-
bration procedure like the continuous calibration 
6 to 8 hours are needed to perform one calibra-
tion run for accountancy tanks of such great size 
- lost time if one instrument or data line would 
fail. 
• To obtain more realistic estimates for the to-
lerance of liquid level measurements during ac-
counting the results from the incremental calibra-
tion exercises with the CALDEX tank ( Goldman 
et al., [5]) should be used upon availability. 
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• Calibration exercises to be performed with the 
CALDEX tank at its new location at Ispra can 
possibly be evaluated together with the calibra-
tion runs evaluated in this paper to see the influ-
ence of large time intervals betweeen calibrations 
- or a different tank profile due to the displace-
ment. 
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SAFEGUARDS CONCEPTS FOR SPENT FUEL CONDITIONING FACILITIES 
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Abstract 
Spent fuel conditioning is a likely option 
prior to disposal in geological repositories. 
During conditioning, spent fuel assemblies will 
be repacked with possible dismantling or even 
chopping in a final disposal container. Loss of 
identity of fuel assemblies will have a major 
impact on safeguards. The inventory of final 
disposal containers has to be re-established. 
This would require the development of an 
advanced accountancy verification and 
containment and surveillance technique in order 
to maintain effective safeguards. This paper 
identifies the system requirements for 
conditioning plants which would provide adequate 
assurance of non-diversion of nuclear material. 
1. Introduction 
Direct disposal of spent fuel has developed 
an important option for the nuclear fuel cycle. 
The two overlying objectives of underground 
disposal are( 1 ]: 
to isolate spent fuel from the human 
environment over long time-periods without 
relying on future generations to maintain 
the integrity of the disposal system or 
imposing significant constraints on them 
due to the existence of a repository; and 
to ensure the long-term radiological 
protection of humans and the environment in 
accordance with current internationally 
agreed radiation protection principles. 
To achieve these objectives, spent fuel has 
to be immobilized and conditioned in accordance 
with specifications dictated by regulatory 
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author! ties. The goal of conditioning is to 
immobilize and package spent fuel so that it is 
suitable for all stages of handling, storage and 
disposal. 
The conditioning provides: 
Safe handling during the pre-disposal 
and disposal operation, i.e. storage, 
transportation and emplacement in a 
repository to ensure no release of 
radioactivity under normal 
conditions; release under accidental 
conditions needs to be acceptable to 
the regulatory authorities; 
Assurance that releases of 
radionuclides into the biosphere must 
be as low as possible, and within 
limits established by the regulatory 
authorities. 
To fulfil these requirements spent fuel 
will be processed and packaged in final disposal 
containers making it 
verification purposes 
material verification 
inaccessible for 
using the 
procedure. 
existing 
These 
containers will contain a large amount of 
nuclear material and an advanced verification 
technique will be needed to provide adequate 
assurances of non-diversion as demanded by the 
international community. Development of 
advanced safeguards technology is essential to 
reduce facility intrusion, radiation exposure to 
inspector/operator 
personpower costs. 
development of 
personnel and inspector 
To realize this goal, 
(a) redundant-automated 
verification and surveillance equipment, (b) new 
techniques and equipment for verification of 
spent fuel assemblies and pins, and (c) 
techniques to monitor nuclear material content 
of the final disposal package, 
required. [ 2 1 
will be 
One may point out that a documentation of 
radioactive inventory including contents of the 
nuclide and its chemical composition will be 
required by the national regulatory authority. 
A verification procedure would have to be 
employed, not only for the requirements of the 
regulatory body 1 but also for addressing public 
concern. Verification may be carried out either 
at the conditioning plant or at the repository 
site to confirm the contents. Whatever 
verification procedure is adopted for regulatory 
purposes, safeguards related activities could be 
performed simultaneously with other operational 
practices. 
2. Safeguards System. 
The purpose[ 3 ' 4 ] of IAEA safeguards 
is to assure that nuclear material is not 
diverted from peaceful purposes. The objectives 
are "the timely detection of diversion of 
significant quantities of nuclear material from 
peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive 
devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence 
of such diversion by the risk of early 
detection". A set of parameters called 
detection goals are used to design a safeguards 
system; these are: the significant quantity, 
the detection time, the detection probability 
and the false alarm probability. In the case of 
spent fuel, the detection goals are based on 
plutonium as it is a more desirable material for 
proliferation. The detection goal for plutonium 
in spent fuel is to detect a missing amount of 
8 kg within 3 months 
probability of 90- 95%[ 51. 
with a detection 
Using the detection goals as guidelines, 
the IAEA draws up the inspection goals for every 
facility, taking the design and operational 
practice of the facility, the provisions of the 
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safeguards agreement and the state-of-the-art 
technical capabilities of safeguards measures. 
Appropriate safeguards approaches are developed, 
designed and implemented accordingly. 
A system of accountancy for, and control 
of, nuclear material is required to assure that 
the safeguards system and measures are effective 
to demonstrate continued presence of the 
material within the designated boundaries. The 
plant operator is obliged[ 3 ' 4 ] to provide 
the Agency with its description of a procedure 
for nuclear material accountancy and control 
including a system of measurements on which such 
accountancy is based. 
3. Safeguards for Spent Fuel. 
The Agency's safeguards for irradiated 
reactor fuel assemblies is one of item 
accountancy. Nuclear material content is based 
on fabrication measurement data and adjusted 
based on calculation of production and loss 
during irradiation. Nuclear material content is 
assumed to be traceable as long as item 
integrity is maintained. The success of item 
accountancy as a safeguards measure is 
critically dependent on the ability to implement 
measures that provide an acceptable assurance of 
continued item integrity. Safeguards measures 
include the use of a combination of containment 
and surveillance measures with periodic 
verification by item counting, serial number 
identification 
emissions. 
and fingerprint radiation 
Existing safeguards measurement techniques 
have been challenged by recent technological 
developments for better management of reactor 
fuel. Recent fuel design permits easy 
disassembly. This makes it more cost-effective 
to repair and reconstitute 
reuse. During such operations 
assemblies for 
fuel assemblies 
lose their original constituents and identity. 
This introduces new problems for material 
accountancy in addition to complications in the 
application of containment and surveillance 
methods. Advanced fuel designs incorporating 
different initial enrichments, axial variations 
in enrichment, use of mixed-oxide fuel and 
greater use of burnable poison rods have 
introduced additional difficulties for NDA 
measurements. 
In addition, expansion of reactor storage 
pool capacities with high density storage racks, 
consolidation of fuel rods, double stacking of 
fuel assemblies and the use of special storage 
baskets or multi-element bottles to accommodate 
an increasing number of spent fuel 
have added further complications 
assemblies 
in the 
application of safeguards 
used safeguards 
verifying the 
methods 
loading 
measures. Currently 
have difficulty in 
of irradiated fuel 
shipping containers, fuel assembly dismantling 
and reconstitution, or the removal of individual 
spent fuel rods. 
These problems have raised questions about 
the basic assumption and hence the adequacy of 
safeguards measures based on i tern accountancy. 
More recently the alternative of reverifying 
integrity by NDA measurements has been given 
increased attention. Considerable progress has 
been achieved in non-destructive-analysis (NDA) 
verification instruments and technique. Further 
improvements can be achieved by constructing 
facility specific NDA instruments. Operator 
understanding and cooperation for adopting are 
necessary for successful application of these 
advanced instruments. 
4. Conditioning of Spent Fuel 
As mentioned earlier, the goal of 
Conditioning is to immobilize and package spent 
fuel so that it is suitable for all stages of 
handling storage and disposal and to minimize 
release of radionuclides into the biosphere to 
be as low as possible. 
Conditioning[ 2 ' 6 ' 7 ] is normally 
performed under dry conditions. At a 
conditioning facility the spent fuel would be 
transferred to a hot cell for further 
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processing. A conditioning facility receives 
(a) intact fuel assemblies {b) defective fuel 
assemblies (c) containers of consolidated fuel 
rods in case rod consolidation has been 
performed at the spent fuel pond and {d) 
containers of damaged/defective fuel rods. 
These will be processed in the following manner: 
(a) Encapsulation of intact fuel assemblies or 
containers consolidated spent fuel rods in 
the final disposal cask; this involves 
(b) 
(c) 
operations 
disassembling; 
without any further 
Encapsulation of disassembled components: 
In this case fuel assemblies/ containers of 
consolidated rods are disassembled and the 
disassembled components are packed into 
canisters and subsequently into final 
disposal casks. Depending on operational 
requirements, fuel and non-fuel bearing 
components will be separated; 
Encapsulation 
some cases, 
of divided 
depending 
component: In 
on operational 
requirements, disassembled fuel components 
will be divided into pieces before placing 
into final disposal casks; 
(d) Encapsulation of damaged fuel 
assemblies/rods will be processed by using 
methods described above; 
(e) Encapsulation of waste generated by the 
process operation which will also be packed 
in a final disposal cask of same 
specification. 
A flow diagram of nuclear material in a 
conditioning plant is given in Figure 1. The 
shaded part shows the places where the spent 
fuel processing will take place in the hot 
cell. It 
processing 
unaccounted 
may be mentioned here that any 
facility which causes MUF (material 
for) will need verification 
techniques to determine the amounts involved. 
STORAGE OF 
SPENT FUEL 
IN TRANSPORT 
CASKS 
PREPARATION 
OF TRANSPORT 
CASK FOR UNLOADING 
EMPTY TRANSPORT 
CASKS 
EMPTY 
BINS/CANISTERS/BASKETS 
EMPTY FINAL 
DISPOSAL CASKS 
LOADED CONDITIONED 
FUEL IN FINAL 
DISPOSAL CASKS 
FINAL PREPARATION 
OF FINAL DISPOSAL 
CASKS 
STORAGE OF 
CONDITIONED FUEL 
IN FINAL DISPOSAL 
CASKS 
UNLOADING OF 
TRANSPORT 
CASKS 
STORAGE OF 
FUEL ASSEMBLIES/ELEMENTS 
TRANSFER OF 
FUEL ASSEMBLIES/ELEMENTS 
TO DISASSEMBLY CELL 
LOADING OF CONDITIONED 
FUEL IN FINAL DISPOSAL 
CASKS 
PRELIMINARY 
PREPARATION OF 
FINAL DISPOSAL CASKS 
Figure 1 FLOW DIAGRAM OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN A CONDITIONING PLANT 
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5. Safeguards concern 
Fuel assemblies arrive at the conditioning 
plant with one very important assumption that 
their integrity has not been breached. 
Assurance must be provided that all nuclear 
been received at the 
Many reactors currently 
material has actually 
conditioning facility. 
reconstitute fuel 
additional burn up. 
assemblies to obtain 
The safeguards accounting 
concern for these reconstituted assemblies need 
to be addressed. The 
diversion of material 
safeguards concern 
by understating 
for 
the 
nuclear material content of the fuel assemblies 
must also be taken into account. 
During conditioning a transition from one 
type of the items, i.e. fuel assemblies/rods 
into another type of item, i.e. final disposal 
container (mentioned as item-item transition 
later in the text) will occur. The content of 
this new item should be verified in respect of 
nuclear material content according to the 
prescribed detection goal. This reinforces the 
need for material accountancy verification 
procedures to maintain continuity of knowledge 
during this item-item transition in order to 
draw Safeguards conclusions. Effective 
safeguards depends on the accounting practice 
and its verification techniques. 
Possibility of diversion of nuclear 
material during conditioning operation needs to 
be addressed by applying appropriate 
verification measurements. If falsification is 
not detected through such verification, then it 
will never be detected because the quantity 
represented by the falsification will be buried 
along with the spent fuel in the geological 
repositories. 
Implementation of effective safeguards will 
require highly reliable safeguards systems, 
since reverification of the nuclear material 
inventory 
discrepancy 
in the 
will 
event of any anomaly 
be extremely difficult. 
or 
A 
sound quality assurance programme is required to 
ensure the effectiveness of the applied 
safeguards measures. 
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6. System requirements. 
Considering these factors, the following 
systems requirements for implementing effective 
safeguards deserves consideration. To 
facilitate the application of safeguards, 
integration of these requirements needs to be 
incorporated during the early stages of facility 
design. If operator systems are used, it will 
be required that Agency specifications are 
fulfilled for authentication. 
a) NDA System 
i) The system should be able to verify 
the nuclear material of all fuel 
assemblies/rods in unattended mode 
during unloading from the shipping 
cask. 
ii) The system should be able to verify 
the nuclear material of all fuel 
assemblies/rods/other waste material 
during loading into the bins/canisters 
after disassembly or other processing 
stages, as appropriate. 
iii) The system should be able to verify 
the nuclear material during loading of 
final disposal cask. 
iv) The system should be able to transmit 
measurement data over a reasonable 
distance to the inspectors' room. 
v) The system data review capabilities 
should not interfere with the system 
when operating in data acquisition 
mode. 
vi) The system should incorporate 
diagnostic checks with an alarm to 
indicate when it is not functioning 
within acceptable bounds. 
vii) The system should be fully automatic 
and operate in an unattended mode. 
b) C/S System 
i) The system should be able to count and 
identify fuel assemblies/rods and 
other material which enters the 
facility. 
ii) The system should be able to 
distinguish various types of material 
which will be handled by the facility. 
iii) The system should provide surveillance 
of the storage hall in order to cover 
all cask movements into and out of the 
area. 
iv) The system should be able to verify 
that all casks leaving the area are 
consistent with the operator's 
declaration. 
v) The system should be operable in an 
unattended verification mode by 
surveillance and pattern recognition 
of a neutron and/or gamma monitoring 
system to confirm that all movements 
are as recorded by the operator. 
vi) The system should be able to transmit 
C/S signals and measurement data over 
a reasonable distance to the 
inspectors' room. 
vii) The system should provide remote 
live-time observation of surveillance, 
of identification and measurement 
data, as well as recording of all data 
for subsequent review. 
viii)The system should provide 
optical-electrical methods for 
checking integrity and identification 
of weld for final disposal cask. 
ix) The system data review capability 
should not interfere with the system 
when operating in data acquisition 
mode. 
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x) The system should 
diagnostic checks with 
incorporate 
alarms to 
indicate when the system is not 
functioning within acceptable bounds. 
xi) The system should be fully automatic 
and operate unattended 
reasonable time interval 
scheduled servicing. 
7. Conclusion 
for a 
between 
Implementation of effective safeguards will 
require highly reliable safeguards systems, as 
reverificaiton of the nuclear material inventory 
in the event of any anomaly or discrepancy will 
be extremely difficult. A sound quality 
assurance programme 
effectiveness of 
measures. 
is required to 
the applied 
ensure the 
safeguards 
A high degree of operator/inspector 
cooperation will be required to implement such a 
complex and advanced safeguards system. It is 
high time to define system specifications and to 
initiate development work before such facilities 
are built. 
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SAFEGUARDS-RELEVANT DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF SPENT FUEL AND 
RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN THE PLANNED GORLEBEN REPOSITORY 
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Bundesamt fi.ir Strahlenschutz, Salzgitter, Germany 
RP. Randl 
Bundesministerium fi.ir Forschung und Technologie, Bonn, Germany 
Abstract 
Safeguards-relevant design clJarac-
teristics of tlle planned Gorleben 
repository llave been identified by a 
team established by the "Bundesmin-
ister fur Forschung und Technologie" 
- Federal Ninister for Research and 
Technology - (BNFT). These clJarac-
teris tics are the advanced condi-
tioning, the reloading cell, the 
above-ground butter stores tor tlJe 
bridging of sllort-term disturbances, 
the hoisting facilities, tl1e mine 
(h'ere especially tile permanent 
structural change, the retreating, 
the exploratory level which is later 
to he used as return air horizon and 
the duration of shaft sinking) as 
well as the mixed emplaceme11t of 
radioactive wastes and spent fuels. 
Introduction 
In September 1989, the Federal 
Minister for Research and Technolo-
gy, BMFT, established a team which 
is supposed to elaborate suggestions 
for a safeguards draft concept for 
the direct disposal of spent nuclear 
fuels. Five members of the following 
institutions belong to this team: 
BfS (Bundesamt ffrr Strahlen-
schutz, Federal Office for 
Radiation Protection), D-W 
3320 Salzgitter 
DBE (Deutsche Gesellschaft zum 
Bau und Betrieb von Endlagern 
ffrr Abfallstoffe mbH, German 
Company for the Construction 
and Operation of Waste Reposi-
tories) , D-W 3150 Peine 
GNS (Gesellschaft fQr Nuklear-
Service mbll, Company for 
Nuclear Service) D-W 3000 
Hannover 
KFA (Forschungszeutrum Jiilich 
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GmbH, Jiilich Research Centre) 
D-\v 5170 Jfrlich 
KfK (Kernforschuugszentrum 
Karlsruhe Gmbll, Karlsruhe 
Nuclear Research Centre) D-W 
7500 Karlsruhe 
BMFT has been elaborating this basic 
concept for IAEA (International 
Atomic Energy Agency) in Vienna 
within the framework of the Task 
A.l4 "Safeguardss for Final Disposal 
of Nuclear Material in a Geological 
Repository" of the German supporting 
programme. 
Sati~guards-Relevant Design Charac-
teristics 
Members of the team have identified 
the following safeguards-relevant 
design characteristics for ·the 
direct disposal of spent nuclear 
fuels: 
1. Conditioning facility 
In the conditioning facility, spent 
fuel elements are packaged in thick-
walled containers which are supposed 
to function as long-term barriers in 
the repository. This presupposes 
that the containers are welded with 
a deep-split welding seam (approxi-
mately 5 cm) around the cap. Another 
composite welding is applied with 
CASTOR-containers with HTR-fuel 
elements. In the conditioning facil-
ity, the nuclear material can be 
seen and measured for the last time, 
before it is packaged into the 
containers.' From this time on, the 
material is regarded as inaccessi-
ble. It is not planned to open the 
containers later on which is mechan-
ically not possible in the area of 
the repository anyhow. 
2. Reloading cell 
In the reloading station of the 
repository there is a reloading cell 
in which heat-generating wastes from 
reprocessing (HLW canisters, BT 
drums) are reloaded from collecting 
transport containers to single 
shielding containers. This reloading 
cell can be designed in such a way 
that the opening of the POLLUX 
containers and the removal of LWR 
fuel elements can be excluded for 
mechanical reasons. Furthermore, 
mechanical monitoring systems are 
possible. 
3. Buffer store 
An above-ground buffer store is 
necessary for all types of waste and 
spent fuel elements in order to 
guarantee an optimum operation, 
respectively to bring under control 
operational breakdowns. Collecting 
transport containers and single 
shielding containers with heat-
generating wastes from reprocessing 
as well as POLLUX and CASTOR con-
tainers with spent fuel assemblies 
to be disposed of directly can be 
buffer stored there to a limited 
extent (for approx. 1 week). A check 
of identity and integrity of the 
buffer stored POLLUX and CASTOR 
containers is possible at any time 
(seal, surveillance by camera or TV, 
inspection by the inspectorates). 
4. Hoisting facility 
For mechanical reasons (max. hauling 
load), POLLUX and CASTOR containers 
can only be hauled in shaft 2, 
perhaps (investigation is being 
carried out) only if an additional 
weight is attached to the counter-
balance. For mechanical reasons, the 
haulage o~ POLLUX containers without 
additional weight is probably ex-
cluded because of the ropes slipping 
through on the Koepe sheave. 
In comparison to 
other radioactive 
haulage of POLLUX 
the haulage 
materials, 
containers 
of 
the 
is 
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relatively rare: If, for example, 
all spent fuel assemblies arising in 
the · Federal Republic of Germany 
amounting to approx. 500 t/a were 
disposed of directly, each year only 
approx. 1~5 POLLUX containers would 
have to be hauled, i. e. a little 
bit more than 2 containers per week. 
Shaft 1 serves for the transporta-
tion of personnel (man·-rld.ing), of 
equipment and of salt to the sur-
face. Possible C/S measures are 
control of identity and integrity at 
the charge of shaft 2, monitors to 
measure the dose output in order to 
control possible material backflow 
at the two shaft charges in case an 
opening of the containers below 
ground cannot be excluded. 
Tri tll the 
lwisting 
measures 
stop. 
measures taken at the 
facility Uw safeguards 
in the repository could 
Tl1e Federal Republic of Germany, 
however, is very in L"erested · in 
demonstrating tbat no nuclear mate·-
rial is removed. 'l'ilc'refore, tlle 
following, confidence-creating 
measures might additionally he taken 
on a voluntary hasis rriUwul: this 
heing necessary from a safeguards-
relevant vierrpoint. 
5. Mine 
The mine shows four safeguards-
relevant design characteristics: as 
there are the permanent structural 
change of the mine caused by the 
drivage of ne'" and the abandonment 
of old emplacement fields, the 
emplacement by retreating, i. e. 
from the periphery of the emplace-
ment horizon to the shaft, and the 
existence of the exploration/return 
air horizon. Further, the long 
duration of shaft-sinldng is safe-
guards-relevant. 
5.1 Verification and re-examina-
tion of the mine 
Due to the permanent structural 
change of the mine, the design 
information (physical structure of 
the mine) changes permanently which 
forms an essential part· of a safe-
guards concept. Verification and 
re-examination of the mine are thus 
essential elements of a safeguards 
concept for the final disposal of 
spent fuel assemblies. The goal of 
the measures is to check periodical-
ly the correspondence of the actual 
physical structure of the mine with 
the details given by the operators 
to the surveillance organizations in 
official reports. 
The construction of a repository and 
the emplacement of wastes and spent 
fuel elements presuppose the permis-
sion according to Atomic Energy Law 
of the competent government of the 
federal states (Lander) and the 
permission according to Mining Law 
of the competent mining authorities. 
The plan-approval decision deter-
mines which waste packages with 
which characteristics and which 
content may be emplaced. 
All works, like the drivage of 
drifts and rooms, the sinking of 
boreholes, the emplacement of 
wastes, the stowing of drifts and 
the construction of closing-off 
structures, are carried out accord-
ing to operational plannings (gener-
al plan of operation), which are to 
be determined beforehand and to be 
individually authorized by the 
mining authorities, which may be 
announced to the inspectors of the 
surveillance organizations before 
starting the works. 
The drivage of a repository mine in 
relation to structure and outline of 
the salt dome is always accompanied 
by geotechnical investigations 
temporally immediately running 
ahead. To a limited extent, this is 
also valid for the emplacement 
rooms, i. e. for the drivage of 
emplacement drifts, rooms and other 
subsurface openings including bore-
hole sinking. Form and shape of the 
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drifts, rooms and boreholes are not 
known exactly before drivage or 
sinking. They are then surveyed by 
the mine survey department and 
entered in plannings, the so-called 
mine map, and certified. The changes 
in the mine caused by the emplace-
ment of the waste packages, the 
placing of stowage material and the 
construction of closing··off struc-
tures are also entered iu the mine 
map and certified by the mine survey 
department as soon as these works 
are carried out. With that a rele-
vant, certified mine map (sketch 
plan according to art. GJ Mining 
Law) is always availabe which can be 
used by the inspectors of the sur-
veillance organizations for the 
purpose of verification and re-
examination. 
A verification and re-examination of 
the mine could then be carried out 
with the help of periodical insp~c­
tions of the accessible parts of the 
mine by inspectors of the surveil-
lance organizations, in the course 
of which the correspondence of the 
actual physical structure \vi th the 
one according to the relevant mine 
map is checked. 
This measure could possibly be 
supported b~ processes using techni-
cal equipment which have primarily 
been developed for geological inves-
tigations, like, for example, bore-
hole radar or drift radar. Hereby 
openings including emplaced contain-
ers etc. can be determined as irreg-
ularities in the salt dome. It must 
be checked to what extent a repre-
sentation of the current mine map 
can be gained with such methods. 
5.2 Emplacement by retreating 
The establishment of emplacement 
fields and the emplacement of repos-
itory waste packages is started in 
parts of the mine bei11g farthest 
away from the shaft. Filled emplace-
ment areas including access drifts 
are stowed with salt sinter and 
separated from the operational part 
of the mine. The emplacement is 
carried out by retreating, i. e. to 
the shafts. Retreating will probably 
be carried out regularly to the 
shaft in the northeastern and south-
western part of the elder rock salt, 
in order to gain a loading of the 
shafts which is symmetric to a large 
extent. Emplacement by retreating 
means that there is no access to 
abandoned districts and that the 
mine gets smaller in the course of 
time. Possibilities to control this: 
design information re-examination. 
5.3 Investigation/return air 
horizon 
Approx. 30 m dbove the emplacement 
horizon there is the exploration 
level which is to be used as return 
air horizon. Like the emplacement 
area, this area must also be includ-
ed in the measures for the verifica-
tion and re-examination of the mine. 
Relevant mine maps have been drawn 
up for this area too. The return air 
horizon is also operated by retreat-
ing and abandoned. 
5.4 Time of shaft sinking 
Because of the water.bearing and the 
low stability ·of the cap rock the 
shaft s~nking takes several years. A 
quick and secret sinking must be 
excluded. Possibilities to control 
this: above-ground superv1s1on of 
the ground, seismic methods. 
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6. Mixed emplacement 
Wastes from reprocessing, spent fuel 
elements to be disposed of directly, 
and other radioactive wastes are to 
be emplaced in the repository, i. e. 
a mixed emplacement of material 
which must be supervised and of 
material which needs not be super-
vised occurs. Material which must be 
supervised as well as material which 
needs not be supervised is disposed 
of in separate emplacement fields. 
The type of waste package and the 
emplacement technique used allow a 
clear statement whether the material 
must be supervised or uol. 
Transport containers for spent fuels 
are disposed of with their content. 
Single shielding containers for the 
internal transport of the wastes 
from the reloading cell to the 
emplacement field (borehole) are 
transported back when they are 
empty. Whether they are empty, can 
be controlled by opening them or by 
weighing. 
Tllanks are given tu Nr. Clir. 
Briickner, Kerntorsclwnqszen trum 
Karlsrul1e GmbH, Karlsrulw, ani to 
Nr. I/. -J. Engelmann, Deu tsclie Ge-
sellscilatt Zllm Bau zmd Betrieb von 
Endlagern flir Abfallstoffe mbH, 
Peine, tor valuable advice. 
USE OF PROCESS MONITORING FOR VERIFYING FACILITY DESIGN 
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Abstract 
During the decade of the 1990s, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency faces the challenge of implementing 
safeguards in large, new reprocessing facilities. The Agency 
will be involved in the design, construction, checkout, and 
initial operation of these new facilities to ensure effective 
safeguards are implemented. One aspect of the Agency 
involvement is in the area of design verification. The U.S. 
Support Program has initiated a task to develop methods for 
applying process data collection and validation during the 
cold commissioning phase of plant construction. This paper 
summarizes the results of this task. 
1. Introduction 
Design information verification is a required element 
for international safeguards as practiced under INFCIRC-
153/1/ for signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
/2/. Paragraph 43 specifies the design information to be 
made available. 
Proposed procedures for design verification of large 
reprocessing plants are reviewed in Refs. 3 and 4 and 
include: 
1. examination and checks required for installed 
safeguards-relevant components [dissolver(s), 
feed clarification devices, plutonium evaporator]; 
2. identification and checks of input accountancy, 
plutonium product, and all other tanks in the plu-
tonium process line, including input and output 
piping connections and "all other details"; 
3. identify recalibration procedures; 
4. follow up and check the procedures and results of 
calibration and homogenization/sampling of the 
input and output tanks and all tanks where pluto-
nium is to be measured; 
5. follow up and check the procedures and results for 
testing and calibrating the measurement instru-
ments, the transfer systems (including dilution and 
"dead volumes" involved), and the auxiliary ser-
vices provided for every tank; 
6. follow up and check the homogenization and 
sampling procedures and the calibration of meas-
uring and monitoring instruments foreseen for 
each key measurement point (KMP); 
7. follow up and check the homogenization and 
sample transfer equipment and analytical proce-
dures for the laboratories; 
8. verify the calibration of nondestructive assay 
instruments to Agency standards; and 
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9. verify the proper location, installation, and cali-
bration of surveillance equipment and systems, 
and check the false-alarm rate. 
Also, the inspector should experimentally test and vali-
date process models used to assess the quantity of nuclear 
material present in process equipment at predetermined 
process conditions. 
Although this represents only a partial list of suggested 
inspector verification activities, it is apparent that design 
verification is a formidable task and could require a team of 
knowledgeable engineers to do the job effectively and effi-
ciently. 
Most reprocessing plants in operation or under con-
struction will have some form of process monitoring to aid 
the operator in reading and assessing process status for 
safety and process control purposes. We propose that some 
aspects of the process monitoring system can be used for 
facility design verification to reduce the inspector resources 
required to meet the design verification objectives and, as 
such, to reduce the impact of the verifications on the opera-
tor's work load. 
2. Cold Commissioning Activities 
The full construction project typically lasts more than 
10 years, from design to hot operation. Agency interest 
related to design verification is concentrated in the final 
phases of the project. As the construction of the facility is 
complete, the operator enters the acceptance testing phase, 
where system operability is demonstrated by the constructor 
and the operator assumes responsibility. This starts the cold 
commissioning phase. 
Cold commissioning requires 2-3 years and typically 
consists of four phases: (1) system acceptance, (2) water 
runs, (3) acid runs, and (4) cold uranium runs. The Agency 
has a role throughout this period to develop a confidence 
in the operator's ability to supply reliable and accurate 
information. 
During the system acceptance phase, Agency-supplied 
instruments and computers are installed and checked. The 
Agency also h\).s an interest in acceptance testing of operator 
systems related to safeguards measurements. During the 
water runs, the operator usually performs volume calibra-
tions of interest to the Agency. During the acid runs, there is 
an opportunity to verify plant design information supplied to 
the Agency. Sample system checkout usually occurs during 
this time. The uranium runs allow evaluation of measure-
ment systems, procedures, and inventory estimates during 
cold commissioning. The Agency should have a role 
throughout all of these activities. Process monitoring allows 
for the unattended collection of information to support 
Agency evaluation. 
J. Process Monitoring and the 
Process Control System 
Process control in modern plants involves interface of 
computers to instruments and control equipment while an 
operator sits at a console in a control room environment. 
Hardware and software consolidate information on the con-
trol room console to allow the operator to monitor perform-
ance and effect control over processes and equipment. To 
varying degrees, the computer systems contains logic struc-
tures to automatically control and adjust process parameters. 
Modern process control systems are really process control 
and information systems, often involving hierarchies of 
computers that consolidate information from plant processes 
with other information such as analytical results, and pass 
this information to plant support organizations and manage-
ment. 
Process monitoring is a term normally associated with 
operation and control of plant operations and the use of these 
modern information systems. Process monitoring has also 
evolved a definition associated with safeguards. In the safe-
guards context, process monitoring is "the use of a broad 
range of process data and analysis tools to make timely and 
sensitive judgements on the location and movement of 
nuclear materials," and as a corollary, "to make timely and 
sensitive judgements on the status and performance of meas-
urement systems used for nuclear material accountancy" /5/. 
There is need to draw a distinction between process 
monitoring in the process control sense and in the safeguards 
application. In process control, the operator monitors con-
ditions and makes adjustments such that the control of plant 
processes is implied. The operator has free access to infor-
mation and returns control signals based on his analysis or 
some level of automated response. In safeguards process 
monitoring, a prescribed subset of process information is 
automatically transferred on a routine basis, likely to a safe-
guards data collection and analysis computer system /6-9/. 
This is a one-way transmittal of information with no free 
access to process information. It is a limited set of informa-
tion, negotiated and agreed to, to provide the required mini-
mum safeguards information. This structure presents sev-
eral advantages to both parties: 
error-free data collection and recording; 
less intrusion time on the operator; 
less time consuming; 
limited topics agreed to by the Agency and opera-
tor; and 
a reduction in the Agency and operator work load. 
To develop the safeguards applications, there is a need 
to understand the architecture and operation of the distributed 
control system. Safeguards applications should make use of 
process control measurements and minimize the need for 
special, dedicated measurement systems. Safeguards 
process monitoring can be developed to be transparent to 
operations and make use of the information available within 
the operators' process control system. 
Process monitoring should be viewed as an advanced 
technique to collect and validate safeguards information in 
support of conventional accounting and NRTA; however, it 
is not proposed as an advanced safeguards technique. 
3.1 Distributed Control Systems. 
The distributed control system comprises a number of 
process control modules (PCMs) that interface directly to the 
plant instrumentation and controls. The PCMs are usually 
linked to a communications module (CCM) that coordinates 
the flow of information from the PCMs to other modules. A 
central host computer is used for program development and 
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for downloading operating software to other components 
including PCMs. 
Modern nuclear facilities take the distributed control 
system used for process control and integrate it into the plant 
information system. A number of computer systems, for 
example, dedicated to destructive and nondestructive assay, 
are interfaced to a central laboratory system that maintains all 
analytical information and results. This, in turn, is inter-
faced to the process control system. 
Safeguards becomes another node on the information 
system. 
3.2 Agency Computer System. 
An agency-owned computer (or operator-supplied 
computer for Agency use) can be interfaced to the host. 
High level communications packages are available to make 
the interface between Agency and host computers a rather 
simple task. Typical system software permits establishing 
the link as a "slave", allowing only structured communica-
tions. In this application, the Agency passes the message to 
the host to return a pre-defined minimum data set. The 
software package within the host puts the request on the data 
highway. The PCMs return the current information which is 
arranged by the host in the structured message for passing 
back to the Agency computer. The Agency computer 
receives and archives the "snapshot" of plant information. 
The operator has control of the communication package 
at the host end of the safeguards link. The list of data and 
frequency of acquisition is negotiated. This arrangement 
does not allow the Agency to access additional infonnation 
or in any way influence process control. 
The Agency is responsible for the data reduction and 
analysis software in the Agency computer system. Any 
Agency-owned measurement equipment should also be inter-
faced to this machine. It is important for the Agency to 
maintain contact with the operator through the design and 
construction of the facility to ensure compatibility of systems 
in the final installation. 
3.3 Process Description 
The process considered for this study is based on 
equipment and instrumentation designed, installed, and 
tested at Oak Ridge in the Integrated Engineering Test (lET) 
facility /5/ and at the Barnwell facility /10/. The input 
accountancy tank and associated equipment including the 
process monitoring capability are shown in Fig. 1. The 
accountancy tank is fed from the dissolvcr surge tank. Typi-
cal process monitoring instrumentation is discussed in 
Section 7 of this paper. 
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Fig. 1. Accountancy/feed adjust system. 
4. Data Authentication 
Agency use of process monitoring information requires 
some means of authenticating the data because process moni-
toring relies on use of information obtained from the opera-
tor's systems. Authentication has been defined in one IAEA 
paper /11/ as "the technique used to assure that valid results 
have been obtained for safeguards purposes using operator-
provided equipment." Process monitoring, and potential 
applications of NRTA, involve the use of data supplied to 
the agency through the operator's computerized process 
control system. However, scenarios develop that involve 
falsification of data, either through data tampering, instru-
ment tampering, or materials tampering. 
Concerns on data authentication, when considering 
safeguards applications for process monitoring and the use 
of data from the operator's process control system, include 
authentication and maintaining continuity of knowledge on: 
pneumatic instrument lines; 
instruments (calibration settings); 
instrument (electrical) lines to computer interface; 
computer software; 
computer to computer communications; and 
off-site transmission of information. 
Process monitoring provides the continuity of knowl-
edge which has application for authentication of other meas-
urements. At several locations in a reprocessing plant, 
increases or decreases in tank volumes can be related to a 
particular flow measurement or other flow indicator. Unde-
clared additions or falsification of data within a continuous 
recording system will be reflected in discrete changes with-
out corresponding indicators. 
The cold commissioning phase of plant operation is the 
time for the Agency to establish authentication mechanisms. 
During the early stages of this phase, the Agency will deliver 
computer equipment and other measurement systems for 
installation and interface to the operator's control and infor-
mation system. 
Part of the normal installation process is to develop an 
acceptance test procedure that tests and documents perform-
ance of the final system to prescribed standards. During the 
testing, each piece of information delivered through the 
software is checked to the actual instrument output, whether 
read from the operator console or directly from the instru-
ment. These tests form the basis for routine checks during 
later operations that can be random in a typical inspection 
mode. 
During the later phases of the cold commissioning, 
specific tests conducted in conjunction with the operator's 
facility acceptance tests establish many of the other compara-
tive techniques that provide authentication. 
In summary, plant process information is, to an extent, 
"self authenticating." In a complex chemical operation like a 
reprocessing plant, the processes are interactive and virtually 
all measurements are related to some other activity indicated 
by measurements. These comparisons form the basis for 
authentication to allow use of process information without 
the burden of many of the computer security techniques and 
concerns applied to other computer information systems. 
Checkout and demonstration of these techniques is an impor-
tant part of the cold commissioning activities. 
5. Diversion Scenarios 
Scenarios for diverting plutonium from the process 
area that are of concern during design verification include the 
following /12/: 
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1. transferral of undeclared dissolved fuel solution to 
the process area bypassi'ng the input accountancy 
tank and removal from the process area; 
2. removal of plutonium nitrate from the input ac-
countancy tank or from other points in the process 
area; 
3. removal of concentrated plutonium nitrate solution 
from the product accountancy tank; 
4. transferral of undeclared dissolved fuel solution to 
the process area, bypassing the input accountancy 
tank, and transferral to the nitrate storage area, 
bypassing the output accountancy tank; 
5. transferral of plutonium nitrate solution from the 
process area to the nitrate storage area, bypassing 
the product accountancy tank; and 
6. removal of liquid waste containing plutonium. 
Scenarios 1, 4, 5, and 6 require bypass of one or more 
key measurement points (KMPs) (the waste accountancy 
tank is considered a KMP). Scenarios 2 and 3 require 
undeclared pipes from the process area or making use of 
abnormal routings (e.g., sampling lines). 
Therefore, design verification activities should address 
bypass of KMPs, detection of undeclared pipework, and use 
of abnormal routings. 
6. Description of Inspection Activities 
Inspection activities during cold commissioning should 
address design verification and recognize the need to collect 
information to support safeguards needs during hot opera-
tion of the facility. 
Specific Agency activities using process monitoring 
proposed for the period of cold commissioning address the 
following: 
1. transfer routes, 
2. in-process inventory, 
3. in-process hold up, 
4. volume calibration and recalibration, and 
5 . mixing and sampler tests. 
A minimum data set negotiated for automatic transfer to 
an Agency computer system includes level, density, temper-
ature, and flow measurements as well as status indicators on 
pump, steam jet, and air lift actuators. Part of the design 
verification activities during cold commissioning is verifica-
tion and validation of measurements and information pro-
vided in this minimum data set. 
The use of process data for Agency safeguards is 
always a sensitive issue. From the operator's perspective, 
process activities can have a broad and complex effect on 
measurement system performance. The operator recognizes 
the opportunity to misinterpret process information and 
offers that intrusiveness is an issue in providing such infor-
mation to the Agency. It is extremely important to establish 
procedures for analysis of process information and imple-
ment these in software within the Agency System. Cold 
commissioning offers the opportunity to implement and 
demonstrate these procedures outside of concerns during 
processing of plutonium during routine plant operations. 
6.1 Transfer Routes. 
Bypass of key measurement points is a concern 
expressed in several of the diversion scenarios presented in 
Section 5. Processing equipment and transfer routes are 
identified in design information typically requested and pro-
vided to the Agency. Process monitoring information 
transmitted to the Agency computer system can be used to 
identify transfer routes for verification of design information 
and to maintain continuity of knowledge over those routings 
which were subject to physical design information verifica-
tion (DIY). Data analysis routines developed and imple-
mented during cold commissioning can be the basis for a 
program to analyze a similar set of information provided 
during routine operation for continued assurances against 
activities that bypass accountancy measurement points. 
Tank transfer devices are typically sized during design 
to accomplish a full tank transfer over a period of 15-30 
minutes. Process monitoring information transmitted to an 
Agency computer system at frequencies on the order of 5 
minutes provide a continuity of information and several 
points during a transfer for analysis. 
6.2 In-Process Inventory 
In-process inventory resides in tanks, contactors, con-
centrators, and associated piping. For NRT A applications 
during plant operation, it will be necessary for the inspector 
to measure (or estimate) this inventory. During cold com-
missioning activities, it may be possible to use process 
monitoring to verify transfer of nuclear material between 
adjacent tanks as described in Section 6.1 and to use the 
information to validate techniques to provide information for 
NRTA. A number of techniques have been proposed for 
estimation of hold up in contactors. Past efforts in applica-
tion of NRTA for international safeguards have been pri-
marily on a plant that uses a batch evaporator for plutonium 
product concentration. Inventories are typically timed to 
concentrator dumps. Modern plants will have continuous 
concentrators and activities during cold commissioning will 
have to address estimator methods for these concentrators. 
6.3 In-Process Holdup. 
In-process holdup is the material that remains in 
process vessels, pipework, and equipment after the process 
material and stored materials have been removed. During the 
cold commissioning of the facility, the quantity of material 
retained can be estimated using by-difference principles once 
the proper transfer of material through the facility has been 
verified. Material measured in one vessel should equal that 
determined in the next vessel if no material is held up. Dif-
ferences between the two assay results can then be attributed 
to material retained in that phase of the process in order to 
complete the mass flow balance. Upon the completion of the 
commissioning activities, a model can be developed using 
this information to identify and aid estimations of material 
that would be retained during normal processing operation. 
6.4 Tank Volume Calibration. 
Tank calibration is a significant part of the cold com-
missioning activities because the operator needs volume 
measurements for operational control as well as to satisfy 
safeguards requirements. 
Inspector resources are not adequate to witness cali-
bration activities for every vessel important to safeguards, 
which includes all tanks and equipment measured for inven-
tory. However, the operator must go through the procedure 
for each tank and must record the information and develop 
the relationships for each tank as a calibration package. As a 
minimum, the calibration relationships must be available to 
the Agency, together with the calibration package that 
includes the basic information for review. 
618 
6.5 Solution Mixing in Tanks 
Adequate mixing of solutions in accountancy tanks is 
necessary to assure that homogeneous solutions are available 
in the tanks for sampling to assure that the quantity of mate-
rial contained in the tanks is accounted for. Adequate mixing 
also is important to facility operations to ensure process 
control information is representative and the homogeneous 
solutions are presented to process systems. During cold 
commissioning, the facility operator will conduct a series of 
tests of mixing equipment and will establish mixing proce-
dures for equipment. The Agency is concerned to verify 
mixing tests to establish optimum mixing procedures to 
assure proper accountancy measurements for key measure-
ment points. In addition there is an interest in mixing 
requirements for most process equipment in support of 
inventory measurements for conventional accounting and 
NRTA. 
It can be expected that the operator will provide the 
results of mixing tests to the Agency for tanks that are 
important for safeguards applications. The actual testing will 
be carried out over a period of time during cold commission-
ing. The Agency likely cannot devote inspector resources to 
validate all of the tests, but can use process monitoring to 
validate the test information provided by the operator. 
6.6 Sampler Tests. 
The operator is interested in establishing the minimum 
recirculation time/volume through the sampler feed line to 
ensure that the sample is representative of the solution in the 
tank, and to ensure that the sampling method does not induce 
any bias in the sample. 
A test that is effective is derived from the mixing test. 
Assuming a homogeneous solution in the tank or process 
line (after the mixing test), the operator backflushes the 
sampler system with a solution of significantly different 
density. The operator then initiates recirculation and pulls a 
seque!lce o~ samples. The samples are analyzed for density 
(de~slty bem.g used for the reasons given in Section 6.5) 
until sequential samples agree within the accuracy of the 
method. As a "rule of thumb", the total volume of the 
sampler feed line should be replaced at least five times. 
As with the mixing tests, the Agency can validate the 
information on the tests provided by the operator by compar-
ison to process monitoring infom1ation. The Agency again 
reduces inspector resource requirements to validate the tests 
by using the comparisons to information automatically 
recorded by the process monitoring system. 
7. Minimum Data Set 
International safeguards applied to the large scale 
reprocessing plants of the future place new demands on 
information transfer and management. For large scale repro-
cessing plants, conventional material balance accounting will 
likely be supplemented by some fom1 of NRT A. 
Activities during cold commissioning should be 
directed at validation of measurement systems associated 
with safeguards applications, including verification that 
design information is complete and accurate. Process moni-
toring is offered as a technique to accomplish this validation. 
Process monitoring information includes the same set of 
information required for the conventional accounting, 
NRTA, and RBI applications, but records that data set at 
frequencies that provide a continuity of information for 
assessment of measurements. 
The Input Accounrancy Tank is one of the most impor-
tant key measurement points associated with conventional 
accounting. Verification of measurements at this point is a 
focus of Agency inspection activities. Tanks adjacent to the 
accountancy tank are major surge locations and are important 
to inventories in conventional accounting and to in-process 
inventories under NRTA. Process monitoring applications 
proposed during cold commissioning are described in Sec-
tion 6. These provide validation of the measurement sys-
tems to support conventional accounting and NRTA and are 
directed at design verification in response to diversion sce-
narios associated with by-pass of the accountancy measure-
ment point. 
Table I lists the measurements available within the 
process control system that are of potential interest to safe-
guards. The table shows the minimum data set needed to 
meet the requirements of process monitoring during cold 
commissioning, and relates that set to the measurements 
needed to support conventional accounting and NRT A. The 
measurements needed during cold commissioning include 
those necessary for all the activities identified in Section 6. 
fABLE I. Process Control Measurements of Interest to Safeguards 
Surge Tank 
Level 
Density 
Tempernture 
Sparge 
11 (to ace) 
11 (10 recycle) 
Accountancy 
Level 
Density 
Temperature 
Conductivaty 
Sparge 
11 (to adjust) 
11 (10 accum) 
Sampling indicator 
Feed Adjust 
Level 
Density 
Temperature 
Conductivity 
Sparge 
Acid add Uldlcator 
11 (to feed) 
11 (to accum) 
Sarnphng indicator 
Accumulator 
Level 
Density 
Tempernture 
Sparge 
11 (to adjust) 
Sampling indicator 
Feed 
Level 
Density 
Tempernture 
Conductivity 
Sparge 
Tl (to sol. ext.) 
11 (to adjust) 
Sampling mdicator 
X = needed;-= useful 
COnvenuonal Accounung NRTA 
Cold Conunissiorung 1/0 1/0 
Process Momtonng Accounung Inventory Accounung Inventorv 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
For both conventional accounting and NRTA, each 
accountancy tank batch must be measured for input/output 
accounting. The chart indicates that status indicators are 
"useful", but not necessary for accountancy measurements 
since part of an effective measurement procedure is to verify 
that solutions are not moving into or out of a tank during 
measurement. These measurements must be transmitted and 
recorded for each accountancy batch, which is typically once 
per day in a large scale facility. 
Inventory requirements for both conventional account-
ing and NRTA add the necessity of volume measurements 
for the additional tanks in the feed preparation area of the 
plant. The table shows that measurements for the surge tank 
are necessary for conventional accounting but not NRTA. 
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This is because the annual shutdown inventory generally 
tries to close the balance to the pool storage area, including 
the dissolver/head end area. There is a necessity to ensure 
that the head end area has been flushed prior to inventory. 
In NRT A, the balance is closed from input to output 
accountancy tanks and the surge tank is not in the area. 
The in-process inventories to support NRTA will likely 
occur on intervals of a month or less. As indicated in the 
table, essentially the same information required for conven-
tional accounting inventories is required for these NRTA 
inventories. Thus, the same basic data set required for con-
ventional accounting is required on frequencies of a month 
or less to support NRTA. 
The data sets for conventional and in-process inven-
tories show transfer indicators and conductivity measure-
ments as "useful". Conductivity is the direct measurement 
of the electrical conductivity of the process solution and an 
indirect measure of acid concentration. In concert with the 
density measurement, this offers the operator a process con-
trol estimate of heavy metal concentration. In the safeguards 
applications, these measurements can help validate sample 
information. For the cold commissioning process monitor-
ing applications, during the uranium run phase, the density-
conductivity relationships are accurate measures of heavy 
metal and acid concentrations that are useful in the transfer 
tests and validation exercises discussed in Section 6. 
The transfer indicators are indicated as necessary for 
process monitoring applications and useful for inventory 
measurements. In all cases, the transfer indicators only 
provide backup of indications of transfers. As shown in the 
data evaluations presented as part of the discussion in Sec-
tion 6, these indicators also require some interpretation and 
are useful based on the interval between data set transmis-
sions. Even in the process monitoring applications during 
cold commissioning, these indicators add additional credibil-
ity to the decisions based on the volume changes alone. 
There has been some work /13/ on evaluation of a data set 
similar to that which would be recorded for the feed prepara-
tion area, without the transfer indicators. This work 
attempted to evaluate transfer routes without any design 
information. Presumably, the Agency will start from the 
position of having design information and its verification as 
a rule base for evaluation of transfers based on declared 
routes. The transfer indicators are also not absolutely neces-
sary for process monitoring. 
The discussion in this section presents an assessment 
of the minimum data set required for process monitoring 
applications applied to the feed preparation area during cold 
commissioning. The data set is essentially the same as that 
required for conventional accounting and NRTA with the 
differences in the frequencies that the data set must be 
transmitted. The data is required frequently, on intervals of 
5-15 minutes, for process monitoring. The data collection 
activities during cold commissioning can help establish the 
link to be used during routine plant operation. 
8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Process monitoring is a term that describes the use of 
information collected from the operator's process control 
system for safeguards purposes. It should be viewed as an 
advanced technique to collect and validate safeguards infor-
mation in support of conventional accounting and NRTA; 
however, process monitoring is not proposed as an 
advanced safeguards technique. 
Process monitoring has been defined as the broad use 
of process data to provide a continuity of information on the 
location and movement of nuclear materials and a continuity 
of information on the performance of safeguards-related 
measurement systems. Process monitoring implies a routine 
and automated collection of a specified data set from the 
control system and transmittal to a safeguards computer 
system for storage and evaluation. Process monitoring has a 
number of applications during the cold commissioning phase 
of reprocessing plant operation that can substantially reduce 
the Agency inspector resources that must be devoted to 
design verification. It provides the inspectorate with the 
continuity of knowledge of design information during plant 
operation and reduces efforts to validate measurement sys-
tems to meet the international safeguards requirements dur-
ing hot plant operation. 
Process monitoring can be used to collect and evaluate 
data on tank transfers that can verify the design information 
provided to the Agency. This is an important step to ensure 
that all equipment typically containing significant quantities 
of plutonium are considered in the design of conventional 
accounting and NRT A. Procedures that consider all equip-
ment must be established to record inventory information for 
both safeguards activities. In addition, there is a need to 
identify all routine transfer routes for nuclear materials to 
ensure that accountancy points are not by-passed, that mate-
rial has not been measured more than once, or that borrow-
ing of material during inventories would be detected. 
Additionally, there are a number of activities during 
cold commissioning that are directed at setup and testing of 
measurement systems that will be used by safeguards during 
hot plant operation. These include vessel volume calibration 
activities and tests to qualify mixing and sampling systems. 
These tests and procedures are typically scheduled through-
out the cold commissioning operations. Direct validation by 
the Agency requires considerable inspector resources. Pro-
cess monitoring offers the opportunity to automatically 
collect information to validate these test results without direct 
inspector involvement, thus saving Agency and operator 
resources, and avoiding data transcription errors. 
Many of the process monitoring tests and activities 
were developed and tested to a limited degree during activ-
ities at the Barn well Nuclear Fuel Plant /10/ and more 
recently in tests at the Integrated Equipment Test facility at 
Oak Ridge Nauonal Laboratory n ,8/. Initial results were 
favorable. However, additional testing and development 
involving Agency personnel is desirable to prepare specific 
methods to be transported to future plants. 
Since the Barnwell and Oak Ridge activities, there have 
been advances in application of intelligent software systems 
to the data analysis portion of the evaluations. Preliminary 
work/14/was done in this area by Los Alamos National 
Laboratory using historical data sets from one of the United 
States Department of Energy reprocessing facilities. Addi-
tional testing and development of this concept should be 
undertaken in conjunction with Agency personnel, poten-
tially at the Oak Ridge facility during upcoming test runs, or 
at a suitable Agency test facility. 
As the Agency progresses towards application of inter-
national safeguards in modern large scale reprocessing 
facilities, there should be consideration given to methods of 
automated data collection and handling to support safe-
guards. This may or may not include process monitoring 
during cold commissioning. However, the Agency will 
have to consider incorporating their need for data processing 
and computers in the facility design. The Agency will have 
to provide specifications for hardware and software to be 
incorporated in the facility. Recognizing the similari~y of the 
basic data sets required by conventional accounting, NRTA 
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and process monitoring applications for cold commission-
ing! th~re shou~d be an effort I? refine this set as facility 
design mformauon becomes available and pursue definition 
of appropriate specifications for the facilities involved. 
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EVALUATION OF INPUT ACCOUNTANCY TANK CALIBRATIONS 
AT WAK SINCE 1982 
J. Lausch, D. Schmidt 
Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage Karlsruhe, Germany 
Abstract 
For reverification purposes the input accountancy 
tank at WAK has to be recalibrated every second year. 
Since 1982 a very precise electromanometer is used in 
addition to a conventional analog manometer. Six 
recalibration runs have been evaluated - differences 
between runs are analyzed and the uncertainty of sub-
sequent volume determinations is calculated. 
1 Introduction 
At any nuclear power plant the contents of Plutonium 
in spent fuel elements can only be calculated. For the 
first time in the fuel cycle this contents will be measu-
red after dissolution in a reprocessing plant. Therefore 
this input measurement is of great relevance to safe-
guards. Input measurement at WAK pilot reproces-
sing plant is done by volume and concentration mea-
surement. The concentrations of U and Pu as well as 
their isotopes are verified to 100% by taking samples 
of each input batch and independant determination by 
EURATOM and IAEA. In contrast to this situation a 
verification of volume measurements is only possible 
by observing calibrations and input volume readings. 
For verification purposes every second year a recali-
bration of the Input Accountancy Tank is performed. 
Since 1982 WAK has installed an identical set of preci-
sion manometers for level and density measurements. 
This paper will describe a statistical evaluation of all 
recalibrations between 1982 and 1990. 
2 Input Accountancy Tank at WAK 
and its environment 
The accountancy tank of WAK is a 800l annular ves-
sel with cooling shell. Fig. 1 shows a schematic dra-
wing. The tank is equipped with pneumercators for 
level and density measurements, a thermocouple for 
temperature measurements, and a sampling line. The 
differential pressures in the pneumercators are mea-
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Figure 1: WAK Input Accountancy Tank 
sured by a Wallace fJ Tiernan analog pressure gauge 
and - in parallel - a Ruska RT6000 electromano-
meter. 
The chemical headend area (from the dissolver to 
the feed tank) is shown in fig. 2. Here the environment 
of the input accountancy tank can be seen. 
For calibrations the input tank is rinsed with wa-
ter and emptied. Then fully deionized water of about 
room temperature is weighed and poured directly into 
the tank using increments of approximatly 8 kg, the-
refore a regression function is derived from more than 
100 measuring points. All calibration runs are nor-
malized to 20 degrees (Celsius). 
During hot operation pieces of the fuel rods are dis-
Oissolver Filter 
37.06 
Catch 
Tank 
Input 
Tank 
37.09 
Feed Tank 
to 
Extraction 
Figure 2: simplified schematics of WAK headend 
solved in the dissolver (37.01), transferred by steam 
jet to a catch tank (37.08), and transferred by steam 
jet over the filter (37.06) to the input accountancy 
tank (37.09). Here the volume is determined and sam-
ples are taken. Then the feed solution is adjusted 
to extraction conditions and transferred subsequently 
by airlift to the feed tank (37.10), so that this vessel 
- in normal operation - will never become empty. 
Rework solutions enter the first extraction cycle on 
the same way. Therefore it is necessary to empty the 
input accountancy tank completely. This means that 
the incremental calibration with water must be repre-
sentative for the feed volume transferred to extraction. 
Not only the slope but also the intercept of the cali-
bration curve must be constant during a recalibration 
interval. 
3 Observations during calibrations 
Graphical data analysis shows that even very smooth 
calibration curves differ in intercept and slightly in 
slope. To point out this situation we plot the residu-
als of these curves in relation to a common regression 
line. In fig. 3 three subsequent calibrations, monito-
red with the Ruska manometer, can be seen. Two of 
them are performed within one week, the third one 
approximately two years later. We assumed that the 
major effect should be a difference in the heel volume. 
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Figure 3: Residuals for a common linear regression 
function of Ruska-readings from last three calibration 
runs 
Because it was impossible to confirm this suspicion at 
our hot input tank, we built a mock-up. These ex-
periments showed [1], that the remaining heel in the 
transfer line from 37.09 to 37.10 is nearly constant 
(±2.5%) and influences the intercept variations only 
by ±0.12£. This value is small compared to the varia-
tions observed between different calibration runs. 
Furthermore the different intercept variations bet-
ween the two manometers at two calibrations gives 
indication for an instrumental reason. Up to now we 
also could not identify reasons for variation of slope, 
but - as the slopes differ systematically between the 
manometers at each calibration -they should be cau-
sed by the instruments and/ or their specific installa-
tion. 
All these effects are quite small ( < 1%) and their 
reasons might be never detected. Therefore we deci-
ded to treat all calibration data of each manometer as 
one unit and to evaluate them statistically. 
4 The data evaluation procedure 
The experiments with the mock-up of the input ac-
countancy tank described above give a strong indica-
tion that starting conditions are identical for all ca-
libration runs. Therefore no alignment of calibration 
data can be performed, the whole run-to-run diffe-
rences must be treated statistically. 
It can obviously be seen (cf. fig. 3) that the run-
to-run differences are significant. Standard statisti-
cal procedures usually ignore these differences and 
would lead to a serious underestimation of measure-
ment variability. Liebetrau et al. (2] worked out a pro-
cedure that takes run-to-run differences into account 
for variance estimates of the calibration function. To-
gether with tolerance intervals for liquid height mea-
surements uncertainty intervals can be given for vo-
lume determination during input accounting. This 
evaluation procedure has been applied to the calibra-
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tion runs of WAK input accountancy tank. Figure 5: profile plots WBT 
Selection of a calibration function We as-
sume - as is done mostly for calibration exerc1ses 
of this kind - that the error of volume determina-
tion is small compared with the error of liquid height 
measurement. Therefore we use the volume as the in-
dependent and the liquid height determination as the 
dependent variable for calculating the calibration fun-
ctions. These calibration functions must be inverted 
for volume determination from observed liquid height 
measurements. 
For calibration purposes the tank has been divi-
ded into five regions and linear regression functions 
have been applied to each region. The region bound-
aries have been selected from calibration profile plots, 
which show the residuals against a linear regression 
over the whole tank. The calibration profiles indicate 
a deformation of the cylindrical tank walls, but this 
deformation seems to be stable since the first calibra-
tion runs in the early 1970's. 
623 
Unfortunately some calibration measurements eva-
luated here show disturbances (see fig. 4, 5). Some 
disturbances are common to both manometers ( cali-
bration D), others are specific to one instrument or 
show a different pattern of disturbances. Former ca-
librations (before 1982) have been performed with a 
less precise manometer. Comparing the residuals sum 
of squares with previous calibrations therefore gave no 
indication for distorted measurements. As will be seen 
later in this paper the effect on the overall uncertainty 
of volume determination is only a minor one. 
We have tested, if a group of linear functions with 
constant slope for all calibration runs but different 
intercepts is an adequate calibration function. A lack-
of-fit test against individual linear functions showed 
that the slope differences between calibration runs are 
significant. The different slopes are significant for all 
five regions. 
Variance estimates An estimate of liquid height 
measurements includes two components: variance uu 
due to the functional form of the calibration function 
and variance u ll due to measurement differences bet-
ween calibration runs. The total variance for linear 
regression functions is 
u 2 (YIXu) = u~ _!_ + 0 - _ 2 [ (X .X)1 l nr L:i,j (Xij -X) + u"h (1) 
Here u 2 (Y JX0 ) denotes the variance of the level mea-
surement Y taken at volume Xo, nr is the total num-
ber of measurement points of all runs and Xij is the 
volume filled in at the ith measurement point of the 
/h calibration run. 
The variance estimators depend on the regression 
model which is adequate to the calibration data - a 
single function, parallel functions or individual func-
tions for all calibration runs. A detailed description of 
the component variances for the three possible regres-
sion models is given in Liebetrau et al. (2]. Because a 
lack of parallelism contributes significantly to the run-
to-run differences, individual regression functions and 
their appropriate variance estimators have been used. 
From the variance estimates confidence intervals 
can be derived to show where the true curve may lie 
relative to the fitted curve within a specified confi-
dence ( 1 - o). For this purpose Scheffe-type confi-
dence intervals are used.[3] 
W(X)scheffe = ±)2F~~1u (YJX) (2) 
The parameters of the F-distribution are the number 
of parameters of the regression function - 2 for linear 
functions - and the degrees of freedom of the overall 
variance of liquid height measurement. 
Uncertainty intervals for volume determina-
tion Prediction intervals that hold simultaneously 
with specified propability for an indeterminate num-
ber of volume determinations can be calculated by 
combining the confidence intervals for the calibration 
functions with the tolerance interval for liquid level 
measurements (see fig. 6). 
The liquid level measurements for input accoun-
ting are done the same way as calibration measure-
ments. Therefore the variance of these measurements 
can be estimated from the calibration data by using 
the within-run differences. 
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Figure 6: Determination of discrimination intervals 
In the case of linear regression functions the equa-
tion 
X 
r:::;;;t2 
vu"J.,"v 
v' 
o/2 2 S' 
Xv• 
(3) 
must be solved to obtain the upper and lower limits 
of the discrimination interval for Volume X at a gi-
ven liquid height measurement Y*. The left hand side 
of the equation is the confidence interval for the used 
set of calibration runs, the right hand side is the tole-
rance interval for liquid level measurements - z and 
x2 being the normal and chi-square distribution, re-
spectively. The variance estimates S' for liquid level 
measurements are set equal with the within-run vari-
ance estimates from the calibration runs (S' = SAl). 
With this setting the degree of freedom v' of liquid le-
vel measurements is set equal to the degree offreedom 
VM of the regression function. 
5 Results 
The evaluation of calibration data h~:~s been performed 
in parallel for the Wallace 8 Tiernan analog pressure 
gauge and the Ruska electromanometer, because the 
precisions of both instruments differ about one order 
of magnitude. 
Evaluation of calibration profiles The six ca-
libration runs evaluated here can be separated into 
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Figure 7: 95% confidence regions for three "good" 
calibration runs (Ru.Jka) 
15~====~----~------~----~~~~ 
95 % 
9 
-9 
-15~====~-----,------.-----.-----~-
0 200 400 600 
Volume (Litea~) 
800 1000 
Figure 8: 95% confidence regions for all calibration 
runs (Ru.Jka) 
three runs with only small within-run variances (see 
fig. 3) and three other ones with greater variances at 
least over a part of the calibration range. For this rea-
son we investigated the three "good" calibration runs 
separately. 
The three calibrations with small within-run va-
riances show the greatest intercept differences (see 
figs. 3, 4). Therefore the effect of between-run diffe-
rences is dominating the overall variance and leads to 
much wider confidence regions. The figures 7 and 8 
show the 95% confidence regions together with the 
residuals of region-specific linear regressions common 
to all investigated calibration runs. In the most inte-
resting range of typical input batch volumes (> 500l) 
the 95% confidence region for the Ru.Jka-manometer 
is about ±7mm for all calibration runs and ±22mm 
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for the three runs with small within-run variations. 
For the less precise Wallace & Tiernan pressure gauge 
confidence intervals of ±llmm and ±28mm have been 
achieved (see figs. 9, 10). 
Tolerance intervals for liquid level measure-
ments The 95% tolerance intervals for liquid level 
measurements are given in table 2. It can be seen, 
that one can take advantage from the higher preci-
sion of the Ru.Jka-manometer only when the calibra-
tion measurements are undistorted. For the Wallace 
& Tiernan pressure gauge the tolerance intervals arc 
only slightly increased when measurements nre distor-
ted. 
As the source of measurement distortion could not 
be identified, it seems adequate to assume that also 
W&T % Ruska % 
all measurements ±6.7£ ±0.95% ±4.7£ ±0.67% 
"good" measurements ±15.2l ±1.90% ±11.8£ ±1.48% 
all measurements assumed to ±6.5l ±0.92% ±3.9£ ±0.56% 
be good ones 
·Table 1: 11 ncertainties for an indeterminate number of volume determinations 
W&T Ruska 
"good" measurements 1.7mm 0.3mm 
all measurements 2.1mm 1.65mm 
Table 2: Tolerance intervals for liquid level measure-
ments 
some level measurements for input accounting have 
been disturbed. Therefore the wider tolerance inter-
vals are a good approximation for typical plant ope-
ration conditions. 
Uncertainty of volume determinations Sol-
ving eq. 3 for the calibration confidence limits and 
tolerance intervals for level measurements presented 
above, we obtain the uncertainties for volume detcr-
minations based on the investigated calibrations. Ta-
ble 1 lists these uncertainties for the volume range of 
typical input batch sizes (> 500l). Strictly spoken, 
there is a propability of 95%, that for 98% of the vo-
lume determinations made with these regressions the 
true volume lies within the discrimination interval. 
Despite their ragged profile the calibration runs with 
great within-run variances are valuable because the 
uncertainty of volume determination can be reduced 
by more than 50%. 
The last row of table 1 shows hypothetical values. 
These uncertainties for volume determination would 
have been obtained, if all calibration runs had as small 
within-run variations as the last three ones. From 
these figures it ~an be seen that the uncertainty of vo-
lume deter'mination is dominated by the large inter-
cept variations. For improvement of this uncertainty 
most effort should be made to get an explanation for 
the intercept variations. Only with mostly reduced 
intercept variations the use of the Ruska electroman-
ometer for accounting purposes would be justified by 
very small uncertainties of volume determination. 
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6 Conclusion and outlook 
Derived from our observations and calculations we 
can state that a routine volume determination at the 
input accountancy tank of WAK had an uncertainty 
of less than 1% with only a small ad vantage for the 
Ruska electromanometer. This result influences the 
uncertainty of the accountancy system noticeably. In 
contrast to analytical procedures an ESARDA target 
value for volume determinations is missing. There-
fore we propose a compilation and evaluation of data 
(from experiments like RITCEX and CALDEX as well 
as from investigations like this one) according to the 
method described by Liebetrau et al. (2]. This work 
will lead to a realistic and achievable target value. 
On the other hand we will try to clarify the WAK 
situation by doing some additional experiments in the 
near future. 
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ABSTRACT: 
A thermal expansion test involving a large 
annular input reprocessing tank was carried out as part 
of the CALDEX Project at the TEKO test facility in 
Karlsruhe, FRG. The objective of this test was to 
investigate thermal expansion properties of the tank and 
effects on various pressure and level measurement 
instruments used in the determination of liquid volume. 
In the thermal expansion test, a weak nitric acid 
solution was heated internally to a temperature of 60°C 
by means of steam injection through the sparge ring. 
After heating, the annular tank took about one hour to 
thermally equilibrate, and it took another hour for the 
sparge ring and pulsator pipes to fill before thermal 
effects could be followed. The temperature at the end 
of the test, after tank and its contents had cooled 
undisturbed for fifty hours, was 29.9°C. Thirteen 
instrument readings were obtained during each 
measurement cycle of roughly 70 seconds for a total of 
over 2800 readings per instrument. Thermal expansion 
effects for the CALDEX annular tank were consistent 
with that reported for cylindrical tanks. Temperature 
variations effect each type of probe in a way that 
depends on the properties of the probe and the 
characteristics of the measurement system. 
1... INTRODUCTION 
In the framework of the ESARDA Working 
Group for Reprocessing Input Verification, member and 
observer organizations were invited to participate in the 
Calibration Demonstration Exercise (CALDEX) 
organized by DWK, Hannover, Germany 11/. Included 
among the specialized tests proposed was a test to 
investigate thermal expansion properties of the tank and 
the effects on various pressure and level measurement 
instruments /2/. The test was designed so that 
correlated data involving the observed liquid height, the 
tank weight, the dimensional expansion of the tank, and 
the density and liquid height, would be used to examine 
the application of temperature correction factors and 
methodology. Experimental studies involving bubble-
probe manometry in cylindrical tanks have been carried 
out previously /3/, but experimental data for annular 
tanks and acoustic and capacitance probes are lacking. 
A schematic diagram of the CALDEX tank is 
shown in Figure 1. The tank is 4.2 meters high and 
has a diameter of 2. 88 meters. The annulus of the tank 
has a radius of 400 mm and a capacity of 12500 liters. 
The change in tank height due to the slope of the 
bottom of the tank is 150 mm. 
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Figure I. CALDEX Accountancy Tank 
TEST CONDITIONS 
The test solution was 0.5 molar nitric acid with 
a density of 1.017 g/cm3 at 20°C. The off-gas air-flow 
rate was 9 standard liters/hour. The solution was pre-
heated internally by means of steam injection through 
the sparge ring to about 50°C the day before the test. 
Additional heating on the morning of the test raised the 
temperature to 60°C. The annular tank took about one 
hour to thermally equilibrate, and it took another hour 
for the sparge ring and pulsator pipes to fill before 
thermal effects could be followed. The temperature at 
the end of the test, after the tank and solution had 
cooled undisturbed for 47.5 hours was 29.9°C. 
±._ INSTRUMENTATION 
In the organization of the CALDEX project, 
DWK made a deliberate effort to assure that all types of 
instruments currently in use to determine tank volumes 
were part of the test apparatus. A list of the CALDEX 
tank instrumentation is contained in Figure 2. To the 
extent possible, instrument control and data acquisition 
MEASURING SECTION NR DEVICE/ MANUFACTURER 
01 TEMP£RATURE 
@auAT BIS 
07 
OB WEIGKT ~ SARTORUS 
09 WEIGKT @AsEA 
10 VOLUME @ ROTARY PISTON METER 
11 6P @ OIPTRON 
12 t.P @ CROUZET 
13 6P @ RUSKA 
14 
t.P ~ TRANSMimR 
15 LEVEL PROBE @ UKAEA 
16 LEVEL PROBE @ENEA 
17 LEVEL PROBE @ ALKEM 
18 OENSJTOMffiR ~ PARR. OMA 55 
19 HUMIOITY/OFF·GAS ~ ULTRAKUST 
20 AIR·FLOW/OFF-GAS @ROTA 
21 PRESSURE/OFF-GAS ~TJCON 
Figure 2. CALDEX Measuring Instruments 
were automated by means of an industrial PC computer-
controller, including the reading and setting of the mass 
gas-flow meters. The types of measurements made in 
this test were: 
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i) actual height of liquid in tank as viewed 
through the upper port window and 
recorded on a strip of graph paper 
ii) pneumatic pressures (height) for three 
different bubbler-probe lengths 
iii) liquid level based on acoustic probe data 
iv) liquid level based on capacitance probe 
data 
v) liquid weight based on load cell data 
vi) liquid density based on bubbler-probe 
data 
vii) temperature measurements at four 
locations 
viii) tank dimension changes measured at four 
locations 
ix) off-gas flow rate and absolute humidity 
Figure 3 depicts the location of liquid-level 
measurement systems. Of particular importance for the 
thermal expansion test was the upper viewing window 
through which the height of the liquid could be 
observed directly. 
~ 
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FIGURE 3. UQUID HEIGHT MEASUREMENTS 
The drawing in Figure 4 shows the position of 
feeler gages used to make the dimensional 
measurements. Not shown are the locations of the 
temperature gages which were located near the bottom, 
at 1500 mm, at 3000 mm (above the level of the test 
solution), and in the off-gas piping. 
~ 
1 for the calculated loss of liquid due to evaporation. 
~ 
PORT 
WINDOW 
~ 
'=J)_ 
Thermal expansion effects for the CALDEX annular 
tank were similar to that reported for cylindrical tanks. 
Each probe has its own thermal expansion coefficient 
that depends on the properties of the probe and the 
characteristics of the measurement system. 
The Ruska bubbler probe and the capacitance 
probe showed an increase in liquid level readings as the 
solution cooled. The sonic ranger showed the largest 
2 ~ 3 change in liquid level readings. 
c: ~ 
4 f 
FIGURE 4. DIMENSIONAL MEASUREMENTS 
l.. TANK TEMPERATURE EFFECTS 
Thirteen instrument readings were obtained 
during each measurement cycle of roughly 70 seconds 
for a total of 2810 readings per instrument. The large 
quantity of data obtained during the 47.5 hours of tank 
monitoring created some data handling problems. In 
addition to the automated data acquisition, dimensional 
and sight window data were recorded manually. 
The thermal expansion data are summarized in 
Table 1. The readings have been corrected to account 
TABLE 1. THERMAL EXPANSION EFFECTS 
Differ- After 
. 
Instrument BEADII::IGS ence Correction 
(units) at 57.9°C at 29.9°C in for 
(start) (end) Readings Evaporation 
Sight Port 0 -27 -27 -24 
(mm) 
Ruska 2606 2610 4 7 
(mm) 
Crouzet 2633 2621 -12 -9 
(mm) 
II&U (nun) 2616 2610 -6 -
Sonic 
Ranger 2698 2632 -66 -63 
(mm) 
Capacitance 2601 2627 26 26 
probe (mm) 
Diptron 1.01 1.02 0.01 -
(g/cm3) 
* The 3 mm estimate of change in liquid level due to evaporation 
losses is based on absolute humidity, temperature, and air 
flow-rate oiT-gas readings. 
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Sight Window The liquid level, observed through the 
sight window and recorded on a strip of graph 
paper, decreased by 27 mm during the 47.5 
hour cooling time. 
Ruska The Ruska data showed a very small increase 
in pressure as the tank cooled. The Ruska probe 
was located at 10 mm above the bottom of the 
CALDEX tank. 
Crouzet The Crouzet data showed a 12 mm decrease 
in pressure level as the tank cooled. The 
Crouzet probe was located 1410 mm above the 
tank bottom. 
H & B The Hartmann and Braun probe, at 2610 mm 
above the bottom of the tank, was covered only 
during the first few hours of the test, and, 
therefore could not be used to estimate thermal 
effect. 
Sonic Ranger At 63 mm, the decrease in the sonic 
ranger readings was the largest observed change 
in liquid level. The sonic probe was located 
2400 mm below the ceiling of the tank. 
Capacitance Probe The 33 mm increase in the 
capacitance probe readings was unexpected. 
The capacitance probe was located 2370 mm 
below the ceiling of the tank. 
Diptron A Diptron pressure gage was assigned to 
measure changes in the liquid density directly as 
function of the distances between two probes 
(probe separation of 200 mm). The 200 mm 
distance corresponded to a pressure of about 21 
mbar (less than 0.3 psi), and was below the 
certified range of the pressure gage. 
Q... ESTIMATES OF LIQUID EVAPORATION 
Data on the amount of liquid lost via the off-gas 
system during the cooling period were estimated on the 
basis changes in tank weight and off-gas flow 
measurements (Table 2). 
Off-Gas Data The absolute humidity, gas-flow rate, 
and temperature in the off-gas system were 
measured and used to establish the rate of 
evaporation. The calculated loss of test solution 
based during the cooling period on off-gas data 
was 9 liters which corresponded to a change of 
3 mm in liquid height. 
TABLE 2. ESTIMATES OF LIQUID EVAPORATION 
Differ 
BEADI~GS ence 
Instrument at 57.9°C at 29.9°C in 
(units) (start) (end) Readings 
ASEA Load 8107 7895 109 kg 
Cell (kg) 107 liters 
OfT-gas 
Flow Rate Reference 9 kg 9 liters 
and 
Temperature 
Load Cell Data The loss of test solution due to 
evaporation based on ASEA load cell system 
weight data was 107.5liters. This corresponded 
to a change of 38 mm in liquid height. 
7. CHANGE IS TANK DIMENSIONS 
As shown in Figure 3, feeler gages were 
positioned at four points to monitor the dimensional 
changes in the tank. 
Tank Capacity The increase, shown in Table 3, in 
the capacity of the tank calculated on the basis 
of the coefficient of observed height expansion 
was 11 liters. 
Solution Volume The change in the volume of test 
solution, which occupied 60% of the tank's 
. capacity, was 7 liters. 
TABLE 3. CHANGES IN TANK DIMENSIONS 
Gage BEAJ2I~GS Change 
LoC'ation at 57.9°C at 29.9°C in 
(units) (start) (end) Dimension 
Top Reference 0.781 
(mm) 
llottom Reference 0.430 1.211 (mm) 
Inner Reference 0.400 
(mm) 
Outer Reference 0.365 0.035 mm (mm) 
Calculated Based on coefficient of 
change in height expansion 0.115 mm 
annulus 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPALS 
The volume of liquid in the tank is a function of 
the probe heel and the change in cross-sectional area. 
The volume equation for a linear region of a regular 
tank is 
(1) 
where V = volume; h = height; and a and b are 
coefficients determined by least squares analysis. 
.8_._1 EXPANSION OF THE LIQUID 
Fundamental relationships between the mass 
(M), volume (V), density (p), pressure (P), and h~ight 
(h) are 
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(2) 
(3) 
Substituting values of V and h in equation (1) 
(4) 
Multiplying equation (4) by the density. 
M. = (a* p.) + [!._]*P. . (5) 
I I g I 
Equation (5) states that a change in the solution 
density, which changes with temperature, only effects 
the intercept (location) term of the equation. In 
practice, the value of the intercept is related to the 
distance of the pressure measuring probe above the 
bottom of the tank. 
.8_2 THERMAL EXPANSION OF THE TANK 
The thermal expansion of the vessel is 
independent of the solution it contains. The terms in 
the volume equation (except for the intercept term) 
express the change in cross-sectional area as a function 
of height. For a linear region in a regular tank, the 
change in volume (V) can be expressed in terms of the 
changes in the vessel's height (h), circumference (C), 
and cross-sectional area (A) as 
av = haA + Aah (6) 
where at = 21lriJr, and ar = iX:/21l. 
.8..J. FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS FOR 
THERMAL EXPANSION 
If L0 is the length at 0°C and a is the coefficient 
of linear expansion, the length at t°C is, 
(7) 
where A I is the change in temperature. 
Equation (7) is applicable to changes in the 
length of the probes and the height of the tank. 
If A0 is the area at 0°C and a is the coefficient 
of linear expansion, the area at t°C is, 
A
1 
= A 
0 
( 1 + 2a At ) (8) 
where A 1 is the change in temperature. 
Equation (8) is applied to the changes in the 
volume of the tank. 
8.4 Determination of Temperature Corrections for 
Volume 
Temperature correction factors must be 
determined individually for each tank, type of probe, 
and measurement system. The change in tank capacity 
due to thermal expansion is a function of the thermal 
properties of the material used in its fabrication. The 
coefficient of thermal expansion for a common type of 
stainless steel is 0.00001872, which is about one 
percent that of water at 40°C. 
2... DATA REDUCTION AND ANALYSIS 
Although the results of the CALDEX thermal 
expansion test are in general agreement with previous 
experiments, spurious data, and small inconsistencies or 
unexpected results were observed. Examples include 
the increase in capacitance probe liquid height and the 
difference between the off-gas estimate of evaporation 
losses and that measured as change in weight by the 
load cells. 
The Ruska data displayed the characteristic 
increase in pressure for a probe whose tip is located 
near the bottom of the tank. The Crouzet probe showed 
thermal expansion effects of both the tank and the test 
solution. In practice, a correction should also be made 
for the change (which was not made) in the length of 
this probe relative to the tank. 
For bubble probes fabricated from the same 
material as the tank and terminating near the bottom of 
the tank, the change due to the vertical expansion is 
negligible. Since the pressure gages sense the weight 
of the column of liquid which does not change with 
temperature, bottom probe readings are effected only by 
the expansion of the tank. For bubble probes not near 
the bottom of the tank, the expansion of the liquid must 
be taken into account as shown in equation (5). 
Temperature correction algorithms for the sonic 
ranger and the capacitance probe, which measure 
distance from the top of the tank to the liquid level, are 
more complicated since the temperature and conditions 
in the vapcirhead above the liquid level must also be 
taken into account. The sonic probe level reading is 
influenced by the expansion of the tank, the expansion 
of the liquid and the temperature effects on the air in 
the vaporhead of the tank. The capacitance probe 
temperature effect is larger than that which can be 
attributed to the tank and solution combined. 
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Additional testing and data analysis will be 
needed to formalize the sonic ranger and capacitance 
probe temperature correction equations. 
The Diptron pressure gage measured the 
differential pressure over a distance of 200 mm, as 
opposed to measuring both the probe pressures relative 
to the vapor head. Although in theory very accurate 
determinations of the solution density should be possible 
using the Ruska and Crouzet probe readings as a back-
up estimate, the fast bubble method used in collecting 
these data rendered them unusable for this purpose. 
Estimates of the loss of liquid due to evaporation 
were made on the basis of the ASEA load cell weight 
data and absolute humidity, temperature and the off-gas 
flow rate calculations. The estimate based on the 
weight data was much larger than the off-gas 
calculations. 
On the surface, the load cell data appeared to be 
relatively error free. However, analysis of other 
CALDEX test data showed that true vertical alignment 
of the load on the load cells was not being maintained. 
This was due to 1) the four load cell suspension 
arrangement which was not self correcting, and 2) the 
fact that the tank had a sloped bottom so that the tank 
center of gravity shifted as it was filled creating a shear 
force that effected the readings. Therefore, the 
evaporation loss calculated on the basis of the off-gas 
data was considered to provide a better estimate. For 
future reference, a three point load cell suspension, 
which is intrinsically self balancing, is recommended. 
The measured change in tank height was 
1.211 mm. Two methods were used to calculate 
changes in the radii: 1) inner and outer wall 
measurements, and 2) the coefficient of expansion based 
on the observed height increase. Because of the 
inconsistency of the inner and outer feeler gage data 
with other measurements, the increase in the capacity of 
the tank was calculated on the basis of the coefficient of 
observed height increase. The calculated value was 11 
liters. Determination of the calculated capacity and 
volume are given in Appendix A. 
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APPENDIX A: CHANGES IN TANK DIMENSIONS 
The formula for the volume of an annular tank with height h and inner and outer radius r. 
and r .. , respectively, is pi"' (r.2 - r .. 2) • h. 
Reference height 
Annulus = 400 mm 
inner radius: 
outer radius: 
pi ... h. 
(r .. 2- r.2) 
mm3 /I06 
Change in height = 1.211 mm 
New height 
Measured change in annulus 
Calculated change in annulus 
New calculated radii 
pi ... h, 
(r,2 - r,l) 
mm3 11o6 
Reference capacity 
Tank heated capacity 
Capacity 
Solution 
Level 
Volume 
Tank capacity at reference conditions 
h. = 4200 mm 
r. = 1040 
r .. = 1440 mm 
= 13,194.7 
= 992,000 
= 13,089 
Tank capacity at 55.9°C 
h, = 4201.211 
0.035 mm 
0.115 mm 
r, = 1040.415 
r, = 1440.300 
= 13,198.5 
= 992,571 
= 13,100 
Change from reference 
13,089 liters 
13,100 liters 
11 !iter 
7 !iter 
Comnarison with Ruska data 
3 mm 
8liters 
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Published tank capacity: 
= 12,500 liters. 
Calculated change is based on 
coefficient of observed height 
expansion: 
(1.211/4200 = 0.000288) 
Test solution volume was 60% of 
capacity 
INTEGRATED MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY SYSTEM 
H. Calabozo, A. Buiza 
ENUSA, Juzbado (Salamanca), SPAIN 
In this paper 1-.e present the system that 
we are actually Ltsing for N...u:lear l"later~<.•l 
PccOLtnting and l"'anufacturing l"'anagement in 
our LD·.· FuE!l Fabrication Plc:<nt lr.ll:ated ,,(-. 
Juzbado, Salamanca, Spain. 
The system is based m<.1inly on a real time 
data base which gather data for all t~~ 
operations performed in our factory frcwn 
LD::o: powder reception to fuel assE..>rnbl if~. 
shipment to the customers. 
The accOLtntancy ls just an important pad· 
of the whole integr·ated syste.'fll covering all 
the aspects related to manLtfacturing: 
planning, traceability, Q. C. analysis, 
production control and accounting dat.a. 
J.. Introduction 
Since 1987 we have been developp~ng at 
Juzbado a computer based system w.i th the 
target of performing the autClllla.ti zation of 
t.he capture, treatment and final 
presentation of all information related to 
the d.i fferent operations in a Fuel 
Fabrication Plant. 
In the fabrication of the L()._. fuel 
assemblies, every year it is necessary to 
handle hundred of thousands of minor 
components which are subJected to 
different. pr-oce.>sses in order to get a final 
fuel assembly. The generated data, are 
processed and StJffer· matht .. "'!latic.al amJ 
logical calculations to obtain the tracea· 
bili.ty and nf..!CE..>ssar·y at:c.tJL.lflti.ng d;,~'l'-<'< 
required for l::x:Jth international authorities 
and customers. This tasks makes necesssary 
the use of a complete and comple:< computer· 
system to avoid the thousands of man-hours 
used during the reloads before 1987. 
This computer system has been cal..1Ed "PATI"~": 
E,f\OYECTD DE 
~TIZACICl\1 DEL 
J:RAZABILIDAD Y CO\IT'I;U.. DEL 
[19TERIAL 
~.EJ.)R 
IH .. the t:x=g~nntng the system was conceived 
from the di ff icul ties that appearnd o·1 yea\1~:. 
1985 and 1986 in making tl"x::! annual nucle<lr· 
material inventory, but a·fter that it rnergt=cJ 
as a "a:t-1" (Cornp~.tter· Aided l"'anufac:tLtring) 
System which intE..ogrates all management 
aspect of the fuel production. Today the 
system .is being improved and developed to 
incorporate the manufacturing pr-cx:e~.:;r, 
computer autClllla.tion, and so, be:.->c:ome <!\ "Cli"l" 
(Computer Integrated l"'anufacturi.ng) Systc.,,n 
.in the ne:<t future. 
It is inter~ting to say that the 
1;0rk has been completely developed 
own computeri~ation perso,nel 
sotwarc~ 
by our· 
wlx~l 
practically have been only dedicat.ed to thu·; 
job fron year iS'85. 
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2- Brief Des_c:_r..irr\;.;i._q:Lof ___ j;~- ~~.?.......lo..cll.J.Q!'EQ 
in_i;he Project 
Due to the comple:<ity of the project it 
has been divided into mo.1ules (or areas) 
which have been d'DSE.'fl u~ most possible 
.isolated atra1g them and, at the same time, 
in such a way that the relations atra1g the 
areas are simple. 
With the above considerations the 
following areas were defined: 
·- Project Planning and Progranvning 
- Non N.Jc:lear Component Control 
- Powder Storage Control 
- Chemical Laboratory Control 
- Ceramic Process Control 
- Mechanical Process Control 
Residues Control 
Traceability and Shipping 
Doc:t.unentation 
Pccountancy Inventory and Official 
Reports. 
The~ areas (or modules) are themselves 
divided into operations in order to develop' 
the svstem. 
:;:.1\ltelear Material Con:\:rol 
Lhder the point of view of Intemal 
N.JClear Ma.terial Control OLtr instalation is 
di·v.ided into seven accounting areas. 
This division is due, among other 
r-easons, to the different types of products 
we hi-Mldle. The areas are: 
1.- Storage of clean LD:z and LJ. •• ~)u 
2.- Storage of other· N. Materials 
3.- Materials in Ceramic Fabrication 
Process 
4.-· Other Materials in Ceramic Area 
5.- Materialsin Mechanical Fabrication 
Process 
6.- Materials in Chemical Lab. 
7 .-· Storage of Non·-Recoverable 
Re<".:;idues. 
The identi ficati.on o·f all .items handled 
.in the siT.>p (e:<cept for area # 5) has a 
codi:fied nLunber as e:<plainE..'Cl hear o·1: 
a b 
99'-7 XX XX "1?9 
a) Fabrication Lot ldentif.ic<ilti~ 
111 • These three 'first digi i.s show the 
ncxninal end.d'VTlf.?nt in the LJ-235 
iSOtope;!. 
:<,Q • The<-,.e ~ di.gi ts identi. fy the lots 
in alphabetical order to avoid 
repetitions. 
~ . These two digits identify the 
product of the material lot in such 
a way that the first one indicates· 
the type of product and the second 
one the phase of the process where 
it is located. 
b) Item identification 
<PI. These are three sequential 
to indicate the different 
belonging to the same lot. 
numbers 
items 
There are material transfers .;vrong 
different areas, which generate 
an internal accounting of th!~ nuclear· 
mi'lterial manaqed by the systF'IIl. 
It also manages the division of an item 
to generate two or rrore items, or the 
blending of several items to generate just 
one. 
In the accounting of the 1\l.u:lear Material 
there are two main characteristic: the 
chemical analysis (to. determine U and l.J-235) 
and the weighing of the material. Based on 
that, there are three ITIOdules to calculate 
the accountancy: 
- Chemical Laboratory Managerrent 
- 1\l.u:lear Material Handling 
- 1\bt Measured Material Evaluation 
~eL_J,.~!:P.r.9.t.P!Y ........ !':kN.:lag~t. The 
analysis of representative samples of the 
lots used in the process are performed .in 
the Chem. Lab. 
The sysi:£.'111 controls not only the samples 
and essays but also the "standards" used to 
calibrate each laboratory equipment and the 
status of equipments regarding recalibra.-
tion. The results of the essays are also 
storaged in the system associated with the 
samples they cover. 
The system also takes into account the 
essays still not made belonging to a. 
determined lot. When all analysis have been 
done, the system makes the calculation of 
the percentage of U and l.J-Z35 as well as 
other requeriments, checking that all of 
them meet the product spec:i fic:ation. 
!.'Y.c;::J_~r.:_ _ ~.ter:::i..9.L._.t~:ut~_.i,ng. In all the 
operations associated with 
process in which Nuclear 
handled, the system obtains 
a. physical 
Material is 
the Ur an iUITI 
weight either by direct weighing 
(difference) or by substraction of tare and 
gross weight. 
The percentages of elerrent and .isotope 
are transferred or recalcu-lated when 
blending of i terns is performed. 
The weight data. is trasferred 
automatically from the measuring instrument 
(scale, etc:.) to the system which evaluates 
if it is inside a determined range. If 
several i terns are placed together or are 
assembled the system calculates the weight 
of the final component or resulting assembly 
and also gives the percen-tage of U and LJ-
Z35. 
~-Mea.st.y:ed_Materisl_!;:_y_all.@.i:j..QQ. In the 
Ceramic Process we hc..'lndle ma.ter·ial that it 
is not 11 !1!1f.!a led" ( h.:'!l1d led l.lf1tler t:·on t.<~.i nment) , . 
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<.Vld is submitted to changes in his physical 
or chemical properties. (In these changes 
weight variations ar·e pr-cx:luced because of 
either chemical or physical changes as for 
instance h.unidi ty loss) . Also there is some 
arrount of material that r-emains inside the 
r~-quipment. In these cases the system 
performs a "Material Di fferenc:e" (MO) per 
ecu:h lot of material managed in the area. 
Lot by lot, along the time, we have 
several "M.D." that can be "counteracted" 
(positives and negatives) because of the 
remaining material that can l::x!! recovered 
dLlring the equipment cleaning operations. 
These accumulations of M.D. 's would give 
us the "t1..F" of the area for a pre-
determined period. 
The way of preparing the .inve:...-1tory is by 
getting a report of i terns or groLlps of 
it.E.'fllS in the whole factory 
t..aken from the physical situation of the 
itt:."fflS of each system ITIOdule /1/. 
So, we may have the following situations: 
In each report there is an item 
identification with rrore than 18 atributes 
related to characteristics about location 
as well as physical, chemical properties, 
type of product and even an error code 
~ssociated to each. From this report we can 
obtain (as wished ) , the fo 11 owing two other 
·reports: 
PIL.-Physical Inventory Listing 
PI I .-Physical Inventory Insj1"Ction 
Pn.:agr.ttn 
The information given by "PIL" is 
codified and sent to El...RAT01 through the 
I EeRF'PC line. 
The information given by "PII" may also 
be transrni ted in Juzbado to the personal 
comj1lter brought at the time of the 
inventory by Euratom inspectors and 
constitutes the starting information for 
the "JUZE\!\00 INVEN'TCFlY II\SFECTICl\1 FRCX:RAM", 
which is a com~ter pr"'gram developped by 
El..RATll'1 that allows their inspectors to 
perform the Physical Inventory in our 
Instala.tion. 
The system allows us to 11se c:1t any time 
all data for "Inten1al Material 
Ar.:c:OI.lfl t.ancy" , as well as to per·fonn •'ll"l 
Ar.:co.Ult:.i.ng Inventory o·f abot.1t 40<))) i t..erns in 
about 20 minub.>s. 
C.h:0 of i-I"M! liiiiJr'Ovenx:;.nts nCJW b€?ing 
developed in the sysb:.'flt is an Iffi (Inventory 
Change Rep::lrt) that allows us, at any time, 
to know the Inventory change'*> happenned .in a 
pre-cleterminE."'CC peh.od of time. Cilce the 
Report is obt.a.ined and CODIFIED, it can be 
SE.'nt to El..RA'TO"' by means of the Conun.ication 
System already e:<plained. 
The Project star·texJ with the basic .idEl<t\ 
o.f integrating all. the informations takE.>n 
from the nuclear material cmd from th'! 
process they have l::x.."€!11 submitted to. Fo1~ 
this reason we have use.'CJ, in the Pr·oject 
conceptioo, a M<?ti"'M.x:lology of the type Subjet 
Ori~:.>nt;~tG'!'.1 (IVBUSE) /2/,/3/,/4/. 
The following graphic gives an idea of 
hc:lw the systam operat.n1 
RLLES 
)Specifications) ~ 
L 
ICffRATIIl\S ij .. ~FffiCU:T I 
MATERir-LS 
Materials are physic;~l ib:\~ns th<.1t an~ 
described by logical items, both with tt"M'! 
same identi 'f.icat:ion. 
Each logic item i.s associated to the 
.ident.i 'f.ic:ati.on of thc:lc'....e atributes corn:.>s;·-
ponding to the character-istic o'f tt"M'! 
phys.i.cal item. 
The identification of the items depends 
on the fabrication phase and the type of 
material as it was descr-ioc"'CC before. 
At ti-e phases where the characte-ristics 
of the prodL>ct. (both Physical and Chemical) 
are evaluated, the system selects the 
spt!.'Ci ficat.ions to be used by just cl"lti!cking 
the identi-fication of the evaluated i h'!!n<.5 
and the type o'f Product to be flliW1u·fac:-b.lrE!d. 
At the phases wt"M'!re ti-e physical statr~ 
tJf the pn:x.Juc:t d~<.>l'lg!.~s, tt"M'! nf..'.'W product and 
consequently .i.ts ne~ dtribut.C?S are also 
c:;~l cul <>h~~~1 by tl"lf! sy:.t.."-"11\. 
Ma.ny operatl.ons can be performed w.i th 
the system and the operator-s (u&~rs) are 
also a qr-edt nwnbc.'t·.. l<k'~ havC'l dr.~.iqnr-'CI a 
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r ul r\LtL~Jill ~·;y•_,Lf•m ~'iO U ldL Ux= tJpC'lraU.ons i:\fld 
inspections can onl)' be made by authorized 
pt'!Ople. 
OF'"' ---· ID,_, 
ID.·, !Du 
ID., 
o=·, means operators (users) 
IDL means operator identification 
The operators (users) are .identified by 
\:tlt.'ir user-name Hnd each one accE!des to the 
system by their =·=ret word (password) ; each 
one has an "identification" that allows him 
to perform only the authorized operations in 
thf.! system. Several operators rnay have the 
sarne i.denti f.icat.ion if they perform the same 
activity .in the shop. In this way we can 
guarantee the use of the appropriate 
DIJE!rC:\tions by only the authori::<--•d people. 
The basis Of the pr-oject ~s a gr-oup elf 
inter-related data bases thc>t containt the 
to..."\1'1ufacturing prcx:ess information referred 
<loove. There are means to guarantee the 
i n'for"fl~tion inb:?gri ty and withdrawal in case 
'".ny hardware trcx..tble can happen. 
There is also .irnplementE!d .in the systE.m 
,a G!.ERY language (consider-ed a fOLlrt.h 
qr51eration language), develop in Spanish, 
lo which has bL"E.'tl added SJ;Neral statistical 
ftu·1ctions, in this w.:.w the system can be 
Hlc:lf1agG.'CI by the Plant operators who are 
tli.Jt 'fdlll.iliari;cE.>d with computers. The 
ind.icatE!d language, called DTF\'SF', hds been 
d!?veloppcd froo, th£= "d ... d:<.~tr.ieve" (DTR) 
comTli.'J~c 1al pack~I•,JC'· 
'l"hw c::c:xmktlrr.::j,,ll, wc:rrtWIII.r·ct ~w::k~IH ut11111!d t:c 
develop th= system are: 
VMS Operating Sysben 
LI~VC Local Area Va:< 
Cluster 
COD CcmnHnd Data 
RDB 
TDI"'3 
COECL 
Fffil'RPN 
!:BJ'Er 
PCSA 
PCL YC(]vf-240 
D'TR 
Dictionary 
Relational Data Base 
Terminal Data 
Management System 
Programming LangL~e 
Programming Language 
Decnet Network 
i"lanagemE.'I1 t 
Per"SSO1nel Computing 
S"ystE."'fll Architecture 
VT 2~) Terminal 
Em.tlator 
Symbol Manipulation 
Program 
Dat<~ Tt:nn.inc~l Heport:. 
6.ffi)JECT ~ Elf'PCRT 
The Hardware means whic:h !IUpport tt-e 
system are: 
a.- Ccmputens 
MICRJJAX 3500 
(CPU 2,7 MIPS, I/0 3,3 MB/8) 
VAX 8250 
(CPU 1,2 MIPS, I/0 13,3 MB/S) 
b.- Mass Storage Disks 
2 RA-82 
( 622 MB , 32,3 ms ac:c:ess time) 
2 RD-54 
(159 MB, 38,3 ms ac:c:ess time ) 
c.- Magnetic: Tape Unit 
TSV05 
(1600 !PI, 45 MB) 
d.-computer Terminals 
40 units 
VT-220, VT -320, VT-340, 
VT-330 and VT -420 
e. -Perscnal Ccmputers 
35 units 
19'1, EF'SCN, etc. 
f.-Lcx:al Area Network(~) 
E1l£RI'£T 
1()(X)m, 3 sectors, 20 nodes 
with 3 network branches PCSA. 
g.-Private c:ommunic:ation network 
frcm Salamanca tc Madrid 
h.-PUblic: connection 
with IE£R'>fC national network 
i.-Process Ccmputers 
Digital PDP-1173 
Digital Vax Station 3100 
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j.-Dcmputer Systt'flt Con figuration 
At the moment Loc:al Area Vax 
Cluster, eventual! y Dual 1-bst 
With this system we have ac:c:omplished the 
main aim planned whic:h consisted in 
implementing an integrated system able tc 
c:over all different purposes in cur 
Manufacturing Plant whic:h signifies an 
increase in CJJCLITY in the fuel manufactured 
by EN..SA. 
D..lr objective was also tc provide cur 
c:ustcmers, and the national and 
international safeguards authorities,with 
the necessary information required and in a 
near real time mode, allowing a way of 
nuclear material control ac:c:ording tc the 
most modern systems used nowadays in the 
world. 
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ORGANISATION ET DEVELOPPEMENT DU SYSTEME 
FRANCAIS DE CENTRALISATION DE LA COMPTABILITE 
DES MATIERES NUCLEAIRES 
B. DUFER CEA/IPSN 
F. LECOMTE CEA/IPSN 
Introduction 
Le CEA a mis en place au debut de 1965 une 
centralisation de la comptabilite des matieres 
nucleaires detenues dans les installations 
nucleaires fran~aises dont il etait proprie-
taire. Ce systeme a ete utilise egalement pour 
adresser a Euratom les rapports comptables 
periodiques. 
Au plan national, la loi du 25 juillet 1980 
sur la protection et le controle des matieres 
nucleaires a donne lieu a la parution de 
l'arrete du 24 juin 1982, confiant au CEA 
(Institut de Protection et de SQrete Nucleaire -
Departement de Securite des Matieres 
Radioactives) la charge d'effectuer la 
centralisation de la comptabilite des matieres 
nucleaires pour la totalite des installations 
nucleaires fran~aises. 
Si, dans une premiere etape cette 
centralisation ne fut qu'une quasi 
generalisation au plan national du systeme 
utilise deja depuis de nombreuses annees au CEA, 
elle a, depuis lors, fortement evolue afin de 
servir au mieux la securite des matieres 
nucleaires tant au plan national qu'internatio-
na l. 
Ainsi aujourd'hui le systeme fran~ais de 
centralisation de la comptabilite des matieres 
nucleaires a plusieurs objectifs : 
rassembler toutes les donnees permettant a la 
France de remplir ses obligations vis-a-vis 
des controles internationaux et principale-
ment fournir a l'AIEA et a Euratom des 
rapports periodiques, 
stocks des 
dans chaque 
dans celles 
dans le cadre du controle national 
connaitre en permanence les 
matieres nucleaires detenues 
installation, y compris 
interessant la Defense, 
conserver l'historique de ces stocks et 
des flux de matieres nucleaires ayant 
transite dans ces installations. 
Compte tenu de cet historique, une 
comparaison du systeme national fran~ais avec 
les dispositions du Reglement Euratom et les 
Arrangements subsidiaires de l'Accord conclu 
entre la France, Euratom et l 'AI EA fa it 
apparaitre certaines differences de conception. 
Elles portent notamment sur le decoupage des 
installations en zones de bilan matieres ou 
ensembles techniques et sur le regroupement des 
donnees elementaires a partir desquelles les 
declarations sont effectuees et les stocks sont 
calcules. Certaines operations techniques, 
telles que les melanges, ou administratives, 
telles que les transferts de propriete, donnent 
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lieu a des enregistrements et a des traitements 
differents selon qu'il s'agit du systeme 
national ou des systemes internationaux. Ces 
disparites ne s'opposent pas cependant a une 
parfaite coherence des resultats comptables et 
ne creent aucune divergence, comme cela va etre 
montre dans ce qui suit. 
1. Oriqine. type de freguence de transmission 
des informations centralisees par l'IPSN 
1.1. Entites a l'oriqine des declarations 
La reglementation nationale fran~aise 
prevoit que les etablissements ou installations 
nucleaires peuvent etre divises en ensembles 
techniques et sous-ensembles techniques. Si 
cette notion est voisine de celle de zone de 
bilan matieres utilisee pour les controles 
internationaux, il convient neanmoins de 
percevoir les relations existant entre ces deux 
notions. 
Aujourd'hui, l'ensemble des detenteurs 
fran~ais de matieres nucleaires soumis au reg1me 
d'autorisation represente 30 societes exer~ant 
leurs activites dans 63 etablissements, au sein 
desquels sont distingues 284 ensembles 
techniques representant 371 sous-ensembles 
techniques. 
Le nombre de detenteurs soumis au regime de 
la declaration annuelle (stocks inferieurs a 
500 Kg d'uranium naturel ou appauvri ou de 
thorium ne necessitant pas d'autorisation) est 
superieur a 600. 
C'est 
techniques 
comptables 
exploitants 
national. 
au niveau de ces 371 sous-ensembles 
que sont redigees les declarations 
elementaires transmises, par les 
au DSMR, au titre du controle 
Ces ensembles techniques etant de taille et 
d'importance variables, il en resulte une 
certaine heterogeneite dans la relation entre 
sous-ensemble technique et zone de bilan 
matieres distinguee pour les besoins des 
controles internationaux. Ces zones de bilan 
matieres peuvent done selon les cas representer 
au sein d'un meme etablissement, une ou 
plusieurs installations, ou un ou plusieurs 
ensembles techniques ou sous-ensembles 
techniques, geres distinctement dans le cadre du 
controle national. 
Cependant heterogeneite ne signifie pas 
incompatibilite et les decoupages entre 
sous-ensembles techniques restent coherents avec 
ceux constituant les zones de bilan matieres et 
ainsi permet d'eviter tout chevauchement. 
1.2. Type de declarations effectuees au titre du 
controle national 
Outre la difference decrite precedemment, et 
pour ne se borner qu'au seul aspect des rapports 
comptables, le systeme de comptabilite national 
prevoit que seules les variations de stocks 
doivent faire l'objet de declarations, alors que 
le systeme international impose d'effectuer des 
declarations de stock en fin de mois, meme s'il 
n'y a eu aucune variation. Si cette difference 
ne parait pas fondamentale, dans la mesure ou le 
systeme informatique national determine en 
permanence la valeur du nouveau stock a partir 
de chaque variation enregistree, on verra dans 
le paragraphe relatif aux procedures de 
codification que les systemes national et 
international sont malgre tout tres differents 
pour ce qui concerne les stocks elementaires 
geres distinctement par chacun d'eux. 
1.3. Freguence de transmission des declarations 
Une des autres particularites du systeme 
national de centralisation de la comptabilite 
des matieres nucleaires reside dans la frequence 
de transmission des declarations comptables par 
rapport a la periodicite mensuelle demandee au 
titre des controles internationaux. 
En effet, les operateurs 
transmettre au DSMR toute 
variation de stock intervenue 
ensemble technique, le jour 
variation de stock a eu 
determinee. 
sont tenus de 
declaration de 
au sein d'un 
meme ou cette 
lieu ou a ete 
La reglementation nationale prevoit par 
ailleurs que les mouvements de matieres 
nucleaires entre deux sous-ensembles techniques 
appartenant au meme ensemble technique peuvent 
etre regroupes pour etre declares a la fin du 
mois au cours duquel ils ont eu lieu. 
En resume le systeme national de 
centralisation de la comptabilite des matieres 
nucleaires, bien qu'il soit tout a fait 
compatible et coherent avec les controles 
internationaux, differe done de celui mis en 
oeuvre pour les besoins de ces controles dans 
ses grands principes de base et notamment au 
niveau 
- des entites a l'origine des declarations, 
- du type de declarations transmises, 
- de la frequence de transmission de ces 
declarations. 
De telles differences pourraient etre 
considerees comme mineures, si par ailleurs les 
systemes national et international utilisaient 
les memes codifications ou des codifications 
distinctes entre lesquelles pourraient etre 
etablies de veritables relations bi-univoques 
mais tel n'est pas le cas. 
2. Principes de codification 
Pour ne citer que les principales et sans 
pretendre les examiner en detail, ces 
codifications differentes portent essentiel-
lement sur les categories de matieres 
distinguees et sur les differentes variations de 
stock suceptibles d'etre declarees. 
2.1. Codification des categories de matieres 
Sous le terme categorie de matieres le 
systeme national regroupe diverses informations 
elementaires relatives a l'entite a 
comptabiliser, ce sont l'element, sa teneur, 
son code d'engagement de controle, son 
irradiation (ou absence d'irradiation) et le 
produit (forme physicochimique) qui le contient. 
2.2. Codification de l'element 
Outre le fait que le systeme national 
prevoit la comptabilisation de certains elements 
non suivis au titre des controles internationaux 
(tritium, lithium 6 ... ), on notera d'une part 
que l'uranium enrichi, quelle que soit sa teneur 
en uranium 235, est caracterise par un code 
element unique, 1~ ou le reglement d'Euratom en 
prevoit deux (legerement enrichi, hautement 
enrichi) et d'autre part que l'uranium 233 fait 
l'objet d'un code element specifique, alors que 
le systeme international le distingue par le 
biais du code isotope. 
2.1.2. Codification de la teneur 
Si le systeme international prevoit pour 
l'uranium enrichi deux grandes classes de 
teneur : uranium faiblement enrichi et uranium 
hautement enrichi, le systeme national gere de 
fa~on specifique chaque teneur isotopique 
distincte. Ainsi sont comptabilisees, 
principalement pour les besoins de la gestion, 
environ 400 teneurs isotopiques distinctes pour 
l'uranium enrichi. 
2.1.3. Codification de ]'engagement de controle 
Bien que la notion d'engagement de controle 
ne soit pas une notion prevue explicitement par 
la reglementation nationale, le systeme national 
de comptabilite des matieres nucleaires a dQ en 
tenir compte au niveau de son organisation pour 
repondre aux exigences des controles d'Euratom 
et aux responsabilites de l'Etat fran~ais dans 
ce domaine. Cette organisation permet 
egalement : 
d'une part ~ la France de suivre 
distinctement des matieres entrant dans le 
cadre d'engagements bilateraux souscrits 
aupres de pays tiers, 
- d'autre part, et historiquement, de 
distinguer les matieres dont le groupe CEA 
est proprietaire. 
Ce sont ces divers parametres qui conduisent 
aujourd'hui le systeme national de 
centralisation a gerer distinctement 59 
"engagements d'utilisation ou de codes pool" 
differents, la ou Euratom ne distingue que 14 
engagements particuliers de controle ou codes 
pool. 
2.1.4. Codification de ]'irradiation 
Outre 
irradiees, 
les matieres fraiches et les matieres 
le systeme national distingue 
l'uranium issu du retraitement auquel a ete 
affecte un code d'identification specifique pour 
des motifs de gestion. 
2.1.5. Codification du produit 
En dernier.lieu et comme cela a ete indique 
en premiere partie, le systeme national 
comptabilise pa~ ailleurs 551 formes 
physicochimiques differentes appelees "code 
produit", 1~ oQ la.reglementation internationale 
n'en gere qu'une trentaine. 
2.1.6. Codification des stocks elementaires 
Ces principales disparites entre le systeme 
national et international de centralisation de 
la comptabilite des matieres nucleaires 
conduisent done au su1v1 de stock elementaires 
fondamentalement differ.ents dans les deux 
systemes. 
Ainsi, si dans le systeme de contr6le 
international les stocks sont caracterises par 
la combinaison des parametres ci-apres : 
zone de bilan matiere, 
element, 
engagement de contr6le, 
dans le systeme national un stock elementaire 
resulte de la correlation de chacun des 
parametres suivants : 
sous-ensemble technique, 
element, 
teneur, 
- code d'engagement de contr6le, 
irradiation, 
produit. 
A titre indicatif, etaient comptabilises au 
plan national, au 1er mars 1991, 7147 stocks 
elementaires soumis au contr6le d'Euratom, ~ 
comparer aux 614 que le systeme international 
conduisait ~ distinguer. 
Encore une fois, il convient de souligner 
que ces disparites de traitement des donnees ne 
font nullement obstacle ~ une parfaite coherence 
des resultats comptables et ne creent aucune 
divergence entre les systemes. 
2.2. Codification des operations 
Plusieurs grandes categories d'operation 
donnant lieu ~ variation de stock et ~ 
declaration de cette variation sont 
differenciees au titre du contr6le national. 
Elles regroupent notamment : 
- des transferts externes de matieres 
nucleaires de ou vers un ensemble technique 
ou une zone de bilan matiere, 
- des transferts internes de matieres 
nucleaires au sein d'un meme ensemble 
technique echange entre deux 
sous-ensembles, 
- des modifications des caracteristiques 
techniques de la matiere, 
- des entrees ou sorties de matieres nucleaires 
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des comptabilites nationale ou internatio-
nale, 
- des ecarts constates entre des quantites de 
matieres nucleaires attendues ou provisoires 
et des quantites reconnues, 
- ·cles modifications des conditions d'utilisa-
tion ou de comptabilisation des matieres, 
des modifications des donnees patrimoniales, 
douanieres ou commerciales, 
- des declarations purement comptables. 
Compte tenu de la difference notable entre 
les stocks elementaires geres par chacun des 
systemes, on imagine aisement que certaines 
variations de stocks se rapportant ~ l'une 
quelconque de ces categories puissent faire 
l'objet de declarations au titre du contr6le 
national et n'avoir aucune incidence au niveau 
de l'evolution des stocks differencies pour les 
besoins des contr6les internationaux, c'est le 
cas notamment : 
des mouvements de matiere entre 
sous-ensembles techniques relevant de la meme 
zone de bilan matiere, 
des changements de teneurs ne conduisant pas 
~ un changement de categorie de matiere pour 
Euratom. 
A l'inverse certaines variations de stock ne 
faisant l'objet que d'une declaration unique au 
plan du contr6le national peuvent dans certains 
cas conduire ~ plusieurs declarations au titre 
du contr6le international. Nous ne citerons ~ 
titre d'exemple pour illustrer ces propos que : 
les melanges de matieres nucleaires. 
A ces equivalences partielles viennent par 
ailleurs s'ajouter des variations de stocks qui 
ne sont generees que pour l'un ou l'autre des 
deux systemes, compte tenu de leur organisation 
et de leur mode de fonctionnement propre ; c'est 
le cas par exemple : 
du changement d'utilisation ou de 
proprietaire sur le plan national, sans 
changement de l'engagement de contr6le 
international, 
des mouvements internes ~ un meme ensemble 
technique. 
Cet examen succinct a permis de mettre en 
evidence les reelles singularites de chacun des 
systemes. Comme on le constatera ensuite, 
l'importance et le nombre de ces disparites ne 
pouvaient conduire ~ envisager l'utilisation, 
par les exploitants, des m~mes procedures pour 
effectuer leurs declarations de variations de 
stocks au titre des contr6les national et 
international. 
3. Support permettant d'effectuer les 
declarations de variations de stock et 
procedures de validation de ces 
declarations 
3.1. Le support 
L'exploitant fran~ais dispose d'un document 
unique, le "bordereau de declaration d'operation 
sur les 
effectuer 
stock. 
matieres nucleaires 
ses declarations de 
(BOOMN)" pour 
variation de 
Outre le fait que ce document permet de 
declarer tout type de variation de stock il 
conduit a 
une meilleure separation des informations 
fournies au titre du contr6le national et des 
controles internationaux, voire de la gestion 
patrimoniale, 
- un cha1nage strict des declarations annulees 
et· remplacees avec les declarations 
rempla\;antes. 
Il autorisera par ailleurs 
un traitement informatise des comparaisons 
entre : 
d'une part les declarations comptables et 
les autorisations d'execution de transport 
et, 
d'autre part les declarations comptables 
et les notifications effectuees dans le 
cadre de l'application des INFCIRC 290 et 
207 et des articles 24 et 25 du reglement 
Euratom, 
l'entree en vigueur d'un systeme d'accuse de 
reception traite informatiquement et 
consistant a correler les declarations faites 
par le destinataire et par l'expediteur. 
Ces deux derniers points seront developpes 
plus loin dans le cadre de l'evolution 
programmee pour l'annee 1991. 
3.2. Procedure de validation des declarations 
La France etant un Etat de droit ecrit, 
chaque variation de stock declaree au moyen du 
formulaire precedent, dolt faire l'objet d'une 
authentification par l'autorite qui en est 
l'origine. C'est pour cette raison que chaque 
BDOMN comporte une zone particuliere dans 
laquelle l'autorite responsable au niveau de 
l'unite emettrice dolt apposer sa signature 
manuscrite afin de valider les informations 
qu'il contient. Ceci est a rapprocher du systeme 
de signature prevu au bas de chacun des 
feuillets de rapport de variation de stocks 
adresse a Euratom pour les besoins des contr6les 
internationaux. 
Environ 3200 declarations de ce type sont 
adressees mensuellement au OSMR/BIC (Bureau 
Informatique et Comptabilite) au moyen de divers 
modes d'acheminement qui vont etre examines 
maintenant. 
3.3. Les moyens de transmission 
Compte tenu de la presence de cette 
signature induisant un statut de preuve, au sens 
juridique fran\;ais, aux documents sur lesquels 
sont redigees les declarations comptables, 
celles-ci doivent reglementairement etre 
adressees sur un document papier au DSMR. 
Toutefois 
conduire a 
ce mode d'acheminement pouvant 
des delais de transmission 
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relativement importants (de l'ordre d'une 
semaine), il ne permet pas de conna1tre en temps 
quasi reel les variations de stock de matieres 
nucleaires detenues dans les differentes 
installations. La recherche de cet objectif, 
associe au developpement chez l'exploitant de 
moyens informatiques permettant d'assurer le 
suivi et la comptabilite des matieres 
nucleaires, ont conduit le DSMR a proposer en 
parallele aux unites effectuant le plus grand 
nombre de declarations, differents modes de 
transmission de leur variation de stock par 
voles telematiques. 
3.3.1. Les transmissions de type BSC 2780 
Ces transmissions qui utilisent le reseau 
commute (reseau telephonique des P et T) 
s'etablissent par l'intermediaire d'une 
procedure de communication developpee par IBM, 
la procedure BSC 2780 (binarysynchroneous 
communication) qui permet, avec une bonne 
fiabilite, l'echange de fichiers relativement 
importants a une vitesse elevee. 
Pour des raisons evidentes de securite ce 
mode de transmission demeure cependant reserve 
aux seules informations non classifiees pour les 
besoins de la defense. 
Aujourd'hui les correspondants les plus 
importants utilisent ce mode de transmission, il 
s' agit : 
- de COGEMA 
concentrateur 
Pierrelatte, 
- d'EURODIF, 
de COMURHEX 
Malvesi et de 
par le biais 
de donnees 
de son organe 
localise a 
: pour les Etablissements de 
Pierrelatte. 
Pres de 75% des declarations re\;ues 
mensuellement sont transmises de cette fa\;on. 
3.3.2. Les transmissions de type "Minitel" 
Ce type de liaison s'effectue en mode 
conversationnel avec l'ordinateur frontal du 
OSMR et utilise le reseau Transpac. Il est 
accessible a partir d'un micro-ordinateur, d'un 
terminal ou d'un minitel. Le minitel est un 
equipement constitue d'un poste telephonique 
couple a une imprimante et a un ecran auquel est 
associe un clavier similaire a celui d'une 
machine a ecrire. 
Ce systeme est parfaitement adapte a la 
transmission de faibles volumes d'information et 
est a ce titre utilise par les petites 
installations. Celles-ci effectuent le plus 
souvent peu de declarations dans lesquelles, par 
vole de consequence, sont constatees 
regulierement un nombre d'erreurs eleve. 
Ce mode de transmission fait l'objet d'une 
presentation Poster dans le cadre du present 
congres. 
Avant d'examiner les divers types de 
traitements effectues sur les donnees re\;ues, 
l'architecture du systeme national de 
centralisation informatisee de la comptabilite 
des matieres nucleaires est decrite ci-apres. 
4. L'architecture informatique 
La configuration materielle utilisee dans le 
cadre de la centralisation des matieres 
nucleaires est articulee autour de 2 mini 
ordinateurs Intertechnique Multiprocesseurs des 
Gammes IN 8000 et IN 4000 dont l'un est 
exclusivement dedie aux transmissions, et dont 
l'autre contient l'integralite de la base de 
donnees du systeme. 
4.1. L'equipement frontal 
Il consiste en un mini ordinateur IN 8700 
comprenant : 
une unite de calcul de 3 mega octets, 
une memoire de masse de 300 mega octets, 
un lecteur de mini bandes, 
5 terminaux de visualisation, 
une imprimante serie 400 CPS, 
une imprimante laser canon pour les 
applications de bureautique, 
une imprimante AGFA P400 permettant d'assurer 
l'impression de 24 pages par minute, 
un interface de transmission X25 pour la 
connexion au reseau transpac et le dialogue 
avec l'ordinateur de base, 
un interface de transmission BSC pour les 
liaisons avec les sites distants. 
4.2. L'equipement de base 
Il consiste en un mini ordinateur IN 4400 
comprenant : 
une unite de calcul de 3 mega octets, 
une memoire de masse de 300 mega octets, 
un lecteur de mini bandes, 
15 terminaux de visualisation, 
une imprimante serie 400 CPS, 
- une seconde imprimante rapide laser AGFA 
P400, 
1 imprimante laser canon pour les 
applications de bureautique. 
Pour en terminer avec cet aspect de 
l'architecture informatique, il convient 
d'indiquer qu'il existe une concentration 
importante sur le site du Centre d'Etudes de 
Cadarache, des inspecteurs charges d'assurer le 
controle national. Le DSMR a done ete conduit a 
mettre en place une architecture analogue dans 
ses locaux situes sur ce Centre afin de 
permettre a ces inspecteurs d'assurer leurs 
fonctions dans les meilleurs conditions 
possibles. Cette architecture comporte un 
ordinateur IN 5054, lui-meme alimente par le 
systeme de Fontenay-Aux-Roses a travers un 
equipement frontal constitue par un micro 
ordinateur Bull. 
Outre les operations necessaires a 
l'acquisition des donnees c'est sur les 
equipements de Fontenay-Aux-Roses qu'est 
effectuee l'integralite des traitements 
necessites tant par le controle national que par 
les controles internationaux. 
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5. Le traitement des donnees 
Dans ce chapitre les traitements des donnees 
effectues au titre du seul controle national 
sont distingues de ceux realises pour les 
besoins des controles internationaux. 
5.1. Traitement des donnees au titre du controle 
national fran~ais 
5.1.1. Acquisition des donnees 
Le premier traitement effectue au titre du 
controle national sur les donnees re~ues 
consiste en leur controle, puis en leur 
integration dans la base de donnees. Il est 
fonction du mode d'acheminement utilise pour 
leur transmission. 
5.1.1.1. Acquisition des donnees sous forme de 
documents papier transmis par voie 
postale 
L'acquisition de telles donnees est operee 
par saisie manuelle au travers d'un logiciel 
permettant le controle des donnees saisies, tant 
dans l'absolu que par comparaison avec les 
declarations saisies anterieurement et deja 
integrees dans la base. Toute anomalie donne 
lieu, grace a la tenue a jour en permanence d'un 
fichier des comptables et des signataires 
recenses dans les installations, a l'information 
immediate par telephone de l'operateur a 
l'origine de la declaration et a la demande 
d'actions correctives. 
5.1.1.2. Acquisition des donnees transmises par 
voie telematique en modes BSC 2780 ou 
Minitel 
De telles donnees sont re~ues sur 
l'ordinateur frontal et font l'objet, deux fois 
par jour, d'un transfert sur l'ordinateur 
contenant la base de donnees. Prealablement a 
l'integration de ces donnees dans la base, 
celles-ci sont controlees par un logiciel qui 
conduit soit a leur acceptation, soit a leur 
rejet. Les donnees rejetees font l'objet d'un 
compte rendu precisant les raisons de leur 
rejet. En fin de traitement, ce compte rendu est 
retransfere sur l'ordinateur frontal et mis a 
disposition des correspondants. Lors de la 
transmission suivante, l'operateur de l'unite 
emettrice viendra puiser dans un espace qui lui 
a ete prealablement reserve sur l'ordinateur 
frontal le compte rendu de la transmission 
anterieure. Ainsi, compte tenu d'un traitement 
bi-quotidien des donnees, un operateur est 
informe de la validite des informations, qu'il a 
transmises au cours d'une demi journee J, dans 
la demi journee J + 1. 
On notera par ailleurs que dans le cadre de 
transfert de matieres nucleaires entre 2 
correspondants A et B, le systeme de compte 
rendu permet aussi a B de recevoir, grace au 
DSMR et par voie telematique, la declaration de 
livraison emise par A. 
En dernier lieu, 
documents papier, que 
en fin de mois les 
les utilisateurs de 
transmission par voie telematique doivent 
envoyer egalement, sont correles aux 
declarations precedemment transmises par voie 
telematique, afin de s'assurer de la presence de 
la preuve de la declaration au sens juridique du 
terme, et d'en authentifier l'emetteur par sa 
signature. 
5.1.2. Traitements 
Dans le cadre national, le traitement des 
donnees re~ues a notamment pour but de produire, 
soit periodiquement, soit a la demande, des 
listages informatiques destines a divers 
utilisateurs. 
Mensuellement au 3tme jour ouvrable du mois 
m+ l sont ainsi etablis et adresses au 
gestionnaire de chaque sous-ensemble technique, 
un etat recapitulatif des variations de stock 
prises en compte par le systeme national au 
cours du mois "m" et un etat des stocks inchange 
au cours du mois considere. Sont ainsi adresses 
annuellement aux exploitants des installations 
environ 80 000 pages de ces listages. Les 
gestionnaires des matieres nucleaires des 
sous-ensembles techniques sont tenus de verifier 
ces documents par rapport aux donnees prises en 
compte localement et d'informer sans delai le 
DSMR des divergences constatees. 
Est par ailleurs edite avec cette meme 
periodicite mensuelle un etat recapitulatif des 
mouvements de matieres nucleaires qui auraient 
du donner lieu a une autorisation de transport 
delivree par le Ministere charge del 'industrie. 
Cet etat permet d'effectuer, encore manuellement 
pour quelques mois mais informatiquement d'ici 
fin 1991, les correlations entre les donnees 
comptables et l'autorisation de transport. 
Enfin et bien que n'entrant pas au sens 
strict dans le cadre du controle national, on 
notera que sont en outre edites mensuellement : 
- des etats recapitulatifs des variations de 
stock et des stocks de matieres nucleaires 
des reacteurs a neutrons rapides geres en 
cycle. 
- des etats recapitulatifs des variations de 
stock et des stocks de matieres nucleaires 
dont le CEA est proprietaire. 
Trimestriellement, sont adresses aux 
autorites chargees du controle national les 
etats des stocks de l'ensemble des installations 
fran~aises. 
A ces taches periodiques viennent s'ajouter 
tous les traitements necessites pour repondre 
aux frequentes demandes particulieres : 
- des exploitants, 
- des autorites, 
- des inspecteurs du controle national auxquels 
sont fournis pour chacune de leurs missions, 
des bilans des matieres nucleaires de 
]'installation controlee, ainsi qu'un etat 
recapitulatif des stocks, permettant 
d'effectuer le rapprochement avec les donnees 
comptabilisees localement. 
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5.2. Traitement des donnees au titre des 
controles internationaux 
Declaration a Euratom : 
Comme indique precedemment et compte tenu 
des disparites des systemes national et 
international, notamment au niveau de la 
frequence, de la codification, et du support des 
declarations, le DSMR procede mensuellement, 
pour le compte d'une grande partie des 
exploitants fran~ais, (a partir d'un logiciel 
relativement complexe, compte tenu des 
disparites), au transcodage en "langage Euratom" 
des declarations de variation de stock 
comptabilisees au titre du controle national. 
Ce transcodage porte sur les notions 
suivantes : 
la reference du sous-ensemble technique, 
l'element, 
la teneur, 
l'irradiation, 
la forme physico-chimique, 
le type de variation de stock, 
l'engagement de controle. 
Il est effectue 
installations fran~aises 
Euratom, exception faite : 
pour l'ensemble des 
soumises au controle 
- des installations EDF qui effectuent elles-
memes sous forme papier leur declaration en 
utilisant le formulaire annexe n• II du 
reglement Euratom. Cette situation est 
provisoire, EDF mettant en place des 
procedures de transmission telematique de ces 
rapports au DSMR, 
- de l'etablissement COGEMA La Hague et de la 
societe EURODIF qui constituent grace a leur 
systeme informatique leurs propres rapports 
de variations de stock. Ces rapports sont 
toutefois adresses sous forme telematique au 
DSMR par le biais du protocole de 
communication BSC 2780 evoque precedemment. 
Les declarations transcodees par le DSMR et 
celles re~ues par ligne, sont ensuite 
enregistrees sur bandes magnetiques, puis 
adressees par courrier a la Direction du 
Controle de Securite d'Euratom, accompagnees 
d'un listage des donnees contenues. 
Le cryptage de ces donnees, considerees 
comme sensibles par les autorites nationales, 
est a l'etude en vue de leur transmission 
telematique a Luxembourg. 
Declarations a l'AIEA 
Conformement a l 'accord Euratom AIEA 
(INFCIRC 290), ces declarations sont etablies 
par la Direction du Controle de Securite 
d'Euratom, a partir des rapports comptables 
re~us des installations fran~aises, suivant la 
procedure precedemment decrite. 
6. Protection des donnees et confidentialite 
Dans le domaine de la protection des donnees 
et de la confidentialite, l'ensemble du systeme 
est base sur les principes suivants : 
equipements installes dans des zones et 
locaux a protection renforcee, 
separation physique des fonctions de chacun 
des ordinateurs, 
acces aux ordinateurs a partir d'identifiants 
et de mots de passe propres a chaque 
operateur, 
acces personnalises pour chaque operateur : 
acces a certains comptes et dans chacun de 
ces comptes a certaines fonctions (lecture, 
ecriture, mis a jour), 
transmissions telematiques reservees aux 
informations non classifiees pour les besoins 
de la defense, 
enregistrement des tentatives de connexion 
sur un journal des communications exploite 
quotidiennement. 
En ce qui concerne la securite de 
fonctionnement, on notera : 
la realisation de sauvegardes quotidiennes, 
l'alimentation electrique sur reseau secouru, 
la protection des machines par un onduleur et 
module de distribution electrique. 
7. Les developpements futurs 
Afin de parfaire l'evolution du systeme de 
centralisation de la comptabilite des matieres 
nucleaires aux fins de servir au mieux leur 
securite, diverses evolutions sont prevues ; 
certaines en cours de test actuellement 
entreront en service operationnel d'ici fin 
1991, d'autres seront realisees au cours des 
annees a venir. 
7.1. Les developpements dont la mise en service 
est prevue d'ici fin 1991 
Ils concernent la generalisation d'une 
procedure d'accuse de reception et la mise en 
place de correlations informatisees entre les 
declarations de variation de stock et les 
operations de transport et/ou d'exportation. 
7.1.1. Generalisation de la procedure d'accuse 
de reception 
Depuis son origine, le systeme actuel 
fonctionne en mode debit/credit pour ce qui 
concerne les expeditions de matieres nucleaires 
d'un ensemble technique a un autre. En effet, il 
n'avait pas ete envisage alors de gerer des 
masses de matieres nucleaires en cours de 
transit sur le territoire national. 
Ce credit automatique, sur le compte du 
destinataire, des quantites de matieres 
annoncees par l'expediteur, n'interdisait 
cependant pas a ce premier de declarer les 
eventuelles divergences constatees entre les 
quantites et qualites des matieres annoncees et 
celles reconnues. Cette declaration restait 
cependant une declaration unilaterale et le 
cha1nage avec la declaration de livraison 
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d'origine etait delicat, notamment lorsque les 
ecarts etaient constates plusieurs mois, voire 
plusieurs annees apres l'arrivee des matieres 
chez le destinataire. Pour ces diverses raisons, 
une procedure d'accuse de reception va etre 
generalisee d'ici fin 1991. Elle repose sur les 
principes enonces ci-apres : 
Le destinataire doit prendre toutes les 
dispositions pour conna1tre de fa~on precise en 
quantite et en qualite toutes les entrees de 
matieres nucleaires dans son etablissement ou 
son installation. 
Parmi ces dispositions doivent figurer des 
procedures relatives a la reconnaissance des 
matieres entrant dans ]'installation. Compte 
tenu des moyens techniques et des moyens de 
mesure dont dispose l'unite destinataire, la 
qualite et la precision de cette reconnaissance 
ne peut qu'etre progressive dans le temps. Les 
procedures precitees doivent en consequence 
mentionner les differentes etapes de ces 
contr6les dont le 1cr doit intervenir dans les 
24 heures qui suivent l'arrivee des matieres 
dans ]'installation. 
C'est sur la base de ces contr6les 
preliminaires que le destinataire fera conna1tre 
son accord sur les donnees comptables relatives 
a 1 'expedition ou fera etat des divergences 
constatees, en emettant un BDOMN de reception de 
matieres nucleaires. 
Celui-ci permettra : 
en comptabilite centralisee de cha1ner les 
declarations respectives du destinataire et 
de l'expediteur, 
d'annuler et de remplacer, par l'accuse de 
reception, en comptabilite centralisee le 
credit temporaire des comptes du destinataire 
par les donnees fournies par l'expediteur, 
de ne crediter le destinataire des quantites 
et qualites de matieres reconnues qu'a la 
date reelle d'arrivee de celles-ci dans son 
installation, 
pour l'organisme de contr6le d'etre informe 
sans delai des eventuelles divergences entre 
expediteur et destinataire. 
Il convient cependant des a present de noter 
que cette procedure n'engagera en aucune fa~on 
la responsabilite de l'unite emettrice de 
l'accuse de reception lors de la mise en 
evidence ulterieure d'un litige portant sur des 
elements d'information dont la verification 
n'aurait pas ete prevue aux contr6les precites. 
Au plan des declarations faites a Euratom, 
cet accuse de reception conduira : 
soit a une seule declaration de type RN, RD 
ou RF lorsque la reception (accuse de 
reception) sera declaree au cours du meme 
mois que la livraison, 
soit a une premiere declaration de type RN, 
RD ou RF generee par le credit automatique 
temporaire du destinataire, puis pour la 
periode au cours de laquelle sera declare 
l'accuse de reception~ une annulation "D" de 
la declaration de credit temporaire et ~ une 
d~claration d'ajout "A" pour l'accus~ de 
r~ception. 
7.1.2. Mise en place de correlations 
informatisees entre les declarations de 
variation de stock et les op~rations de 
transport et/ou d'exportation 
Au plan de la reglementation nationale, 
lorsqu'une livraison de matieres nucl~aires fait 
l'objet d'un transport, il appartient au 
transporteur DU a l'exp~diteur qui l'a mandate 
d'adresser a un service particulier de 
l'IPSN/DSMR 15 jours avant l'ex~cution du 
transport, certains documents en fonction du 
type de transport effectu~ et des qualit~s et 
quantit~s de matieres mises en jeu. Il s'agit, 
soit d'un pr~avis, soit d'une demande 
d'autorisation speciale. Apres examen ce 
service accorde au transporteur et/o~ au 
destinataire, selon les cas, une autorisation 
d'ex~cution ou une autorisation speciale. 
Jusqu'alors il ~tait procede mensuellement 
et manuellement au rapprochement des 
informations fournies sur ces preavis ou 
demandes d'autorisations speciales avec celles 
figurant sur les declarations de variation de 
stock. 
D'ici fin 1991 les ref~rences des 
autorisations d'ex~cution ou des autorisations 
speciales seront communiquees aux operateurs des 
installations concernees, charge a ceux-ci de 
faire figurer ces r~f~rences sur les 
declarations de variation de stock adressees a 
la comptabilite centralisee. 
Le lien entre les transports et les 
variations de stock sera alors etabli avec une 
grande fiabilit~ autorisant ainsi des 
traitements et comparaisons informatisees des 
donnees contenues. 
7 .I. 3. Mise en place de corr~lations 
informatisees entre les d~clarations de 
variation de stock et les op~rations 
d'exportation 
Certains transferts de matieres nucl~aires 
vers l'etranger doivent donner lieu a une 
notification prealable d'exportation dans le 
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cadre de l'article 24 du reglement d'Euratom ou 
dans celui d'un accord avec l'AIEA. (INFCIRC 
290, INFCIRC 207 add 1). 
Cette notification etablie sur la base des 
donn~es fournies par le Service d'application 
des controles internationaux de l'IPSN/DSMR 
donne lieu a l'ouverture d'un dossier 
specifique. La reference de ce dossier sera, par 
un p~ocessus identique au prec~dent, transmis au 
gest10nnaire de 1 'unite expeditrice · il lui 
appartiendra de transcrire cette refe~ence sur 
sa declaration de stock permettant ainsi 
d'etablir un lien etroit entre ces deux domaines 
et d'effectuer des traitements et comparaisons 
7.2. Les developpements pr6vus pour les annees a 
venir 
* 
Devraient etre entrepris en 1992 
au titre du controle national : 
la generalisation du cryptage des 
transmissions telematiques utilis~es avec nos 
correspondants, 
une nouvelle analyse de 
informatique, notamment 
protection contre les 
virus, 
s~curite du systeme 
vis-a-vis de la 
intrusions et les 
l'examen des possibilites de retransmission 
par ligne telematique des documents edites 
mensuellement et adresses aux op~rateurs, 
l'analyse, tant au plan technique que juridique, des systemes de signature 
electronique et de tel~-authentification 
visant a se substituer a la signature 
manuscrite port~e sur les declarations 
comptables, l'objectif vise est en effet a 
terme la suppression quasi totale de la 
circulation des documents comptables sous 
forme "Papier". 
* dans le cadre des controles internationaux : 
la mise en service d'une liaison t~l~matique 
crypt~e avec la Direction du controle de 
S~curite d'Euratom afin de permettre la 
transmission des rapports de variation de 
stock de l'ensemble des installations 
franr;aises, par ligne, et remplacer les 
bandes magnetiques utilisees aujourd'hui. 
THE COMPU1ERIZED NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANCY SYS1EM FOR THE NEW SIEMENS 
M OX-FUEL FABRICATION PLANT 
E. Haas, G. Latzel, E. Miinz 
SIEMENS Brennelementewerk, Hanau, Germany 
According to the provisions of the Atomic Law of the Fe-
deral Republic of Germany a new production facility desi-
gned as largely atomated plant is under construction. For 
this new facility also the Computerized Nuclear Material 
Accountancy System had to be newly developed and inte-
grated into a production information system as part of the 
overall CIM-Concept. 
The Nuclear Material Accountancy System has been deve-
loped as a "on-line"-system on a Siemens MX 500-75 
computer with the UNIX-operating system SI NIX and the 
database INGRES. The chosen relational database system 
permits a high flexibility in the utilization of the accounting 
data and in the generation of records and reports. In the 
first implementation step the system will be operated as a 
off-line system with a manual data input via PC's at the 
working stations. 
Introduction 
Under the provisions of the Atomic Law of the Federal 
Republik of Gennany the new production facility for the 
Mox-fuel fabrication had to be designed as highly automa-
ted plant. Part of the concept to reach the required stan-
dard of remote controlled production is the CIM Concept 
(Computer Integrated Manufacturing) which integrates the 
data processing systems such as 
- production planning (PPS) 
-laboratory management (LVS) 
- quality assurance (CAQ) 
- nuclear material control and accountancy (KMO) 
into a production information system. Intelligent worksta-
tion systems are the interface between the process control 
and the master control level. These systems are connected 
with the master control level data procesing system through 
the SINEC H2B - and/or SINEC-Hl-bus. The data pro-
cessing system architecture is shown in Fig. I. 
Basically, the data processing-supported nuclear material 
control and accountancy system has the following tasks: 
- collecting the data of any movement of nuclear material 
during the production with the possibility to call at any 
time the current data of the nuclear material distribution 
within the production plant by booking them "on site" as 
real inventory. In addition also the book inventory of the 
plant and of the material balance areas according to the 
Particular Safeguards Provisions (PSP) can be called at any 
time. 
- detection of "hidden inventory" and "hold up" by com-
parison of real and book values in the accounting positions 
and by analysis of the accounting data collected. 
- preventive control for meeting material related restrictions 
due to license requirements. criticallity control and radiation 
protection. 
- generation of accounting reports according to national 
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and international commitments and regulations as well as 
the generation of internal documentation and statistics. 
Scope of functions 
The nuclear material control and accountancy system is 
mainly based on measures and measurements in any case 
necessary for operation purposes with regard to quality 
control and quality assurance, supervision of the production 
and the flow control of material in order to assure the criti-
callity safety. For the purpose of the material control and 
accountancy as early as possible, identifiable, countable and 
traceable items are created in a discontinuous, batchwise 
production mode. This builts together \vith the division of 
the plant into small subunits for accounting purposes the 
basis of the accountancy system. 
The production batches differ from each other by their 
different production - and quality levels and are divided into 
individual containers, wluch can be retraced. The data struc-
tures of the material and the location are connected with 
each other through the transfer function. The individual 
booking items of the system receive all data of the nuclear 
material with respect to quantity, batch, production - and 
quality status or their changes through the protocols about 
the nuclear material movement from one local balance unit 
to another. 
The total and type of the data compiled on the basis of this 
principle permit continuous balancing and/or balance chec-
king, with chronologically and also locally delineable resol-
ving power. 
The "chronological resolvtng power" is due to the determi-
nation of quality criteria by means of chemical analysis, a 
time-consuming measuring method which destroys material, 
and in which furthem10re the analysis result is always avai-
lable only after a certain time delay. This means that calcu-
lated or estimated values must be used for balancing or for 
compilation of an overview of the current distribution of 
nuclear material until analysis results are available, unless 
old analysis figures can be extrapolated. 
The local resolving power with regard to distribution of 
nuclear material in the plant is, essentially, a function of the 
instrumentation, and of the division of the plant and flow 
into localizable and identifiable sub-units. Equipment and 
plant hold-up (hidden inventory) remam~ inaccessible for 
measurements under running process conditions. However, 
estimation is possible on the basis of the data obtainable 
from the accounting system. 
Besides, the recording of the data transfer permits the re-
presantation of a so-called "batch history" for each genera-
ted production batch. The batch-history shows the begin-
ning, processing and losses etc. of the batches. Thus, it is 
possible to retrace the material history from the finished 
product to raw material and backwards. 
The history of each container can be retraced and called 
through its container identification in such way as applied 
for the batch. 
The system also allows to establish for any point in time 
the nuclear material inventolies and their changes for each 
local area on the basis of the respective preceding invento-
ry. These features of the accountancy system and the data-
transfer to the inspectorate& as described later in this paper 
also built an important basis of the safeguards concept for 
the new MOX-fuel fabrication plant.' 1121 
According to the EURATOM-regulation, the book- and 
real inventories are managed separately from each other. 
The book inventories are composed of the sum of all inputs 
and outputs of the plant (or material balance-areas) where-
as the real inventories are composed of the sum of booking 
item's inventories acquired through the data transfer func-
tion. The difference between the book - and the real inven-
tories (Material Unaccounted For) results from positive or 
negative differences found out in the individual accountancy 
units by keeping the real inventories. 
Softwarestructure 
The accountancy system (KM'O) was realized on a 
SIEMENS MX-500 computer by the use of SINIX as ope-
rating system and INGRES as relational database. As tools 
for programming the system were used 
- ABF/OSL (4GL) 
- Embedded SQL in C 
- Vifred 
- Report Writer 
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The use of a relational database management system allows 
at any time changes of relation of data in the tables. This 
special feature in using a relational database system results 
in a high flexibility in the report system as well as in the 
evaluation of those data. 
Databases of the data processing system for the nuclear 
material accountancy which are identical, however, indepen-
dent of each other cover 
- the accountancy system of book and real inventories 
- a production preparation - and planning sector 
- an "inventory" sector. 
Within the production preparation sector, it is possible for 
example, to keep any kind of data e.g. expected receipts or 
fuel element composition which will be later used in the real 
system as accountancy data. The purpose of the inventory 
sector is to freeze the status of inventory taking for later 
generation of the PIL after completion of the PIV so that 
after tag check and sample taking the production can go on 
without interruptions. The access to the individual sectors or 
the work in these sectors is possible with the same mask 
system. 
The nuclear material accountancy system ist operated thro-
ugh a hierarchical menu tree. The operation is basically 
objectoriented, that means, the operator chooses at first the 
data he wants to process (for example a batch) then the 
function he intends to carry out using these data (for ex-
ample, filing of new analysis data). 
In processing any function, the operator is supported by the 
system which indicates him the existing data for his data 
selection. After the operator can select the required data 
and go into the requested processing function branch. 
The menu tree always begins with a central log-in mask in 
which any operator must identify himself with his identity 
number nnd password against the system. 
From the centrnl mask, any application specific mask can be 
rl!achl!d through data s<!l<!ction masks. This application-
specific mask on its turn can have submasks. The nuclear 
material accountancy system offers the following functions: 
- Administration 
With the help of the application "Administration" a selected 
database can be locked and secured. In addition a copy of 
the LII can be generated. 
- Parameterization 
Covering the production plant configuration, which means, 
the definition of system parameters used by any nuclear 
material production control. 
- Master data 
This function sector defines the local structures of the plant 
such as accountancy units. rooms, material balance areas 
etc. as well as their material related limitations. 
- Containers 
Containing all information about valid container "names", 
and their specific data as tara weigh~ etc. 
-Batch 
In this section all data about the production batches, analy-
tical results and the history of the batches are kept. 
-Transfers 
The production uses this function in order to inform the 
nuclear material accountancy system about any material 
movements. 
- Limit checks 
Comparising check for exceeded limits based on the para-
meterized limits, within data transfer dialogues. An excee-
ded limit is protocolled and can be called through an infor-
mation function at any time. 
- Real inventory and correction 
This function provides above all the Division for Nuclear 
Material Control And Accountancy with information and is 
used for making data corrections necessary such as roun-
ding, NT -corrections, determined differences in the real 
inventories of the accountancy units etc. 
- Book inventory 
Covering the balance reports such as inventory change -
material balance report etc. printed in accordance \\1th 
national and international regulations. 
The protection against unauthorized access to the data 
Inventory of the nuclear material accountancy system and 
the functions of the system is of great importance. Any 
user being authorized to have access to this supervision 
system Is recorded in a table where one can see 
- the user's name 
- user's password (in cryptic letters) 
- user class to which the user is allocated 
In the user class, following authorizations are specified such 
as: 
- Authorization for access to functions and masks 
autorizations for access to masks specify which masks, a 
user class is allowed to select. Authorizations for access 
to functions specify which funtions (function keys) a user 
class is allowed to initiate (operate) within a mask. In 
addition to each authorization for access to masks or 
functions of a user class, it is possible to file an autoriza-
tion string which regulates the authorizations within the 
function, for example, within a master data mask. The 
contents is function-related and is evaluated only by the 
respective function itself. 
- Authorization for access to the terminal 
authorizations for access to the terminal specify the 
masks and functions which are permissible on a specified 
terminal in the network. 
- Authorization for access to a specified location 
authorizations for access to a specified location specifies 
for each user class such locations (production locations) 
where the functions are allowed to be applied. 
Any trial for an unauthorized access to the system func-
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tions will be recorded in a separate table containing time, 
function and used identification, respectively pass-word. 
Accountancy data transfer to an "Tn Field PC" of the in-
spectorate& 
For inspection and verification purposes the inspectorate& 
will be supplied with a modified version of the system kee-
ping only the safeguards relevant data as operators declara-
tion running on a PC. Via a periodic data transfer by floppy 
disc or tape the Inspectors will have available for their in-
spections ncivities 
- the actual material distribution in the facility (real inven-
tory) 
- the book inventories 
- the running MUF-account 
- transfer records 
- records of any correction effecting book or real account. 
In addition all data defining the system as parametrization, 
master data, container and batch data \\1ll be updated. 
The modified version does not allow any change of data but 
contains the same record and report system. Due to the 
availability of the transfer records the inspectorate& can 
select information needed to be compared with indepen-
dently collected verification results. 
The system includes an additional dBASE-interface for use 
of selected data in subsequent MS-DOS systems. 
Hardware configuration 
The nuclear material accountancy system has been designed 
as central database system where the material flow is acqui-
red on decentralized workstation systems. In order to achie-
ve a high safety degree against hardware components failure, 
the production is subdivided into cells to each one of them 
is allocated an intelligent workstation server. Here we started 
from the idea to maintain the material flow within each 
production cell, should the central system not be available. 
Each workstation server has the production data of its pro-
duction cell. This means that all data are maintained twice 
within the whole network, on the one hand on the work-
station systems and on the other hand, on the central com-
puter. 
The material flow is acquired through a screen mask on the 
individual workstation systems (PC 32.30). The workstation 
PC is connected with the nuclear material accountancy 
system computer through the SINEC H2D and SINEC-H 1-
bus. The operating system UNIX is used for these work-
station systems. Some workstation systems are used as cell 
servers thus having their own database where their respective 
central database section is kept as redundant. 
/1/ E. Haas, W. Hagenberg, A New Safeguards Concept at 
ALKEM MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant, Proc. 3rd Int. Conf. 
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/2/ E. Haas, W. Hagenbcrg, M.J. Canty, Material Control and 
Accountancy at the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant 
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ABSTRACT 
The paper descibes the integrated computer 
control system on British Nuclear Fuels' new Thermal 
Oxide Reprocessing Plant at Sellafield. lt explains the 
hierarchical structure and the r61e of the major 
components. 
The paper provides an outline description of the 
"Conventional" Nuclear Materials Control and 
Accountancy and the on-line Near Real Time Materials 
Accountancy Systems. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
British Nuclear Fu~ls' Thermal Oxide 
Reprocessing Plant (THORP), presently under 
construction at Sellafield in the UK, is the largest current 
process plant project in western Europe, with a design 
capacity of 1200 ton of Uranium per annum. The 
reprocessing plant is due for completion in 1992, and the 
fuel receipt and pond storage facilities are already 
operational. 
The plant will operate as an integrated facility that 
includes Fuel Receipt and Storage, Head-End Plant, 
Chemical Separation, Purification, Finishing for both 
Uranium and Plutonium and waste handling processes 
prior to conditioning and subsequent storage of the waste 
in other facilities. 
With the scale of THORP, marshalling together 
the inordinate quantity of process information and 
operational actions to a single location is a considerable 
task. The use of computer-based equipment has clear 
advantages and has been incorporated into an integrated 
control and information systems structure. 
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2 HIERARCHIAL SYSTEMS STRUCTURE 
At the top of the hierarchical systems structure is 
the Chemical Plant Information Computer (CPIC). As 
well as CPIC, the hierarchical environment contains a 
large Distributed Control System (DCS), a Head-End 
Central Computer (HECC), an Automatic Sampling 
Computer (ASC), Receipt and Storage Information 
Computer and over a hundred programmable logic 
controllers. The major components reside on a local area 
network which also provides external connection to other 
facilities on the Sellafield site including:-
Sellafield Laboratory Information Management 
System (SLIMS); 
Encapsulation Plant Information Computer, and 
Sellafield Nuclear Materials Accountancy and 
Safeguards Office (NMASO) Computer. 
The network is based on the proprietary Ethernet 
data network and a simplified schematic of the network 
is shown in Figure 1. Communication is executed using 
the proprietary software packages SQLN ET and 
DECNET. 
3 SYSTEM MAJOR COMPONENTS 
Chemical Plant Information Computer 
The CPIC provides, as one of its r61es, the nuclear 
materials control and accountancy function for the 
THORP Head-End, Chemical Separation and Uranium 
and Plutonium Finishing. In addition to this r61e, the CPIC 
is required to provide the following facilities:-
- Production Planning; 
Data Archiving; 
Decision Support; 
Solvent Accounting; 
Tank Sentencing Data Analysis; 
Vessel Calibration Calculations, and 
Daily, Weekly and Monthly Report Generation. 
Plant data that are required to perform the above 
tasks are received from the other systems on the network 
within a real-time environment an outline diagram of 
which is shown in Figure 2. 
Distributed Control System 
The bu~k of the data coming to the CPIC will be 
from the DCS &2. Plant parameters such as tank levels, 
temperatures, pressures, densities, weights, vessel 
status, etc. from each of the plant areas are stored by the 
DCS onto six associated historic recorders. Accordingly, 
both current and historic data records relating to process 
parameters are available to the CPIC, via the network, for 
subsequent analysis and interpretation. 
Head-End Central Computer 
Within the Head-End Mechanical Plant individual 
fuel element movements are tracked from building entry, 
at each stage of transfer, up to the dissolver batch by the 
HECC. When a rack arrives at the Head-End hand-over 
point, the fuel is validated against the current customer 
campaign before entry is allowed. The fuel is then moved 
through the feed-pond processes to the removal stations. 
The individual fuel elements are removed from the 
Multi-Element Bottle (MEB) or container and monitored. 
The fuel monitoring system is fed details about the fuel 
element from the HECC. The monitoring results are 
stored by the HECC againest the fuel element details. If 
the fuel element passes the set criteria for clearance to 
shear, the fuel element is allowed to transfer to the Shear 
Cave. When the fuel element is ready for shearing the 
H ECC feeds the local control system with the associated 
cutting pattern for that fuel element. As the fuel element 
is sheared, the HECC records which dissolver and 
basket the fuel is dissolved in and allocates a unique 
batch number. Regular detailed reports are transmitted 
to the CPIC covering the fuel movements. 
Automatic Sampling Computer 
The Autosampling System3 provides an 
automatic sampling facility for the chemical separation 
process and informs the CPIC each time a process 
control or accountancy sample is taken. The majority of 
the samples are scheduled but the system provides the 
facility to request additional samples when required; e.g. 
repeat samples for laboratory purposes. 
Sellafield Laboratory Information Management System 
Sometime later, dependent on the type and 
complexity of the analysis, the results of the analysis are 
sent by the SLIMS computer to the CPIC. This 
information is used in determining calibration factors, in 
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determining the suitability of liquor for conditioning and 
tank sentencing and by the nuclear materials accounting 
function in deriving Uranium and Plutonium 
concentrations. 
4 AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
Production Planning 
The CPIC maintains the production plan, 
containing all fuel details required to run the overall 
production campaign and specific Head-End campaigns 
for onward transmission to the HECC. Collation of the 
production plan is initiated by the supervisor creating a 
list of MESs/containers required for processing. The list 
is accessed by the NMASO computer which compiles 
futher information about the individual fuel elements from 
its records and transmits this back to the CPIC. 
Additional information is added by the supervisor as 
necessary, and only a supervisor can change the order 
or contents of the plan, although the plan is available for 
viewing by operators at all CPIC terminals. The CPIC 
transmits to Receipt and Storage the identification 
numbers of the required MESs/containers for the 
planned Head-End campaign. The Receipt and Storage 
computer will use the information to id~ntify the storage 
rack and hence the location of the required 
MESS/containers in the storage ponds. This enables the 
work in Receipt and Storage to be planned to match the 
requirements of Head-End. 
5 NUCLEAR MATERIALCONTROLAND 
ACCOUNTANCY 
The performance of the THORP materials control 
and accountancy system relies on the automatic 
recording and analysis of accountancy data taken by the 
CPIC and its subordinate computer systems from the 
plant instrumentation throughout THORP. Specific 
measurement requirements have been specified for 
identified vessels and at product filling stations solely for 
accountancy purposes. Within CPIC, two types of 
nuclear materials accounting will be provided:-
"Conventional" Special Nuclear Materials 
Accountancy for Plutonium and Uranium, and 
Near Real Time Materials Accountancy (NRTMA) 
for Plutonium. 
"Conventional" Materials Accountancy 
For nuclear materials control and accountancy 
purposes the plant has been divided into a number of 
physically discrete accountancy areas which will form the 
basis of the Material Balance Areas (MBA's) for 
safeguards purposes. A schematic diagram of the 
arrangements is shown in Figure 3 and depicts the five 
main areas within the THORP complex. 
Area 1/2 - Feed-Pond which includes the pond 
area, from Rack Transfer Machine handover to the Fuel 
Elevator. Head-End which includes the Fuel Shear, 
Dissolvers, Basket Handling and Hulls Monitoring 
equipment and Feed Clarification. The Head-End 
Accountancy Tanks (23 cubic metres) equipped with 
weight and level measuring systems are also located in 
this area. 
Ama....a. - The main Chemical Separation Plant, 
including HEP/SEP Buffer Tanks, Uranium and 
Plutonium Extraction and Purification Plant, Uranium 
Finishing and U03 drum weighing, Plutonium Nitrate 
Accountancy Harp Tanks and Liquid Waste Treatment 
systems. 
Area 4/5 - Plutonium Finishing including 
Plutonium Nitrate Buffer and Feed Tanks, Plutonium 
Finishing Line and product weighing and preparation of 
Product Can for storage. Additionally, there is a 
Plutonium-Contaminated Materiai(PCM) handling area 
and storage capacity for Oxalate Mother Liquors (OML) 
from the finishing process. Plutonium Can buffer storage 
area including systems for can inspection prior to storage 
or export. 
Am.a...Q- Main Plutonium storage area. 
~- Main Uranium storage area. 
In each case, transfers of materials between such 
areas, or from these areas to adjacent facilities, will be 
automatically identified by the subordinate plant control 
systems and signalled to the CPIC. Within the Chemical 
Plant materials tranfers from vessels across material 
boundaries are controlled and require authorization by 
operations personnel through the DCS. These 
transactions together with known steady state conditions 
trigger "Accountancy Transfer Reports" from the DCS to 
the CPIC. The reports are unique for each combination 
of issuing and receiving vessels. During the plutonium 
finishing line processes of can filling, packaging and 
storage, product accountancy data are collated, and 
validated. Data validation consists of checking can 
weights are within set limits, checking cans are in their 
expected locations and can numbers are within the range 
specified for the type of can. This data collection and 
validation is performed by the local control systems 
which regularly transmit the information up to CPIC 
through the DCS. Similar accountancy facilties are 
provided in the Uranium drum handling and storage 
areas with drum details being transmitted by the local 
control systems up to CPIC through the DCS. Such data, 
together with information from other THORP computers 
systems, are collated and stored in a relational database 
on CPIC. This will ensure that a single, integrated 
database of accountancy information is held on CPIC to 
meet the various statutory, commercial, materials 
accountancy and safeguards requirements under which 
THORP will operate. 
The conventional accounting facility produces the 
physical inventory at the end of a production campaign 
and maintains complete transaction lists for all the 
materials balance areas throughout THORP. This 
651 
information is transferred to NMASO to assist in the 
compilation of its sitewide accounts and reports. 
An important consideration of the design objective 
is to ensure that the materials balance for individual 
areas can be rapidly updated to facilitate high standards 
of materials control. To that end, BNFL's NRTMA system 
will play a significant r61e. 
Near Real lime Material Accountancy 
BNFL has been engaged in the development of 
NRTMA since the early 1980s and has had a functional 
prototype system available for two years. That system is 
currently being restructured and enhanced for use in the 
Chemical Separation and Plutonium Finishing Areas of 
THORP. lt will reside within the CPIC enviroment as an 
on-line facility. Accordingly, data collected and 
processed for "Conventional Accountancy" purposes will 
be readily available to the NRTMA program modules, 
together with addional information required by NRTMA, 
for further analysis. In all, the following data sources will 
be available to, and analysed by, the materials 
accountancy tasks on CPIC:-
Piant instrumentation readings in engineering 
units (temperature, density, level and weight); 
Vessel status information from which 
accountancy transaction data "Events" can be 
determined; 
Vessel calibration data; 
Measurement uncertainty data for use in error 
propagation modules; 
Process models to derive the plutonium inventory 
in pulsed columns, evaporators and inter-vessel 
pipework; 
Data from the Plutonium Inventory Monitoring 
System (PIMS) installed in the Plutonium 
Finishing Line, and 
Analytical data from plant samples. 
Relevant data from each plant area will be 
processed by the NRTMA facility through a common 
series of program modules (although certain modules 
require optimization for specific reprocessing 
campaigns). The overall structure of the NRTMA facility 
is show,r_Jn Figure 4, and explained in more detail in other 
papers being presented at this Symposium. Overall, 
however, the design philosophy of the NRTMA system 
developed by BNFL is based on the following four 
objectives:-
To automate and integrate the capture and 
analysis of process data, thereby minimising 
operator involvement; 
To present the results of analysis in a clear, 
uncluttered manner to facilitate the use of NRTMA 
as a materials control tool; 
To ensure the facility is robust, both statistically 
and in respect of plant operational conditions, and 
To indicate, on the basis of the available 
information, the quality of the NRTMA balance 
derived by the system (in the event of spurious or 
missing data values). 
The Near Real Time Materials Accounting Facility 
duplicates that of the "Conventional" nuclear accounting, 
but only in the plutonium materials balance areas. The 
significant difference between the facilities is one of 
timing, with the NRTMA facility being capable of 
determing the inventory in "near real time" while the plant 
is operational. 
6 OPERATOR INTERFACE 
The operator interface is via dual session, colour 
visual display units. These are located throughout the 
building but in particular within the management centre, 
the display enviroment is a menu driven hierarchy. The 
outline diagram of which is shown in Figure 5. 
A menu display is a list of textual titles of options. 
Selection is by positioning of a cursor against the option, 
or entry of an associated screen number. The hierarchy 
allows restrictions to be placed on which personnel are 
authorised to access the menu and provides menus 
aimed at specific process cycles or facilities. Movement 
down the hierarchy provides either a more specific menu, 
or the final detailed "form". Information is accessed via 
the menu hierarchy and presented to the user in "form" 
type displays. These displays detail the database 
information in a simplified way. A ''form" is as screen 
layout with a ''fill-in-the-blanks" or "view-only" format of 
data, allowing information to be entered or queried. 
Access is password protected, with three levels of 
access:- Operator; Supervisor and Maintenance. One 
branch of the menu hierarchy covers accountancy whilst 
another branch is provided for the Euratom Safeguards 
Inspectorate to access agreed information. 
7 QUALITY ASSU RANGE 
BNFL's engineering procedures require the 
process and mechanical offices to supply source 
documentation. The source documents were used to 
develop the THORP Division nuclear materials 
accountancy and safeguards strategies, thereby allowing 
the definition of the Works Accountancy Areas, the 
process information and the instrumentation required to 
determine the required accountancy transactions 
discussed earlier. This source information was then 
developed into the system's equipment definitions and 
specifications. · 
In order to produce computer software that 
operates as intended it is essential that the requirements 
are specified in a comprehensive and unambiguous 
manner. Accordingly, to ensure a quality product, quality 
assurance has to be applied throughout the life cycle of 
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a system development on THORP. BS5750(Part 1) has 
been mandatory on all the control and information 
systems, and, via BNFL's engineering procedures, has 
required the System and Equipment Engineering 
Department to produce detailed User Requirements 
Specifications for each system. 
The functional requirements for CPIC were 
defined in english text but were supported by a system 
context diagram, data flow diagrams and data table 
structure. In addition it was necessary to define and 
document the interface requirements to the other 
computer systems on the network. 
The system supplier (in the case of the CPIC it 
was BNFL's own Corporate Management Services) used 
this document as a reference document for the 
production of a System Definition Document, which 
detailed how the requirements were to be met, including 
the logical data model, functional breakdown, screen 
layout, forms, menu structure, detailed table structure 
and sizing. Following approval, the system supplier then 
entered the detailed design stage, producing the physical 
data modeland the module design, leading to detailed 
software design specifications for each of the modules 
identified. The output was a system context diagram, 
entity-relationship diagrams, data flow diagrams, a data 
dictionary and module specifications. 
The implementation phase then followed where 
software programmers used the detailed program 
specification to code and annotate the application 
software. A case tool embodying a data flow and data 
dictionary design methodology was used throughout the 
software design and implementation phases. The test 
requirements consisted of a comprehensive test plan 
which identified unit testing, integrated testing and final 
customer acceptance testing. 
The CPIC software, in common with that for each 
of the information computers on the network is built 
around the same relational database software package 
utilising the associated fourth generation language and 
utilities. The use of the same well proven database and 
communications software packages throughout the 
integrated system design facilitates coding, testing, and 
commissioning, which, together with common hardware 
from the Digital range of VAX machines and terminals, 
provides an integrated system with high integrity and 
lower maintenance. 
8 CONCLUSION 
Overall, the adoption of a fully integrated control 
system on THORP provides BNFL with a powerful 
information system. lt has been fully utilised to provide a 
reliable nuclear materials control and accountancy 
function. 
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NEAR REAL TIME MATERIALS ACCOUNTANCY 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR THORP 
BARRY J JONES 
British Nuclear Fuels plc 
Risley Warrington UK WA3 SAS 
0925 832159 
ABSTRACT 
BNFL is currently designing and installing a fully 
automated system of data capture, storage, and 
processing for its Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant 
(THORP) at Sellafield. A prototype Near Real Time 
Materials Accountancy (NRTMA) system has been used 
to demonstrate the advantages of this method of 
materials control to the future plant operators and their 
feedback continues to be incorporated in the 
development of user interfaces. NRTMA has been 
includ~d in the User Requirements Specification for 
Chem1cal Plant Information Computer, the top-tier 
computer which is being provided to archive, retrieve and 
analyse plant data. 
The paper describes a development programme 
of performance and quality related improvements to the 
prototype NRTMA system. Furthermore advanced 
diagnostic systems are described which ~ill help the 
operator in the resolution of anomalies. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1980s, BNFL has been committed 
to the development of Near Real Time Materials 
Accountancy (NRTMA). NRTMA holds the greatest 
potential for improving materials control and 
accountancy in large commercial plants handling high 
strategic value materials and, therefore, THORP has 
always been seen as the main target for the benefits of 
this development. 
At the last ESARDA symposium, the components 
of an. NR1TM~ system for a commercial plant were descnbed . S1nce that time a major achievement in the 
development of a system for operational ~se has been 
the building of a prototype NRTMA system . 
2 THE CHEMICAL PLANT INFORMATION 
COMPUTER 
BNFL is currently designing and installing a fully 
automated system of data capture, storage, and 
processing for THORP. The components of this 
integr~ted computer system are described in another 
paper . At the top of the hierarchy is the Chemical Plant 
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Information Computer (CPIC) which is provided with 
functions for materials accountancy and control. 
3 DEVELOPMENT OF NRTMA 
Two years ago, a prototype computerized NRTMA 
system was developed in BNFL's Safeguards Section 
using simulated data corresponding to steady plant 
operation, in order to establish the fundamental factors 
affecting the system's performance. Using the prototype 
NRTMA system, the Safeguards Section has been able 
to demonstrate how the advantages in statistical analysis 
of materials accountancy data can be made available to 
plant operators and non-specialist staff by means of a 
comprehensively engineered software package. 
The prototype system has been fully validated 
and, under ideal flowsheet conditions, would meet the 
NRTMA requirements for THORP. However, from a 
materials control point of view, most plants are unlikely to 
operate under ideal conditions for the following reasons:-
the in-process inventory will fluctuate due to 
normal plant behaviour, and as batches of 
material are received and despatched; 
the disposition of the inventory, and its 
measurement uncertainty, will vary with time, and 
the sizes, and the intervals between successive 
receipts and despatches of material will vary. 
Accordingly, BNFL has adopted a strategy which 
has the following aims:-
- to minimize the amount of manual effort required 
by operators to set up test parameters, and 
- to carry out initial interpretation of results. 
In order to meet these ends, a number of 
performance/quality related improvements to the 
prototype NRTMA system have been identified which will 
increase the effectiveness of the THORP materials 
accountancy and control system. These improvements 
are discussed in detail later. Furthermore, advanced 
diagnostic systems will be provided to help the operator 
in the resolution of anomalies. 
In order to support the developments described 
above, it is necessary to employ a model which can be 
used to simulate data more representative of real plant 
operating conditions. The basis of such a model existed 
in the form of the THORP stochastic models already 
being used to support plant design. However, some 
enlargement of the model was needed so that the 
necessary simulated data could be made available for 
further development and testing of the NRTMA system. 
The NRTMA Development Programme for 
THORP comprises:-
- Migration of the Prototype System to VAX 
Hardware; 
- Joint Test Generation; 
- Timing of Physical Inventories; 
- Error Propagation; 
- Anomaly Resolution, and 
- Enlargement of the Stochastic Model. 
4 MIGRATION 
The first element of the NRTMA Development 
Programme was the migration of the prototype NRTMA 
system from the IBM PC, used for the research hitherto, 
to VAX hardware, as specified for the CPIC. In addition, 
the structure of the NRTMA system was reviewed to 
bring it in line with the CPIC design, and similar Quality 
Assurance procedures adopted. 
5 JOINT TEST GENERATION 
From necessity, the performance of the prototype 
NRTMA system was based on flowsheet parameters, 
and assumptions made in regard of instrument 
performance, balance frequency and false alarm 
probability. When THORP is operational, some of these 
assumptions may prove inappropriate and parameters 
will vary between campaigns. This may have a significant 
effect on the performance of the NRTMA system, which 
can only be overcome by customizing and recalculating 
the test parameters for specific campaigns and Works 
Accountancy Areas (WAAs). 
The Joint Test Generation function is 
being developed to allow the test parameters to 
be customized for specific campaigns and 
WAAs. This development will also allow the 
operator to ask "what if" type questions to 
predict the effect of changes in the operating 
conditions or measurement system. 
The required false alarm probability must 
be specified before the Joint Test can be 
generated. Suppose that one Joint Test is 
generated for a campaign false alarm 
probability of 5%. lt would then be possible to 
generate an alternative Joint Test for a 
campaign false alarm probability of, say, 10%. 
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This second Joint Test, on account of its higher 
false alarm probability, will have a higher 
response. An alternative way of looking at this 
is that the second Joint Test will respond earlier 
to a protracted event (albeit with a higher risk of 
false alarm). This approach introduces the 
concept of an "amber'' and "red" alarm. On the 
"amber" alarm, the operator is alerted that 
something ~ be wrong, and he has the 
opportunity to make preliminary investigations. 
The "red" alarm alerts him, with more certainty, 
that something is. wrong, and action should be 
taken. 
As part of this approach using two alarm 
levels, each Joint Test would have its 
corresponding set of Page's test statistics and 
the operator could be provided with additional 
screens and print-outs from the statistical 
analysis module. However, it would be clearer 
for the operator if this additional information 
could be presented without the need for 
additional statistics and screens. The Joint Test 
generation procedure is being extended in 
such a way that the two Joint Tests will use the 
same Page's test statistics but two different H 
values (alarm levels) corresponding to the two 
campaign false alarm probabilities. In this way, 
the additional alarm levels can be clearly 
displayed without the need for additional 
displays. 
6 TIMING OF PHYSICAL INVENTORIES 
The sole purpose of doing frequent 
in-process inventory determinations is to 
achieve good results and to demonstrate 
control over nuclear materials in a timely 
manner. A major factor which determines the 
response of the Joint Test is the uncertainty 
associated with closing the materials balance. 
The materials balance error is made up of 
contributions from the opening and closing 
inventories, and from the transactions taking 
place between the two in-process inventories. 
The quality of the NRTMA system will 
depend on the timing of the in-process 
inventories, and will be influenced by factors 
such as:-
- the uncertainty in measuring the inventory; 
- the uncertainty in measuring the cumulative 
throughput since the previous in-process 
inventory; 
- the time since the previous inventory, and 
- the time available to take the remaining 
inventories in the campaign (to be consistent with 
the number of balances stipulated at the 
beginning of the campaign). 
The effect of these variables is not always 
simple or obvious. A reduction in the NRTMA 
system performance could occur if sub-optimal 
timings for in-process inventories were to be 
chosen. To avoid this happening, a function is 
necessary which will analyse the prevailing 
plant conditions and recent plant inventory and 
give readily usable advice to the operator to 
allow him to make the final choice for the timing 
of each in-process inventory. 
There are a variety of ways of selecting 
times for the taking of physical inventories. One 
way would be to divide the time between the 
beginning and end of the campaign into the 
required number of balance periods and then 
calculate the appropriate times for striking the 
materials balances. Another way would be to 
strike the materials balance at a certain time 
every so many days. The basis of the Timing of 
Physical Inventories function is that the 
expected performance of the NRTMA system 
can be calculated at a greater frequency that 
that which is necessary to achieve the requisite 
number of balances in the campaign, and the 
decision of when to actually calculate the 
materials balance and apply the Joint Test 
made after analysis of this expected 
performance data. lt is important to note that 
the materials balance would be calculated, 
possibly retrospectively, when the plant 
operating state was judged to be most 
favourable for the response of the NRTMA 
system. Furthermore, the NRTMA system does 
not demand that balances be taken at regular 
intervals of time. 
Data will be available from the stochastic 
models and will be used to develop rules for 
evaluating the expected performance of the 
Joint Test for different timings of the in-process 
inventory. An important achievement for this 
function will be to show how the optimum times 
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for calculating the materials balances can be 
proposed by the NRTMA system. Furthermore, 
it will be demonstrated that the response of the 
NRTMA system, using the timing of physical 
inventories module, is greater than if materials 
balances were taken at regular intervals, or 
when the plant was in a "standard state". 
7 ERROR PROPAGATION 
The prototype NRTMA system applies elementary 
measurement error analysis procedures. This function is 
being developed so that correlations in the data can be 
identified, calculated and then taken into account to 
obtain more realistic expressions for overall 
measurement uncertainties. False alarm probabilities, 
test procedure responses and anomaly resolution 
procedures are strongly influenced by measurement 
uncertainties and the incorporation of sufficiently 
rigorous error propagation procedures is a fundamental 
requirement. The error propagation function will require 
no input from the operator. 
The only correlations taken into account in the 
prototype system are the negative correlations between 
successive balances. These correlations occur because 
of the common inventory determination. In total, there are 
simply one less than the number of balance periods of 
these correlations, and they are stored as a vector. When 
more extended correlations are considered, this method 
of storing the correlations is not suitable. A matrix is 
necessary. The first stage in providing for extended 
correlations has been the setting up of a matrix for storing 
extended correlations, and developing supporting 
software routines. This modification has already been 
incorporated. 
The study of error propagation has been started 
by considering movements of highly active liquor from 
the Head-End to the HEP/SEP Buffers, and of plutonium 
nitrate concentrate within the harp tank suite. lt is in such 
areas, where batches of liquor will be mixed and the 
concentrations calculated from previously recorded data 
for the components, that the error propagation process 
will induce correlations large enough to be important for 
the correct calculation of inventory uncertainty. The 
sources of significant correlations in the data can only be 
identified by examining campaigns of data in populated 
data base tables, and developing procedures for 
extracting those elements required for the calculation of 
the correlations. The THORP Stochastic Model will be 
used to generate data to allow error propagation 
procedures to be developed. 
8 ANOMALY RESOLUTION 
The anomaly resolution function in the prototype 4 
system considers, one at a time, the following plausible 
models:-
- an abrupt loss/gain at any period; 
a protracted loss/gain beginning and ending at 
any periods, and 
- an inventory error at any inventory determination. 
New procedures are being developed to 
consider models with two or more components. 
The benefit for the operator is that, compared 
with the prototype system, it will be possible to 
present more information about the pattern of 
an anomaly. No additional input will be required 
by the operator to get this additional 
information. 
Whereas the anomaly resolution function in the 
prototype system has only been able to consider 
plausible models one at a time, the extended function will 
enable conditions likely to occur on operational plant to 
be considered. For example, a bias on throughput 
determination may have been occurring for a number of 
balance periods when an error is made in determining the 
in-process inventory. In such circumstances, the 
anomaly resolution procedure must be able to recognise 
contributions to the overall anomaly from a number of 
sources if it is to generate the most useful diagnostics. 
The theoretical basis for fitting composite anomaly 
resolution models has already been developed. 
Consideration is now being given to how the additional 
information should be presented to the operator. 
The anomaly resolution function in the prototype 
system was developed using data from a simulator which 
assumed steady flowsheet conditions. Each balance 
periods was taken as the same length, and regular 
throughput was assumed each balance period. The 
anomaly resolution procedure will be modified to 
accomodate plant conditions where the timing of physical 
inventories will be chosen to optimize the response of the 
NRTMA system, and throughput transactions will not 
necessarily occur at regular intervals. 
The operator will be permitted to propose 
his own "models" for inclusion in the evaluation 
and ranking. The operator may receive 
information, outside of the NRTMA system, 
about the quality of data fed to the N RTMA 
system. For example, he might be informed, 
after a calibration check, that an instrument had 
been performing so as to introduce a bias or an 
additional measurement error, or he might be 
alerted to a mistake in an analytical result. The 
operator will wish to evaluate such information 
by examining its influence on the results, which 
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may include an alarm, generated by the 
NRTMA system. Such an interactive diagnostic 
tool may prove itself particularly valuable during 
the commissioning phase, and the early stages 
of operation, when the base of experience is at 
its lowest. 
9 STOCHASTIC MODEL 
The THORP Stochastic Model is being improved 
in order to generate information about the quantities of 
plutonium associated with transfers and inventory items. 
Furthermore, the ability to introduce sources of 
measurement error is required so that the improvements 
to the prototype NRTMA system can be tested using data 
which closely resemble those possible from operating 
plant. 
10 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In terms of construction and engineering, THORP 
is a major process plant project. In terms of statistical 
data analysis, the THORP NRTMA system is also a 
major project. 
The culmination of development work since the 
early 1980s was the production of a prototype NRTMA 
system for THORP. This prototype is now being 
extended to produce an effective materials accountancy 
and control system for operational use. 
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NEAR REAL TIME MATERIALS ACCOUNTANCY 
RESOLUTION OF ANOMALIES 
JANETTE WARK 
British Nuclear Fuels plc 
Risley Warrington UK WA3 6AS 
0925 832297 
ABSTRACT 
When a single stream of materials accountancy 
data is tested, there may come a time when an anomaly 
is signalled. This means that, allowing for the false alarm 
probability which has been specified when setting up the 
testing procedure, the data stream appears to be 
inconsistent with there being no loss or gain of material. 
Test procedures are insufficient on their own; an anomaly 
resolution procedure is essential. 
The purpose of the anomaly resolution procedure 
is to provide evidence of the size and duration of the 
irregularity which caused the alarm. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
An earlier paper1 described how a Near Real Time 
Materials Accountancy (NRTMA) system could be 
broken down into a number of modules, each with a 
clearly defined function. Some modules are versatile 
and, therefore, capable of being installed as part of any 
NRTMA system. This paper concentrates on one such 
module - for anomaly resolution. 
When a single stream of materials accountancy 
data is processed and the Joint Test applied to the 
resulting series of SITMUF values, there may come a 
time when one of the test statistics exceeds the alarm 
level. 
For materials control purposes, it is just as 
important to detect an apparent gain of material as it is to 
detect an apparent loss. Therefore, two Joint Tests are 
employed to give a two-sided testi~ procedure and, 
altogether, four test statistics are used . This means that, 
allowing for the false alarm probability which has been 
specified when setting up the testing procedure, an alarm 
from the testing procedure is a signal that the data stream 
appears to be inconsistent with there being no loss QI 
gain of material. The testing procedure does D.Q1 identify 
the cause of the alarm. Therefore, it is important to have 
an anomaly resolution procedure since test procedures 
are insufficient on their own. 
A recent paper2 in the ESARDA Bulletin showed 
the sound basis for an anomaly resolution procedure but 
pointed out that more development was required to 
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produce a comprehensive procedure for operational 
purposes. Two areas for further work were identified. 
Firstly, those models which best fit the observed data 
should be ranked. Secondly, standard errors associated 
with loss, gain or error estimates need to be calculated. 
This paper addresses these two topics. 
2 RESOLVING ANOMALIES BY MAlHEMATICAL 
MODELLING 
The basis of resolving anomalies by mathe~atical 
modelling has been introduced in an earlier paper . The 
approach is made possible because of the properties of 
the SITMUF statistic. Firstly, sequences of expected 
SJTMUF values can be calculated for various plausible 
loss, gain or error models. Secondly, the SITMUFseries 
is made up of independent items with the same variance 
so that observed and expected sequences can be 
compared by the method of least squares. 
3 EXPECTED S/7MUFPATTERNS 
For any plant which is suffering no loss or gain of 
material, the expected value of the Inventory Difference, 
CUMUF and SITMUF statistics, each period, is zero. 
Once a loss or gain occurs, the expected values of these 
statistics are no longer zero. When a loss occurs, the 
expected value of the Inventory Difference and CUMUF 
will be negative. Generally, for a loss in period i, the 
expected SITMUFvalue, ~·in period j, is 
~=0 j< 
~<0 j"?. 
SITMUF patterns depend on various plant 
operating parameters, and on materials measurement 
uncertainties, and will therefore be plant dependent. 
Before expected SITMUF patterns can be derived for 
specific loss, gain or error models, a plant model is 
necessary. 
4 lHE PLANT MODEL 
2
-
7 
. I th Previous work has chosen a campa1gn eng 
cif 240 days, divided into 40 balance periods of 6 days. 
The standard deviation of the throughput measurement 
error per balance period, T, set at 1 kg gives a standard 
deviation of the campaign throughput measurement error 
of 6.325 kg. This, and the standard deviation of the 
inventory measurement error, /, of 2 kg, is consistent with 
predictions for the THORP materials accountancy and 
control system8 . This model will be used throughout the 
paper. Table I shows, for the specified plant model, the 
expected SITMUF values resulting from a gain of 1 
kilogram in any one of the first 5 periods. 
Gains 
Period 
4 
5 
Table 1: Expected SrTMUFVaJues 
for a Gain of 1 Kilogram 
SITMUFValue. in Period 
4 5 
5 COMBINATION OF VECTORS 
The values (0.44721, 0.33218, 0.22084, 0.13937, 
0.08610), in Table I, constitute the SITMUFvector for a 
1 kilogram gain in period 1. Subsequent rows of values 
constitute the SITMUFvectors for the same size gain in 
later periods. SITMUFvectors can be scaled, and added 
to one another. Because of these properties it is possible 
to calculate the expected SITMUF vector for ~ loss, 
gain or error model from a knowledge of the individual 
expected SITMUFvectors for a gain of 1 kilogram in any 
particular period. The number of basic scenarios for 
which the SITMUFvectors need to be known is therefore 
limited to the same number as there are periods in the 
campaign. 
Table 11 shows how the SITMUF vector for a 
uniform protracted gain over periods 2 to 4 can be 
derived from the individual SITMUFvectors for a gain in 
each of the periods 2, 3 and 4. 
Table 11: Derivation of Expected SITMUFVector 
for a Uniform Protracted Gain over Periods 2 to 4 
Gain Gain Expected S/TMUFValue in Period 
Period(s) (kg) 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 1 0.41523 0.27605 0.17422 0.10762 
3 1 0.40028 0.25261 0.15605 
4 1 0.39416 0.24349 
2to4 3 0.41523 0.67633 0.82099 0.50716 
2to4 1 0.13841 0.22544 0.27366 0.16905 
Table Ill shows how the SITMUF vector for an 
inventory error at the end of period 3 can be derived from 
the SITMUFvectors for a gain in period 3 and a loss in 
period 4. 
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Table Ill: Derivation of Expected SITMUFVector for 
Inventory Error at the End of Period 3 
Gain Gain Expected SITMUFValue in Period 
Period(s) (kg) 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 1 0.40028 0.25261 0.15605 
4 ·1 ·0.3941€ ·0.2434~ 
1 kg 0.40028 ·0.1415~ ·0.08744 
Inventory Error 
6 ESTIMATION OF THE BEST FIT FOR A GIVEN MODEL 
Suppose the Joint Test gives a signal in period p. 
1t has already been shown2 that, for anomaly resolution, 
it is important to consider SITMUFvalues up to the period 
after the alarm from the Joint Test, periodj, where j=P+ 1. 
Let the observed SITMUF sequence be Y1, Y2 , .. , 
Y; Let the expected SITMUFsequence corresponding to 
unit loss, gain or error, for a given model, be W1, W2, .. , 
~·Let the unknown loss, gain or error beL kilograms. 
Now the sum of squares is 
j 2 
Si= I ( Y;- LW;) 
i= 1 
What is wanted is the best estimate of L. In other 
dS· 
words, find the value of L for which~= 0. 
dS· i i 2 
-
1 
=- 2 ""Y.W.·+ 2L ""W. dL L I I L I 
dS· When~=O, 
i= 1 i= 1 
Check the 2nd derivative 
2 j 
d si=2"" w.2 
2 L I 
dL i=1 
which is always positive, so the value obtained for 
L corresponds to a minimum for Si 
Likelihoods and Standard Errors 
If x is an observation from a normal distribution 
with mean Jl and variance ci, then 
1 1 (~)2 f(x) = - e- 2 a 
& 
The probability that 5/TMUF(ri = 1) takes a value 
in the interval x to x + dx is given by 
1 2 
ke-2<x-l!) dx 
In the case of n observed 5/TMUFvalues, Y1, Y2, 
.. , Yn, and expected 5/TMUFvalues, G1 W1, G1 W2, .. , 
G1 Wn corresponding to a gain of G1 kilograms for a given 
model (1) W1, W2, .. , Wn, the joint probability ol the 
observations, regarded as a function of the unknown 
gain, G1, is called the Likelihood Function of the sample, 
and is written 
For a second model (2), and a corresponding gain 
of G2 kilograms 
Therefore, the relative likelihood of model (1) 
compared with model (2) is 
The variance of t;, where t; is the maximum 
likelihood estimate, is 
1 
2 
E{ _li} 
ad 
where t; is the value of G which maximizes /, and 
I is log( likelihood) 
n 
I= n log k- ~.L (Y;- GW;) 2 
I= 1 
if=- i Wf 
ad i=1 
and the standard error of t; is therefore 
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1 
(i w;J-
=1 
Example 
For the plant model described above, and a 
campaign fajse alarm probability of 5%, it has already 
been shown that a suitable Joint Test for detecting gains 
has the following parameters:-
H1 = 0, K1 = 3.4758, H2 = 7.8, K2 = 0.24389 
The corresponding Joint Test for detecting losses 
has negative values for the test parameters:-
H1 = 0, K1 = -3.4758, H2 = -7.8, K2 = -0.24389 
The Joint Test procedure is made up of two 
components, each of which is a Page's Test. For these 
components the two test statistics S1 and S2 are defined 
by:-
51 0 = 0 
S2o= 0 
S1 ;= max (0,51 i-1 + Y;- K1 ) 
52;= max (0,S2i-1 + Y;- K2.) 
i>O 
i> 0 
where Y1, Y2, ... , Y; is the series of SITMUFvalues 
generated from ID1, .•• ,1D;. the series of Inventory 
Difference values. The Joint Test is applied in such a way 
than an alarm is given if 51;> H1 otherwise no alarm is 
signalled unless 52;;,: H2. 
Consider a sequence of observed 5/TMUF 
values. Table IV shows such a sequence.We wish to 
determine which loss, gain or error scenarios best fit the 
observed data. 
Table IV: Observed SfTMUFValues 
Period Observed SITMUF 
Value 
1 0.419 
2 -0.093 
3 0.358 
4 -4.735 
5 -2.012 
The Joint Test alarms in period 4, the SITMUF 
sequence is analysed for the first 5 periods, since as 
previously explained it is important to consider 5/TMUF 
values up to the period after the alarm. 
All plausible models are considered and the 
expected 5/TMUF vector is calculated for each model. An abrupt model is where the loss or gain begins and 
ends in the same period, a protracted model is where the 
loss or gain extends over more than one period, and an 
inventory error model is where an error has occured at an 
inventory determination. For each model, the observed 
and expected sequences are compared by the least 
squares method and the best estimate of the anomaly 
and the least squares value are calculated. The models 
are then ranked in order of their least squares values and 
the likelihood of each model calculated relative to the 
most likely one. 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In a recent paper2, it was shown how a series of 
observed SITMUF values could be compared with the 
expected SITMUFvalues for a chosen loss, gain or error 
model, and the best fit of that model found using standard 
least squares techniques. This paper describes the 
underlying mathematical principles of a computer 
application which is used to evaluate an exhaustive 
Table V shows the results of the analysis range of models for abrupt loss (or gain), protracted loss 
performed on the above SITMUF sequence. The table (or gain) and inventory errors. 
shows that the most likely explanation of the alarm is that For the operator the product of the Anomaly 
there has been an abrupt loss of 10.7kg in period 4. The Resolution module is directly useable information about 
data for this example were simulated using an abrupt loss the plant events most likely to have given rise to the alarm 
of 1 Okg in period 4. from the Joint Test procedure. 
2 
3 
4 
Table V· First Ten Loss/Error Scenarios for the Observed SITMUF Values I 
Model Periods Anomaly Standard Least Relative 
First Last 
Estimate Error Squares Likelihood 
1 4 4 -10727 2266 4.362 1.000 
2 3 4 -9280 2285 10.280 0.003 
3 4 5 -12366 3127 11.136 0.001 
4 3 5 -9419 2540 13.025 <0.001 
5 4 5 -9352 2533 13.150 <0.001 
6 2 4 -7241 2088 14.756 <0.001 
7 2 5 -8061 2357 15.078 <0.001 
8 3 3 -5394 1918 18.871 <0.001 
9 1 5 -5681 2057 19.152 <0.001 
10 1 4 -4786 1803 19.735 <0.001 
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FUZZY METHODS FOR SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
A. Zardecki and E. A. Hakkila 
Safeguards Systems Group 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA 
Abstract 
We propose a new method, based on the notion of 
fuzzy sets, to evaluate system performance. This method is 
applicable to an arbitrary system composed of the compo-
nents that describe the system hierarchically. As an illustra-
tion, we introduce a new figure of merit, consistent with the 
recommendations of the Advisory Group Meeting on Con-
tainment and Surveillance. The fuzzy attributes, such as no-
diversion, assurance, and reliability replace the subjective 
characterization parameters of individual components. Our 
methodology should be advantageous both in safeguards and 
in containment and surveillance problems. 
1. Introduction 
At the 6th Advisory Group Meeting on Containment 
and Surveillance held in Vienna in 1988, a framework was 
proposed to enable the characterization-with respect to 
assurance--of the performance of containment and surveil-
lance (C/S) devices. Although one cannot quantify the per-
formance of C/S in terms comparable to those of materials 
accountancy, the overall performance of a C/S system in 
terms of a factor of merit has been attempted /1/. This trend 
to express system performance in a formalized way is not 
limited to C/S. We mention but a few examples. Risk 
assessment to characterize the potential for liability costs 
associated with a facility for disposal of low-level radioactive 
waste was studied by Karam et al. /2/. The radiological 
sabotage consequence index was introduced by Altman and 
Hockert /3/. More recently, this type of qualitative analysis 
has been applied to risk of disclosure /4/ and vulnerability 
assessment to determine risks resulting from possible adver-
sary actions /5/. 
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the system 
performance, and also the system risk, by using an approach 
based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables. 
The idea is to represent a fact as an evaluation and to repre-
sent a production rule as a transformation of evaluations. A 
fuzzy set can be regarded as function mapping the universe 
of discourse to a continuum of possible choices; such a 
function can be used to describe imprecise terms. Fuzzy 
sets, seen as states of fuzzy systems, thus become an algebra 
of approximate reasoning. The elements of this algebra are 
linguistic variables whose values are words or sentences in a 
natural or artificial language. For example, the values of the 
linguistic variable age may be young, middle-aged, old. 
We summarize in Sec. 2 the classic approach to system 
performance, quantified in terms of a figure of merit. In 
Sec. 3, we provide the necessary definitions of the fuzzy 
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sets theory and touch briefly on the applications of fuzzy sets 
to risk analysis. Section 4 is devoted to a fuzzy figure of 
merit. This will be based on linguistic rather than numeric 
measure. 
2. Performance Characterization of C/S Systems 
As indicated in Ref. 1, the overall characterization of the C/S 
system can be expressed in terms of a figure of merit that 
accounts for the system performance with respect to three 
major categories. These categories encompass the require-
ments of (1) analysis of diversion routes and their effective-
ness; (2) system reliability, derived from mean time before 
failure (MTBF), false alarm (FA) rate, and detection prob-
ability (DP); and (3) system assurance (tamper resistance). 
The proposed figure of merit M is defined as 
M=ND xR xA. (1) 
where ND refers to diversion possibilities, R denotes the 
reliability, and A denotes assurance. 
The diversion parameter ND and system assurance A 
are derived subjectively; they characterize diversion through 
subjectively assigned numbers (Tables I and IT, respec-
tively). 
TABLE I. Characterization of No-Diversion 
Diversion Analysis Grading 
No analysis or diversion route identified 0.0 
Diversion route identified- 0.2 
low risk to operator 
Diversion route identified- 0.5 
high risk to operator 
No diversion route identified 0.8 
No diversion route identified and 1.0 
effectiveness demonstrnted 
System vulnerability is treated in the same way (see 
Table Ill) but could be quantified if MTBF, detection prob-
ability, and false alarm rate have been determined from engi-
neering tests on operation data. 
In the following, we attempt to replace the numeric 
grading in Tables I-III by a linguistic grading reflecting our 
state of ignorance about numeric data. 
Table Il. Characteri1.ation of System 
Assurance 
Assurance Analysis Grading 
Tamper route demonstrated 0.0 
no risk to divertor 
Tamper route demonstrated- 0.2 
some risk to divertor 
Tamper route believed feasible-- 0.5 
but could not be demonstrated (wlo black 
hatting by a group of specialists) 
Tamper route demonstrated- 0.7 
high risk to divertor 
Tamper rout believed feasible--but could 0.8 
not be demonstrated with black hatting 
OR 
No tamper route conceivable--but wlo 
attempted black hatting 
No tamper route conceivable by a group 1.0 
of specialists 
TABLE Ill. Characterization of System 
Reliability 
Reliability Analysis Grading 
MTBF or false alarm or detection 0.0 
I probability-not acceptable 
MTBF + false alarm + detection probability- 0.3 
lowest acceptable level low risk to operator 
Medium MTBF +FA+ DP 0.7 
High MTBF +FA+ DP 1.0 
3. Imprecise Estimates of Performance 
Fuzzy set theory, originally developed by Zadeh, is 
today a subject of review articles 16,7 I nnd monographs 
18,9/. Fuzzy set theory was developed to generalize classical 
set theory in such a 'manner as to allow the possibility of 
partial membership in a set. In everyday life, one can find 
many examples of sets for which membership is not well 
defined. Some examples are the set of all tall men, the set of 
very large trees, or the set of all protective mechanisms that 
provide security against a certain threat. 
In this section, we illustrate the notion of a member-
ship function and define the operations of addition and mul-
tiplication of fuzzy sets. This will be followed by a descrip-
tion of the application of these concepts to risk analysis. 
Fuzzy Sets 
Intuitively, a fuzzy set is a class that admits the possi-
bility of partial membership in it. Let X = {x} denote a ref-
erence set (universe of discourse). Then a fuzzy·set A in X 
is a set of ordered pairs 
A = {x.u(x)) , x e X , (2) 
668 
where XA(x) is termed the grade of membership of x in A. 
We assume for simplicity that XA(X) is a number in the 
interval [0,1], with grades 1 and 0 representing, respec-
tively, full membership and full nonmembership in a fuzzy 
set. As an example, consider a linguistic variable confidence 
factor with values low, medium, and high, regarded as fuzzy 
sets. With the universe of discourse specified, arbitrarily, as 
the set of integers 1, ... , 9, the fuzzy sets low, medium, 
and high are represented gmphically in Fig. I. 
a. 
:c 
IIl 
Ci> 
.0 
E 
Q) 
~ 
Medium 
Low\ High 
. 
0'-----"-----~-----'------"--
1 
Confidence Factor 
Fig. 1. Membership function for primary 
terms: low, medium, high. 
9 
A finite fuzzy set A having n elements in X is 
expressed as 
n 
A = I XA(Xj) /xj 
j=l (3) 
With this notation, the basic algebraic operations are intro-
duced through the so-called extension principle: 
n 
A + B =I min [XA(xi).xn(xj)] I (xi + Xj) , (4) 
iJ 
n 
A x B = I min [XA(xi).xn(xj)] I (xi x Xj) , (S) 
iJ 
n 
A I B =I min [XA(x;).xn(xj)] I (xi I Xj) 
iJ (6) 
The operation of division requires that A I B should be 
reduced to a set of integers. Using the terminology bor-
rowed from object-oriented programming, we have over-
loaded the operators+, x, and I, thus extending their domain 
of definition to fuzzy sets. 
The entities on which the basic operators act co11stitute 
either the primaries or hedged primaries of a natural language 
of linguistic variables. The primaries are low, medium, 
high, as well as the fuzzy numbers between 1 and 9. An 
example of hedged primary is fairly low or pretty high. The 
complete syntax of the natural language we use follows 
closely the monograph of Schmucker /10/. This syntax 
includes more involved constructs, such as relational phrases 
and composite relations. 
Fuzzy Risk Analysis 
Our performance evaluation method can be applied 
immediately to risk assessment. This method, used earlier in 
the context of risk analysis for computer security /11/ applies 
to a system composed of units that can describe the system 
hierarchically. One merely climbs the tree of decomposition, 
computing the risk of each interior node from the risk values 
of its descendants, until one arrives at the root node. 
At the lowest level, the terminal nodes have three 
attributes associated with them. They are probability of fail-
ure, severity of loss, and confidence factor. The fuzzy 
product of these attributes, defined as an extension of the 
product of real numbers, results in a component risk indica-
tor of the node. This is analogous to the figure of merit of 
Ref. 1. The component risk indicators of the descendants of 
each parent node are then weighted by the weight factors to 
produce the parent's node risk indicator. The weight factor, 
therefore, adds or subtracts weight from the risk indicators 
as they are merged into higher level indicators. The non-
terminal nodes, which rely on their descendants, do not 
require the three attributes of terminal nodes. 
When our algorithm is implemented on a computer, we 
are in a position to simulate a variety of systems studying 
their weakest nodes that lead to the highest risk. This is 
reminiscent of the method of Gayral et al. /12/ to assist a 
protection system. 
4. Fuzzy Performance Characterization 
We now construct the model that characterizes the per-
formance of a safeguards system, like we did for the risk 
assessment model. As an illustration, we consider a simpli-
fied model of a facility consisting of two divisions, D1 and 
D2. Divisions Dl and D2, in turn, are composed of three 
and two sections, respectively. We refer to sections of D1 
asS 1, S2 and S3, whereas the sections ofD2 are denoted by 
T1 and T2; this is indicated in Fig. 2. 
At the lowest level, the component performance indica-
tor is given by Eq. (1) as a product of ND, R, and A, as 
shown in Table IV. To assure the flexibility of our descrip-
tion, we do not provide a translation of Tables I - Ill in terms 
of fuzzy sets. Instead, we quantify the attributes of the 
components in terms of complex phrases compatible with the 
natural language we use. The overall figure of merit, on the 
other hand, is quantized at 8 levels; its value is determined 
through the shortest distance analysis /10/. 
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Fig. 2. Simplified scheme of a facility composed 
of divisions and sections. 
TABLE IV. The Computed Section Performance 
Indicator 
Performance No 
Section Indicator Diversion Assurance Reliability 
Sl Fairly high Very low Pretty Medium 
high to high 
The fuzzy figure of merit of each parent node is 
obtained by combining the component risk indicator with the 
weighting factor specifying the proportion estimate of a child 
node. An example of this procedure is shown in Table V. 
TABLE V. The Computed Division Performance 
Indicator 
Division Section 
Division Performance Performance 
D1 Indicator Proportion Indicator 
Section Sl Medium About three Fairly high 
Section S2 Morlhigh Medium to high 
Section S3 High High 
Here, the shorthand "Mori" stands for "more or less." 
To arrive at the performance indicator for Dl, we have com-
puted a weighted average of the performance indicators Mj 
of the individual sections, according to the formula 
3 
L, W; xM1 
'-1 MDI = '"-_,..:__ _ _ 
3 I. Wj 
j=l 
(7) 
where the Wj's denote the weights describing the propor-
tions associated with each section. In a similar manner, the 
facility performance indicator, which quantifies the overall 
figure of merit, is obtained as a weighted performance indi-
cator of individual divisions. The described procedure can, 
obviously, be extended to more complicated subdivisions. 
The key assumption is that only the terminal nodes of the 
hierarchy are described in terms of the diversion possibility, 
reliability, and assurance; the nodes at higher levels merely 
require the weighting factors. 
5. An Example of Computation 
The tree structure shown in Fig. 2 will now be sup-
plemented by a specific description of the performance of 
individual nodes. Table VI details our example. 
The computation yields the figure of merit low as a 
measure of performance for the facility. It is easy to see 
that, although weighted low, division D2 is a weak link in 
the overall performance. In fact, if the last row of Table VI 
is changed into high, high, one, medium, the figure of merit 
changes into medium. This example indicates how the worst 
performing link of a complex facility can be localized, thus 
leading to an improved performance. 
TABLE VI. Performance of Individual Nodes 
of Facility F 
Node No Diversion Assurance Rehability Weight 
D1 Medium 
D2 Low 
SI Very low Pretty high Medium AbouT three 
to high 
S2 Low Medium Low Mori high 
IS3 Low Medium Medium High 
Tl Low Low Low High 
T2 Low to Medium Fatrly low Low 
medium 
6. Conclusions 
We have proposed a new figure of merit, useful in C/S 
problems and in safeguards, based on linguistic variables. 
In many cases of practical interest, this may be a more 
adequate description of performance than the description 
employing numeric variables. Future research will focus on 
refining our model and applying it to realistic facilities. 
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Abstract 
In order to verify the material balance data reported by 
plant operators, the safeguards authority performs inde-
pendent measurements on a random sampling basis and 
compares the resulting data with the reported ones. It is 
shown that the so-called D-stutistic, which originally has 
been justified with heuristic arguments, and since then 
has been used in practice for many years, is qptimal if 
the total assumed falsification is small. Furthermore, nu-
merical calculations indicate that for larger total falsifica-
tion, where a more complicated test procedure would be 
optimal, the D-test is still useful from a practical point of 
view. For very large total falsification, the optimal test 
statistic is complicated; this, however, is not so impor-
tant since here one is approaching the attribute sampling 
area. 
Introduction 
International nuclear material Sltfeguards is by general 
agreement organized in such a way that the plant ope-
rators generate all the data necessary for the establish-
ment of a material balance, that the inspectors verify the 
operators' data with the help of independent measure-
ments and that - if there are no significant differences 
between the operators' data and the inspectors' findings 
- the material balance is established with the help of the 
operators' data. 
In this paper the present state of data verification is 
discussed. In doing so, only variables sampling [1] pro-
cedures are considered which take into account measu-
rement errors, and with the help of which the expected 
differences between the operators' reported data and in-
spectors' findings are quantitatively evaluated. 
In the following we will have in mind primarily the 
verification of inventory data, first, because it is easier 
from a methodological point of view, and second, be-
cause it represents an especially important part of safe-
guards: whereas flow measurement data sometimes can 
be verified by comparing shipper and receiver data, there 
is nothing which can replace inventory data verification 
using independent measurements. 
Data verification presents a statistical problem be-
cause of the random sampling pt·ocedure and, in case of 
variable sampling, because of the existence of statistical 
measurement errors. Furthermore, since at the end of the 
verification procedure a decision has to be taken whether 
or not the data of the operator are accepted, data ve-
rification in safeguards basically is a test problem. (An 
inspector may also be interested in estimating possible 
defects [2]; since, however, their use is not clear in in-
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ternational safeguards, estimation is not discussed here.) 
Finally, contrary to conventional statistical problems like 
quality control, there is a conflict situation between an 
operator who may falsify data- otherwise there would be 
no reason for verifying his data - and the safeguards aut-
hority which has to detect an eventual falsification. This 
means that data verification represents a game theoretical 
problem. 
Any game-theoretical model of variable sampling da-
ta verification problems requires the definition of payoffs 
to both the inspector and the operator for detected and 
undetected illegal behavior as well as for confirmed and 
not confirmed legal behavior (false alarms). It should 
be mentioned that at least in case of false alarms the 
interests of both players are not opposite to each other. 
Therefore, non-zero-sum models have to be used. 
It can be shown (see, e.g., [3]) that models of this 
kind can be decomposed into two sub-models such that 
the first sub-model deals only with the decision of the 
operator whether or not to act illegally, and the inspec· 
tor's choice of the false nlann probability. The second 
sub-model deals with the operator's choice of an illegal 
strategy and the inspector's choice of a decision proce-
dure for a given false alarm probability. This second sub-
model, however, is a zero-sum game with the probability 
of detecting an illegal action as payoff to the inspector. 
This means that, for a given value of the false alarm pro-
bability, payoff parameters need not be known, which is 
very helpful for practical applications. In the following, 
we consider only the second "statistical" game-theoretical 
model. 
Analytical Results 
Let us assume that N data X;, i = 1, ... , N, have been 
reported by the operator, and that n (:::; N) data are 
verified by the inspector with the help of independent 
observations Y; , i = 1, ... , n, on a random sampling ba-
sis. Since the inspector is not interested in the true values 
of the random variables X; or Y;, but only in the devia-
tions between corresponding reported and independently 
generated data, he will construct his test procedure with 
the help of the differences of these corresponding data. 
We formulate this test problem as follows: 
Definition 1. The differences Z;, i = 1, ... , n, between 
the operator's reported data X; and the independent fin-
clings Y; of the inspector are assumed to be indepen-
dently and identically normally distributed random va-
riables with variances 
var(Z;) = var(X;) + var(Y;) =: a 2 , i = 1, ... ,n, 
and with expected values 
E(Z;) == { 0. > 0 
p., ' 
under Ho 
i == 1, ... , n, under H1, 
where Ho is the null hypothesis (no data falsification) 
and H1 the alternative hypothesis (data falsification). 0 
As a result of the game-theoretical analysis sketched 
before, we are looking for that test procedure which ma-
ximizes the probability of detection 1 - f3, given a fixed 
value of the false alarm probability. In doing so, we as-
sume that the operator - if at all - will falsify all data by 
the total amount p. in such a way that the probability of 
detection is minimized. 
First, for maximum sample size n == N an optimal 
test procedure is given: 
Theorem 1. [4] Let the sets of pure strategies 6.a and 
r Jl of the inspector and of the operator be given by the 
set 6. 01 of all test procedures for the test problem given 
by Definition 1 with n == N and given false alarm proba-
bility a, and 
rll :={ (p.I,. · · ,!JN): 'L:~l /1-i = /1- > 0, 
O~p.;, i=1, ... ,N}, 
and let the payoff to the inspector be the detection pro-
bability 1 - f3, i.e., the probability of rejecting H0 if in 
fact H1 is true. Consider the two-person zero-sum game 
(6. 01,rp,1-{J), where the values of p., u and a are 
known to both players. 
Then the saddlepoint strategy of the operator is gi-
ven by (p.fN, ... , p.fN), that of the inspector is a test 
given by the critical region 
N 
{ (ZI, ... , ZN): L Z; > u · VN · U(1- a)}, 
i=l 
and the value of the game, i.e., the guaranteed optimal 
probability of detection 1 - {J* is 
1- {3* = 'P(p.fu · VN - U(1- a)), 
where if!( o ) is the normal distribution and U( o ) its in-
verse. 0 
According to this Theorem, the test statistic is D := 
'I:; Z;. This is the well known D-test statistic which was 
proposed first in 1970 (5] for use in nuclear material safe-
guards; at that time, it was justified by heuristic argu-
ments. 
Second, let us assume that only one datum drawn at 
random out of N reported data (minimum sample size) 
is verified by the inspector. The following solution to this 
problem is more complicated than the preceeding one: 
Theorem 2o [6] Consider the two-person zero-sum game 
(6. 01 , r 1., 1-{J) as in Theorem 1, however with n == 1. Let 
p. = p.*(N) be the unique solution of f(Jt) = 0, where 
the function J(p.) is defined by 
f(p.) = 'P(U(1- a)-..!_·!:!.)-N u 
('P(U(1- a)-!:!.)+ (N -1) · (1- a))fN. 
(]" 
Then for p. < p.*(N) the saddlepoint strategy of the ope-
rator is (p.fN, ... , p.fN), whereas for p. ~ p.*(N) it is 
(p.,O, ... ,O) or ... or (O, ... ,O,p). 
12----------~------------~-----------.------------,-------,---TJ 
t~ 
10 
2 
0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 
Figure 1: Critical falsification Jl*(N) for vari~us values of Nand limiting ~~lue Jl*, 
as given by Theorem 2, as function of no-false-alarm probab1hty 1-a. 
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The saddlepoiut ~tmtegy of the iu~pector is the test 
given by the critical region { Z: Z > u · U(1- a)}; it is 
independent of the strategy of the operator. 
The value of the game, i.e., the guaranteed optimal 
probability of detection 1 - /3*, is 
{ <P(!J · ~- U(1- a)) for f-l ~ f-l*(N) <P(~- U(1- a))/N + (1- 1J) ·a for f-l?. f-l*(N). 
The sequence {f-l*(N)} for N = 1, 2, ... of critical fal-
sifications is strictly increasing; it starts with f-l*(2) = 
2 · u · U(l -a) and converges to a limit value f-l* which 
is implicitly determined by the equation 
f-l* f-l* 1>(U(l-a))·- + <P(U(l-a)--)-1+a 0, 
(j (j 
where 1>(.) is the normal distribution density. 0 
The critical value p*(N) as well as the limiting value 
p.* are graphically represented in Figure 1. 
This result recurs in some form or other throup;hont 
the problem area. It has an intuitive interpretation: If 
the total falsification is small, then from a falsification 
point of view it is best to distribute it on all N data 
in order to conceal the falsification by the measurement 
uncertainty. If, on the other hand, the total falsification 
is large, it can no longer be concealed in this way, so the 
number of falsified data has to be as small as possible 
to minimize the probability that the falsified datum is 
verified and thus discovered. 
Third, we consider the general case 1 < n < N , 
again without restriction to single falsifications. So far, 
no general solution to this problem is known. One only 
kuow~ that for small total fabificatiou I'· again the D-
statistic is optimal: 
Theorem 3. [4] If the total fal~ification {t satisfies the 
condition 
where f-l*(.) is given by Theorem 2, then the D-test as 
well as the equal distribution of the falsification are sadd-
lepoint strategies of the game ( fl 0 , f I', 1 - {3). 0 
There are further analytical results for the general 
problem considered here, e.g., for the case where there 
exists an upper limit J.Lr for the falsification of one single 
stratum [7]. There is, however, no general theorem which 
describes the saddlepoint strategy of both the inspector 
and the operator for all values {t of the total falsification. 
Numerical Calculations 
It has been shown numerically that. for arbitrary values 
of N and 1 < n < N and for large total falsification p, 
the D-statistic is no longer the best test statistic for the 
inspector. Nevertheless, for the moment we continue to 
consider the test based on the D-statistic and ask which 
falsification strategy minimizes its detection probability 
for given value of J.L. Theorem 3 tells us that for small 
values of p the equal distribution (f-l/N, ... , f-l/ N) of the 
falsification is optimal, i.e., saddlepoint strategy for the 
inspector. 
So far, it cannot be proven analytically, but there is 
strong numerical support [8], that in addition to the equal 
distribution (f-t/N, ... , f-l/N) only the similarly defined 
1.0---------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
t ~ (J.1) 
2 4 6 
Figure 2 : Probability of non detection P<~) for the D - test as function of total falsification 
~for {N,n) = {6,4) and various falsification strategies 
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Strategies 
1: (p,O,O,O,O,O) 
2: (p/2,~112,0,0,0,0) 
3: (p/3.~tl3,p/3,0,0,0) 
4: (p/4.~t!4,~t!4,p/4,0,0) 
5: (~t15.~t/5,~tl5,~tl5,p.l5,0) 
6: (p/6.~tl6,p/6,p/6,p/6,p.16) 
8 
strategies (Jt/(N -1), ... , Jt/(N - 1 ), 0), or, analogously, 
(J.L/(N- 2), ... , J.L/(N- 2), 0, 0), ... , (J.L, 0, ... , 0), mini-
mize the detection probability of the D-test so that the 
optimization procedure can be limited to these marginal 
strategies. 
For these marginal strategies, with 7' falsified out of 
N data, the probability of detection is given by 1- f3(J.L), 
where 
f3(J.L) = "'<I>(U(1- a)- - 1- · !!.) · (~)(~=;-) £..: vn·r (j (~) 
with summation for max(O, n + r- N) s; l s; min(n, r). 
Special cases are for r = N: 
Vn J.L f3(J.L) = <I>(U(1- a)--·-) N u 
and for r = 1: 
1 JL n n f3(J.L) = <I>(U(1- a)--·-)·-+ (1- a)· (1--). Vn u N N 
For n = 1 , these expressions are obviously the same as 
those given by Theorem 2; for 7' = n = N, we get the 
expression given by Theorem 1. 
An overview on all possible optimal falsification stra-
tegies for 1 s; N s; 18 and n s; N is given in Table 1, 
which shows that there are only four different cases: 
N 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 n 
1 a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a 
2 d b a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a 
3 d b c a a a a a a a a a a a a a 
f--4 d b b c a a a a a a a a a a a 
1--
5 d b b b c a a a a a a a a a 
rs- d b b b c c a a a a a a a 
~ d b b b b c c a a a a a 
1--
8 d b b b b b c c a a a 
9 d b b b b b b c c a 
- 10 d b b b b b b b c 
-,-;-- d b b b b b b b 
""12 d b b b b b b 
13 d b b b b b 
f--14 d b b b b 
1--
15 d b b b 
r-;s d b b 
~ d b 
'18 '--7 
Table 1: Optimal falsification strategies for the D -test. 
Further explanation see text. 
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(a) The only optimal strategies arc the equal distribu-
tion for small J.L and the one point distribution for 
large J.L. 
(b) All marginal falsification strategies mentioned above 
are optimal within well defined ranges of J.L, starting 
with the equal distribution for small J.L and ending 
with the one point distribution for large J.L. 
(c) Except for (J.L/3, J.L/3, J.L/3, 0, ... , 0), all marginal fal-
sification strategies are optimal. 
(d) Only the equal distribution is optimal as shown by 
Theorem 1. 
It should be kept in mind, however, that the optimal 
falsification strategies in cases (b) and (c) are not sadd-
lepoint strategies: The best test against these strategies 
is not the D-test, but a much more complicated test given 
by the Neyman-Pearson Lemma (see, e.g., [9]). 
Let us consider now explicitly an example of case 
(b), where all marginal falsification strategies arc opti-
mal within well defined ranges of JL. Figure 2 gives the 
probability of non-detection as a function of fL for N = 6, 
n = 4, u = 1 and a = .05 which illustrates two very in-
teresting aspects: First, in that region of J.L where the 
one-point falsification (1) is not optimal, all probabilities 
of non-detection are very close to that of the equal dis-
tribution for given value of J.L, except for that of the one 
point distribution. Second, in the optimality region of the 
one point distribution, the probability of non-detection 
approaches very quickly its asymptotic value which is gi-
ven by (1- a)· (1- n/N) for arbitrary values of N and 
n. 
These results are very important for practical ap-
plications. Quite generally, one may conclude that it is 
sufficient to consider only the equal and the one point dis-
tribution of the falsification. This has been proven to be 
correct for n = 1, and shown numerically for n s; N /2. 
For all other cases, the probabilities of detection of all 
other marginal falsification strategies which are optimal 
for some ranges of the total falsification J.L, are so close 
that the differences are practically irrelevant. 
This means that one has just to look for that va-
lue J.L*(N;n) of J.L, where the probabilities of detection 
for the two extreme marginal falsification strategies inter-
sect: J.L*(N; n) therefore is given as the unique solution 
of g(J.L) = 0, where g(J.L) is given by 
Vn /L g(J.L) = <I>(U(1- a)--·-)-N u 
1 J.L n n 
<I>(U(1- a)--·-)·-- (1- a)· (1--); 
.fou N N 
for N--+ oo the sequence {JL*(N; n)} converges for fixed 
n to a limiting value ft*(n) which is implicitly determined 
by the equation 
J.L*(n) J.L*(n) 
rP(U(l-a)) · ~+<I>(U(1-a)-~) -l+a = 0. 
yn·u yn·u 
If we compare this with the limiting critical falsification 
given by Theorem 2, we observe that we ju~t have to 
replace,,. hy /t.*(n)fj/i. 
As a result for given values of N and n, we have to 
take for p. < p.*( n) the equal distribution, and for p. > 
p.*(n) the one-point distribution; for the latter case the 
probability of no detection is practically equal to ( 1 - a)· 
(1-n/N). 
Concluding Remarks 
Let us conclude our deliberations with some remarks on 
several strata. Stratified sampling means considering da-
ta in different classes or "strata". This is appropriate 
when there arc different typ<•s of llteasm<•<l <!nl.i l.i<•s, lik<· 
volume, weight, etc., or to achieve a greater uniformity 
if the measurements are of widely different magnitudes, 
for example. In case of several strata of data to be ve-
rified, there is a new element, namely how the inspector 
shall allocate his inspection resources (like ma.nhoms or 
money) to the different ~trata. Furthermore, how shall 
he do this if the verification of one datum in one class 
takes more effort than in a different class'? There is no 
general solution to these problems in view of the difficult 
situation even for one stratum. Therefore, special cases 
and approximations are usually considered [3]. Both are 
oriented at the existing solutions for one stratum, espe-
cially at those for the case where there exists an upper 
limit p,. for the falsification of one single stratum. 
One important special case, also from the practical 
point of view, is that if the operator acts illegally, he falsi-
fies all data of one stratum by the same pa.rt.icnla.r a.mcnmt 
which is typical for that stratum. In view of Theorem 2, 
one expects this assumption to be reasonable for small 
total falsification fl. In this case, the set of illegal stra-
tegies of the operator is the set of the single falsifications 
for all classes. The inspector's set of strntel!,ics is the set 
of possible decision procedures for given false alarm pro-
bability and the set of possible modes of allocating the 
inspection effort to the different strata. 
Considering the strata sample sizes of the inspector 
as continuous variables, this problem can be solved in 
a satisfying way: The saddlepoint test statistic is the 
weighted sum of D-sta.tistics for the single strata., and the 
optimal allocation of the inspection effort is dct.enniiwd 
by the well known Neyman-Tschuprow formula (sec, e.g. 
[10]). 
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Another important special case is given by the as-
sumption that the operator falsifics only parts of the data 
of the stra.t.a by strata typical auHH!Hts. Thi:; ma.y be re-
asonable for larger total falsification. This case cannot be 
treated analytically with the same rigor as that described 
before. If one assumes, however, the D-statistic to be use-
ful also for this case, then one arrives again at solutions 
which can be applied in practical situations. In particu-
lar, one obtains again the Neynmn-T~chuprow sampling 
procedure. This is very satisfying since the inspector thus 
gets a sn.mpling procedure tlmt does not depend on the 
scheme by which the operator will falsify data, if at all. 
The authors would like to thank H.P. Battenberg 
and B. von Stengel for very valuable discussions and sug-
gestions. 
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Abstract 
According to the Treaty of Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) , 
the International Atomic Energy Agency 
( IAEA) executes frequent inspections in 
nuclear facilities. In this connection, 
a computer program called PROSA was 
developed at the Karlsruhe Nuclear 
Research Center. PROSA evaluates nuclear 
material balances using sequential test 
procedures based on the measurement 
model of the facility. In order to 
enable the determination of the 
measurement model, a computer program 
MEMO has been developed, in addition. In 
a first step, MEMO creates the 
measurement system of the facility which 
includes the facility design and the 
measurement uncertainties of each of the 
material-balance components. On the 
basis of real detailed measurement data, 
MEMO then allows to compute the detailed 
measurement model related to the balance 
periods considered. 
1. Introduction 
According to the Treaty of Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) , 
the International Atomic Energy Agency 
( IAEA) executes frequent inspections in 
nuclear facilities. For inspection 
planning and evaluations, a set of 
technical criteria has been defined by 
the IAEA for internal use. 
One important goal of international 
safeguards is to detect a possible loss 
of material timely - in particular as 
far as bulk handling facilities of 
industrial scale are considered. That 
means, about monthly inspections are 
required in order to make sure that no 
diversion of nuclear material has 
occurred. It is obvious that this cannot 
be performed in the 'classical' way of 
material balancing which means process 
stop, clean-out and verification of all 
nuclear materials. Advanced methods are 
required which enable the IAEA to apply 
acceptable safeguards measures whilst 
plant operation is continued. 
Investigations related to this subject 
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have been performed in several 
countries. These activities are usually 
associated with the term Near-Real Time-
Accountancy (NRTA) . 
The Karlsruhe Nuclear Research 
Center started research and development 
activities on NRTA many years ago. The 
basic idea was to establish short-time 
material-balances from those measurement 
data on process inventories which are 
primarily collected for process-control 
purposes. Then, sequential statistical 
tests are applied to the short-time 
material-balances in order to decide 
whether or not the observed differences 
between book and measured inventories 
can be assigned to measurement uncer-
tainties. 
In this context, a computer program 
PROSA /1/ (Program for ~tatistical 
Analysis of NRTA data) was developed as 
a tool to apply truncated sequential 
test procedures to a given sequence of 
material-balance results. 
The evaluation by statistical tests 
is based on the measurement model of the 
facility. Sequential evaluation requires 
sequential measurement modelling which 
leads to a variancejcovariance matrix of 
the material-balance sequence. This 
variancejcovariance matrix is the con-
densed form of the sequential measure-
ment model. 
2. The Material-Balance Problem 
Material accountancy is an important 
tool for international nuclear safe-
guards. The aim is to detect a possible 
loss of material timely and with high 
probability. The 'classical' method of 
material balance performing one or two 
balances per year is not able to meet 
the goal of timeliness in industrial 
plants with high throughput. Therefore, 
advanced methods have to be applied 
which evaluate the generated sequential 
material balances during plant oper-
ation. These methods are summarized 
under the term Near-Real Time-Accoun-
tancy (NRTA). NRTA means that the whole 
reference time is subdivided into 
several periods and the material balance 
is closed after each period. So one gets 
a sequential series of material-balance 
results MUF(l), .MUF(2), ... ,MUF(N). The 
terms MUF and N denote Material 
.Qnaccounted .[or and number of periods, 
respectively. Each single MUF value can 
be determined according to the following 
equation: 
MUF(i) = I(i-1) + T(i) - I(i). 
I(i) is the measured .ending 
inventory of period i, I(i-1) ~s the 
measured ending inventory of period i-1, 
and T ( i) is the measured net transfer 
within period i. Due to measurement 
uncertainties, the MUF values in general 
do not amount to zero, even in the case 
of no loss of material. That means, at 
the end of each balance period i, a 
decision has to be taken whether or not 
the deviations of the sequence 
MUF(l), ... ,MUF(i) from the expectation 
values zero can be explained by 
measurement uncertainties. To take this 
decision in an objective manner, 
sequential statistical test procedures 
are required. The evaluation of the 
series of MUF values with such tests is 
based on the detailed measurement model 
of the facility considered. 
3. Determination of a Detailed 
Measurement Model 
The determination of the detailed 
measurement model for real sequential 
process data is an essential step in 
applying NRTA-test procedures. One can 
assume that in most cases all material-
balance terms can be calculated by the 
mathematical product of two single 
determinations, for example, volume 
measurement and concentration measure-
ment. For computing the measurement 
model, each process component is 
considered separately using its 
individual random and systematic 
measurement uncertainties. With the 
knowledge of the variances of each 
inventory and transfer measurement, and 
with flow-sheet information supplied by 
the operator, all variance and 
covariance calculations can be 
performed. 
3.1 Determination of the variance of the 
inventory of one component 
The amount of plutonium (Pu) of each 
single process component of the facility 
is without limitation of general 
validity - the mathematical product of 
the volume measurement (VOL) and of the 
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volumetric Pu-concentration measurement 
(CVP) : 
(1) Pu = VOL * CVP. 
Both measurements are assumed to be 
random variables with random and 
systematic components. The standard 
deviation of the two types of errors are 
assumed to be known from operators 
quality control programs. The mean 
valu•as are assumed to be zero for both 
erro::-s, so that each measurement is an 
unbiased estimate of the true value. 
Using truncated Taylor series 
expansion in the mean values E (VOL) and 
E(CVP) one gets: 
(2) VOL * CVP = E(VOL) * E(CVP) 
+ (CVP- E(CVP)) * E(VOL) 
+ (VOL- E(VOL)) * E(CVP) 
which results 
equation: 
in the reasonable 
(3) E(Pu) = E(VOL) * E(CVP). 
With regard to the variances, the 
following expression holds: 
(4) var(Pu) = (E(VOL)) 2 * var(CVP) 
+ (E(CVP)) 2 * var(VOL). 
:ln the right hand of Formula ( 4) , 
the terms E(VOL) and E(CVP) appear which 
represent the true values of volume and 
concentration. These values are even 
unkno·,.,n, however, there is the possibi-
lity of replacing them by the measure-
ment values, because each measurement is 
an unbiased estimate of the true value. 
Doing this, detailed knowledge of all 
measu::-ement data which means the volume 
measu::-ement and the concentration mea-
surem«mt of each process component is 
neces:;ary. 
\'Tith this procedure, the variance of 
the a:nount of plutonium of each process 
component can be calculated. The 
variance of the inventory of each 
component of the facility is split into 
a random component and into a systematic 
component. Both components are of random 
origin. They differ only in the way of 
error propagation. In this case of a 
model reprocessing facility, systematic 
errors are assumed to be constant for 
the whole model campaign. Furthermore, 
in order to consider the influence of 
measurement errors in a reasonable way, 
each uncertainty component - random and 
systematic as well - is split into an 
additive part and into a multiplicative 
part. So one gets at least four 
different kinds of measurement uncer-
tainties: 
SAD (systematic, additive), 
SMU (systematic, multiplicative), 
RAD (random, additive), and 
RMU (random, multiplicative). 
3. 2 Determination of the dispersion 
matrix 
In order to determine the measure-
ment model, each process component is 
considered separately using its individ-
ual random and systematic uncertainties 
of the volume and of the concentration 
measurement as well. Within one balance 
period, all measurements of inventories 
are in general independent to each other 
from the statistical point of view. 
However, with respect to the influence 
of systematic measurement uncertainties 
there are covariances between inventory 
measurements from balance period to 
balance period. Such covariances are 
also exist between an input transfer and 
inventory of the current balance period, 
and between output transfers (product or 
waste) and inventories of the balance 
period next to the last one. 
All these variances and covariances 
have to be calculated and considered by 
the . computer program in order to 
determine the so-called dispersion 
matrix (variancejcovariance matrix) of 
the MUF series /2/. This matrix is the 
condensed form of the sequential 
measurement model and provides all 
necessary information to perform 
statistical test procedures, for 
example, using the computer program 
PROSA. This matrix represents the 
special measurement model calculated 
from special series of measurement data 
by the use of the only measurement 
system of the facility which is valid in 
general. 
4. The Computer Program MEMO 
Up to now, those sequential measure-
ment models have been calculated with a 
computer program running on a host 
installation. In order to make this 
procedure userfriendly - as done earlier 
with the program PROSA - , now a first 
attempt was made to implement also the 
program MEMO (Program to Establish a 
Measurement Model for NRTA Procedures) 
onto a portable Personal Computer 
system. 
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4.1 General Structure of MEMO 
In a first step, MEMO has to create 
th7 mea~urement system of the facility 
wh~ch .. ~ncludes the facility design 
descr~b~ng each of the material-balance 
components and the measurement uncer-
tainties associated with each of the 
appropriate measurements. 
This measurement system of the 
faci~ity has to be created only once and 
re~a~ns unchanged as long as there is 
ne~t~er a change in the facility design, 
nor ~n the measurement uncertainties of 
the measurement methods applied for 
concentration determinations, nor in the 
measurement uncertainties of the 
measurement devices used for volume 
determinations. 
Using these general features for the 
creation of the measurement system of 
the considered facility, in a second 
step MEMO is able to compute the special 
sequential measurement model related to 
a chosen number of material-balance 
periods. Thereby, two additional data 
sets are necessary, namely the detailed 
measurement data of the campaign and a 
run-time file as well. 
The campaign data contain all 
measurements of volume determination and 
of concentration determination. They 
must be stricly correlated to the 
facility design. In the facility design, 
all balance components inventory 
batches and transfer batches as well -
are defined and the appropriate 
measurement methods are indicated. The 
batches are marked by a batch-code 
number and by a description name. The 
description name enables the computer 
program to detect the kind of batch 
treated and, therefore, via the design 
data to connect each batch with the 
appropriate measurement-uncertainty 
data. 
The run-time file controls the 
starting point of balancing and the 
number of balance periods to be 
computed. Furthermore, setting a 
printout option, one can choose the 
volume of recorded output data which 
will be written on a result file. There 
is the possibility to record only the 
total balance results and the 
contributions to the dispersion matrix 
of all computed balance periods. In 
addition, these data can also be 
complemented either by recording the 
measurement system (design data and 
measurement-uncertainty data) or by 
recording of all the batch data which 
contribute effectively to the material 
balance and to the dispersion matrix as 
well. 
However, the most important output 
data of MEMO are the two result files 
called MUF and COVA. These result files 
are generated in order to be used as 
input data for the performance of the 
statistical test procedures implemented 
in the program PROSA. 
4.2 Description of the Model Facility 
Implemented in MEMO 
In order to demonstrate the func-
tioning of MEMO and its linkage to the 
already existing progam PROSA, a model 
facility was created. The design of this 
model facility is based on ten inventory 
components and three transfer compo-
nents, resulting in a total of thirteen 
batches which have to be considered 
within each balance period. The ten 
inventory components are distributed 
among six facility areas with up to two 
components each. 
In total, there are eighteen 
measurement points in order to compute 
the batch amounts of plutonium and their 
contributions to the dispersion matrix. 
According to the ten inventory batches, 
there are also ten volume-measurement 
points. Together with further eight 
concentration-measurement points, they 
represent the complete measurement-
uncertainty data of the facility. 
4.3 Current Limitations and Future 
Aspects of MEMO 
For reasons of run time and of 
necessary core memory as well, this 
first version of MEMO is limited in the 
following way: 
- the maximum number of facility 
areas is limited to six areas, 
- the maximum number of groups 
within each area is also limited 
to six groups each, 
- the maximum number of components 
within each group is also limited 
to six components each, 
- and the number of balance periods 
which can be computed by MEMO is 
limited to a maximum value of 
20 periods. 
In the future, it is intended to 
extend these limitations to values of 
more than ten facility areas, of more 
than ten groups per area, of more than 
ten components per group, and of fifty 
balance periods which can be treated, as 
well. 
Furthermore, a menu-guided user 
shell will be implemented in MEMO which 
shall enable the user to establish its 
individual measurement system (facility 
design and measurement uncertainties) 
related to a facility of its own. 
Due to the fact that the measurement 
data of the considered campaign must 
strictly correlate with the facility-
design data, the authors intend to give 
any support in order to transpose such 
measurement data according to the 
facility design created. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
With the PC-version of MEMO, an 
important step is solved for applying 
sequential statistical test procedures 
implemented in PROSA. The combined 
program packages of PROSA and MEMO might 
be very suitable for routine field use 
not only with respect to reprocessing 
facilities but probably also for 
applications in other fields. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes the prototype Near Real 
Time Materials Accountancy (NRTMA) system which 
forms the basis of the NRTMA system being developed 
for inclusion in the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant 
(THORP) Chemical Plant Information Computer. 
The NRTMA system incorporates the joint Page's 
test on SITMUF (the Joint Test) which has been 
developed in BNFL to meet the requirements for a robust 
testing procedure capable of both responding effectively 
to abrupt losses/gains, and also controlling protracted 
materials loss. 
The NRTMA system is presented as a 
menu-driven application. Emphasis is placed on 
minimizing and simplifying operator input whilst 
maximizing the return to him of readily useable 
information. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper describes the prototype Near Real 
Time Materials Accountancy (NRTMA) system which 
forms the basis of the NRTMA system being developed1 
for inclusion in the THORP Chemical Plant Information 
Computer. 
2 THE PLANT MODEL 
The prototype uses data from a simulator whicp 
models the C'1f~acteristics BNFL expects of THORP . 
Previous work has chosen a campaign length of 240 
days, divided into 40 balance periods of 6 days. The 
standard deviation of the throughput measurement error 
per balance period, T, set at 1 kg gives a standard 
deviation of the campaign throughput measurement error 
of 6.325 kg. This, and the standard deviation of the 
inventory measurement error, /, of 2 kg, is consistent with 
predictions for the THORP materials accountancy and 
control system. The above values for I and Tare used as 
basic parameters in the simulator. The simulator allows 
abrupt and protracted losses/gains, and inventory errors, 
to be incorporated into the data stream. 
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3 THE PROT01YPE SYSTEM 
The prototype NRTMA system is the culmination 
of development work in BNFL since the early 1980s. The 
system is presented as a menu-driven application 
running on an IBM PC. The rest of this section of the 
paper is a description of the functions included in the 
system. 
The Copyright Screen 
The Copyright Screen, Figure 1, the first screen 
seen by the user, shows, amongst other information, the 
date and version of the application, and the date when 
the prototype NRTMA system was first created. The user 
presses <SPACE> to move on to the Joint Test Module. 
The Joint Test Module 
The NRTMA system incorporates the joint Page's 
test on SITMUF (the Joint Test) which has been 
developed in BNFL to meet the requirements for a robust 
testing procedure capable of both responding effectively 
to abrupt losses/gains, and also controlling protracted 
materials loss. In this prototype system, the Joint Tests 
are generated off-line and read in from a file. The Joint 
Test Module Screen, Figure 2, shows the parameters 
which will be used in the two Joint Tests. The user 
presses <SPACE> to move on to the Main Menu. 
The Main Menu 
The Main Menu, Figure 3, displays the current 
period and measurement system. The latter is discussed 
more fully later as part of the Utilities Module. An option 
is selected by pressing a single key. 
Get Data for Next Period and Apoly Joint Test 
This module is used to read in the receipts, 
shipments and closing inventory for the next balance 
period. In addition, the data is processed in order to 
calculate the corresponding value for SITMUF, and the 
Joint Tests are applied. 
Standard Errors of Throughput and Inventory Module 
This module, Figure 4, displays, for each balance 
period, the standard errors associated with receipts, 
shipments, wastes, overall throughput, and inventory. 
Transactions and Balances Module 
This module, Figure 5, displays, for each balance 
period, the opening inventory, receipts, shipments, 
waste, closing inventory, inventory difference and 
CUMUF. Note, from the displayed data, how the opening 
inventory equals the closing inventory of the previous 
period, and that negative values for the inventory 
difference and CUMUF statistics correspond to an 
apparent loss of material. Graphical display of the 
Inventory Difference and CUMUF statistics, and of the 
inventory is also provided. 
Sequential Analysis Statistics Module 
This module, Figure 6, displays, for each balance 
period, the inventory difference and SITMUF statistics, 
together with the four statistics associatpd with the 
application of the two-sided Joint Test . Graphical 
display of the test statistics and alarm levels is also 
provided. 
Anomaly Resolution Module 
This module, Figure 7, displays the results of the 
anomaly resolution function. The mathematical as~ects 
of anomaly resolution are described in other papers & . 
The anomaly resolution procedure considers, one at a 
time, the following plausible models:-
an abrupt loss/gain at any period; 
a protracted loss/gain beginning and ending at 
any periods, and 
For each model, the following information is 
provided:-
the first and last periods which define the loss, 
gain or error model; 
the lower and upper 95% confidence limits of the 
size of the anomaly; 
the likelihood of the model relative to that of the 
most likely one, and 
a comment which is "Protracted Loss (or Gain)", 
"Abrupt Loss (or Gain)" or "Inventory Error''. 
Special Procedures Module 
This module, Figure 8, is password protected and 
allows the experienced user to customize the way in 
which the anomaly resolution function is implemented. 
Utilities Module 
This module allows the user to switch between the 
primary ~main) and secondary (back-up) measurement 
systems . 
Quit Function 
This option allows the user to leave the NRTMA 
application. 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Emphasis is placed on minimizing and simplifying 
operator input whilst maximizing the return to him of 
an inventory error at any inventory determination. readily useable information. 
Figure 1: Copyright Screen 
CONTROL 4 April 1990 
Near Real Time Materials Accountancy 
Version 4.0 
Copyright British Nuclear Fuels plc 
Created 2 November 1989 
Author Barry J Jones 
Press <SPACE> to Continue 
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Eioure 2: Joint Test Module 
JOINT TEST MODULE 
A module for Joint Test generation can be incorporated later as an 
enhancement. 
At present, Joint Tests are generated off-line and read in from a file. 
Joint Test for 
Loss Detection 
HlLoss 
KlLoss 
H2Loss 
K2Loss 
0.0 
-3.47590 
-7.9 
-0.24399 
Press <SPACE> to Continue 
Fioure 3: Main Menu 
Joint Test for 
Gain Detection 
HlGain 
KlGain 
H2Gain 
K2Gain 
0.0 
3.47590 
7.9 
0.24399 
NEAR REAL TIME MATERIALS ACCOUNTANCY CONTROL MODULE 
Current Period 0 Measurement System Primary 
OPTIONS 
G Get Data for Next Period and Apply Joint Test 
E Standard Errors of Throughput and Inventory 
T Transactions and Balances (+ MUF & CUMUF Statistics) 
S Sequential Analysis Statistics 
A Anomaly Resolution 
X Special Procedures 
U Utilities 
Q Quit 
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FIQure 4: Standard Errors of Throughput and Inventory 
MEASUREMENT ERRORS 
Current Period 5 Measurement System Primary 
Period <- - - - - - Measurement Errors - - - - - - - - - -> 
Receipts Shipments Wastes Throughput Inventory 
1 346 0 10 346 1,048 
2 346 0 10 346 1, 883 
3 346 1, 060 10 1,123 2,217 
4 346 1,068 10 1,123 2,875 
5 346 1,068 10 1,123 2,875 
Use U fi PgDn PgUp End Home to View Standard Errors Press Esc to Quit 
Fioure 5: Transactions and Balances(+ MUE & CUMUE Statistics) 
TRANSACTIONS AND BALANCES 
Current Period 5 Measurement System Primary 
Period Opening Receipts Shipments Waste Closing Inventory CUMUF 
Inventory Inventory Difference 
1 0 2U, 625 0 4 90 241,509 4 62 4 62 
2 241,589 241,660 0 520 482,132 -597 -135 
3 482,132 241,311 223,215 510 500,792 1,074 939 
4 500,792 251,474 241,283 501 494,328 -16,154 -15,215 
5 494,328 241,731 240,284 513 502,338 7,076 -8,139 
Use U fi PgDn PgUp End Home to View Transactions Press Esc to Quit 
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Figure 6: Sequential Analysis Statistics 
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS MODULE 
Current Period 5 Measurement System Primary 
Period Inventory SITMUF SlGain S2Gain S1Loss S2Loss 
Difference 
1 462 0.419 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.000 
2 -597 -0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 1,074 0.358 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.000 
4 -16,154 -4.735 0.000 0.000 -1.259 -4.491 
5 7,076 -2.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 -6.259 
Use U fi PgDn PgUp End Home to View Statistics Press Esc to Quit 
Figure 7: Anomaly Resolution 
ANOMALY RESOLUTION MODULE 
Current Period 5 Measurement System Primary 
Model Periods Anomaly 95% Limits Relative Comment 
First Last Lower Higher Likelihood 
1 4 4 -15,168 -6,286 1.000 Abrupt Loss 
2 3 4 -13,758 -4,802 0.003 Protracted Loss 
3 4 5 -18,494 -6,237 0.001 Inventory Error 
4 3 5 -14,397 -4,441 <0.001 Protracted Loss 
5 4 5 -14,317 -4,386 <0.001 Protracted Loss 
6 2 4 -11,334 -3,148 <0.001 Protracted Loss 
7 2 5 -12,680 -3,442 <0.001 Protracted Loss 
8 3 3 -9,153 -1,634 <0.001 Abrupt Loss 
9 1 5 -9,713 -1,648 <0.001 Protracted Loss 
10 1 4 -8,320 -1,:;!51 <0.001 Protracted Loss 
11 2 3 -7,946 -1,036 <0.001 Protracted Loss 
12 5 5 -9,692 -128 <0.001 Abrupt Loss 
13 2 2 -5,581 -64 <0.001 Abrupt Loss 
14 1 3 -5,909 53 <0.001 Protracted Loss 
15 3 4 -1,060 8,536 <0.001 Inventory Error 
16 1 2 -4,171 648 <0.001 Protracted Loss 
Use U fi PgDn PgUp End Home to View Anomalies Press Esc to Quit 
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Figure 8: Special Procedure 
SPECIAL PROCEDURES MODULE 
Current Period 5 Measurement System Primary 
Model Periods J\nomaly Standard Chi Square Comment 
First Last Estimate Error Value 
1 4 4 -10,727 2,266 4.362 Abrupt Loss 
2 3 4 -9,280 2,285 10.280 Protracted Loss 
3 4 5 -12,366 3,127 11.136 Inventory Error 
4 3 5 -9,119 2,540 13.025 Protracted Loss 
5 4 5 -9,352 2,533 13.150 Protracted Loss 
6 2 4 -7,241 2,088 14.756 Protracted Loss 
7 2 5 -8,061 2,357 15.078 Protracted Loss 
8 3 3 -5,394 1,918 18.871 Abrupt Loss 
9 l 5 -5,681 2,057 19.152 Protracted Loss 
10 1 4 -4,786 1,803 19.735 Protracted Loss 
11 2 3 -4,491 1,763 20.285 Protracted Loss 
12 5 5 -4,910 2,440 22.728 Abrupt Loss 
13 2 2 -2,822 1,407 22.755 Abrupt Loss 
14 l 3 -2,928 1,521 23.071 Protracted Loss 
15 3 4 3,738 2, 448 24.445 Inventory Error 
16 1 2 -1' 7 61 1,229 24.724 Protracted Loss 
Use u fi PgDn PgUp End Home to View Anomalies Press Esc to Quit 
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MODEL-BASED DIAGNOSIS 
IN NEAR-REAL TIME MATERIALS ACCOUNTANCY 
J. Howell 
Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Glasgow 
Glasgow, Gl2 8QQ, Scotland 
Absttact 
NRTMA systems must be capable of diagnosing 
anomalies as well as detecting them because of problems 
associated with, for instance, obtaining apriori knowledge 
of systematic errors. A question therefore arises as to 
whether methods developed for fault diagnosis may be 
equally applicable in NRTMA. This possibility is examined 
and a model-based approach to diagnosis Is described. 
1. Introducdon 
It has been argued elsewhere /l-3/ that near-real-time 
materials accountancy (NRTMA) systems installed in 
reprocessing plants must diagnose as well as detect 
because of the likely occurrence of false alarms induced 
by systematic errors, transcription errors and so on. If a 
NRTMA system is to perform effectively in a reprocessing 
facility, it must therefore be able to build on experience 
gained in previous campaigns and investigate data 
irregularities. 
The idea of an intelligent knowledge-based system 
(IKBS) providing valuable assistance in this situation has 
been mooted /1/ previously. A number of approaches are 
possible depending on factors like the type of knowledge 
available, methods of representation and manipulation. The 
simplest and most widely proposed method for representing 
knowledge is with if-then rules; for example 
if the accountancy tank has just been emptied 
then the level in the plant feed tank > 1 m. 
A large number of these rules can be strung together 
to relate observed symptoms to implied underlying causes 
and faults. Such systems tend to lack depth because 
although terms like empty and full can be quantified the 
relationships between the various plant components do not 
represent the mechanism by which these rules 01re obtained: 
the underlying physical relationships have been elimil).ated 
from the description. There is therefore a strong argument 
in favour of incorporating deep, or model-based, knowledge 
into any diagnostic system. This in turn requires 
mechanisms to reason about the models constructed. 
Although little has been published about the 
model-based diagnosis of anomalies in NRTMA, 
considerable researeh/4,5,6/ has been carried out into 
model-based diagnosis of faults in general. The question 
therefore arises as to whether this research is equal! y 
applicable to NRTMA. There is no conceptual difference 
between faults and anomalies. Materials accountancy is to 
do with ensuring that the measured or estimated flow of 
material through a plant balances; a fault may be deemed 
to be anything that upsets this balance. 
This paper first puts model-based diagnosis into 
context by briefly outlining an IKBS structure to meet 
NRTMA requirements It goes on to discuss the most 
relevant aspects of current research into fault diagnosis and 
proposes a diagnosis methodology that is suitable for the 
information content that is likely to be available from 
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reprocessing plants. That is a methodology which will 
accommodate the quality of data and models thought to be 
available. A diagnostic procedure is outlined and its 
capabilities are assessed by examining its performance on a 
reprocessing plant simulation. 
2. A Suitable Knowledge-Based System Sttucture 
for NRTMA 
It is argued elsewhere nt that an appropriate knowledge-
based structure could have the following knowledge 
sources: 
Rgure 1 : Knowledge Sources 
The system could be invoked everytime a set of plant 
measurements becomes available. This data would then be 
input to the fault detection and partial isolation knowledge-
source which would be subsequently activated. 
The primary role of this knowledge-source is to 
detect the occurrence of an anomaly and having done so, 
to perform a pattern matching exercise on, for instance 
MUF, CUMUF and CUSUM plots. It outputs two lists: a 
list of symptoms or discrepancies and a list of assertions 
which point to possible classes of anomalies that could 
account for the patterns observed. It would be unusual for 
the charts to identify an anomaly uniquely; their role is to 
focus attention. Two issues complicate the recognition 
process, that of noise and of multiple faults (anomalies). 
Both can largely be overcome by adding any fault, that is 
remotely likely, to the list Care must then be taken to 
ensure that the most likely are considered first 
The Supervisor is driven by data flowing from the 
fault detection and partial isolation knowledge source. It 
has two roles, that of an evidence gatherer and hypothesis 
generator and that of an adjudicator. We use the term 
gatherer to refer to the former. The basic mechanism 
behind the Gatherer is as follows. On receipt of a list of 
possible fault scenarios, the Gatherer takes each fault 
scenario In turn and Invokes one or more of three options: 
a model-based analysis, a reference to history or its own 
assessment In most situations it will invoke all three. 
Each option returns either a statement of its deliberations 
In the fonn of hypothesis explanations or nothing at all. 
Finally the adjudicawr is invoked to assess the hypotheses 
gathered. Little research has been carried out into the 
process of adjudication. The current state assumes that the 
operator will make his own assessment based on the 
hypotheses fonned. 
Model-based fault diagnosis is therefore viewed as 
contributing only one aspect to the overall strategy. 
3. Introduction to Model-Based Fault Diagnosis 
What do we mean by model-based fault diagnosis? 
In its simplest fonn /5/ it can be considered as 
consisting of a parallel simulation predicting plant 
measurements, a comparison between these predictions and 
the actual measurements and a means of generating fault 
hypotheses on the basis of any discrepancies obtained. 
FEEDS 
DISTURBANCES 
MANIPULATED 
VARIABLES 
Figure 2 : Model-based Fault Diagnosis 
A slightly more sophisticated arrangement /8/ is where 
the simulation outputs model parameters Instead. 
Figure 3 : Model-Parameter-based Fault Diagnosis 
Processes need not be modelled quantitatively, various 
techniques have been proposed which reason with 
qualitative models instead /9,10/. However these arc 
unlikely to be of interest to materials accountancy which 
is singularly numerical In nature. Virtually all research .into 
quantitative techniques has focused on plants or systems 
that are information rich: either in the sense that there is 
a proliferation of sensors throughout the plant, the outputs 
of which are of a sufficiently high quality and are 
recorded at frequencies much higher than that of 
underlying process fluctuations or in the availability of 
models that are accurate in terms of structure and 
parameters or both. If this was the case in NRTMA, then 
only actual diversions would be alarmed because the 
detection system would be able to compensate for any 
other anomaly that might arise. Reprocessing plants tend to 
be information poor. Howell /11/ has proposed a common 
sense · approach to fault diagnosis in infonnation poor 
processes and it is this approach that is followed here. 
It is not our concern here to digress into models, 
measurements and their inaccuracies. The reader is asked 
tci accept that such inaccuracies can exist and can have 
various affects on the discrepancies observed. To give an 
idea of scale, the plant model discussed later requires 26 
variables to describe the time variations in its principal 
inaccuracies assuming that the structure is correct. There is 
no guarantee that a particular pauem of discrepancies can 
be attributed to a particular fault because various 
pennutations of model and measurement system 
inaccuracies may have a similar effect. The following 
fonnula is therefore proposed /11/ to represent the various 
possibilities. 
The process, plant or system is divided into parts 
along physically meaningful boundaries and a model is 
constructed for each part Variables describing the flow 
across boundaries are defined as path variables. Neither 
measurements nor model inaccuracies need be confined to 
these boundaries and a Principle of Re-Distribution nt is 
introduced to fonnalize this new representation. This 
principle provides a common approach to the categorization 
of the effects that individual model inaccuracies, 
measurement errors and faults have on the discrepancies. 
Any model inaccuracy, measurement error or fault can be 
identified with a single element contained in one of two 
mutually exclusive sets, 9, the set of path errors, and U, 
the set of non-path errors. One difference between them is 
that each element of e is always present which is not the 
case with elements of U. For instance, an analogue 
measurement can only be obtained to the accuracy of the 
measuring device; some error will always exist. A set e* 
is then defined as containing those elements of e that are 
significant! y in error in the sense that, for instance, the 
error cannot be explained by nonnal inaccuaracies in the 
measurement system. 
Figure 4 A Typical 4-Element Candidate Space 
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A candidate is now defined as a particular hypothesis 
for how the plant differs from the model. That is, it is a 
set of elements of SuU whose values could, 
hypothetically, be manipulated to explain the discrepancies 
observed. Figure 4 shows the candidate space for a simple 
example containing just two path and two non-path errors. 
Each set of explanations, indicated by [.], is possible 
giving 35 candidates in all. More realistic situations would 
involve much larger candidate spaces. The space, shown in 
Figure 4, can be viewed as a lattice composed of 4 
sub-lattices, each starting at a different 4-element node 
with only one node containing purely insignificant errors. 
If considerable uncertainty surrounds the diagnosis, then 
candidates at the top of the lattice are likely to be true; 
the greater the certainty, the more likely the candidates 
towards the bottom of the lattice become. 
The number of explanations contained in each of the 
candidates towards the top of the lattice are like! y to be 
far greater than the number of symptoms available to 
perform a diagnosis. In these circumstances it is difficult 
to discriminate between the various candidates unless some 
of the explanations can be eliminated on grounds of 
inter-dependence or through non-symptom related 
arguments. 
Howell /11/ has proposed a way forward based on 
common sense reasoning and has developed techniques to 
evaluate the various sets of possibilities. Based on 
subjective probabilities and estimation theory, they are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
4. Model-Based Diagnosis in NRTMA 
Figure 5 shows the knowledge-based system that has 
been developed to combine the ideas of the previous two 
Sections. 
Q Lisp Programs 
c=J Fortran Programs 
Figure 5 : Proposed Knowledge-based System 
It consists of a hybrid lisp/Fortran environment with 
the lisp environment acting as host calling Fortran routines 
when necessary. A hybrid implementation is preferred 
because it combines the numerical affinity of Fortran with 
the list and symbolic processing powers of lisp. The 
Fortran environment is composed of simulation, analysis 
and numerical routines. The numerical routines arc a 
library of routines to perform matrix algebra, to solve a 
set of linear simultaneous equations and to generate 
random numbers for test purposes. The lisp environment 
consists of knowledge-sources, an inference engine and 
various global data structures and methods. 
689 
5. An Example 
This Section discusses the steps that have been taken 
to develop a model-based diagnosis system for a particular 
plant; in this case the hypothetical solvent-extraction and 
concentration plant shown in Figure 6. Ideally, there would 
be three stages to such a development: 
1. form a skeletal knowledge-base and produce simulation 
and analysis routines; 
2. test the functionality of the resulting system using data 
output from the simulation; 
3. assess its performance on the real plant 
Unfortunately neither a plant nor resources were 
available to perform the third stage. A relatively superficial 
assessment of its performance was therefore made by 
testing it against a simulation designed to reflect some of 
the uncertainty surrounding the model. 
5.1 Knowledge-sources, Sim.ulations and Analysis 
There is insufficient space here to discuss the 
knowledge-sources that must be constructed to interpret 
alarms generated from control charts, represent operator 
experience and so on. The discussion will be limited to 
the model-based part of Utc system. 
With the absence of a real plant for comparison, it 
was assumed that the structure of the model incorporated 
into the fault diagnosis system was Utc simplest possible. 
That is, one with perfect mixing in all the buffer tanks 
and with the ratios of the various feeds in the 
solvent-extraction plant maintained constant The only 
random errors were those assumed to exist in the 
individual measurements. 
System performance was then examined by diagnosing 
faults generated from a simulation in which non-perfect 
mixing and variations in a number of feeds and parameters 
were, or were not, be imposed. To be concise, only two 
plant simulations are considered here, 
Plant A: 
i) 
ii) 
random errors applied to individual 
measurements; 
fluctuations in each of the elements initially 
contained in Ute set of simulation variables, 
S: 
Plant B: as above plus 
iii) only the top quarter, of the total possible 
volume, of each buffer tank is mixed; 
iv) 0% mixing in Ute buffer tanks prior to 
sampling; 
v) 0.5% fluctuation in the nominal load of the 
solvent-extraction plants; 
vi) 0.5% fluctuations in each of Ute feeds to the 
first cycle of the solvent-extraction plant: 
where an n% fluctuation is modelled as a multiplicative 
gaussian random error with standard deviation, n/100. In 
all, 16 different random sources were included in Plant B 
in addition to those used to corrupt the individual 
measurements. It must be emphasised again that these 
plant simulations were performed for the purposes of 
experimentation and not to depict reality. 
5.2 Performance of Model-Based Reasoning 
System perfonnance was assessed by examining its 
ability to detect and diagnose the following faults: 
A. an erroneous measurement of volume (equivalent 
to 3.7 crMUF) of the plant feed tank (buffer tank A) 
on period 5; 
C. a diversion from the concentrator (equivalent to 
4.2 crMUF) on period 5; 
D. solvent_extraction_A plant load incorrectly specified 
on period 5 as 60% instead of 100% load; this will 
cause the simulation to either over or under predict 
the inventory in the plant feed tank with an 
associated under or over prediction of the 
inventories of buffer tanks B and C. In addition, 
the estimated inventory of the relevant solvent 
extraction plant will be in error. 
The simulation runs were restricted to 16 periods in 
all cases because of the not insignificant amount of data 
required like switching times. Ten experiments were 
perfonned, giving ten sets of data in all. Although an 
attempt was made to make the 10 sets different, a certain 
amount of similarity still existed because of difficulties in 
generating operational times which do not result in tanks 
being emptied. 
Table 1 shows the results obtained when model-based 
reasoning was applied to data collected at the end of a 
single period, on the assumption that all path faults were 
insignificant This is a limitation of the current 
implementation. 
The following observations were made. 
Fault A: the correct measurement error was identified in 
all cases; 
Fault C: diagnosis was incorrect because it should have 
been perfonned over two periods although it did identify 
the correct plant component; 
Fault D: one diagnosis, per plant, failed completely whilst 
the other 9 required at least 2 non-path explanations. A 
question therefore arose as to whether or not these 2 
explanations could be replaced by a single, significant path 
explanation. That sub-lattice containing no insignificant path 
errors was therefore examined for those datasets containing 
Fault D and the following results were obtained: 
ACCOUNTANCY 
TANK 
SOLVENT- EXTRACTION 
PLANT A 
SOLVENT- EXTRACTION 
PLANTS 
CANDIDATES 
p=path np =non-path 
Plant Fault np p+np 2np 2p+np p+2np 3np npidentified 
A A 6 4 pft_vol 
c 7 3 prod_stor A_ vol 
D 8 1 tt vol 
+bu _talikB_vol 
( +prod_storA_vol) 
B A 7 3 pft_vol 
c 1 7 2 prodJtorA.._vol 
D 8 1 rvol 
+bu _talikB_vol 
(+prod_storA.._ vol) 
Table 1: Fault Studies using Insignificant Path Sub-lattice 
Plant A - 7*p* & 3*2p* 
Plant B - 5*2p* & 1 *(p* +np) & 4*3p* 
where a particular p* in every case was that composite 
element that contained both solvent_extraction_plant_A_load 
and solvent_extraction_plant_B_load. Each sub-lattice 
containing a single significant path error which was 
identical to one of those identified was searched next. 
Only 2 significant path errors were successful in the case 
of Plant A, the 2 loads and the following candidates were 
identified, 
Plant A - solvent_extraction_plant_AJoad* 
+ (7 & 3*p) 
Plant B - solvent_extraction_plant_A_load* 
+ (4*p & 2*np & 4*2p) 
5.3 Perfonnance Overall 
The discussion will be limited to that pertaining to 
Plant A, Fault A because there is insufficient space to 
describe all the results here. Indeed this example is only 
given to elaborate on system perfonnance and to 
demonstrate its potential. Considerably more development is 
required before the system can be viewed as being 
operationally viable. 
At present, the consequences generated by the 
Control-chart and Supervisor knowledge-sources arc held in 
CONCENTRATOR 
FJgure 6: Plant Layout 
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a common assertion base, goals. Model-based reasoning 
and history have their own assertion bases, sim_asserts and 
corr _asserts. The following assertions have been selected 
from the contents of the various assertion bases generated 
when the system was invoked at the end of the period 
subsequent to the anomaly having occurred. 
goals -
goals -
as produced by the Control Chart 
knowledge-source 
(INV-LOSS+SIM-OUT YESTERDAY) 
(INV-LOSS YESTERDAY) 
(SINGLE-TRANSFER-ERROR YESTERDAY) 
(SINGLE-INV-ERROR YESTERDAY) 
(CUSUM-P YESTERDAY) 
(MUFTEST-P YESTERDAY 316.498) 
The Supervisor takes each assertion indicating 
an anomaly (ie the top 4) and assesses the 
possibility by generating LOOK-FOR assertions. 
These, in turn, are acted upon. 
produced by the Supervisor, 
(LOOK-FOR-FAULT S-I-E YESTERDAY 
(YESTERDAY YESTERDAY)) 
(LOOK-FOR-FAULT S-T-E YESTERDAY 
(YESTERDAY TODAY)) 
(LOOK-FOR-FAULT I-L YESTERDAY 
(YESTERDAY TODAY)) 
sim_asserts - as produced by the analytical approach, 
(S-I-E ((PFTVOL-MEAS -9.20707)) NIL I) 
(INTERPRET -MODEL S-I-E 
((0 NIL (((I -0.492931) 
(991 -9.20707))) 
(0.965009)))) 
Only one possible explanation was generated on 
the second row of the insignificant path error 
sub-lattice and the search was terminated. (The 
first row having identified no suitable 
candidates.) A reduction of -9.21 in the 
simulated volume in the plant feed tank would 
explain the measurements. That is, there was a 
measurement error of -9.21 as compared to an 
actual error of -101. An insignificant error in 
the volume input to the plant is also needed to 
explain the discrepancies. 
6. Conclusions 
A knowledge-based system structure has been described 
which incorporates and subsequently analyses the outputs 
of statistical tests applied to MUF series with surface 
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knowledge about previous experience, operator heuristics 
and plant peculiarities and with model-based reasoning. 
It has been shown how anomalies can be diagnosed by 
taking a common sense approach to reasoning about 
differences between simulations based on quantitative 
models and plant data. A number of successful 
experiments have been performed to prove the efficacy of 
the approach. However considerable effort is still required 
to demonstrate its potential in general. In particular, 
experiments to date have been with simulated data in· a 
university environment A demonstration on a real plant is 
required before the approach would be acceptable to the 
NRTMA Community. 
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TORNESS COMPUTERISED FUEL RECORDS SYSTEM 
Abstract 
Tooy Ible 
Scottish 'tb::Iear 
Tomess Power Statim 
Nr.n.mbar 
East I..oth:i.an Eli42 1QS 
ScotlaOO 
Early during the construction of Torness 
Power Station it was decided that a computerised 
record systan would be developed to enable the 
Station to comply with current legislation 
relating to the control of fissile naterial. The 
resultant systan was delivered in stages to 
natch the conmissioning of the various sections 
of the Fuel Route and has been used successfully 
now for five years. Infornation on fissile 
naterial is up:lated in 'real-time' and all 
statutocy and rrandatocy reports required by 
Regulatocy bodies are provided, thus eliminating 
potential sources of errors. 
1. Introducticn 
Torness Power Station, located near !Ainbar 
in East Lothian Scotland, is owned and operated 
by Scottish Nuclear Limited. Torness Power 
Station consists of two Advanced Gas Cooled 
(P.GR) nuclear reactors with a total generating 
capacity of 1400 megawatts. 
The Computerised Fuel Records systan 
(Fuelroute) is a complex data processing systan 
which tracks the rovement and storage of all 
Fissile Material and associated Reactor 
components from receipt on the Station, to 
dispatch off the Station for reprocessing or 
disposal into the High Active Debris Vault in 
the case of non-reusable itans. The systan was 
designed to provide a database of current and 
historical transactions which could be 
interrogated to provide the wide variety of 
reports required by Scottish Nuclear personnel 
and outside regulatocy bodies. 
The software requirements of the Fuelroute 
Progranme was specified by the Fuel Records 
Eilgineer at Torness Power Station and produced 
in accordance with an approved Project Plan by 
ScottishPower Plc. It was agreed at the onset 
that all Software would be delivered from 
ScottishPower plc. in batches to natch the 
conmissioning of the various sections of the 
physical Fuel Route. 
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2. History 
At an early stage during the construction 
phase it was decided that, wherever possible, 
all infornation at Torness Power Station would 
be 'Computerised' ; since there was no known 
computer systan readily available it was 
necessacy to develop a computerised Fuel Records 
systan from scratch. 
This computerised record systan now forms 
part of the Torness Management Infornation 
Systan and is considered as the definitive 
Station based Fissile Material Record. The 
systan is used for recording the description, 
location, rovement and use of all Fissile 
Material and associated components at Torness 
Power Station. 
The systan has been used successfully now 
for five years and has proved to have three vecy 
important advantages over a paper based systan: 
1) the data base is always up to date, being 
up:lated in 'near' real time 
2) data is subject to rigorous vetting, thus 
giving confidence in the infornation at all 
times 
3) the database can be easily and speedily 
interrogated day or night to give either 
standard or miscellaneous reports. The 
database can also be interrogated ranotely 
from the Company Headquarters in the 
unlikely event of a serious Nuclear Site 
Incident. 
Since the software was delivered in phases, 
this allowed the users to become familiar with 
using it gradually and to gain confidence in the 
systan. It also allowed the project team 
designing the software to take into account 
users' COITilJents. Throughout the design and 
production phases close collaboration was 
naintained at all times between Station Staff 
and ScottishPower Infornation Systems 
Departnalt. 
3. RequireiEnt 
At the conm:ncement of the design stage of 
the computerised record system it was stated by 
Station Managanent that the follow:ing 
requirements were parallYJunt and had to be JJEt in 
totality by the system: 
* To be able to demonstrate that the Nuclear 
Site Licence conditions are being complied 
with in respect to the IJX)Vement and storage 
of the Fuel Route items during the life of 
the station. 
* To enable auditing of the above Nuclear Site 
Licence conditions by Regulatory Bodies. 
* To computerise the record keeping of all 
operations within the physical Fuel Route. 
* 
To naintain 
transactions 
Records. 
a database of all above 
for the Station's Lifetii!E 
For the Physical Fuel Route at Torness Power 
Station to be able to function effectively the 
follow:ing infomation IIJJSt be available at all 
tii!Es: 
* Details of all fuel elements, associated 
reactor components, fuel flasks, skips and 
bottles delivered to the Station eg. 
Identification Numbers, Location and 
contents. 
* Fuel and components specified for fuel 
assembles, ie. Stock Levels, Identification 
Numbers and Location. 
* Fuel and components used in fuel assembles. 
* Discharge instructions detailing the channel 
to be discharged and where the constituent 
parts of the fuel assembly are to be stored. 
* Confomation of the di.snantling process and 
compliance with the discharge instructions. 
* Details of Irradiated and lh-irradiated 
fuel, Irradiated fuel flasks etc. dispatched 
from the Station. 
* Records of all Fissile Material movement 
within the station. 
4. Hardware 
This progranme rims on a clustered Digital 
Vf.:/. computer system, comprising two VAX 8550's 
and a VAX 6310. The programs and data occupy 30 
Megabytes of disk storage and access by users is 
via terminals or personal computers attached to 
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a local area network. Security on the VAX system 
is ensured by use of file protection, access 
control lists and further restrictions built 
into the executable image. 
It is Station Policy that all Engineers have 
personal computers or have access to a tenninal 
when required. In addition to personal terminals 
there are also a number of terminals 
strategically located around the plant and 
throughout the physical Fuel Route. These 
terminals are linked to the cluster via a Local 
Area Network which utilises glass fibre cable 
because of the distances involved. Having a 
number of terminals available enables all 
Station Staff, wherever they are located, to 
have access to the infomation as required. 
The cluster is also linked via a Wide Area 
Network to other computers including the 
developnent machine. 
5. Software 
The system was produced according to a 
Quality Assurance Plan which followed the 
guidelines contained within BS:5750 and thus 
detailed responsibilities, deliverables, 
standards/JJEthods/tools to be used to ensure 
quality, and reviews. 
The software was designed using a structured 
JJEthodology. Various computer languages were 
used where applicable (ie <Xl.BOL, BASIC, F'()RffiAN, 
and DATA'IlUEVE - DEC high level query language) 
and the screen user interface uses 00::' s 
Tenninal Data Management System ('l'CMS). 
The comprehensive database is a series of 
Index Sequential files which were designed to 
minimise redundancy of data. Record Locking is 
utilised to ensure that no inconsistencies in 
the data arise from multi-user access. 
The project team developed the system on 
their own computer which is 1.50 kilometres from 
the target computer at Torness Power Station. 
When preparing the Software Requirements 
Specification, and when unit and system testing 
etc, naximum use was rrade of the Wide Area 
Network (WAN) linking the two sites. This 
method worked very well indeed and allowed the 
project team to develop the computer system very 
nn.Ich in partnership with the end users. 
6. System 
The multi-user system is menu based with 
extensive on-line help facilities. It is updated 
in 'near' real tii!E by the Sections responsible 
for fuel Records, Reactor Physics, Fuel Handling 
Operations and Fuel Handling Maintenance. 
In addition to the 'Live' database a 
Training database is maintained for staff in 
these sections. This Training database is an 
exact copy of the live prograrrme and as such can 
provide realistic training for all. 
Security vithin the Station Vax Computer 
systan is strictly controlled in the first 
instance by the Computer Sec.ti~n only issuing 
User Accounts to named individuals and each user 
having their ow password to permit access to 
the system. There are further security controls 
built into the system, e.g. all users are placed 
into sections and access to various activities 
are limited to ncminated sections and in some 
cases to named individuals. 
Security vithin the Fuelroute System is 
further controlled vith access only being 
granted to named users by the Fuel Records 
El:lgineer. Only approved users are allowed access 
to the software and each approved user has 
access only to the facilities required to carry 
out his involvarent within the Fuel Route. The 
data is thoroughly vetted before the database is 
updated and an audit trail, detailing 'Who 
perforrred a particular transaction and when, is 
maintained of all transactions. Many of the 
security features of the VMS operating systan 
are also utilised to ensure the security of the 
data. 
I::e.ta is protected from loss by the 
implementation of 'Volume Shadoving' which 
ensures that a back-up copy of the data is 
al'oays available within the systan. In addition 
to Volume Shadoving all data is archived on a 
"iieekly basis and is stored at tw separate 
locations for security reason. This system of 
duplication of files ensures that, even in the 
wrst possible scenario, the maximum loss of 
infor:nation is one ~o~eo...k.' s data which could be 
recovered vithin a fairly short period of time. 
0 
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7. Reports 
It is one of the ftmctions of this computer 
systen to provide status reports on demmd. 
These reports can either be produced in a paper 
for:nat or negnetic tape for dew loading 
directly onto other computer system as required. 
Examples of computer produced reports are: 
1) EUratom Reports eg. ICRs, MBRs and PILs -
These above reports can be produced in the 
for:nat of Magnetic Tape for direct transfer 
of data to Ellratc:m Headquarters in 
lJJxanbourg 
2) Cetails of the isotopic content of the 
High Active r:ebris Vault -Required for the 
government's Scottish Office. 
3) Reactor Core contents• 
4) Station Stock levels of all Reactor Fuel 
and components 
5) History of all fuel assemblies during 
their lifetime at Tomess. 
8. Top level Functiws 
This section contains a top level 
description of each of the main ftmctions that 
OBke up the computer system and the top level 
I::e.ta Fl01<1 Diagram (figure 1) shows than 
diagranatically. 
Fig. 1 -Top Level Data Fl01<1 Diagram (DFD) 
The Receipt and Storage function deals with 
the delivery to To mess of boxes of fuel 
elements and reactor components and their 
associated telex, advice note and packing sheet 
de tails, it also deals with their storage within 
the reactor building. The following items are 
delivered in boxes - fuel Elements, Tiebars, 
Bottom Support Reflector Assemblies (BSRAs), Top 
Reflectors Assemblies (TRA.s) , Central Inertial 
Collectors (CICs), Finned Upper Stabilising 
Brushes (FUSBAs), 'E' Seals, Collets and 
Sleeves. 
This function also acts as a goods inwards, 
providing facilities to enter flasks, bottles 
and skips, coupled with their telex, advice note 
and packing sheet details into the system. 
Ft.N:ITOO 3: CliABGE FOlDER PREPARATIOO 
This function handles the inter-departmental 
preparation of a statutory charge folder which 
is required to be produced prior to the loading 
of a fuel assembly into a reactor channel. The 
charge folder contains the details of the fuel 
elements and components to be used in the 
building of a fuel assembly and the tests that 
they must undergo as defined by Reactor Physics 
Section. 
FUCITOO 4: BUTID FUEL ASSEMBLY 
This function handles the actual building of 
the fuel assembly as specified within the charge 
folder. At this stage individual fuel elements 
and components which have failed the specified 
tests nay have to be replaced by compatible 
ones. This sub-sys tern also provides a facility 
for quarantining (and I..U'l--<jtlaiatining) the 
failed fuel elements and components and will 
confi:rm that all alternatives used are of the 
sane type as the original specification. 
FUO'IOO 5: DISCHAF.GE FOLDER PREPARATIOO 
This function handles the multi-departmental 
preparation of the statutory discharge folder 
which is required to be produced prior to the 
removal of any fuel assembly from a reactor 
channel. 
Ft.N:ITOO 6: DISMANTI.E FUEL ASSEMBLY 
This function handles the actual disnantling 
of the fuel assembly as specified in the 
discharge folder. 
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After a fuel assembly has completed its life in 
the reactor and using the appropriate discharge 
folder, the fuel assembly nay be dismantled and 
its constituent fuel elements and components are 
placed, as specified on the discharge folder, 
into skips, bottles or into the High Active 
Debris Vault (HAIJJ). The facility allows the 
user to overrule the discharge folder 
instructions for operational reasons. Other 
items nay also be dispatched to the HA!N. The 
isotopic contents of the fuel elements may be 
calculated 'Hhen required. 
Fl.N:ITOO 7: DISPATCH 
This function completes the fuelroute cycle 
by acting as goods outwards. It controls the 
dispatch of boxes, fuel elements, components, 
flasks, bottles and skips from the Station. 
This function allows• the FUelroute System 
Manager to IIXlve any FUelroute entity throughout 
the station (eg. a fuel assembly nay be IIXlved 
from the Build Area to the Reactor via the 
FUelling Machine; a fuel or component box may be 
llX>Ved from one store to another). 
This function handles all reports and 
enquiries that are available via the menu. The 
Euratom reporting is included within this 
function. A draft ICR, MBR, or PIL report nay 
be produced prior to the required date. This 
facility m:ans that the report nay be. checked, 
the database IIXldified if required, and then the 
actual report nay be produced on the required 
date. The database nay also be interrogated at 
any time using procedures writ ten by the users 
in a high level query language. TI1ese are not 
incorporated into the menu system. 
9. SltiMARY 
The Computerised FUel Records System as 
outlined above, has now been in use at Torness 
Power Station for five years and has been found 
to be invaluable in enabling the Station to 
comply with all Mandatory and Statutory 
requirements relating to the control of Fissile 
Material within the site. 
It has been found that with the use of this 
computerised system the FUel Records Team can 
operate IIXlte efficiently and with only one third 
the staff required to run a comparable 
non-computerised system. 
It is our opinion that this system could, 
with various levels of rrod.ification, be used to 
perfo:rm the sane controls at any other Nuclear 
Power Station. 
PEPSICODE- A COMPUTER CODE FOR TilE DYNAMIC SIMULATION OF 
SNM HOLD-UP IN MIXER-SETTLERS 
M.Dionisi (ENEA) 
F.D'Agostino, R.Remetti (University of Rome "La Sapienza") 
Abstract 
Hold-up of Special Nuclear Material in 
processing facilities is an insidious problem from 
both safety and safeguards point of view. 
Large inventory differences (IDs) are often 
proven to be caused by wrong estimates of hold-up, 
consequently, for a more efficient SNM accounting 
system, a new awareness about the problem of 
hold-up estimation has been created. 
In order to simulate the dynamic behaviour of 
mixer-settlers in an extraction solvent process, 
ENEA, in cooperation with the University of 
Rome, developed a Purex Extraction Process 
Simulation Code (PEPSICODE). 
PEPSICODE, due to a peculiar hydrodynamic 
modelling, describes time evolution of U, Pu and 
fission products concentrations both for transient 
and steady-state conditions. 
Simulation of an extraction campaign of 
EUREX plant will be reported. 
1. Introduction 
Within the next years, three new commercial 
reprocessing plants will start the operation with a 
total capacity of about 2800 t HM/y. That will 
means, for each plant, a total solvent extraction 
system inventory of 1 0+ 20 Kg Pu. 
With enhanced material control and accounting 
practices and procedures, inventory differences 
and, consequently, the problem of quantifying 
residual process material (hold-up) have been 
enphasized. 
Then, the importance of knowing uranium and 
plutonium concentrations vs. time in process 
equipment is become a more and more felt 
requirement in process control and Near Real 
Time accounting procedures for nuclear material. 
In a PUREX extraction process, mixer-settlers 
contactors are characterized by relatively low 
throughputs and large hold-up volumes. 
Measuring hold-up dynamic behaviour is an 
extreme difficult topic, it is more convenient an 
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estimation by studying and developing 
mathematical models of the hydrodynamic 
characteristics of the contactors. 
In the framework of the ENEA activities 
relevant to the Safeguards implementation in 
reprocessing plants, a general computer program 
simulating the process section and the measuring 
system of the EUREX pilot reprocessing plant 
(Fig.1 and Tab.l) has been developed to evaluate 
the performances of near real time accountancy 
procedures /1, 2, 3/. With the aim to implement a 
subroutine for the hold-up estimation a Purex 
Extraction Process Simulation Code 
(PEPSICODE) has been developed by the 
University of Rome "La Sapienza" and ENEA. 
PEPSICODE provides time varying estimates 
of the SNM hold-up residing in a mixer-settler 
from the start-up until the steady state is achieved. 
It can be very useful in studying also process 
shutdown and transient conditions including 
problems of sensitivity and stability. 
PROOUCT 
TAIIK 
Fig. I - Scheme of the simulated Eurex process 
section, /1/. 
Comp. V (I) Description Pu (g/1) 
F-307 360 Feed 1 °Cycle 2.5 
F-404 180 Aqueous waste 1 °C 210-4 
F-408 350 Organic waste 1 °C 110-5 
F-405 35 Product adj. 1 °C 0.41 
F-406 35 Feed2°C 0.41 
F-505 100 Aqueous waste 2°C 2 10-5 
F-508 350 Organic output 2°C 
F-506 40 Product 2°C 2.7 
F-507 40 Feed Evaporator 2.7 
C-603 14 Evaporator 100 
F-606 125 Output 100 
D-401 54.4 Codecontamination battery 
1 °Cycle (8 st.) 
D-402 68 Scrub battery 
1°Cycle (10 st.) 
D-403 68 Strip battery 
1°Cycle (10 st.) 
D-501 74.8 Codecontamination battery 
2°Cyc!e (11 St.) 
D-502 74.8 Coscrub battery 
2°Cycle (11 st.) 
D-503 108.8 Partial partition battery 
2°Cycle (16 st.} 
Tab.l - In process hold-up in tanks and extraction 
equipments of Eurex plant, /1/. 
2. The hydrodynamic modelling 
The hydrodynamic model implemented within 
PEPSICODE derives from experimental studies 
carried out by means of a transparent liquid-liquid 
contactor with coloured phases /4/. 
Within the mixer the flow of the two mixed 
phases is particularly well approximated by a 
plug-flow. In this condition residence time is 
obviously given by the ratio between volume and 
total flow Vmix/(A+O), (Fig.2). 
mass transfer 
Fig.2 - Mixer model. 
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In the settling zone plug-flow hypothesis is 
reasonably acceptable only for organic phase, as a 
consequence its residence time is given by the ratio 
between the volume of organic zone and the flow 
of organic phase. 
Aqueous phase shows a noticeable shift from 
plug-flow. Aqueous zone within the settler is 
modelled by six perfectly mixing theoretical 
vessels, connected in series with a recirculation 
flow R between the first and the last one. This 
model allows simulation of aqueous flow A which, 
in small quantity, may invert global flow from 
input to output. This is accounted for by the 
recirculation flow R. The six theoretical vessels 
have different volumes, ranging from 2/20 to 5/20 
of the aqueous phase volume. The output of the 
settler is placed in the fourth vessel (Fig.3). 
A A+R 
R 81U 
a u 
[1 ~ UA T 
Fig.3 - Settler model. 
3. The extraction process 
The mathematical model of the extraction 
process is based on the following equations /5/: 
Va(Xi-Xi)=V0 (Yi- Yi) 
Yj= EffDiXi+(l- Ef~Yi . 
.. 
where: 
i=l indicates uranium, 2 for plutonium, 3 for 
fission products and 4 for HN03. 
V a, Vo 
X,Y 
Eff 
Di 
Pi• qi 
Ki 
- Aqueous and organic volumes 
- concentrations in aqueous and organic 
phase 
- Murphy efficiency 
- distribution coefficients 
- coordination factors 
- equilibrium constants 
This constitute a set of 12 equations that solved 
for time steps gives near continuous evolution of 
the concentrations in organic and aqueous phases. 
The in-process inventory for any contactor is 
influenced by many parameters, namely: 
- acid and nuclear material concentrations in the 
streams entering the contactor; 
- organic TBP concentration; 
- U(IV) reductant concentration in the feed 
streams; 
- flow rates of all streams entering the contactor; 
- number and volume of the stages; 
- phase volume ratios. 
In order to characterize more completely the 
mathematical model, input flows within 
PEPSICODE have not been considered fixed 
nominal values but random values originated from 
a random sampling process on a gaussian density 
function with nominal values as centroid. In the 
next future, also the other parameters will be 
described with stochastic distributions. 
4. Description of the Code 
PEPSICODE is written in FORTRAN 77 and 
optimized to run on PC MS-DOS compatible. It 
simulates dynamic pattern of a solvent extraction 
process of uranium and plutonium carried out by 
means of a battery of pump-mix mixer-settlers. 
Default configuration of the stages number of 
the battery is 15 for scrubbing and 16 for 
extraction. Default configuration may be easily 
changed by the code user. Chemical simulation is 
carried out on the basis of conventional 
theorethical models and takes into account five 
components: uranium, plutonium, fission products 
as whole, nitric acid and TBP. 
The code gives as output the time pattern of the 
uranium, plutonium, fission products hold-up 
inside the battery for the transitory from the 
start-up to steady state, further also solute 
concentrations in output flows are given. 
5. Conclusions 
By means of PEPSICODE an extraction 
campaign performed at EUREX pilot reprocessing 
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m 
0 
plant has been simulated, data obtained show a 
good approximation with real ones. Parametric 
studies on the influence of the recirculation flow in 
the settling zone show hold-up .grows up with this 
flow, causing slowing down of process dynamics. 
Fig.4 shows the plutonium hold-up in the 
extraction battery of the first cycle with different 
recirculation flow. The input data are listed in 
Tab.2. 
Simulation experiments using the model 
described in this paper are currently underway. 
The sensitivity of NRTMA under more realistic 
operating conditions will be tested (effects of 
process noise, inventory fluctuations, changes in 
burnup of processed fuel, deviations from 
equilibrium plant operation etc ... ). 
In parallel, investigations on the validity of the 
simulation model will continue. 
N° of extraction stages 
N° of scrubbing stages 
Mixer volume 
Settler volume 
Feed flow rate 
Scrub flow rate (10th stage) 
Scrub flow rate (lst+9th stugc) 
Organic flow rate 
TBP concentration 
U concentration (feed) 
Pu concentration (feed) 
HN03 concentration (feed) 
HN03 concentration (scrub) 
8 
10 
2.5 I 
4.3 I 
0.0006138 1/s 
0.0004166 1/s 
0 1/s 
0.0016666 1/s 
1.09 moles/! 
1.0504 moles/1 
0.0105 moles/! 
2 moles/! 
3 moles/! 
Tab.2 - Input data for the preliminary tests. 
Plutonium Hold-up 
.. 
05 
.. 
I o> 
/• 
/···· 
j 
0.1 
.. ... ... 571 ... , .. , 
lime (minutes) 
Fig.4 - Plutonium hold-up in the first extraction 
cycle vs. time with different recirculation 
flows. 
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THE EURATOM INFORMATICS ARCHITECTURE 
J.F. Blerot, H. Kschwendt 
Commission of the European Communities 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg 
Abstract 
Open systems and standards in a 
multiproduct environment are the EURATOM 
guidelines. Consequently, the O.S.I. model, 
UNIX (POSIX) and X/OPEN specifications determine 
the EURATOM informatic strategy. 
The major objectives are the development of 
secured telecommunications, the migration to 
open systems and the integration of data 
processing from measurements in the plants to 
accountancy at the headquarters. 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is 
( i) to demonstrate to new inspectors the main 
information flows and verifications at 
nuclear installations and at Euratom 
headquarters; 
(ii) to inform operators about the informatics 
strategy used by Euratom in order to 
improve information transfer between the 
nuclear installations and Euratom 
headquarters. 
Chapters 2 to 4 discuss the information 
flows and verifications, the computer 
architecture and the informatics strategy of the 
Commission of the European Communities. Chapter 
5 explains the Euratom objectives based on this 
architecture and strategy. 
2. The main Information Flows and 
Verifications 
To simplify the understanding of the 
different information flows, Fig. 1 shows the 
main information flows relevant to Euratom 
Safeguards. 
There are 2 types of lines, indicating 
(i) the information flows (thin lines); 
(ii) major verifications carried out by Euratom 
(thick lines) . 
2.1. Flow of information (thin lines) 
1. 
2. 
The operator performs measurements in order 
to improve his knowledge of the physical 
reality in his plant. 
Euratom performs its own measurements 
(mainly non-destructive analysis) in order 
to verify: 
the material flow in critical steps in 
the industrial processes (verification 
A); 
the operating records (verification B); 
the List of Inventory Items (LII) given 
by the operator (information flow 8) 
when a physical inventory is done 
(verifications C and D). 
3 
De•lruclive 
'-.I~J-----;:----+•ndlysis 
c:::J Collection or 
lnrorrnalton 
lnforrnalion 
Jo'low 
Luralorn 
vcnriealton 
Jig. I : Alair1 l!.'uraLolfJ saft.'l{llilrds 
liJ/t.JrlftalirHJ /low.:,· a11d 
vt.·rific.•rJLtoll.v. 
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Typical items to be measured are: tank 
volume, weight, temperature, density, 
neutron/gamma spectra, images produced by a 
containment/surveillance camera etc. 
The equipment used to collect the 
measurement results are automatic nuclear 
material flow measurement stations, logging 
devices, verification and transmission 
systems and others. The majority of these 
instruments are portable or at least 
transportable. MS-DOS PCs are used daily 
to collect and evaluate the data. Great 
effort is made to authenticate the 
appropriate functioning of the in-plant 
instruments (Ref. ) . The inspector can 
verify the quality of the data by comparing 
information coming from different steps of 
the plant or processes or by checking the 
consistency of data gonorated by different 
operations. 
3. To improve the measurement precision, 
samples are analysed in laboratories. 
Euratom will install on-site laboratories 
in some major plants to have the analysis 
results available as soon as possible. 
4. The measurement results of the operator are 
reflected in the operating records. 
5. The accounting records of the operator are 
generated from the operating records. In 
the large plants, Euratom has installed 
computers to support the inspectors in 
verifying measurements, operating records, 
accounting records and in preparing the 
physical inventory verifications. 
6. On a monthly basis, the Inventory Change 
Reports are sent to Euratom either directly 
or via an enterprise headquarters or a 
national organisation. After each physical 
inventory taking, the Material Balance 
Report and the Physical Inventory Listing 
are transmitted to Euratom (Ref. 2). 
600.000 entry lines were reported in 1990 
to Euratom by the operators, 74% of which 
were in computer-readable form. 
7. With the same monthly frequency, Euratom 
sends the reports to !AEA (Ref. 3). 
8. The List of Inventory Items (LII) is 
produced for a full or partial Physical 
Inventory Verification. This listing is 
later compared with the Physical Inventory 
Listing received at Euratom headquarters. 
2.2. The verifications: (thick lines) 
A. 
B. 
c. 
D. 
Safeguards relevant critical process steps 
are verified using mainly non-destructive 
measurements. 
The operating records are validated with 
these measurements. 
Items on the LII are verified by non-
destructive or destructive analysis. 
Based on 
operator, 
verified. 
the LII established by the 
the physical inventory is 
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E. 
F. 
The LII used for the physical inventory 
verification is compared with the Physical 
Inventory Listing received at Euratom 
headquarters. 
The operating records help the inspector 
to validate the Inventory Change Reports 
received at Euratom headquarters. 
G. Accountancy verifications are performed at 
headquarters in order to ensure the quality 
of the reports. 
3. Hardware and Telecom Architecture 
3.1. The first computerized nuclear materials 
accountancy system of the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate became operational 
in 1962 after the creation of Euratom 
Safeguards in 1959. A second system was 
established before 1969. The present 
system became operational in 1977. After a 
general change in the informatics policy of 
the Commission of the European Communities 
based on the principle of distributed 
information processing, the Euratom 
Safeguards Directorate got its own computer 
in 1982. 
3.2. The present hardware and telecom 
architecture at Euratom headquarters is 
described in Figs. 2 and 3. Fig. 2 shows 
the internal network, Fig. 3 the external 
network. These two networks are completely 
independent for security reasons. 
3.2.1. The internal network (Fig. 2) is 
based on 2 Ethernet Local Area Networks 
(LANe) installed in 2 separate buildings. 
These 2 LANe are interconnected via a 
telephone line. All information passing 
through this line are ciphered 
automatically. Many different computers are 
connected to this internal network: 
a. A Siemens mainframe with the 
BS2000 operating system. It includes: 
- a 7560-EX CPU of 1. 7 HIPS and 
16 MBytes real memory; 
- 4100 MBytes of disk space; 
- 2 magnetic tape units of 1600 and 6250 
bpi each; 
- 2 line printers (600 lines per 
minutes); 
- 32 Siemens 9750 terminals. 
b. A Unix Olivetti 3B2/700 of 
900 Mbytes of disk space and 
of real memory. 27 WYSE VT220 
are connected to this computer. 
7 Hips, 
16 Mbytes 
terminals 
c. A UNIX NCR 600 of l. 2 Hips, 120 Mbytes 
of disk space and 8 Mbytes of real 
memory. 10 WYSE VT220 terminals are 
connected to this computer. 
d. 70 MS-DOS PC are connected to the 
LAN. They can access not only the 
UNIX computers but also the Siemens 
BS2000 system. 
e. 15 laser printers are connected to 
the UNIX computers. 
The main software packages used by Euratom 
are: 
for wordprocessing: Q-Office on UNIX and 
MS-WORD on MS-DOS; 
for spreadsheets: MULTIPLAN or LOTUS 
123; 
data base management systems: D8ASE III+ 
or Clipper on MS-DOS; Oracle on MS-DOS 
and UNIX; ADA8AS on Siemens 8S2000; 
for telecommunication: TCP-IP with NFS 
or FTP on the LAN; Easy Access on the 
MS-DOS PCs to access the UNIX computers 
or the 8S2000 computer in emulation 
mode; 
for electronic mail: Insem Local 
(an in-house package). 
Server 
UNIX 
Oflvettt 
382/700 
WYl>EVI;>;'O 
LA N TCP/JP NFS/FTP 
Fig.2 : 1'/uratom llflrrlwarc afJ(/ 
te/ccom arcl!itcr:turc 
NCfl600 
UNIX 
lnturnal network ( rnay 91) 
X 25 
WVSE 
""' 
Fig . .'/ · Ai;ratom lwrdwarc 
T~~rmlfllll 
&emens9750 
27 
and lc/ccom arclutccturc 
External network (n7ay 91) 
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3.2.2. The external network (Fig. 3) is 
composed of the following equipments: 
a. To exchange files or messages, a UNIX 
computer (NCR 600) is connected to the 
public packet switching data network 
based on the X25 standard. The 
confidential data is encrypted by a 
software package using the Data 
Encryption standard (D.E.S) algorithm 
(Ref. 4). Presently the protocol used 
to ensure file transfer is KERMIT (soon 
X400 or FTAM). 
b. To exchange telexes a software package 
is used. 3 terminals and 2 laser 
printers are connected to the telex-
transmission system. 
c. To exchange facsimiles 
2 fax machines equipped 
unit (OMNISEC 5198). 
Euratom uses 
with a cipher 
C.E.C. DG 17-E-6/JFB 111ny 91 
WV~( 
vrno L.o,;mprml9f 
.1!. 
C. E. G. DG 1 7-E-6 / JF£3 may 91 
3.2.3. In big nuclear installations, 
Euratom has installed computers to support 
the inspectors in their activities. Today, 
8 nuclear installations are equipped with 
MS-DOS PCs. Moreover, 12 portable PCs are 
at the disposal of the inspectors. In the 
near future, UNIX computers will replace 
some MS-DOS PCs. 
4. The New Informatics Strategy 
Open systems and standards in a multi-
product environment is the basic rule for all 
Commission's services and consequently also for 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate. 
This rule is enshrined in guidelines 
published by the Commission which thinks that 
this basic rule is relevant not only to public 
administrations but also to the private sector. 
The most recent version of this rule is 
contained in the '"Guidelines for an informatics 
architecture" (Ref. 5). 
The main principles are briefly presented 
here to simplify the understanding and to 
facilite the integration and exchange of data 
with operators of nuclear installations. 
The spirit of these guidelines is: 
"Most architectures have been designed by 
the computer manufacturers to match their 
present and future product ranges. such 
architectures are, generally speaking, mutually 
incompatible even where standards are used. A 
vendor-independent architecture can only be 
developed by the user organisation being the 
customer of the information technology (IT) 
industry - but no single customer has the power 
to impose a given architectural design on 
industry. Consequently, such an architecture 
must emerge from the ongoing process of supply 
and demand." 
"Open systems are those systems and 
components which can be specified and multi-
sourced in a competitive market place. An Open 
system specification must not be owned by any 
single vendor and must be freely available." 
The switch to open systems procurement 
policies based on standards is an obligation for 
public administrations in the European Community 
(Council Decision 87/95/EEC of December 1986)." 
It is in the interest of all users to 
remain free to choose the best way to integrate 
new technology independently of the policy of 
individual vendors." (Ref. 5). 
A vendor-independent strategy based on open 
systems 
(i) is economical because standards reduce 
complexity and training costs and because 
competition brings prices down; 
(ii) necessary to communicate between 
organisations. 
"Migration to open systems should be 
planned as a series of steps congruent with the 
life cycle of equipment and application in order 
to avoid costly conversions." 
Consequently the main standards followed 
presently by the Commission are: 
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MS-DOS 
UNIX V Rel 4 
SCO UNIX OPEN DESKTOP 
c, Cabal 
SQL 
X-WINDOWS 
MOTIF 
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
model has been the basis for the connectivity 
standards since 1980. 
For portability, the UNIX operating system 
is the de facto standard with increasing 
acceptance, but the UNIX based Portable 
Operating System Interface (POSIX) reached the 
de jure status in 1989. 
X/OPEN specifications 
Application Environment 
sufficiently large number 
software vendors have been 
for a Common 
supported by a 
of computer and 
a great help in 
bridging the gap. 
the For the external communication, 
Commission follows the standards presented in 
Fig. 4. 
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5. Objectives for the Next Five Years 
The three main objectives which will 
influence the informatics development for the 
next 5 years are: 
(i) telecommunication; 
(ii) integration of in-field and headquarters 
applications; 
(iii) migration to Open systems. 
5.1. Telecommunication 
a. Efforts to decrease the number of 
accounting reports received on hard copy 
must continue (see information flow 6 in 
Fig. 1). In 1990, in the mean, 26% of the 
accounting reports had to be keyed in 
manually. For the first 3 months of 1991, 
this percentage could be brought down to 
10%. The objective for 1995 is 1%. 
The reasons for changing from manual to 
automatic data entry are two-fold: 
(i) to minimize human errors and 
(ii) to speed up the availability of data. 
b. 
The transmission medium which is mainly 
used to date is the floppy disk (64% of the 
reports transmitted in computer- readable 
form). To date, in the mean, 80.000 entry 
lines are input every month into the 
Euratom system. 
The replacement of magnetic tapes and 
floppy disks by secure telecommunication is 
an important objective. 
Secure telecommunication: three 
principal caracteristics for secure 
telecommunication must be respected 
which are implemented by hardware and 
software components: 
(i) the sender must be authenticated, 
(ii) the transmitted data cannot be 
modified without automatic 
detection of the modifications, 
(iii) the transmitted data should only 
be comprehensible to the receiver 
(the data must be ciphered). 
To implement caracteristic (iii), 
Euratom will use the Data Encryption 
Standard (D.E.S) algorithm (see Ref. 4). 
The standards followed for the 
telecommunications are presented in 
chapter 4 above. Fig. 5 summarizes the 
possibilities of exchanging data or 
messages with Euratom. 
EURATOM 
FTAM 
5.2. Integration of In-Field and Headquarters 
applications. 
This objective concerns large nuclear 
installations requiring computer processing 
support. 
a. Confidence in the operating records must be 
improved by: 
increase of the frequency and accuracy 
of verifications; 
decrease of the delay between the 
measurements and the verification of the 
operating records. 
b. The in-field software has to be compat~ble 
c. 
with that used at headquarters to: 
decrease the costs for the training, 
maintenance and interventions; 
standardize the interface with other 
software used by inspectors and 
headquarters (graphical user interface, 
etc.). 
Euratom intends to develop secure 
telecommunications between headquarters and 
Euratom offices in the nuclear 
installations 
to exchange newly acquired information; 
to reduce inspector isolation; 
to support the inspector in solving 
computer problems; 
KERMIT 
INSTALLATION 
PC 
MS_DOS 
X400 
FTAM r---------------, 
.Fig. 5: example of file 0 
message exchange wi!!J 
Euratom 
In the years 1991 and 1992, X400 will be 
used to transfer not only messages but also 
ciphered files. When FTAM becomes 
available in a production environment, the 
ciphered files will be transmitted using 
this protocol. 
Great effort will be put into the 
establishment of a secure telecommunication 
system with IAEA. This should not only 
serve for the transmission of the 
accounting reports, but also for the 
exchange of messages, inspection planning 
information, and other regular information 
exchanges. 
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to avoid the need for the inspector to 
carry confidential information while 
travelling. 
5.3. Migration to Open systems 
Following the strategy developed in chapter 
4 above, all the applications running on the 
siemens BS2000 have to be converted to run under 
the UNIX (POSIX) environment. This requires 
considerable human and financial effort which is 
not available presently. 
The main applications are described in the 
paper of M. KSCHWENDT. (Ref. 6) 
6. Conclusions 
Open Systems, secure telecommunication and 
development of in-field computer applications 
determine the Euratom informatics strategy for 
the next years. Close cooperation with the 
operators and the !AEA is essential to achieve 
these objectives. 
1. 
2. 
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A METHOD FOR CALCULATION AND REGISTRATION OF NUCLEAR DECAY 
IN A MOX FUEL FABRICATION PLANT 
J. Beckers - R. Ingels 
BELGONUCLEAIRE-Dessel 
Abstract 
The calculation and registration of the con-
tinuous decrease in quantity of nuclear material 
due to nuclear transformation becomes rather im-
portant in large MOX Fabrication Plants. 
This is due not only to the important 
amounts of plutonium that are processed but also 
to the relative high 24lpu content of the 
plutonium which is used in the fabrication pro-
cess. The decayed quantities are already impor-
tant over smaller periods e.g. one month and are 
to be taken into account because they can in-
fluence the MUF-evolution and consequently the 
inspection and verification efforts. 
This paper describes how the nuclear trans-
formation is processed at the BELGONUCLEAIRE MOX 
Fuel Fabrication Plant. 
!.Introduction 
The physical process leading to nuclear 
transformations is a continuous one. Consequent-
ly the time lapse between two analysis results 
has to be considered in the accountability sys-
tem. If this is not done, the decayed 
quantities will be added to the MUF, with all 
its consequences. 
In large commercial MOX plants these quanti-
ties can certainly not be neglected. In the 
period 1975-1980 a typical 24lpu-content 
used in the fabrication process was 3.3% with a 
relative low throughput of about lOO kg per 
year. If a time period of e.g. 3 months was not 
taken into account for decay, the contribution 
to the MUF would be about 40 g Pu per year. At 
present the new MOX plants have a throughput of 
2000 kg Pu per year, while one PI is taken per 
2ear. This would mean, with a typical 
4lpu content of 9. 7% 24lpu of the Pu 
in process nowadays, a contribution to the MUF 
of about 2500 g. The situation for the future 
MOX plants with greater throughputs will even be 
worse. 
As an increase of the throughput does not 
mean a proportional increase of the MUF, it is 
clear that the decay has to be excluded from the 
MUF. At the BELGONUCLEAIRE MOX plant there is 
not seen any increase of the MUF related to the 
increased throughput. 
BELGONUCLEAIRE developed gradually a real 
time accountability system, based on our expe-
rience, which allows us to calculate and book 
the decay at any time. It is based on a itemiz-
ed accountability system. Per item all the ne-
cessary data for calculating the decay are re-
gistered in a file (Pu-total, isotopic composi-
tion, date on which the data are valid ••• ). 
The quantities received from the shipper are 
booked as declared by the shipper with all data 
necessary for calculating the decay when need-
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ed. In general, the decay is calculated and 
booked 
- when incoming Pu02 is sampled and analyzed 
(normally not); 
- when the master blend is made; 
- when the final blend (secondary blend) is 
made; 
- when scrap is micronized and blended; 
- when the rods are updated with the analyses 
results. 
At each step the Pu-quantities of the items 
(batches) are updated and the decayed quantities 
are accounted for. 
Thanks to the accuracy of our calculations 
at the various process steps, BN could conside-
rably reduce the number of samples and ana-
lyses. 
2.Description of the problem 
In the period before 1987 several problems 
were encountered when dealing with Pu quantities 
registered in the accountability system. Below 
we list the main problems the safeguards service 
was confronted with. 
- Which was the Pu isotopic composition per 
item, batch ? 
- Which was the validity date for the mentioned 
Pu amounts ? 
- How to update correctly the quantities per 
item ? 
- Updating the Pu quantities was cumbersome 
even if the isotopic composition and analysis 
date were known. 
- The listings or documents distributed at dif-
ferent periods, mentioned different quantities 
for the same item, especially when the mate-
rial hadtobe stored for several years. This 
was very annoying when comparing balances. 
- An unknown amount of MUF was due to the NT 
(Nuclear transformation) as it could not 
always be correctly calculated and booked. 
- In order to compare measurement results ob-
tained by the inspector during PIV/SIV (SIV = 
4 weekly short inventory verification) and 
FLOW verifications the operator needed the up-
dated values, otherwise no exact evaluation of 
the measurement results was possible. 
3.Requirements for a correct NT follow-up sys-
tem 
- The exact analysis date, isotopic composition 
and related Pu amounts have to be known for 
all the incoming Pu, as well as for the actual 
inventory. 
- Care has to be taken, that from the analysis 
date of the incoming Pu until the reference 
date of the rods leaving the facility, no time 
period is not taken into account for calculat-
ing the NT, notwithstanding the various 
crossblendings and material flows in the 
plant (Fig.1). 
- Certain process steps have to be defined, 
where NT must be calculated and accounted 
for. 
- The system has to be computerised as far as 
possible to exclude human transcription er-
rors. That means e.g. that for a blending 
all calculations, file updating, inventory 
change report, etc. no operator has to in-
tervene. 
- Per item, the validity date and related Pu-
amount and composition has to be known ex-
actly. 
4.Description of the BELGONUCLEAIRE system 
for accounting NT. Solution choosen 
4.1. General. 
When BELGONUCLEAIRE started developing a 
new accountability program in 1985 one of the 
aims was to solve the above mentioned problems 
and certainly avoid the contribution of NT to 
the MUF and uncertainties when comparing book 
values with measured values by the inspecto-
rates. 
Based on BN experience a system was develop-
ed which allows to calculate and book the NT at 
any time on any item as long as it is register-
ed in the accountability records. It is based 
on an itemized accountability system. 
This was achieved in the following way 
1. an itemized system was developed that allowed 
BELGONUCLEAIRE to know the exact Pu quanti-
ties and isotopic compos! tion per batch and 
per item on any date, either in the future or 
in the past. Per item at least the following 
data are registered in different files 
Pu-total, isotopic composition, analysis or 
calculated date. 
2. at certain intervals, process steps; e.g. 
when blending several batches/items, the 
decay is calculated and accounted for until 
the blending date and the new values are 
registered in a file. In this way BN avoids 
that the NT has an influence on the MUF. 
3. 'istings can be made, at any time, with cal-
culated values on the date wanted, e.g. in 
case of non-destructive measurements by the 
inspectorate listings are made which give the 
Pu amounts on the measurement date, without 
changing the accountability records. 
4.2.Process steps where NT is computed and 
accounted for. 
The following internal rules are applied 
(Fig. 1) 
4.2.1.0n receipt of Pu02 
No decay is booked. The data as declared by the 
shipper, are used for accounting purposes. 
The items remain in the store with thP riginul 
shipper values (Pu-total + corresponding isoto-
pic data and analysis date). The isotopic com-
position is registered by batch (BN-lot). 
This gives the possibility to calculate at any 
time the actual isotopic composition. 
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Exception : if an analysis is done by BELGO-
NUCLEAIRE on the incoming Pu02, a NT is ac-
counted for, for the period between the analysis 
date of the shipper and the new analysis date of 
BELGONUCLEAIRE. The difference between the new-
ly calculated values and the analysis result 
will be declared as Shipper-Receiver-Difference 
(DI). For fresh Pu02 powder, there can be a 
time lapse up to several years between the ana-
lysis date, after reprocessing, until the last 
can is used at BELGONUCLEAIRE for the master 
blend. This means that the NT-amount can be 
considerable. 
4.2.2.0n master blends. This means that 
fresh Puo2 powder + uo2 + scrap is microniz-
ed and blended in the process. In order to ob-
tain the same isotopic composition for several 
blends, cans from different batches are used (= 
crossblending). 
As the accountability system knows the Pu-
::ontent + corresponding isotopic composition + 
analysis date for each can, it is easy to calcu-
late the NT and to update the accountability 
files for the blended quantities. The NT is 
automatically calculated until the blending date 
and registered in the files by the computerpro 
gram that is used for processing the blending in 
the accountability files. 
4.2.3.0n secondary blends. These blends are 
made of master blend powder, diluted with uo2 
+ scrap to obtain a specified ratio Pu/ (U+Pu) 
for MOX fuel. 
At the moment the blend is registered in 
the accountability system, the decay is automa 
tically calculated and accounted for based on 
the registered values of the cans (see master 
and scrap blend), until the date of blending. 
The various conversion factors (U+Pu/ox, 
U/Pu+U, ••• ) are calculated by the same compu-
terprogram. These factors will be used for 
transfers later on. 
4.2.4.0n scrap blends. From time to time 
the scrap is collected, micronized and blended. 
The same procedure is followed as for the 
secondary blend. The decay is accounted for 
from the various secondary blend dates until the 
scrap blend date. 
4.2.5.0n rods. The provisional values with 
which the rods are created after welding, will 
be updated for decay starting from the blending 
date until the reference date, as soon as the 
final figures per rod are available and intro-
duced in the accountability files. The final 
values per rod are calculated on a reference 
date (this date is usually the date of loading 
into the reactor) valid for a campaign or sub-
campaign. This reference date is imposed by the 
client. 
4.2.6.0n shipments other than rods/assem-
blies 
- shipments of small quantities : the values on 
the blending date are used; no adjustment is 
made for the decay between blending date and 
shipment date; 
- shipments of waste quantities : idem; 
- shipments of Pu02 cans : no general rule is 
applied; case by case, it is decided whether 
the decay has to be accounted for by BN, prior 
to shipment, until the shipment date. 
5. Half-lives values used 
238pu 87,74 years 
239pu 24119 years 
240pu 6540 years 
24lpu 14,4 years 
242pu 376000 years 
241Am 432,6 years 
These values are agreed upon by EURATOM and 
IAEA(l). 
6. Conclusion 
Inventory changes like NT are rather complex 
in a MOX fabrication plant. The aim of this 
paper was to explain how this problem was solved 
at BN and why it was done in this way. 
It was shown how the time lapse between the 
analysis date at the reprocessing plant and the 
reference date imposed by the reactor operator 
is completely covered. 
This way of operating guarantees that : 
1. all Pu-decay is accounted for correctly and 
easy to verify; 
2. the MUF is not influenced by decayed Pu 
amounts; 
3. the obtained measurement results during 
PIV/SIV and FLOW inspection by the inspecto-
rate can be perfectly compared with the va-
lues declared by the operator. 
4. excludes that for the same item different va-
lues come into circulation; 
5. for any item, at any time, the operator can 
reproduce the actual value, updated for de-
cay. 
7. References 
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COMPUTER ASSISTED HUMAN MATCHING, 
A SOFTWARE TOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL TRANSIT MATCHING 
L. Costantini 
Commission of the European Communities, Joint Research Centre 
Ispra Establishment, 21020 Ispra (VA) - Italy 
Abstract 
One of the responsabilities of the !AEA is 
to confirm the receipt of international ship-
ments of nuclear material by matching shipments 
reported by one Member State against receipts 
reported by another Member State. When suffi-
cient information is available, this matching of 
receipts against shipments is straight forward. 
However, because of non-uniform reporting prac-
tices in different countries a significant num-
ber of reports must be investigated manually. In 
these cases the matching reports are often hid-
den among a large number of other transactions. 
To identify matchings involves considerable work 
in studying lists of declarations and using ex-
pert judgement. An expert system, Computer As-
sisted Human Matching (CAHM) has been designed 
and implemented to reduce substantially the man-
power required in the Human Transit Matching 
phase. 
This new system is completely integrated 
within the !AEA Safeguards Information System 
(ISIS) and since January 1989 has completely re-
placed the previous manual matching system. The 
current implementation of the system covers the 
area of international transfers and domestic 
transfers as well. 
The CAHM system: 
- extracts data (un-matched records) from the 
accounting file, 
- generates a new data structure, 
activates the automatic matching algorithm, 
displays the results for human acceptance, 
- updates the matched records in the accounting 
file. 
1. Introduction 
The CAHM software package was developed to 
help achieve the safeguards goal of verifying 
the information contained in the reports of 
State concerning international and domestic 
shipments. The term "transit matching" is used 
for procedures performed in the process of 
identifying which "receivers reports match ship-
pers reports" that nuclear material has been 
transferred to another State when the reports 
are received at !AEA headquarters in Vienna, 
they are loaded into the ISIS database. These 
data are then checked for validity and consis-
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tency with relevant requirements. After this 
quality control process, an interrogation is 
made to find a corresponding report from the 
country from which it has been indicated the 
shipment was made. When such a correspondence is 
found, the shipment and the receiver reports are 
marked as "Machine matched". From the data, it 
can be observed that on average about 75\ of all 
shipment records must be manually treated in or-
der to achieve a matched status. This process is 
called the Human Transit Matching phase. 
The final aim of this system is to reduce 
considerably the manpower required in the Human 
Transit Matching phase, trying to replace the 
knowledge of human experts with a program which 
simulates their behaviour while at the same time 
allowing human experts to validate the results 
of the system. The system under examination does 
not pretend to replace human activity completely 
throughout the process of search1ng and validat-
ing shipper and receive records (Human Matching 
phase), but to reduce it considerably, so that 
the human expert is only involved in the 
"Suggested Matched Group" validation phase. This 
paper is divided into two parts. In the first 
part, section 2 gives an overview of the expert 
system techniques from the methodological point 
of view. In the second part, section 3 presents 
the development of the system from the first 
analysis and design to the last version used at 
present by the !AEA in Vienna, while section 4 
describes the expert system which allows the 
creation of the associations (Matching) between 
shipment and receiver records and section 5 
analyses the results obtained using CAHM and 
considers the future development of the system. 
2. Overview of Expert System Techniques 
The Expert System is a computer program 
which uses an intensive collection of heuristic 
knowledge based on experience, observation or 
measurement to solve a specific problem, usually 
through a process of inductive inference. The 
knowledge is unlikely to be derived from sci-
entifically provable theorems, but may be de-
rived by analogy with similar experiences or by 
iteration from an initial estimate. Many knowl-
edge-based systems have concentrated on simu-
lating the activities of a human expert who has 
a long record of achievement as well as a 
thorough educational training in his field of 
expertise. As a result, the programs have come 
to be known as Expert Systems /1,2/. 
The Expert System has evolved through prac-
tical experimentation rather than, theoretical 
research. In early work the knowledge was embed-
ded in the program. As a result problem solving 
was efficient but the systems were useful only 
for one task and were difficult to update and 
maintain by staff not participating in the sys-
tem design. They were unpopular with experts as 
a result of the rudimentary user interfaces and 
reasoning procedures that were seen to be clumsy 
and inappropriate. 
Recently a modular approach based on the 
three distinct elements shown in Fig. l has been 
adopted. The elements are: 
- the inference engine, 
- the knowledge base, 
- the user interface. 
Using the modular approach the system con-
trol is independent of the knowledge and the 
user interface. The program is less sensitive to 
USER 
a particular application and it is feasible to 
develop commercial software packages for a lim-
ited range of applications which can be filled 
with alternative collections of knowledge. This 
type of commercial software is known as an ex-
pert system shell. 
The Knowledge Base. 
The knowledge base is a collection of in-
formation which contains the following: 
- the program variables which represent concep-
tual units of information, 
- information in the form of assertions about 
the program variables, 
- heuristic information in the form of condi-
tional rules which describe relationships be-
tween program variables. 
The form in which information is stored in 
the knowledge base is known as the method of 
knowledge representation. Knowledge representa-
tion can affect the conflicting requirements of 
extensibility of the knowledge base and search 
INTERFACE 
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MENUS, EXPLANATION FACILITIES 
INFERENCE ENGINE 
CONTROL STRUCTURE 
KNOWLEDGE BASE WORKING KNOWLEDGE BASE 
HYPOTHESIS, 
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RULES 
SIMPLE SCHEMA OF THE EXPERT SYSTEM 
Fig. l 
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efficiency. The principal methods for knowledge 
representation are either as a semantic network 
or as a list of production rules. In the seman-
tic network form of representation the condi-
tional relationships are compiled into the com-
puter memory from an explicit graphical repre-
sentation of conceptual relationships. The 
search efficiency of this type of representation 
is good, but the system is difficult to maintain 
and concepts cannot be evaluated according to a 
number of different criteria. In the production 
system, rules of thumb can be represented eas-
ily, making modification simple; this factor has 
contributed to the popularity of production sys-
tems. The major drawbacks are that system per-
formance is often dependent on the ordering of 
the rules and can require extensive search pro-
cedures. Moreover, unexpected side effects can 
be experienced during inference. 
The knowledge base is filled during a pro-
cess known as knowledge acquisition. Knowledge 
acquisition is often carried out by a "knowledge 
engineer", who is a computer scientist conver-
sant with the expert's knowledge representation 
methods, working together with an expert. Their 
joint task is to translate the expert • s knowl-
edge into the format required by the software 
system. 
The Inference Engine. 
The inference engine is the system which 
carries out logical inference by processing in-
formation in a computationally efficient fash-
ion. Its task is to select the conditional in-
formation, or rule, which is most likely to lead 
to a solution from the knowledge base and apply 
it to a working data base to produce a modifica-
tion to that data base. The working data base 
contains the information that is known or in-
ferred about a specific problem. The process may 
be iterative so that several rules are chained 
together producing many intermediate states in 
the working data base. 
Inferential problem solving requires that 
it be possible to discriminate between alterna-
tive solutions, or courses of action. The sim-
plest method is to decide between alternatives 
based on a two-valued logic. This type of system 
can work well although it has been found that 
human experts are reluctant to describe their 
knowledge in a deterministic fashion. Instead, 
various methods of approximate reasoning have 
been proposed and implemented. Traditionally ap-
proximate reasoning has been based on Bayesian 
statistics which works well for independent and 
well-defined data, but is less satisfactory for 
vague and interacting propositions. 
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The User Interface. 
The user interface has two main functions; 
to provide a vehicle for knowledge acquisition 
and testing, and to provide a consultant -like 
dialogue during problem solving. 
The user interface can have a major influ-
ence on acceptance of the Expert System. Whilst 
performance of the Expert System can be analysed 
for particular case studies, it is not possible 
to device a test methodology that can demon-
strate complete system reliability. Instead, the 
user interface can increase user confidence by 
providing a detailed explanation and interroga-
tion facility through which the inference proce-
dures can be monitored and assessed. Explanation 
and interrogation facilities are based on the 
chain of inference rules. Normally, a temporary 
record of the reasoning chain is maintained and 
the inference paths can be displayed to the op-
erator, who can judge whether the intermediate 
steps are reasonable. The textual content of the 
rules can be used to display simple explanatory 
information. 
3. Design Evolution 
The CAHM system as a whole is made up of a 
suite of programs which, starting from the raw 
data which are normally found on the ICR-File, 
(Inventory Change Report ADABAS F1.le 105), ex-
tracts all the Shipment ~nd Receiver records, 
generates a new data structure which is more 
suited to the phase of selection of country 
pairs and then, after having selected two or 
more country pairs, by the use of an expert sys-
tem, generates a file which contains all the 
"suggested matches" ready for the validation and 
update phase /4/. 
The development of the CAHM system was 
anomalous, as compared to the design of a normal 
software system, because the central nucleus 
(expert system) was designed first and then all 
the series of modules which allow the logical 
connection between the raw data contained in the 
ICR file and the "Suggested Matches" file was 
created /2/. 
This mode of procedure is JUstified by the 
fact that the practical running of the whole 
system depends exclusively on the quality of the 
results of the central nucleus (Expert System). 
This in the first place we tried to under-
stand the behaviour of a human expert when tack-
ling a problem of matching a certain shipped 
batch with one or more receivers, or viceversa, 
i.e. in other words we tried to understand if it 
was possible to simulate or better codify the 
mental process of the human expert with a logi-
cal series of conditional rules. 
This first phase of work was particularly 
complicated because in a first analysis it 
seemed that the rules used for the Matching pro-
cess were contradictory, in other words we could 
not formalise the problem. Considering that it 
was impossible to find general rules which would 
allow formalisation of the reasoning which the 
expert uses in the active sense, i.e. why "make 
a certain Match", we tried to use the cognitive 
process in the passive sense, i.e. try to for-
malise the rules which determine the reasons why 
the expert "does not make a certain Match". 
Using this approach it was possible to for-
malise general universally valid rules. The ap-
plication of this procedure was extremely useful 
in the first phase of drawing up rules for the 
expert system. 
Once this preliminary analysis was finished 
a very simple prototype was made wh)ch could be 
used to test the validity of the rules deter-
mined with the method described above. 
STRUCTURE OF CAHM (COMPUTER ASSISTED HUMAN MATCHING) 
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Fig. 2 
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The results of this first prototype were 
not very encouraging, or rather the prototype 
did not create invalid Matches, but the number 
of valid Matches was very small. 
The result of this first experiment should 
not be considered completely negative because, 
on analysing the results in detail, it became 
clear that the number of rules used was too 
small to give good results. The problem to be 
resolved was how to determine the best matches 
from a large class of possible Matches. To de-
termine this type of rule we analysed the Match 
results which were available in the ICR file. To 
do this a set of about 10000 shipment and re-
ceiver records, which had already been treated 
by human experts, was extracted at random from 
the ICR file and we tried to analyse the Human 
Matching results trying to extract general rules 
from this mass of data. 
The results of this analysis were very en-
couraging because we were able to understand the 
rules most commonly used for the Matching pro-
cess. Once these new rules were determined we 
then made a second prototype using all the rules 
which had been already formalised. 
The results obtained were very encouraging 
because not only did the system manage to make 
most of the Matches but in some cases it gave 
the expert new combinations which had not been 
previously considered. The experience acquired 
in the making of the second prototype was fun-
damental in producing the final system because 
not only could we make a software system which 
was capable of formalising the cognitive pro-
cesses of the human expert, but also, through 
the use of practical cases, we understood how to 
proceed to acquire new knowledge from experts. 
In fact because of a normal psychological 
process the expert is led to give more impor-
tance, in his description, to the more compli-
cated Matching case than to the normal cases. 
This is why in the first analysis the rules 
seemed contradictory whereas using the analysis 
of the practical Match results identified the 
normal cases, i.e. the rules which were valid 
for most cases. Having available all the neces-
sary rules we then implemented a first version 
of the "Stand Alone" system /1/, using data sets 
extracted "ad hoc" from the ICR file. In this 
first file we extracted unmatched records from 
the ICR file with a simple sequential reading 
program, and then the expert system was used to 
find the possible matches. 
The results which the expert system gave 
were compared with the results obtained by the 
human experts in their normal working procedure 
and when necessary some new rules were intro-
duced, or some existing rules were modified to 
adapt the expert system to a new situations 
which was not considered. 
This expert system "Tuning" phase continued 
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until optimum results were obtained and, having 
obtained approval from the people in charge of 
the Safeguards activity of the Vienna Agency to 
move on to the production phase, we then pro-
duced a series of programs which allowed com-
plete integration of CAHM with ISIS (!AEA Safe-
guards Information System). 
4. General System Description 
The main aim of the whole CAHM system is to 
start from a given file of unmatched shipped 
records and find the corresponding partners in 
the corresponding file of unmatched receiver 
records. In other words the system matches the 
shipped records declared by a certain country 
with the corresponding receiver records of the 
receiver country. 
The problem, which at first sight would 
seem easy to solve, becomes much more compli-
cated because the mode of defining a single 
record depends on the country to which it be-
longs when it is declared. This means that the 
same entity may be defined in a different way 
depending on which country it belongs to. This 
is why the module was designed with an expert 
system, in that it is composed of rules which 
define the "knowledge" with which a Match can be 
made, and by an "inference engine", which scans 
all the defined rules and gives the results, 
which in the specific case are all the possible 
"matches". 
Unlike a traditional "Expert System", where 
there is a phase of dialogue between the user 
and the "Expert System", for efficiency and be-
cause of a specific request made by those re-
sponsible for the work, the module works like a 
"Black Box", i.e. the CAHM user does not inter-
act with the Expert System, another module being 
responsible for the decision part, the approval 
or refusal of a certain Match Group. 
The two input files, shipped and receiver, 
are sorted depending on whether homogeneous 
record groups can be created, to make the pro-
cess of consulting "matching" rules by the 
"inference engine" easier. Homogeneous groups 
are defined, records which have the following 
information in common: 
Country 
Country 
FROM 
TO 
Class of Element Code 
MBA Code 
DATE of Matching 
Element Code 
Batch name 
Obviously if all the values of the fields 
specified are equal we have an ideal situation, 
but the system considers the various degrees of 
aggregation of these homogeneous sets. In other 
words the system assigns levels of similarity to 
the sets and processes them on the basis of the 
types of rule which are appropriate for their 
state of similarity. 
We will now examine the rules which define 
the generical case of "Matches". These rules are 
in relation to the type of link which can be 
found between an unmatched shipped and receiver 
record. The following types of link may be con-
sidered: 
a) 1 Shipped v. 1 Receiver, 
b) 1 Shipped v. M Receivers, 
c) M Shipped v. 1 Receiver, 
d) M Shipped v. M Receivers, 
Below we give a brief description of the 
rules used: 
We consider for a possible Match only 
records which belong to the same class 
of element code. 
The element weight is equal to or less 
than a certain threshold which is a 
function of the element itself. 
The date of the shipped record must be 
less than or equal to that of the re-
ceiver. The difference must be less 
than the time expressed in days needed 
to transport a certain batch from one 
country to the other. Thus this value 
is a function of the country pair. 
Degree of similarly between the 
shipped record and its corresponding 
receiver. When the two batch names are 
the same the "match" is generated even 
if none of the other rules hold. This 
can be done only in the case of the 1 
Shipped v. 1 Receiver relationship. 
Before generating a match one must 
check if the batch name of the two 
records being examined has ~ high de-
gree of similarity with any other 
batch name. This can be done only in 
the case of the 1 Shipped v. 1 Re-
ceiver relationship. 
For each group of shipped or receiver 
records which have the same data cre-
ate sub-totals, the sum of the weights 
and then check whether any correspond-
ing batch has the same weight. 
To generate a group of homogeneous 
batches for a possible match, each of 
the group components must belong to 
the same MBA. 
Batch groups can be created with dif-
ferent element codes only when all 
other possibilities have been exam-
ined. 
Below is the table of the threshold values 
applied to the various Elements and Isotope 
Codes for unmatched shipped and receiver 
records. This table represents the threshold 
values applied each time the program makes a 
Match. Sometimes the system also considers the 
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Element Code Isotope Unit Rounding 
Code of Meas. Difference 
Enrch. Uranium U-235, gr 1.0 gr 
U-233 
Depl. Uranium Depl. kg 500.0 gr 
Fissile 
Natur. Uranium Natur. kg 500.0 gr 
Fissile 
Unif. Uranium U-235, gr 1.0 gr 
U-233 
Plutonium gr 1.0 gr 
Thorium kg 500.0 gr 
possibility of creating a match even when the 
element codes are not the same but they always 
belong to the same class, in which case the 
threshold value applied is the smaller of the 
two considered. 
When the Expert System has consulted all 
the rules for all the unmatched records it gen-
erates two files which join the associations 
found (Matches) and the pointers to the ICR 
file. 
One to One Matching Phase. 
It is the objective of this phase to try to 
find all the shipment and receiver records that 
can satisfy the one type of link. The system 
scans the data structure of the receiver and for 
each unmatched record found it scans the ship-
ment unmatched record directory. When the date 
of the shipment record is earlier than or equal 
to the receiver date the inner set of rules, 
which check the validity of the matching sug-
gested, are activated. 
The first rule says that the similarity be-
tween the two batch names is checked. To do this 
the program runs a procedure which assigns, on 
the basis of the degree of similarity of the two 
batch names, a value between 0, when the two 
batches are completely different and 100, when 
the batches are identical. 
The first operation performed on the two 
names is to eliminate special characters and 
non-significant zeroes. The similarity value is 
then assigned on the basis of the number of 
equal characters and the position which two or 
more equal characters occupy inside the two 
batch names. 
When the degree of similarity is not 
greater than the threshold value, one checks if 
the isotope is declared in the two batches. If 
yes, if the two isotope codes are equal, the 
rule is considered to hold. The second rule to 
check is the difference in weight between the 
two element codes, thus the program checks if 
the threshold value is less than or equal to the 
difference of the two weights. 
The third rule checked is the equality of 
the element codes, but in the case of Depleted 
uranium, Natural Uranium and Unified Uranium 
this rule is considered to hold even if the two 
element codes are different. 
The fourth rule checked is that the differ-
ence in days between the receiver date and the 
shipment date must be greater than or equal to 
the Transit Times already calculated. 
When a shipment and receiver combination 
satisfies all the rules mentioned it is saved in 
an array which contains all the candidate ship-
ment records for matching with the corresponding 
receiver. 
When the scanning of the data structure of 
the shipment records is finished all the 
combinations found, which have been saved in the 
array already mentioned, are analysed and 
"weighed". 
The procedure of "weighing" any combination 
means, in technical terms, assigning a certain 
value on the basis of certain parameters. This 
values represent the probability that the right 
Match has been found. 
One thus takes the rules already mentioned 
analysing them again, but this time from the 
quantitative point of view, assigning a certain 
"weight". These "weights" are then summed. 
Obviously the most probable combination is 
that with the highest sum of "weights". Before 
passing to the phase of writing any matching, 
the system checks if there is a more probable 
combination between the receivers which has not 
yet been checked, because the shipment/receiver 
pair which the system chooses at this point of 
the run represents the most probable between the 
current shipment and the set of receivers which 
satisfy the preceding rules. This does not how-
ever exclude the fact that there may be a re-
ceiver which has not yet been examined, which, 
coupled with the current shipment, could give 
rise to a new pair with "weight" which might be 
greater than that of the current pair. 
To check this situation the following no-
tion should be remembered. Of a set of candi-
dates, which have conformed to all the rules 
cited above, in most cases, the one chosen is 
the one with batch name closest to the current 
receiver. Thus if there is between the shipment 
or the receiver records which have not yet been 
examined a record with batch name more similar 
than a fixed threshold, the system decides that 
there may be a combination with possibly greater 
"weight", thus it releases the combination being 
examined and goes on to examine the next re-
ceiver. 
Matching One to Many Phase. 
In this section we consider the one to many 
relationship which may occur in a match. This 
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type of relationship is two-way, because there 
may be one shipment vs. many receivers. 
Both the relationships are described in 
this section because the procedures are very 
similar from the software point of view. 
The system checks both the relationships, 
but the order of execution depends on the number 
of unmatched records. 
When the number of unmatched receiver 
records is greater than the unmatched shipped 
records the system executes the rules starting 
from the data structure of the shipment records, 
oecause the one shipment v. many receivers is 
more probable than the opposite relationship. In 
the opposite case it runs the rules starting 
from the data structure of the receiver records 
for the same logical reason, with the problem 
terms inverted. In this case also the induction 
engine runs a certain number of rules which are 
very similar to those run for the relationship 
considered above, the difference being due to 
the given priority and to the difficulty of run-
ling the rules themselves. This can easily be 
Jnderstood if one considers the rule. 
Element weight of the unmatched shipment 
record equal to or less than a certain thresh-
old, to the sum of the weights of the elements 
of the unmatched receiver records. 
In mathematical terms this means calculat-
ing all the possible combinations for a certain 
set of elements n, for all the possible classes 
k, when k assumes the value from n, n-1, n-2, 
until k = 2. 
The formula is the following: 
(:) n! k! (n-k)! 
Thus the inference engine runs all the 
other rules so as to reduce to the minimum pos-
sible the number of set elements to work with. 
As in the previous example, we will consider the 
case of one shipment v. many receivers. In this 
case the system saves the element weight, the 
isotope weight if declared and the inventory 
date of the current unmatched shipment record. 
Starting with these parameters one can examine 
all the rules which define a possible matching. 
Using the directory which points to the MBA 
of the receiver records data structure, one runs 
the first rule which is: 
1) All the records belonging to the same match 
group must have the same MBA Code. 
In the next phase the inference engine runs 
the following two rules: 
2) The shipment record date must be less than or 
equal to the group of receiver records. 
3) The Transit time expressed in days must be 
less than or equal to that of the group of 
records considered. 
On the basis of the number of records gen-
erated with the running of the previous rules, 
the inference engine decides whether to run the 
following rules. 
4) All the records which font1 part of the same 
group must have the same inventory date or a 
date within the same period (4-6 days). 
5) The similarity of the batch names of the 
records of a certain group must exceed a cer-
tain threshold. 
The running of one rule does not necessar-
ily imply the running of the second; the infer-
ence engine decides on the basis of the number 
~f unmatched records. If this number is consid-
ered too high, the last rule is run cyclically 
increasing the threshold value incrementally 
each time until the inference engine considers 
the number of elements to be reasonable. 
In effect the running of the rules by the 
inference engine acts as a "filter", reducing 
the number of unmatched records and making the 
remaining records more homogeneous. 
On this last set of records the system runs 
the final rule. 
6) Weight of the element of the unmatched ship-
ment record equal to or less than a certain 
threshold, to the sum of the weights of the 
unmatched receiver records. 
In cases in which the number of combina-
tions is very large, the use of rules 4 and 5 
serves to identify a subset of the set of all 
combinations. The final search for a match is 
carried out on the subset using rule 6. This 
kind of rule based heuristic search is necessary 
to prevent the system becoming bogged down in 
exhaustive computations which are unlikely to be 
more successful then the heuristic search. 
Many to Many Matching Phase. 
This section describes the Many to Many 
matching phase. The Expert System considers this 
phase as the last attempt to establish a rela-
tionship between two groups of unmatched ship-
ment and receiver records. 
This type of relationship occurs fairly 
rarely, if the preceding phases have been car-
ried our correctly and exhaustively. For most 
cases this type of relationship (matching) oc-
curs when the information available is not suf-
ficient to find the relevant relationships in 
the preceding phases. 
Let us consider the case of the country 
pair (Japan France). In this specific case the 
quantity of nuclear material, sum of the batch 
weights, declared as shipped from France is 
equal to the quantity of nuclear material which 
Japan declares it has received. As the number of 
batches is different, it is intuitive that there 
are one to many or more to one types of rela-
tionship (Matching), but because the information 
available to the expert is insufficient to ver-
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ify these types of relationship the matching es-
tablished is of the many to many type. 
The rules which the inference engine runs 
are the same as those run in the preceding 
phase, but the approach is different, because 
this type of relationship says that there are 
many shipments and many receivers. Thus all the 
records which belong to the same MBA are agin 
subdivided on the basis of the same inventory 
date, and then on the basis of the country pairs 
the Transit Time is calculated. Again from this 
set we eliminate all the records with Transit 
Time greater than that given by the expert sys-
tem. 
All these operations have the aim of ob-
taining various more homogeneous aggregates of 
records (batches) from one non-homogeneous set 
of records and of reducing the number of records 
which define an aggregate. Once this operation 
is performed the inference engine dynamically 
generates an array which contains all the possi-
ble combinations for each previously generated 
aggregate. 
The inference engine considers the array so 
generated as a directory. Each row of the array 
is a possible combination, thus for each line 
one sums all the weights of the records whose 
address corresponds to each element of the same 
line. Once the total weight is obtained the sys-
tem also saves the inventory date, the highest 
in the case when the records which form part of 
the aggregate being examined have different in-
ventory dates. 
The operations which the system has per-
formed until this moment have allowed the 
transformation of many to many relationship into 
a one to many relationship because the inference 
engine has available an inventory date and a 
weight, the same attributes which define a 
batch. Thus the system performs the same logical 
operations which were performed to analyse the 
preceding relationship. In the case when no 
valid matches are found the inference engine 
analyses the next combination. In other words a 
new weight with a new inventory date is gener-
ated and the process is repeated recursively un-
til all the combinations for the aggregate being 
examined are exhausted. 
5. Conclusion and Plan Future Work 
The CAHM system was installed on the IAEA 
Vienna computer in October 1988 and for the 
first three months the system operated in paral-
lel with the old manual system. 
The results obtained by the expert system, 
following this first experience, were analysed 
and compared with those supplied by the human 
experts. As a result of the success of the 
comparison, it was decided to replace "Human 
Matching" with the CAHM system. For interna-
tional transfers this decision was operative at 
the beginning of 1989. The use of the system has 
led to a considerable saving in manpower and 
greater reliability in treating the matching of 
the data of nuclear (transfer) transport. The 
advantages thus obtained can be summed up below: 
a) A Safeguards Analyst was given another task 
with no detrimental effect on the quantity 
and quality of the activity under examina-
tion. 
b) The Safeguards Analysts considered more 
than 90% of the CAHM "Suggested Matches" out-
put as valid: 
c) As a result of the implementation of CAHM 
the Safeguards Analysts have more time to 
solve more complicated cases. 
Considering that the CAHM system is a 
logically independent application a distributed 
processing system could be implemented where the 
kernel of the system could be accesse~ from sev-
eral workstations which are connected to a Local 
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Area Network (client-server architecture). The 
migration from a centralized system to a dis-
tributed processing system should be discussed 
and eventually approved by the IAEA Vienna Safe-
guards authorities. 
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MANU - ICR ACQUISITION AND TRANSMISSION THROUGH 
MINITEL 
B. Dufer, G. Thoue 
CEA, C.E.N. Fontenay-aux-Roses, France 
Abstract 
Since last September a new telematic 
transmission mode for domestic accounting reports 
is available to correspondents that used paper and 
the usual postal services for sending their reports to 
IPSN. It is called MINITEL. This type of link is made 
in conversational mode with IPSN's front feed 
computer and makes use of the Transpac network. 
It is accessible from a micro-computer, a terminal or 
a minitel. A minitel is a device consisting of a 
telephone set linked to a printer and a screen with a 
keyboard similar to that of a typewriter. 
This system is perfectly suitable for the 
transmission of small amounts of data and should 
thus be used by small facilities which often make 
few reports with, logically, numerous erros. For less 
than 10,000 FF, this device makes possible the 
following: the acquisition of reports by means of 
data acquisition masks, strictly identical to the 
nuclear materials operation report form; the 
consulting of reports by relating to previous 
accounting reports; the retrieval of reports issued by 
other units (in the case of shipper /receiver 
relations); the correction of inaccurate reports; the 
issue of accounting reports by copying the screen on 
which there is an image of the single form; 
assistance for operators. 
SCHEMATIC OF COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM FOR 
ACCOUNTING DATA CENTRALIZATION 
!written sheetct-~----------------------• 
Main Frame 
computers 
PCs 
I DATA ACQUISITION I 
NB Also data authentication 
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FISSILE MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY ON PERSONAL COMPUTER 
J. Baral and W. Van Gelder 
SCK/CEN Mol, Belgium 
Abstract 
Recently, a new accountancy programme for 
nuclear material has been installed on a PC. 
Being programmed in dBaseiii, it represents the 
advantage of being user-friendly and having easy 
access. The programme treats the problems met in 
a diversity of installations such as fuel 
fabrication laboratories, research laboratories, 
PWR and research reactors with dismountable fuel 
assemblies. Examples of this flexibility in use 
are given. 
l.Introduction 
For almost fifteen years,. our fissile 
material accountancy has been treated on the 
central computer, of our institution (different 
types of IBM computers). However, as a result of 
the constant increase of the number of users and 
realization of the different accountancy tasks, 
in a reasonable lapse of time, it has become 
more and more difficult. This has been the 
reason why we decided in early 1989, to change 
our policy and to keep the fissile material 
accountancy on an independent personal computer. 
Taking into account our experience acquired 
by the different successively used programmes, 
we have made a complete analysis of the overall 
problem and have asked the software company HAVE 
(IBM dealer at Mol), to rewrite the programmes 
required for the realization of our accountancy. 
The accountancy is done on the following 
configuration : 
- a personal computer : PS2 model 80 with a hard 
disk unit of 111 Mb and 4 Mb fast memory 
- a 5.25" floppy disk drive 
- a 3.50" floppy disk drive 
- a tape streamer for the back-up 
- an IBM model 4216 laser printer 
For writing the programme, use was made of 
the Clipper software from the company Nantuket, 
allowing management of the files and offering 
moreover possibility of compiling the realized 
programme, thus presenting the great advantage 
of an accelerated data processing at the level 
of the final user. 
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2. Description of the software 
All data are stored in databases which can 
be divided into two groups : the main files and 
the auxiliary files, helping the user while 
executing the accountancy. 
I. MAIN FILES (Each table gives the contents of 
the file) 
This group includes the files containing the 
data for the different batches and reports. The 
group comprises 7 files. 
1. Smbatchl.dbf contains in 1 record per batch 
all general data for this batch. 
Field Field name Type Space Decimals 
1 Name Character 8 
2 MBA Character 4 
3 Place Character 10 
4 Seal Character 8 
5 Description Character 4 
6 Use Character 2 
7 Measurement Character 1 
8 Item Numerical 4 
9 DOC Character 10 
10 Date Date 8 
11 Info Character 20 
12 Type Character 2 
**Total** 81 
2. Smbatch2.dbf contains per batch the data 
concerning the nuclear material contained in 
this batch from Smbatchl.dbf. This file contains 
as much records per batch as there are different 
types of nuclear material in this batch. 
Field Field name Type Space Decimals 
1 MBA Character 4 
2 Name Character 8 
3 Post Numerical 4 
4 Metweight Numerical 10 3 
**Total** 26 
3. Smic.dbf contains all records for 
establishing an ICR. 
Field 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Field name 
MBA 
Date 
KMP 
Type 
Character 
Date 
Character 
Measurement Character 
Tbook Character 
OMBA Character 
Name Character 
Item Numerical 
Descr. 
Elt 
Eltweight 
Eltunit 
Character 
Character 
Numerical 
Character 
Space 
4 
8 
1 
1 
2 
4 
8 
4 
4 
1 
10 
1 
Iso Character 1 
Isoweight Numerical 10 
Isounit Character 1 
Obligation Character 1 
Character 
Character 
Numerical 
Character 
Date 
Character 
2 
8 
1 
1 
8 
10 
use 
Oinfo 
Book 
Cor 
Odate 
Doe 
Note Character 30 
**Total** 121 
Decimals 
3 
3 
4. Smba.dbf contains the totals per element 
and per obligation for the different MBA on the 
declaration data. 
Field 
1 
Field name 
MBA 
2 BAdate 
3 Elt 
4.6.160bl. Met. 
5.7.170bl. Fiss. 
18 Code 
**Total** 
Type 
Character 
Date 
Character 
Numerical 
Space 
4 
8 
1 
12 
Numerical 12 
Numerical 1 
168 
Decimals 
3 
3 
5. 
and 
date 
Smpb.dbf contains the totals per element 
per obligation for the different MBA on the 
of the physical inventory. 
Same table 
BAdate read 
as sub 
PBdate 
4., except second line 
6. Smdat.dbf : contains per MBA the date of the 
last declaration to Euratom and of the last 
control by Euratom. 
Field 
1 
2 
3 
Field name Type 
MBA Character 
Declaration Date 
Inspection Date 
**Total** 
Space 
4 
8 
8 
20 
Decimals 
7. Sminbd.dbf contains the totals per element 
and obligation at the date of inspection for the 
different MBA. 
Same table as sub 4., except second line : 
BAdate read : Inspdate 
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II. AUXILIARY FILES 
This 
containing 
asked by 
different 
files : 
group consists of the statical files 
the required information which can be 
the programme when realizing the 
bookings. This group comprises 5 
1. Smickode.dbf : contains per MBA the possible 
admitted IC-codes with their KMP and a 
conversion factor. 
Field 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Field name 
MBA 
ICCD 
ICCF 
KMP 
**Total** 
Type Space 
Character 4 
Character 2 
Numerical 2 
Character 1 
9 
Decimals 
0 
2. Smmater.dbf : contains the codes imposed by 
Euratom concerning the material description, 
measurement and use. 
Field 
1 
Field name Type Space Decimals 
Form Character 2 
2 
3 
4 
Packing 
Situation 
Use 
Character 
Character 
Character 
5 Measurement Character 
1 
1 
2 
1 
**Total** 7 
3. Smmbg.dbf contains all MBA codes of the 
community, known to us, with their address and a 
code whether they belong to SCK/CEN or not. 
Field 
1 
2 
3 
Field name 
MBA 
Address 
INT-EXT 
**Total** 
4. Smpla.dbf 
locations where 
reside with their 
Field 
1 
2 
3 
Field name 
MBA 
Place 
KMP 
**Total** 
Type Space 
Character 4 
Character 45 
Numerical 1 
50 
Decimals 
contains per MBA all possible 
nuclear material is allowed to 
KMP. 
Type 
Character 
Character 
Character 
Space 
4 
10 
1 
15 
Decimals 
s. Smpost.dbf contains, per post, the data 
concerning element, obligation, isotopic 
composition. 
Field 
1 
2 
3 
4-17 
Field name 
Post 
Elt 
Obl 
Isol-14 
**Total•• 
Type 
Numerical 
Character 
Character 
Numerical 
Space 
4 
1 
1 
8 
118 
Decimals 
3. Application of the software 
This programme is used via programmed 
screens which, per selection, allow to realize 
the desired accounting operations entry, 
modification or erasion of data in an auxiliary 
file are carried out by means of the programme 
and have only influence on the selected file. 
All data of the auxiliary files may be consulted 
on the screen or on the document printed on 
request. 
Recording of the accountancy movements of 
the batches in the main files influences the 
different files, the relations and functional 
connections of which are programmed. 
This programme allows not only recording of 
all accountancy movements to be obligatory 
declared to the international control bodies, 
but also to realize recording on diskette of the 
monthly report transmitted to EURATOM (Inventory 
Change Report Physical Inventory Listing -
Material Balance Report), to obtain quickly 
inspection manuals required during the 
inspections (about 40 per year for the whole of 
the 7 installations of our research centre) and 
also the Physical Inventory Listing and the 
Material Balance Report, foreseen in the 
regulation. By drawing up, as a Working Paper, a 
recapitulatory list of all inventory modifi-
cations brought to the inspected installation 
since the last control, we facilitate the 
necessary verifications thus allowing decrease 
of the duration of. the inspections. 
We can also retrace the complete history of 
a material batch with its divisions, present 
locations (all data since 1983 are recorded on 
the hard disk of the PC, the former data remain 
accessible via the central computer, if 
necessary). 
The possibilities for modifications which 
must not be declared to the international 
control bodies are also included in this 
programme, such as : change of the description, 
quality, use, form or quantity of items or 
affixture, change or removal of the seals on a 
batch or on a location. 
Owing to the geographical dispersion of our 
installations and the dimension of some (the 
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whole of the laboratories comprises officially 
12 key measurement points of which 7 are really 
active), it is very important, in the scope of 
safety, to be able to locate, at any moment, the 
different materials and their movements even 
when we are not legally obliged to declare the 
latter to the international control bodies. 
This control on the movement of the 
materials is also of prime importance in an 
installation such as reactor BR2, where shift 
work is carried out 24 hours on 24 all year 
around and where each shift carries out its part 
of the manipulations during each loading 
unloading period (every month); these are thus 
entered directly by the shift responsible in the 
specific system of the installation. 
To avoid transcription errors, the central 
accountancy can, via a central computer, have 
access to the internal lists of BR2 and ask a 
list of the modifications carried out since the 
last consultation (receipts, shipments, change 
of the key measurement point, change of the 
storage location inside a same measurement point 
... ). 
Since the reactor BR3 has been stopped, we 
are carrying out the last movements of the pins 
such as to be able to reconstitute a certain 
number of complete dismountable fuel elements 
which are to be stored in a container during a 
transitory period which is still to be 
determined; for this reason, it has not been 
judged necessary to establish a llnk similar to 
that of the reactor BR2. 
4. Conclusion 
We can say that this programme is largely 
wider and more powerful than required by the 
international control bodies. 
It allows to cover certain aspects of our 
safety system by a continuous follow-up of the 
material batches staying in our installations. 
It also allows to realize certain economies at 
the level of time required to execute the 
accountancy and a reduction of the duration of 
the inspections at the level of the accountancy 
control. 

OPERATION OF THE ADVANCED MULTI-LANGUAGE PC SYSTEM 
FOR SAFEGUARDS REPORTS AND INSPECTION SUPPORT 
FOR SINGLE-MBA OR MULTI-MBA 
Per Frederiksen 
Ris~ National Laboratory, Roskilde, Denmark 
Abstract 
The new advanced multi-language PC 
version of the system for safeguards 
reports and inspection support is now in 
operation at the Ris~ National Laboratory 
for all Danish installations. 
The system can be used on PCs in 
other Community countries, because the 
language of the display text can be selec-
ted on a menu. The programs are being 
delivered to Petten for use for 3 material 
balance areas. 
The system has been improved by sig-
nificant increased capacity and speed. A 
sub-batch system has been integrated in the 
general programs. 
1. Introduction 
The new advanced DOS version for PCs 
of the system for production of safeguards 
reports and inspection support documents is 
now in operation in Denmark. It is used for 
all Danish installations. 
ICR and BA reports have been submit-
ted on diskettes to Euratom with respect 
to reports since 1 February 1991 for all 
these installations. Future PIL and MBR 
reports will also be sent on diskettes. 
Since 1984 the high quality inspec-
tion support produced by the previous CP/M 
version has been appreciated by Euratom and 
!AEA inspectors, because their tasks were 
eased. The system has eased significantly 
the tasks at the safeguards office and at 
the various installations. 
The new DOS version for PCs includes 
additional possibilities for inspection 
support. 
The system can be used in other Com-
munity countries. All display texts can be 
shown in English or in another language 
selected on a menu. For ICR printouts the 
form can be printed in English or in 
another selected language. 
The flexibility of the system makes 
the operation easy for a single MBA, for a 
group of MBAs at an installation, for a 
number of MBAs (regional use) or for all 
installations in a country. It can also be 
used for central safeguards administration 
of all Catch-All MBA installations. 
The programs are being delivered to 
ECN Petten in the Netherlands for use for 
three material balance areas. Various im-
provements of the programs have been made 
in order to ensure that the general system 
will comply also with all safeguards and 
operational needs at Petten. 
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2. New Advanced PC System 
Multi-Language Version 
The new advanced version for PCs is 
designed for use in the various countries 
within the Community. 
The standard language for all display 
texts is English, but another language for 
all display texts can be selected on a 
menu. Hereby, operation in these countries 
is eased. 
The printout form for the inventory 
change reports is in English. However, it 
is possible to print the form in another 
selected language. Copies of ICR printouts 
can be used as official document to the 
receiver, e.g. at international transfers. 
The programs can be operated on a 
large group of personal computers compris-
ing models from IBM, Olivetti, and other 
manufactures producing IBM compatible PCs 
using PC-DOS or MS-DOS operative systems. 
The advantage of using a PC, which is 
not connected to any external line, is that 
unauthorized persons can not interfere with 
or extract safeguards data. The security 
aspects are limited to the room, where the 
PC is located. 
Purpose of System 
The system can be used for e.g. light 
water power reactors, research centers as 
well as bulk handling installations having 
rather simple safeguards accountancy needs. 
Special modified versions can be developed 
on request. However, it is not the intention 
of the program designers to solve the prob-
lems at large bulk handling installations 
requiring complicated accountancy. 
Safeguards tasks are rather standard, 
while operational tasks are individual for 
the various types of installations. The 
operational tasks depend also on the size 
of the installation. 
Therefore, it is an advantage to sep-
arate safeguards tasks from the operational 
tasks. Hereby, the user of the system is 
not obliged to comply with special require-
ments for other types of installations. 
The new PC system is designed for the 
standard safeguards tasks and for the pro-
duction of inspection support documents. 
The system can produce reports: 
- Inventory change reports. Concise 
notes can be entered. 
- Monthly reports on the book inven-
tory sorted by obligation. 
- Physical inventory listings. 
- Material balance reports. 
The reports required by Euratom can 
be submitted on diskettes for direct use in 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate. 
The system can also produce various 
types of high quality inspection support 
documents. They ease the inspections very 
much. The various types are described in 
this paper. 
A new sub-batch system has been inte-
grated in the general programs. The user 
can enter batch data or sub-batch data in 
the PC. In both cases the system produces 
the safeguards reports at batch level as 
required by Euratom. 
The new version of the system could 
be useful to operators not only with re-
spect to the safeguards tasks but also with 
respect to operational tasks. Supplementary 
programs can be added. 
Single-MBA/Multi-MBA Operation 
The system is very flexible. The 
operator of a single material balance area 
can easily use the system as a SINGLE-MBA 
system. 
If more than one MBA exist at the 
installation, e.g. at a power reactor site, 
then it will be an advantage to use the 
system as a MULTI-MBA system for the MBAs. 
Also at a research center benefits 
are achieved, if a central safeguards of-
fice uses the system as a MULTI-MBA system. 
It is also possible to use the system 
as a regional system for a group of instal-
lations. 
Finally - as in Denmark - the system 
can be operated as a national system for 
all MBAs and for all Catch-All MBA instal-
lations in the country. 
The harddisk contains all inventory 
change reports and book inventory infor-
mation on particular days for all MBAs 
covered by the system. 
For each material balance area, the 
updated inventory information is stored on 
~ separate diskette. The diskette contains 
batch data as well as sub-batch data. 
Fast and Easy Operation 
The new advanced version for PCs 
replaces the CP/M version that has been 
used in Denmark since 1984. Improvements 
have been included where possible on basis 
of extensive research performed by a safe-
guards expert and a programming expert 
since 1984. 
Direct access to the mostly used pro-
grams is very easy from DOS at start of the 
pc. Access is also possible through the 
main menu and the menus for the various 
parts of the system, but direct access to 
programs is very fast. Direct access from 
DOS to the menus for the various parts is 
also possible. Therefore, it is not neces-
sary to call the main menu. 
The display colours can be changed by 
the user. Hence, each user can select the 
colours he prefers. This provision is simi-
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lar to the provision that the language of 
all display texts can be selected on a menu 
by the user. 
At operation of the programs, it is 
possible to benefit from the individual 
MBA guide text (5 pages), which is shown 
automatically, when needed. The user can 
change this text at any time. 
The operation of the various programs 
is also eased by fixed guide texts on the 
display. 
At a transfer between 2 MBAs covered 
by the system, it is possible to produce 
shipper's inventory change report as well 
as receiver's inventory change report from 
one input to the PC. 
The input tasks are also reduced due 
to standard information stored in the PC. 
Repetition of data are performed automati-
cally or by pushing the key ENTER. 
Enrichment information can be used 
for calculation of U-235, if wanted. Then 
the quantity of U-235 is not entered. 
In the batch field it is possible to 
enter 15,149 for a batch 15/149. When the 
key ENTER is pushed, then 15,149 is con-
verted to 15/149. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to use the key SHIFT. One hand 
can enter data, while the other hand can be 
kept at the line in the source document. 
Concise notes can be entered in the 
inventory change reports. Experience has 
shown, that the tasks in the safeguards 
office are performed more effectively, if 
useful information is entered. 
It is very fast and easy to produce 
safety copies of data on inventory changes, 
on book inventories on specific days, as 
well as on the batches and sub-batches in 
the various material balance areas. 
New Integrated Sub-Batch System 
In order to limit the accountancy 
tasks in the situation, where many similar 
items are handled, it may be useful to con-
sider these items as sub-batches within a 
particular batch. 
The new advanced PC system includes a 
sub-batch system integrated in the ordinary 
programs. The user can enter information on 
batches or on sub-batches. In both cases, 
the system produces e.g. physical inventory 
listings and inspection support documents 
at batch level. The data are used also at 
the production of material balance reports. 
The sub-batches within a batch may 
concern one or more material category, one 
or more enrichment, and one or more obli-
gation. However, the program calculates in-
formation at batch level for each material 
category, enrichment and obligation. 
A batch may consist of a number of 
sub-batches located in various places. 
Here, it is easy to update the location 
information in all lines for a sub-batch, 
if it is moved to another place, or trans-
ferred from the batch. 
The sub-batch consolidation listing 
shows the data for each sub-batch as well 
as the totals for the batch. Therefore, it 
is very useful at inspections. 
An item listing on all items, or on 
selected items, sorted in sequential order, 
can be useful to the operator. 
A batch may also consist of a number 
of sub-batches, which all are located in 
the same position. Here, it is easy to up-
·date the position for all sub-batches. All 
lines can be deleted in case of shipment. 
An example is a fuel assembly con-
sisting of rods, which can be replaced by 
other rods. Each rod is a sub-batch, while 
the fuel assembly is the batch. Movement of 
the total fuel assembly can be entered in 
the PC. It is also easy to update the PC, 
if a rod is moved to or from the assembly. 
The sub-batch consolidation listing 
shows the data for the various rods as well 
as the totals for the assembly. It is very 
useful at inspection of such assemblies. 
An item listing can show the rods in 
a sequential order and the assemblies, they 
concern. 
Inspection Support Documents 
The inspection of accountancy is 
eased by the following support documents: 
- Book inventory updating document 
showing the inventory at the 
previous inspection, consolidated 
information for each type of change 
on a particular day, and the book 
inventory at the new inspection. 
Inventory information is also shown 
according to IAEA specifications. 
- Inventory change report printouts 
with and without obligation. 
- PE/BA printouts for the physical 
inventory and the book inventory, 
both sorted by obligation. 
- Physical inventory listings with 
and without obligation. 
- Material balance reports. 
The inspection of materials is eased 
by the following support documents: 
- Inventory distribution document 
showing the total inventory within 
each KMP and AREA. It also shows 
the number of batches and items. 
- Updated inventory listing showing 
the various batches sorted by KMP, 
AREA, POSITION. It does not contain 
obligation information. 
- Sub-batch consolidation listing 
showing the various sub-batches 
within each batch. The lines for 
the total quantities for a batch 
are equal to the lines for the 
same batch in the updated inventory 
listing. 
It should be noted that more than one 
KMP can be used for the batches within the 
inventory part of the system in order to 
ease the inspections. If only one KMP is 
accepted by Euratom in physical inventory 
listings, then the system can convert all 
KMPs to A at the production of physical 
inventory listings for Euratom. 
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3. Operation in Denmark 
Safeguards Administration 
In Denmark, the new advanced DOS 
version for PCs replaces the CP/M version 
that has been used since 1984 at the Ris~ 
National Laboratory for all Danish instal-
lations. 
It will be used for 8 MBAs at Ris~, 5 
MBAs elsewhere in Denmark and 18 Catch-All 
MBA installations. The MBAs at Ris~ com-
prise now a fuel fabrication plant, two 
reactors, a hot cell facility, a storage 
MBA, a waste installation, a uranium ore 
MBA and research laboratories. 
The conditions in Denmark are such 
that it is not necessary to use regional 
administration (all MBAs at Ris~ and near 
Ris~). It is convenient to include all 
other installations in Denmark. 
The efficiency of the safeguards ad-
ministration was increased significantly by 
use of the CP/M version. Many tasks - such 
as production of printouts and production 
of the monthly diskette for ICR-BA reports 
to Euratom - are performed by the secretary 
at the national safeguards office. 
The increased speed of the new DOS 
version for Pes leads to further improved 
conditions at the safeguards office. 
Since March 1984 Euratom Safeguards 
Directorate has received diske~tes con-
taining more than 25,000 records concerning 
reports. There have been no problems at the 
transfer of data. 
Procedures 
The safeguards office administers all 
safeguards tasks for all installations in 
Denmark. Standard procedures ensure that 
reports comply with Euratom requirements. 
Errors in data are also avoided. 
The operators can concentrate their 
efforts on operation of the installations. 
The local, individual registration system 
for nuclear material can be developed in 
such a manner that the operation of the 
installation is most effective without any 
unnecessary safeguards administration. 
However, link to the accounting system at 
the safeguards office is necessary. 
The advantage of the individual local 
systems is that operators at small instal-
lations are not obliged to comply with the 
complicated accountancy requirements for 
the large installations. 
The safeguards office produces the 
inventory change reports on basis of mini-
mum information from the operators as well 
as safeguards information in the ledger 
sheets kept in the safeguards office. The 
information is entered in the accounting 
system by the secretary, and the safeguards 
officer performs then an audit. 
At a transfer between two material 
balance areas covered by the system, the 
safeguards office is able to produce the 
inventory change reports for the shipper as 
well as for the receiver from one input to 
the PC. 
The safeguards office updates the 
inventory information at physical inventory 
takings on basis of information from the 
operator. The physical inventory listing 
and the material balance report are then 
produced. 
The tasks at the safeguards office 
are limited by concentration on changes of 
the total inventory at each HBA. Below is 
described the preferred administration. 
The new, advanced PC system is very 
flexible and can be operated in various 
manners. There may be circumstances, where 
the operator e.g. by using the inventory 
part of the system himself ·can achieve sig-
nificant benefits at the operation and at 
the inspections. 
Accounting System at Safeguards Office 
For process material undergoing daily 
physical changes, the safeguards office 
uses a consolidated batch-account for 
material of a particular enrichment and 
obligation. The daily processes are not 
recorded in the ledgersheet for this 
account. Receipts, shipments, and transfer 
to another batch are recorded promptly. 
Rebatching to ordinary batch accounts are 
performed at physical inventory takings and 
just before inspections in accordance with 
the physical situation. Consolidated 
process differences and roundings are then 
reported and recorded for each consolidated 
account. Hereby, the assessment of the 
inventory differences is eased. 
Each fuel assembly at a reactor con-
stitutes a batch, for which the safeguards 
office keeps a ledger sheet. Just before 
inspections the PC is updated with respect 
to the location of the various assemblies. 
If many similar items are handled at 
an installation, then it is convenient to 
use a sub-batch system. Hereby the number 
of ledger sheets is reduced, because one 
ledger sheet can concern a number of items. 
For a batch consisting of a number of 
items, that normally are not changed or 
moved, a sub-batch listing is kept at the 
safeguards office. This listing has infor-
mation on location of the items. The total 
quantity is recorded in the ledger sheet 
for the batch. 
The ledger sheet for a batch includes 
information on the dates for all changes 
that have been reported. The corresponding 
MBA or batch is also recorded. 
The PC contains the updated safe-
guards information on batches and consoli-
dated batches corresponding to the data 
in the ledger sheets. The sub-batch system, 
which is integrated in the new PC version, 
makes it possible to enter sub-batch data 
instead of batch data. Location information 
can be updated just before an inspection. 
Then the inspection support documents can 
be printed rapidly. Copies are ready for 
the inspectors, when they arrive. 
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Accounting Systems at Installations 
The individual accounting systems at 
the installations should comply with the 
operational needs. Experience has shown 
that some operators prefer that unnecessary 
safeguards information should not be en-
tered by the operator. There is a high risk 
of errors, if persons without sufficient 
safeguards education enter data. Wrong data 
at the installations could give rise to 
confusion at inspections. Instead, docu-
ments prDduced by the safeguards o~fi~e are 
kept as correct safeguards information. 
The starting document is the inven-
tory change report for the receipt of the 
material. The safeguards office ensures 
at the production of the report that the 
data correspond to the official safeguards 
information from the shipper. Frequently, 
different data are declared in the various 
transport documents. 
A copy of the inventory change report 
is checked and signed by the operator. This 
copy is returned to the safeguards office, 
where it is used as a source document for 
the safeguards accounting. Another copy is 
stored at the installation. 
Subsequent reports are produced by 
the safeguards office on basis of minimum 
information from the operator. A copy is 
signed by the operator and returned to the 
safeguards office. Another copy is stored 
at the installation. 
Furthermore, the operator receives 
copies of the monthly BA reports on the 
book inventory sorted by obligation, as 
well as the physical inventory listings 
and material balance reports. 
The local accounting and identifi-
cation system should comply with the oper-
ational and safety requirements. It should 
also include convenient provisions for fast 
identification of the various materials of 
a particular batch or consolidated batch 
recorded by the safeguards office. 
At least one convenient parameter 
concerning the quantities (e.g. the gross 
weight) should be recorded for use at the 
verification of the total quantity declared 
at inspections. By use of supplementary 
standard information (e.g. enrichment and 
U-factor) for the particular batch, it 
should be possible to verify the safeguards 
data on weights of U and U-235 declared 
in the inspection support documents. 
If e.g. the weight of U3Si2 is used 
as operational parameter for certain fuel 
fabrication processes, then these quan-
tities can be used for establishment of a 
material balance for the batch based on 
this parameter. Conversion to safeguards 
data leads then to the data in safeguards 
reports and inspection support documents. 
As mentioned previously, the operator 
may have advantages by operating e.g. the 
inventory part of the advanced PC system. 
The accounting and identification 
systems have been developed in close 
collaboration with the safeguards office. 
Inspections 
The inspection support documents are 
produced by the safeguards office after 
updating of the PC data with respect to the 
situation just before the inspection. 
The inspection support has eased the 
tasks of the inspectors not only during the 
inspections but also at subsequent evalu-
ations. 
The inspectors perform accountancy 
checks in the safeguards office as well as 
inspection of materials in the instal-
lations. 
When four inspectors perform the in-
spection, then two inspection teams are 
established. The secretary in the safe-
guards office assists the team concerning 
accountancy checks, while the safeguards 
officer assists the team performing verifi-
cation of materials. When the accountancy 
checks have been completed, then both teams 
check materials. 
The inventory at the previous 
inspection is updated at the accountancy 
check with respect to changes since that 
inspection, and the new book inventory is 
calculated. The PC produced inspection 
support document Book Inventory Updating 
and copies of inventory change reports 
- with and without obligation information -
ease this task very much. 
The inspectors also check that the 
changes declared in the inventory change 
reports signed by the operator have been 
recorded in the ledger sheets. They also 
check relevant transport documents, which 
are kept as source documents. 
Printout of the physical inventory 
listings - with and without obligation 
information - and material balance reports 
are ready, when the inspectors arrive. 
The printout of PE/BA on the total 
physical and book inventory - sorted by 
obligation - is given to Euratom inspectors 
only. 
At the installations the staff from 
the safeguards office accompanies the in-
spectors and advises them with respect to 
various aspects. Furthermore, the operators 
are advised with respect to rights of in-
spectors and operators. One staff member 
from the installation is present, but he 
does not need to be familiar with safe-
guards aspects. The operators have appreci-
ated this assistance that has reduced the 
work load of the operators. 
The various inspection support docu-
ments ease the tasks of the inspectors very 
much: 
- The document on the inventory dis-
tribution can be used to assess the 
number of items to be selected for 
inspection. 
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- The updated inventory listing shows 
the batches sorted by location. The 
inspection time is reduced by using 
this document. 
- The sub-batch listings are also 
very useful at the inspection of 
batches. The consolidated quantity 
is equal to the information in the 
updated inventory listing. 
The staff from the safeguards office 
also checks identification and weight data 
for the batches and items. Improvements are 
organised, if needed. Hereby, the intended 
safeguards quality is ensured. 
4. Conclusions 
The new advanced multi-language PC 
system for safeguards reports and inspec-
tion support is used for all installations 
in Denmark. It can be used in other Com-
munity countries, because the language of 
display texts can be selected on a menu. 
The system can be operated for a 
single MBA, a group of MBAs or for all MBAs 
in a country. The new effective sub-batch 
system, that is integrated in the general 
programs, may be very useful to operators. 
The system constitutes an important 
improvement of the CP/M version that has 
been used for all Danish installations 
since 1984. 
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CLOSlNG StMofiNG-UP BY THE 
CHAIRMAN OF THE SYMPOSIUM 
B H PATRICK 
UKAEA, Harwell, UK 
This meeting has covered the canplete spectrum 
of safeguards topics, ranging fran the political 
and regulation aspects, and tlrrough all the 
technical areas which contribute to the subject. 
To atterrpt to sumnarise such a diverse range 
-would be a very daunting task and one which is 
beyond my capabilities. 
The Secretaries of the Sessions have . kindly 
provided ne with sumnaries but to go tlrrough 
each one -would take too long and I am sure you 
do not wish to hear a long speech. Instead 
therefore, I propose to pick out a few 
highlights, selected on a personal basis, but in 
the proceedings I shall include the sumnaries by 
the Session Secretaries. 
To ne, the highlights have been as follc:ws: 
In the initiatives which are beginning to be 
brought forward on energy policy in the 
European Camrunity, nuclear pc:ll.'.er is expected 
to continue to play an important role and 
safeguards are an essential ingredient in 
that. They will also be of high importance 
in the increase in nuclear trade which could 
result when the open market cares into being 
at the beginning of 1993. 
An important landmark was reached recently 
when fresh MJX fuel was verified for the 
first time under water by the Euratom 
Inspectorate. The anticipated increase in 
the flew and use of MJX in the future makes 
it essential to devise and demonstrate 
successful safeguards maasures which can give 
the necessary assurance. The ability to 
verify under water is a key part of that. 
A m.nnber of organisations are -working on 
schemes for randanisation of inspections or 
zone approaches. Mr Qrelin' s remark that 
while the elegance of the techniques is 
unquestionable, the practice is not so 
encouraging. I suspect this is the first 
shot in a discussion that will last for sore 
tine and I look forward to seeing the outcare 
of the argument. 
The advances in NDA techniques in recent 
years have been remarkable. In sore areas, 
they are beginning to approach capabilities 
so far achieved only by DA mathods and this 
can only be good for safeguards. I -would not 
be surprised if this infringerrent of the 
prima position held by the DA camrunity stirs 
them into even greater efforts, resulting in 
further jmproverrents in their anroury. This 
rivalry is a great stimulating influence 
which will inevitably lead to improved 
accuracy and therefore improved safeguards. 
Recent developrents in C/S techniques seem to 
have eliminated the Cinderella image which it 
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has had. The application of modern, 
sophisticated techniques has brought about a 
revolution and raised the status of C/S very 
significantly. Data are new of higher 
quality which leads to greater assurance. 
This is a much-needed developrent because, 
with the limitation on inspection resources 
making it difficult to keep pace with the 
increasing number and canplexity of nuclear 
installations, greater reliance on C/S is 
required. C/S seems to have risen to the 
challenge and those responsible for the 
advancerrent are to be congratulated. 
The participation of Eastern European 
countries in this Syrrposium is a very welcare 
addition. Both sides have much to offer and 
can learn fran each other. I hope their 
participation is a trend which will continue, 
to the benefit of all. 
If I had to select only one highlight, it 
would have to be the trend towards 
integration. Integration has been with us 
for a long tine but I lost count of the 
number of tines the -words "integrated system" 
were used by presenters. fibre and Il'Ore, 
canplete systems are called for, requiring 
contributions fran several technical areas. 
Besides producing better, Il'Ore reliable, 
safeguards systems, integration brings 
together personnel involved in different 
disciplines and this must be an additional 
benefit. Using the -word "integration" in a 
looser sense, I have been struck by the 
number of papers involving authors fran 
different organisations, not only R&D ones 
but also the inspection agencies. Safeguards 
is an international business and 
collaboration adds to this dimansion and is 
therefore to be encouraged. 
I am sure that each of you, if you had been 
in my position, would have selected an 
entirely different set of highlights; and 
that is how it should be; discussion, 
collaboration, different ideas, all have an 
important role to play and it -would be dull 
if there were no disagreerrents. 
The programre for this Symposium held out the 
prospect of an interesting maeting and we 
have not been disappointed. I believe it has 
been an excellent gathering, with stimulating 
papers and exciting developrents. The future 
for safeguards looks very bright and we can 
look forward to facing challenges with 
confidence and the prospect of making a major 
contribution to a safer -world. 
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behalf of all the participants, I should like to 
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v..ould be like to have a Syrrq;Jositnn without 
the presence and hard v..ork behind the scenes of 
Professor Stanchi. He is the personification of 
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rreeting. I am sure he will once again finish it 
all off by producing the proceedings in a very 
short time, adding maximum value to the 
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Scientific Secretary was Mlle Neuilly. Her hard 
work and contribution have also been 
instrurrental in ensuring the success of the 
meeting and for that we acknowledge our 
gratitude. 
The Ccmnissariat a 1' Energie Atcmique (CPA) of 
France - our hosts are to be congratulated on 
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been excellent and we are grateful for the 
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of the rreeting. 
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security. They have provided valuable support to 
participants throughout the week. 
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be a nonentity. Thank you for the trouble you 
have taken to inform us of the v..ork going on in 
safeguards and nuclear materials accountancy 
around the v..orld. 
Chairman and secretaries of sessions - for their 
efficient conduct of · the sessions and for 
ensuring that they ended close to tilre. 
Participants - for providing such an interested 
audience and stimulating questions. 
Interpreters - who have coped with a wide 
variety of technical jargon admirably and 
managed to keep up with presenters, keen to 
tell us about many aspects of their v..ork. 
Projectionists, technicians and all others who 
have contributed to the efficient running and 
success of this Syrrq;Josiun. 
Session 1: Invited Papers 
In the first session four speeches were given by 
invited speakers. 'IW:> of them concerned the 
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French approach to nuclear safeguards, both 
technical and political; the third one presented 
the energy policy of the Ccmnission of the 
European Ccmnunities; the fourth reviewed the 
support programres to the IAEA by the !Vanber 
states. 
The presentation of Mr Laureana, of the French 
Ministry of Industry, highlighted the French 
approach to safeguarding of nuclear materials. 
Safeguards in France has much broader scope than 
international safeguards, including arrong its 
objectives materials which are not considered by 
international safeguards (e.g. D, T, Li -6, and 
military materials), consider such issues as 
physical protection of materials and 
installations, and also addresses such problems 
as the verification of good technical managerrent 
by operators. 
Mr Felten, Deputy Director of the International 
Relations Department of the CPA, pointed at the 
need of reconsidering certain aspects of 
international safeguards, since the recent 
events in the Middle East sha.-.oed that sare of 
the political assumptions on which the present 
system is based might not be verified in the 
future. m particular: (i) there is the 
possibility that nuclear weapons are considered 
for actual use in local conflicts rather than 
for deterrence, and (ii) there is the fear that 
weapons grade materials might be obtained 
through an undeclared fuel cycle rather than 
diverted fran the civilian cycle. These facts 
might require a revision of certain limitations 
now imposed on safeguards activities, rrore 
intensive use of all existing safeguards 
provisions and the possible introduction of 
appropriate non-quantitative criteria in 
safeguards implerrentation. 
Mr Gnelin, on behalf of the Director General for 
Energy of the Commission of the European 
Carmunities, presented the main lines of the 
energy policy of the Commission. Having stated 
that energy is a major econcmic issue in the 
community and that the Commission aims at 
achieving a "secure energy supply to satisfy 
demand at reasonable cost and low environmental 
impact" , Mr Qrelin said that this target may be 
achieved through a Single Energy Market. The 
Commission is v..orking to this objective by 
issuing appropriate regulations to harm::lnize 
national energy policies, by pranoting cam10n 
industrial strategies, by strengthening 
relations with countries of the EFTA and of the 
fonrer East European econcmic block. Specific 
collaboration programmes are now developed for 
East Europe. The importance of nuclear ];lOWer in 
Europe is high, since 35% of the EC electricity 
is now produced in this way by 134 reactors. 
Public acceptance of nuclear power is a major 
concern for the ccmnission, and safeguards is 
one of the neans to make the nuclear option 
credible. In this context, the Ccmnission is 
giving considerable attention to the recent 
statenent of Mr Blix on the strenghtening of 
safeguards. 
Mr Naito, Director of the Division of 
Developrent and Technical Support at the IAE'A, 
highlighted the importance of the Supp:Jrt 
Programres of the Member States to the IAE'A for 
the development of safeguards instrurrents, 
procedures and techniques. The number of these 
programmes has steadily increased fran the 
original one in 1976 to the present 14, and 
covers n<::W 150 tasks for a total budget of 22 
million dollars. The programres practically 
cover the needs for R/D of the IAE'A and are 
coordinated through national coordinators' 
rreetings. Diffusion of information is achieved 
through the SPRICS Informatic System. 
Session 2A: Safeguards Systems and 
~lementation I: 
The first session ( 2A) on Safeguards Systems and 
Implementation was entirely devoted to new 
concepts for safeguards implementation. 
In presenting his paper, "Contributing to 
Goals concepts for Safeguards Ircplementation" , 
Mr Grelin emphasised the fact that by the end 
of the 1990s Safeguards in the European 
Ccmnunity will have to cope with an increased 
availability and use of plutonium, on increased 
use of J:IDX in LWR, with the presence of large 
commercial fuel fabrication and reprocessing 
plants, and of plants to condition irradiated 
fuel before re:PJsitory. Consequently and in 
order to continue to improve the effectiveness 
and the efficiency of the safeguards operation, 
with necesasrily limited resources, safeguards 
concepts and approaches need new thinking 
- Relating to the technical goals, i.e. the 
tryptic of characteristic arrounts, t:irres and 
probabilities. In this line the IAEA Safeguards 
Criteria for 1991-1995 are under review in the 
perspective of the Unique European Camon Market 
in 1992. 
For large fuel cycle installations in the 
line to gradually replace rnanp<:;Wer by machine 
P<::Wer. 
Mr Lu and Mr Canty, in spite of different 
approaches, presented stimulating thoughts on 
the use of randomization for inspection. 
Application to IAEA safeguards practices sh<::Ws 
for the two approaches an improvement of the 
efficiency in the use of inspection resources 
and a reduction of intrusiveness in plant 
operation. For Lu, unpredictability and 
increased intensity of the inspection results in 
a strengthening of inspection effectiveness. 
According to Canty guaranteed detection t:irres 
comparable or shorter to those obtainable 
without randanisation are achieved. 
Because of the importance of this new concept 
the authors are warmly encouraged to pursue 
their studies on the use of randomised 
inspection scheme. werkoff presented the first 
results obtained in France for the developrent 
of a knowledge-based software system for 
inspection strategy. The use of such software 
is expected to assist the IAEA in improving and 
optimising its inspection strategy, particularly 
in taking into account the whole fuel cycle of a 
state. 
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Session 2B: Safeguards systems and 
~lementation II 
Five papers were presented in this session. 
Two papers ( 2. 5 and 2. 6) described the State 
system for nuclear material accountancy and 
control in Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
The nuclear facilities and the materials on 
which these systems are applied were described 
together with the inspection activities 
performed both by the national authorities and 
by IAEA. 
The State office accountancy system was 
computerised in both countries and in the 
frarrework of the international agreement, a gocd 
cooperation exists between State and IAEA 
inspectors. 
sane exarrples of the measurement techniques and 
instrumentation used were given together with 
the research and development activities carried 
out in order to improve the accuracy of the 
measurements and the effectiveness of the 
controls. 
A nuclear material accountancy system in the 
industrial MOX fuel fabrication plant of 
Belgonucleaire was presented in paper 2. 7. 
In order to solve the problem of separate 
accountancy systems, for safeguards and clients, 
Belgonucleaire is using a system called "current 
account" in which materials are recorded in 
terms of Pu total, Pu fissile, Pu equivalent, 
U total and U 2 3 s • Advantages of this system 
are: traceability between fabrication and 
recycled materials fran different custarers; 
allowing a wider choice for cross-blending 
operations; avoiding interruptions of 
fabrication in case of temporary technical or 
administrative problems. 
The data obtained by this "current account" 
system, referred to about 6 tons of Pu processed 
in the last five years, were used satisfactorily 
both for safeguards and carmercial pur:PJses. 
The problems associated with the safeguarding of 
large plutonium stores presently under 
construction or recently commissioned were 
examined in paper 2. 8. 
Several features were analysed and evaluated 
fran the safeguards p:Jint of view: reduction of 
personal access, improved remote operation, 
transmission of data to a central office, use of 
unattended safeguards systems, etc. 
The conclusions were: an accurate installation 
of a properly designed NDA system, interlinked 
with the overall C/S system to maintain 
continuity of knowledge and in such a way that 
loss of continuity of kn<::Wledge is greatly 
reduced. 
Furthermore, in order to have a reliable 
safeguards system, more developrent activities 
are required in particular in the area of 
authentication techniques and advanced 
surveillance equipment. 
A survey of NDA instrurrentation used routinely 
by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate was 
presented in paper 2.9 with the purpose of 
outlining the present and future needs for NDh 
instrumentation by comparing the types of 
nuclear materials and facilities in the European 
Ccmnunity with the capability of existing NDh 
instrumentation. 
The different NDh techniques based on passive 
and active neutrons and gamua rreasurernents, were 
described and evaluated. 
Further improvements were envisaged for 
irradiated LEU and HEU assemblies, U 2 3 5 content 
of UF 6 cylinders and for techniques for 
rreasurernents on wastes and scraps and for more 
sophisticated portable instrurrentation. 
Regarding large-scale facilities, it is 
necessary to include automated NDh stations able 
to rreasure lOO% of the material flow at various 
parts of the plant. This automated approach 
requires a large amount of preparatory WJrk 
before the equiprent becares operational. 
Session 3: Measurement Techniques 
A major change in the way that independent 
analysis of verification samples will be 
accanplished in the future was identified in a 
paper describing the design concept for an 
on-site laboratory for the Euratan Safeguards 
Directorate at the ENFL Sellafield site. Due to 
the vast increase in samples of special fissile 
materials required to be analysed for Safeguards 
purposes from the new large reprocessing 
facilities in France and the UK and the 
increasing difficulty of transporting such 
samples, it has becare necessary to set up 
on site laboratories to carry out independent 
analysis at these plants. Of the many 
additional advantages that will be gained fran 
on-site operation the most important is probably 
the considerable improvernent in tirrelines of 
verification, with results obtainable within 48 
hours. 
A variety of techniques will be required for the 
analysis of input solutions, plutonium nitrate 
solutions and plutonium oxide samples. Well 
established titrirretric rrethods will be used for 
assay analysis and NDA techniques will be 
increasingly used where applicable. It will be 
essential to use automatic equipment and 
robotics to maintain a high throughput of 
samples with a minimum of staff. 
The ECSAM laboratories will continue to have an 
important function in the future in analysing 
inspector samples taken fran nuclear facilities 
in the EC and the current and future WJrk of the 
ECSAM and PERLA laboratories were described in 
tWJ further papers. Certain activities were 
highlighted; the production and certification of 
reference materials at JRC-Geel together with 
the responsibility for implementing the REIMEP 
programme, the development of automatic 
rdbotised rrethods of analysis at JRC-Karlsruhe 
and the developrent and testing of in-field 
rrethods of analysis for uranium at JRC-Ispra. 
PERI.A has provided invaluable training courses 
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for EC and IAEA Safeguards inspectors in the use 
of currently used NDh techniques as well as 
assessing the performance of a variety of NDh 
techniques employed in Safeguards. Further 
workshops for PNCC, calorirretry and software for 
NDh are planned for 1992. 
The final paper given in the session described 
the features and possible applications of the 
highly sensitive tirre-resolved laser-induced 
spectrofluorometric techniques for the 
determination of elernental uranium, curium and 
arrer~c~um. The technique is very rapid and 
suitable for such applications as; mapping 
uranium concentrations around nuclear sites, 
medical surveillance of staff and for the 
determination of uranium in 'IBP solutions fran 
the Purex process. 
Session 4 : Measurement Techniques : 
Destructive Analysis 
G Bortels ( 4. 1) This presentation covers the 
situation in alpha spectraretry. The most 
important points are: experirrental pararreters, 
peak distortion. The application to 
238Pu239+24oPu was presented. 
V F Kositsyn (4.2) The results of preparation 
and certification of three reference materials 
were presented. The certification of 2 33U, 
235U, 238U ratios to 236U was done by analytical 
rrethods and by IllVJS. The R.M. will be used in 
mass spectraretry as well as for calibration of 
mass spectrareters. 
C. Nichol-Rostaing ( 4. 3) Ti tanous sulphate and 
ferric nitrate have been proposed as 
substitution of titanous (III) chloride and 
ferric choloride. Experirrental conditions to 
synthesize titanous sulphate have been 
optimized. 
T K Li (4.4) The determination of Pu 
concentration and isotopic distribution has been 
carried out by gamua-ray spectroscopy. The 
results obtained by this study agree well with 
results by IDMS. 
P DeBievre ( 4. 5 & 4 . 6) The frarreWJrk of REIMEP 
UF 6 rreasurernent was presented. The results 
obtained by M. s. and gamua ray spectraretry have 
been canpared. Calculated examples of both 
isotopic selective processes were presented. 
Final Remarks In this session it is 
important to note the canparison of different 
techniques used for the determination of u and 
Pu. Alpha particle spectranetry gamua-ray 
spectrometry and mass spectranetry: results 
obtained with those techniques can be canpared. 
Each one of them presents sane advantages or 
inconvenience in relation to the others. 
Session Sa: Measurernent:Techniques Non 
Destructive Assay I 
This first session on Non-Destructive Assay 
concerned gamma spectrometry techniques (4 
papers) and calorirretry rreasurernents (1 paper). 
The first paper presented the conclusions of the 
ESARDA interlaboratory PIDIE exercise on 
plutonium. The results showed the very 
.important progress of the last years in the 
field of the gamna spectranetry :rrethods, for 
detectors, electronics and software with the 
analysis possibilities in the x,r region. Now, 
capability is near the DA performance for the 
determination of plutonium isotopic composition. 
Nevertheless, 2 • 2 Pu is not measurable by this 
technique and has to be determined by calculated 
correlations; improvements are necessary to 
obtain reasonable accuracy. A benchmark 
exercise on this subject in the fraireW:>rk of 
ESARDA NDA WOrking Group could contribute to 
irrprove the actual situation. 
The second paper of SCK IDL concerned a large 
measurement campaign by gamna spectranetry on 
about 500 waste d.nrrns. Although this technique 
is interesting for safeguards measurements 
(sirrplicity, rapidity) and progress have been 
realised during these last years (additional 
gamma segmented scanning, interpretation 
software) its use stays limited for the 
harogeneous and low density material in d.nrrns. 
The presentation by Canberra and the Safeguards 
Directorate of EURATCM (Paper No. 3) sha-Jed the 
interest of the unattended gamna systems to 
irrprove the security and to decrease the cost of 
safeguards inspections. The developrent of 
counting electronics, software and computer 
architecture and networks I!UlSt be actively 
followed in this direction. 
In Paper No. 4, the USSR team of Riga Scientific 
Research Institute presented recent irrprovements 
for the performances of Cd-Te detectors. These 
very compact detectors, which do not require a 
cooling system, have attracted a very high 
interest for gamna spectranetry measurements in 
the fraireW:>rk of safeguards control. It is now 
indispensable to obtain quickly industrial 
detectors with a resolution consistent with the 
measurement needs. 
The last paper of this session presented the 
recent developrents on the calorimeter with 
the aim of reducing the measurement time of this 
technique which is always attractive by its very 
good accuracies for Plutonium mass 
determination. Progress has been significant 
and the evidence of preheating and reduction of 
the measurement time below tw::> hours makes the 
method acceptable for more safeguards 
applications. 
Session 5B: Measurement Techniques: 
Non-Destructive Assay II 
The session treated passive neutron coincidence 
techniques and, in particular, multiplicity 
theory and practice. The session (5B) was 
opened by Dr Hooton who gave a review of passive 
neutron coincidence techniques. The preparation 
of a review of this subject is a very positive 
initiative and it is hoped that it will be 
extended to other areas in safeguards. 
The second paper was that of Dr Krick who 
discussed tw::> different multiplicity counters 
737 
constructed at Los Alamos. He shc:wed that with 
very high efficiency counters ( > 50%) they were 
able to verify the plutonium mass to better than 
..2:. 2% for a wide range of masses and for 
pure and impure plutonium. Practical 
multiplicity counters are proposed which may 
well indicate the way forward for future 
measurement systems for the verification of 
large plutonium masses. 
A paper by Dr Carchon et al discussed an 
important step forward in the underwater 
verification of fresh LWR-IDX fuel elements. 
The paper discussed a passive neutron 
coincidence fork detector for underwater 
measurements. The detector is now available in 
Euratan Safeguards Directorate for inspection 
use. 
In addition there were tw::> papers fran the 
Soviet Union, the first from Dr Janjushkin 
contributed to the multiplicity analysis (he 
attached a program listing to his paper to 
encourage people to provide him with feedback). 
The second fran A K Gorabets et al investigated 
the effect of the moisture on plutonium 
measurements by neutron coincidence counting: 
measurement results and interpretation were 
given, in this area which is of high concern in 
safeguards. 
These last two contributions show that there a 
very significant amount of very interesting 
work being carried out in the Eastern bloc 
countries, which is a very encouraging sign. 
In total the session shcwed that in the area of 
passive neutron coincidence counting there is a 
great errphasis on making big irrprovements in 
existing techniques and trying new developrents, 
as is the case of multiplicity cotmters and time 
correlation analysis. 
Session 5C: Measurement Techniques: Non-
Destructive Assay III 
A demonstration was given on plutonium mass 
evaluation in spent fuel by passive neutron 
measurement, with a precision of about 3% and on 
fissile mass content evaluation by active 
neutron :rreasurements with a precision of about 
5%. The method presented is a reasonable 
alternative to the FORK detector, for systems 
that can be permanently installed in spent fuel 
storage pools. 
The developrent of a new thernru coincidence 
counter with a high efficiency, for general use 
in U/Pu facilities has been presented. 
Versatility and optimum performance were primary 
goals of this development. 
The utility of the application of different 
techniques, related to NDA measurements on small 
U/Pu samples in various fonns was described. 
Nee, r-ray spectroscopy and calorimetry 
measurerrent techniques were involved, on old and 
less well defined materials. 
Progress has been reported concerning the 
practical use of K-edge densitaneters for the 
verification of product solution in reprocessing 
plants. Accuracies of al:xlut 0. 2% - 0. 3% at 
concentration levels typical for product 
solutions were obtained. 
A paper was reported on the installation, the 
calibration, sample handling procedures and on 
the performance of a hybrid K-edge densitometer 
after 18 m:mths of routine operation. The 
technique has achieved a high degree of 
maturity. 
Session 6: C/S Posters 
In the Surveillance field it can be seen that: 
the transfer from film cameras to video 
techniques has been successfully achieved and 
the next stage in this area, namely the use of 
digital video looks to be very encouraging, with 
the capability to achieve automatic data 
reduction, on site review and easy transfer of 
data to headquarters. Euratan' s support and 
encouragerrent in these developrents deserves 
recognition. 
A further trend in the surveillance field was 
illustrated in the CONSULHA project with an 
integrated system using optical surveillance and 
NDA techniques to monitor nuclear material 
movements. Integrated systems became more 
feasible and more credible safeguards techniques 
and this trend will accelerate as a consequence 
of digital processing developrents. 
The limited contributions on seals technology 
could lead me to conclude that seals technology 
does not require further developrent and that 
all is well in this area. I cannot believe that 
to be the case. 
Comments on the C/S Session Although 
limited to only four papers, they all 
illustrated that significant technological 
advances are being made in C/S. These will 
ensure that lt will be possible to provide the 
assurance required in the future as C/S plays an 
increasingly important role in safeguards. 
The developrent of the I.J>SCO test and training 
facilities will enable C/S devices to be tested 
under lal:xlratory and simulated-field-conditions 
in order to evaluate their performance. 
Additionally, training facilities will be 
available for safeguards inspectors. There is 
the opportunity here to improve the interface 
between inspectors and developers. 
The two papers on integrated optical 
surveillance systems served to reinforce the 
comments made on the poster session concerning 
the major advances in surveillance recording and 
review techniques. 
It was interesting to hear that not only have 
the fortunes of the ultrasonic sealing bolt been 
revived but also to know that there are 
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encouraging signs concerning their performance 
in an operating environment. 
session 7: Spent Fuel Strategies 
The contributions to the Spent Fuel Session as 
well as for posters on the subject demonstrate 
clearly that Spent Fuel Strategies which do not 
take reprocessing into account already play a 
deceptive part in safeguards work today. 
Not only were design questions pertaining to a 
final repository discussed, but also the atterlq)t 
was made to undertake a diversion path analysis 
for final repositories on the basis of a 
probabilistic analysis. 
The paper presented on spent fuel conditioning 
discussed primarily systems-analytical questions 
especially the application of NDA and the 
introduction of so-called integrated 
verification systems. 
The topic of reprocessing featured in two 
contributions. The successful completion of the 
benchmark exercise, undertaken by the RIV 
Working Group demonstrated an excellent 
of the ICT with the data acquired analytically. 
With regard to input tank calibration it was 
reported that a considerable number of 
parameters still remain to be examined more 
closely before it can measure up to the standard 
achievable by analytical input determination. 
Session 8: Materials Accounting and Data 
Evaluation 
The papers presented in this session fell into 
three general classes: 
{1) those papers describing conventional 
accounting systems. 
( 2) papers that sought to use accountancy 
information to provide plant rnanagerrent and the 
international safeguards authorities with 
additional assurance. 
( 3) papers exploring ways of applying advanced 
mathematical techniques to the problem of 
retrieving as much information as possible fran 
a given data set. 
Conventional accountancy is following the 
developrent of canputer hardware and software :In 
a most encouraging manner, the larger systems 
taking advantage of developrents in operating 
systems and relational database managerrent 
whilst in the smaller systems IBM PCs and 
clones, dominate. Near real time nuclear 
materials accountancy has matured with little 
further work in the developrent of statistical 
tests, the erlq)hasis now being on the practical 
implerrentation of the technique. 
GAMMA AND X-RAY MEASUREMENT OF NUCLEAR 
MATERIAL CONCENTRATION AND QUANTITIES 
T. Dragnev, F. Grinevich, V. Rukhlo, D. Rundquist, J. Safar, E. Szabo 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria 
Abstract 
Gamma and X-ray spectrometric measurements of 
nuclear material concentrations and quantities are restricted 
because of the significant and unknown attenuation of 
gamma and X-ray radiations in the measured sample itself. 
However the measured gamma and X-ray spectra, used for 
isotopic composition determination contain also quantitative 
information about nuclear material concentrations and for 
"thin" samples, nuclear material quantities. The possibility 
to extract more information from the measured spectra has 
been successfully used for wide range of materials. Two 
methods are considered: 
i. The use of normalized intensity of self-excited X-rays 
in order to determine the corresponding nuclear material 
concentration [1, 2]. 
ii. Spectrometric Gamma Absorption Method (SGA), 
when different attenuation of gamma rays with different 
energies is used as a measure of their effective attenuation 
[3, 4, 5]; 
1. Introduction 
Nuclear radiation from nuclear materials excites 
X-rays radiation, which can be used to determine their 
concentrations - passive X-ray fluorescence analyses. The 
intensity of these X-rays is proportional to the total element 
concentration of the measured sample. However this 
intensity depends also on the intensities of exciting 
radiations, which are determined by the isotopic 
composition of the sample. As in most of the cases now, the 
main purpose of gamma and X-ray spectrometric 
measurements is to determine the isotopic composition of the 
measured sample, the same measurement can be used to 
normalize the intensity of self-excited X-rays and finally to 
determine the total element concentration of the measured 
sample as well. 
The second possibility to measure the total element 
concentration of nuclear materials is through intensity ratio 
measurements of gamma and X-rays with significantly 
different energies [3, 4, 5]. If the thickness of the measured 
sample in the direction of measured gamma and X-rays is 
smaller than the quasi-infinite thickness for corresponding 
energy this measurement can be used to determine the 
effective attenuation of gamma rays in the sample and total 
quantities of nuclear materials. 
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2. Gamma and X-ray Measurement of 
U-total Concentration and U-235 Enrichment 
This method is described in more details in IAEA 
report STR-264. 
The 98.44 KeV X-ray line is the strongest one in the 
measured spectra of low enriched U materials. Its intensity 
determination is relatively easy because the line is well 
isolated from other gamma and X-ray lines. Therefor the 
normalized intensity of the self-excited 98.44 KeV X-rays is 
used as a measure of U-total concentration. 
Only one measurement is required. The isotopic 
composition of the material and its radiations are determined 
by U-235 isotopic abundance (enrichment). The enrichment 
of the sample is determined either from the intensity of 
185.7 KeV gamma rays of U-235 - enrichment type of 
measurements, or through intrinsic calibration 
measurements. The determined value of the enrichment is 
used to normalize the intensity of 98.44 KeV X-rays. 
Simple linear dependence between the intensity of 
X-rays and corresponding U-235 enrichment or the intensity 
of 185.7 KeV gamma rays was established [2]. 
1(98.44) =KO* 1(185.7) + Kl (1) 
The same function is used for normalization. 
Parameters of the function are determined through 
measurements of suitable standards of materials with the 
same U-total concentration (e.g U metal samples), with 
different enrichments and under the same geometry of 
measurements. The used measure of U-total concentration is 
determined by equation (2): 
R = I(98.44)meas/(KO * 1(185.7) + Kl) (2) 
A second degree polynomial is used for the 
dependence of the U-total concentration C(U) as a function 
ofR: 
C(U) = KOO * R'··2 + KOl * R + K02 (3) 
Our restricted experience to date shows that this 
dependence (3) is very close to linear. The parameters of 
the equation (3) are determined using suitable standards with 
different concentrations values covering the range of 
measured concentrations. Measurements under reproducible 
geometry are required. It is recommended also (optionally) 
to measure the thickness (or at least the uniformity of the 
wall) of the container at the place where measured gamma 
and X-rays are passing, using an ultrasonic gauge. 
The results from concentration measurements done 
during our tests of the method are collected in table 1. We 
have measured four types of samples: four large U308 
(about 2 Kg) samples ; four small U308 (about 0.2 Kg) 
samples; five (1 Kg) enriched U02 standards; and five 
natural uranium concentration standards prepared in SAL 
(0.5 Kg). 
The four large U308 samples covering U-235 
enrichment range (0.2 - 20) % were used for 
determination of normalization function 
I(98)n = KO * 1(186) + Kl 
In this case it was for U308 samples with 84.8 % U-total 
concentration. Using this function the normalization values 
for all samples were calculated. The ratios of measured 
1(98) values divided by normalization I(98)n values are 
given in column 3. The average values for different 
materials and corresponding standard deviations are 
expected ones 
Table# 1 
U-total CONCENTRATION MEASUREMENT RESULTS 
SAMPLE Enr R Cum/Cuk 
U308(s) 0.708 0.9868 0.9809 
U308(s) 1.94 1.0006 0.9952 
U308(s) 2.95 1.0163 1.0123 
U308(s) 4.46 1.0219 1.0165 
Aver 1.0064 1.0012 
StDev(%) 1.37 1.42 
U308 0.225 1.0072 1.0005 
U308 0.708 0.9870 0.9754 
U308 3.105 1.0046 0.9968 
U308 19.82 0.9999 0.9945 
Aver 0.9997 0.9918 
StDev(%) 0.78 0.98 
U02 19.88 1.0343 0.9984 
U02 35.00 1.0317 0.9925 
U02 45.55 1.0375 1.0051 
U02 60.06 1.0382 1.0030 
U02 92.42 1.0407 1.0034 
Aver 1.0365 1.0005 
StDev(%) 0.31 0.46 
Cone 
ST-1 82.35 0.9830 1.0028 
ST-2 81.31 0.9726 1.0043 
ST-3 73.44 0.8775 0.9960 
ST-4 69.66 0.8307 0.9901 
ST-5 60.38 0.7393 1.0070 
Aver 1.0000 
StDev(%) 0.61 
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The concentration standards were used for 
determination of concentration calibration function. It can 
be seen from the data that in some cases even linear 
dependence can be a suitable function. Then this calibration 
function was used to determine concentrations of all of the 
measured samples. The results divided by known 
concentrations are presented in column 4. Again average 
values for the types of materials and standard deviations 
for single measurements are given. Particularly interesting 
are measurements of U02 materials from Ispra for two 
reasons: 
i. The U-total concentration of this material is 
significantly outside the range of concentrations of the 
materials used for calibration of concentration 
measurements. The U-235 enrichments of these samples 
are outside the range of the enrichments of the samples used 
for determination of normalization function. 
ii. These measurements were done in a different location 
and the calibration of concentration measurements from 
Vienna was used. 
In spite of these unfavorable conditions the measurement 
results are quite reasonable. 
One of the strong reasons for good results is the fact 
that the intensity ratios are used as measure of U-total 
concentration. This makes both measurements and analysis 
more reliable. 
The following conclusions are results from 
measurements in Seibersdorf IAEA Laboratory, where 
different mainly low enriched U materials have been 
measured and in PERLA Laboratory in Ispra, JRC, where 
mainly high enriched samples have been measured. 
i. The method is simple and reliable. The attainable 
accuracy for U-total concentration should be better than 
1 % RSD at the one sigma level. 
ii. The largest errors in the final results of these 
measurements and analyses (U enrichment and U-total 
concentration of the sample) usually come from the 
corrections for attenuation of gamma and X-rays in the 
wall of the measured material container. It is 
recommended to use gamma rays ratios for these corrections 
as general procedure, but it will be very useful to verify 
these measurements with a very simple ultrasonic gauge 
measurement of the container wall thickness at the 
measurement spot. 
3. Intrinsic Calibration Gamma and X-ray Measurement 
of Pu IsotQPic Composition and Pu-total Concentration 
This paragraph describes preliminary results of 
development of a new method, which we consider as 
important. 
Measurement of Pu-total concentration is of even 
more interest for international Safeguards, than U-total 
concentration. Pu is accounted in elemental quantities. If 
Pu-total concentration is measured then for homogeneous 
samples the weight of the sample determines the total 
quantity of Pu. Again the normalized intensity of self 
excited X-rays has to be used. However in this case the 
strong intensity of X-rays is in a complex cluster of other 
strong lines. This is the first feature of Pu concentration 
measurements. Until recently it was not possible to 
measure the intensity of the X-rays. Due to the significant 
improvements of both the available hardware (Ge detectors 
and new amplifiers) and the software (the pioneer work of 
R. Gunnink [7] for analyses of the X-ray region), recently 
we succeeded in developing a computer program which 
extracts the intensity of99.53 KeV X-rays ofPu reliably and 
accurately. This creates the possibility of a single 
measurement for both Pu isotopic composition and Pu total 
concentration. 
The second feature of Pu concentration measurements 
is that the isotopic composition of Pu-Am-241 spectrum is 
much more complicated. Even more complicated is the 
spectrum of the Mixed Oxide ( MOX) materials. Naturally 
its influence on Pu X-ray intensity is more complicated than 
in the case of U materials. Fortunately not all of Pu 
isotopes emit intensive radiations exciting Pu X-rays. The 
contribution of Pu-242 e.g. is definitely negligible. The 
specific exciting power of Pu-241 (exciting power per 
percent Pu-241 abundance) is by far the most significant. 
For high bumup Pu materials the total contribution of Pu-
241 is in the range of 90 % from the total exciting power of 
all isotopes. As in addition it is relatively easy to measure 
Pu isotopic ratios with high precision it is possible to 
determine the normalization function with high precision. 
The third feature of Pu concentration measurements 
is that the intensities of its gamma and X-rays in X-ray 
energy region are very strong. The Overall Relative 
Efficiency Dependence (ORED) on gamma and X-ray 
energies ORED(En) in this region is determined very 
precisely. Fortunately very close by in energy to the 
99.53 KeV X-rays is the strong 101.07 KeV Np X-rays 
which is excited directly by Pu-241 and Am-241 decays. 
The contribution of Am-241 is equal to about 0.1 multiplied 
by Am241/Pu241 ratio. Therefor the intensity of this line, 
after small well known corrections accurately represents the 
Pu-241 abundance of the measured sample. And corrected 
ratio of 99.53 KeV line to 101.07 Kev line is a measure of 
the Pu-total concentration measured by intrinsic calibration 
method. 
R = K * 1(99.53) *Cl + .101 * R6) * ORE0(101.07) (4) 
1(101.07)*(1 +KS+R1 +K9*R2+KO*R3+K6*R6)*0RED(99.53) 
Where Rl is N(Pu238)/N(Pu241) isotopic ratio 
R2 is N(Pu239)/N(Pu241) isotopic ratio 
R3 is N(Pu240)/N(Pu241) isotopic ratio and 
R6 is N(Am241)/N(Pu241) isotopic ratio 
K8, K9, KO, K6 are corresponding coefficient 
determined through measurements of 
standards. 
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Initial results from laboratory measurements 
demonstrated that the precision of these measurements can 
be in the order of 0.2 % - one sigma relative standard 
deviation for single measurements. 
4. Simple, Reliable and Accurate NDA Method for 
Measurement of U-235 and U-total Quantities 
in MTR Fuel Assemblies 
This method is described in more details in IAEA 
report STR-263. 
The following features of the MTR fuel assemblies to 
be measured have to be taken into account, when 
considering suitable methods for measurements of U-
235 and U-total quantities: 
i. Material Test Reactor (MTR) fuel assemblies are 
large size items, length about 60 cm. and width about 10 
cm, of highly enriched uranium (enrichment 20- 93 %), 
but the quantity of nuclear material per unit length of 
fuel assembly and its area density (projection on the 
plane passing through the axes of fuel assembly) is 
relatively small (about 0.5 grams per cm"'2 ). Most of 
U-235 gamma rays and U X-rays emitted by the assembly's 
nuclear material escape it without severe attenuation. 
ii. There are several types of MTR fuel assemblies: 
parallel plates elements, concentric cylindrical elements, 
concentric square cross section elements and some 
variations of these types. 
iii. It is difficult to have the range of suitable standards 
(the same type,size quantity and enrichment of nuclear 
material, cladding and so on) required for direct calibration 
of the measurements. 
There are two existing methods of measurement ofU-
235 quantity and one method of measuring U-total quantity. 
a. Gamma spectrometric measurements of U-235 
quantity using the intensity of 186 KeV gamma-rays 
and gamma rays absorption measurements of U-total 
quantity, using the intensity attenuation of 186 KeV 
gamma rays from external assembly, by the measured 
assembly [8]. Because of the size of measured assembly 
another fuel assembly is used as a source of irradiating 
gamma rays. For U-total quantity measurements by this 
method three measurements are required: 
i. "source gamma rays" assembly alone; 
ii. measured assembly alone; and 
iii. both fuel assemblies together. 
Making three measurements is not convenient. In 
addition differential measurements are not generally 
accurate. These type of attenuation measurements are not 
applicable for some type e.g. cylindrical fuel assemblies. 
The direct measurement of U-235 quantity 
through intensity measurement of 186 KeV gamma rays is 
more convenient when there are suitable standards for 
calibration, or other methods of taking into account the 
attenuation of gamma ray intensity by the material of the 
sample itself. However, the self attenuation measurement of 
186 KeY gammas can be difficult. 
b. Active neutron coincidence measurements [9]. 
Measurement of induced fission rate of U-235 
nuclei through neutron coincidence counting rate 
measurements using Active Well Neutron Coincidence 
Counter. In this case: 
Only U-235 quantity can be measured relatively 
conveniently. 
Because of the large size of MTR fuel assembly only 
part of it can be measured at once. This 
complicates measurements and makes them less 
accurate. 
Because gamma-ray, passive X-ray fluorescent 
and spectrometric intrinsic absorption measurement, when 
performed in a single measurement is significantly 
simpler, and potentially more reliable and accurate, there 
is little justification to use more complicated active 
neutron measurements for MTR type of fuel 
assemblies. 
We propose a new method of direct measurement of 
the intensity attenuation of the gamma rays used for 
measurement ofU-235 and U-total quantities. The intensity 
ratio of two strong gamma ray fluxes with significantly 
different energies is an precise measure of the effective 
attenuation of gamma rays by the measured sample. 
The proposed method is to use the ratio of intensities 
of 186 KeY to 144 KeY gamma rays of U-235 as a 
measure of the effective attenuation of 186 KeY gamma 
rays intensity by the assembly material on their way to 
the detector. The 98.4 KeY X-rays to 185.7 Kev gamma 
rays intensities ratio can be used as additional useful 
(redundant) measure of U total quantity and 186 KeY 
intensity attenuation. 
The reasons to propose this method are: 
i. There is large difference in mass attenuation 
coefficients of 186 KeY (1.516 cm"'2/g) and 144 KeY 
(2.869 cm"'2/g) gamma rays in the uranium material of 
the assembly and their ratio is a sensitive and precise 
measure of 186 KeY gamma rays attenuation- see fig 1. 
ii. This ratio can be calculated accurately using 
suitable model and numerical integration calculations 
using in addition some parameters from measurements of 
similar standards - see fig 2. 
iii. The 98.4 K U-X rays are emitted by, and 
characteristic, for all U atoms. The intensity of this 
fluorescence line is a reliable quantitative measure of 
uranium presence. 
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iv. The values of mass attenuation coefficients of 98.4 
KeY X-rays and 186 KeY gamma rays in U materials are 
close. So the ratio of intensities of these two lines is also 
a measure of U-total quantity, area density, and effective 
attenuation properties of the whole assembly for 186 KeY 
gamma rays. 
The measurement geometry should be such that 
registered gamma and X-rays pass the measured assembly 
by the shortest way. As the thickness of the material in this 
direction is significantly less than corresponding quasi 
infinite thicknesses, the intensities of gamma rays with 
energies higher than 84.2 KeY gamma rays depends 
strongly from the quantity of U-235 and U. Naturally from 
U-235 gamma rays the intensity of 186 KeY gamma rays 
was used as a measure of U-235 quantity. The 
corresponding equation is: 
M235 = K235 * 1(186) * Ka(Rg) (5) 
where 1(186) is the measured intensity of 185.7 (186) KeY 
gamma rays; 
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K235 is a calibration coefficient determined mainly 
by geometry of measurements and the efficiency of 
the used detector; 
Ka(Rg) is a calibration function determined by 
the effective attenuation of 186 KeY gamma rays by 
the material of the measured assembly. For the 
method of measurements it is very important that 
Ka(Rg) is a simple function of the intensity ratio of 
186 KeY and 144 KeY gamma rays of U-235; 
M235 is total quantity of U-235. 
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Figure 3 
Calibration function Ka(Rg) can be determined 
using suitable standards or through numerical integration 
calculations. Calculated calibration attenuation function is 
shown on fig 3. Suitable function for interpretation of the 
calibration data is: 
Ka = AO + AI * Rg + A2 * Rg (6) 
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Coefficients AO , AI , A2 are determined by 
calibration with suitable standards or by standards and 
calculations with computer programs based on models of 
measured and standard assemblies. We have developed such 
programs for parallel plates fuel assemblies and cylindrical 
assemblies. . 
As the intensity of 98.4 KeY U X-rays depends 
strongly on U concentration, and coefficients of 
attenuation of 98.4 KeY X-rays and 186 Kev gamma rays 
in U are practically equal, the total mass of U and the 
calibration function are simple functions of the intensity 
ratio Rx (Rx = 1(98.4)/1(186)) values: 
Ka(Rx) = BO + Bl * Rx + B2 * Rx"'2 (7) 
.M235 = K * 1(186) * Ka(Rx) (8) 
For samples with equal enrichment the total quantity 
of U is proportional to the total quantity of U-235. So 
the equations for total U will have the same general 
appearance: 
Mu = Ku * 1(186) * Ka(Rg) 
Mu = Ku * 1(186) * Ka(Rx) 
(9) 
(10) 
Ku is a calibration coefficient for determination of 
U-total; 
Ka(Rg) and Ka(Rx) are above described 
calibration functions determined by effective attenuation 
of 186 Kev gamma rays in the material of measured 
assembly; 
Mu is the quantity of U-total in the assembly. 
The calibration constants Ku and calibration functions 
Ka(Rg) and Ka(Rx), which are functions correspondingly 
of Rg and Rx can be determined using the results of 
measurements of suitable standards or results of computer 
calculations using corresponding models and programs. 
Calibration functions Ka(Rg) and Ka(Rx) are similar 
but different functions. Calculation of the function Ka(Rx) 
is a more difficult task. At present it is more reliable to 
determine this function using suitable standards. 
Calibration and Measurements 
Calibration and measurements of parallel plates type 
of MTR fuel assemblies were done in Scibcrsdorf 
Safeguards Laboratory of IAEA. The available standard 
assembly was used for these measurements. The assembly 
is dismountable so it was possible to prepare many different 
combinations of plates in order to simulate different 
assemblies and to establish corresponding calibration 
functions. The length of plates is 60 cm, the width is 10 
cm and they have slightly different but well known 
quantities of U, about 12 grams per plate of 80 % 
enriched U. 
Having dimensions of the plates and assembly we have 
developed also a suitable model and computer program using 
numerical integration calculations. During the 
measurements of different "assemblies" the center of mass 
always was on the same distance from the front edge of 
the Ge detector. 
In order to take into account the effective distance 
between the front edge of the detector and effective location 
of detected gamma-rays, special measurements were 
done. Using point multiple energy source and 
measurements at two different distances it was possible 
to determine the effective distances of detecting gamma 
rays with different energies. The parallel 
measurements and calculations of well known samples 
help to fix more accurately some of the parameters of 
calculations, particularly the effective detector efficiencies 
for different gamma and X-rays energies. As illustration 
of calculations and measurement precision part of the 
results are shown in table 2. 
The first row of the table shows number of plates 
in assembly. The second row shows corresponding ratios 
of calculated to measured ratios of the 186 KeY intensities 
from the corresponding i- number of plates to the intensity 
from 7 plates. 
Table# 2 
No. of plates 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
(il/17)c/ 1.001 1.002 1.010 1.007 1.006 1.004 1.004 
(lil17)m 
As one can see from the table the agreement 
between the two groups of data - calculated and measured 
is quite good (differences are smaller than 1% ). 
Measurements of the U-235 and U-total quantities of 
cylindrical MTR fuel assemblies were done by IAEA 
inspectors in another country. Suitable standards were 
not available. The results from the calibration in 
Vienna and numerical integration calculations were used 
in order to take into account differences between standard 
and measured fuel assemblies on the site. The 
necessary model and corresponding program for 
cylindrical type of MTR fuel assemblies with 
corresponding sizes and parameters have been developed. 
Because the measurement system and particularly the 
detector were the same for standard and measured fuel 
assemblies the calculations effective efficiencies were the 
same. The results of calculations were very close to the 
measurement results. Differences were below 1 %. 
Particularly careful measurements have been done on 
one of the assemblies. It has been accurately characterized 
and now is used as a secondary standard. 
Having all these data and a secondary standard the 
standard procedure for routine safeguards measurements 
and corresponding computer programs for this type of 
MTR fuel assemblies have been prepared. 
The procedure is based on recalibration 
measurements on the secondary standard. The measured 
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spectrum is processed by the program F-CAL.BAS and 
it creates two small calibration flies. One for energy 
calibration and second one for quantitative measurements 
of U-total and U-235 quantities. These files are generated 
at each new calibration. 
The second program F.BAS automatically process the 
spectrum of the measured assembly and using calibration 
files determines U-235 and U-total quantities. 
Results of the analysis including energy resolution of 
the system - FWHM(l86) areas of corresponding gamma 
and X-rays and their ratios date and time of analysis are 
shown on the computer screen and recorded as a new 
result flle with the same main name and extension "res". 
Calibration measurements normally are done only 
once for given measurement system and type of 
samples. However if there is significant difference 
between measured and facility results calibration 
measurements should be repeated. 
All results including measured spectra are recorded 
on magnetic cassettes and floppy disks, for additional 
analysis if required. 
Some of the results of the last series of measurements 
are shown in table 3. In this case all measured assemblies 
were of the same cylindrical type. This allow some 
additional analysis to be done and to determine the overall 
precision of the measurements. In evaluating these results 
one should take into account that they are just routine field 
measurements. Attainable accuracy would be better. 
Table# 3 
Code Rg U5m/U5k Utm/Utk 
FG63 4.991 1.0022 1.0043 
FG64 5.043 0.9986 I.OOll 
FG73 4.912 0.99ll 0.99ll 
FG74 4.924 0.9903 0.9840 
FG133 4.959 1.0162 1.0031 
FG135 4.989 0.9985 0.9988 
FG140 4.944 0.9937 0.9903 
FG142 5.002 1.0076 1.0274 
Aver 4.970 0.9998 1.0000 
StDev(%) 0.88 0.88 1.32 
The method has some general feature. It unites 
gamma spectrometric, passive X-ray fluorescence and 
spectrometric intrinsic absorption measurements. An 
important part of the method are precise models and 
computer programs for numerical integration calculations 
of gamma spectrometric measurements. 
The method has the following advantages: 
i. It is very reliable - a series of U-235 gamma rays 
are used for measurement of U-235, and U-total. They 
are characterized quantitatively by intensities and intensity 
ratios ofU K-X rays and U-235 gamma rays, so there are no 
possibilities for substitution of nuclear material; 
ii. The method is accurate. It unites possibilities of 
IAEA certified standards with possibilities of computational 
methods in order to take into account differences 
between standards and measured assemblies; 
m. The method is easy to use. It is passive, i.e. 
radioactive sources are not needed. Only one measurement 
is required in order to determine U-235 and U-total 
quantities. Processing of the spectra and all data is 
computerized. 
The procedures for measurements of U-235 and U-
total quantities in parallel plates and cylindrical types of 
MTR fuel assemblies have been prepared, tested and 
used by inspectors. The corresponding computer 
programs have been tested and used. This includes also 
special computational programs based on nuclear material 
item modeling and numerical integration 
calculations. Some of parameters used for calculations 
have been determined using measurements of standards. 
5. Gamma Spectrometric Measurements of Pu-total 
Quantities in Solid Waste. Ash Samples 
and Rinse Solutions 
Another good example of total Pu measurements by 
SGA method is measurement of Pu-total quantities in solid 
waste, contained in 30 !iter drums, ash samples and rinse 
solutions. This method was described in details in IAEA 
report STR-56. 
The intensity of 414 KeV gamma rays was used for 
quantitative measurement of Pu. The ratio of measured 
intensities of 414 KeV to 129 KeV gamma rays of Pu-239 
are used as a quantitative measure of the effective attenuation 
of 414 KeV gamma rays by the measured sample itself. On 
site prepared working standards were used to calibrate the 
measurement system. The results of the NDA gamma 
measurements lie between the results of two destructive 
analyses results, which were available much later. 
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